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1 

2 

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6 

Omrfesfo/t  re/fresf^i^s  /^wifp/z^fAm 
Sout/fc/7f  SM^s  r 


'^m 


BATTLES 


Ol-  THE 


AMERICAN  REVOLUTION. 


1775-1  781. 


HISTORICAL  AND   MILITARY   CRITICISM, 

wirii 

TOPOGRAPHICAL  ILLUSTRATION 


JUSTiriA   ET  PltJETEREA   NIL. 


BY 


HENRY   B.   CARRINGTON,   M.A.,   LL.D., 

COLONEL   UNITED  STATES   AKMY, 
raOFE£SOI!  OF   MIL.TART   SC.ENfE   AND   DYNAMIC    ENG 

.STATE  OP  INDIANA,   UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 


.Vc 


INEEKING,   V.  ADAUU  COLLEOB,         NO 


^ 


o 


<6^ 


FOriiTII   THOUSAND. 


( 


u 


S.     BARNES      &      COMPANY, 
NEW  YORK,  CHICAGO,  NEW  ORLEANS. 


5     3       .        »  ,  i  ^    1    > 


S^lii'ftfeAi  ' 


COPYUIGIIT,  18r*;.  A.  S.  BARNES  &  CO. 


(•  ,,  *■      i      ' 


.  *  *  • 


■     • 


«  .         •  •  • 


r   o'     t    c        e 


PERSONAL    TRIBUTE. 

THIS   VOLUME,   VViriCIt    SKIKS   TO    INKITKI-    FRKSII    INTF.RKST    IN   TME   rRINClI'LES   WHICH 

UNDERLIE 

N  A  T  I  O  N  A  L    DEFENSE, 

AVI'    TO    ILLUSTRAIK    IlIosK    I'lUNCII'I.ES    I!V    REFERENCE   TO    THE  WAR    EOll    AMERICAN 

INUEI'ENDENCE, 

IS,    I!Y    I'ERMISSIDN,    DEDICATED 

TO 

W  I  L  T.  I  A  M     T  .     SHERMAN, 


GENKRAL  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


'^*«<i;w'a?te..v, 


I    i 


ArTllOR'S  PRi:i'ACB  TO  FOURTH  lilJlTlON. 


To  THE  Public  : 

"  Fonblaiiquc's  Burgoync"  >v;is  carefully  read  while  the  first 
c'Utioii  of  this  volume  was  in  press,  without  occasion  to  make  any 
changes.  All  essential  tlata  referred  to  had  l)een  considered  and 
weighed. 

A  suggestion  oi  Mr.  Hancroft  incorporated  in  the  present  edition, 
bears  upon  the  c|uestion  of  .Vrnold's  presence  at  the  Hattle  of  I'Vee- 
n.an's  Farm.  It  is  to  be  interpreted  with  the  text  and  authorities 
cited.     (See  notes,  pages  344,  354  and  663). 

The  valuable  work  of  Mr.  \V.  L.  Stone,  upon  the  campaigns  of 
ikirgoyiie  and  .St.  Leger,  has  since  appeared.  Mr.  Stone  writes  that 
tile  original  plan,  as  stated  t)\-  (ieneral  Riedesel,  was  to  send  I.ieii- 
tenant-colonel  liauni  directly  from  fort  .\nn  to  Bennington,  but  that 
the  march  is  correctly  established  by  this  text.  The  ma[)  ])ublished 
in  Harpei's  Magazine  for  October,  1S77,  is  therefore  incorrect. 

The  Brooklyn  Historical  .Society  are  still  making  the  Battle  of 
Long  Island  a  specialty;  and  similar  societies  in  other  .States  are 
gathering  all  possible  data  that  may  illustrate  their  battle-history. 

The  author  wishes  to  avail  himself  of  all  authentic  documents 
which  may  be  brought  out,  to  modify  text  or  maps,  so  as  to  realize 
a  substantial  record  of  the  War  of  1775-17S1-3.  Thus  fir,  with  the 
few  typographical  crors  corrected,  the  te.xt  has  anticipated  the  battle 
celebrations  in  all  material  data. 

It  may  not  be  too  much  to  ask  that  readers  will  apply  to  the 
study  of  the  facts,  the  general  elements  of  military  science,  which 
are  laid  down  in  the  introductory  chapters.  They  reflect  accepted 
principles  which  have  the  approval  of  t':.  vicneral  of  the  American 
Army  and  of  Colonel  llamley  of  tlv:  Queen's  .Staff  College,  Kngland. 


■v;i'*,».^«hy^/ 


CONTENTS. 


I. 

II.- 
III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

vnr. 

IX. 

X. 

XI.- 

XII. 

XIII.- 

XIV. 

XV.- 

XVI.- 

XVII. 

XVIIl. 

XIX.- 

XX 

XXI. 

XXII.- 

XXIII. 

XXIV.- 

xx\.- 

XXVI.- 

XXVII.- 

XXVIII.- 

XXIX. 

XXX. 

XXXI. 

XXXII. 

XXXIII.- 

XXXIV. 

XXXV. 


-The  Revolutionary  Epoch 

-Lexington  .ind  Concord.     Their  Lessons .      .  .  .  . 

-Military  .Science  tlie  Key  to  Military  History 

-.■\poloi,'y  f(>r  the  Military  ,\rt 

-Wars  between  Nations.  . » 

-Civil  Vvar.    Distinction  between  Insurrection,  Rcljcllion  and  Revolution. 

-Providence  in  Wc.r  iiiastrated 

-Statesmanship  in  War  illustrated .  -        

-Principles  defined.     .Strategy  illustrated 

-Strategy  i  n  War  continued 

-Grand  Tactics  illustrated 

— Logistics ". 

-Miscellaneous  Considerations 

-The  Hour  of  Preparation 

-Hunker  Hill.     The  Occupation 

"  "  "    Preparation 

-      "  "  "    Battle 

-Daitle  of  Bunker  Hill.    Notes 

-The  Northern  Campaign.     Preliminary  Operations 

-Expeditions  to  Quebec  and  Montreal.      Their  X'alue 

-The  Assault  upon  Quebec 

-Campaign  of  1775.     Brief  Mention 

-Campaign  of  1776.     Boston  evacuated.     Concurrent  Events 

-Washington  at  New  Vork,     April  to  July,  1776 

-American  Army  driven  from  Canada 

-British  Preparations.     Clinton's  Expedition  unfolded , 

-The  Republic  of  South  Carolina.     Preparations  for  Defense 

-Clinton's  Expedition.     Attack  on  Fort  Moultrie 

-The  two  armies  in  July  and  August,  1776   

-Battle  of  Long  Island.     Preparations  

-Battle  of  Long  island , 

-Retreut  from  Long  Island , , 

-The  American  Army  retires  from  New  Vork 

-Harlem  Heights  and  Vicinity,  1 776 , 

-Operations  near  New  Vork.  White  Plains,  ("hatterton  Hill 


vi 


CONI'KN  IS. 


'I 


tt 


PAni< 

\X.\V[.- Opi-nilioiis  lie. ir  New  \'. irk.     Wliito  I'l.iins  1.)  Fort  Wiishinston 343 

XXXVII. —  fLiiis  ami  CiHiMuT  I'l.iiis.      Fort  \Vii>.liiiii;toi'  to  rroiitoil    254 

\X\VIII.--\V:i;,liiuj;li)n  returns  the  Oflciisivc.     'I'reiiloii  his  lirst  Cthjeclive i().\ 

XXXIX, —  Hessians  surprised  at  Trenton a;.) 

XL. —  Mis<ellaneons    Fveiits.       \Vavhin^;li)ii  ilnlhed    with    IViwers   i<(  Diclalor. 

( t|iiniiins  of  Treiil'in 27s 

XI. I. —  1  loin  I'rineeloM  to  .Mi 
Xl.ll. —  Minor  l!venl>..      l.\nu.irv  to  July,  1777. 
XLIII. —  Ilinj^oMU'',  (anip.ii^n  npennl,  1777.  .  . 

X  I, IV. —  I'loni   lieonilero^a  to  I'ort  Fclwar'l,  1777 313 

.\I.\'.   -I'l'it  .^ehiiyler,  Oris 
X;  \'l.~  ILuilcof  I'Veenian's  l'"ain). 
XI.VII.— I' 
Xl.N'IlI. — t  inilon's  Hxpeilition  u|i  the  Hudson,     Capture  ol  I  oris  Clinton  and  .Mont- 


l  he  A-,>.inpinU  .ind  I'l  inceton  , 


•J94 
3<>.T 


and 


lenuMii^ton,  1777 32a 

335 

Heij;l\ts,  liurgoyne's  Surrender,  1777 345 


j;oniery. 


355 


XI.l.X.  —  \!(iM-NU'iit  on  rhil.iilelphia.     iMoni  .\e\v  Ndik  t'>  the  Mrandywinc,  1777.  .    3(>2 

I,. —  ll.illle  of  liiandyw'inr 3()() 

LI.— ( )p(Malions  neai  rhiiadriphi.i.      I'l.illle  of  ( lerniantown,  1777 382 

I. II. —         "  "  "  .Minor  Meniion,    Clo^eof Campaign,  1777.   39.' 

LIII,-  "  "  "  I''roni  Januai)  to  lunr,  177.-..    X'aliey  I''oryr. 

liarren  1 1  ill 401 

Ll\.— I'l-oin  riiiladelphi.i  t'l  .Monniouili.      .Monmouth  .md  \ieinily,  177S 412 

I.\'. —  Preparations  for  the  liattle  of  .Nlonmoulh,  177S 422 

l.\l. — The  I'atlle  of  Monmouth    '77"! 433 

L\II. — Lroni  .Monnunith  to  N'e      I'ork.     .Sii'L;e  of  Newport,     t.'oneurient  Lvenls..  4.(f) 

L\  1 11. — C.uniiai,i.;n  of  177S,  July  (o  Heeemlier 4s" 

'IN. — J.muary  to  July,  1779.     I'o--ition  of  the  .\rmie>.     Ineidcnt>  of  tlie  y;cneral 

("ampaign 463 

I.X  — July  to  Deeember,  1771).     iK'solating  Ineursion^.     Minor  Mention 468 

LXI. — ^iege  of  .Savannah.     (  uneral  Clinton  sails  for  Cliarl.'^tjri,  177  1 477 

LXH,--j,ininr\  to  July,  17^0.    Condition  of  the  .\rniies 485 

LXIII. — South  Carolina  ami  New  Jersey  invaded.     Siege  i<i  Charle-ion.     l.altle 

of  S]iringrield,  I7.'>u 493 

I..NIV. —  Frenth  .Auxili.iries.     .\rnold's  Treason.     Southern  Skirmishes,  17.^0    ...   503 
LXV.-— liattle  of  Camden.     King"-  Mountain.     Position  of  Southern  Armies  ....    513 
I  X\'I.— Minor  Mi-ntion,  l7"io.       I'nropean  Coalition  against  I'ligland.     Ceneral 

(ireene  at  the  South 523 

t.N\  II. — Condition  ofSoulhern  afl'airs.      Mnliny.it  the  Norlh.     (  Iperations  of  Cen- 

erals  Creene  and  Cornwallis.      ISatlle  of  t  'owpens 534 

,.\\TII. — From  Cowpens  to  Ciuilford  Cmirt  House.      Manoaivers  of  the  Armies.  .  .  .    547 

LXIX. — Battle  of  (luilh/rd  Court  I  lousC 556 

1..XX. — Southern  Campaign,     liatlle  of  Ilohkirk  Hill   566 

I, XXI. —  Hattle  of  ]'',utaw  Sjuings.    Closing  F'.vents  of  Southern  Campaign,  I7.'!i. 

I'artis.m  Warfare 577 

I  .\.\1I. —  l.a  Fayette's  X'irginia  (.'ampaign.     Condition  of  the  two  armies 584 

I  NX  II  I.—  I.. I  Fayette  and  Cornwallis  in  \irgiida 59^ 

CN'NI\'. — W'.ishington  and  koihamheau.    .\rnold  at  New  London.     l''ri:m  the  Hud- 
son to  N'orktou  n    61 7 

L.N.N  V. — Siege  of  Vorktou  11.    Surrender  of  Coni\\  uUis.    Close  of  Campaign,  17S1.   631 
LXXX'L— Coiielusion.  .  . 647 


TOPOGRAPIirCAL    ILLUSTRATIONS. 


1. 

3. 

3. 
4 

5, 
<i. 

7* 
8. 

10. 
1 1. 

14- 

•  > 
1(1, 

I". 
18. 
19, 
20, 

31, 

24. 

25. 

■2(,. 


-Outline  nf  All 
-liatllf  (if  I'.iinl 


:inlic-  (  oast. 


i'V 


Hill. 


—  Sici;l'  111  (jtui-licc  .  .  . 

—  lio.slim  ami  N'iciuiu 


-(  »|ii  lalkiii.s  ill  Ciiiaila. 
-Ilalllc  of  Lone;   l-laiul. 


-.\\ 


'a|iUiio  of  l''<iit  \\',i-liiiiL;toii 


— 'rroiiloii  and  \ 


—  1' 


iTiitiiii  an 


1  I'vin. 


-( iirL'ratinii,  in  New  j 
-  r.iirt;^ 


IT- 


dviu' s  Saratoga  L-impaiirn 


liilie  of  I[iil)1iai,'i 


on 


.'iinintlloii 


iciinan  h 


I'arni 


innis  1  lii'^nts 


— SuircnilLT  of  lUni;ovnf 

—  ('aplnrc  of  i*'orts  (linlr 

—  llallli'  of  I'll' imh  u  inc 

—  '       "    (Icrinanlovv  n 


-C>iii'ralions  on  tin-  Dilauan 


M 


onmoincrv 


-Ki 


uampnu'ii 


avetli;  a 


'liilatlcl|iliia 
t  al  X'aili'V  |-'oi;,'c 
t  I'larrcMi    Hill. .  . 


-La  V  _ 

— liattle  of  Monnioiuh 


—Si 


cge 


if  N 


cuport. 


Savannah. . 
(.'liaiK-ston. 


.— 15atllu  of  S 


prin^lu'ld 


-Omli 


Ma 


)f  111 


. — I'altle  of  Camden 

I. — Arnold  at  Richmond  and  IV'tcrslniu 


-liatlle  of  Coupe 


pens. 


28 

2() 

30 

31 

32 

33-- 

34. — C'peralions  in  Soiilhein  States 

35 
36.—     " 

37- — 

38, — 0]ieiations  m  L,liesapei.n.e 

39. — l-a  Fayette  in  Virginia  .  . 

4a 

41. — Siege  of  Yorktown 


on  Ki'-er,  I  liglilands 


I, — liaiile  of  Ciuilfoiil 
Holikiik 
Kutaw  S| 
Chi 


Hi 


irmu 


Bay 


i  — T!enedict  Arnold  at  New  London 


KkOMISPtKC'R 

lli)%vs  page  I II 

"  13- 

"  154 

"  i6() 

"  2i:^ 

"  253 

"  261J 

"  277 

"  302 

"  312 

"    "  321 

"  334 

"  344 

"  349 

"  354 

"  361 

"  3S1 

"  391 

"  395 

"  3')^ 
401 

■'  4"7 

"  445 

■'  456 

"  4^3 

"  407 

"    "  502 

52.' 

"  533 

"  54<J 

'•  55C' 

■•  51,5 

"  575 

"  582 

"  59(3 

"  616 

"  f.zg 

"  .  "  645 


I 

I  ' 

I? 


i\ 


n 


GREETING. 


IT  is  eminently  proper  that  an  effort  to  give  fresh  distinctness  to 
facts  and  principles  should  be  introduced  to  the  public  by  some 
outline  of  the  method  adopted. 

The  author  has  accepted  the  reports  of  commanding  officers  as  to 
all  matters  peculiarly  within  their  personal  knowledge,  unless  some 
serious  conflict  of  opinion,  or  marked  discrepancy  in  statements  of 
fact,  has  compelled  resort  to  other  authority. 

Anecdotes,  whether  authentic  or  traditional,  as  well  as  incidents 
affecting  the  personal  habits  or  life,  of  officers  engaged  in  the  Revolu- 
tionary War,  are  excluded  from  consideration.  So  long  as  military 
negligence,  errors  of  judgment,  or  of  execution,  and  incompetency, 
or  the  correlative  excellencies,  can  be  determined  from  operations  and 
results,  without  the  introduction  of  special  criticism,  it  has  been  more 
agreeable  to  the  author,  and  more  consonant  with  the  spirit  of  this 
undertaking,  to  submit  all  issues  to  that  simple  test. 

The  Bibliographical  Table,  at  the  end  of  the  volume,  embraces  the 
list  of  authors  consulted. 

No  statements  of  fact  have  been  made  without  responsible 
authority. 

No  map  has  been  completed  without  the  careful  study  of  those 
heretofore  published,  and  of  many  never  in  print  at  all,  and  a  personal 
examination  of  the  battle-fields,  or  consultation  with  those  who  have 
made  such  examination. 

In  the  correction  of  river  courses,  as  in  the  "  Plan  of  the  Battle  of 
Monmouth,"  reference  has  been  made  to  modern  atlases  and  actual 
Hurveys,  geological  or  otherwise. 

The  delineation  of  surface  is  not  designed  to  furnish  a  technical 
ftacincss  of  detail,  but  aims  to  so  impress  the  reader  with  the  objective 
of  the  text,  that  there  may  be  that  real  recognition  of  the  battle-fields 
and  battle  movements  which  topographical  illustration  alone  can 
supply. 


GREETING. 


.'77: 


The  iiiduccincnts  which  led  the  aiitlior  to  preface  tlic  historical 
record  with  simple  outlines  of  military  science  are  elsewhere  stated. 

While  it  has  appeared  hist  to  avoid  technical  terms  as  a  c^eneral 
rule,  there  has  been  ever  present,  as  the  prime  incentive  to  the  whole 
work,  the  assurance  that  the  education  of  the  times,  and  the  depend- 
ence of  all  aulhorit)-  upon  the  people  for  its  ultimate  protection, 
enforce  upon  the  people  the  consideration  of  military  principles,  as 
well  as  of  military  history.  A  nation  which  \alues  a  patriotic  record, 
and  has  the  nerve  to  sustain  that  record,  is  never  harmed  by  an  intel- 
lij^ent  idea  of  '•  Tlu'  ])rinciples  which  underlie  the  national  defence." 
The  dedication  of  this  volume  is  therefore  the  key  to  its  mission. 

The  inijiulse  wlu'eh  started  this  x'cnture  u[)on  the  sea  of  thou^^ht 
h.is  trained  fresh  breath  t'rom  the  sympatli}-  of  scholar  and  soldier, 
riie  words  of  Bancroft,  Woolsey,  Day,  Evarts,  Brinsmade  aud  Crane, 
and  of  Generals  Sherman,  Townsend,  and  Humphreys,  have  imparted 
eourai;e,  as  well  .is  zest,  to  both  study  and  execution. 

If  nothin;^  new  has  been  e\ol\ed  out  of  fresh  readinL;s  of  many 
•luthtirs,  there  will  be  ///is  satisfaction  to  the  citizen  or  stran;^'er- — thar 
the  suijstantial  issues  of  arms  which  marked  the  war  of  American 
Revolution  ha\e  been  C(im])ressed  into  a  sin;^le  volume;  that  th.c 
topoj^raphicai  illustrations  are  in  harmon)'  with  all  fiir  historical 
narratives  of  that  war,  and  that  they  so  reconcile  the  reports  of 
opposiiiL^  commanders  as  to  gi\e  some  intelligible  idea  of  the  battle- 
issues  themselves. 

It  would  be  indeed  rude  not  to  thank  the  British  and  French 
authorities,  American  T.e^^ations  abroad,  and  manv  en'.itnnt  scholars 
of  both  countries,  as  well  as  L,'ent!emen  in  charoe  of  American  public 
libraries,  who  extended  courtesies,  facilitated  research,  and  expressed, 
their  warm  sjnipalhy,  during  visits  in  behalf  of  the  enterprise  //ctc 
jJoati)ig  out  of  port  to  tihct  its  a'lstiny. 

It  would  be  a  \iolation  of  honor  not  to  testify  of  obligation  to  orie 
V  ho,  long  since,  \i>itetl  every  battle-field  herein  discussed,  who 
obtained  from  sur\i\ors  of  the  revolutionaiy  struggle  the  data  which 
otherwise  would  luue  had  no  record,  and  who,  as  the  only  living  link 
which  connects  limes  present  with  iuwus  a  hundred  years  (igv—\\i\< 
iinited  the  author  to  share  the  benefit  of  his  labors,  and  has  made 
possible  much  that  must  have  been  crude  or  imperfect  but  for  the 
generous  cooperation  of  Benson  J.  Lossiw; 


f 


CHAPTER   I. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH. 

THE  soldiers  of  1 775-1 781  were  not  deficient  in  military  skill  and 
ready  appliance  of  the  known  enginery  and  principles  of  war. 
In  spite  of  modern  improvements  in  gunnery,  transportation,  and 
hospital  adjustments,  and  in  all  that  relates  to  pure  Logistics,  there 
has  been  no  substitution  of  agencies  that  has  involved  other  prin- 
ciples than  those  which  belonged  to  those  campaigns.  Then,  as 
now,  every  contest  was  largely  determined  by  the  skillful  application 
of  the  laws  which  underlie  all  human  success.  Even  the  introduction 
of  steam  propulsion  has  not  suspended  the  laws  of  Nature,  which 
laws,  for  all  time,  have  made  sport  of  those  who  go  upon  the  sea  in 
ships.  The  repeated  storms  which  diverted  British  and  French  fleets 
from  their  projected  course,  or  those  which  affected  the  operations  on 
land  at  times  of  real  crisis,  are  not  without  their  equally  decisive 
counterparts  in  all  wars  of  early  or  later  date.  It  is  an  instructive 
fact,  in  military  as  in  civil  life,  to  illustrate  the  inability  of  human  fore- 
sight to  force  the  future  to  its  feet  and  then  compel  its  issues.  No 
more  then  than  since  did  the  negligence  of  a  picket-guard,  the  reck- 
lessness of  a  rash  leader,  or  the  waste  of  a  commissary,  prove  fatal  to 
well-advised  movements  and  blast  a  fair  promise  of  real  fruit.  Then, 
as  since,  one  gallant  defense  at  an  unexpected  point,  one  error  of 
guides,  one  precipitancy  of  an  is:,ue  not  fully  ripe,  determined  that 
issue  adversely. 

Then,  as  since,  injustice  to  an  antagonist,  or  an  undue  confidence 
in  attack  or  defense,  brought  dismal  defeat.  Then,  as  ever,  the 
violation  of  the  claims  of  humanity,  contempt  for  conscientious  oppo- 
nents and  attempts  to  use  force  beyond  a  righteous  limit,  worked  its 
fatal  reaction  ;  and  then,  as  since,  the  interference  of  cabinets,  or  the 


» 1 


ill 


THE    REVOLUTIONARY    EPOCH. 


[1775 


M 


't! 


substitution  of  extrinsic  for  vital  issues,  worked  tlic  discomfiture  of 


w 


ise  military  plans  on  eitliei  side  of  the  struy^le.  It  is  e([ually  true 
that  in  the  face  of  the  more  sharply  defined  social  <;r<ules  then  exist- 
ing the  ;4eneral  spirit  ot  the  warfare  was  honorable  to  both  parties  ; 
and  the  issues  between  Washington  and  Howe,  or  other  generals  of 
responsible  coinmand,  as  disclosed  in  their  correspondence,  were  as 
courteously  discussed  as  are  like  issues  now. 

Even  with  the  motlern  miracle  of  journalism,  which  fastens  its 
imprint  upon  the  minutest  word  or  fact  in  the  career  of  men  and 
nations,  there  is  as  much  of  license,  of  hyperbole  and  partisan  abuse, 
as  in  those  d.ivs  when  the  mocher  country  and  the  colonies  ensjasred 


My 


f 


in  a  deadly  w  restle.  JtMlr.usies  of  rank,  ihirst  for  office,  aspersions  o 
char.icter,  and  susi)icions  of  all  who  attained  success,  had  their  place 
then,  as  since  ;  and  as  a  century  ()f  time  has  revived  only  the  more 
agreeable  features  of  that  struggle,  it  is  not  to  be  overlooked  that 
Howe  and  Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  as  well  as  Washington  and  his 
generals,  had  their  heartaches  as  well  as  their  laurels,  and  administered 
their  trusts  under  responsibilities  and  burdens  never  surpassed. 

The  war  itself  was  no  sudden  rebellion  against  authority,  nor  a 
merely  captious  and  arbitrary  assertion  of  the  popular  will.  It  was 
even  then  admitted  by  the  noblest  of  English  statesmen  that  the 
English  government,  as  so  tersely  stated  by  Mr.  Bancroft,  "  made  war 
on  the  life  of  her  own  life." 

The  era  of  facts,  therefore,  which  marks  this  volume,  was  the  fruit 
of  English  thought  relating  back  to  Magna-Charta. 

Humanity  made  constant  progress  in  the  assertion  of  normal 
rights,  and  the  passing  issues  which  ripened  into  American  independ- 
ence only  indicated  the  culmination  of  those  issues  to  a  more  substan- 
tial vindication.  Prerogative  of  church  and  state,  the  .centralization 
of  property  and  authority,  the  irresponsibility  to  the  people  of  men 
who  asserted  absolutism  by  virtue  of  ancestry,  or  the  so-called  divine 
right,  had  involved  England  in  bloody  wars,  alienated  faithful  subjects, 
induced  domestic  disorders,  and  made  natural,  as  certain,  the  separa- 
tion of  the  American  colonies. 

Emancipation  from  Papal  dictation  did  not  bring  a  corresponding 
grant  of  genuine  reigious  liberty  to  the  earnest  people. 

Human  conscience,  bound  to  its  Author  by  intrinsic  obligation, 
which  no  human  authority  can  long  control  or  evade,  asserted  its 
power  over  the  lives  and  conduct  of  sober-minded  men. 

The  bonds  which  confined  its  expression,  and  drove  devout  Chris- 


■^ 


I775.J 


Tin:    KKVOI.UTIONAkY    EPOCH. 


5 


tian  men  and  women  to  secret  conclave  and  worsliip,  became  too 
stringent  for  those  who  obeyed  God  as  the  Supreme  Arbiter  of  h'fe 
present  and  life  future. 

The  presumption  that  tlie  governed  sliould  have  a  voice  in  shap- 
ing the  policy  which  e.xercised  control,  was  solved  by  its  positive 
averment  as  a  principle ;  and  the  reluctance  of  authority  to  bend  its 
measures  to  meet  this  human  craving  and  rigiitful  demand,  only 
quickened  the  sentiment  of  resistance  to  every  evasion  or  defiance 
of  the  right.  Every  domestic  struggle  which  marked  the  centuries 
of  British  growth,  had  this  warp  for  every  woof. 

Invisible,  but  present!  despised,  but  quick  with  life,  the  new  ele- 
ment was  giving  robustness  and  nerve  to  the  British  people,  and  both 
shape  and  endurance  to  the  British  constitution. 

The  state  itself,  as  it  began  to  feel  the  spur  of  the  new  impulse, 
began  also  to  render  tribute  to  the  true  patriotism  which  a  high  moral 
and  religious  obligation  alone  develops. 

The  interregnum  of  Cromwell  was  resplendent  with  national 
glory ;  and  the  enthusiasm  of  free  men  began  to  testify  in  clear  and 
significant  tones  of  the  greatness  of  a  people,  who  so  freely  con- 
tributed of  life  and  treasure  to  dignify  and  maintain  a  genuine  national 
liberty. 

Ripe  statesmen  and  hereditary  officials,  alike,  saw  the  drift  of 
human  thought  ;  but,  as  this  pulse-beat  strengthened,  the  hatred  ol 
innovation,  and  cultivated  doubt  of  the  capacity  and  nerve  of  the 
commons  to  mingle  with  and  share  tho  control  of  public  affairs  pro- 
longed the  established  contempt  for  the  commons,  while  intensify- 
ing the  popular  purpose  to  resist  the  presumption  of  caste  and  undele 
gated  authority. 

The  exodus  of  colonists   to  America,  was  the  combined  fruit  of 
this   misconception  of  the  rights  of  the  people,  and  of  the  latent 
resistance  which  rules  the  life  whenever  the  human  soul  makej  duty 
its  purpose,  and  conscience  its  guide. 

The  Puritans  of  New  England,  the  Huguenots  of  South  Carolina, 
and  the  emigrants  to  Maryland,  alike  shared  in  the  impulse  to  escape 
from  hierar.hical  control,  and  work  for  freedom,  self-government,  and 
the  best  interests  of  the  governed.  The  emigration  to  Maryland 
had  its  small  element  which  maintained  the  obligation  of  conscience 
to  superior,  foreign  control ;  but  the  majority,  who  were  laboring 
men,  and  independent  of  every  such  obligation,  asserted  their  due 
share  in  giving  shape  to  the  colony,   and    thus  its  birth-hour  was 


i 


il 


M 


TlIK    KrVOI.UlU)N.\KV    KPOCH. 


[IT/S 


accompanied  liy  the  same  birth-rights  wliich  nuuie  tlic  New  England 


colonics  nieniorahli.'  for  all  time. 


A  centiu)-,  and  tlun  a  half  ccntur>-  more,  passeil  by,  \vl 


iile 


til 


dynastic  element  persistently  failed  to  realize  the  fact,  that  the  col- 
onics were  energized  !>>■  principles  which  behuv^ed  to  man  by  rii;hl, 
and  which  no  physical  forms  could  lon^-  resliain. 


'I'hc 


c)-  were  the  princijiles 


■hich,  in  fact,  made  Great  Britain  tjrcat. 


The  AnL;lo-SaNon  blood  was  directing  the  heart-beats,  but  it  had  the 
oxvi^rn  0/(7  iiii^/nr  /ifi-,  and  a  bolder,  if  not  .i  licrccr,  activity.  Prompt 
to  meet  obligation  and  render  legitimate  homage  to  lawful  authority, 


it  brooked  no   tramn 


nels   which    part 


OUl' 

ifidi 


.f 


oppression   or   injustice 


still  liopcful,  and  lor  a  long  time  confident,  tiiat  sagacious  .statesmen 
winild  so  control  and  shape  dynastic  power  as  to  atlmit  of  genuine 
loyalty  without  the  loss  of  sclf-rcspcct. 

The  old  l""rench  war  of  1 756.  brought  home  to  the  colonics  some 
ver\-  he;iv\-  responsibilities,  and  these  they  met  with  a  free  expendi- 
ture of  blootl  and  treasure.  But  il  taught  them  how  much  they  must 
cultivate  their  own  resources,  and  how  little  could  be  realized  from 
the  throne,  in  the  assurance  ol  a  pervasive  ami  lasting  peace. 

Sacrifices  brought  only  partial  ecjuivalents,  so  that  ordinary  taxes 
took  the  color  of  enforced  tribute.  Slowl\-  but  surely  the  procrasti- 
nation, uncertainty,  and  prevarications  of  officials  compelled  the  sub- 
jects to  repeated  demonstrations  of  their  wishes,  and  of  their  claim  to 
be  represented  in  the  councils  oi  lie  nation,  until  the  Revolution 
enforced  their  will  and  determined  tiicir  future. 

After  the  lapse  of  more  than  a  i  eutury,  the  great  I'Lr.glish  Nation 
and  the  American  Republic  review  that  [leriod  of  struggle  with  equal 
satisfaction,  as  the  evidence  of  the  superintending  control  of  a  Higher 
Authoritv,  and  both  nations  accept  the  results  of  the  war  and  the 
developments  since  realized,  as  the  best  possible  conclusion  of  the 
ordeal  undergone,  and  the  best  pledge  to  the  world  of  the  spirit  with 
which  both  nations  shall  aim  to  dignify  national  life,  while  honoring 
the  rights  and  highest  interests  of  every  individual  life. 

The  power  and  glory  of  England,  are  not  in  her  army  or  navy,  or 
her  displays  of  physical  force,  so  much  as  in  the  development:  of  all  her 
people  of  all  classes,  in  the  culture  and  ripeness  which  peace  and  free- 
dom involve.  And  the  American  Republic,  which  dismissed  to  their 
farms  and  merchandise  a  million  men,  when  their  use  was  needless, 
while  unarmed,  is,  by  the  compensations  of  intelligence  and  industry, 
irmed  to  the  teeth  against  all  unrighteous  intervention  or  violence. 


77=; 
ind 

lir 
ol- 

It, 

It. 
le 
)t 


1775J 


Tllli   REVOLUTIONARY   EPOCH. 


It  is  the  earnest  man  of  peace,  calmly  pursuing  life's  ends,  render- 
ing  justice  and  thus  dcservir.jr  justice,  who,  in  the  aggregate,  makes  a 
state  respected;  and  thus  let  tlie  future  develop  both  mother  country 
and  its  first  born,  so  that  the  world  shall  render  to  each  the  homage 
which  every  true  vian  deserves  ! 


II  i 

.    I 


''^ 


I  I 


CHAPTER   II. 


i  ■  i 


LEXINGTON   AND   CONCORD.     THEIR   LESSONS. 

THE  skirmishes  of  Lexington  and  Concord  were  such  pulsations 
of  an  excited  people  as  not  to  have  a. proper  place  in  a  strict 
Battle  Record,  except  as  they  mark  the  progress  of  public  sentiment 
toward  the  maturing  issue  of  general  war. 

Raw  militia,  jealous  of  the  right  to  bear  arms,  and  thoroughly  set 
in  purpose,  to  vindicate  that  right  and  all  the  franchises  of  a  free  peo- 
ple, by  the  extreme  test  of  liberty  or  life,  had  faced  the  disciplined 
troops  of  Great  Britain,  without  fear  or  penalty. 

The  ciuickcning  sentiment  which  gave  nerve  to  the  arm,  steadiness 
to  the  heart,  and  force  to  the  blow,  was  one  of  those  historic  expres- 
sions of  human  will,  which  over-master  discipline  itself.  It  zuas  the 
viethod  of  an  inspired  madness.  The  onset  swept  back  a  solid  column 
of  trained  soldiers,  because  the  moral  force  of  the  energizing  passion 
was  imperative  and  supreme.  No  troops  in  the  world  could  have 
resisted  that  movement.  Discipline,  training,  and  courage  are  expo- 
nents of  real  power  ;  but  there  must  be  something  more  than  thesr. 
to  enable  any  moderate  force  of  armed  men  to  cope  with  a  people 
already  on  fire  with  the  conviction,  that  the  representatives  of  national 
force  are  employed  to  smoLher  the  national  life.  The  troops  them- 
selves had  a  hard  ordeal  to  undergo.  Sent  out  to  collect  or  destroy 
some  munitions  of  war,  and  not  to  engage  an  enemy,  they  were  under 
a  restraint  that  stripped  them  of  real  fitness  to  meet  so  startling  an 
issue  as  one  of  open  resistance  and  active  assault.  There  was  a  clear 
reluctance  on  their  part,  to  use  force  until  the  first  hasty  delivery  of 
fire  opened  hostilities. 

The  ill-judged  policy  which  precipitated  these  memorable  skir- 
mishes was  directly  in  the  way  of  military  success.  It  impaired  the 
confidence  of  soldiers  in   their  ability  to  maintain  the  impending 


1 


1775] 


I.KXINGTON   AND   CONCORD. 


striifryle,  while  at  the  same  time  intensifying  the  fever  and  strength- 
ening the  nerve  of  the  ujirising  commons. 

Lexington  and  Concord  were  the  exponents  of  that  daring  which 
made  the  resistance  on  Breed's  Hill  possible.  The  invincibility  of 
discipline  was  shattered,  when  the  prestige  of  the  arni\'  went  down 
before  the  rifles  of  farmers.  The  first  tendency  was  to  make  those 
farmers  too  confident  of  the  physical  strcni:;tJi  of  moral  opinions,  and 
to  underrate  the  value  of  an  organized  force.  Years  of  sacrifice  and 
waste,  enforced  an  ippreciation  of  its  value;  and  the  failures,  flights, 
and  untoward  vicissitudes  of  many  battlefields  were  made  their 
instructors  in  the  art  of  war. 

The  military  demonstration  of  April  iQtli,  1775,  was  but  supi)le- 
mental  to  similar  inovemeiits  for  the  suppression  of  the  general  arm- 
ing, and  for  the  seizure  of  guns  and  powder,  which  began  in  1774. 

A  battery  had  been  established  on  Boston  Neck  as  earl)'  as  Au- 
gust of  that  year.  The  citizens  had  refused  to  furnish  quarters  for  the 
royal  troops,  and  when  the  government,  during  the  month  of  Sep- 
tember, attempted  to  build  public  barracks,  the  mechanics  of  Boston 
refused  to  work  at  any  price,  and  both  artisans  and  laborers  had  to  be 
brought  from  the  colon)'  of  New  York.  Under  date  of  August 
twenty-seventh,  1775,  Dr.  Joseph  Warren  wrote  as  follows  :  "As  yet, 
we  have  been  preserved  from  action  with  the  soldiery,  and  we  shall 
endeavor  to  avoid  it  until  we  see  that  it  is  necessary,  and  a  settled 
plan  is  fixed  on  for  that  purpose." 

The  Provincial  Congress  that  organized  October  twenty-sixth 
adopted  a  plan  for  the  organization  of  the  militia,  with  the  express 
understanding  that  one-fourth  of  the  aggregate  force  should  be  in 
readiness  for  service  at  the  shortest  notice.  The  "  minute  men  "  o"" 
the  Revolution,  were  thus  called  into  being. 

Artemas  Ward  and  Seth  Pomeroy  were  chosen  general  officers. 
A  concentration  of  military  stores  and  arms  at  Concord  and  Worces- 
ter was  formally  authorized.  Under  date  of  November  tenth,  Gen- 
eral Gage  d'  uounced  as  treasonable  the  proceedings  of  that  body. 

On  the  ninth  day  of  February,  1776,  a  second  Provincial  Congress, 
"empowered  and  directetl  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety,  to 
assemble  the  militia  whenever  it  was  required,  to  resist  the  execution 
of  certain  Acts  of  Parliament,"  just  then  promulged. 

The  following  citizens  composed  that  committee,  viz.,  John  Han- 
cock, Joseph  Warren,  Benjamin  Church,  Richard  Devens,  Benjamin 
White,  Joseph  Palmer,  Abraham  Watson,  Azor  Orne,  John  Pigeon, 
William  Heath,  and  Thomas  Gardner. 


10 


LKXlNOroN   AND  CONCORD. 


1 1775 


(! 


If 


The  follivA  iiirr  "  Committro  of  Sunplios."  ums  annoiinccd,  viz., 
i'.lbiiils^c  Gcri}',  D.ivid  Clii-rvrr,  InMijainin  TJnculn.  Moses  Gill,  and 
Hi'tijamin  Hall. 

At  tin-  same  time,  John  Thomas  ami  William  Jlcatli  were  added 
to  the  list  of  [general  officers.  That  lej^qslative  body  went  so  far 
<is  to  warn  the  people  that  it  was,  "  'I'hc  Christian  and  sneial  duty  of 
eaeh  indix'idual,  with  a  i)roper  sense  of  depei,  li-nci;  on  (ind,  to  deleiid 
those  ri|j;ht.i  which  heaven  j^ave  thetn,  ind  no  one  ou;_;ht  to  take  from 
them." 

li>'  tlu;  first  da\-  of  January,  1775,  the  garrison  of  Boston  hail  been 
increased  to  thirt>--five  hundred  men,  and  mounted  three  hundred 
and  sevent)'  men  as  a  dail\-  guard-detail,  besides  a  field-officers'  guard 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  on  Boston  Neck.  Three  brigades  were 
organized  and  were  officered,  respectively,  by  (lenerals  Lord  Percy, 
I'igolt  ami  Jones.  In  November  of  1774.  (leneral  Gage  had  advised 
till.'  Ikitisli  government,  that  he,  "  wcxs  confident,  that  to  bci^in  xvitli  an 
army  twenty  thousand  strong,  would  in  the  end  s.ive  Great  Britain 
blood  and  treasure." 

Meanwhile,  the  militia  drilled  openly,  rapidly  completed  company 
organizations,  and  made  many  sacrifices  to  procure  arms,  powder 
and  other  materials  of  war.  The  Home  government,  in  view  of  the 
serious  aspect  of  affairs,  ordered  (jenerals  Howe,  Clinton,  and  Bur- 
goyne  to  join  General  Gage,  and  announced  that  "  ample  reinforce- 
ments would  be  sent  out,  and  the  most  speedy  and  effectual  measures 
would  be  taken  to  put  down  the  rebellion,"  then  pronounced  to 
already  exist. 

On  the  eighth  of  April,  tlie  Provincial  Congress  resolved  to  take 
effectual  measures  to  raise  an  army,  and  requested  the  cooperation 
of  Rhode  Island,  New  Hampshire,  and  Connecticut.  On  the  thir- 
teenth, it  voted  to  raise  six  companies  of  artillery,  to  pay  them,  and 
keep  them  at  drill.  On  the  fourteenth,  it  advised  citizens  to  leave 
Boston  and  to  remove  to  the  country.  On  the  fifteenth,  it  solemnly 
appointed  a  day  for  '•  Public  l*'asting  and  Prayer,"  and  adjourned  to 
the  tenth  day  of  May. 

The  Committee  of  Public  "Safety  at  once  undertook  the  task  of 
securing  powder,  cannon  and  small  arms.  A  practical  embargo  was 
laid  upon  all  trade  with  Boston.  The  garrison  could  obtain  supplies 
only  with  great  difficulty,  and,  as  stated  by  Gordon,  "  nothing  was 
tvanting  but  a  spark,  to  set  the  whole  continent  in  a  flame." 

As  a   matter  of  military  policy,  the  statesmanship  of  war,  the 


1775 


I.i:XINGI(»N    AND   CONCOKI). 


I  1 


whole  drift  of  tlu'  Governor's  coiuluct  was  not  to  pl.icate,  but  to 
excite  tlie  pL-opIe.  It  w  is  tlu-  precursor  of  iiiilit.u\'  failure.  All 
deiiionstrations  were  those  of  force,  atu!  not  those  of  wisdom,  or 
comity.  I  lis  purpose  to  seize  the  stores  then  accumuKilin;,^  .it  Con- 
cord h.ul  no  indorsement  of  his  oflkers  or  council,  for  lie  adviseil 
with  neither.  It  wa.^:  predicated  ii{)on  his  intlividu.il  o|)inion,  by 
which  he  afterw.uils  sou^dit  to  justify  liis  conduct,  that  the  show  of 
force  in  the  tlcld  and  the  arrest  of  leading  patriots  would  extint^uish 
the  rebellion. 

This  rai)id  and  very  partial  outline  of  events  which  immediately 
preceded  the  skirmishes  of  Concord  and  Lcxini^ton,  is  important  in 
order  to  disclose  the  circumstances  which  so  (piickly  culminated  in 
the  sicj^e  of  Boston,  the  action  on  Breed's  II  ill,  and  the  evacuation 
of  the  city.  General  (iaj^e,  as  he  said,  coniinunicated  his  plan  for 
seizure  of  the  stores  at  Concord  \t>  but  one  person,  and  yet  it  was 
soon  known  to  Hancock  and  Adams,  so  that  the  colonists  took 
prompt  measures  to  meet  the  issue.  When  Lord  Percy  left  Head- 
quarters on  the  evenin;^  of  .April  cii^hteciith,  he  [jasscil  a  t;roup  of 
men,  on  Boston  Common,  and  heard  one  man  say  :  "  The  British 
troops  have  marched,  but  they  will  miss  their  aim."  "What  aim  ?" 
Ml  juired  Lord  I'crc)-,  "  Why,  the  cannon   at  Concord,"  was  the  reply. 

The  detachment,  consisting  of  the  (.jren.uliers  of  the  garrison, 
the  Li;4ht  Iiifantr\,  and  Major  Pitcairn,  of  the  Marines,  all  under  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Smith  of  the  Tenth  re;4iment  of  infantry, 
started  on  the  niL,dU  of  the  ei:.^hteenth,  with  every  reason  to  believe 
that  their  movement  was  a  secret  to  all  but  the  Governor  and  them- 
selves. Taking  boats  up  the  Charles  river  as  far  as  Phipps  f.irm, 
now  Lcchmcre  Point,  they  l.uuled  i)romptl\-,  and  pushed  for  Con- 
cord, twenty  miles  from  Boston.  The  ringing  of  bells  and  the  tiring 
of  small  arms  soon  .showed  that  the  countr)-  w.is  aroused.  A  mes- 
senger was  sent  for  reinforcements.  Si.vteen  companies  of  foot, 
and  a  detachment  of  marines,  under  Lord  Percy,  was  promptly 
advanced  to  their  support,  uniting  with  them  at  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  on  their  return  from  Concord,  and  making  the  aggre- 
gate of  the  entire  command  al)t)ut  eighteen  hundred  men. 

This  eventful  day  closed.  The  stores  at  Concord,  which  had  not 
been  removed,  were  destroyed.  The  casualties  on  the  British  side 
were  seventy-three  killed,  one  hundred  and  seventy  four  wounded, 
twenty  six  missing.  The  colonists  lost  forty-nine  killed,  thirty-nine 
wounded,  and  five  missing. 


I" 


12 


IKXINGTON   AN'I)   CONCDRD. 


t'775 


i!' 


[•I 
I* 


■'  I 


Stcdman  thus  sums  up  llic  result.  "  The  events  of  the  day  on 
wliich  l)Ioocl  was  first  shed,  in  llie  contest  between  (ire, it  Britain  and 
her  co!f)nies,  served  to  sliow  tliat  if  the  Americans  were  unacquainted 
witli  military  discipline,  they  were  not  destitute  of  either  courage  or 
conduct,  but  knew  well  how,  and  dared,  to  avail  themselves  of  such 
advantages  as  they  possessed.  A  kind  of  miiitiry  furor  had  by  this 
time  seized  the  inhabitants  oT  the  colonies.  They  were  willing;  to 
risk  the  conscf;uences  (jf  opposint^  in  the  field,  their  juvenile  ardor  to 
the  matured  strrii|^'th  of  the  parent  state,  a.id  in  this  resolution  they 
were  encourac;ed  to  persist,  by  recollecting^  the  events  of  the  nine- 
teenth of  Ajjril,  by  which  it  appeared,  according  to  their  manner  of 
reasoning,  that  in  such  a  country  as  America,  abouniling  in  danger- 
ous passes  and  woody  defiles,  the  Ikitish  troops,  with  all  their  valor, 
discipline  and  military  skill,  were  not,  when  opposed  to  the  Ameri- 
cans, so  formidable  as  had  been  generally  apprehended." 

The  promptness,  coolness  and  moderation  of  Lord  Percy  saved 
the  commanil  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Sinith.  It  was  worn  out  by  hard 
marching,  and  the  fretful  k'  .d  of  warfire  which  decimated  its  ranks, 
and  only  under  the  escort  of  his  cr-mmand  were  they  enabled  to 
reach  Boston  in  safety.  It  is  a  historical  fact,  that  ^^•ljor  Pitcairn, 
whose  reputation  and  character  were  of  a  high  oiU'.r,  deeply  felt  the 
misfortune  which  so  intimately  associated  hi-i  name  with  the  aff.iir  at 
Lexington. 

Dr.  Dwight  says  that  the  expedition  to  Concord,  "  was  one  which 
in  other  circumstances  would  have  been  merely  of  little  tales  of 
wonder  and  woe,  but  it  became  the  preface  to  the  history  of  a  nation, 
the  beginning  of  an  empire,  and  a  theme  of  disquisition  and  astonish- 
ment to  the  civilized  world." 

The  issue  was  joined.  The  siege  of  Boston  followed.  The  begin- 
ning ol  the  end  began  to  appear  in  full  view  of  many  English  states- 
men, and  thenceforth  their  disregarded  warnings,  and  their  unex- 
amjiled  assurance  of  sympathy  with  the  American  people,  vv(>re 
among  the  most  inspiring  elements  which  sustained  the  struggle  and 
assured  the  ultimate  result. 

And  now,  that  the  presentation  of  some  of  the  principles  which 
distinguished  the  epoch  of  the  American  Revolution  and  gave  char- 
acter as  well  as  strength  to  the  new  State,  and  a  brief  statement  as 
to  the  issue  at  arms  which  introduced  the  struggle  have  been  made, 
the  discussion  of  the  art  of  war  is  next  in  order,  to  be  followed  by 
its  application  to  the  battle-issues  themselves. 


CHAPTER   III. 


MILITARY  SCIENCE  THE    KEY  TO  MIL'TARY  HISTORY. 


IT  is  a  prime  factor  in  the  right  estimate  of  any  historical  epoch, 
or  issue,  that  the  data  command  confidence;  and  the  value  of  all 
conclusions  will  be  determined  by  the  fitness  with  which  cognate 
principles  are  applied  to  the  events  or  cliaracters  unfolded. 

The  integrity  of  a  narrative  may  indeed  be  verified  through  the 
absolute  want  of  conformity  to  another  version  ;  but  the  consistency 
of  either  with  a  sound  final  judgment  must  depend  upon  the  success 
of  the  effort  to  clear  the  story  of  all  extrinsic  color  and  stage-effect 
which  the  locus,  or  miiiiiiis  of  the  author  has  cast  upon  the  scenes  and 
actors.  To  review  the  battles  of  the  American  Revolution  and  so 
test  their  record  as  to  impart  lessons  of  value  to  the  student  of  mili- 
tary science,  is  equally  an  effort  to  interest  the  general  scholar  ;  and 
the  earnest  you^h  who  struggles  to  attain  ripeness  for  true  citizenship 
by  i-Esthetic  culture  and  faithful  brain-work,  cannot  afford  to  break 
away  from  the  examination,  as  from  some  cold  and  barren  sphere  of 
thought. 

More  than  this  is  involved  in  the  present  discussion.  History  is 
the  life-record  of  man,  and  its  fruitage  matures  in  proportion  as 
e.\i)erience  evolves  wisdom  for  the  future.  National  history  is  there- 
fore not  the  exclusive  possession  of  its  subject  ;  but  stands  as  a  wit- 
ness to  all  nations,  and  it  is  their  right  as  well  as  duty  to  demand  a 
just  interpretation  of  its  facts. 

Patriotism  that  is  mature  and  abiding,  is  linked  with  charity. 
Justice  is  embosomed  with  love  of  country.  Both  elements  attach 
to  an  abiding  record. 

We  measure  a  painting  by  the  rules  of  art,  and  gauge  a  freshly 
invented  motor  by  the  principles  applied.  Thus,  also,  and  in  a  truly 
catholic  spirit,  are  battles  and  battle-direction  to  be  estimated,  and 


I, 


i 


*if 


>'ll 


1', 

til 
I       .  ■' 


■  I 


14 


MII.ITAKV   SCIKNCK  TIIK   KEY   TO    MII.ITARY    HISTORY.      [i775. 


thus  alone  can  there  be  developed  out  of  human  conflict  some 
endurintr  nroduct  N  •  the  instruction  and  benefit  of  succccdinfj  <zen- 
erations. 

While  all  axiomatic  truth  is  but  indifferently  served  by  many 
who,  of  necessity,  bow  to  its  dicta;  so  a  worthy  purpose  may  fail  of 
standa/d  fruition  through  fault  of  the  agent.  The  proposed  discus- 
sion seeks  to  analyze  all  accessible  data,  and  thus  afford  to  the  gen- 
eral student  some  basis  for  sound  judgment  as  to  the  battle-fields 
and  battle-direction  of  the  war  of  the  American  Revolution,  while 
ajjplying  to  their  elucidation  those  accepted  principles  of  military 
science  which  impart  value  to  military  action. 

The  consideration  of  minor  issues  and  isolated  skirmishes  is 
foreign  to  the  purpose  ;  but  it  is  requisite,  that  the  annual  campaign:; 
of  the  struggle  shall  obtain  their  legitimate  sequence,  and  hold  their 
intrinsic  relations  to  the  ultimate  achievement  of  American  Inde- 
pendence. 

The  swift  progress  of  international  courtesy  in  the  direction 
of  closer  national  affinities  imparts  signal  interest  to  the  investi- 
gation ;  and  although  an  era  of  universal  peace  is  not  already  over- 
lapped by  the  hastening  present,  it  is  safe  to  assert  that  the  time 
has  come  when  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  can  pleasantly 
do  justice  to  old-time  valor,  and  welcome,  as  already  assured,  a  tuture 
itlentity  of  aspiration  and  progress. 

Other  incidents  peculiar  to  this  age  of  general  education,  force  the 
peo[)le  themselves  to  a  closer  view,  and  wiser  appreciation  of  military 
art.  Great  Britain  already  depends  largely  upon  her  organized  militia 
Ijr  national  defense.  Her  regular  army,  the  nucleus  for  efficient 
expansion,  is  but  a  national  police,  to  watch  over  her  world-wide 
interests,  and  assure  lur  subjects  that  the  mother  country  does  not 
neglect  the  rights  of  any  who  render  homage. 

The  mobilization  of  Germany  and  the  conscript  system  of  France 
bear  home  to  every  household  the  consideration  of  military  contin- 
gencies and  militar  antecedents.  But  it  is  true  of  the  United  States, 
as  of  Great  Britain,  that  the  regular  army  has  bul.  light  responsibility 
for  domestic  peace.  The  conservation  of  resources,  attended  by 
education  of  the  masses  and  the  wise  development  of  industrial  labor, 
furnish  a  basis  of  resistance  to  assault  from  without,  that  will  wear 
out  any  antagonist  which  estimates  its  means  of  aggression  by  the 
numerical  list  of  bristling  bayonets  which  it  holds  in  position,  at  the 
expense  of  civil  growth. 


4 


1775.1      MILITARY    SCIKNCE   THE   KEY   TO    MILITARY    HISTORY. 


IS 


Continental  army  budgets,  and  continental  military  dilation  have 
involved  one  error  ;  and  the  American  militia  s\stein,  notwithstanding 
its  elasticit}'  and  its  prodigious  expenditures  of  vital  force  in  an 
extreme  hour  of  national  peril,  has  involved  an  equally  serious  error. 
The  responsibility  for  military  direction  has  been  cast  upon  militarj- 
experts  exclusively;  or  the  attainment  of  high  positions  by  the 
adventurer  has  developed  the  idea  that  any  good  patriot  might,  by 
cas\'  transition,  leap  to  a  place  of  honorable  command,  and  discharge 
its  functions  with  emir.ent  success. 

But  the  philosophy  of  war  is  not  exclusively  within  the  province 
of  the  military  man,  and  there  are  governing  laws  which  trat^slate  the 
events  of  battle  history,  and  impart  to  them  a  life  and  meaning  well 
worthy  the  sober  thought  of  the  citizen  and  scholar. 

Hitherto,  the  literature  of  military  science  has  been  addressed  to 
experts  only,  and  the  world  at  large  has  been  satisfied  with  some 
graphic  narrative,  regardless  of  the  mental  processes  which  evolved 
the  results  and  made  success  possible,  or  assured  defeat.  While 
physics  and  physiology  are  deemed  indispensable  to  every  sound 
curriculum  of  stutl}-,  the  Iolmc  of  war  has  been  as  listlessly  and  coolly 
ignored,  as  if  its  precepts  imposed  upon  the  time  of  the  general 
scholar,  and  were  utterly  foreign  to  a  sound  education  of  the  young 
men  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

In  Continental  Iiuroi)e,  however,  with  a  little  more  of  theoretical 
instruction,  the  physical  drill  in  arms  has  largely  absorbed  that  indus- 
trial labor  which  is  the  life-blood  of  a  civilized  state,  and  the  individ 
uality  of  the  citizen  has  been  merged  in  the  military  martinet.  /A' 
!/i(rj'  be  one  small  eog  in  the  rast  coniplieation  of  adjusted  inaeltinery,  or 
one  little  nerve  in  the  enfold int^  sheath,  but  lie  is  not  a  responsible  part 
of  the  eont rolling  element  that  W(>rks  the  niaehine,  or  thrills  the  nerve 
with  its  vital  for  ee. 

In  the  United  States,  where  military  obligation  is  feather-light  in 
time  of  peace,  and  hardly  less  in  Great  Britain,  the  assumption  is  ever 
at  hand,  that  when  a  crisis  shall  demand  the  soldier,  there  will  be 
found  the  hero  and  the  victory. 

This  is  trifling  with  grave  issues.  It  is  a  verv  rare,  if  not  an  im- 
possible  matter  in  modern  times,  for  a  great  war  to  ensue  witliout 
antecedent  deliberation  on  the  part  of  one  or  both  o{  the  parties 
in  interest.  The  mighty  aggregate  of  European  armies  is  closely 
related  to  intense  brain-work,  and  no  advocate  more  exhaustively 
anticipates  the  contingencies  of  evidence  and  the  sco[)e  of  past  ad- 


4 


*, 


:  f' 


1 6 


MI1.ITAKY    SCIENCK   THE   KEY   TO   MILITARY    HISTORY.       [i775 


judications,  than  do  tlie  adepts  in  military  sc-ii-ncc  rovit;\v  their  maps, 
and  sprciilatc  ujxin  tlvj  very  riTcsscs,  as  wi-ll  as  the  VL'sourccs  of  tlie 
coiintr\"  llu\-  |>iirpiisr  to  attack. 

It  is,  tlurcforc,  possible  and  hecomiiiLj,  for  the  educ.ited  masses  of 


ree  neoiile 


t(j  U 


•th 


if  tl 


earn    sonietluni:j  ot   the  principles  wliuli  under 


hich 


the 


ational   lU-fense.     These  principles  have  not   been   unfolded   in   due 


id  with  th.it  familiarity,  which  has  carrii-d  those  of  n.itura! 

1  of  farm- 


proportion  ai 

science  into  evi'ry  housi-hold.      Tlu'  heads  of 

ers'   sons,  have  ached   from   the  e'laboralion  of  some  fresh   invention 


mechanics  am 


1  this,  the    fruit   of  iiul 


ei)endenc'.'  ol    thoiii^ht  and   personal  action, 


a  IK 

rii^htly  fits  the  demand  of  the  times.  IVat  with  all  this,  there  is  ,i  sub- 
tle, unacknowled;j;ed  sentiment,  that  the  civil  functions  of  the  state 
will  be  smoothl)'  and  fairly  performed  by  those  in  chari;e.  This  is 
dcvelopeil  from  the  fact  that  laws  are  in  force,  and  that  those  laws  arc 
assured  of  wise  and  conipetent  s.uiction.  llere  bej^ins  for  military 
science,  its  startiiii^^  point,  its  L^enesis.  .And  yet,  before  its  iliscussion, 
tluie  is  to  be  I'-^tablishetl  cert.iin  s^round-woik,  necessarily  i^^nored  by 
strictly  military  writers,  while  intej^r.il  and  fund.urientid  to  the  ;j;eneral 
purpose  in  view. 

Milit.iry  law,  while  that  of  force,  ;is  is  all  police  law,  is  founded 
u]ion  the  adapt, ition  of  all  r.ecess.iry  nii-ans  to  meet  an  impendin;^ 
crisis,  and  its  uuthods  of  ai)])lic,ition  are  controlled  by  th.it  crisis 
The  wi-dom  <>f  tin  st.itesman  is  <iul\-  dilTerent  in  decree  from  that  of 
the  householder,  aiul  both  .lim  after  a  wise  constr.iint  of  offendint.; 
iknients.  and  the  radic.ition  of  those  that  are  eminently  just  and 
projjer. 

To  meet  thedemaiul  ade(|uatel\-,  wisely,  and  successtully,  to  antici- 
pate all  counter-. iction,  and  tlu-rel)\-  assure  ultimate  results,  is  the 
e.\[)ressive  lo^ic  for  personal  action,  municipal  action,  a:  tl  militai)' 
action. 

'/7/r  braiii-po'ii'cr  is  htiiiihd  to  various  shaftings.  Tlic  niciital  pro- 
cesses arc  itiflcrciit,  l>v  virtue  of  dilferciii  a/^/^/ieatioits,  but  the  prime 
activities  are  the  same. 

The  domain  of  natural  sciiuice  h.is  its  departments  and  sections. 
It  is  so  witli  all  physics.  .\nd  yet,  to  the  ijreat  eni;4ma  of  esseii- 
ti.d  force,  the  milit.ir)-  art,  all  science's  exttiid  their  aitl.  No  labor- 
atory f.iils  of  e.xperts  in  its  behalf.  All  dynamic  force  l)a\-s  tribute 
to  its  demand.  This  rests  upon  a  simple  necessity.  In.ismuch 
as  offenses  against  society  and  law,  require  the  sanction  of  force, 
so  shall  all  a|)pliances  of  .art  and  science  contribute  their  full  measur< 


4 


mii.hary  sciencl  the  kkv   lo  mii.hary  msrouv. 


•7 


so  to  perfect  and  apply  th:it  force  as  to  secure  to   the  state  its  iiiU;^- 
rity  aiul  safety. 

Mi/idiry  science  is,  therefore,  the  art  of  enip/ojin^^  force  to  vin- 
dicate or  execute  authority.  Its  offices  task  all  possible  enerL;ies, 
iiunjve  all   [)ossible  errors,  .iiul    meet   all    possible     trials,  that   betide 


huiiiaii  ex[)erience. 


r 


le   'fiieiilla  and   b.itu 


lit 


ma 


>■ 


tl 


irou''M  wisiloin, 


nerve  and  commensurate  skill  become  a  soldier  ;  while  the  scholar, 
in  hiLjh  command,  may  drop  the  sceptre  of  the  state  which  he  is 
called  to  upliold,  not  from  want  of  patriotic  zeal,  but  because  he  is 
not  wise  in  a  life-and-death  strug;-,de. 

In  the  battles  of  the  American  Revolution,  illustrations  of  the  art 


)f  war.   in    the   uKjre   scientific,  as   in  {\\c    mon 


'I'll  era 


lly 


acc( 


ptc 


meanin;^  1)1  the  term,  were  lunnerous  .md  memorable.      Independently 
of   the  numbers  en;4aL;(xl,  the   vast   territory  involved,  the   distances 


traversed  with  an  ocean  lo  be  crossetl,  the  consaiv^uimly  ol  the  parties 
at  issue,  and  the  new  politic. il  principles  evoked,  th.it  battle  history 
h.is  i)eculiar  v.ilue.  Not  a  siiv^le  principle  put  under  tribute  by  threat 
captains,  i)eloro  and  since  th.it  pe'riod,  filled  \.o  h.ive  its  e.\i)res>ion, 
and  not  unseldom  its  masterly  ap[)lication.  The  philosojjhy  of 
Frederic  .md  Jomiiii  asserts  nothing  be}()iul  the  skill  ,ind  wisdom 
therein  illustr.ited. 

It  is  .issuined  that  all  truth  which  be.irs  direct  rel.ition  to  a  better 
undeisl.indiiij^  of  those  battles,  is  of  value  to  the  student,      llistor)' 

t   be  placed   side    by  sitle.  with   the   })hilosophy  which   interprets 


imis 


th.it  histors' 


tavil 


bear  tlieir  ii.irt  m   the  elucid.ilioii.  .ind  mil- 


t  iry  science  must  fill  its  pi, ice.  or  the  jud;j;ment  will  fiil    to  reach  lh>. 


conclusion-  wliieli  convi.'rl  the  anleceuent  experience  ot  men  into  sate 


ife 


i^uides  lor  the  resolution   of  the  future. 


tl 


le   propcjsed   brief  dis 


cussion   of  military   scii-nce,  the   purpose   is   to   set   forth   onl\-  those 
lund.iment.il  laws  and  rel.itions  which  wil 


.lid  the  re.ider  m 


h 


is     UK 


Jl 


du- 


inent  o(  the  ficts,  ins[)ire  fresh  respect  for  that  talent  which  sustains 
the  commonwealth  in  ,in  hour  of  (.l.in;_;er,  and  i)ossibly  induce  .i  hii^her 
sense  of  responsibility  for  a  fit  pre[).ir.ition  ti 
Ljcncies  which  can  come  to  the  body  politic. 


)   meet   a 


11   I' 


le  contin- 


In  the  discussion  of  battles  .md  battle-direction,  including  the 
topogr.iphical  illustr.ition,  the  standard  authorities  of  both  countries 
have  been  summoiud  ;o  the  witness-staiul,  .md  are  duly  accredited. 


!■'■ 


h  ! 


I 


Ml 


I  ill 


i  M 


CHAPTER    IV. 

ai'()L(k;v  1()K   riiK  militarv  art. 

Till'"-  iJiiiiciplcs  (if  the  niilitai)'  .irt,  havin;.^  their  application  in  the 
u-.r  (if  fiiiw.-,  all  iionii.il  (.IcnnMUs  that  shape  or  ap[)iy  to  force, 
in  the  ilircctioii  of  estaljlishiii;^  or  protectin;,^'  the  stale,  have  their 
a])propriale  place  and  relation-,.  Those  principles,  ,is  already  inli- 
niatcd,  ar  •  not  of  nece^.sity  and  exclusively  professional,  nor  are  tliey 
so  much  matters  of  discovery  as  the  tlirect  application  of  human 
uihdoin  to  reco;_;iiized  e.\ii;encies. 

All  priniitiw;   ([uestions  of  ethics   or   morals,  and  all   discussion  as 
to  the  abstract    rii^ht    tf 
table  struf''. 


'o  to  war,  are   merged    m    the-  actual,  inevi- 


thal  do  .111(1  must  (jccur. 


The  proL;ress  of  invention  lias  indeed  developed  machinery  to 
inti  nsily  physical  force  and  multiply  its  forms  of  action  ;  hut  the 
essential   principles  have   not   been  created;  tluy  are  only  UKjre  lully 


detectetl,  unl 


.;d  and  ut 


nizerl 


The  successful  man,  of  whatever  calling,  must  achieve  that  success 
through  intimacy  with  the  sprin;.;s  and  modes  of  human  .iction,  a.nd 
by  use  of  such  skill  in  the  adju-itmei  t  of  plans  as  to  meet  or  anticipate 
such  action. 

Mental  philos(jphy  demaiuls  as  much  credit  for  military  success, 
IS  for  an\'  other  success. 


ie(JL;raphical  (iisco\ery,  so  c, 


died. 


has  al\va\s  had  some  antecedimt 


hypotl 


lesis  oi  the  proper  harmony  of  the  physical  wor'      and  lias  thus 


been  impelled  to  push  the  conviction  to  assurance.     So  with  physics, 
whether  of  e.irlli  or  heaven.      Even  the  diversities  of  the  earth's  sur- 


ice  and    all  avenues  of  inter  communication    have   proved  as  vital  to 


rt   of 


war,  in 


military  as   to   commercial  or   political   relations.      1  he  ar 

common  with  other  science,  applies  sound   reasoning  to   all  possible 

contingencies  that  can  come  within  its  sphere  of  duty. 


17751 


APOLOGY    FOR   TIIK    MII.ITARV    AK 


«9 


{(> 


It  shares  tlic"  limitations  of  all  fmilc  knowlcdLjc,  and  is  not  closeted 
with  sonic  niilit;  rv  buiiaii,  n(jr  stored  in  any  arsenal.  It  inheres 
wherever  sa_L;acit>',  obst;rv'ation,  iiuickness,  and  [)recisi(jn,  have  their 
best  harmony  .md  material. 

Types  of  mind  of  e(iual  slren;^th  in  all  those  cleinents  v/ill  drift 
with  tile  circumst.inces  of  birth,  or  education — will  seek  various 
objectives  and  exhiljit  tlissimilar  manifestations,  so  that  society,  in  all 
its  civil  adiustments  and  ;^ro\vth,  onl)'  emjjloys  the  same  faculties 
which  couM'rvc  the  riidiU  of  the  state,  and  vindicate  its  honor,  when 
peril  invoke-^  the  aid  of  sanction  and  a  correspundiny;  physical  sup- 
\>()V\i.  The  m.ixinis  of  l'',n;_;lish  common  l.iw  which  .iffecl  civil  life,  and 
civil  rel.itions,  are  but  accumulated  ex[)erience,  beycjiid  date  or  mein- 
or)-,  indicatiuL^'  how  society  may  so  happily  and  securely  subsi-^t,  that 
the  ri;^dits  of  the  many  shall  be  but  the  ai^grej^ate  of  individual 
ri;^hts. 

These  flow  from  the  past,  i^ainiiiL;  volume  and  illumination  with 
the  centuries:  but  thiJse  are  not  older  nor  more  consistent  with 
iiuman  reason  than  are  the  ijeneral  maxims  which  inspire  a  wise  self 
defense,  and  the  conse(iuent,  national  defense.  They  llow  toi^ether, 
one  and  indivisible.  It  is  as  great  an  ern-r  to  predicite  of  the  art  of 
war,  that  it  is  abnormal  and  beyoml  the  field  of  the  schokir,  as  to 
tre.it  the  whole  system  of  state  and  nmnicipal  politics  as  of  imma- 
terial concern  to  the  individual  ulizen,  in  his  comparatively  passive 
sphere  of  trust  and  de])endence. 

In  proportion  as  the  citizen  freely  exercises  his  civil  rights,  and 
takes  part  in  their  establishment  ;uul  perpetuation,  so  does  it  become 
his  privilege  and  duty  to  understand,  7i'/iy,  when,  and  lioxv,  he  shall 
respond  to  their  hearty  supi)ort  if  assailed.  The  delegation  of  certain 
trusts  to  the  cabinet,  the  bench,  or  the  bailiff,  is  predicated  upon  the 
idea  that  these  are  agents  (jf  the  people,  duly  responsible  for  the 
trusts  in  their  charge;  but  the  obligation  to  render  all  needed  physi- 
cal and  mora!  sujjport  i.o  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  functions  of 
their  trust,  is  im[)erative  in  every  well  ordered  state.  These  functions 
are  performed  almost  automatically  during  peace,  with  but  incidental 
friction,  and  under  light  burdens. 

But  the  contingencies  of  lawlessness  and  violence  and  a  conse- 
quent appeal  to  force  are  not  to  be  ignoretl,  because  in  abeyance,  or 
out  of  sight. 

In  the  state,  as  in  the  houseiiold,  during  wholesome  peace,  the 
supremacy  of  law  seems  to  be  most  positive  when  the  external  display 


•I  ■::! 


\  • 
1  ,■• 


(   •' 


sii! 


'.  I 


1  i '  1 
l'  i 

h  I! 
;1» 


20 


AI'OI.OGV    FOR   THE   MILITARY   ART. 


['775 


nf  sanction  is  least  prominent.  77ic  visih/c  ivldp  stands  for  its  ready  use. 
There  is  no  exception  in  the  case  of  states  haviiiij  large  armies  ;  for 
there  every  outlook  comprehends  a  possible  strut^;^le,  which  of  itself 
precludes  the  idea  of  substantial  peace.  There  is  no  rrst,  and  /'cace 
tncajis  rest  from  coiijlkt,  with  a  corresponding  devotion  of  personal 
and  national  resources  to  permanent  i^ood. 

While  therefore,  that  sanction  which  is  the  reser\e  force  to  com- 
pel order,  nia\'  not  be  paraded  in  the  sight  of  all  men,  its  existence 
must  be  pervasive  ;  and  the  capacity  to  defend  or  assert  rights  must 
be  coextensive  with  the  ultimate  value  of  the  rights  enjoyed.  Other- 
wise, ever\- franchise  depends  alone  upon  outside  forbearance,  (jr  that 
most  fickk'  of  all  elements,  falsely  stx-led  policy.  It  is  therefore 
accepted,  tliat  all  citizens  have  a  deej)  concern  in  every  [primary  truth 
that  lies  in  the  direction  of  national  defense,  or  guides  their  judgment 
to  a  right  estimate  of  the  national  history,  as  compared  with  that  of 
other  nations.  If  peace,  w  itii  its  compensations  and  possibilities,  its 
sweet  domesticities  and  its  crowning  glories,  be  indeed  the  sphere 
wherein  man  can  alone  secure  renewal  of  primeval  perfection,  there 
mu-.t  be  large  wealth  of  values  in  those  deeds  of  self-sacrifice  and 
heroism  which  hasten  its  advent. 


W 


iile  tlie  assurance  ot   penalty  acts  as  a  preventive  oi  crmie,  a 


f 


uui 


the 


e  cai)acity  to  vindicate  rights  wards  off  assault,  so  does  true  valor 
rescue  war  from  its  most  brutal  aspects,  and  assimilate  the  guardian 
of  public  peace  to  the  administrator  of  law  and  justice. 

The  history  of  all  legitimate  warfare  is  instinct  with  the  exhibition 
of  noble  attributes  and   profound  wisdom.      If  the  object  of  this  vol- 
e  were  but  the  simple  compilation  of  battle-narrative,  there  would 


um 


be  no  pi, ice  for  the  present  discussion  ;  but  the  desire  is,  to  place  the 
battles  in  the  scales,  and  test  their  merits  by  the  experience  of  other 
nations  and  other  great  captains,  in  order  that  all  non-military  schol- 
ars who  have  set  uj)  false  standards  of  judgment,  or  have  presumed 
upon  the  ignorance  of 
as  to  the  ; 
direction    of  the    American   Revolution. 


;iy  determine  for  themselves 
ption   advanced  in  behalf  of  the  battles  and  battle- 


gnorance  ot  past  generations,  m 
issu 


Th 


ere    are    those    who  wi 


11 


rej 


ect    the    term,  "  science    of  war. 


Some  will  deny  to  the  soldier  a  higher  purpose  than  self-support, 
and  ambition  for  place  and  power,  and  decry  the  profession  as  servile, 
nr  denounce  it  as  despotic. 

There  will  not  be  wanting  those  who  will  treat  the  general  educa- 
tion of  Germany  and   the  elastic   resources  of  France,  as  at  variance 


1775] 


APOLOGY   FOR   THE    MILITARV   ART. 


2\ 


with  the  assumption,  that  nations  liabittially  armed  to  the  teeth  are 
sloioly  bleediii!^ to  dee.th.  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  tl;at  the  normal  con- 
dition of  society  is  peace  ;  and  in  proportion  as  the  resources  of  the 
state  are  diverted  to  \varlike  uses,  exccj)t  ///  extremis,  or  in  the  indis- 
pensable preparation  for  impeiulin;^  or  continj^ent  dant^er,  society 
suffers,  and  suffers  just  in  proportion  as  the  oblit^ations  of  God's  law 
are  impcnitivo.  and  vital  prosperity  depends  upon  adherence  to  those 
oblii^ations. 

All  similar  and  related  questions  of  every  kind  are  swallowed  up 
in  the  fact,  that  as  society  suffers  from  internal  violence,  so  nations  as 
such,  are  put  in  peril.  True  wisdom  lies  in  such  a  just  and  honorable 
discharije  of  every  tluty  that  war  without  just  cause,  is  only  possible, 
as  an  outrage,  which  humanity  at  large  would  condemn  and  resent. 

Should  any  maintain  that  the  time  has  passed  for  rendering 
homage  to  military  attainment,  it  must  be  first  made  to  appear  that  all 
nations  are  prompt  to  rentier  justice,  and  to  accept  and  practice  the 
cardinal  principles  which  Montestjuieu  declares  to  be  the  spirit  of  laws, 
or,  that  the  higher  refinement  of  duty  which  attaches  to  the  precepts 
of  the  Saviour  himself,  has  already  blossomed  into  fruit.  The  great 
fact  is,  that  true  life  is  made  up  of  struggle.  iMnulation  in  labor, 
resolution  as  against  oppression,  ami  ambition  for  preferment  are  parts 
of  all  inner  life.  When  these  partake  of  .self-sacrifice  and  ex[)osure 
for  holy  ends,  .it  the  risk  of  life,  the  subject  is  lifted  above  the  pl.uie 
of  mere  living,  to  that  of  monumental  worth  and  bright  example. 
Where  these  elements  work  evil,  and  assail  the  rights  of  man.  the 
issue  must  be  squarely  met  by  every  agent  avail.ible  for  the  r 
suppression. 

No  nation  rises  by  easy  spring  to  well  balanced  independence. 
Injustice  and  wrong  assert  their  claims,  and  unless  a  people  will  so 
f.ir  indicate  their  self-respect  as  willingly  to  understand  their  duty 
under  any  possible  phase  of  the  future,  there  will  be  brought  home 
to  their  experience  the  bitter  lessons  which  have  involved  so  many 
listless,  corrupted,  and  conceited  nations  in  remediless  ruin. 

If  a  nation,  like  the  m.in,  be  tloubly  armed,  in  a  just  c.iuse,  so  tne 
conscious  dignity  that  follows  an  assured  ability  to  maintain  that 
cause,  is  strong  assurance  of  independence,  and  a  stern  warning  to 
aggressors.  No  student  of  history  will  fail  to  see  that  the  profession 
of  arms  has  ever  been  esteemed  honorable. 

The  sacred  record  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  society  itself, 
and  thus  becomes  the  vitalizing  and  essential  element  of  all  true  pro- 


f 


liljH 


•a 


M 


[ 


h 


I  f 


22 


AI'Ol.OCY    FOR    I'lIK   MII.irAKY   ART. 


I1775 


gress,  bears  honorable  testimony  to  the  prowess  of  those  who  bore 
arms  against  unrigliteous  violence.  The  Bible,  therefore,  recognizing 
the  necessity  for  those  who  bear  the  shield  in  the  front  of  battle,  both 
records  and  honors  their  triumphs.  Where,  in  classic  epic,  will  be 
found  more  jubilant  refrains  over  victories  won,  than  the  song  of 
Deborah  !  and  what  can  surpass  the  majesty  and  all-embracing  full- 
ness of  the  chorus  of  Miriam  and  Moses  ! 

The  \er\-  l.iws  and  usages  of  chivalry  were  predicated  upon  the 
idea  that  the  true  soldier  represented  the  best  type  of  ri'tlnement  and 
honor.  I'iety  itself,  now  so  exalted,  self-denying,  and  precious,  was 
once  but  a  synonym  for  generous  courage  and  true  manhood.  In 
its  manifestations  of  filial  love,  combined  with  brave  deeds,  was  fouml 
the  hero  of  Virgil.  There  have  indeed  been  periods  of  history,  when 
the  soklier  knight  was  almost  exclusively  the  scholar,  and  the  cloister 
alone  furnished  those  who,  besides  himself,  could  transcribe  thought 
upon  parchment  or  paper. 

Bunyan  and  Milton  assume  the  metaphors  and  terms  of  military 
life,  while  they  delineate  their  highest  characters,  and  expend  the 
best  efforts  of  their  genius  in  forms  which  borrow  strength  and  signifi- 
cance from  the  military  profession.  Both  sacred  and  profane  history 
combine  to  honor  him  who  honors  himself  in  arms.  The  "  good 
fight  "  has  not  been  fought  out.  This  is  not  the  day  for  the  gracious 
glories  of  millennial  peace  ;  neither  should  the  military  profession  be 
crowned  for  other  merit  than  that  which  attaches  to  its  fa'ithfulness  to 
duty,  as  the  conservator  of  just  and  sacred  rights. 

T/u'  ever  iiiereasing  responsibilities  t/uil  attend  tlic  rapid  increase  of 
the  zi'or.'d's  population,  and  t/ie  eotnniereial  enterprise  which  brings  half- 
vivilizcd  and  barbarous  people  into  intimacy  and  interfusion  with  less 
populous,  but  better  educated  nations,  are  pregnant  with  issues  ivhich 
provoke  luDiian  passion  and  huvuiii  conflict.  Tidal  waves  of  armed 
ignorance,  superstition,  and  brutalism  are  not  impossible  because  a 
select  minority  of  the  earth's  inhabitants  are  enlightened  and  civil- 
ized. 

History  has  recorded  such  events  under  circumstances  no  more 
difficult  than  the  future  may  evolve.  So  also,  the  irresponsibility  of 
despotic  power,  and  the  fiery  scourge  of  religious  fanaticism,  are  not 


)arrcd  ou 


t  bee 


ause  just  now  restrain 


ed. 


There  is  already  a  relaxation  of  fealty  to  authority,  an  indepen- 
dence of  individual  obligation  to  the  rights  of  the  many,  a  jealousy 
of  superiority,  whether   of  mental   or  industrial   attainment,  which 


'775.J 


APOLOGY   FOR  THE   MILITARY   ART. 


23 


tend  to  anarchy ;  and  these  work  in  the  same  direction  with  the 
arrogant  spirit  of  centralization  and  oppression,  which  gradually  and 
inquiringly  lifts  its  arm  as  in  the  middle  ages. 

The  final  issue  must  be  resolved,  either  by  intelligent  recognition 
of  a  common  moral  obligation,  and  respect  for  the  rights  of  all  ;  or 
the  conflicts  of  physical  force  will  go  beyond  their  true  mission  and 
introduce  unparalleled  conflict. 

Tlicre  is  no  aspect  in  which  the  knowledge  of  military  science  does 
not  commend  itself  to  the  favor  of  the  present  generation.  The  les- 
sons to  be  derived  from  history  were  never  so  pre-eminently  useful 
as  now,  and  they  will  hereafter  hold  a  more  solemn  place  in  the 
mind  of  the  thoughtful  scholar.  In  introducing  those  principles 
which  place  military  attainment  in  fellowship  with  true  science,  thereby 
stating  the  laws  by  which  to  test  the  deeds  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion, it  can  not  be  entirely  foreign  or  discursive  thus  to  blend  their 
statement  with  honorable  mention  of  its  history. 


'i  , 


ii 


ji" 


-III 


I 


fii 

ii  } 


'( 


r  1'  'i.'.    ' 

1  1 

i  ■■ 

' 

1  ' 

I    ! 


11 

in        i 


CHAPTER     V. 

WARS   BETWEEN  NATIONS. 

THE  use  of  force  to  assert  rights,  or  redress  wrongs, — the  inter- 
ruption of  friendly  relations  between  states, — organized  resist- 
ance to  the  supreme  authority  of  a  single  state  ;  and  the  sweep  of 
some  over-mastering  passion  or  opinion,  carrying  with  its  ebullition 
violence  and  the  upheaval  of  existing  order,  n/iL'  I'riiii^iiuir. 

Whether  the  rights  asserted  be  just,  and  the  wrongs  alleged  be 
real,  is  a  matter  that  mainly  affects  that  moral  force  which  imparts  to 
physical  force  its  best  assurance  of  success.  Without  this  electric 
impulse,  the  superior  in  numbers  and  general  resources  may  become 
the  vanquished  party. 

Barbarism  and  fanaticism^  alone,  are  unrestrained  in  war. 
One  is  the  expression  of  the  brute,  the  other  of  madness;  and  yet,  by 
a  strange  anomaly  in  human  nature,  certain  classes  of  wars  among 
civilized  nations  partake  of  both  elements. 

Ex-President  WoOLSEY  defines  a  just  war,  as  "  one  that  is  waged 
in  the  last  resort,  when  peaceable  means  have  failed  to  procure 
redress,  or  when  self-defense  calls  for  it." 

The  common-law  rule  for  the  magistrate  in  the  execution  of  his 
duty,  and  for  the  citizen  in  self-defense,  admits,  however,  of  only  the 
necessary  force  required  for  the  immediate  issue.  This  princiyile  is 
agreeable  to  international  law  as  best  interpreted,  and  should  be 
regarded  as  the  standard  of  waste  which  a  state  can  afford  in  exercise 
of  the  right  of  war.  Excessive  or  vindicative  force  is  retro-active 
upon  the  party  exercising  it,  and  is  fatal  to  all  concert  of  nations  in 
relief  of  the  hardships  of  war. 

Vattcl  declares  that,  "  whenever  justice  is  done,  all  right  of  em- 
ploying force  is  superseded."  He  divides  wars  into  two  sorts  ;  lawful 
and  unlawful,  the  latter  being  those  undertaken  without  apparent 
cause  and  for  havoc  or  pillage ;  all  others  being  lawful. 


1775- 


WARS   BKTWKEV    NATIONis. 


35 


itjcd 


his 
the 
e  is 
be 
iCise 
:tive 
IS  in 


I 


Grotiiis  makes  the  distinction  between  those  solemnly  undertaken 
by  the  state,  and  those  non-so/oiiii,  that  ^low  out  of  the  acts  of  sub- 
ordinate authority,  not  r.itified  by  the  head  of  the  state. 

IV/icaion  asserts  that,  if  war  be  declared  in  form  by  one  state,  it 
entitles  both  bellii;erent  parties  to  all  the  rights  of  war  against  each 
other,  whether  the  war  be  just  or  not. 

Ilallcck  notices  the  distinction  between  perfect  and  imperfect 
wars,  when,  in  one  case,  all  the  citizens  of  two  states  are  placed  in 
anta^Ljonism,  aiul  in  the  other,  there  is  a  limitation  ol  persons,  places, 
and  tln'ngs,  as  illustrated  in  the  character  of  hostilities  authorized  by 
the  United  States  against  France  in  179S. 

The  terms  offensive  and  defensive  have  also  been  applied  to  dis- 
tinguish wars,  although  more  applicable  to  military  opcratioiiSy  since 
every  war  o"  considerable  magnitude  or  duration,  has  its  alternations 
of  attack  and  defense.  Even  in  the  shaping  of  cabinet  policy,  these 
terms  are  rather  those  of  action  than  of  type  of  contest,  the  verbal 
or  diplomatic  initiative  b  ing  so  aggressive  as  to  compel  protest  and 
armed  resentment. 

An  equivalent  principle  obtains  at  common  law,  where  "  verbal 
acts,"  so  called,  may  warrant  physical  redress.  It  is  not  proposed  to 
carry  this  discussion  into  the  domain  of  international  law,  which  is 
largely  that  of  ethics,  but  to  recognize  the  distinctions  and  energizing 
principles  of  battle-issues. 

Writers  have  needlessly  enlarged  upon  the  classification  of  wars, 
and  only  a  brief  allusion  is  deemed  necessary  to  cover  all  the  ground 
wnich  has  real  value  to  the  citizen  or  student. 

While  wars  vary  in  the  manifestation  and  use  of  force,  their  suc- 
cess involves  the  same  principles  of  the  military  art.  The  elements 
that  inspire  hostility,  and  tender  the  battle-issue,  largely  determine 
the  character  of  the  war,  and  decide  whether  a  whole  nation  is  to 
put  its  resources  and  existence  at  risk,  or  only  to  display  a  partial 
force  for  some  temporary  advantage  to  itself,  or  in  behalf  of  another 
nation  seeking  its  support.  But  when  two  nations,  as  two  pugilists,  em- 
ploy their  resources  exhaustively  against  each  other,  the  term  national 
Tfrtrhas  proper  application.  Such  wars  are  peculiarly  free  from  those 
heathenish  exhibitions  which  attach  to  internecine  types  of  conflict. 
The  national  honor,  sensitive  and  forced  to  the  issue,  aims  to  pay 
respect  to  international  law,  and  thereby  to  challenge  the  moral  recog- 
nition of  civilized  neutrals. 

It  is  not  an   error,  in  a  qualified  sense,  to  treat  as  national  wars, 


II  fi' 


i 


26 


WAKs  ri:t\vf;i:n  nati  )ns. 


[1775 


the  striigf;lcs  of  ;i  oncL-  vanquished  pt-nplc  to  rc;^ain  their  iiulcpcii- 
cicnce.  The  supprcssrcl  riiitidiiality  h.is  its  ])atiiotic  loni^iii^^s,  aiul 
althoui^h  lacking  piibhc  rccoijiiitioii  until  successful,  the  struLj^le  par- 
takes of  a  national  character.  I'okiiul  .iiul  Hungary  for  example, 
tried  to  re>unie  their  place  anion^  nations,  so  that  revolt  was  not 
.nerel)'  insurrection,  hut  assertion  of  national  i/i/i'/y,  kept  in  subjection 
by  the  force  of  contiuest.  Such  cases  differ,  however,  from  a  pre- 
tended re-assertion  of  n.itional  character  in  attempted  disruption  of  a 
union  whicli  h.ul  the  consent  of  both  parties,  and  where  the  merger 
of  individuality  has  oeen  voluntary  and  complete.  Thus  Scotland 
became  an  intej^ral  i  irt  of  (ireat  Ihitain,  ami  Te.xas  became  an 
integral  part  of  the  United  States  by  common  consent.  Turkey  has 
repeatedly  made  war  witii  Russia  to  ward  off  the  accumulating  force 
which  threatened  her  iniiependeiice,  her  national  life. 

The  stiu_ij;;^Ie  of  the  Netherlands  against  Spain,  of  the  Spa!iish 
peninsula  against  France,  of  France  against  the  allies,  are  treated  by 
General  Halleck  as  wars  for  indepentlence,  and  )'et  those  were 
national  wars,  to  perfect  and  vindicate  national  existence.  The  war 
of  i.Sij,  between  (ireat  IJritain  and  the  United  .States,  has  been  treated 
as  a  war  for  independence.  It  was,  however,  largely  the  culmination 
of  misunderstandings,  put  at  issue  indeed  by  the  dawning  develop- 
ment of  those  rights  of  citizenship  which  in  later  years  have  gained 
general  acceptance.  The  claim  of  America  was  no  ni'^re  an  assertion 
of  independence  from  l^ritish  control,  than  was  that  of  Great  l^ritain 
a  claim  for  independence  in  the  control  of  her  home-born  subjects. 
The  former  was  the  outgrowth  of  questions  unsettled  by  the  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  and  the  latter  but  the  instinctive  adherence  to  long 
existing  prerogative.  The  former  guaranteed  to  the  adopted  citizen 
the  full  measure  of  national  protection  ;  the  latter  claimed  the  per- 
petual allegiance  of  all  once  citizens,  and  the  right  to  reclaim  their 
persons  even  on  the  high  seas,  whenever  found.  The  war,  howeve-, 
was  truly  a  national  war.  A  war  for  independence  suggests  its  own 
mission.  It  is  the  struggle  of  a  colony,  a  dependent  section  of  the 
state  or  of  a  distinct  race,  to  obtain  and  maintain  public  recognition 
as  a  distinct  nation.  It  finds  its  key  in  the  first  grade  of  Revolution 
hereafter  considered. 

liaron  Jouiini  declares  that.  "  the  spontaneous  uprising  of  an 
united  nation,  must  not  be  confounded  with  a  national  defense,  in 
accordance  with  the  institutions  of  the  state  and  ilirected  by  the  gov- 
ernment."    His  statement   originates  in  the  idea,  that  the  govern- 


[1775 


I77S] 


WARS  nirrwKKN'  nations. 


37 


Lsscrtion 
Britiiin 

uhjects. 

Anicri- 

to  long 

citizen 

|hc  pcr- 
iii  their 
tnvevc", 
[its  own 
of  the 
ignition 
lolution 

of  an 

|nse,  in 

lie  gov- 

tovern- 


ment  m.iy'act  indopendeiUly  of  tiie  people,  .ind  foreign  to  their  interests 
or  wishes.  He  would  thus  limit  iiiitional  w.irs  to  popiil.ir  outbursts  in 
search  of  iiuiepcndcnce,  or  such  as  are  necessary  to  save  the  national 
life  which  has  been  put  in  peril.  The  statement  ignores  those  states 
whose  government  is  rep,  cscntativc,  and  therefore  the  e.^ecutive  of  the 
will  of  the  people,  lie  adds:  "The  term  national,  can  only  be 
applied  to  such  wars  as  are  waged  against  an  united  people,  or  a 
majority  of  them,  filled  with  a  noble  ardor,  and  determined  to  sustain 
their  inilependence."  Wars,  however,  may  be  precipitated  upon  an 
entire  1.  ition  by  blunders  of  administration,  misconception  of  con- 
flicting issues,  or  want  of  that  catholicity  and  generous  negotiation 
which  will  ^'eierally  command  [)eace  when  nations  really  desire  peace. 
There  may  be  re.di/.ed  in  such  cases  only  a  lukewarm  support  of  the 
government  by  the  people  ;  but  the  nation  is  responsible  for  the  war, 
and  its  government  is  responsible  to  the  people.  Sometimes  a  war 
is  begun  which  dishonors  national  character  and  strikes  at  the  rights 
of  other  nations,  without  any  reasonable  equivalent  to  the  party  tak- 
ing the  aggressive.  Wars  for  conquest  are  of  this  type,  and  so  are 
wars  for  the  propagandism  of  ideas,  whether  political  or  religious. 
Upon  the  assumption,  not  to  be  thoughtlessly  discredited,  that  every 
nati(Jii,  as  an  abstract  matter,  has  a  rightful  independence  in  legitimate 
pursuits  of  peace,  but  no  right  to  enforce  its  domestic  policy  upm 
equally  independent  nations,  all  forms  of  propagandism  by  force  of 
arms  are  destructive  of  society,  and  violate  that  international  comity 
tvhich,  as  between  nations,  is  but  the  application  of  the  wise  restraint 
which  governs  citizens  in  the  exercise  of  individual  personal  rights. 

The  Crusades  and  the  Moslem  wars  were  of  the  character  adverted 
to,  full  of  evil  passions  and  evil  fruit,  and  in  defiance  of  all  social  and 
national  rights.  Fortunately,  wars  for  mere  conquest  have  rarely 
perpetuated  the  state  which  committed  the  robbery.  The  compensa- 
tions of  time  under  Providence  brand  conquest.  The  mark  of  Cain 
shows  itself.  To  rob  a  nation  of  life,  is  not  to  be  a  glorious  mission 
in  the  future. 

Wars  of  Intervention,  once  so  common  in  behalf  of  a  so-called 
balance  of  pozvcr,  are  almost  invariably  of  doubtful  expediency,  and 
can  only  be  justified  when  there  has  been  that  willful  violation  of  the 
law  of  nations,  which  calls  upon  the  strong  to  protect  or  vindicate  the 
weak  from  an  attempt  at  conquest,  or  the  destruction  of  rights  which 
are  fundamental  and  essential  to  national  life. 

The  true  balance  uf  poiver,  is  that  of  moral  and  industrial  excel 


»'•: 


Hit 


it! 


28 


WARS   BETWEEN   NATIONS, 


[i77S. 


lence.  All  else  savors  of  the  dark  ages,  and  is  as  absurd  irl  essence, 
as  the  impossible  equality  of  individuals  in  wealth  or  accomplishments. 
Equality  to-day,  will  end  to-morrow,  just  in  proportion  as  the  deserving 
improve  their  acquisitions  and  the  unthrifty  and  selfish  waste  them. 
When  the  French  army  shall  equal  the  German,,  the  German -impulse 
will  prompt  a  fresh  expenditure  to  retain  ascendency  in  the  material 
of  war,  at  the  expense  of  domestic  rest.  Such  are  the  considerations 
which,  as  a  general  rule,  are  to  determine  the  character  of  national 
wars  and  indicate  their  limit. 

A  nation  has  in  fact  no  right  to  go  to  war  unless  it  can  pledge  its 
entire  national  resources  to  the  hazard.  Neither  has  a  nation  the  right 
to  go  to  war  if  there  be  any  attainable  settlement  of  controversy  upon 
a  just  basis  without  war.  As  a  general  rule,  one  nation  has  no  pur- 
pose to  destroy  or  absorb  its  opponent,  but  only  to  wear  it  out  a  little, 
so  that  it  will  be  too  tired  to  keep  up  controversy.  As  an  equally 
general  rule,  nations  are  left  after  war  pretty  much  where  they  started 
in  respect  of  the  issue  made,  but  fearfully  poor  in  the  elements  of  a 
truly  national  life 


1 13      " 


4 


[i77S. 


1 


CHAPTER   Vr. 


CIVIL  WAR,   DISTINCTION    BETWEEN   INSURRECTIO'-I,  REBELLION, 

AND   REVOLUTION. 

CIVIL  war  is  a  war  of  one's  own  household,  intestine,  and  full  of 
bitter  issues. 

In  proportion  as  a  state  conserves  the  rights  of  its  citizens  and 
dispenses  even  justice,  a  civil  struggle  has  the  same  merit  which  the 
claim  of  any  bodily  member  might  assert  against  the  supremacy  of  the 
head  or  the  heart.  Just  as  the  mangled  limb  or  deranged  function 
imperils  the  whole  system,  and  can  only  revive  its  normal  use  by 
wholesoine  acceptance  of  its  dependence,  and  such  treatment  as  sub- 
serves the  welfare  of  the  uninjured  parts,  so  do  civil  feuds  and  strifes 
endanger  the  state  at  the  expense  of  the  disaffected  members,  crown- 
ing the  struggle  with  the  ruin  of  all  alike. 

Civil  war  proper,  is  a  war  of  factions,  not  necessaiily  aiming  at  the 
integrity  of  the  state,  but  involving  separate  aspirations  to  obtain 
control  of  the  state,  or  at  least  supremacy  over  the  rival  faction.  The 
South  American  States  and  Mexico  furnish  impressive  examples  of 
civil  war.  The  English  "  War  of  the  Roses,"  that  of  the  League  in 
France,  and  of  the  Guelphs  and  Ghibellines  in  Italy,  arc  suggestive 
of  the  mischief  to  the  body  politic  which  must  attftnd  an  effort  to 
push  personal  or  party  strifes  to  the  usurpation  of  national  authority. 
Success  itself  has  no  sound  basis  of  perpetuity,  because  essentially 
maintained  only  in  defiance  of  others'  rights.  Such  wars  were  rife  in 
feudal  times  ;  and  more  than  once  the  powers  of  Burgundy  and 
France  were  well-nigh  paralyzed  for  national  offense  or  defense,  by  the 
selfish  strife  of  rival  aspirants  for  local  power  or  influence  at  court. 

Civil  war,  however,  has  a  general  sweep  which  includes  other  and 
related  classes ;  these  having  subjective  relations  while  full  of  dis- 
similar elements,  viz.,  INSURRECTION,    Rebellion,    Revolution 


!  ir 


» It 


^  •;: 


'i; 


1  :i^ 


'I 

I 


1' 


30 


CIVIL  WAR. 


L1775- 


Each  alike,  belong;  to  civil  war,  insomuch  as  the  parties  at  issue 
bcloni;  to  tlic  state  which  is  put  in  labor  by  their  struggle. 

{</)  IxsURRKC'l'IDN  is  resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  state  in  con- 
tempt of  cxistin;4  law,  It  has  no  dignity,  no  worthy  aspiration,  and  is 
as  lawless  as  it  is  illegal.  It  has  none  of  the  elements  which  make 
rebellion  formidable,  which  vindicate  revolution,  and  give  to  both 
rebellion  and  revolution  a  memorable  j)lace  among  wars. 

The  failure  of  a  state  to  govern -wisely,  in  accordance  with  divine 
obligation,  may  engender  distrust,  antagonisms,  and  ultimate  over- 
throw ;  but  insiirrixtion  is  limited  to  that  st>-le  of  popular  outburst, 
which,  with  no  possible  hope  of  redress  for  alleged  wrongs,  or  benefit 
to  the  complaining  parties,  puts  the  rights  of  all  in  peril. 

It  mocks  at  law  and  order  and  the  remedies  of  the  courts,  aijd 
trifles  with  the  rights  of  property  and  person.  This  statement  is  pre- 
dicated upon  the  supposed  existence  of  legitimate  authority,  and  that 
the  functions  of  the  body-politic  are  working  in  the  usual  channels  of 
a  state  of  peace. 

Jealousy  of  a  superior  social  condition,  conflict  with  wise  social 
laws,  sudden  impulses  to  take  crimes  or  political  issues  out  of  the 
sphere  of  their  legitimate  control  and  adjudication,  and  even  political 
or  religious  cntJinsia,  are  among  the  causes  of  insurrection. 

The  violence  is  limited,  and  in  a  state  which  is  upheld  by  a  healthy 
moral  sentiment  on  the  part  of  the  people,  must  be  short-lived  and 
fruitless  except  for  evil.  In  this  class  of  conflict  occur  those  strikes 
of  labor  against  capital,  which  both  waste  capital  and  degrade  honor- 
able industry;  and  to  this  ephemeral  and  suicidal  ebullition  of  passion 
the  reckless  partisan,  with  no  ambition  beyond  office,  is  the  incentive. 

Insurrection  has  no  apology,  short  of  a  condition  where  the  resist- 
ance of  an  individual  to  lawless  force  is  his  only  salvation  ;  and  then 
insurrection  is  merged  in  the  duty  of  Revolution.  In  a  just,  civilized 
state,  there  is  redress,  however  slow,  by  legal  methods,  and  deferred 
redress  is  better  than  law  defied.  The  mob-law,  which  hangs  a  crim- 
inal in  advance  of  legal  process,  breathes  the  spirit  of  insurrection,  and 
its  impulse  may  shift,  and  may  in  turn,  strike  the  best  friend  of  the 
state  and  people.  History  bears  frightful  testimony  to  the  character 
of  such  demonstrations. 

In  1358,  the  Jacquerie,  on  the  assertion  that  the  nobles  were 
oppressive  and  guilty  of  all  license,  began  an  unqualified  slaughter 
of  all  who  had  preeminence  for  education,  station,  or  wealth,  until 
the  catalogue  of  outrages  upon  person  and  life  became  the  synonym 


'775-] 


CIVIL  WAR. 


3' 


.>althy 

d  and 

strikes 

lonor- 

assion 

jutive. 

resist- 

(1  then 

.ilizcd 

fcrrcd 

crim- 

1,  and 

.f  the 

racter 

wore 
t:;hter 
[until 

)nyn' 


for  all  time,  of  the   possibilities  of  insurrection   in   the  decjradation 

of  man. 

Under  the  cloak  of  religious  zeal,  an  equal  fury  burned  in  the 
breasts  of  bigots  during  the  middle  ages,  and  the  spirit  has  not  )'et 
taken  its  flight  from  earth  to  its  oivn  placi.  On  the  fifth  of  March, 
1770,  when  the  jieople  of  Boston  were  almost  at  open  issue  with  the 
authorities,  and  the  leaven  of  revolution  was  already  working  to  the 
surface,  a  mob  precipitated  a  needless  quarrel  with  the  soldiery, 
caused  the  death  of  Attucks  and  two  other  citizens,  and  threatened 
the  entire  city  with  fire  ai;d  blood.  The  dignity  of  the  courts,  and 
the  vindication  of  the  soldiers  by  Quincy  and  Adams,  alone  restored 
order  and  averted  extremes. 

In  December,  1 786,  Shays'  rebellion  broke  out  in  Massachusetts. 
The  claim  that  the  Governor's  salary  was  excessive,  that  the  State 
Senate  was  aristocratic,  and  that  taxes  were  odious,  was  pushed  so  vio- 
lently and  wildly,  that  courts  were  interrupted,  and  it  seemed  as  if 
anarchy  was  to  bur)-  all  memory  of  holy  sacrifices  made  in  the  war 
which  had  so  recently  closed. 

When  a  rightful  duty  was  imposed  upon  spirits  in  1795,  the  pop 
nlar  resistance  set  Pennsylvania  on  fire  with  similar  demonstrations. 
I'he  mails  were  robbed,  and  nameless  crimes  against  virtue  and  inno- 
cence followed  in  the  wake  of  pretended  assertion  of  civil  rights.  It 
required  the  promptest  exertion  of  President  Washington  and  Gov- 
ernor Lee,  and  the  employment  of  fifteen  thousand  troops  to  restore 
order,  and  society  did  not  resume  a  placid  surface  for  a  long  time 
thereafter. 

No  less  conspicuous,  in  a  military  relation,  were  the  uprisings  of 
both  British  and  American  troops  in  New  Jersey.  In  both  cases,  the 
exhibition  of  force  had  nothing  to  gain,  but  put  in  jeopardy  the  very 
interests  which  the  men  were  sworn  to  uphold.  In  one  case,  the 
English  proposition  to  compromise  with  the  colonies,  was  the  exclu- 
sive prerogative  of  the  state  ;  and  in  the  other,  the  very  ability  of 
Congress  to  pay  arrears  due  the  troops,  depended  eventually  and 
wholly  upon  the  moral  force  which  discipline  could  impart  to  the 
army.     Moreover,  the  officers  suffered  equally  with  the  men. 

[J))  REUIiLLIoNhas  a  broader  domain.     While  insurrection  ignores 
or  trifles  with  authority,  and  substitutes  selfishness  and  passion  for  le- 
gitimate means  of  redress,  the  former  disobeys  and  defies  the  author 
ity  of  the  state.     Halleck  defines  rebellion  as,  "  usually,  a  war  between 
the  legitimate  government  of  a  state,  and  portions  or  parts  of  the 


u. 


!^l 


|i  ij!;     '  M 


if 


">; 


|r 


32 


Civil,   WAR. 


177? 


saim.-,  who  sock  to  ovcrthiDW  tin;  1:0  vc  mm  cut  or  to  dissolve   the  allc' 


^naiui"  to  it,  and  set  ii])  one  of  their  o 


)\vn. 


.itinir  tlie  war  of  tiie  (1 


at 


Kebelhon  in  l'",ii;_;l,iii<l,  and  that  of  the  SMiitiierii  States  in  America  in 
1S61.  Rcbelh'i)n  lias  organization  and  nulhod,  embraces  more  defi- 
nite plans  for  prolonged  resistance,  and  differs  therein  from  insurrec- 
tion, which  expends  its  stren<^th  upon  sudden  and  tem])orarv  expres- 


sion, .iffi'ctin!. 


)d  oriler,  indeed,  but  lackinir  the  cohenuce  ,ind  com- 


pri'licnsiim    of  issues  which  char.icterize    its   development    into   open 
rebellion  aijainsi  the  slate  itself. 

(()   Ri;vi  lU!  I II  ).\   .advances  with   purpose  to  overthrow  the  state 
and  substitute  a  new  form   of  i^overnmeut,  or   a  new   dynasty.      The 
ominal  Rii^/if  (>f  Rrro/ii/ii'ii  is  asserted  by  ni.iny,  as  if  it  were  a  hi;^h 
nchisi;  bclnnL;ini;  to  the  people,  and  one  which  they  may 
iccordin'/   to   their   choici'.      11 


n 


reserve 


exercise 


lis    is   not    tru( 


here  are 


ie.lecd,  conditions   under  which  a  people  may  assert    such   a  choice; 
but  these  conditions  must   have  foundation  in  principlc-s  which  under- 

cale  the  claim  of  the  people  to 


lie  social  ori'anization   i 


I  self.     '1 


O   VUKll 


be  i^overned  wisely  and  justl)'  is  one  proposition  ;  but  to  admit  that  a 
majority  may  exi'rcise  their  choice  as  a  matter  of  abstract  ri_i,dit,  and 
by  violence,  is  to  strike  a  fatal  blow  ,it  real  liberty.  The  doi^ma  savors 
ot  the  WMj-'.,!  forms  o|  civil  war,  ;j,i\(s  tlii^nit}'  to  insurrection,  develops 
formal  ri  Ixllion,  and  refuses  to  the  minority  their  ecpial  ri_L;hts  with 
the  niajoiit)-.  The  deliberate  and  in.itinu'd  moditlcation  of  existing 
forms,  pe.iceably  and  constitutional!)-  effecteil,  is  of  course  an  entirely 
different  matter.  The  fluctuations  of  opinion  which  mark  all  truly 
enlit^htened  nations,  are  the  true  life  of  real  development,  and  the 
alternat  ions  of  .ivil  control  which  attend  these  conflicts  of  opinion, 
are  desiL;iied  to  work  out  ultimate  jjcace  and  prosperity  for  the 
entire  body  politic.  ;\  false  assumption  as  to  this  alleijed  ric^ht  ni 
revolution  has  oftc'ii  dis;^niised  civil  war,  and  has  made  Me.xican  Rev- 
olution an  ex])ression  for  license,  insecurity,  and  general  waste. 
There  are  but  two  conditions  which  lift  revolution  to  the  dit;nity 
of  a  riLjht,  and  t/iiii  t/ic  Iwu-  of  duty  (oiii/hIs  the  revolution.  It  is  not 
sought,  but  comes  as  an  inevitable  assertion  of  the  principle  of 
self-thfense. 

'1  he  first  grade  is  that  which  devolves  u])on  distant  dependencies, 
the  assertion  of  IndkI'KNDKNCK,  when  the  controlling  authority  is 
unable  or  unwilling  to  grant  the  people  their  rights  and  proper  rep- 
resentation ;  when  laws  arc  constraints  without  ecpiivalents,  and  the 
subjects  are,  in  fact,  slaves,  without  the  filial  relation  which  people  are 


1775-1 


Civil,   WAR. 


33 


to  bear  to  the  state,  and  which  reciprocally  binds  the  state  to  Ie;^Ms- 
late  for  tlu;  coinrnoii  ^o(k1  of  all  who  render  homage. 

Tile  si'cond  condition  is  cumulative  of  the  first;  when  the  ab- 
sorption of  power  in  the  t^overnin;^  authority  is  wholly  srt  upon  its 
own  a;.ji,n-andizenient  in  defiance  of  popular  rii^hls,  ;ind  no  redress 
cm  be  found  throu^di  lei^islalivi;  or  judicial  sources.  Merc  errors  of 
i(l;.Mnent  in  line  of  polic)-,  or  the  administration  i 


.1" 


if  law  tl 


iroii'.ih  mis- 


taken forms,  is  not  a  fair  basis  for  ovrrlhrow  of  t:\isliiii(  state  sov- 
ereignty. There  must  be  such  a  condition  that  no  nMJress  is  obtain- 
able tlirouidi  e'stablishcd  methods,  and  existin;^  .uithority  has  lost  its 
ts  subjects,  by  subvertiiij^'  the  [)rincipies  which  under- 


lold  upon  I 


lie  and  imparl  all  authority.  • 

riurc  is  (I  divine  riyjtt  of  authority.     That    social  crystallization 


whicli  enlar'U's  tlic 


finiily 


relation  aiK 


1   f- 


rms  ihe  state,  carrii's  with  it 


not  onlv  the-  obliiralion  of  wise  control,  l)ut   that  of 


wise  o 


bed 


lenct: 


Tl 


le  parent    may  outraL^i;  liiat   relation,  and   the   law  will  i;ive  to  liie 


iid 


ciiilil  a  iMiardian,  or   emanci|)a 


te    it   fr 


om   the   abused   control 


It 


is 


uiuler  just  such  a  phase  of  civil  sufferiiii;  th.it  the  remedy  lies  in  rev- 
olution and  independence.  The  obhYjation  of  the  child  to  endure 
until  no  other  renu.'dy  is  [jossible,  is  the  type  of  the  patii'iici'  and 
duty  which  must  possess  the  citizen  until  the  necessity  of  self-defense 
ilemands  the  ultimate  remedy 


In   itH 


s  assertion    there  must    be 


an 


unfiualiHed    search   for  a  true 


social  peace,  and   not  a 


11  am 


biti 


fe 


d( 


ion    lor  independence  such  as   a   muK 


would   covet    under  the    irksome    restraint    of  wholesome    or    even 
stringent  control. 

The  whole  history  of  continental  revolutions  is  full  of  lessons  of 
warniiv^  to  those  wlu)  for  nominal  chanj^es,  or  nominal  forms  of  ijov- 
ernment,  make  haste  to  overturn  e.xistiiiij  order  without  the  moral 
purjjose  or  ca|)acity  to  remedy  the  evils  which  are  the  burden  of 
complaint. 

Authority  is  intrinsically  arbitrary.  So  lon^^  as  men  are  fickle  and 
human,  there  will  be  a  tendency  to  abuse  that  authority,  and  an 
equally  fatal  tendency  to  despise  all  authority.  The  power  of  the 
many  is  no  less  despotic  than  that  of  the  few  ;  and  the  law  of  man,  is 
to  aim  at  the  hii^hest  t^ood  of  the  greatest  number,  and  not  to  fly  in 
the  face  of  authority  because  of  a  fancied  improvement  throuf^h 
coveted  chanije.  Outside  of  this  law  of  social  life  there  is  no  stability, 
no  progress,  no  abiding  peace. 

Revolution  is  therefore  a   last   resort,  and   the  subordination  of 


r 


1      ■    ■ 

iiiii 

1      ' 

. 

34 


CIVIL  WAR. 


L1775 


temporary  issues  or  burdens  to  the  general  peace  will  bring  ultimate 
benefit  to  any  cnliLjhtencd  people  who  have  legitimate  avenues  by 
which  to  control  or  shape  the  policy  of  rulers,  without  a  spasmodic 
dash  for  its  overthrow,  and  a  plunge  from  bad  to  doubtful,  or  worse. 
Revolution,  like  civil  war  in  all  its  phases,  involves  cost,  waste,  and 
long  stagnation  of  the  offices  of  true  peace.  These  must  be  risked  in 
the  last  resort,  but  only  when  legitimate  methods  fail,  and  the 
issue  hurries  the  solution  to  a  crisis. 


:  I 

IP 


11 


I 


i 


:; 


CHAPTER   VII. 


PROVIDENCE   IN   WAR   ILLUSTRATED. 

THE  war  for  American  Independence  was  marked  by  many  crit- 
ical events  which  were  beyond  human  control  or  remedy. 
Some  of  these  changed  the  relations  of  contending  armies  in  a  single 
night.  More  than  once,  a  few  hours  of  unexpected  rain,  wind  or  fog, 
were  enough  to  assure  lasting  results.  These  determining  events, 
because  belonging  to  the  sphere  and  operation  of  physical  laws,  are 
not  beyond  the  recognition  of  nature's  Master.  They  testify  very 
clearly  at  least,  the  absolute  uncertainty  of  the  best  human  plans, 
whether  for  peace  or  war,  and  the  value  of  the  promptness  which 
seizes  every  opportunity  as  it  passes,  and  thus  gives  shape  to  material 
issues  which  are  ripe  for  solution. 

A  few  facts  are  grouped  together  in  advance  of  their  relations  to 
specific  battles,  to  illustrate  the  principle. 

Early  in  the  month  of  November,  1775,  the  expedition  of  Arnold 
to  Canada  was  rashly  pushed  through  a  pathless  wilderness  to  the 
shore  of  the  river  St.  Lawrence.  The  possibilities  of  success  were  fair, 
if  the  invader  could  have  struck  the  feeble  and  astonished  garrison 
promptly  upon  arrival.  Sleet  and  rain  continuing  for  several  days, 
kept  the  adventurer  fast  at  Point  Levi,  and  prepared  the  way  for  his 
signal  failure. 

On  the  morning  of  August  twenty-eighth,  1776,  just  after  the 
battle  of  Long  Island,  a  drizzling  mist,  succeeded  by  heavy  rain  which 
continued  for  most  of  the  day,  retarded  the  approach  of  the  British 
army  to  the  American  intrenchments  at  Brooklyn,  and  prevented  the 
fleet  itself  from  approaching  New  York.  Toward  evening  the  rain 
ceased,  and  work  was  resumed  upon  the  British  lines. 

August  twenty-ninth  was  a  second  day  of  rain  ;  but  every  hour 
was  improved  by  Washington  to  collect  all  kinds  of  boats,  including 


l*t. 


f^',  1', 


I- 


4 


I 


■ 

4 
I'll 

L 

' 

'^!i 

ii 

'w 

i! 

%■ 

1 

I   I   . ,  1  1 


f 


36 


I'koVlUKNCK    IN    WAR    Il.l.US  I  K.\  IKI). 


!"775. 


sloops,  scows,  .111(1  row  Ijd.its,  will)  vi<rw  to  ic-.i  iic  liis  army  lioin 
iinpL'iitliii;;  r.iiiturc.  I  in'  iii.ist<'i  ly  cxcLiitiuii  ul  tin-  it:t  umI  was  m.iilt; 
possible  by  .iii  umx.nnpli  i|  lui;,  wiiiLb  iiiii^crcd  until  Uic  l.isl  ilcl.iclj- 
iiU'iil  liad  t.il\i'ii  p,r...ii;i-.  Ihc  wind  ilsi'll,  wliicli  tluiMlfiifd  to  drive 
tlic  bo.ils  toward  st-a,  sliiftcd  suddenly  and  (piicl<i-ni'il  tin-  transit, 
'lliclii;;  lilted.  I  lir  uiud,  mi  Inn;;  iinprnjiitious,  li.id  dct, lined  the 
Uritish  tlect  .it  the  N.irmws,  while  by  the  cli.in'u:  which  h.nl  didie  S(i 
niiu  h  lui  the  .Anieiicans,  t  li.it  ll(  ct  u.is  bmne  ii|)  the  b.iv  to  assert 
tontml  oi  the  h.irbnr  .ind  river  p.iss.iiM-,  but  [od  Lite  tu  Iml  the  iiiovc- 
iiient  oi  the  Ainerii.in  (  oinm.iiider. 

(  )ii  the  evening;  ol  the  thiitieth  of  ()itober,  l'/J'>,  l'"..iil  I'ercy 
joined  Lord  Howe,  then  em  .iiii|ied  in  troiil  of  tlu;  Anierie.in  lines  at 
White  i'l.iiiis,  and  it  w.is  resolvi:d  to  stoiiii  the  work,  .it  d.i)'bie.ik- 
follo\'.  in;;.  .A  iioi  1  h  c.ister  i.ime  down  ii|)on  the  t  .iiii|is  .it  niidiii;dit, 
ra^iii;,;  wildly  lor  ne.uiy  t  wt'iity  lour  hoiii  s  ;  but  bilon-  tlie  .idv.iiice 
vv.is  .ittein|)ted,  W.isliiiiijtoii  li.id  a;4ain  rescued  hi-,  .iriny  by  wilh- 
dr.iw.il  to  the  liei;;hts  ol  North  (!.istle,  and  oicupied  ,i  position  to(» 
btrouj^  to  w.m.mt  .iss.iult. 

On  (!hristiu.is  ni;;ht,  1 77'),  the  p,ulin;.j  ice  at  Mc("oiikey's  l'\rry, 
nine  miles  .ibove  rreiiloii,  on  the  iJcIawarc  river,  admitted  ol  the 
safe  passa;,;e  .nid  landiii;;  ol  one  column  ol  the  /XnieiiiMii  .niny, 
althoui^h  othi-i  divisions  were  (uled  in  like  .ittrmpts  ,it  terries  still 
nc,iri;r  Ireiiton,  and  thus  the  b.iltle  ol  'I'reiiton  m.idi:  its  st.imi)  "j"*" 
the  eiil  ire  history  of  the  stru;.;;4le.  It  impressed  .ill  ii.itioiis  with  re- 
spect lor  the  ju  iideiu  <■,  coiiraj^e,  and  l.iitli  of  \V.ishiii;.;loii,  .111(1  relieved 
the  .Ameiiciii  tiDop,  ol  tlu:  impression  lli.it  the  llessi.uis  were  a  pecu- 
liarly lieii:e  ,111(1  iiivinciljle  r.ice. 

'I'lle  renew. ll  of  the  olfellsive  by  Waslllll^toll  oil  the  first  of  J. Hill- 
ary, 1777,  by  a;.;.iin  cros.siiiy  the  river,  .ind  in  force,  duriii}.'  comp.i''- 
atively  mild  wiatlier,  was  followed  by  the  abrii|)t  closiiii;  of  tlic* 
Dclaw.ire,  not  siifliciciitly  for  safe  retreat  over  the  ice,  but  .solid 
cnouLjh  to  threaten  his  entire  force  with  destruction  or  t.ipture.  '1  he 
same  e.\treiiie  cold  froze  the  ro, ids.  111. ide  them  pass.ible  lor  artillery 
and  men,  .iiid  th'j  wiiole  situ.itioii  w.is  so  skilllully  improved,  th.it  the 
action  .it  I'linct.tou  followed,  and  his  retre.it  to  secure  winter-tpi.irters 
on  the  hei;^hts  of  New  Jersey,  not  only  s.ived  his  commaiul,  but 
threateneil  the  IJritish  posts  about  New  York  aiul  .ilfected  the  entire 
New  Jersey  camp.iiyn. 

The  b.itlle  of  liraiidywiiie  which  occurred  September  eighth,  1777, 
was   not  accepted   by  Washington   as  decisive   of  the   f.ite  of  Phila- 


%y, 


4 


177' 


11  nVini'NCK    IN    VVAK    1 1,1.1  !s  IK  A  I  1.1  •. 


37 


(Iclplii,!.  Altci  ,1  l)iir|'  rest,  tlic  ,11  mils  ufii-  ;i|;.iiii  I.k  c  to  I.kc  Sip- 
t<iiil)i  r  ■,i.\t(<  III  li,  111, II  Wliitf  lluiisi-  r.iviiii,  tutiily  mile  Iimiii 
I'liil.nli  l|)lii.i,  W'.i  .liiirMuii  M-clsiii;;  tile  issue  (iiini.il  lluwc  sl<i.  My 
tuiiK'ii  liii'  ii:',lil  lliiik  III  I  ill'  Ainniciii  ,11111)',  ,iiiil  J'.iiiiiisluii;;  li.ni 
l»i;;iiii,  wiini  .1  ■.tiniii  111  iiiiusii.il  ■.rviiit)'  piil  ,iiiir>  .iml  .iiiiiiiiiinliun  uiit 

of  CUIIiiil  i<  >n   liil'   II  >i',   llllril     llli-    Mil, ill    sill. nils,   li.illril    tllr    (  i  iHi  I  ).||,|Mts, 

;iiiil  iiltiiii,i!<ly  ;;.ivc  Ik  iIh-  ISiiliili  tin-  h.iin  ii  ,ii  i|iii-,ilii>n  i.t  iln-  (  ily. 

Tiir  sill  111  i-ii  iiMi\v,il  III  t  ill-  iilTnisivr  .it  ( iiiiii,mti)\vii,  1)11  tin-  j.iiiit  li 
(il  (  )i  tiiKil    luildU  ill;;,  ,illil    with   l.ll;'/-   •Molllisr  1)1    -ilU  I  rss,   w.is  llrull.il 
i/i  i|  .iiiil   tiiniril   llltn  ,1  rr|)lll  M'  1))'  lllr   illl  ri  |  li  )slt  ii  ill  iil   il-ll'.r   In;;   wliu  il 
I  i)iiliisi:il  llii'  triiii|ts  ,iiiil  I  i)iiii)rlliil  ,1  ntiiMt,  Iml   linn  hy    'ii  iiiiil  tin" 
iiiliiiiin    liMiii    I  111-  prrsMirr  1)1    uvnw  lirliinii;;    (i)i(c,    w  liu  li  (  oiiivv.illis 

il.r.trlliil    llMlll    rilil.li|il|)lli  I   I')   Illl-     MlppDlt    III    (iilli  l,ll    iiuWl.-. 

( )ii  I  111-  i-lrvnil  11  III  <  )c  ti)i>i-i  III  lin-  i.iiiii-  )'i-,ir,  uliiii  t  in-  army  of 
I{iii;;iiyiii-  h.iil  (ID,. is!  tin-  l'"i,likiil,  .iini  \v,It  ■,ii|<i)i)  ,i-i|  Id  jji-  in  lull 
r'-trr,ll  ,  (  iilH  l.li  (  i.iti-'.  |ill',lli-il  .Mm;;,  III'-,  I  illl-  i  i)|  p-,  ,iil(l  I  In-  lili;;,ii|r-.  of 
Ni.Miii  .iml  (iliivi-r  ,uiiiss  till-  livi-r  iiiiili-r  idvii  dI  .i  iI(I1-,i-  Id;;.  /\ 
(l(-scit(-r  i;,i\-r  w,iriiin;.;  .mil  tin-  iiiuv-i-iin  lit  \v,ii  siispnidi  d.  .A,  the 
(i)^;  liltril,  tlii-  tiitiii-  ,iiiiiy  \v,is  si-i-ii  Id  1)1-  111  Inn-  dI  l»,iltli-  Id  iin-it  tlnr 
,itl,ick. 

A  siK'(cssii(ii  of  ln-,ul  wiinls  ticl.iyi  tl  tin-  iL  i  i  nl  (  Diiiit  I  )'lv4.iiii|4 
(liiiiii;;  till-  viiy,i;;i-  to  AiiU'rii  .i  in  177S,  sd  tli,it  .Ailiiiii'.il  llnwc  with- 
(In.-w  his  siMKiiliDii  liDiii  till-  1  )i-l,i\v,ir(-  livcr.  Iln-  piDiiipt  i-v.uu.iliDii 
of  I'hil.nli-lphi.i  I))'  (iiin  r,il  (lliiiloii,  pur, 11. ml  Id  oisli-rs.  w.is  thus  tln,- 
miNllls  ol   s,l\ill;;  hotll  .Ulll)'  ,lllil   llrrt. 

A  pri)|iitiiius  vii)-,i;;i-  ol  tin-  l''ri-iu:li  sipi,nlrDii  unuM  li.ivc  hii-ii 
fatal  to  both,  'llu-  sipi.tdinii  nl  !  .oid  liyroii,  whit  h  w  ,is  to  li,iv(!  s.iili-d 
from  i'",ii;;l.md,  w  Inn  iiifoi  iii.itioii  wms  rcct.'ivc'd  ol  tlu- ili-p.irt  un;  of 
C'oimt.  I  )'i-lst,iiii!;  Iiom  I'"r.mi:r,  w.is  (l(;t,iini-i!  until  )uin-  tin-  tilth,  .iinl 
was  so  disablri!  by  a  storm  as  to  he;  coinpclli,-d  to  n-lil  lulorv  t,ikiii^ 
tin-  olfi-iisivc-  oil  tin:  .Aiiui  ii  ,111  mast. 

On  the  tenth  d,iy  of  /\ii;_;ust,  I77,S,  astorm  di^ahk-d  hntli  I'riti.h 
and  1m-c;iu1i  llct-ts  u{T  the  h.irbor  of  Ncvvport,  Klmdi-  Iskiinl,  di-privcd 
(jt-ncr.tl  ^^u!!ivan  of  the  support  of  the  l''ri-in  h  tn)0[)s  in  tlu;  sie^'c  of 
til. It  I  ily,  and  fompi-'lk-d  both  .i  rt-trcil  from  the  iskmd  itself,  and 
al),iiidi)iimcnt  of  the  sic^c.  Almost  iinincili,iti-ly  .ifler,  (leiu'r.d  (,'lin 
ton  ,irrived  with  a  reinforcement  ol  four  thmis.ind  Hrilisii  troD])s. 

The  supposed  insecurity  of  the  southern  coast  uurin;,r  the  fill 
immtlis,  forced  Count  De  Grassc  to  a  premature  assault,  followed  by 
deleat,  at  .Savann,ih  in  the  month  of  October,  1779.  -.vheii  completed 


38 


PKOVinKXCK    I\    WAR    I  I.I.I  S  rUAIKI). 


[I77S- 


It      «         ' 


'if:  I 


trenches  and  adcciuatc  forces  ^.ivc  entire  assur.incc  of  a  successful 
sie;^c.     Two  days  aftL-r  he  left,  his  fleet  was  dispersed  by  a  tempest 

On  thi' nintii  of  January,  I  "So,  General  Lord  Stirlin;^  took  a  force  of 
twenty-fix  I'  hundred  men  from  Eli/abethtown,  New  Jersey,  to  Statcn 
Islanil  in  sleiL,dis,  crossini^  the  river  on  the  ice,  for  the  purpose  of 
attackin;^  the  Ihitish  in  their  cpiarters.  'Die  harbor  itself  hail  been 
closed  so  that  heavy  cannon  had  been  hauled  across  on  the  ice. 
Quite  unexpecteilly,  the  channel  iiail  opened  between  New  York  and 
the  island,  so  th.it  the  l^ritish  posts  had  been  reinforced  during  that 
very  day.  'Ihe  snow  was  three  feet  deep,  and  nearly  five  hundred 
men  paid  the  [)enalty  of  frozen  limbs  for  this  mammoth  midniLjht 
sleitjh-ride. 

On  the  twenty-m'nth  day  of  January.  I  7<S|.  Lord  Cornwallis  march- 
iu'^  between  Broad  and  Catawba  rivers,  pursued  Mors^an  with  the  hope 
of  recajituriiv^  the  prisoners  which  that  officer  acquired  in  the  battle 
of  Cowpens.  The  pursuit  was  successful.  Nii^ht  came  on,  and  it  was 
left  for  sunrise  to  assure  the  victory.  Mori^an  crossed  the  Catawba. 
A  heavy  rain  filled  the  river  to  its  banks,  and  cut  off  further  pursuit. 

Morgan  trained  the  banks  of  the  river  Yadkin  on  the  second  day 
of  Februar)-.  An  ecpially  sudden  storm  came  on.  Mori^an  swam  his 
horses  across  the  ri\er,  and  transported  his  troojis  in  batteaux,  which 
he  secured  on  the  other  bank,  so  that  his  ])ursuer  ai;ain  failed  of 
success. 

On  the  thirteenth  day  of  tlie  same  month,  Morci^an  havin^^  effected 
a  union  with  Greene,  the  whole  command  successfully  crossed  the 
river  Dan,  and  then  renewed  rain  interposed  the  shield  of  an  impass- 
able barrier  for  a  third  time,  and  Lord  Cornwallis,  disheartened, 
abandoned  jiursuit  and  retired  to  1  lillsboroufrh. 

At  the  critical  period  when  the  Count  De  Grasse  entered  Ches- 
apeake bay  with  a  formidable  fleet  of  men-of-war  and  transports,  to  aid 
the  American  army  in  the  reduction  of  Yorktown,  a  Franco-Spanish 
fleet  of  more  than  si.xty  sail  was  on  its  way  to  the  West  Indies  to 
operate  a<^ainst  the  liritish  colonies.  The  former  fulfilled  its  mission. 
The  latter,  sejxirated  by  storms,  and  tb.oroucjhly  demoralized  for  any 
concerted  action,  returned  to  Europe,  leaving  the  record  of  a  profitless 
venture. 

During  the  night  of  the  sixteenth  of  October,  1781,  v  Uen  stillness 
pervaded  the  air,  and  a  calm  surface  invited  the  attempt,  the  vanguard 


)f  the  beleairuered 


;irmy 


of  C 


ornwallis  crossed  York  river  by  boats 


and  landed  safely  at  Gloucester  Point.     It    was  the  beginning  of  a 


1775. 


I'ROVIUKNCt:    IN    WAK    M.LUS  I  KATKI ). 


i9 


-d, 


bia\i"  aiiil  c.-irncst  effort  tn  extricate  liis  army  frnm  iinpoiidincj  sur- 
render, and  to  make  a  bold  pusli  for  New  York  by  land.  Suddenly, 
without  warnin;^,  a  storm  of  rain  and  wind  burst  over  the  heads  of 
the  hopeful  Liarrison.  The  detachment  already  over,  was  safely  re- 
called, and  the  drama  of  the  war  proee-eded  to  its  catastrnphe. 

Suih  ficts  as  are  thus  j^rouped  fnnn  the  record  of  the  war  of 
1775-17S1,  are  not  exceptional.  Neither  w.is  the  overthrow  of  the 
Spanish  Armada  exceptional.  The  majority  of  lar;^'e  maritime  expe- 
ditions have  had  similar  vicissitudes,  and  the  battle  of  W.iterloo  itself 
vibraletl  under  the  strokes  of  the  storm  kiiiL;. 

Such  ficts  step  in  alony  the  life  record  of  nations,  to  show  on  the 
one  hand,  how  utterly  dependent  are  al!  luinian  enterprises  upon  ele- 
ments lar;_,fely  beyond  human  control,  and  on  the  f)ther  hand  to  de- 
nionstr.ite  that  wise  and  earnest  men,  resolute  of  will,  and  prompt  to 
execute,  have  converted  storm  itself  and  seeminjr  misfortune  into 
permanent  benefit,  and  have  even  rescued  victory  from  the  o^rasp  of 
the  elements  themselves.  It  is  a  part  of  the  philosophy  of  v.ar  to 
stud)-  such  examples,  and  the  American  strui^'^le  is  the  history  of 
seven  years  of  characteristic  fluctuations  which  worki'd  in  the  direc- 
tion of  American  Independence,  even  when  'hardships  and  misfor- 
tunes seemetl  to  alternate  durin;.^  the  operations  of  the  contending 
armies, . 

It  is  not  alone,  however,  in  the  realm  of  physical  nature  that  life's 
issues  bear  th  ipress  of  external  force.  Opportunity  is  ;^iven  to  men 
and  nations,  and  all  probation  is  full  of  the  neL,dect  or  improvement 
of  opportunity.  Slight  causes,  no  less  than  those  more  impressive 
and  prominent,  give  shaj)e  to  issues  and  assure  results.  The  states- 
manship of  war  grapples  with  all  classes  of  influences  which  work 
for  or  against  success,  and  a  brief  consideration  of  its  principles  and 
obligati(ins  is  regarded  essential  to  the  proper  fulfillment  of  the 
purpose  in  view. 


!fl| 


m, — 


H    • 


X     . 


v 


)f 


I  '  !■! 


i   !!■; 


I  I) 
I 


(I 


;  1 


!!jil 


i    :il 


CHAl'TER   VIII. 

STATESMANSHIP   IN   WAR   ILLUSTRATED. 

WAR  bcL;iii.s  ill  the  closet.  Tl\e  purpose  to  riL;lit  is  defiiiitely 
settled  before  the  army  moves  to  strike.  The  entire  success 
of  that  army  will  larL;el\'  (lejjend  u]K)ii  the  wisdom  of  the  policy 
ado[)tcd  by  the  state.  While  military  men  must  bear  the  buriien  of 
field-work,  and  be  held  accountable  for  adequate  preparation  for  all 
its  contini^encies,  there  is  a  kind  of  closet  work  which  will  make,  or 
mar.the  success  of  all  field-work. 

Inasmuch  as  the  army  is  but  the  stroiii^  arm  of  the  state,  to  be 
employetl  in  last  resort  to  support  the  state,  so  will  there  be  a  tend- 
ency on  the  part  of  the  state  to  confound  its  own  relations  with  those 
of  the  executive  force,  and  usurp  functions,  or  dictate  action,  which 
shouUl  be  determined  mainly  by  the  exercise  of  military  judj^ment, 
actin;^  in  harmony  with  a  sound  state  policy.  The  [jrimary  principles 
which  in  the  outset  are  to  determine  for  or  against  war,  belonij;  jjccu- 
liarly  to  the  consideration  of  the  statesman.  Some  of  these  principles 
arc  such  as  ci\v  icern  the  soldier  and  bintl  him  to  the  study  of 

their  relati*^'  ,ses  of  war. 

A  fu'  .ii  condition  of  rightful  war  is,  that  it  be  essentially 

just,  be  ,  .ately  necessary,  and  be  ])rosecuted  by  just  methods  for 
its  legitimate  ends.  There  are  circumstances  which  compel  war. 
These  have  been  sufficiently  outlined  in  tlie  consideration  of  wars 
between  nations. 

The  present  inquiry  teaches  the  management,  of  war  which  has 
been  already  determined  upon  b\'  the  state.  The  problem  whether 
one  state  "shall  be  able  with  ten  thousand  to  meet  one  that  cometh 
against  it  witn  twenty  thousand,"  involves  the  corresponding  inquiry, 
"  whether,  while  the  other  is  yet  a  great  way  off,  an  embassage  shall 
go  forth  to  propose  conditions  of  peace." 


■75.1 


ST.VIKSMANSllir   IN   WAR    ILLUS  IKA  1  ElJ. 


4« 


Tlu'  parable  of  the  Saviour  is  suggestive  of  that  so'cmn  dulibera- 
;ion  wliicii  the  contingency  of  war  devolves  upon  the  state. 

'I"Iie  tlrst  consitlcration,  therefore,  which  tlemantls  notice,  is  that  of 
the  character,  resources,  and  location  of  the  force  opposed.  A  state, 
whether  near  or  remote,  having  maritime  relations,  is  not  to  be  esti- 
matetl  as  is  a  border  state  non-maritime  and  entirely  restricted  to 
operations  liy  land. 

'file  wliole  question  of  supply  for  troops,  and  of  the  exclusion  of 
supjilies  from  the  opijosing  force,  is  largely  affected  by  this  single 
question.  It  affects  the  selection  of  a  proper  base  of  operations  for 
the  army  itself,  and  no  less  determines  the  cliaracter  of  the  force  to  be 
retained  at  home  for  defen;  against  a  possible  intrusion  from  liostile 
fleets.  The  ri^ilit  and  application  of  l)li)ckade  is  thereby  brought  under 
serious  notice,  as  well  as  many  ilelic.ite  questions  concerningtlie  rights 
of  iiiiitrals,  since  tlie  sea  itself  is  liie  free  higliway  of  nations,  and  all 
nations,  even  *vhilc  at  war,  are  under  high  obligations  to  protect  all 
other  nations,  so  far  as  possible,  from  the  waste  and  burdens  which  all 
w.u-s  involve.  If  w.ir  ensue  between  border-states,  the  cpiestions 
wiiicii  affect  other  nations  arc  more  restricted,  and  offenses  again.st 
neutrals  ;ue  less  likely  to  enl.irge  the  field  of  war  and  involve  thoae 
n.itiuns  whose  interests  lie  in  a  continued  peace.  It  is  important 
that  the  issues  joined  are  not  tiiose  of  political  or  religious  opinion. 
There  is  no  iialiircil  end  to  siic/i  a  coii/ist,  and  the  passions  aroused  are 
absolutely  foreign  to  a  fair  settlement  of  legitimate  international 
differences.  Hence  it  is  the  part  of  intrinsic  wisdom,  so  to  carry  on 
war,  th.it  neither  the  political  nor  religious  opinions  of  the  opponent 
are  stirred  up  ;uid  made  tlie  impelling  force  which  resists  the  demand 
for  a  iair  settlement  of  the  controversy  begun. 

There  are  times,  however,  but  rare,  when  moral  qucsHons  force 
themselves  into  that  "  military  policy  "  which  is  very  properly  classed 
by  Jomini  as  the  statesmanship  of  war.  The  war  which  began  in 
iS6i,  between  different  sections  of  the  American  Republic,  involved 
such  a  question,  and  its  part  in  the  war  was  the  result  of  changing 
condition,  and  not  an  original  impulse  of  the  national  authority  in  its 
assertions  of  national  unity.  The  abolition  of  slavery  was  not  a  real 
issue  at  the  outset.  A  declaration  of  that  issue  as  a  purpose,  would 
not  have  rallied  to  its  support  an  united  citizenship,  as  did  the  vindi- 
cation of  tlie  national  flag  and  the  national  life.  Its  subsequent  intro- 
duction into  the  contest  was  a  matter  of  military  luccssity,  on  the 
ground  that  the  prolonged  warfare  compelled  a  blow  at  the  vital  cle- 


!  t 


1,1 


>" 


■j 


l;ii 


niij!'  r 


11 1 :: 

i  r         ; 


,1    I' 


If 


i       !  [ 


42 


STATl'SMAXSIIir   IX    WAR    ILLUSTRATED. 


[1775. 


im.'iit  u[)(>n  whicli  ihc  resistance  hinged.  It  took  its  place  as  an 
element  of  tlie  war,  t)ecause  permanent  [)eace  under  reinstited  autlior- 
ity  was  impossible,  so  lon^  as  an  abnormal  social  conilition  con- 
flicted with  the  law  and  essence  of  pure  individual  and  personal 
liberty. 

The  suppression  of  the  Mamelukes  in  i8l  I,  and  of  the  Janizaries  in 
I8i6,  became  indispensably  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  legitimate 
authorit)-.  because  the  creature  usurped  authority  over  the  state,  its 
creator,  and  would  not  accept  the  legitimate  control  which  the  state 
asserted.  It  will  not  be  questioned  now  that  the  aspiration  of  slavery 
to  hold  perfect  ecpiality  off  iting  with  liberty,  forced  it  into  an  atti- 
tude wholly  at  war  with  ti,,,  charity  which  had  so  long  tolerated  its 
presence  as  a  transmitted  incubus  upon  the  national  life.  Hence,  it 
became  an  objective  of  attack. 

The  expulsion  or  suppression  of  the  order  of  Jesuits  by  certain 
Huropcan  states,  is  not  predicated  upon  tlu'ir  holding  certain  religious 
faith,  l)ut  upon  their  supposed  organization  to  contravene  the  author- 
ity, or  seek  the  overthrow,  of  the  very  state  which  affords  them  pro- 
tect inn  and  a  home.  Neither  of  these  exceptions  are  in  conflict  with 
the  i)rincii)les  asserted. 

In  view  of  war  once  undertaken,  it  is  equally  important  that  regard 
be  had  to  the  social  anil  nmral  circumstances  of  the  state  assailed.  Its 
go\'ernment  m.iy  ha\'e  forced  the  w.ir,  while  its  jieople  oppose  or  reluc- 
t.intl)'  su]3pi>rt  it.  The  whole  polic)'  of  o]K-rations  is  to  be  sh.iped  by 
regard  to  such  issues.  .X  just  .idvocac)'  of  rightful  claims,  .is  between 
civilized  and  enlightened  nations,  will  gradually  constrain  a  people  to 
put  their  own  government  in  the  right,  and  compel  the  admission  of 
such  claims,  if  there  be  no  manifest  aggression  for  selfish  ends,  and  in 
disregard  of  a  snund  discussion  of  the  issues  m.ule.  Hence.  ;ui  iin- 
ri-(/si>;/ir/'/i'  ultimatiiiii,  [propositions  looking  to  iiatioiid/  /iimii/idtioii.  (jr, 
a  claim  for  x'indictive,  consequential  tlamage  for  injuries  alleged,  is 
not  onl\'  pro\ocativc  of  protracted,  bitter  resistance,  but  will  leave 
heartburns,  thirst  for  revt.-go,  and  seed  for  future  conflict.  Regard 
must  be  had  even  for  national  peculiarities.  An  issue  with  Turkey  is 
not  well  presented  if  it  offend  Moslem  prejudices,  unless  that  .state 
shrdl  intrude  such  prejudices  in  the  way  of  equal  justice  to  non- 
Mohammedan  natiiins.  An  issue  with  China  is  not  well  presented  if 
it  make  war  upon  its  social  customs,  irrespective  of  their  relation  to 
international  intercourse.  In  a  word,  the  instincts  of  christian  gen- 
tlemen are  not  to  be  cast  away  by  nations  any  more  than  by  individ- 


1775-J 


STATESMANSHIP   I\    WAR    ILLUSTRATED. 


43 


uals  when  differences  arise,  and  the  rights  of  each  are  to  be  weighed 
in  the  balances  of  even-handed  justice. 

A  poHcy  that  will  allay  passion,  and  impress  the  opponent  with 
the  justice  of  the  claim  at  stake,  will  hasten  peace  and  a  final  settle- 
ment of  all  interests  involved.  In  harmony  with  this  line  of  conduct, 
is  such  a  course  as  strongly  appeals  to  sound  patriotism  at  home,  and 
thus  unites  the  people  in  a  iicarty  support  of  the  government  which 
carries  on  the  war  on  their  behalf. 

An  attitude  which  vindicates  a  merely  partisan  ascendency,  is 
repugnant  to  the  sober  judgment  of  an  intelligent  people,  and  such  a 
war  must  soon  languish  and  fail,  or  be  fruitless  of  substantial  benefit 
to  the  nation  involved.  It  is  therefore  just  that  the  cause  of  the  w,ir 
be  fairly  stated,  and  that  the  men  who  are  to  furnish  lives  and  treas- 
ure \.Q  fi'i'd  Ziuir,  shall  be  in  full  symjiath)-  with  its  prosecution.  Alere 
national  aggrandizement,  or  the  reduction  to  a  lower  grade  of  a  state 
which  is  confessedly  superior,  will  nr-'c  meet  the  requirements  of  sound 
statesmanship.  "To  live  and  let  live,"  is  the  duty  of  nations  as  well 
as  of  individu.ils.  Predicatetl  upon  such  principles,  and  working  in 
such  channels,  a  war  advances  to  execute  its  work.  Shall  the  nation 
take  the  offensive  or  await  the  attack?  This  must  be  determinetl  by 
the  respective  preparations  of  tlic  i)arties,  the  location  of  objectives 
most  susceptible  of  attack  with  view  to  hasten  the  final  result,  and  the 
character  of  the  issue  itself.  If  a  boundary  be  in  dispute,  a  prompt 
occupation  and  armed  possession  of  the  territory  involved  may  prove 
a  virtual  solution  of  the  wdiole  controversy. 

Dispossession  of  a  firmly  established  force  may  be  more  costly 
than  a  surrender  of  claim  to  the  title.  Barren  points  of  this  kind 
have  cost  many  lives  and  large  treasure.  A  state  can  not  afford  to  go 
to  war  for  barren  issues,  and  when  no  national  benefit  can  possibly 
ensue  from  the  contest. 

It  is  always  bad  statesmanship  to  mike  merely  nominal  issues,  or 
to  stake  the  settlement  of  differences  upon  questions  of  pride,  as  for 
instance,  the  occupation  of  an  enemy's  capital,  or  any  other  particular 
and  merely  formal  success,  which  does  not  of  necessit  •  work  to  the 
([uickest  conclusion  in  peace. 

It  is  equally  wrong  to  over-ride  the  jurisdiction  of  military  men  to 
whom  the  armies  are  entrusted,  by  loading  them  down  with  instruc- 
tions that  are  non-military,  and  too  late  for  ajiplication  when  the 
issue  of  arms  has  been  joined.     Confidence  must  be  given  to  the 


*       ;        ■ 


44 


STATKSMANSIIIl'   IN   WAR    II.IJJS'IKA'IKI). 


[1775 


J    i  I     If 


i    iJiP 


commatidcrs  w  Iumi   tlicy  have  been  wisely  selected,  or  their  success  is 
put  in  hazard  at  the  outset. 


iJiniir'  llie  \ear  i.S(^)i ,  t  lie  American  Coiiirr 


Am 


erican  press  reiterated  the  cry 


)f 


ess  and  a  portion  of  tlie 
on  to  Richmond"  ad  11  an  scam. 


until  outside   non-coml)atant   enerL;ies   largely   precipitated   the   first 


battl 


)f    liuU   Run,  and    e\'en   contributed    spectati 


tl 


iorou''hiv  a  bruhaiu  triumoh  would  vindicate  the  mam 


to    sec;    h 


fold 


o\v 


criticisms 


ui)on  the  deliy  of  the  n.itional  arin\-  to  niciw  to  the  front. 


movement    ma( 


at   the  close-  ol    the 


M( 


xican  war  to  suner- 


sede   .Major-;_,u;ner,d  Scott   by  a])pi)intment   of  a  citizen   to  the  i^rade 
of  lieutenant-;_;eneral,   was  an   intrusion  of   foil)-  into   matters  slrictl)' 


in 


ilitary,  and  failed  throutjjh  its  inherent  simplicit)', 


It  is  .dready  evident  that  strategical  combinations,  and  considera- 
tions such  as  l^aion  Joniini  calls  "  makiiiLi  war  on  the  map  in  cout  radis- 
tinction  to  opt'ralions  on  the  field,"  fall  within  tii<;  consider.ilt:  rei;ard« 
of  the  statesman  as  well  as  of  the  soldier;  and  niuch  that  beloiv^s  to 
the  consideration  of  stratet^y  proper,  is  emineiUly  worthy  of  the  stutly 
of  that  cabinet  which  rules  the  affairs  of  states,  and  acts  l)y  author- 
ity in  initiatin;^  the  war  itself. 

It  onlv  remains  to  add  that  wise  statesmanship  in  war  inii)races  a 
careful  coiisider.ition  of  the  military  and  financial  resources  of  the 
op[)osin;_j  state,  in  comparison  with  those  of  t'.u:  state  makini;  war,  so 
that  adequate  means  may  be  furnished  for  the  purpose  re(piired,  with 
the  least  possible  dr.iin  upon  the  state,  and  the  least  possible  sus])en- 
sion  of  the  industrial  pursuits  of  tliose  not  called  ujion  to  take  active 
part  in  the  war  itself. 

'I"o  break  up  a  nest  of  piratt's,  to  vindicate  a  wron;^  done  to  ;i  citi- 
r.en  by  a  half  civilized  or  barbarous  state,  would  involve  a  very  differ- 
ent ex|)enditure  of  means  and  men  from  a  contest  with  a  state  fiilly 
up  to  all  standard  improvements  in  the  capacity  to  carry  on  war. 
r>xtrava<;ant  means,  beyond  the  necessity  of  the  end  in  view,  always 
be^et  a  suspicion  that  the  state  is  only  .seekint^  an  excuse  to  increase 
its  w.irlike  cai)acity  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  and  the  demands 
of  a  health)'  and  permanent  peace.  Stronj^  armaipeiits  besret  occa- 
sions for  their  use,  ami  true  statesmanship  in  war  is  that  which  is  best 
in  peace. 

Finally,  let  it  be  understood  that  "  amenities  in  war,"  belont^  to 
the  a;^e.  Ciiristianity,  which  is  the  true  life  of  all  national  life,  only 
declares  the  demand  which  civilization  now  affirms,  that  war  shall  have 
its   issue   between   real  combatants  only,  and  that   in   the  effort  to 


I775. 


Sl'AI'I'SMANSinP    I.V    WAR    IM.USrRA'I'KD. 


45 


deplete  tlie  rnciny  of  res(;urces  for  continuin!^  tlic  stni;^;^!^,  tlicro  is 
to  l)e  reco'^nized  ;i  lii^^Hi  rci^.ird  for  life  itself,  .iiid  for  tiiose  personal 
ri'dits  which  heloiiL;  to  the  fainily  and  society.  Of  this  class  are  those 
which  deal  with  prisoners  of 'var  and  certain  j^rades  of  j)rivate  property. 
Plunder  is  no  lont^er  a  jnst  rii^ht  of  the  individual  soldier.  Starvation 
or  al)usc  of  captives  only  rebounds  to  irritate  the  enemy,  and  make  a 
;^()od  cause  i)aital.e  of  all  the  dishonor  and  natural  fatality  of  a  bac; 
cause. 

lli;^h  statesmanship  in  war,  wliich  includes  statesmanship  durinj^ 
its  inciption  and  looking  to  its  prevention,  affords  the  best  promise 
that  tiie  time  will  hasten  when  reason  and  charity  combined  will  dis- 
arm the  nations,  and  leave  the  settlement  of  national  issues  to  that 
kind  of  arbitrament  which  lon<^  since  abolished  the  "  wager  of  battle," 
and  the  duelist's  senseless  "code  of  honor." 


t 


,,  ,11 


i.    I 


M  I 


'  I 


'  |i  i,vii^' 


lii|  IL 


CHAPTER    IX. 

PRINCIPLES   DEFINED.     STRATE(,Y    ILLUSTRATED. 

WAR  may  be  foniKilly  (.Icchircd. — may  start  in  the  collision  of 
armies  stationed  on  the  border,  or  may  be  forced  by  invasion 
or  some  other  a|jj;^ressive  act  of  another  state.  The  United  States 
and  Mexico  were  [)ut  at  war  with  each  other  in  1S45  by  the  advance 
of  (leneral  Zachary  T.iylor  upon  territor)-  then  in  controversy. 
NapoletMi  III.  hurled  the  announcement  of  w,;r  against  Prussia 
in  J  870  only  as  lie  advanced  his  army  of  invasion. 

Lexin;4ton  and  Concord  opened  the  war  of  1 776- 178 1.  The 
principles  involved  by  the  bei^iuniiiL^  of  war  are,  however,  entirely 
within  the  sphere  of  international  law,  except  so  far  as  policy  or  the 
statesmanship  of  war  has  considered  the  issue,  for  the  purpose  ot 
detcrminini;  what  methods  shall  be  adopted  for  its  prosecution. 

At  this  period  physical  force  enters  the  arena.  Practical  questions 
take  the  place  of  theory.  Shall  the  state  take  offensive  measures, 
thereby  to  make  the  struL^i^lc  upon  foreign  soil,  or  limit  its  action  to 
defense  of  its  own  soil  ? 

The  offensive  not  only  bears  to  the  territory  of  the  ailversary  the 
local  waste  of  war,  but  carri  "s  with  it  the  incentive  which  attends  a 
first  success.  It  assumes  a  superiority  by  assertion  of  the  aggressive, 
and  often  excites  enthusiasm  at  home  while  discouraging  the  adver- 
sary. The  offensive  must  work  by  careful  plans,  with  close  counsels, 
and  thus  keep  the  enemy  busy  to  meet  them  as  they  unfold.  But  it 
must  be  followed  up  with  vigor  and  with  adequate  resources.  These 
resources,  whether  of  men,  munitions,  provisions,  or  transportation, 
must  be  continually  renewed  and  continually  protected.  Otherwise, 
the  advancing  force  will  be  so  wasted  by  casualties  as  to  become 
inferior  to  the  resisting  force,  and  will  then  fall  an  easy  prey  to  a 
revived   adversary  backed  by  an  aroused   people,  restored    to  a  fresh 


'!        1 


)  .1 


1775-J 


PRINCIPLES   DKFINED. 


47 


The 


consciousness  of  their  ability  successfully  to  resist.  Failure  to  sustain 
the  offensive  isijenerally  the  prelude  to  ultimate  defeat.  The  defens- 
ive, on  the  other  liand,  inspires  a  n, it  ion  to  cirnest  resi>taiue,  if  its 
people  are  united  in  thouL;ht  and  policy,  and  if  thi.Mi.'  be  no  elements 
in  till.'  i>sue  which  [irompt  a  .sympathy  with  the  cause  of  the  invaders 
and  induce  a  lukcivann  resistance. 

.Supplies  are  more  readily  at  liand.  The  superior  knowledi^e  of 
the  countr)-  is  of  Ljreat  use  in  keepin!.^  ui)  communications  anil  dis- 
turbin;^  those  of  the  enemy.  The  social  in-tincts,  obliijations,  ,md 
.sympathies,  are  more  closely  bound  to  (.very  incident  of  the  struL;;_;le, 
and  the  national  lite  itself  may  be  so  imperiled  as  to  evoke  the  max- 
imum of  resistance  which  the  state  and  pei/jde  combined  can  possibly 
put  forth.  M, my  classes  of  supplies  a  iiich  are  essential  to  invasion, 
can  be  IarL;el\'  ilispeiised  with  .;  nler  many  phases  of  a  simple  defense. 

When  the  defensive  by  ■('  ''Uiite  resistance  is  enabled  to  assume 
the  offensive  in  return,  and  ioUow  this  with  viijor  and  resi)tn'ces 
adequate  to  the  opportunit\-,  the  war  ma\'  be  considered  as  near  its 
final  crisis.  But  the  passive  or  persistent  defensive  will  ultimately  be 
fatal  in  any  stru;_;";4!e,  whenever  the  .iL;!^res-.ive  force  p  itiently  main- 
tains its  pressure. 

The   terms  offensive    and    defensive   have  pointed  application   in 


^mcle  actions,  w 


hich 


are  often  decisive   o{  a  campaign,  or  o 


f  t: 


le  war 


itself,  whatev 


er  ma\'  nave  Deen  tlie  oriL^ifial  ponc)' 


the 


)f  t: 


le  state  winch 


took  the  initiative  at  tlie  outset  ot  hoslililie- 


\Vashin!jton  at   I'rinceton,  and    Clinton    at    Monmouth,  alike  re- 


turned  the  offensive,   u 


nder 


cu'cums 


tances  which    accomi)lislud   for 


each  the   object  in  view,  and   alike  testified  of  their  coura;j;e.  conduct, 
and  military  skill.     In   the  war  of  1775-1781,  there  were  joeculiar  cir- 


cumstances  to   LTive  value   <-,o   the 


olteiisive 


return. 


Ljes  were  infre- 


dcfciisiic,  having 
'1  ho  territory  was  quite  i^enerally  thickly  wooded  :   brii 
quent.  the   population   w.is  scattered,  roads  were  i)oor,  water  cmuses 
re  not  only  numerous  and   lari;e,  but  were  peculiarly  susceptible  to 


w<. 


use    o 


f   tl 


le    nK.Hintains    and     liills    which    evervwhere 


overflow,    bec.i 
abounded. 

In  recjions  not  hilly,  or  near  the  sea-coast,  the  numerous  swamps 
interposed  equally  serious  obstacles  to  the  movements  of  organized 
commands,  ami  afforded  special  opportunity  for  that  partisan  species 
of  warf.ue  which  is  then  so  efficient  in  defense,  and  so  annoying  to  an 
invader. 

War  having  in  fact  begun,  the  elements  which  control  its  destiny 


"il: 


It    ■' . 

I     :• 


',    ! 


•V 


iiili 


V 

1 1 

'"II 

1   !|: 

•^   1' 

i^'  •.. 

('"■I , 


m 


liiii 

r;;i: 


48 


PRINCIPLES   DEFINED. 


[ms. 


arc  embodied  in  simple  propositions.  These  embody  five  universally 
recogiii/cd  divisions  of  the  art  of  war,  ami  will  be  defined  as  follows  : 

I.,  StratCLjy. 

To  secure  those  combinations  wiiich  will  assure  the  hii^hest  possi- 
ble advantages  in  the  employment  of  military  force. 

II.  (irand  Tactics. 

To  handle  that  force  on  the  battle-field. 

III.  Logistics. 

Tile  practical  art  of  brin^intj  armies  fully  ecjuippcd  to  the  battle- 
issue. 

I  v.   Engineering;. 

The  application  of  mathematics  and  mechanics  to  the  mainte- 
nance or  reduction  of  fortified  places,  the  interposition  or  removal  of 
natural  or  artificial  obstacles  to  the  passage  of  an  army,  and  the  erec- 
tion of  suitable  works  {ov  defense  of  territory  or  troops. 

\\   .Minor  Tactics. 

The  instruction  of  the  soldier  individually  and  ivi  masse,  in  the 
details  of  military  drill  and  the  perfection  of  discipline. 

With  regard  to  the  last  two  divisions,  it  is  only  necessary  to  notice 
that  the  early  drill  oi  Washington,  as  a  practical  civil  engineer  and 
frontier  officer,  was  made  conspicuously  useful  in  the  selection  of 
niilitar\'  positions  for  hisarni)'  in  the])rogress  of  the  war  of  1775-1781. 
Although  he  had  the  cooi)eration  of  several  foreign  officers  of  real 
attainment,  he  gave  his  personal  attention  to  the  location  of  field- 
works  on  occasions  of  great  recessity.  He  had  strong  faith  in  a 
system,  now  so  indispensable,  of  casting  up  light  earthworks  when  his 
army  halted,  and  an  enemy  was  within  a  short  march  of  his  lines. 
Baron  Steuben  and  Generals  Lee,  Greene,  Wayne,  Varnuni,  and  Max- 
well, were  among  his  most  skillful  and  urgent  officers  in  imparting 
instruction  in  the  tletiiils  of  minor  tactics.  The  success  was  only 
limited  bv  the  fluctuations  of  armv  organization,  and  the  short  terms 
of  enlistment.  The  continental  troops  which  were  enlisted  for  the 
war.  very  properly  styled  the  "  American  Continental  Army,"  vindi- 
cated their  drill  and  discipline  in  the  field.  The  first  three  divisions  of 
:he  art  of  war,  in  their  order  as  named,  will  receive  brief  consider- 
ation. 

Strategy  deals  first  with  the  iltcatre  of  war.  This  involves  a  clear 
consideration  of  several  included  topics,  vis., — the  character  of  the 
country,  its  natural  resources,  its  topographical  features,  its  means  of 
inter-communication,  in  short,  all  elements  which  form  or  impede  the 


ti77S. 


'775] 


PRINCIPLES   DEFINED. 


49 


Iclear 

the 

IS  of 

the 


movement  of  an  army  iimler  the  cliaiv^iiiLj  circumstances  whicli  affect 
all  armies  in  the  field. 

During  the  war  of  1775-1781,  the  theatre  of  war  extended  from 
the  St.  Lawrence  river  to  Florida,  ami  from  the  .Atlantic  ocean 
nearly  to  the  Mississippi  river.  It  was  not  then,  umI  never  is,  enouLjh 
simply  to  take  cognizance  of  the  theatre  of  active  operations. 

In  the  contingency  of  a  collision  between  England  and  the  United 
States,  Canada  would  be,  as  then,  a  i)ossiblc  base  of  British  operations, 
requiring  observation  at  least  as  a  hostile  border,  if  it  did  not  become 
an  actual  field  of  operations  by  intrusion  of  American  troops. 

Equally  important,  in  case  of  trouble  between  the  United  States 
and  .Spain,  would  be  such  a  naval  observation  of  Cuba  as  to  anticipate 
a  concentration  of  troops  on  the  island  and  a  descent  upon  the 
American  coast.  Either  Canada  or  Cuba  might  become  a  field  of 
active  operations,  and  neglect  to  anticipate  these  contingencies,  would 
violate  the  demands  of  sound  strategy  as  well  as  wise  statesman- 
ship. 

Arnold's  fatal  attempt  upon  Quebec  will  be  hereafter  considered 
in  connection  with  the  battle  record  proper.  Sufficient  to  say  in  this 
connection,  th.it  it  had  but  one  possible  element  of  merit,  and  that, 
the  wild  conjecture  that  Canada  had  a  common  interest,  and  was 
willing  to  make  common  cause  in  the  issue  with  the  mother  country. 

In  a  wise  examination  of  x.\\c  thcatrt'  of  zuar,  X.\\q  outlook  must 
include  natural  s/rati]<^-u-  f^ositir-iis,  just  as  in  the  operations  of  a  cam- 
paign there  will  be  found  accidoital  a)td  conditional  strategic  positions, 
having  their  sole  value  in  the  temporary  strength  or  opportunity  which 
they  afford  to  one  army,  and  the  temporary  detention  or  reverse 
which  they  involve  for  the  adversary  force. 

The  wise  location  of  an  army  at  the  end  of  a  day's  march,  will 
often  secure  determining  positions  which  directly  involve  ultimate 
success,  while  a  corresponding  error  will  bring  a  quick  attack  and 
a  speedy  reverse. 

Compactness,  so  that  the  whole  force  can  be  handled,  and  such 
disposition,  that  no  surprise  can  be  effected,  are  alike  indispensable  to 
such  a  position.  West  Point  was  a  natural  strategic  point  in  respect 
of  operations  along  the  Hudson  river.  Forts  Lee  and  Independence 
had  a  similar  element  of  value,  inasmuch  as  these  positions,  if  sub- 
stantially supported,  were  links  to  assure  speedy  communication 
between  New  England  and  the  other  colonies,  and  impart  to  each  sec- 
tion the  confidence  which  a  prompt  mutual  support  would  engender. 
4 


I 


i  'f,  ■  '' 


p*  '' 


5" 


i'i<iN(:iri,i:s  i»i.I'Ini;i). 


['771 


Ir 


Mjj      '     '  i»il| 


»  1 


r  •■ 

}     :! 

ri 

I 

f 

ill 


■'\- 

:■  i;:     ■ 

I  lii-ir  (Mily  ii-iliittinii,  .md  that  ul  l''oits  ('liiit'Hi,  .M<)nt;;i)iii'i)',  .iiid 
Sillily  I'nint ,  iri)\v(l((l  tin-,  link  ul  iiilir  i  uiimiuiiic  ,it  loii  (,ir  u]i  the 
lluil..»n  river.  Sm  li  |)i>sil  imis  ,is  the  "',tr,iil'<  ol  the  I  ).ii(l,iiii|l(:s  " 
ll.lVc  .1  siniil.ir  ]MIIIl,ini|ll  stlMti",ic  value,  tu  lie  |-e;',il<lei|,  wlietlier 
.l(-lll,lily    111  (  llpleil    (II     ||-,t  . 

Stra/tiiii  iiio.'i  iihii/''  li.ivi-  a  .  their  philn  .'iphy  tlu'  use  cif  ,ill  incis- 
ures, (ither  than  thir,<'  of  iletaii  and  the  ineie  phyaial  stnr'/de  (il  the 
held,  u'hii  h  tend  to  'rihance  sucicss,  ami  icduee  tu  their  loucst 
j.naile  (il  de  .1  riieti\c  loicc  the  resinirtcs  ul  theeiieinv.  1  hiis  ,i  vic- 
tor)' may  \n:  wuii  withoiil  a  Nat'le,  wheuevc.'r  a  |>rMiii|it  and,  liluituus 
str.itedc  inuveinent,  or  the  tinnlv  ,ei/ure  ul  a  siiede  jiu-atiun,  -.ImII 
compel  an  <nemy  tu  al)au<luii  his  own  i^osilion  as  unleiiable,  ni  view 
ol  1  he  inu\cmeiit   made. 

I'Ih-  siniulal<-<l  .itlaik  ii]iun  New  \'uik  liy  \\  .i  liiii;;!  uii,  in  17.S1 
whieli  \sa  1  (.iriied  .u  lai  .1,  tu  have  Uiiek  hriMd-uveii  ^  eicited  in  New 
Jeise)',  u|)|)u  ,i1  e  Slat  en  I -.land,  w.is  a  st  rat  e' ■  ii;  muvement  whuh  liejil 
t  he  I'.irrisun  l.i-t  luthat  i  il_\',  induced  a  call  u|)un  i  ,urd  ( 'uiiPAailis  lor 
reiiilorcements,  and  nil  imalely  re  ailli-d  in  t  he  e  ipt  iin-  ul  \'oii;to\\ii. 
rinis  the  .\nieiii  an  arniv  hail  snli  ,taiit  iall\'  a  duiiMe  pieM-nce,  re|ir(.'- 
sciited  a  duulile  liiice,  ,ind  jilt  Milled  a  duuhle  IruiU,  one  lalse,  .ind 
one  real. 

I'he  estahlishineiit  of  Washiii'Mun's  1  lead  i|uarter ,  at  Muii  i-^tuun 
was  ol  iii;.di  slralcdcal  value,  inasmuch  as  New  I'jedand,  .New  \'ork. 
New  .lerse\',  and  the  Southern  Stales,  \Mre  all  on  /(n/n  liuin  that 
centre,  ,ind  almu-,1  eijualiy  ai.:cesal)le  hy  his  luminand.  On  the  uilnr 
hand,  the  m  <  npatiun  ul  i'hilailel|jliia  hy  ( iener.d  i  luwe,  lu-,1  the  \'aluc' 
which  was  |)iediciled  n])uii  liie  inoveinenl,  lor  waul  ol  ailef|uale  foia c 
l>y  which  tu  reduce  the-  .iriny  ul  \Va-,liin;;lun  still  in  the  lield.  It 
simjily  alfiided  a  cuiiiparalive  rest  in  cumlurlalile  winter  ipiarters,  but 
was  harreii  ul  military  results. 

Lurd  Raw<lun  e.\-t:rcisL'd  sound  stratcLjy  at  the  hatlleof  ('am>len, 
wIuMi  he  secured  rui"  his  army  tin;  jirolc'Cliou  ol  holh  llaiik^  Ijy  an 
impassable  niaish,  while  maiut.uiiiii;.;  commuuic.itioii  with  his  ba-,c,  as 
the  me, ins  ol  turum;;  iIk-  y\meiica:i  lelt. 

/]  /disc  tif  (i/urn/idiis  \s  of  prime  im|)urt,inc(j  to  an  inv.idin;^  army, 
and  is  equall\'  important  in  the  loiisidcratioii  of  suitable-  and  deter- 
minin;^f  objective  points. 

The  ^(eiieral  purjxjsc  of  the  campai'.ni  will  lar^u-ly  determiiu;  the 
choice  of  the  base  ami  the  iin mediate  olijective.  Joiiiini  declares 
that  "  il  is  important  to  estal)lisli  tlu;  base  upon  those  points  where  it 


"<* 


I77-. 


"775. J 


1  KINCII'I.I.S    lilCFlNKI). 


.111(1 


)    Ihc 


ics 


iitlicr 


rmas- 
.1   thr 

)\\(st 


I   VIC 


ll  1)11- 


VHW 


cm  !)'■   lU  itaiiicil  l)\ 

tilDi-    ill  .lllf  .1     -ll''    I'  '  l''l 


1   l)\'    ill   tlir  ITSdlllH  c's  of   tllc  (MllllfrV,    iiul  .it    llw   saill 


1  )lll  III' 


1  iic  All)'  I  ii  .III  war  1)1    1 


S'')!      I.S^i;,    Whrll    thr     Irilcial     tl 


,if    till-     llllillli'-     /"III'     111     DplT.ll  l')ll   .     III. (ill-      l/il|i,vil 
IllililllA'   ll.lM-,  •l'^     U'l'll     .1  .   llli-   1)..  .'■    Ill        i||»l)lli    ..    \vi 


l)|''i  llVi-     U'llll 


t      Id  I 


jr    I C.H  hi-ij,    ll     1)11  .lllli:     lli't  (--I 


li-,  K'  111  II'  k)',  1  ln-ii- 
III  N.i  .hvilli,'  .1  .  Ilic 
.11-)-  lir  .1  Id  i'i  i\i-  till- 
CDiiliiliiMli-  Imii.-  Ii'iiii  IIdwIiii;',  (jh-i-ii,  a  liiitiliiii  pniiliKii  lu'lwiiii 
Li.iii->vill''  .mil  Na  .iivilli',  .iml  IIumi  Id  icdiu  r  I-'mtI  ,  i>i)ii,iii|  .mi  and 
1  Iciirv   1)11    t  111-  ' 


iiinhi  I  laiHl    .1111 


1    liiii 


11-  ,',ri'     I  IVr! 


Im 


IIH    I       \\.l' 


(iirccl  Iv  mi    t  ll'     milmiil    li 


Imi-    Im  N 


I  .li\il|i- 


i  ll.;  I.illii   iii.nl 


1-    |)ii  ,  .ll)ll.- 


t  In-  rmi 


t|-.)l  1)1    llii'  (  > 


1I||)    IIViT     l)\'    ll"  .1  111-    VC^-i<- 


nr  a  II. mk    m"\.(  iiii  iil 


Im  I  hi-  ii'.ii ,  l)\-  laiiil,  and  till-    I"..    "I    lln-    Ii.im-    it    ill.       I  In  ii    i.imIiiii 


ir.si 


N 


(-W 


Ill-ill 
li.  Im- 
lowii. 


n-un.' 


and 


ti)\\-n 

V'urk, 

that 


ithi-r 


\aliu.' 
1)1  li- 
lt 
liiil 


Mill, 


iv  an 


niiy 
rtrr- 


tlii 


.iic-s 


re  It 


.ivi-    a    si-cdiiiI   liin    ul  m 

N, 


)i-ialii)n.    I)\'  w.itir,  in  iMiHirt  with    tin;    iii.iiii 


niDVciiiriil  up "11  .N.i.livilji-,  wliu  ll 

kind,  ,md  limi  ii-ili/i-d  tin-  di-^nid  ii-iiill. 


•  ly  1)11  till-  ll  ll 


.\i-'.\    \'"ii; 


w  .I'l  ni.iili:  1  In:  inn 


h.n.i.-  1)1   ( i'-nmal  i  1 


till-  <  .  II  mill  r- 


)'v\-i.'  -)  I )|)i-r.il  n )ns 


in  (I  I"!!-;  .illi-|-  tin-  i  A-.un.il  imii  "I  11"  .Idii.  In  mn-  m-ii  .i;  it  \va -.  ,i  ifoiihlc 
basi,-.  VV'hili;  .Sl.ilin  1  .kind  :',.ivi-  pit  nil. ir  kuililn.-.  ImI'  M[iiali"iis 
t"U-,iid,  riiikidi'lnlii.t   .md   till'   s"al  ll.  t  In:  i:i)iilri)l  1)1  N<:'.\'  Vork   l,-,laiid 


11 
and  "I  tin:  aciDiii  p.myin"  i  nt  i  .im  i;  Id  i  ."in.;  I  s  kind  S 
valti.il)lir  in  vii:\v  1)1   "pii.il  Imii  mip   tin:  1 1  ml  ."ii  nvii  .md    tM\\'.ii 


Diiinl,  w.i-i  (J(|ii:i 


ly 


N 


(-W 


I'ai;;kmd.      As  .i  di-pnl  mI    Mippin--.  .md    I  In:  ;;i:ni:r.il  ri:ndi:/.V"ii  ,  "I    tin; 
Jl  I5iiti.li  n.iv.il  l"ici:'>  il  ,il  .1)  i)pi-iali-d   .ii  lln-  prini.ii)'  Ijau:  lor  all  i:nli:r 

pn^i-i  in  t  in:  diri;i:liMn  mI  ( ii-i)i;;i.i  .md  lln:  <  .iidIiii.is. 

Oin:  Ml)ji:L-livi:,  .1  .  .ilii'.nl)-  sl.ili-il,  W.is  tin-  L.i|)lnri;  "I  I'liikidi  Iplii.i. 
AllliMii-'Ji  lln.  n-.nll  \s-.i-,  lln. illy  i  "iiMiniin.iliil,  only  1))'  .i  dil'iur 
tliiMii;;ii    (  !ln:'-;.ipL-,iki:    W.iy    liy   aid     mI     lln:     llccl  ;    lln:    iilDVclin  nl    \s,is 


fjii'.mi.i 


Ih 


)■    in-;.;.iiii/,':il    .i,    ,in    "pcr.il  nui    hy 


l.y    kmd.       ri 


n  ,   niv"lvi:il    tlii- 


iiiilil.uy  Mi;i:up.iliMii  "I  New  J 


ci  -.i-N- 


W. 


.iim;',l"n\  i>l/<ii.si;>c  ntiini  .il    TientMn   and  i'l  inri-lDii,  niDililn- 


tln-  "|-i;',m.tl  pnrpMiC,  .md  liis  loiiim.md  w.is  -.iilli:ri-il   I"  IimIiI  tin;  pM.si- 
liuii  .ll  .\I"ni:Ji)wn  in  tin;  very  In-.irt  "I  Ni:w  Jcrsry,  .md  Im  lut'oiiu:  a 


source  ol  ion  4. ml  mn:  isine-,s  .md  cvi-n  o 


f  ikm-'i-r  I"  Ne-A-  York  ib 


C. 


I  lif    seleilioii    .and    MK-cesxIul    oecnp.it  ion    mI    (  "li.irji- .ton,    SmuiIi 
irolina,  as  the  imnn-di.ilc  Ij.im:  ol  ope-nilioii -,  in    tin:  Soulhern  Sl.itt:. 


w.is   i-iiinn:iilly  wi  ,e   and    I  iiiiely,  bill    w.is    not    supporleil    by    a   loicc 
.nil  ipniti;  lo  the  iiccessilii-s  of  llu:  nioveiiielll. 

C.iinnki  W.IS  iii.nle  ,i  base  loj-  .a  tiiird  line  of  oper.uimis,  lliri.iliiiiii;^' 

but    llii; 


oiin-s 


the   separ.itioii   ol    New  l'LnL;lanil    Iroin   the   otln:r   tol 

l.iihiri:  to   destroy  the   army  of  Washington,  which  reiii.iiiie-d   on    tlie 


'■^ 


I  'S' 


i    u? 


'.     •     ( 


52 


rUINl-Il'I.MS    DKKINKI). 


11775- 


alert,  u'itliin  strikiiv^  distance  of  New  York,  still  paralyzed  the  arm 
wliicii  w  IS  to  strike  with  Hur^^oyiie,  and  his  operations  closed  at  Sara- 
toga. Wliile  a  base  restini^  on  the  sea  must  be  adecjnately  supplied, 
as  was  New  York,  throus^h  superior  maritime  resources,  it  .is  equally 
true  that  an  .irniy  forced  back  n/>ofi  the  sea  by  a  competent  force,  as 
was  that  of  Cornwallis,  is  lust. 


'II 


i  fi'ii 


■t^ 


f- 


(1       ! 


CHAPTER    X. 


STRATEC.Y   IN    WAR    CON  IINUKO. 


TIIR  prime  objective  of  the  war  of  1775  -17S1,  w.is  tlie  rcduclioii 
of  the  colonial  armies  and  enforcement  of  tiie  authority  ot  the 
cr(3\vn.  The  occupation  of  territory  or  cities  by  an  ina(le(|iiate  force, 
while  the  opposinLj  armies  ke[)t  tlie  fieM,  was  therefore  of  tran>iei\t 
benefit. 

Philadelphia  was  made  the  objective  of  the  British  army  diirin;,^ 
the  campaii^n  of  1777,  mainly  because  it  was  the  ca[)ital  of  the  enemy. 
Congress  removed  to  Wilmington, — Washington  struck  a  blow  at 
Gcrmantown,  close  to  the  city,  and  the  issue  was  as  f.ir  as  ever  from 
conchision.  A  sinj^Ie  reniaik  is  therefore  i)ro])er  as  to  the  v. due  ot  a 
national  ca])ital  as  a  chief  military  objective. 

Colcjnel  llamley,  commandant  of  the  British  Staff  College,  in  his 
excellent  volume  u[)on  "  The  ( )per,itions  of  War,"  (edition  of  1S75) 
.states  the  proposition  very  precisely.  "  The  mere  possessicin  of  the 
capital  is  not  final,  so  long  as  the  enemy  can  still  make  head  in  the 
field.  It  is  when  the  seizure  of  the  capital  is  cou[)led  with  such 
ascendency  over  the;  defensive  armies   that   they  can   ne\er   hope  to 


retake  it,  th.it  further  resistance  is  felt  to  be  hopeless,  as  lead 


\n<l  on 


ly 


to  national  extinction,  and  that  any  terms  not  absolutely  unendurable, 
are  acce[)ted  by  the  vanquished." 

between  indepemlent  nations. 


11 


us,  as  a  general  rule,  is  true  as 
During  the  .\merican  war  of  1861-1865,  another  element  entered  into 
the  ([uestion.  If  Washington,  with  its  archives,  public  buildings,  and 
foreign  representation,  had  fallen  under  Confederate  control,  es[)ecia!ly 
as  its  soil  was  within  the  original  territory  under  inlluence  of  .Southern 
sympathy,  there  would  have  been  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  success- 
ful party,  that  the  Confederacy  was,  a'e  facto,  the  United  States. 
Neither  would  there  have  been  wanting  a  certain  extent  of  foreign 
sympathy  with  the  demand,  and  also  a  color  of  right.     On  the  other 


m 


1^  ti 


54 


STRATKelV    IN    WAR    CON  1 INU  KU. 


[J77S 


I  I 


*    \ 


:  is 
■  \t 


ii  ;■ 

k  i. 

t 

1 

\l 

f  ■ 

i  i 

( 

hand,  Richmoiul,  while  a  Icj^itiinato  base  of  operations,  was  not  a 
national  capital,  in  any  permanent  sense.  The  tr.insfer  of  its  execu 
tive  ami  of  its  Kv^islative  boily  to  Monli^'oincry,  was  not  analo;^'ons  to 
tliat  of  the  removal  of  the  American  Coni^ress  to  Hailimore,  limine; 
the  war  of  1775  I  7S  I .  I'iie  iiopular  pressure  for  the  premature  occu- 
pation of  Kichmoiiil  at  ;^reat  ha/,aril,  Kn\  tlie  Lj;r(nnnl  that  it  w.is  a 
capital  was  siiitiniciital  and  unbound.  Its  sole  valui"  was  in  its 
character  as  a  niilit.iry  base,  h.ivin;^  -lolid  relations  to  an  advance  upon 
\\'ashin;4ton.  Moreover,  iMiropcan  e.qiit.ds  have  bicu  repeatedly 
occujjicd,  with  no  permanent  benefit  to  the  invader,  M\i\  with  no  .ip[)re- 
c'.djle  effect  ujjon  the  issues  of  the  war  itself. 

ImuMterial  objectives  only  impair  general  oper.itions.  Tiie  vari- 
ous Ihitish  expeditions  to  Connecticut  and  \''iP4inia  committed  waste, 
but  acconlpli■^h^■d  nothin;^  else,  except  to  endjilter  the  stru^g^de  and 
arouse  fresh  passion  to  resist. 

Lines  of  operations  are  the  patliii'ays  of  armies,  and  include  such 
contiL^uous  territory  as  render  the  march  secure  and  pr.icticable. 

Deep  lines  are  those  which  advance  far  beyond  the  base.  iNapo- 
leon's  march  tt)  Moscow  is  the  type  of  aw  extreme  line.  The  Hurt^oync 
cami)aiL,Mi  was  another  instance  in  point.  'It  .issumed  impossible  data 
as  certain.  It  tlirew  away  communication  with  its  base,  whicii  also 
inchuled  its  base  of  supplies,  since  the  su])pl\'-train  was  too  limited 
for  the  entire  movement:  it  over-estimated  the  resources  of  the 
countr\'  invaded,  and  depended  upon  the  support  of  another  far  dis- 
tant army  for  success,  while  that  army  was  to  operate  from  an  oppo- 
site base,  with  no  such  assured  readiness  of  communication  as  to 
assure  the  concert  of  action  indispensable  to  the  result.  That  other 
army  projected  a  line  of  operations  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  beyond 
its  base,  with  the  positive  knowledge  that  if  the  movement  were  made 
with  adequate  force,  it  must  imperil  that  base,  and  put  the  whole 
purpose  of  the  war  in  peril.  Justice  to  the  high  military  qualities  of 
Kurgoyne  ;uul  Clinton,  requires  the  statement  that  this  measure  wa.s 
at  the  dictation  of  bad  .statesmanship  which  controlled  the  English 
commaiidei  at  New  Vork. 

Lines  of  operation  may  be /(?r(?//r/ with  or  i)crpendicular  to  tiie 
base,  this  depending  upon  the  strength  of  the  forces,  and  the  topog- 
raphy of  the  country  occupied.  It  may  be  along  a  river,  or  through 
a  region  which  gives  strategic  value  to  the  movement,  and  thereby 
gain  additional  advantages  to  that  of  a  mere  advance.  Thus  the 
river  Raritan.  in  New  Jersey,  repeatedly  exercised  a  marked  influence 


tVb 


hrKAlKClV    IN    WAR   tJoMlM   ID. 


5S 


N;ipo- 

[  data 

also 

itod 

tlic 

dis- 

[)pO- 

is  to 
'//irr 

ond 
iiado 
liole 
;.s  of 

was 
;lish 

the 

pog- 

roby 

tlic 

:ncc 


1 


in  .i^i^i'i'.;  direction  to  tin-  lines  of  oixTation   ie>pi'cli\oly  adopted  by 
the  Hiiii^ii  and  AinvTican  armies  in  tlnir  movements  to  and  from  the 


Dela 


wall'  ri\er, 


W 


ashiiiLjton's   retreat   from    I'ort  l^cc,  in    IJ/f*!  w-i 


secured  only  b}'  a  prompt  withdrawal   behind  the  liackensack,  and  a 
movement  down  its  ri'ht  bank,  holdinii  the  river  itself  as  a  cover  from 


tile  k 


ft   11 


ink  o 


f  tlu 


arm\', 


A  fr,ii/f  (>/  (>/'rrti//(>//s  includes  not  merel)'  the  territory  occupied 
tow.Mils  the  i'nem\',  but  so  much  as  must  be  obser\'etl,  in  order  to 
anticipate  a  hostile  advance,  while  also  affordinc^  mar!4in  for  counter 
mamruvers.     Jomiui,  as  well  as  other  writers,  limits  this  front  to  the 


iuiv.i!ent  of  a  tw 


O     (l,l\'S 


inarch.     This  is,  however,  an   artificial  tlis- 


tance,  wlioll)-  dependiMU  upon  the  nature  of  the  country.     The  strict 
front  of  the   army  itselt".  has    l)eeu    called   the   stratiy;ic  front.      If  an 


,rm\-  be  oi'lniK 


an    nn 


passable   stream,  its    Ironl    is   sharply  defuu 


ri 


lis  Ijccoines  .1 


n    indication   of  the  tract   wi 


thin 


w  nic 


h  til 


e  arnu'  mav 


operati:   with    decisive    adwuilaj^e,  so  that   the    .ictual   front   and   the 
strategic  iVoiit  may  thus  coincide. 

As  .1    matter  of  fict,  there  is  iittle  value    in    maint.imin;^'   the  dis- 
tinction, >ince   it   niu^t   be  assumed  of  an\-  wise  commander,  that   he 


wu 


>necial  altent!;>n  to  an  issue  which   iiresents  si 


ich  a 


pressiiv. 


deni.inil  .is  the   presence  of  an  enemy  within   eas\"  strikini;'  tlistance. 
It  often  devolves  upon  a   commander  to  maintain  a  double  strategic 


front. 


r 


lis  invariably  atteiuls  the    presence 


of  a  substantial  foict. 


upon   cither 
ti''uiMlioii  o 


fl 
f  tl 


iin 


It   iiKiv  a 


Iso   1 


Jecome   necess.irN' 


by  th 


e  verv  con- 


ic countrv.  and   this  necessarilv  increases  ;is  the  arnn- 


dvances  into  an   enem\'"s    territory     Tiiis    iiu'olvi 


th 


e  separ.Uion 


Ironi 

bulli 


th 


e'    com  ill, I 


nd    of   l.ip'c   detachment 


be   laiuire  ot 


(iciu 


i\an  to  maintain  sucli  a  froiu  to  the  riidit   Hank  of  the  A 
Kww  at    r>r,inil\'wine,  coupled    with   defective   r 


merican 


it.ued  that  action 


bef( 


ore  the  arm\-  coui 


be 


econnoissance,  precip- 
adjusted   to  meet  the 
.-killful  flank  movement  of  (leiicrals  Howe  and  Cornwallis. 

A  hue  oj  dcjciifc,  indepeiKlent  of  the  b.ise.  is  not  always  indispens- 
able, when  the   protection  of  the  base   is  adecju  ite,  ami   the  \ 


orces  in 


and  are  ec 


[ual  to  ,iny  recpiired  ath'ance  niovenient. 


\Va<l 


iiiv'ton 


|)Oll 


•  bein;^  the  i)reserv.itioii  of  his  army,  he  adopted 
a  line  oi  dcteiise  .icross  the  New  Jersc)"  iiills,  which  not  only  served 
.•-  .1  liase,  but  gave  a  definite  character  to  his  operations,  and  repcat- 
ved  that  army,      Natur.d  or  artificial  obstacles  should  be  iiKule 


eai\-  s,i 


to  serve  as  supports  to  the  army  wiien  driven  to  the  stationary  de- 


tensive.      Riv 


ers  often  form  lines  of  defense,  as  in   repeated  instance: 


5f> 


STRATEGY    IN    WAR   CON'ITXUED. 


[»775. 


|i    £ 


I         l!-!l 


:.i  V, 


tiiii 


during  the  campaign  of  1781  in  the  Soutliern  States.  The  winter 
quarters  of  the  American  army  at  Valley  I"\)rge.  1777-S,  were  a  line 
of  defense  no  less  than  a  peculiarly  well  selected  strategic  position. 
A  large  back  country  was  accessible  for  supplies,  although  greatly 
impoverished  by  the  waste  of  war,  anil  the  distance  from  the  ]5ritish 
army  at  Philadelphi.i  fulfilled  all  the  conditions  which  were  necessary 
to  secure  reasonable  safety,  keep  the  troops  on  the  alert,  and  afford 
both  opportunity  and  intlucement  for  observation  and  operations  to 
the  front. 

A  line  of  defense  should  be  as  compact  as  possible,  with  a  strategic 
front  so  limited  as  to  give  promi^t  concentration  of  the  army  upon 
critical  points.  One  considenition  is  uorthy  of  suggestion  to  the 
student  who  would  rightly  estimate  the  merits  of  an  issue,  when  one 
army  is  assured  of  artificial  means  of  defense.  If  forces  be  otherwise 
equal,  that  army  which  holds  a  firm  position,  h.i^ />/iis  strength  equal 
to  the  advantage  of  that  position,  while  the  ;issailant  has  iiiinus 
strength  equal  to  the  estimated  loss  involved  in  forcing  that  position. 
In  an  ojien  field  where  successful  movements  and  hard  fighting  make 
up  the  issue,  the  force  of  discipline  and  both  the  moral  and  physical 
elements  which  command  success  are  left  to  their  free  exercise. 

No  line  of  detensc  should  he  passively  occupied.  The  atlvance  of 
i^a  Fayette  to  Barren  Hill,  and  Washington's  attack  at  Germantown, 
were  expressions  of  torce  which  gave  value  to  the  position  at  Valley 
Forge,  exalted  its  defensive  properties,  and  put  the  British  army 
itself  upon  a  quasi-dcfcnsivc.  The  latter  army  during  the  New  Jersey 
campaign,  had  tioo  ultimate  lines  of  defense.  The  banks  of  the  Dela- 
ware, with  X\\c  cordon  of  posts  extending  to  New  Brunswick  and  Perth 
Amboy,  foi  nied  one,  and  the  river  Raritan  on  the  right,  was  auxiliary 
to  the  former,  so  long  as  the  fleet  controlled  the  waters  about  Staten 
Istand.  The  latter  was  practically  an  advanced  base  for  operations 
working  southward  from  New  York,  with  a  strategic  front  looking  to 
the  movements  of  Washington's  army  which  occupied  the  heights  of 
middle  New  Jersey. 

Zones  of  opodtion  are  belts  of  territory  controlled  by  m  )ving  col- 
umns, or  those  within  which  columns  can  act  in  real  concert.  Several 
lines  of  operation  may  fall  within  one  zone. 

During  the  war  of  1775-178 1,  New  Jersey  and  Pentisylvania  were 
within  the  cetitre  zone,  while  (ieorgia  and  the  Carolinas  belonged  to 
the  left. 

During    the  American   war  of    1861-1865,  the    trans-Mississippi 


■:^ 


[1775. 


i:75.J 


SrUATEGY    IN    WAR    CONTINUi:i). 


57 


states  filled  the  right  zone  ;  the  country  eastward  to  Virginia,  indi- 
cated the  centre;  while  the  Atlantic  belt,  with  operations  on  Rich- 
mond, determined  the  zone  of  the  left. 

It  is  possible,  with  the  motlern  telegraph  and  railroad  system,  for 
a  competent  commander  to  ordain  a  general  policy,  by  which  opera- 
tions in  different  zones  may  determine  together  toward  the  general 
result.  Thus  General  Grant  on  the  left,  and  General  Sherman  in  the 
centre,  acted  in  full  concert  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  1864, 
so  to  occupy  the  Confederate  forces  as  to  neutralize  the  benefit  which 
otherwise  enured  to  the  latter  by  virtue  of  a  series  of  interior  railroad 
lines,  which  enabled  their  armies  to  operate  alternateiy  against  the 
Federal  armies  of  either  zone,  by  a  shorter  route  than  was  available 
for  the  latter  troops. 

Dining  July,  lS62,the  author  was  instructed  by  competent  author- 
ity, to  meet  Generals  Halleck  and  Pope  on  their  arrival  at  Wash- 
ington, t)  which  pkice  they  had  been  called  by  telegram,  antl  to 
inform  them  that  an  immediate  interview  was  desired  by  tiie  Presi- 
dent, then  at  the  Soldiers'  Home,  a  short  distance  from  the  city.  The 
whole  object  of  the  proposed  interview  was,  that  the  Presitlent  might 
determine  in  his  own  mind  whether  the  different  operations  in  Mis- 
souri, Kentuck}',  and  Tennessee,  were  the  result  of  one  forecast,  or 
judgment,  or  merely  accidental.  As  the  result  of  their  arrival,  (ien- 
eral  Halleck  was  placed  in  general  command,  under  the  st\'le  of  chief 
of  staff  to  the  President,  who  thereby  asserted  his  constitutional  pre- 
rogative as  commander-in-chief,  ufion  the  assumption  that  General 
Halleck  had  the  mental  scope  and  executive  ability  to  handle  all 
the  armies  over  the  entire  theatre  of  w.ir.  General  Pope  was  also 
assigned  to  a  highly  responsible  sphere  of  duty. 

rile  details  ot  separate  zones  are  necessarily  distinct,  as  are  many 
oper.itions  of  single  arinies  moving  on  separate  lines  in  the  same  zone. 
General  Sherma:i\  march  to  the  sea  w.is  practically  but  one  line  of 
operations,  because  he  kept  up  such  constant  communication  with  his 
entire  command,  that  it  was  at  all  times  in  hand  for  concentration,  and 
the  efficient  accom[)lishment  of  his  plans.  If  it  be  regarded  as  the 
equivalent  of  two  lines  of  operations  acting  together  within  one  zone, 
it  had  the  perfect  accord  of  purpose  and  action,  which  under  skillful 
hands,  makes  every  key  in  music  to  vibrate  in  harmony  together. 
1  lie  grand  divisio        f  his  army  moved  as  a  unit,  on  their  mission. 

During  the  war  of  1775-178 1,  the  operations  of  General  Clinton 
were  marked  by  great  wisdom,  and  a  fi.xed  purpose  to  secure  a  suf- 


)    ( 


1  !'<  ■'iii|. 


'i  mm 


li     t 


'. 


in:,!  ■u.i 


J  ^  III 


6f,  '^   -:i|,; 


S8 


srUAII-CV    IN    WAR   COXriNUFD. 


[177: 


ficiont  concentration  of  force  to  realize  success  on  tlie  tiiree  zones  of 
proposed  oper.ition.  'riie  riL;ht  zone,  bounded  on  the  left  by  tiie 
1  hulson  river  and  its  delenses,  was  favored  by  Lord  Geort;e  (jerniaine, 
but  at  the  sacrifice  ot  results  elsewhere,  aiul  without  an  appreci.ition 
of  the  resistance  with  which  he  had  to  cope,  and  the  character  of  the 
country  in  which  the  war  was  c.irricd  on. 

^Althou;4h  Massachusetts  was  left  unassailed  by  British  troops, 
after  the  evacuation  of  Hoston,  a  base  was  securetl  .it  Newport, 
Rhode  Island,  which  was  far  mure  eligible  for  operations  in  tiiat  zone 
than  was  lioston  itself.  Its  distance  from  that  cit\'  was  but  seventy 
miles.  General  La  l''a\ette  went  from  Newport  to  Boston,  during  the 
sie^e  of  Newport  in  177S.  in  seven  hours,  and  returned  in  six  and  a 
half  hours.  It  was  sufficiently  ne.ir  to  threaten  the  Hjrmer  city,  and 
to  somewhat  restrict  Massachusetts  in  contribution  of  troops  to  the 
.entral  army  of  \\'ashin!j;ton.  I  he  harbor  was  excellent.  Long 
Island  .Sound  affortled  a  safe  interior  passage  to  tjie  head-cpiarters  at 
New  York,  so  that  the  success  of  the  apparently  useless  diversion.s 
into  Connecticut  would  have  had  substantial  method,  if  troops  liad 
been  furnished  up  to  the  demand  of  tlie  British  General-in-chief. 
Herein,  as  elsewhere,  the  military  judgment  was  superseded  in  opera- 
tions stricH)-  militar\-,  by  a  purely  civil  control.  If  military  policy  was 
considered  in  the  Lnglish  cabinet  at  all.  it  omitted  to  make  tiie 
movement  independent  by  the  suppl)-  of  means  ade(|uate  to  assure 
results. 

Li/ic's  of  cotinnunicattoii  are  tlefined  bv  tiieir  title.     Modern  science 


IS  facilitateci 


th 


e  connection  o 


armies  wi 


th  tl 


leir 


ase  and  wi 


th 


eacl 


other.      It   was  witii   difficulty  that  O.Ioncl  Hamilton,  aid-dc-caiiip  of 
(ieiieral  W'-ishington,  cnuld  (.letermine  the  position  of  his  own  Hanking 


artie- 


which    were  watchini;'   the   movements  ol   General    Clinton's 


arm\-  durni'. 


the    retreat  of  that  officer  from  Philadelphia  111  the  )'ear 


I7:S:  and    it  was  not   until    the   allernoon  bef)re   the  battle  of  Moi 


mouth,  that  h  •  could  report  the  exact  facts. 

IiiiCri'r  lilies,  exterior,  eoneenirie,  and   (iiveri:;ent  lines,  are  also  self- 
expressive.      It   is   obvious   that    in    covering   a  capital   or  any  other 


commercial  centre,  w 


hicl 


1   IS   ai)i)roacneil 


1)\'  ilifferent   arnu'   cori 


)s  on 


diffi 


erent    roads,  the   def 


ensi.'   can   concentrate  a  superior   force   more 


speedil}-  than  the  advancing  armw  unless  tiie  advance  be  made  a  si 


prise,  or  with  grea 


tly 


superior  numbers. 


In    the   advance    upon    (jermantown.    tluring   October,    1777,   the 
extreme   left  wing  of  the  .\merican  army  was  too    widely  spread,  so 


.77^] 


SI  KATKCN'    I.N    WAR    CON' riNU'KI). 


59 


that  tlic  ri;.rlit  winc^of  the  IJritish  army  actually  iciiirorccl  the  centre, 
ami  settled  the  issue  without  receiviii;..^  a  sinijle  blow  from  the  force 
which  hatl  been  sent  to  occupy  its  attention  duriuL;  the  main  att.ick. 

On  the  Britisli  left  a  similar  concentration  took  place,  the  observ- 
ing,'party  sent  by  Geneial  Washin;^ton  to  engage  the  Hessian  forces 
haviiii,'  utterly  failed  to  follow  up  the  enjoined  movement. 

The  inferior  forces  employed  durin;^  the  war  of  1/75 -1 78 1,  as 
compared  with  i^real  continental  armies,  limited  the  raiii^c  of  i-/raA;<,'-/V 
operations,  althouL;h  demanding  the  right  use  of  all  general  pririciples  ; 
and  while  army  formations  have  been  modified,  and  greater  mobility 
has  been  secured  during  the  century  and  more  which  has  passed  since 
that  struggle  began,  the  review  of  the  actions  themselves  will  prove 
that  the  lessons  of  antecedent  warfare  were  carefully  studied,  and 
judiciously  applied,  up  to  the  extent  of  the  then  realized  facilitie« 
for  war. 


u 


'      ;   il!    ;   .ill. 

I  i  iil  '^* 


I  if 


'&^.  'li 


If     I 


;  I  '■  ifc 


I 


CHAPTER   XT. 

GRAND    TACTICS    ILLUSTRATED. 

TO  hancile  well  a  military  force  on  the  battle  field,"  which  the 
author  offers  as  a  concise  exposition  of  the  term  "  Grand 
Tactics,"  involves  several  principles  which  all  military  writers  accept 
as  fundamental. 

Although  these  truths  have  been  elaborated  and  illustrated  by 
eminent  scholars  of  modern  times,  they  obtained  recognition  and 
application  at  very  early  periods,  and  thus  imparted  success  to  mili- 
tary enterprise  as  long  ago  as  the  days  of  Hannibal  and  C^sar.  T/wir 
maxims,  and  t/uir  instructions  to  commanders  are  sound  and  practical 
noiv,  as  they  were  then.     Baron  Jomini  states  them  thus: 

First.  "  To  throw  by  strategic  movements  the  mass  of  an  army  suc- 
cessively upon  the  decisive  points  of  a  theatre  of  war,  and  also  upon 
the  communications  of  the  enemy  as  much  as  possible,  without  com- 
promising one's  own." 

Second.  "  To  manoeuvre  to  engage  fractions  of  the  hostile  army 
with  the  bulk  of  one's  forces." 

Third.  On  the  battle  field,  to  throw  the  mass  of  the  forces  upon 
the  decisive  point,  or  upon  that  portion  of  the  hostile  line  which  it  is 
of  the  first  importance  to  overthrow." 

Fourth.  "  To  so  arrange  that  these  masses  shall  not  only  be 
thrown  upon  the  decisive  point,  but  that  they  shall  engage  at  the 
proper  time  and  with  energy." 

To  apply  military  force  upon  these  conditions,  involves  the  high- 
est wisdom, — a  keen  perception  of  the  relations  and  circumstances 
which  attend  the  changing  issues  of  war; — a  lightning-like  logic,  by 
which  to  interpret  both  relations  and  circumstances,  and  both  skill 
and  nerve  to  strike  home  the  blow,  with  precision  and  force. 

The  introductory  chapters  have  demonstrated  the  philosophy 
which  underlies  the  conduct  of  war. 


kr^ 


O-J 


GRAND    TArriCS    II.I.US  TRAIT-b. 


Ci 


As  with  all  theories,  however  perfect,  the  issues  themselves  arc 
often  confronted  witii  facts  which  no  human  foresii^lit  can  .inticipatc. 
If  all  ;4reat  battles  could  be  traced  throuj^h  the  minute  details  which 
m. irked  their  proi^ress,  the  human  mind  would  be  humbleil  by  the 
evidence,  that  very  often,  an  unexpected  and  app.irently  trivial  event 
has  been  the  [)ivot  upon  which  the  entire  event  chanL;ed  its  drift  and 
destiny. 

Notwilhstandiiv,;  these  contini^encies,  cnnviion  to  .ill  pursuits  in 
life,  the  operations  of  the  battle  field  have  i^eneral  features  which 
work  in  the  direction  .)f  the  conditions  laid  down,  and  these  are 
entitled  to  a  brief  review. 

The  war  of  1775  17S1:,  afforded  illustrations  of  the  changes  which 
have  ch.iracteri/.ed  modern  warfare  from  the  time  that  Frederic 
William,  of  Prussia,  father  of  Frederic  the  Great,  combined  rigid 
drill  and  exact  discii)line,  with  swift  and  impetuous  movement  upon 
exposed  or  cramped  boilies  of  the  enemy. 

The  Ihitish  Light  Infantry  and  Fij^ht  Dragoons  were  active  troops. 
and  b(,M.h  mobility  and  ilexibilit)'  began  to  take  the  place  of  those 
heavy  strokes  which  simply  measuretl  the  relative  momentum  of 
colliding  bodies. 

Braddock's  campaign  was  a  type  of  the  old  method.  Tarleton's 
operations  were  characteristic  of  that  new  s}-stem  which  gained  fresh 
spirit  during  the  French  revolution  and  afterwards  distinguished 
Napoleon  L 

The  first  Italian  campaign  of  that  commander,  which,  in  a  mere 
handful  of  days,  made  memorable  the  names  of  Legnam),  Castiglione, 
Mendola  and  Mantua,  has  the  magic  thrill  of  romance.  Fike  Ilabib, 
of  the  Arabian  Nights,  he  seemed  to  wield  the  sword  of  Solomon, 
and  at  every  stroke,  its  talismanic  emblem,  " />ou'i'r,"  only  shone 
forth  with  increasing  lustre, — disenchanting  all  machinations  to  check 
hisadv.mce,  and  melting  a'l  barriers  of  men,  or  matter,  as  the  summer 
sun  dissolves,  dissipates  an^  bears  away  the  lingering,  contending 
snow  s  of  winter. 

It  was  in  the  maturing  ascendency  of  this  new  .system  of  tactics, 
that  the  British  and  American  armies  came  to  an  issue.  The  colonists 
had  been  thoroughly  proven  in  the  skirmishing  warfare  of  the  Indian, 
had  acquired  signal  skill  in  the  use  of  the  rifle,  and  by  contempt  of 
exposure  and  repeated  battles  ui)on  the  frontier,  had  been  taught  many 
lessons  which  were  wild,  but  impressive,  in  the  direction  of  attack  and 
defense. 


wn 


.\... 


!       1*' 

'? 


■'J! 


-I 

t  ' 


i 


I 


ft 


i  t 


I 

' '!  "'iji' 


i   ,,.1'JI 


iJ    i 


62 


(.UAMi     l.\rlU>    li  I  ISI  KAIi:i). 


775 


Upon  this  traiiiiiiL^,  iri)iit  ^lnwlv,  ihr  stem  discipliiK-  .iiid  inilit.ir\- 
vi|4i>r  iif  W'.i-^liiiv^tdi),  Circcnc,  Stciilx-ii  anil  \.cc  wrrc  in  l)c  '^Maiird. 

AiMllu'r  (.'UnK'nl  ;-;.ivr  cliaractrr  to  tlu'  .\nu'iii.an  arm\-.  and  luadr 
soldiLis  i|iiii.kl)-.  lndc[n.'ndciitl_\'  ol  tlu'  spirit  of  the  >tniL;!^l;-  itsclt, 
till'  coloiu>t>  posscsscil  unusual  inti'lliL;rnci..  and  mi'iital  culture  for 
nu-n  ot  that  period  :  and  tho^r  who  eontrollrd  the  public  ])oli(.\-  were 
men  \\  hose  ca[)acit\'  and  moral  uiuth  \\vi\:  pieeiniiient  ai)ove-  all 
others. 

The  ^reat  skill  in  m.ii(ru\ri'  which  ciiaracteri/.eil  I*'rederic  was  well 
represented  l)y  Clinton,  Kn_\'piiau-en,  IVrcy  .md  Tarjeton,  and  the 
German  troops  came'  promptly  u|)  to  duty  in  accordance  with  the 
methods  of  severe  schooliiiL^  to  which  they  had  been  trained. 

\\'ashin;.;ton,  (ireene,  Lee,  .Ma.xwell,  and  otlu-r  coni])etent  com- 
maViders,  both  American  and  toreii;n,  who  took  the  .\merican  armv 
in  ham!,  wt-re  compelled  to  enter  the  contest  before  their  soldiers, 
however  well-drilled,  indi\idually,  could  possibly  accjuiie  that  concert 
t)f  action  which  makes  of  ,m  educated  army  a  perfect  machine. 

This  affords  tiie  clew  to  many  disasters  which  attended  oper.itions 
in  the  field.  An  illustration  oi  recent  d.ite  will  del'iue  the  point  in 
\iew. 

IV't'ore  the  batth,-  of  Hull  Run,  in  the  American  war  of  lS6i~i8<S. 
the    single    rcijimeiUs    of    the    I'"edera!    arm\'    had    been     thoiouLihU- 


instructed  m 


battalion  ilrill.       These  movements  were  e.xact. 


llriijatle 


commanders  h.ul   been  assitjnec 


f. 


o  lar  a- 


ibk 


from   the  colonels 


of  the   regular  arin\-,  ,ind   evolutions  of  the  line,  in   .skeleton   am 


1   1 


JV 


divisions,  had  been  commeiicetl  ami  well  .ulvaiiced 


lacticaliw  how- 


ever, the   re-'iiiieiit   was   the    unit,  aiul   these   units  lar''el\-  maintainei 


their   ori;.inic    coherence,    when    the    tresliK-    or''ani/,e(.l    briLT.ules   and 


divisions, /'(?/7(v/,  in  the  fust  trial   at  arms  witl 


1   an   earnest   adversar) 


ri 


le  "en  era  I   com 


mandinLT,   McDowell,   himself  a   n 


lodel   l\'pe  ot 


the 


complete  si 


)kiR 
lid 


r,  was  crowdeti  to  the  tront. 


captain    could    have   dc^ne    witii    an   arm\-    not   _\  et   pertecteii   m   tliat 


and  dul  ah  that  an\'  Lrreat 


discii)liiie  wiiich  must  interjienetrate  all  parts  an 


.1    hold   them    fast  to 


svstem,  even  in  the  decim.i 


ion  of  battle. 


Hut, 


,is  with    th.it   arm\',  so    with    tiie   armv   of 


Wasl 


uiv'toii,   the 


tl 


opportunit)'    was  hjrced,   wiiile  the  e.\i;^encies  were  too  pressms^   to 


to  I 


)e 


<^ive  time  to  make  a  really  perfect  army,  and  t/iat  result  had 
evolved  out  of  the  battle  struL^i^lc  itself. 

The  most  difficult  position  which  troops  can  liold,  is  that  which 
requires  ilicm  to  stand  under  fire,  in  passive  waiting  but  with  entire 


ICIS 

by 

nw 
led 

Liid 
r\  . 
he 

rat 
at 
to 

the 
t(j 

ch 
re 


,77c„l  GRAND   TACIICS    ILLUS  1  UA  IKD.  <>.] 

coiifidiMici'  tliat  this  piisitioii  is  for  eventual  Ix'iuht,  wh.i'nevrr  the 
e.)iUr()lhii'4  iniiiil  sliill  unfold  his  purpose.  \  " /orI(>rii  /tope  "  \\:\a  a 
stiinuhis.  The  other  deiuands  supreme  steadiness,  tin.'  liarchiess  of 
.-ulaniant.  This  text  is  not  discursive,  nor  without  interest  and  tlircct 
rehitions  to  liu;  battle  narrative  hereafter  I'urnished.  All  that  has 
been  said  is  but  a  niea^^re  indie, ition  of  that  exhaustive  drain  wliieh 
war  ui.ike-i  upon  all  ])ossil)le  resources  ih.it  can  .ippl)'  torce  to  the 
resohilioii  of  battle  issues. 

As  yrand  tactics  de.ils  with  the  conllict  of  armies,  so  thi'ir  op^mii- 
i/.ation  and  ci>nii)osilion  is  worthy  of  consideration.  MoiiDvcr,  it 
invokes  L;iiod  combinations  before,  as  well  as  tlurini;  the  progress  of 
battle. 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  in"  p.issini^-  on,  that  mililarv  n.itions  |)roiiiplly 
s.'ize  and  appl_\-  all  improvements  that  .any  simde  nation  ori'_;inate,  so 
tiiat  the  balance  stands  nearl\-  the  same  as  when  war  was  wa;4ed 
under  systems  of  ,in  earlii'r  period.  Hrain  and  muscle  ;-;ive  lorce  .uul 
value  to  all  alike. 

.\s  a  full  discussion  of  the  military  art  is  reser\ed  for  a  future 
vohnue,  onl\'  those  elements  will  be  consitlered  which  afford  a  kc)'  to 
the  battles  of  the  perioil  under  re\iew. 

J'l'ii'  chief  braitchix  or  anus  of  uiililary  scrriiw  Artiller)',  Cav.dry 
and  Infintr)',  proportionetl  as  in  order  n.imed.  tVom  least  to  most 
mnnerous,  ha\e  varx'in;^  values,  accordiii;^'  to  the  ser\ice  recpiired, 
Iiifmtr_\-  com|)osin;_;-  the  fundamental  strenj^th  of  all  .irmies. 

Improvements  in  artillery  h,a\e  m.ule  impossible  that  .iii;4hty  sweejj 
ol  mounted  troops,  which  now  aad  then,  in  e.arly  da)-^,  l)oi\;  down 
whole  armies  b\'  their  intririsic  wei;_;ht.  Swift  desol.ition  ma)-  still  be 
carried  o\-er  a  wide  raiiLje  of  country,  communications  may  be  cut  off 
and  dist.mt  points  may  be  struck  suddeidy  by  such  a  force  ;  but  there 
can  be  no  overwhelmintjf  assault,  by  cawdry,  upiMi  a  stronL,^  army  well 
supplied  with  well  h, nulled  l^^uiis. 

DuriuLj;  the  war  of  1775-1781,  a  real  restriction  was  imposed  upon 
the  movements  of  cavalry  l)y  the  nature  of  the  country,  so  that  tlieir 
service  was  lari^ely  continetl  to- att.ick  upon  columns  already  broken, 
independe'nt  operations  a^jainst  similar  forces,  raids  u[)on  sui)i)ly 
trains,  or  the  dispersion  of  small  detachments. 


riie    British    draeoo 


ns 


did 


su 


bstantial    service    at    Germantown, 


M. 


m mouth  an 


d  B 


r.ind\'wiiie,  although  in  the  last  named  act 


ion  they 


were  not  employed  until  after  the  ilivision  of  General   Sullivan  w.is  in 
full  retreat.     Some  of  the   Roj-alist  volunteer  cavalry   proved    tjuite 


I'.  :' 


I"    ' 
■I'  ■ 

I-' 


I 

u 

•|:  ■  ■ 

il' . 

'}' '  ^ 

i 

ffi    1 

j 

ifl 

i      > 

1 

J, 

k    »] 

'            "          ■ 

'  '1 

"'■:„. 

i       1-:; 

i 

11 


04 


GRAM)    lAtllCS    ILLUmI  KAII.I). 


['775- 


efficient;  but  Tarleton's  Li'j^ioii  was  especially  known  for  its  sleepless 
activity,  its  keenness  of  scent  in  pnrsuit,  and  sometimes,  for  its  relent- 
less vit^or  of  stroke. 

DiuinL^  llie  earl\-  part  of  the  war,  the  AiiKiican  army  was  deficient 
in  this  arm  of  the  service.  Colonel  Lee,  known  as  "  Lii^ht  Horse 
Harry."  and  Colonel  Washington,  handled  mountetl  men  with  signal 
ability,  and  the  latter,  at  the  battle  of  Cowpens,  inflicted  a  blow  upon 
C'olonel  Tarleton  which,  according  to  his  own  "Narrative,"  almost 
ruined  "  The  Legion."  Sumter,  Marion  and  Horry  performed 
brilliant  feats  and  made  their  respective  corps  distinguished  for  a 
semi-ubiiiuitous  warfare  in  the  swam[)  districts  of  the  Carolinas. 

It  was  rarelv  the  case  that  artillery  determineil  an  action  in  the 
field,  simplv'  by  sui)eri<ir  weight  of  metal  and  its  destructive  force, 
'llu.'  short  range  of  the  guns  then  in  use,  the  difficulty  of  moving  them, 
and  the  general  reliance  upon  infantr)-,  in  close  action,  limited  the 
supremacy  of  this  great  arm  of  war. 

The  infantry  had  its  scouts  and  skirmishing  parties,  but  such 
detachments  were  more  frequently  mounted  men  ;  and  modern  skir- 
mishing was  hartll}-  known  until  the  French  initiated  the  s\-stem  of  a 
thin  line  of  sharp-shooters  in  advance  of  moving  columns. 

General  Morgan's  ritle  conmiand,  or  brigade,  was  the  nearest 
approach  to  a  systematic  skirmishing  force,  while  equally  efficient  in 
general  action.  The  l^ritish  arm\'  itself,  especially  in  the  southern 
districts,  followed  the  example  o(  the  Americans  and  organized  inde- 
[)endent  ritle  corps,  which,  more  than  once,  did  efficient  service.  The 
brigades  were  generally  small  in   numbers,  often  not  exceeding  eight 


hundred  men,  and  by  this  means   the   number  of  opposing  forces  was 
often  greatly  over-estimated  on  both  sitles. 

Although  the  artillery  was  then  employed,  as  now,  wherever 
actually  needed,  it  was  habitually  posted  in  the  centre  unless  required 
at  the  flank,  and  was  used  mainly  to  hold  or  assail  positions  occupied 
by  troops.  It  lacked  the  mobility  which  the  light  artillery  of  modern 
times  has  attained.     General  Burgoyne  was  sharply  criticised  before 


the  "  House  of  Commons"  for  takin"  too  manv  heavy 


siuns  u 


|)on  h 


IS 


expedition  from  Canada,  and  )'et,  it  appears  from  a  careful   review  of 


the 
th 


e  evidence  offered  in   his  case,  that  he  was  simply  cumbered  with 


recedent   assigned    to   h 


IS  com- 


m 


e  exact    proportion    which   rigid    p 

;ind,    irrespective    of  the    field   of  service    it    was    to    be    draiiLred 


over. 


The  engineer  corps  of  that  period  was  well  organized  and  well 


1775- 


CRAM)    lACIICS    ll.I.USlKArKl). 


65 


arcst 
It  in 

icrn 

indc- 

Thc 

:ight 

was 

icver 
lired 
pied 

)dorn 
.'fore 
n  his 
w  of 
witli 
:oni- 
icd 

well 


handled,  and  by  virtue  of  the  short   ran;j;c  of  <^uns,  they  liad  full  as 
much  active  work  in  the  trenches  as  in  UK^re  modern  times. 

The  Order  of  Battle  varies  witli  the  features  of  the  country,  the 
position  (if  the  armies,  and  the  object  in  view.  Whether  the  move- 
ment be  offensive  or  defensive,  which  circumstances  alone  cm 
determine,  there  are  certain  prevailing  mctiimls  of  arrani^mi;;  a  com- 
mand to  meet  the  issue. 

The  parallel  order  must  have,  on  one  or  both  sides,  elective  posi- 
tion.'i  to  be  held  or  seized,  or  tile  issue  will  be  sim[)ly  one  of  physical 
streiii^th  and  the  contin;j[ency  of  superii^r  numbers  or  skill.  In  this 
order,  whether  the  centre  or  one  win;^  be  the  object  of  attack,  it  is 
cert.iin  lh.it  the  concentr.ition  must  be  prompt  for  tin:  blow  or  it  will 
fiil,  proviiletl  th.it  the  eneni)'  is  closed  up,  st)  as  to  be  able,  quickly,  to 
reinforce  the  part  ass.iiled.  It  cm  r.irely,  if  ever,  be  of  indifferent 
v.ilue  whether  to  strike  tiie  centre,  or  one  wini;,  unless  the  force  be 
so  small  as  to  meet  either  attack  equally  well. 

At  the  battle  of  Germantown,  Washington  advanced  with  his 
main  force  upon  the  British  centre,  striking  full  at  the  outpost  in  the 
villaiTc,  while  1  irLie  detachments  were  sent  to  C(jnfront  e.ich  wiim  and 
hold  tlum  l)ack  from  giving  support  to  their  centre. 

The   panillel    order   may    be    modified    by    reinforcement   of  the 
centre  or  either  wing,  and  this  will  often  happen  during  the  manceu- 
vers  or  feints,  which  are  resorted  to,  that  the  enemy  may  not  antici 
pate  the  genuine  attack. 

.\  crochet  upon  the  flank  like  the  letter  L.  is  ot'ten  of  value,  _J,  1—, 
thus  offering  two  faces  for  defense,  or  [)resenting  ;i  second  front  per- 
pendicular to  the  first,  for  the  purpose  of  turning  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  or  striking  to  his  rear.  The  advance  of  the  British  right  wing 
at  Long  Island  secured  the  latter  result,  first  capturing  the  .Xmerican 
centre,  and  then  cutting  off  the  right  wing  and  capturing  its  com- 
mander. In  this  action  the  flanking  force  swept  the  whole  American 
line,  routing  it  utterly. 

The  crochet  proper  is  susceptible  of  being  roughly  dealt  with,  if 
the  adversary  can  mass  artillery  at  the  angle  ;  and  the  movement 
generally  is  hazardous,  unless  to  resist  an  .attempt  upon  a  flank,  or 
tlie  force  bf  strong  enough  to  take  some  risk  in  an  ailvance. 

The  coiiTcx  attd  concave  orders  of  battle  are  self-e.xprcssive.  One 
advances  ai^d  the  other  refuses  its  centre.  At  the  battle  of  Cowpens 
the  display  of  the  American  centre,  as  a  feint,  followed  by  its  prompt 
withdrawal,  enticed  Tarleton  within  a  trap  and  it  was  sprung  upon  him. 


06 


(;u.\Mi   lAcrics  ii.i.rsi  kaiid. 


I    ' 


(  'I! 


i  -    * , 

'  if 

ii^ 

,     !  , 

k^ 


'/'//(•  ('/'//(///(■  Older  lia-^  a(lv.iiita;_;(S  lor  an  inferior  force,  as  it  iTia_\' 
rai)i(ll)-  L;atlnr  up  tin:  rclnseil  uiiii;  to  Mippoit  the  advance,  or  c<incen 
trate  rapitllv  if  conipellcii  to  retire. 

I'll,  oriii)-  by  edition  on  tlie  centre,  or  one  wine;,  is  flexible;  unci 
while  licldin;^  the  refused  battalion  as  a  reserve,  affords  prompt 
support  b>-  .1  dinct  adwi.nce',  and  so  disposes  the  whole  command  that 
it  ma\',  u  ith  eipial  promptness,  operate  toward  eitiicr  flank,  or  to  the 
rear. 

Modifications  of  these  forms  are  various,  but  unim[)ortant  in  this 
ci>nneetion.  The  exact  foriitatiott  of  ptuuule  is  ni.ver  lon;4-liveii  in 
real  action.  \\'liate\er  nia_\'  bi'  the  form  adopted,  there  nnist  l)e  care 
not  to  prolon;^  the  line  bejontl  support  and  thus  lea\e  a  ^ap  which 
will  admit  a  (piick  and  iiitelli;^a'nt  adversar}-.  This  Ljaj)  at  Ikmker 
Hill  will  be  noticed  hereafter.  A  wise  determination  of  choice  in  this 
important  matter,  may  en.ible  an  inferior  force  to  retard  a  superior 
force,  may  persuade  it  to  fit,dit  at  dis;idvanta;4e.  or  even  force  it  to 
movements  which  will  set  the  inferior  force  free  from  peril. 

In  this  connection  may  be  applieil  the  sut^i^estion,  that  both  van- 
fTuard  and   rear-guard  of  armies  which  are  on  the  verge  of  action,  are 


to  be  esiiecially  warnetl  ot  the  miportance  of  then-  trusts. 

When  Cornw.illis  a[j])roached  Trenton   in  January,  1 7//',  with   full 
purpose  to  c.i[)ture  or  destro\'  Washington's  arni\',  his  rear-guard  was 


drooped  so 


far  b 


ehunl  as   to   nivolve  a  severe  contest  to  e.\tricate  it 


from  the  grasp  ot  his  adversary. 

Before  the  battle  of  Camden,  the  van-guard  of  the  two  armies,  each 
intent  upon  surprising  the  antagonist,  met  after  midnight,  and  by 
their  mutual  surjirise,  hurried  the  American  army  prematurely  into 
action,  at  bitter  cost. 

(^n  the  other  hand  the  strong  van-guard  of  the  American  army 
was  so  loosely  haiuUed  at  Monmouth,  that  Clinton  ])ut  in  jeopardy 
one  half  of  the  entire  American  army,  and  extricated  his  own  army 
from  a  position  of  no  little  peril. 

To  these  general  remarks  as  to  the  battle-issue,  there  may  well  be 
added  the  opinion  of  Colonel  Hamley.  "  Orders  of  battle  establish 
the  relations  existing  between  the  hostile  lines  before  or  during  the 
encounter."  "The  great  object  in  modern  battles  is  to  bring  at  a 
certain  point  of  the  battle  field  a  superior  number  of  troops  to  bear 
ui)on  the  enemy.  The  design  is  screened  by  fdse  attacks,  by  features 
of  the  ground,  by  a  general  advance  of  skirmishers,  and  by  deceptive 
formations  and  manoeuvers.  The  attacking  force  must  be  strengthened 


,77j.l  GKWD    lAilKS    Il.l.rsiK  \li:i ).  6j 

at  ihi:  I'Spi'iHc  of  some  otlu-r  portion  ol  tin:  liiu'.  lo  lmii^mj^i;  tli.it 
otiicr  part  would  be  to  offer  to  tin;  (.'iniii)'  the  o])portimiLy  of  restor- 
in;4  tile  iijiiilihrimn  of  the  hitlK'  uhicli  it  has  been  the  object  of  the 
iiiaiKinu'cr  to  disturb.  I'herefore  modern  battles  have'  bi'eii  for  the 
most  i)art  parti. il  attacks,  when  the  assailant  i)Uts  hi>  foot  no  f'rther 
tlian  lie  can  be  sure  of  (hMU'in;^  it  b.ick  ay.iin." 
The  follouir.;^'  is  a  brief  ei)ilonie  of  li.iron  J 
selection  of  tactic, d  ])ositions: 


omini  s  views  upon  the 


That    it    be     e.isier    to    fail    upon    the    ciieiii)'    tli.m    for    him    t' 


i])pioacn. 


use. 


Th.it  artiller\-  iia\'e  all  its  possible  effect  in  ilv^c 

'I'll, it   the  i^rouiul  selucteil   conce.il  siibordin.itc   movements  from 

the  eiiem\',  while  commandiiv^  .1  view  of  the  movements  of  tlic  eiicmv. 


'I'll, it   the    line   of   retreat    be    unobstructed,  and    the   flank 


secured 


Tlu'  m.itterof  retre.its  will  h,i\e  lirief  not 


s   wel 


i(;e  in  auotiier  connection. 


Those  of  the  war  under  review  were  frequent  .iiid  often  masterly. 


If 


1 1 


\  I 


.  s 


I  'I 

!   W 


m 


i\ 


'ii 


( 


'       !' 


CHAPTER    XII. 

l.DC.ISl  Its, 

LOGISTICS  was  ckfiiK-d  as,  "  The  practical  art  of  briiic;in<T  armies 
fully  c(iuii)i)c'il  iiitu  the  field." 

'I'he  primary  necessity  U)V  a  thoroufrh  preparation  of  all  the  cle 
mcnts  which  yo  to  ecpiip,  transport,  and  sustain  an  arms-,  is  .ipparcnt 
without  (liscMssion. 

It  is  ecpially  oljvious  that  while  the  strates^ist  and  tactician  must 
have  wistloin  in  all  (.'Kuients  that  niakt'  the  successful  solilier,  it  is 
impossible  for  all  the  details  of  anr.)'  oultit  and  army  movement  to  be 
under  their  innnediate  care,  wh.ile  Kiden  with  the  burtlen  of  directing 
war  and  ri;_;htini;'  battles. 

The  di'iails  of  loj^istics  are  therefore  more  especi.dl)'  within  the 
sphere  of  various  st.uf  dul\',  and  th.it  department  of  public  trust  which 
superintend-^  army  ppl)'-  l^ut  it  is  far  from  sufficient,  that  aisenals 
be  filletl,  that  pro\isions  abound,  that  hos[)ital  supplies  have  .iccmnu- 
lated.  and  that  every  possible  item  which  can  bu  needed  in  camp  or 
field,  in  victor)'  or  defeat,  by  nii^ht  or  by  day,  has  been  provided, 
unless  each  item  shall  be  accessible  at  the  riij[ht  time  and  at  the  rii^ht 
place.  C'trtain  materials  must  accompan)-  the  first  advance  of  an 
army  ;  son)r  attentl  the  main  army,  and  others  are  supplied  as  con- 
tingency retpdres.  All  these  must  be  at  hantl  in  fit  proportion  lo  tlie 
force,  with  no  surplus  to  iMubarrass  movements,  and  no  deficit  to 
retard  them.  I  he  supply  must  never  fail,  but  How  on  as  the  army 
moves,  smooth!)-,  adequately,  and  inevitably. 

It  is  in  small  details,  numlierless  and  perplexing,  which  worry 
men  more  th.m  L^rave  issues,  that  lo<^istics  finds  its  great  burden.  In 
one  continL;enc)',  a  box  of  horse-shoes  may  be  oi  more  value  than  a 
box  of  cartridges  ;  and  in  another,  a  roll  of  lint  may  do  more  service 
than  a  bale  of  clothing. 

The  wants  of  the  soldier  as  well  as  the  requirements  of  the  gen- 


■1 
J 


]Vii(>'st(i('li,iptirXI 


i 


/UnitMOM^r  i>rH(ltH<> 


A'r  Diriim-if  H'liiii 


III  the 
liicli 

iciials 
iimu- 
ij)  or 
led. 
n'l^ht 

of  an 
coii- 
)  tlic 
t    to 

ariiu' 


_J 


<li 


j;. 


^•\ ,  n/wkli'/t  iiiMg.mfA  ^fi^'i',  fob/vak 

t/ff  V/v/cJiff,  waife/o  Men  uri^B 
1),  .\t(iAes  ir  in/onvi/  Cfflfc/irf  f'J  /.'ifi 

/rent,  foj/aiit  t//e//a/i/i:  C'w<7^r-?/r 

Civ/c/iet  (o  tAe  rcaK 
Y.  Ec/ii'foit  by bflt.'i  ii/i/i/s,  rvfim/i.'f 

///r  ceHtcr.  (/■.■isi/ni/atnt  to  cc/it  •iirff 

form//f/on. 
Y.  OM/ifne  On/fir,  tf/r/v^rrtri/// /iirma- 

/ion  r,>  Mf  /,/'/Y.  orFrc/rt. 
G.  ft  ErMon  />y  //to  JCig/if,  iw/ica- 

/J'ref/hcfm/fi///'ss  o/O/iiitt^'  p/ 

I'm///  /o  ///)'  /(•//,pc/-/;MUicu//rf 

/o  o/-//fi//n//(jr/na//o/e, 
H.  Er>/r/fl//  />i//hr/g//f,(r/f///i;Mff 

////r  ii///r//fcW,  o»fo/Scie/oH. 
lJ(/i'/f//rc  i/t  co/u/ff/t  tfl  break /ft/^ 


1        I 


i  I 


J        J         J 


*         ♦ 


\  y 


(J. 

< — «. 


L^ 


r^ 


^. 


I    0/-/^i/tat Firma//<>/t 


If. 

.    }        2         ;i        *• 

E/vn/  ac/i  -a/tccci » 


/orry 
In 
an  a 
rvice 


/         2  0/-/ir//ta/ L//t/:     6 

mmm  cr 1  r^    n  r      3  \ 


i  «* 


11: 


I    ,• 


■| 


■".•fe 


p!h* 


I, 

\             ,          ,■ 

/                :' 

\ 

k 

r! 

ixxjis'lics 


69 


:S 


eral,  arc  tn  he  met  promptly  and  sufficiently,  or  ciiil)  irrassment  must 
attend  everv  muvement,  and  the  entire  cam[jaiL;n  will  he  im[)eriled 
<.)r  sacrificefi. 

It  is  nut  t'l  he  (|ue^li'ined  that  the  failure  of  tin;  movement  of 
N;in(jleon  III.  upMii  I'rn^-^ia,  u.is  on^icU.-raljly  proni-ited  hy  had 
lo'MsticT,  and  tiial  tiie  -^ucce^-.  of  the  aili'.'s  diu-in'.;  the  (aiuiean  war 
was  s<cin-e(l  tlirou;4h  excellent  .idju-tni'.nt-?  ami  jirouipt  executinii  in 
lhi-1  \'er\-  hranch  of  military  art.  'I'lie  I'ra-,->i.in  lu^^dstic-.  in  the  Franco 
I'ru^iian  war  were  admirahie,  and  no  operations  oi  modern  limes, 
within  a  period  so  short  and  dc'ci-^ive',  have  cvinceil  a  niuic  tiioron;_di 
])reparation  and  ada[)tation  of  m.iterials  to  meet  the  demands  of 
hattIe-i.-..-.ues. 

Tin:  Ahys-inia  and  Coast  of  (juinea  campai;.nis  of  Great  Jiritain 
were  marked  hy  C(;mmenTurate  skill  in  adjustin'4  the  outfit  (>\  tin; 
connn.ind  \<>  its  neccTsitii.;  i,  whether  of  service  or  clim.ite.  It  would 
he  (hff'iciiit  to  estimate  the  expenditure  of  material  which  enteied  into 
the  .\mc:rican  w.u"  nl  1  SOi -1865.  TIk.:  several  staff  department>>  were 
sewrel)'  ta-.ke'd  h\"  the  e-normou-.  drain  up-ui  their  re-S'Mii'Ce-.,  ,ind  \'et 
the  exactin;,^^  demand  was  fully  met. 

'i'lie  'livi->ii)ii  of  lahor  aloni;  made  the  ,-esiilt  pos-^ihle.  'idle  sjjhere 
of  lo;_;i^iic^  however,  is  not  hound  up  in  merely  mechanical  w(irk.  In 
modern  war  the  siir^le  direction  of  transportation  recpjirt.'S  the  control 
of  a  m, titer  mind,  (ireat  tale'Ut  i-;  found  at  the  head  of  railroad  cor- 
porations: and  similar  capacity  is  necessary  to  move  armies. 

'I'he  I'i'UT-iian  rail'.v.i\'s  mo\'ed  more  liian  six  hundi'eil  thousand 
troops.  The  advance  u|) on  I'aris  invi.)lved  the  adjustments  of  ioilin;4' 
stock  and  material  to  dilfereut  roads.  ICveuy  department  of  hrid'^e 
huiliiin;,;"  and  en;_;ineerin;.;  was  called  into  re(iuisitif)n,  and  such  was 
the  i)recision  ami  (juinii)re-sent  control,  that  accidents  were  r,u-e.  and 
the  \',ist  army  was  untailin;^!)-  sup[)lied  with  all  th.in;_;s  essential  t(j  its 
Comfort  and  i  s  oifensive  work.  liie  inspection  of  troops  and  ol 
supplies  Ijelon;.;  to  tais  dej),irtmcnt. 

The; a;  can  he  no  deficiency  in  the  means  of  equippin;^  an  army  that 
is  not  referahle  to  had  lo_L,dslics.  To  ;4:\e  el'lect  to  this  resjjonsihh:  trust, 
there  must  he  thorou:^h  coacert  of  i)ur[)osc  and  exact  s>'slem  in  the 
execution.  OvercroAded  transports  or  tr.iins,  the  indiscrimin.Ue 
shipn\ent  of  sui)piii;s,  the  confusion  of  m  iteri.d  helon;^in:4  to  dilfcrent 
arms  of  the  SL-rvice,  and  the  misdirection  of  these  sup[jlies  are  inevi- 
table, unles.s  the  m'tli-    '.   be  Ldd  down  clearly,  and  competent  officers 


T 

r 

TTif 

t*,' 

1 

• 

s 

I  it  ,  '   ': 

■•    !  ■ 

i 

^>     . 

9     1 


''    it!' 


5     i( 


^  ^ 


■  i 


i    i!! 


""^*^5^Bil' i ' 


ill 


70 


l.OCISl'ICS. 


1  '775 


iIiscli.ii\L;c  till'  (Iiit.\-.  It  is  not.  Ikavcvlt,  the  whole  of  loi^istics  to  fur- 
nisli  tin;  ;irni_\-  in  the  rTianner  ii-idicated. 

The  diiti'  s  of  uMieiiuuse  nian,  and  forwarder  of  merchandise, 
however  wisel\-  planned  and  executed,  are  not  np  to  the  demands  of 
the  arm)-.  Depots  and  ho-~[)itals  are  to  be  established  and  sust.'.ined  ; 
a  watchtul  e\  e  must  con-^tantl)-  ^^uard  a;_;ainst  .my  deficiency  at  every 
l)oint  where  the  arni\'  will  make  it-,  demands,  anil  this  demand  is 
coextensive  with  ever_\-  arm\'  movement  wliether  of  ^'eneral  or  of 
minor  concern.  I'he  broken  down  bridj^e  must  find  a  s^uardian  at 
hand  to  restore  it  promptly. 

5ie_>i'-;_;uii-^  mu->t  be  fomul.  siile  by  side  with  the  means  an(J  talent 
ncccssar)'  to  i)ut  them  in  position  ;  the  re<4ulation  of  the  movement  of 
the  troops  themselves  must  be  so  discriminalin;,;  and  exact,  that  no 
contlict  of  route  or  orders  shall  cross  the  pl.m  of  the  _L;eneral  comm.intl- 
in;_;  :  and  tin  as^iL^nmeiits  for  rest,  for  intrenchiiv_j,  or  advancin;^,  must 
be  intelli;4entl\'  communicated  to  the  officers  who  are  respectiwlv 
called  uj'on  to  tlischarj^e  these  special  duties.  The  protection  of  all 
supplies,  .uui  their  location  and  movement,  so  that  the\'  shall  not  be 
niere  iiiipcdiinoita,  to  cripple  tiie  general  command,  is  etjuall)'  impor- 
tant to  the  hii;hest  success. 

No  department  of  ilut\-  in  military  ojierations  is  more  imperative 
in  its  necessities,  or  more  painf  iily  emliarrassim:^  under  pe.glcct,  than 
the  care  of  the  sick  anil  wounded  ;  and  no  other  department,  if  neij- 
lecled,  is  such  a  trxin^  encumbrance  durin;4  the  active  issues  of  a 
campaiL;n.  Mere  loj^istics  must  come  in  with  the  fidlest  possible 
equivalent  fordi:;tress  that  is  inevitable,  and  here  the  stern  machinery 
ol  war  must  have  the  appliances  ^A  a  ,;'VC(//  heart,  so  that  even  in  its 
ri;4id  outline,  the  soldier  sliall  feel  that  there  is  represented  the 
abundant  s_\'mpath_\'  of  the  state  i"or  which  he  iniperils  life. 

In<lei)endenth-  of  all  these  meciianical  adjustments,  however  intcl- 
li^entlv  administered,  there  is  a  vast  field  of  intellectual  labor  that  is 
behind  tlu'  pliysical  facts.  Whatever  may  be  the  capacit}-  of  the 
master  br.un  which  directs  the  battle  and  sliapes  its  antecedents,  the 
tictails  must  be  so  conformed  as  tr)  exactly  accord  with  his  purpose. 
Details  themselves  must  be  modified  b\-  circumstances,  and  the  fluc- 
tuations of  battle  issues  .ire  often  as  critical  as  th.ose  of  a  i^ame  of 
chess,  calling  for  new  adaptation  of  material  to  meet  the  moilified 
relations  of  the  for; 


es  emplo^'et 


Clcaf  instructions 


are  muisne 


nsabU 


lo  nnlitarv  success,  and   these 


mu 


St   be  as  clearl)'  uiulerstood    by  those   who   are   to   e.xecute   tliose 


1775 


I77;- 


LOGISTICS. 


71 


I 


liesc 
liose 


instructions.  Battle  iiistory  is  full  of  disasters  which  attach  thscredit 
to  "-rcat  captains,  when  tlie  responsibiht}-  properly  belonj^ed  to  tiiosc 
wlio  taiK'd  to  api)reciate,  or  accurately  to  execute,  tlie  will  of  the 
comm.uuler. 

It  is  authoritatively  stated,  that  on  the  evenin;^  of  July  4th,  1809, 
before  the  battle  of  Wayrani,  the  nii;ht  bein;^  dark,  and  tlie  rain  f.ill- 
ini;  in  torrents,  when  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men  were 
puslied  across  the  arm  of  the  Danube,  there  one  huiulred  and  fifty 
yards  wide,  1)_\-  three  brid;4es,  that  it  w.is  assigned  to  Davoust,  who 
commanded  tlie  r!;^ht  win;.;,  to  cross  the  centre  bricf-je,  and  to  Oudinot, 
who  commanded  the  cmitre,  to  cross  the  bridLje  to  the  rigiit.  These 
commamlers  obe)-ed  the  orilers  as  received,  and  such  was  the  marvel- 
lous discipHne  of  the  triio[)s  tliat  the  armies  jj.issed  each  oilier  with- 
out disorder,  and  the  movement  was  accomplished  without  knowledge 
of  the  enemy.  While  the  error  is  attributed  to  Najioleon's  haste  in 
dictatin;4  the  onler,  Berthier  is  criticised  for  not  observini^  the  mis- 
take, since  he  was  called  u[)on  to  make  ten  copies  of  the  cM'der  for 
information  of  the  army. 

Jomini  broadly  asserts,  that  "  Na])oleon  made  no  provision  tor  the 
contiui^ciicy  of  retreat,  and  livetl,  not  only  to  demonstrate  what  might 
be  done,  but  loliat  a  .yood  i^eueral  should  avoid." 

It  was  in  the  sphere  of  loL^istics  that  the  Hritish  army  e.vcelled,  and 
the  American  army  was  det'icient.  The  colonies  had  furnished  army 
Continsj^ents  in  the  o!tl  French  war,  but  these  operated  under  the 
confol  of  experienced  officers  of  the  British  arm\-. 

The  sudtieii  demand  for  the  thorough  ecjuipment  of  twenty 
thous.uui  men  designated  t'or  the  siege  of  Boston,  devolved  vast  mili- 
tary responsibilities  ujion  inexperienced  citizen  militia.  The  public 
trusts  which  invoivetl  the  ;)urchase  t)f  sup/plies  were  too  often  con- 
fided to  ign.)rant  or  dishonest  parties.  The  eager  struggle  tor  place 
and  preferment  entered  into  the  army  at  the  outset,  and  almost  as 
soon  .IS  certain  regiments  recei\ed  an  outfit,  the  expiration  of  their 
Nliort  enlistment  involved  a  new  issue  of  arms  .md  eciui[)iiieiits,  or  the 
transfer  of  those  already  issued  from  the  returning  to  the  incojiiing 
recruits.  Those  consider.itions  will  find  their  illustration  in  the  his- 
tory ot  successive  campaigns,  and  will  be  therefore  passed  by  until  the 
eltect  of  b<ul  logistics  shall  mark  the  issues  themselves. 

The  British  army  realized  ilifficulties  of  a  different  kind  in  tlic 
^..une  general  direction,  until  taught  that  the  antagonist  was  one  that 
vxuuid   enforce  respect   at   their  cost,  if  the  full   measure  of  military 


ill 

iK 

% 

% 

% 

■*■ 

i^  I: 

it  ^  ■  ■* 


72 


I.DGISTICS. 


L1775- 


u 

If:  »■ 

.7     •; 


'i 


|l  li 


S.    f      !'::"? 


' 


I 


■'(1 


;4i     It' 


if  ■)[ 


"11(1-1 


;■  w 


.■!i 


■•  ^'iHi 


I'll 

I:  J 


iHi 


'■i 


preparation  was  not  made  to  meet  an  enemy  fully  competent  to  test 
their  mettle. 

The  first  action  itself,  that  of  breed's  Hill  (Bunker's  Hill),  was 
marked  by  carelessness,  which  amounted  to  i;ross  ne<^lect,  the  shot  for 
the  guns  first  landed  beinj^  of  briber  caliber  tlian  the  guns  themselves. 

The  Army  of  Burgoyne,  as  already  indicated,  was  iiKnieqiiateU- 
furnislieti  tor  the  expedition,  and  many  similar  defects  in  prejiaration 
were  prcLlicated  ui)on  the  supposition  that  the  ad\'ersar_\'  was  to  be 
dealt  with  as  an  inferior  in  ail  military  qualities,  and  theref(jre  the 
risk's  taken  were  not  unmilitar)',  but  either  economical  or  non-essen- 
tial elements  in  the  struggle. 

A  crowning  elemei  t  of  logistics  obtains  in  all  truly  uiiiitary  opera- 
tions, antl  that  is,  that  so  far  as  possible,  they  shall  be  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  enemy.  The  battle  of  Bennington  hail  its  incentive 
in  the  i)ur[)ose  of  General  Burgo_\aie  to  complement  his  own  scanty 
supplies  from  the  depot,  reported  to  luive  been  accumulated  near 
that  pl.ice  for  the  arm_\'  of  (ieneral  Schu)ler.  Many  of  tiie  minor 
operations  of  each  arm_\'  were  predator)',  and  to  secure  rations  for  the 
needy  troops.  The  British  forces  endeavored  at  times  to  live  off  the 
country,  aid  the  American  troops  during  the  scarcit}-  of  genuine 
monc)'.  were  compelled  to  seize  horses,  cattle,  flour,  and  other  pro- 
visions which  merchants  and  farmers  rehised  to  sell. 

During  the  term  tli.it  General  Greene  was  ([uarler-mahter-gencral 
of  the  American  arm\',  the  logistics  were  as  good  as  possiljle  under 
the  changing  circumstances  of  that  fluctuatir.g.  uncertain  force;  and 
Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  had  been  introduced  by  (General 
Cireene  to  Washington  as  a  }  oung  m.ui  of  promise,  gained  deservcti 
credit  for  his  skill  in  the  preparation  of  orders  and  accuracy  in  their 
distribution. 

In  this  department,  however,  the  remark  which  Baron  Jomini 
applies  to  Napoleon,  can  with  truth  be  said  of  Washington.  "  l/g 
was  Ms  own  best  chic/  of  staff." 


ilcr 
and 

icrai 
veil 

ihcir 

)niini 
He 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

MISCELLANEOUS   CONSIDERATIONS. 

A   FINE  RRTREAT/'says  Baron  Jomini.  "should  meet  with 
;i  reward  eciual  lo  that  given  for  a  great  victory." 

"  A  beaten  army,"  says  the  Archduke  Charles,  "  is  no  longer  in 
the  iiands  of  its  general." 

•'  When  an  army  makes  a  compulsory  retreat,"  say.^  Colonel 
Haniley,  "  it  is  not  in  a  condition  to  renew  the  contest.  The  troops 
tl'iat  have  been  driven  from  the  field  will  be  slow  to  form  front  for 
battle;  confusion,  too,  will  be  added  to  despondency,  '".^r  regiments 
will  be  broken  ami  mixed,  artillery  will  be  separated  from  its  ammu- 
nition, supply  trains  will  be  thrown  into  disorder  b\'  the  sudden 
rcilux,  and  the  whole  machine  will  bo  for  the  time  disjointed." 

In  the  American  war,  1861-1S65,  the  Federal  retreat  under  (}e.i- 
L-ral  Ivmks  from  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  those  of  the  Confederate 
arm\-  iVom  Vorktown,  Antietam,  Corinth,  and  Murfreesboro,  were 
sign.il  for  their  gooii  milit.iry  tli-^uositions  and  preeminent  success. 

])ut  during  tiie  war  of  1775  1781,  the  lluctuations  of  the  tide  of 
war  induced  retreats,  under  even  more  pressing  exigencies  and  with 
etjualiy  skillful  execution. 

The  maich  of  Ceneral  Clinton  from  Philadelphia  to  the  shelter  of 
the  licet  near  .S,uiii\'  1  look,  was  in  all  respects  a  proof  of  his  merit  as 
a  soidicr  and  brave  commander  ;  but  while  it  was  a  retreat,  it  was  not 
the  sequel  of  defeat,  and  a  des[)erate  race  for  an  asylum  of  safety. 
The  transfer  of  his  army  to  the  original  base  with  view  to  a  new  des- 
tination, was  a  prudential  and  strategic  movement  ;  but  failure  to 
ach'eve  anticipated  results  at  Philadelphia,  did  not  so  demoralize  his 
command  as  if  it  had  been  beaten  out  of  its  city  quarters  by  a  hostile 
toree. 

The  retreats  of  \Vashington  from  Long  Island  to  Pennsylvania, — 
from  Princeton   to   the  hills  of  New  Jersey — ^and  from  the   field  of 


m 


ftj>i^ 


^iS'i 


If 


74 


MISCI.I.l   \Ni:()l!S    ('nNSIDI'KA'MoNS. 


I  1 77^ 


II' 


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ih: 


r"    i; 


^'  :i' 

li 

i    '.f'V,i 

% 


t 


*  tfi 


ill  :;':'ii;l'ii 


?:'• 
f 


iiH 


lii.'ini,iiiti)\\  II  of  L.if.iyL'ttc'  Unm  Harron  llill,  .md  of  Mi)r;^Mn  and 
drcciR-  tiuiii  thf  (  \iiiilina>,  u  nr  mailt:  umlcr  circumstances  of  extreme 
peril.  1  lie  re^cue  ol  the  armies  from  impendinLj  ruin,  was  in  eacli 
case  (jnite  material  to  the  fate  of  the  wliole  w.ir.  The  most  ctirsor\- 
reference  to  the  m,i])s  will  \indicate  ihe  claim  of  those  officers  to  tlie 
tribute  which  introduces  tin's  chapter. 

The  movement  ot  Cornwallis  to  \'orktown  in  I /S  I ,  while  embrac- 
iii!^'  ulterior  [jlans.  was  substantially  a  rctrcit,  and  neither  his  ireneral- 
>liip  nor  that  of  (ieneral  Clinton  is  impeached  by  tlu'  circumstance 
which  cntorced  his  fin, il  surrender.  The  record  will  vuulicate  this 
position,  and  sliow  tli.it  the  misuiulerst  iiidin;.4  between  those  officers 
which  so  loni;  .mno\'etl  p.irliainent  and  the  Uritish  public,  was  unne- 
cessary, provided  that  the  burden  of  their  failure  had  fallen  where  tlie 
responsibility  beloiifjed,  upon  the  ministry. 

The  conditions  of  a  wise  retreat  .ue  many.  The  tendency  is  to 
li.inic.  'I'he  whole  m.itter  of  essential  supplies  is  thrown  into  con- 
fusion. All  facilities  for  food  or  rest  .are  disturbed,  and  the  only 
remedy  lies  in  t!ie  self-possession,  firmness,  and  tlarinc;  of  the  com- 
mandini;  officers.  Absurd  panics  have  .ittendcd  the  best  of  troops. 
False  alarms  h.ivt'  converted  a  well  or,L,Mnized  retreat  into  a  ])recipi- 
tate  lliL^ht.  an<l  more  than  once  the  real  victor  has  lost  his  laurels  by 
failure  to  re.dixe  his  success. 

While  the  ami)'  of  W  ashiiii^ton  was  emliarkin;^  at  Brooklyn  for 
passage  to  New  \'ork.  on  the  night  of  .September  twenty-ninth,  177'", 
tliat  general  disp.itclu'd  an  itid-di-cdiiip  to  (ieneral  Mifflin,  who  was 
superintending  the  movement,  with  orders  to  hasten  all  the  troops 
on  their  march.  Tlr's  order,  given  in  the  broadest  sense,  st.irtetl  the 
verv  troops  which  had  been  posted  in  the  redouljts  .and  trenches,  to 
keep  up  the  ,i[)])i.'arance  of  \-igilant  w.itch  o\i  r  the  movement--  of  the 
enenu'.  These  men,  imi)resseil  with  the  necessit}'  of  ha^te,  pushed 
for  the  1, Hiding :  but  W.ishington's  proinjit  measures  suspended  their 
march,  and  the)-  coolU-  resumed  their  [positions.  This  temporary 
desertion  was  not  known  to  the  beseigers,  ,uid  thus  the  retreat  w.is 
secured  .ami  the  .ii'my  saved.  It  is  just  such  crises  which  dignify 
retreat,  and  exalt  the  wisdom  .and  heroism  of  its  execution. 

The  rear  guard  in  a  retreat,  while  adequ.ite  to  check  [Pursuit,  must 
not  be  so  strengthened  as  to  recall  the  whole  army  for  its  support, 
unless  some  position  be  secured  which  will  warrint  a  renewal  of  battle. 
The  elements  as  st.it.-d  by  Colonel  llamley.  are  too  significant  to 
warrant  hope  of  such  coolness  and  concentration  of  material  and  men. 


I -"7^ 


bv 


i;75-J 


MisrKF.i.Axr.nrs  coxsrnF.RA'noNS. 


75 


as  will  w.irnuit  success  under  the  (M'diiiary  [)liases  of  a  positive  retreat 
from  a  beaten  field. 

The  /^itrsiiil  nf  a  retreat  ill;::;  uriny  involves  hardly  less  wisdom, 
unles.--  the  victor  has  sufficient  cavalry  to  li.irass  his  adversary,  suc- 
cessfull)'  cut  off  all  fuL^itive  detachments,  and  occujjy  the  rear  i^uard 
until  ade(]uate  force  can  be  Ijrou^dit  up  to  induce  a  new  action.  '1  he 
pressure,  howi'ver,  upon  the  retiring  force,  should  be  so  constant 
ami  earnest  as  to  ke'ep  it  too  busy,  in  escape,  to  .illow  time  for  the 
de-^triK'tion  of  bridt^es  and  \.\\v.  inter])osition  of  obstacles  to  the  pur- 
suit. Cav.dry  and  artillerv  may  thus  be  stopped  for  a  sufficient 
leiiLjth  of  time  to  save  the  .irir.y  pursued. 

It  is  of  hi;4'h  importance  that  the  jjursuit  shall  l)e  so  directed  by 
tlaiik  movements,  as  to  crowd  tiie  retirin;4  army  upon  rivers  or  por- 
tions of  counlr\-  wliich  check  their  progress,  ami  c^ive  strategical 
aiivantage  to  the  adveu'sary  pursuing. 

Pircrsiiiiis,  such  as  those  made  by  the  British  army  from  New 
V:)ik  into  Connecticut,  are  calculated  to  interfere  with  the  general 
l)ians  of  the  adversary.  Tiiey  have  value  in  proportion  as  that  result 
is  effected,  and  the  army  which  spares  the  detaciiment  still  retains 
an  adecpiate  force  for  its  general  operations.  It  is  due  to  General 
Washington  to  state,  that  he  was  so  bent  u[)on  his  purpose  to  suike 
those  armies  which  kept  the  field  in  ft)rce,  that  he  could  not  be 
diverted  from  chief  and  paramount  objects  b\' those  which  were  minor 
and  transient,  even  while  such  movements  inflicted  local  waste  and 
real  loss  in  propert\-  and  life. 

The  diversions  of  Greene  and  Morgan  in  1781,  which  thre;itcned 
Ninet}--si\  and  other  posts  to  the  rear  of  the  British  headquarters  .it 
Camden,  really  exposeil  the  army  to  be  beaten  in  detail.  The  feint 
was  however  successful.  Fearing  lest  the  base  so  far  advanced  from 
Charleston  would  be  imjieriled,  and  every  benefit  of  the  recent 
victory  over  Gates  wouM  be  lost,  the  army  was  divided  ior  the  pro- 
tection of  the  threatened  posts,  and  the  American  detachments 
rejoined  the  army  with  safety. 

Iiiipro:i('iiu'iit  of  sKcccss.  After  the  battle  of  Bennington  in  I/"/, 
tlie  American  troops,  elated  with  the  result  of  the  day's  fight,  occupied 
themselves  so  intently  with  the  plunder  of  the  battle  field,  that  the 
artillery  of  Colonel  Breyman,  alone,  aroused  thcni  to  the  conviction 
that  another  enemy  was  on  their  hands,  and  that  victory  itself  was 
well  nigh  lost. 

General  Howe  habitually  failed  to  realize  the  best  fruits  ot  success 


1*  ;■  -1'  ■ 

a, 


'J  ! 

1^ 


■<•■■  Hi 


►  B  -«■ 


V.  .1 


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■1  ■ 

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(1"  . 

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I 


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7b 


MISCKI.I.AXI'IOUS   CONSIDFK AIIONS. 


fi77fi 


It  w.is  cliaractcristic  nf  Wclliiv^toii  ami  Naiiolcon,  as  of  Marlboroiij^li 
and  Fic'iUiic,  tliat  tluri'  was  no  rest  afdr  '.•icton'.  What  next? 
Strike  on  and  fiiiish  war.  tliat  ])cace  may  repl.icc  conflict.  Ifcitlicr 
of  these  i;reat  captains  f.iiled  to  achieve  the  hii^hest  piyssible  results, 
it  w.'is  Napoleon,  when  ambition  and  restless  pursuit  of  mihtary 
supremacy  would  not  let  him  rest  when  peace  was  within  reach,  and 
when  its  blessiui^s  were  most  of  all  thint:js  essential  to  the  well  beinij 
of  Fr.mee. 

/'?.W( ?!,'•('  of  riz'i'rs.  The  multiplication  of  machinery  and  the  great 
respect  paid  to  mechanical  skill,  have  Ljreatly  f.icilitated  the  passa;^e 
of  stream-.  The  I^ritish  aimy  transport' il  a  bridge  of  boats  and 
pontoons  to  New  Jersey  in  December,  1777,  '^'^'t  returned  it  to  the 
coast,  as  soon  as  Washington  refused  to  be  enticed  from  the 
fastness  of  Alorristown.  Upon  his  original  retreat  to  Pennsylvania, 
he  had  cleared  the  left  bank  of  every  accessible  craft,  so  that  although 
he  was  landing  his  rear  guard  as  the  J^ritish  troops  reached  the  river, 
tiiere  were  no  facilities  for  further  pursuit. 

While  at  Vallev  Forge,  the  American  army  established  a  bridge 
across  the  Schu\-lkill.  for  the  double  purpose  of  communication  with 
the  country,  and  to  secure  a  means  of  retreat  in  case  the  British  army 
should  threaten  his  camj). 

During  the  war  of  1861-1865,  "The  Board  of  Trade  Battery,"  and 
reg-iment  from  Chicago,  was  so  thoroughly  composed  of  .skilled 
mechanics,  that  their  briilge  buiKling  and  their  cooperation  in  the 
passage  of  streams  by  the  armies  of  the  midtlle  zone  was  simply 
wonder  fill. 

Such  movements  are  generally  to  be  anticipated,  or  covered  by 
light  earthworks  or  bridge  heads — tctcs  do  pont.  A  memorable 
instance  of  the  value  of  such  a  position  is  that  of  the  defense  of  the 
bridge-head  and  a  light  earthwork  at  Franklin,  Tennessee,  just  after 
the  principal  action,  November  thirtieth,  1864,  when  a  Federal  corps 
commanded  by  General  Schofield,  crowded  by  the  entire  army  of  (ien- 
eral  Hood,  successfully  crossed  the  Harpeth  river,  and  effected  their 
retreat  upon  Nashville  together  with  artillery  and  baggage.  The 
river  banks  were  precipitous,  the  stream  was  not  fordable,  a  single 
railroad  bridge  had  to  be  adapted  to  the  pressing  emergency;  and  the 
assailing  force,  more  than  double  in  numbers,  was  that  army  which 
immediately  after  attempted  the  capture  of  Nashville  itself. 

The  neglect  to  establish  a  sufficient  rear  guard  and  light   earth- 


f«775 


•7751 


MlSCKI,l,ANi:()US   CONSIUKKAI'IONS. 


n 


work  at  Cowan's  Foid,  in  17S1,  cspocially  oidcnd  1)_\'  General  Greene, 
crave  to  the  advance  of  Cornw.iIIis  a  hrilli.ml  success. 

Tlie   passa^j^e   or  attempted   passai^e    of  rivers,  is   fjften    a  feint  to 

mislead  an    enemy.       .Such    movements    involve    strate^^ical    no    less 

than    t.ictiud    consideratinns,  aiul    this    in    proportion    as   the   hostiU- 

force,  the   character   of  the   river,    and    the   immediate   issue   assume 

importance.       I'he  pass,i;4e  of  the  Mast  river  at  New  Vcjrk,  .September 

twent_\--ei;^lith,  \~'(\  and  of  the  iXl.iware  river  on  C'iiristmas  niL;iit  of 

the  same  year,  are  characteristic  oper.itions  in  the  passa^^e  of  streams. 

Obstructions.      In  the  war  of  1775    17S1.  tlie  movements  of  armies 

were   lar;j[ely  alTected   1)\-  that   diss  of  labor,  which,  without   fii^htini,', 

!.;ave  distinctive  shajH;    to  more  active   oper.itions  b\'  obstructini:^  the 

advance  or  retreat  of  armies.       I'i'e  destiaiction  ot   brid^^es,  the  fellimj 

of  trjes,  and    other   obstructions  were    of  sii^nal  ser\-ice.      The    policy 

of  the  liritish  army  was  L  >  strike  (piickl)'  and  hard,  before  the  colonies 

coulii  concentrate  men,   improve  tliscipline,  procure  arms,  and   inter- 

j)ose  substantial  defense.      Tl'.e  .Vmerican  army  w.is,  constructively,  on 

the  defensive.     Its  policy  was  to  delay  and   wear   out    its  opponent, 

S  postpone  prematun;  collisions,  and   as    far  as  possible,  only  to  eiv^ai^c 

v  under  such    local  advantaijes  as  would   encourai;e  tr(jops  and  enhance 

tile  promise  of  succes.s.      Familiarity  with  the  country,  the  scarcity  of 

S£  skililul  engineers  at  the  outset,  and  a  lar;_;e  experience  in  tVontier  war- 

^  tare  encouraged  them  to  pursue  this  p(^iic\-  with  success. 

M  In  every  struggle  when  invasion  threatens  the  homes  of  a  people, 

S  there  h.is  been  this  spontaneous  movement,  even  of  non-combatants, 

%  thus  to   add  to   the    efficiency   of  milit.;ry   defense    and   imperil   the 

%  hostile  ailvance.      It  becomes  the  i)usinrss  oi  n'crybody,  and  the  troops 

■■'  in  the   field  are   both  stimulated  and  strengthened   by  all  such   mani 

%  testations  of  popular  zeal. 

^  (luards  and  outposts.     .\  single  word  only  is  requiretl  to  magnify 

5^  tile'  olfice  of  scouts  and  pickets.     Vigilance,  obedience  and  nerve  mark 

I  the  true  picket-man.      In   darkness   and    storm    he    is   the  uncom|)ro- 

J  niising  guardian  of  the  safet\'  of  the  entire  arm\-.      Indifference  is  trea- 

son !  To  sleep  on  post  in  an  enemy's  presence  is  worth)-  of  death, 
its  established  penalt)-.  lie  holds  the  key  of  the  outer  door.  Me 
has  the  pass-word  !  The  S.icred  record  thus  testifies  of  the  faithful 
and  the  faithless,  watchman. 

"Son  of  man,  I  have  made  thee  a  watchman  unto  the  House  of 
Israel,  therefore  hear  the  word  at  mv  mouth,  and  give  them  warning 
troni  me." 


R  " 


7« 


MISCKI.I.ANi:ni;s   CONSIDKkA  I  I()\>. 


1 1775 


'  t  :  I 


i 


1  •■■ 


■H't 


I      'III'  ;!,. 


^"'  <;!!!lira< 


I 

j 

''I 


Si, 


"  Ill's  w.ttflimc'ti  arc  liliiid  ;  they  are  all  ij^morant ;  they  arc  all 
(lunil)  ili>;^'s,  tlu'V  r.m  not  hark;  slcH-piiiL^,  lyiiv^'  down,  lyiiiLj  down  to 
sliiinlxr  I" 

riiiis  si;^iials  1)1"  al.iriu,  oitcn  l)\'  w.iU:h-riri.'s  and  sin(>l<in|_j  Ixacnns, 
nad  early  introihu  lion,  and  tlicrr  will  appear  in  this  narr.itivi;  more 
than  oni;  instance  wlu'n  tlu'  s.ilvation  of  armies  ami  detaelnnenls 
entire!)-  hiiv^ed  upon  skillhd  reconnoissanee  .mil  faitiiUd  picket  duty. 

'I'lu:  use  of  >pies  ver_\-  natural!)'  comes  witliin  tills  L,uTjer.d  class. 
Prisoners  of  war  are  also  t!)e  source  of  valuable  information.  l'".,icli 
class  is  a  doul)thd  dependence,  unless  corrol)oratin;^r  circumst.mces 
confirm  their  statements.  Tlie  nnuiories  of  Andre  and  Hale  are 
emi)almed.  Their  losalty  to  their  cause,  their  intrinsic  excellence  as 
men,  .md  theii"  noljle  conduct  in  the  extreme'  liour,  have  i^dveii  tliem 
a  like  place  of  honor  in  llriti-^h  and  .\merican  liistory.  II  (jixeiie 
blotted  liis  fin.d  si^^nature  Uj  the  order  for  Andre's  execution  with  .1 
tear,  it  was  but  the  tribute  wliicli  many  an  I^iglisli  soldier  paid  to  the 
memoi)'  ot   1  iaie. 

///(■  sii/<h's  of  ti'ar.  Tlie  iluctuation  in  llic  iniiiilhrs  of  the  .Anu.ii- 
can  arm\',  was  not  more  strikiiiL;  th.m  their  uncert.u'nty  of  pa\',  and 
tlie  scarcit)'  of  arms  and  proper  equipments.  Several  l),itt!es  were 
affectid  Ijv  tlieir  skill  as  marksmen.  (Others  were  clKuv^ed  at  critical 
moments  !))■  possession  and  [prompt  use  of  tlie  bayonet.  If  as  a  i^^ener-d 
rule,  tlie  American  soldiers  were  individuail)' l)etter  "shots,"  and  could 
^ive  an  el'fect  to  the  rille  which  was  beyond  the  reach  of  the  "  kini^'s 
arms,"  the  opposiii;,;  force  h  id  the  advanta;_;e's  which  the  l)ayoiiet  and 
a  complete  e(pii[)nunt  ahorded.  It  h.id  adi.ipiate  supplies  of  [)owder, 
suitable  caniiJ  eipaipaj^e,  an  orL;ani/ed  conimisScuiat,  and  iiiouov.  The 
liistor)'  is  not  more  instructive  and  interesting^  ju  inspect  of  the  par- 
ticular deeils  done,  than  in  the  really  extensive  operations  compassed 
through  disproportioiied  means  and  under  discourai^in;^  circumstances. 

Neither  side  was  ready  lor  war  wlien  it  beLjan.  The  British  army 
fouyht  with  inad.eipiate  lorces.  Tlie  American  army  foui^ht  with 
inade(|uate  means,  onl)-  complemented  by  nuiubers  and  faith  in  their 
ultimate  imlepenileiice.  'Tliis  last  consideration  was  the  potent  niai;ic 
which  transmuted  continental  paper  into  a  semblance  of  money,  and 
dignified  semi-starvation  into  a  herijic  waitiii;^  for  the  rewards  oi  the 
future. 

Tb.e  assum[)tion  of  independence,  so  long  merely  nominal,  w.is 
found  t(j  be  a  poor  antidote  for  liimyr  and  rags,  and  Congress  fmally 
instituted   that   system   of  bounties  so  largely  adopted   in  the  war  uf 


•775 


1775-1 


Misci:i,i,\\i;i)rs  (•(l\^ll>l•;k aiidns. 


79 


iS^i-iSr),,  ;inil  (.-lotluMl  \V,isIiin;^M()n  with  diil.itDii.il  |)m\vcis,  wliicli 
were  al)^()hitc  and  siipri.'ine.  As  the  w.ir  proj^rcssed,  aiiillii)'  and 
otlii  r  111  ilciial  olwar  were  fuiMi-^lu'd  l)\'  l'"raiuc,  and  the  liiiirly  cuntri- 
biiliiiii  iif"  ^is  inil!iiiii  dollars  !))•  Louis  XVI.,  as  well  ,is  a  loan  tlii'ii 
cffeilcd,  iii'-pired  soiii';  iVrsli  seiUiimiit  that  natioiiaiily  was  at  last 
rciil.  'I'liis  practira'  support,  in  additi(»ii  to  its  inor.il  \-aluf,  ;^reMtly 
i'iilaj\m(l  the  l.u'ilitics  for  carryiu;,;  on  this  conflict. 

A/li(iiUtS.  I'lic  iii-.tor)' of  nations  is  full  of  treaties  of  alliance, 
(ilTensiw;  and  deic'ii-iive.  Ihee  need  no  explanation.  That  ol  I'rance 
with  the  llnil^.'d  .States  iiad  as  its  incenliw  the  reduction  ol  Mrilish 
|)()\ver,  and  w.is  not  intrnisically  .m  assurance  of  sympathy  with  the 
priirary  cau^e-;  of  tlu;  ^Xnierican  w.ir  <u\d  of  the-  principles  which  it 
■  isserteil.  I  hat  some  phases  of  the  asserted  IVeedoiii  r(.MCte'd  upon 
Fr.mcc,  and  'iiade  Louis  .W'L,  .iiid  Lafi\ette  indeeti,  to  suffer  under 
that  license  wliicli  affecliid  the  f)riii  of  lihert}-,  is  a  fict.  I'll, it  the 
l''rench  re\dlutioii  re-acted  in  like-  maniua',  and  threatened  .America 
uith  the  supremacy  of  a  fmatical,  ;H)illess,  and  irri.'sponsil)ic  democ- 
racy is  eiiually  true.  I'he  names  of  W'.ishiiv^ton  and  (itniet  i  mhody 
the  whole  history  of  that  event. 

I'he  pnipositioii  ivmoiiiucci,  does  not  lie  in  the  discussion  of  the 
p(jlitical  issues  of  that  jjcriod.  //  states  tluit  fii,< ni/iaiirrs  liax'c  a  luitii- 
ral  aiiil  luiiiliiii:;  forci'.  The  interests  of  ivw  fmnlies  are  e.x.utiy  com- 
mon. 1  hose  of  nations  are  common  only  within  the'  pro\iiice  of 
ris^htluily  accepted  international  law,  just  as  families  have  a  common 
relation  to  social  law. 

'i  he  l'"reiich  alliance,  \alual)le,  and  to  he  hoiiort-d  for  real  aid  ren- 
dered, was  re])eatedl)'  put  in  jeop.u'd}-  Ijv  distinctness  of  interests; 
and  the  pro|)osed  diversion  of  a  portion  of  the  .American  arm\'  to 
reassert  and  eiilorce  l'"rench  soverei^nt)-  over  Cmada  was  but  one 
illu.stration  in  point.  'I'iie  extraordinar>'  tact,  unselfishness,  and  solid 
judL;inent  ot  Lati)-ette  are  monumental,  .is  determiniiv^  elements 
which  L;,ive  to  the  alii.mci;  much  (jf  its  harmony  and  enhanced  its  value. 

II  the  cooper.ition  of  several  powers  in  tlie  Crimean  war  be  citcil 
as  dis[)rojt  of  the  [)roposition,  let  it  be  noticed  that  the  Crimean  war 
was  based  upon  the  supposed  purpose  of  Rus-^ia  to  control  the  Dar- 
danelles at  the  expense  of  Turlie)-,  and  of  all  interested  maritime 
nations,  and  was  predicited  iipon  a  princi[)lc  .similar  to  that  which 
biiuls  societv  to  protect  its  members  against  lawless  assault.  It  was 
another  protest  a-^ainst  a  war  for  conquest. 

Military  commanders.     The   selection  of  men  who  shall  vindicate 


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8o 


MIS'ELI.ANEOUS  CONSIDERATIONS. 


['775. 


the  authority  of  the  state,  and  apply  military  force  in  the  battle-issue 
tasks  the  hij^hest  capicit)'.  Probity,  wisdom,  unsellshness,  and 
energy  belon;j^  to  such  a  trust.  Appreciation  of  the  issue,  and  intelli- 
t^cnt  compi:;hension  of  the  resources  of  either  contestant,  and  a  cor- 
dial adoption  of  sound  military  policy,  which  is  in  harmony  with  the 
best  interests  of  the  state,  .ire  \ital  to  the  highest  success. 

Baron  Jomini  says  : — "  He  must  iiave  a  physical  courage  which 
takes  no  account  of  obstacles,  and  a  high  moral  courage  capable  of 
great  resolution.  Unfortunately,  this  choice  of  a  general  is  influenced 
by  so  many  petty  passions,  that  chance,  rank,  age,  favor,  partj'  spirit, 
jealousy,  will  have  as  much  to  do  with  it  as  the  public  interest  and 
justice." 

If  this  eminent  scholar,  so  long  confidential  with  Alexander  of 
Russia,  as  well  as  with  Napoleon,  can  so  broadly  state  his  conviction, 
it  might  be  a  source  of  congratulation  both  for  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  and  indeed  for  civilization  itself,  that  in  the  fore-front 
of  the  battles  of  1775-17S1,  and  during  the  introduction  of  the  Great 
Republic  to  a  place  ainong  nations,  there  stands  in  bokl  relief  the 
name  of  Washin(;T(  >N. 

Leaving  to  the  b  ittle  record,  however,  the  test  of  battle  direction, 
it  is  not  iinpolitic  or  iliscursive  to  state  the  training  of  one  single  gen- 
eral of  that  period,  thus  to  indicate  the  type  of  mind  and  preparation 
which  the  period  developed. 

A  Quaker  youth  of  fourteen  spared  time  from  the  forge  to  master 
Euclid  and  geometry.  Providence  threw  in  his  way  Ezra  Stiles, 
president  of  Yale  College,  and  Lindley  Murray,  the  grammarian. 
They  became  his  friends  and  advisers.  Before  the  war  began,  and 
while  \et  a  \oung  man,  he  carefully  studied  Caesar's  Commentaries, 
Marshal  Turenne's  Works,  Sharp's  Military  Guide,  Blackstonc's  Com- 
mentaries, Jacob's  Law  Dictionary,  Watts'  Logic,  Locke  on  the 
Human  Understanding,  Eerguson  on  Civil  Society,  Swift's  Workh, 
and  some  other  models  of  a  similar  class  of  reading.  In  1773  he 
visited  a  Connecticut  militia  parade  to  study  its  methods.  In  1774 
he  visited  Boston,  to  watch  the  movements  of  British  troops,  and  took 
back  to  Rhode  Island  a  British  sergeant  w  ho  deserted,  as  the  in- 
structor of  the  Kentish  Guards,  a  militia  company  of  which  he  was  a 
member.  Such  was  the  proficiency  attained  by  this  company,  that 
more  than  thirty  of  the  private  members  became  officers  in  the  sub- 
sequent war.  He  commanded  the  brigade  of  si.xteen  hundred  men 
which  Rhode  Island  s"  it  to  the  siege  of  Boston. 


LI775. 


«775] 


MISCELl.ANKOU'S   Ct^NSlDKKA  IIONS. 


Si 


Modest,  faithful,  dignified,  cool  in  danger,  unprovoked,  and  un- 
daunted by  rebuffs  or  failures,  equable,  self-sacrificing,  truthful,  and 
honest,  a  man  like  General  George  H.  Thomas  in  simple  grandeur  of 
character  and  the  fullness  of  a  complete  manhood — such  a  man  for  the 
hour,  the  peril  and  the  duty,  was  NATHANIEL  Gkekne. 
6 


1 


>!;  >i  ■ ' 

( 

i: 


4 


'••"I    I  :llll':r.,, 
^'      (-III    ;  Milii,;/,, 


CHAPTER   XIV. 


j 


^ 


THI-:    HOUR   OF   PREPARATION. 

AT  Iciii^th,  the  thrill  of  action  drove  forth  on  errands  of  war  the 
long  smothered  passions  which  so  slowly  deepened  into  a  settled 
conviction  that  peace  could  never  smile  upon  the  colonies  while  the 
su])reniacy  of  Great  Britain  enduretl.  Multiply  all  assumptions  of 
superiorit}',  all  public  tokens  of  contempt,  all  enforcements  of  unpal- 
atable law,  all  restraints  upon  provincial  commerce,  and  all  espionage 
upon  the  brain-work  which  really  wrought  in  behalf  of  peace,  seeking 
a  fair  reconciliation  with  guarantees  of  representation  and  personal 
rights,  and  their  product  represents  that  incubus  whose  dead  weight 


was  upon 


the  American  colon 


ic^. 


That    is   the   statement   of  history.     The  longer   that    burden  re- 
mained, the  heavier  it   felt.      It   fretted,  then  aroused,  then   inspired, 


and 


at 


as 


t  set    fr( 


th 


e    [)ent-up    fires  w 


hich    cast    it    off  forever. 


Rocked  to  and  fro  by  the  heaving  of  the  heart  it  would  smother,  it 
was  compelled  to  increase  its  force  in  proportion  as  the  real  vitality  of 
a  true  sou!  life  pervaded  the  masses.     British  will  was  firm  and  daring 


in  tile  child  as  wi 


th  th 


e  parent. 


The  legacies  of  I'lnglish  law,  the  inheritance  of  English  liberty  had 
7'i's/id  in  the  colonies.  Their  eradication  or  withdrawal  was  impos- 
sible.    'Jhe   time  had   passed  for  compromise   or   limitation    of  their 


enjoyme 


nt.      The  issue  lonti  before  fought  out   on  EiiLrlish  .soil,  and 


bearing  fruit  in  English  ascendency  almost  world-wide,  had  to  be 
renewed  ;  and  the  authority  which  might  have  gladly  welcomed  the 
prodigious  elasticity  and  growth  of  the  American  dependencies  as  the 
future  glory  of  Great  Britain,  was  armed  to  convert  the  filial  relation 
into  one  of  sl,iver\'. 

Lord  C/fr^Z/ww  announced  that,  "  it  would  be  found  impossible  for 
freemen   in  Entilaiid  to   wish  to    see  three   millions   of    Englishme: 


slaves  in  / 


\in 


erica 


THK    IIOUI*-  OF    I'REl'AKAriON. 


83 


Lord  Dartinoiith  decl.ircd,  "  the  effects  of  General  Gage's  attempt 
at  Concord  to  be  fatal." 

Granvilh'  Sltarpc  of  the  Ordnance  department  resij^ned  rather 
than  forward  stores  to  America. 

Admiral  /v' />/>(•/ requested  not  to  be  employed  against  America. 

Lord   litjiiiii'hain  resigned    his    commission   when   he  learned    h 


IS 


rc'Timen 


t  was  ordered  to  America. 


It   was  such   demonstrations  as  these   that  indicat(;il    how  deeply 


the  mother  country  was  jealous,  even 


of  the  efforts  of  her  own  <fov- 


.'rnmeiit  to  assert  a  doubtful  policy  by  force  of  arms. 

yokii  Wrs/iy  declare  1,  that  neither  tivciity,  forty,  nor  sixty  thou- 
-aiid   men   could   entl   the  dawning  struggle.     Thus  revolution  alone 


so 


could  roll  off  o[)pression. 

I'lie  \e,u'  1774  witnessed  the  formation  of  new  militia  companies 
in  all  the  colonies.  New  Lngland  had 'made  especial  progress  in  that 
liircctio'i.      rile    noiseless  arming  of  the  people,  and  the  formation  of 


inde 


Dciident   orLrani/.ations  was  t)t   still  earlier  date. 


Tl 


le  experience 


of  tlic   (lid    I'rench  war  had   developed   a   necessity  for   f.iir   military 
acquirements,  and   had   educated    man\'  leaders   fidly   competent   for 


small  commands  ;  while  a  airowin"  uneasiness,  in  view  01  the  increasiiiLr 


fth 


111 


IIHJll 


\  of  British  troops,  inspired  others   to  a  studious  pre[xiration  for 


the  probable  issue  of  force  with  the  mother  country. 

The  attempts    of   official  aiithorit)-  to  prevent  the    people    from 
obt.iiiiiiiijf  arms   and  munitions  of  war,  and  to  seize  those  alread\'  in 


their  possession,  were  not  limited,  as  will   hereafter  appear 


to  M 


issa- 


husetts  and  other  X 


ew 


I'Ln; 


and  colonies. 


The   fortification   of  Host 


on 


N 


eck 


jencral 


Ga 


L^e   h 


ad 


elicitetl 


by  { 
,'hich    met   on    the   fit"th  day  of 
Se[)tember,  1774,  an    uncquivocU   declaration   of  s\-mpathy  with   the 


from  the    tirst  Continental  Co;v. 


res- 


>r 


le  of  Boston  and  Massachusetts,  and  thus  the    local  stn 


le  was 


the  basis  for  orLMiiized 


swiftlv  changing   its  character,  and    becomiiv. 
general  resistance. 

It  has  been  noticed  during  comment  upon  the  affairs  of  Lexington 
.ind  Concord,  how  rapidly  the  provincial  congress,  which  succeeded 
the  Massachusetts  assembly,  developed  its  purpose  to  place  its  militia 
on  a  war  tooting. 

During  September,  1774,  a  re[)ort  had  become  current  that  Boston 
hid  been  attacked.  Tli'^  removal  of  powder  from  Cambridge  and 
t^harlestown,  which  belonged  to  the  colony,  was  magnified,  and  t.dcen 
as  the  open   offensive,  until    the   wliole   c   antry  was  excited.     One 


PI 


""Tf  ,ff*^ 


■RHI 


.n 


)1 


Fi  J' 


I   ■ 


■> 


II 


^4 


THE   HOUR   OF   rRICPARATION. 


[1775. 


author  states  that,  "  within  tliirt\--si\-  lioiirs,  nc.irly  thirty  thousand 
nu'ii  vcrc  uiulcr  arms,"  and  a  profound  iinprcssion  was  made  even 
upon  the  American  Con.Ljress  tlien  in  session  in  riiihulelpliia.  This 
onl>'  inthcated  ihe  breadlii  of  that  feehtii;,^  which  ah'eady  panted  for 
armed  expression. 

On  Sund.i/.  the  twenty-second  (iay  of  April,  1 775,  Massaclui- 
setts  declared  a  necessity  for  tlie  empl(>yment  of  thirty  thousand  men 
in  defense,  and  called  ui)on  ailjoinin;4'  colonies  ftjr  their  proportional 
q  iota,  .issumiuLj'  as  her  own  bunlen  the  enrollment  of  thirteen  thou- 
sand six  hundred  men. 

On  the  twenty-iifth  day  of  April  Rhode  Island  devoted  fifteen 
hundred  men  to  "An  arm_\'  of  Observation." 

On  the  day  foUowinL;,  Connecticut  voted  a  contingent  of  six  thou- 
sand men. 

On  the  twentieth  tia}'  of  May,  New  Hampshire  tendered  her  pro- 
portion, which  was  two  thousand  rnen. 

Each  colonial  continijent  went   u[)  to  Boston  as  a  separate  army, 


with  i-i.lependeiit   organization  and  responsibility 


Til 


)owuer  a 


nd 


food  of  each   of  these  armies  was   distinct,  and  there   was  little  that 
except    the    purpose    which    impelled    theni    to 


was    nomoLTeiieou^ 


concentrate. 


M 


issac 


:iuisetts  selected   Artemas    Ward,  who   had    served 


unuet 


General   .\bercrombie,    to   be    general-in-chief,  Joh'i   Thomas   to    be 
lieutennU  ;4eneral,  antl  Richard  Gridley,  an    experienced   soldier  .ind 


enmii 


e.r.  to  organize  artillery  and  act  as  engineer  in  chief. 


Connecticut  sent  General  Putnam,  whom  active  service  in  the  old 
h'rench   w.ir  and   in   the  West  Indies,  had   inureti   to   daring  and   ex- 


posure ;  General 


W 


loster,  an  old  veteran  o 


th. 


:xp 


edition  to  Louis 


bur''  tnirt\'  \'eais  betore.  w 


ho  had   ser^■ed   both  as  colonel  and   briija- 


ner-"eneral  n 


1  the  French  and  Indian  war  and  General  Spencer. 


Rhotle  IsKmd  entrusted  her  ticjops  to  General  Greene;  with  Var- 


nuni, 


Hit 


clicock,  and 


Ch 


urch  as  subordinates 


New  Hampshire  furnished  Gener.il  Slark,  also  a  veteran  of  former 


wars. 


I'omeroy  and  Prescott  were  also  experienced  in  the  operations  of 


the  old 
Thi 


l""rench  and  Indian  wars. 


these    armies    c.ime    together,  and   General  Ward  was  by 
courte>\'  accepted  as  acting  commander-in-chief.     It  was  there  before 


l3osl 


on,  ear 


ly 


m  J  Line, 


1//3 


that  General  Greene  declared  that  there 


were  .-.ix  indispensable  conditions  to  the  promptest  success. 


[1775- 


1775-1 


THE    HOUR    OF    PRF.PARAIION. 


8! 


•usand 

:    even 

This 

:cd  tor 


ms  of 

as  by 
)L'fore 
there 


1 


/■"//■.\7.   That  tlicrc  be  one  General-iii-cliief. 

SiYomi.    That  the  army  should  be  enhsted  for  the  w.ir. 

Third.  That  a  system  of  bounties  shouhl  be  ordained  which  would 
provide  for  the  faniihes  of  soldiers  absent  in  the  field. 

i'ourtli.  That  the  troops  should  serve  wherever  required  through 
the  colonies. 

I'iftlt.  That  funtls  slu^uld  be  borrowed  ecjuil  to  the  demands  of 
llie  war,  for  the  conijilete  eciuipment  and  support  of 'he  army. 

Sixth.  That  Independence  shoukl  be  declared  at  once,  and  ever\' 
resource  of  every  coUviy  be  [)ledL;ed  to  its  su[)port. 

The  history  of  the  war  furnished  its  indorsement  of  the  wisdom 
of  these  propositions.  Ilis  pitriotism  was  like  that  of  Patrick  Henry, 
who  cU:clared  that  "  landmarks  and  boundaries  were  thrown  down, 
that  distinctions  between  VirL^ini.ms,  lVnns\lvanians,  \ew  Yorkers, 
and  New  luiglanders  were  no  more,"  adding,  "  I  aui  not  a  Viri:;iiiian, 
l>!it  (HI  .liinriiaii." 

15y  the  middle  of  Jane,  and  before  the  battle  of  Breed's  Hill,  the 
colonies  were  substantiail)'  united  in  the  war.  During  March,  1/75, 
Kicliard  Henry  Lee  offered  resolutions  before  the  second  Virginia  con- 
vention, "  that  the  colony  be  immediately  put  in  a  stale  of  defense,"  and 
advi^cated   "  the  reorganizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  of  the  militia." 

The  winds  seemed  to  carr_\-  the  sound  of  the  first  conflict.  In  six 
da_\s  it  aroused  Mar\-land.  Intermediate  col'inies  in  turn  responded 
to  the  summons.  Greene's  com;)any  of  Kentisn  Guards  started  the 
morning  after  the  Le.vington  skirmish.  The  citizens  of  Rhode  Island 
took  possession  of  more  than  forty  cannon,  and  asserted  their  claim 
to  control  all  colonial  stores. 

Xi:\V  YiiKK  organized  a  committee  of  one  himdred,  and  then  of 
one  thous.md  leading  citizens,  to  assure  her  support  in  tiie  struggle, 
declaring,  that  "all  the  horrors  of  •■  ivil  war  could  not  force  her  sub- 
mission to  the  acts  of  the  crown."  'i  iie  City  Hall  and  Custom  House 
were  seized  by  the  jiatriots. 

Arming  and  drilling  were  immediate.  "  An  association  for  the 
defense  of  colonial  rights  "  was  formed,  and  on  the  twent\'-second 
day  of  May,  the  colonial  assembly  was  succeeded  by  a  Provincial  Con- 
gress, and  the  new  order  of  government  was  in  full  force  and  effect. 

In  NliW  jERSliV  the  people  seized  one  hundred  thousand  dollars 
winch  were  in  the  Provincial  treasury,  and  devoted  it  to  "  raising 
troops  to  defend  the  liberties  of  America  "  The  news  reached  Phila- 
delphia on  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  April.     Prominent  men  at  once 


i 


m 


m 


■    i- 

1  i|   "• 

ir 

1P 

li 

1  : 

H 


86 


■iiii;  iioru  OF  I'Ki.i'AkA  i  ii»\'. 


[■775. 


accepted  coininantl,  anioiv^  tlu-ni  (iciu'imI  Dickinson,  afterwards 
prominent  in  duty;  .md  on  llie  Inst  dax'  ot  Ma\',  the  assembly  made 
an  appropriation  of  nuinev  to  raise  troops,  Dr.  I'ranklin,  just  retmiied 
from  I'-n^l,ind,  was  made  cliairman  of  the  committee  of  safety,  and 
the  cit_\'  was  full)'  aroused  to  a  lieart)'  support  of  the  common  cause. 

In  M.\m'l  AM),  the  iniiabitants  .seized  the  I'mvincial  masjazine  and 
fifteen  hundicd  stand  of  arms,  enrolled  "volunteer.-,  for  the  army 
about  Boston,"  api)ointed  a  committee  of  observation,  "  and  recom- 
mended a  s)steni  of  economy, and  abstinence  from  liorse-racinL;',  fairs, 
and  other  e\tr.i\aL;ant  amusements  as  dero^Mtory  to  tiic  character  of 
patriots  at  that  solemn  hour." 

ViKiilMA  was  as  tinder,  ripe  for  the  s])ark-.  A  positive  issue  hail 
been  made  between  Lord  Dnnmori'  and  the  people.  The  former  had 
sent  powder  of  the  colony  on  board  of  a  vessel  Ix'ins^^  in  the  harbor. 
The  militia  ;_;athereil  in  force  under  Patrick  Ilenr)-.  The  powder  was 
])aid  for  by  w.iy  of  ccjinpromise,  but  1  lenr)'  was  denounced  as  a  traitor. 
The  storm  sratlicred  hourly,  and  Lord  Dunmore  took  refut^^e  on  board 
of  the  Fozc'cy,  ship  of  war,  then  lying  in  York  river. 

The  governor  of  NORTH  Carolina  had  also  (luarreled  with  the 
peoi)le,  in  his  effort  to  thwart  the  organiz.ition  of  a  Provincial  Con- 
gress in  April.  It  was  organized,  however,  and  while  the  jieojile  were 
consulting  as  to  ,i  jjermanent  sei)aration  from  (iix'at  iiritain,  the  mes- 
sage from  Boston  inti'usified  their  iiurjiose  and  r.itified  their  judgment. 

In  Si  ir  I'll  Cari  )i,iN'A,  on  the  twenly-t'irst  lIav  of  A[>ril,  committees 


appointed 


tor 


lie 


purpose,  took   eight   hundred   stand    of  ar 


ms,  anil 


two  hundred  cutlasses  from   the  matjazme 


for  tl 


le  use  o 


f  th 


e  natriots, 


upon  receiv 


ing  information  th.it 


oruers 


had  been  sent  to  all  tiovernors 


to  seize  the  arms  and  ainmunition  of  the  colonists.  1  his  order  w;is 
baseil  upon  the  act  jf  parlian'ient  forbidding  the  exportation  of  arms 
to  the  colonies.  The  news  from  Le.xington,  received  twenty  days 
.ifter  that  skirmish,  added  fuel  to  the  flame. 


At  Savannah,  Ckorgia,  six  members  of  the  "  council  of  safeti 


broki 


e  open  the  i)ublic  magazine,  seized  the  powder,  place 


dit 


tl 


uis 


m  secret 
testified    of  their   readiness  to  meet  the 


places  lor  salet\',  anil 

grave   futiu'e  with  decision  and  spirit,  and  this,  before  receiving  news 

of  the  beginning  of  war. 

Such  is  the  briefest  possible  outline  of  the  state  of  concurrent 
feeling  and  preparation,  which  harmonized  with  the  resistance  offered 
at  Le.Kington  and  Concord- 

The   first  Colonial  Congress   had  authorized   the  formation  of  an 


m 


"^ 


i;:5- 


THE   HOUR   OF   PREPARATION. 


»7 


"  American  Association,"  under  a"di.'claiMtioii  of  colonial  ri;^^hts,"  bav- 
in'' (or  its  purpose  entire  non-intercourse  with  Great  liritain.  Ireland, 
and  the  West  indies.  This  was  a  measure  of  policy  designed  to  force 
a  financial  crisis  before  the  British  cabinet,  and  compel  a  modification 
of  us  I.iws  ;  but  it  also  was  a|,'!^ressi\'e  in  spirit,  and  Ljave  warning  of 
ultcri'  r  measures  in  reserve.  The  second  Continent.il  Congress  met 
on  the  tenth  day  of  May,  1775,  immediately  after  Allen's  cajjture  of 
Ticonde>\)ga. 

Prompi.  measures  were  taken  for  the  purchase  of  materials  for  the 
manufacturi  of  powder  and  of  cannon.  .Authority  was  given  for  the 
emission  of  t>vo  millions  of  Spanish  milled  dollars,  and  a  resolution 
was  adopted  th  it  the  "  Tivcivc  Confederate  Colonies"  be  pledged  for 
the  redemi)tion  v.f  bills  of  credit,  then  directed  to  be  issued. 

A  formal  systein  of"  Rules  and  Articles  of  war "  was  adopted,  and 
due  provision  was  m:aie  for  raising  an  additional  armed  force,  sufficient 
to  meet  the  Ihitish  ru'nforccments  then  e.\i)ccted  from  England,  for 
the  enforcement  of  acts  of  parliament  which  were  denounced  as  "  un- 
constitutional, oppressive  a'ld  cruel." 

Meanwhile,  the  colonial  truops  continued  in  position  before  Boston, 
and  the  state  of  war  was  so  fully  accepted,  that  a  regular  exchange  of 
priso!iers  was  made  on  the  sixth  day  of  June. 

On  the  twelfth  of  june  General  Gage  offered  pardon  to  all,  Sam- 
uel .\tlams  and  John  Hancock  excepted,  who  would  lay  down  their 
arms,  following  this  proclamation  with  a  declaration  (jf  martial  law. 

This  second  Continental  Congress  promptly  adopted  the  forces 
before  Boston,  and  such  as  should  be  afterwards  organized,  as  THE 
American  Comixental  Armv. 

A  light  infantry  organization  was  authorized  on  the  fourteenth  of 
June,  to  consist  of"  e.xpert  ritlemen,"  of  which  six  companies  should 
be  raised  in  Pennsylvania,  two  in  Maryland,  and  two  in  Virginia,  who 
should  join  the  army  at  Boston  as  soon  as  possible.  Adtlitional 
companies  were  authorized  before  the  adjournment  of  Congress. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  June,  the  appointment  of  commander-in-chief  of 
all  continental  troofis  then  raised,  or  to  be  raised,  was  authorized,  and 
Cjcorge  Washington  was  unanimously  elected  upon  a  vote  by  ballot. 

A  brief  outline  of  the  personal  and  military  antecedents  of  that 
officer  is  highly  proper,  since  his  identification  with  the  struggle  <"o- 
American  Independence  is  a  memorial  lesson  for  his  country,  men  to 
study,  and  no  less  valuable  to  the  intelligent  appreci''<-'c.i  of  .\merican 
historx-  hv  the  world  at  hu'ie. 


f'-m 


i?ya 


I  II 


h    ■ 
i 


<:■( 


n 


It  I 


\     T"' 


88 


TIIK   HOUR   OF   rKKl'ARAriON. 


[177$ 


The  author  docs  not  propose  to  fill  up  his  volume  with  bioj^raphy 
or  to  cnlar^fc  upon  civil  issues.  All  readers  have  access  to  complete 
histories,  lie  exercises  a  choice,  freely  to  use  whatever  his  liiDits 
will  warrant  in  carrying  out  his  own  purpose. 

Washington  was  ready  to  enter  the  British  navy  as  a  midshipman 
at  fifteen  years  of  a^^c,  but  withdrew  from  his  chosen  profession  upon 
his  mother's  request. 

At  the  age  of  nineteen,  full  of  zeal  in  military  studies,  and  those 
relating  to  civil  engineering,  he  accepted  an  appointment  as  an  Adju- 
tant-general of  Virginia,  with  the  rank  of  major. 

In  the  year  1753,  v\hilc  organizing  militia  for  frontier  service,  he 
was  detailed  by  General  Dinwiddle  upon  a  delicate  mission  to  tiie 
l'"rench  commandants  of  the  frontier  -posts,  and  made  the  trying 
jc  rney  through  a  country  infested  by  hostile  Indians,  with  signal 
credit.  During  this  journey  lie  selected  the  forks  of  the  Mononga- 
hela  and  Alleghany  rivers  as  the  proper  site  of  a  fort,  subsequently 
established  by  the  French  as  Fort  du  Quesnc,  (now  Pittsburgh). 

The  journal  of  that  winter's  expedition  is  marked  by  critical  notes 
of  the  military  features  of  the  country  ;  and  that  journey  without 
doubt,  formed  the  basis  of  that  peculiar  skill  and  strategical  exact- 
ness with  which  he  adopted  military  positions  during  his  subsequent 
career.  At  Great  Meadows,  Fort  Necessity,  and  during  Braddock's 
campaign  he  gained  a  high  reputation  for  sagacity,  practical  wisdom, 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  courage.  These  operations  were 
followed  by  a  careful  inspection  of  all  posts,  and  the  careful  organiza- 
tion of  the  Vnginia  militia,  which  was  widely  dispersed  in  small  parties 
over  an  extensive  range  of  wild  country. 

During  these  inspections  he  caused  the  posts  to  be  made  more 
secure  by  felling  trees  which  would  cover  an  advancing  enemy,  and 
otherwise  instructed  officers  and  men  in  the  details  of  a  peculiarly 
trying  service.  With  a  thousand  men,  he  was  charged  with  the  care 
and  defense  of  four  hundred  miles  of  frontier. 

Mis  formal  suggestions  as  to  army  organization,  movements,  and 
supply,  made  from  time  to  time,  furnish  maxims  which  are  the  equiva- 
lent of  those  which  obtain  with  standard  modern  writers,  and  indicate 
the  thoroughness  of  his  study,  and  the  practical  use  he  made  of  real 
experience.  After  his  occupation  of  F'ort  du  Quesne,  abandoned  by 
the  F'rench,  and  the  establishment  of  comparative  quiet  along  the 
frontier,  he  became  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  troops  raised  in 
Virginia. 


1775-1 


THE   HOUR  OF  PREPARATION. 


89 


y\s  an  engineer  and  cliscii)liiiarian  he  achieved  credit,  and  when 
sumniuned  to  tlic;  command  of  the  Continental  army,  he  brought  to 
the  public  service  those  qualities  which  enforced  success. 

The  officers  who  were  associated  with  Washington  in  high  com- 
in.uul  were  as  follows  : 

Major  Generals. 

1st.  Artemas  Ward:  already  noticed. 

2d.  Ciiarles  Lee  ;  an  officer  once  in  the  British  army,  and  well 
sl<'llcd  in  military  affairs. 

After  a  life  of  rare  adventure  a  soldier  of  fortune  from  his  eleventh 
year,  a  professional  adventurer,  he  still  possessed  remarkable  faculties 
as  a  disciplinarian,  and  at  least  brought  to  the  army  such  a  reputation 
for  brilliant  deeds  in  various  European  service  that  strong  endeavor 
was  made  to  give  him  the  first  command  in  place  of  General  Ward. 
His  aspirations  were  even  higher  still. 

3d.  Philip  Schuyler ;  a  man  of  rare  excellence  of  character,  who 
served  in  the  French  and  Indian  war,  took  part  in  Abercrombie's 
campaign  against  Ticonderoga,  ami  was  a  member  of  the  Continental 
Congress  from  New  York  at  date  ca  his  appointment. 

4th.  Israel  Putnam  ;  already  noticed. 


Brigadii-:r  Generals. 

1st.  Seth  Pomeroy  ;  already  noticed, 

2d.  Richard  Montgomery  ;  who  had  served  gallantly  under  Wolfe, 
and  in  the  West  Indies  in  1762. 

3d.  David  Wooster  ;  already  noticed. 

4th.  William  I  leath  ;  who  before  the  war  was  a  vigorous  writer 
upon  the  necessity  of  military  discipline  and  a  thoroughly  organized 
militia. 

5th.  Joseph  Spencer ;  who  had  served  as  major  and  colonel  in  the 
French  and  Indian  wars. 

6th.  John  Thomas ;  also  a  soldier  of  the  old  French  and  Indian 
war  already  in  camp  at  Boston,  at  the  head  of  a  regiment  recruited 
by  himself. 

7th.  John  Sullivan  ;  a  lawyer  of  New  Hampshire,  of  Irish  blood,  a 
member  of  the  first  Continental  Congress,  and  a  man  quick  in 
sympathy  with  the  first  movement  for  the  organization  of  armed 
resistance. 


'  ,1 


1' 

j 

i 

;:r" 

'    1 

i 

* . 

i 
f 

; 

1 
■  1 

I 

■ 

i 
f->, 

i 

( 

;  , 

1 

1 

1 
1 

,    i 

f 

» 

.!   I 


••il 


H<' 


90 


THK  HOUR  ov  i'kj;i'ARA'rroN. 


|i775 


8tli.  Nathaniel  Greene;  tlien  at  tlm  licad  of  tlie  Rhode  Island 
troops  before  Boston,  antl  ah'eady  noticed. 

Congress  elected  Horatio  (iates  as  aiijutant-gencral.  lie  had 
served  in  the  British  army,  commanded  a  company  during  Hraddock's 
campaign,  accompanied  lieiu-ral  Monckton  as  aid-di-canip  to  the 
West  indies,  anrl  gained  laurels  at  the  c.ipture  of  M.irtinico. 

Both  dates  a..d  Lee  had  settled  in  Virginia  after  leaving  the 
British  army,  and  had  there  formed  the  acquaintance  of  the  future 
commander-in-chief. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  June.  Washington  left  Philadelphia  for 
Boston,  and  on  the  third  <jf  July  assumed  command  of  the  CiJiitinental 
army  with  head-quarters  at  Cambridge.  Thenceforth  the  war  pro- 
ceeded with  slow  but  steady  progress  to  its  accomplishment. 

At  this  point  tiie  mind  instinctively  turns  fro-n  the  general  retro- 
spect of  tiies(;  wide-spread  pulsations,  to  again  look  upon  the  imme- 
diate theatre  of  active  force.  For  two  months  the  yeomanry  of  New 
England  laid  a  close  grasp  upon  all  lar  a[)proaches  to  the  city  of 
Boston.  The  pressure,  now  and  then  resisted  by  efforts  of  the  gar- 
rison to  secure  supplies  from  the  surrounding  country,  only  brought 
a  tighter  hold,  .itul  incited  a  prime  purpose  to  crowd  that  garrison  to 
an  escape  by  sea.  The  islands  of  the  bay  were  mini.iture  fields  of 
conflict,  and  the  repeated  efforts  to  procure  bullocks,  flour,  and  other 
needed  provisions,  through  the  use  of  boats  belonging  to  the  British 
fleet,  onl\-  developed  a  counter  system  of  boat  operations  which  neu- 
tralized the  former,  and  gradually  limited  that  garrison  to  the  range 
of  its  guns. 

And  yet.  the  beleaguering  force  fluctuated  every  week,  so  that  few 
of  the  hastily  improvised  regiments  maintained  either  identity  of  per- 
son or  permanent  numbers.  The  sudden  summons  from  industrial 
duty  was  like  the  unorganized  rush  of  men  upon  the  alarm  of  fire, 
quickened  by  the  convictioi'  that  there  was  wide-sweeping  ami  com- 
mon danger  to  be  withstood,  or  a  devouring  element  to  be  mastered. 
That  independence  of  oj^inion,  however,  which  began  to  assert  a  claim 
to  independent  nationality  was  impatient  of  restraint,  and  military 
control  was  irksome,  even  when  vital  to  success.  Offices  were  con- 
ferred upon  those  who  raised  companies,  regardless  of  character  or 
other  merit. 

Jealousies  and  aspirations  mingled  with  the  claims  of  families  left 
at  home,  and  nany  local  excitements  threatened  disorder  wherevei 
officers  of  the  crown  were  stationed. 


m 


17751 


TIIK   HOUR  OF  PREPARATION. 


91 


istrial 
fire, 

com- 
:crc'd. 
claim 

itary 

COII- 

tcr  or 


The  flash  of  Lexington,  and  the  hot  heat  of  its  lire  had  passed 
\)y.  antl  it  was  dull  work  enough  to  stand  guard  by  day,  lie  upon  tht 
ground  at  night,  live  a  life  of  routine,  receive  unequal  and  indifferent 
food,  and  wonder  when,  and  how,  tiic  affair  would  end. 

These  elements,  however,  were  not  sufficiently  depressing  to  lei 
loose  the  pent-in  Hritish  forces.  Strong  wills  carried  men  of  strong 
convictions  everywhere  among  the  people.  The  raw  troops  were 
under  wise  guardianship! 

The  integrity  and  far  reaching  forecast  of  great  citizens,  united 
their  influence  with  that  of  a  few  real  soldiers,  to  keep  an  adequate 
force  in  the  field.  The  idle  were  at  length  set  to  work.  Occupation 
lii;htened  the  restraints  of  camp  life.  Earthworks  and  redoubts  grad- 
ually'unfolded  their  purpose,  and  out  of  seeming  clu  there  was 
lifted  into  perpetual  remembrance  the  issue  of  Bunker  Hi... 


II  ^ 


1. 


1 

'            .                               ■' 

ii.' 

1  f 

* 

ii 

1 

1; 

1      i 

CHAPTER   XV. 

BUNKER   HILL.    THE   OCCUPATION. 

THE  peninsula  of  Boston  connects  with  Roxbury  by  the  narrow 
neck  of  land  which  had  been  fortified  by  General  Gage  as  early 
as  October,  1774. 

North  of  Boston,  and  separated  by  the  Charles  river,  is  a  second 
peninsula,  fully  a  mile  long,  and  a  little  inore  than  half  a  mile  wide  ; 
also  connected  with  the  main  land  by  a  narrow  isthmus,  formerly  sub- 
ject to  overflow  at  unusually  high  water. 

By  reference  to  the  maps, — "  Boston  and  vicinity^'  and  ''■  Battle  of 
Bunker  Hill," — the  reader  will  gain  a  fair  impression  of  the  topography 
of  the  immediate  field  of  operations.  The  positions  there  assigned  to 
American  commanders  are  such  as  were  established  after  the  arrival 
of  General  Washington  ;  but  the  entire  circuit,  with  the  exception 
of  Dorchester,  was  in  possession  of  the  Provincial  troops  at  the  date 
of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  although  with  less  completeness  of  earth- 
works and  redoubts  than  after  the  investment  was  permanently 
developed. 

Morton  s  Hill,  at  Moulton's  Point,  where  the  British  army  landed 
on  the  seventeenth  day  of  June,  1775,  was  but  thirty-five  feet  above 
sea  level,  while  "  Breed's  pasture,"  as  then  styled,  and  Bunker  Hill, 
were  respectively  seventy-five  and  one  hundred  and  ten  feet  high. 
The  adjoining  waters  were  navigable,  and  under  control  of  the  British 
fleet. 

Bunker  Hill  had  an  easy  slope  to  the  isthmus,  but  the  other  sides 
were  quite  steep,  the  position  having  control  of  the  isthmus  itself,  as 
well  as  commanding  a  full  view  of  Boston  and  the  surrounding  coun- 
try. The  strategic  value  of  this  summit  wa^  very  decided  for  either 
army,  yet  it  had  been  overlooked  or  neglected  by  the  British  com- 
mander, even  although  the  arrival  of  Generals  Howe,  Clinton  and 
Burgoyne,  with  reinforcements,  had  svvei'ed  the  nominal  strength  of 


1775-] 


BUNKER   HILL. 


93 


arrival 
cption 

e  date 

:i 

earth- 

^ 

nciitly 

anded 

above 

r  Hill, 

t  high. 

British 

;r  sides 

self,  as 

l  coun- 

eithcr 

■ 

I  com- 

n   and 

Sth  of 

the  garrison  to  about  ten  thousand  men,  and  the  importance  of 
atTfressive  movements  upon  the  colonial  militia  had  been  carefully 
considered  and  rightfully  e:>timated. 

This  garrison  had  been  gradually  weakened  by  constant  skirmishes, 
by  sickness  and  other  causes,  leaving  an  effective  force,  even  for  gar- 
rison duty,  of  hardly  eight  thousand  men.  Scarcity  of  supplies, 
especially  of  fresh  meat,  bore  some  share  in  a  depreciation  of  physical 
fitness  for  the  field.  The  troops,  however,  that  were  fit  for  duty,  were 
under  excellent  discipline  and  ably  commanded. 

The  American  army  received  information  the  thirteenth  of  June, 
that  General  Gage  had  definitely  decided  to  take  immediate  pos- 
session  of  the  Charlestown  peninsula,  and  also  of  Dorchester  Heights. 

As  early  as  the  middle  of  May,  ho'vever,  the  "  committee  of 
safety,"  and  the  "  council  of  war,"  had  resolved  to  occupy  and  fortify 
lUuiker  Hill  as  soon  as  artillery  and  powder  could  be  adequately  fur- 
nished for  the  purpose  ;  while  from  want  of  definite  knowledge  of 
the  military  value  of  Dorchester  Heights,  a  committee  had  been 
appointed  for  examination  and  report,  respecting  the  merits  of  that 
position  as  a  strategic  restraint  upon  the  garrison  of  Boston. 

On  the  fifteenth  day  of  June,  the  "  Massachusetts  committee  of 
safety,"  and  the  same  "  council  of  war,  "  voted  to  take  immediate 
possession  of  Bunker  Hill.  This  action  was  predicated  upon  positive 
information  that  the  British  council  of  war  had  resolved  upon  a  sim- 
ilar movement,  and  had  designated  the  eighteenth  day  of  June  for 
execution  of  that  purpose. 

There  is  no  more  significant  fact  of  the  want  of  thorough  military 
oversight  and  system  in  the  then  existing  Provincial  army,  than  the 
looseness  of  discipline  with  which  the  enterprise  under  consiileration 
was  initiated,  and  the  want  of  specific  responsibility  which  attended 
its  execution. 

It  is  unquestionably  true  tliai  the  presence  of  Doctor  \V^lrren  was 
one  of  the  chief  elements  which  inspired  the  prolonged  resistance 
after  the  action  began  ;  and  the  chief  credit  at  the  redoubt  belongs  to 
Colonel  Prescott.  There  was  at  first  no  unanimity  in  approval  of  the 
plan,  no  thorough  support  of  the  detachment  sent  upon  so  se'ious  an 
expedition,  and  there  was  a  complete  failure  to  furnish  that  detach- 
ment with  adequate  means  to  maintain  a  serious  contest  v.-ith  an 
enemy  of  considerable  force. 

More  than  a  hundred  writers  have  made  this  action  the  theme  of 
diverse  criticism,  and  many  of  them  have  run  tilts  for  or  against  some 


I  '^ 


'■  S; 


'-rytfjlim 


h 


* 


1 

II  ■'' 


94 


BUNKKk  ini.i. 


LI775. 


candichitc  for  special  Iionor  in  connection  with  the  first  forma!  battle- 
issue  of  the  war  of  1775  -17S1. 

The  peculiarly  loose  ('ri,'V)'«/?(?/'/(^;/ of  the  army,  also,  hatl  much  to  do 
with  the  inefficienc\'  of  the  movement  upon  Hunker  Ilill  ;  and  yet,  the 
specific  work  of  the  detachment,  independent  of  the  want  of  support 
to  hack  the  movement,  was  well  done. 

There  were  special  considerations  that  undoubtedly  exerted  their 
influence  at  tiie  time  when  the  expedition  was  first  considered.  The 
supineness  of  the  Hritish  army,  the  limitation  of  its  outside  ilemon- 
strations  to  sim[ile  excursions  for  supplies,  and  the  impression  that  it 
was  unable,  or  unwillinL,^,  to  renew  active  hostilities  against  tlie  force 
which  controlled  the  main  land  and  surrounding  country,  must  have 
hyd  effect  upon  tlie  officers  in  command  of  the  American  army. 

If  the  contingency  of  a  b.ittle,  such  as  transpired;  that  is,  of  an 
attempt  in  force,  to  dislodge  a  successful  occupation  of  the  hill,  had  any 
consideration  whatever,  tliere  was  terrible  neglect,  in  failure  to  supply 
ammunition  and  rations  for  that  em.ergency.  That  the  occupation  of 
Breed's  pasture,  instead  of  Hunker  Hill  proper,  was  a  departure  from 
the  tc.v/  of  the  original  instructions,  is  undoubtedly  true  ;  but  a  prompt 
and  sufficient  support  would  have  assured  the  control  of  both,  and 
have  realV.ed  the  complete  repulse  of  the  British  assault.  It  will 
appear  hereafter,  that  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  judgment  of 
Colonel  Gridley,  who  laid  out  the  intrenchments,  was  eminently  wise 
.uid  i)roper. 

The  narrative  will  be  cleared  of  extrinsic  issues,  and  no  attempt 
will  be  made  to  suj)ply  facts  which  history  omitted  and  the  grave 
buried. 

Few  modern  battles  are  described  alike  by  different  critics,  and 
many  a  general  would  be  puzzled  to  know  whether  he  was  in  an  action, 
where  he  actually  commanded,  if  he  sought  information  from  con- 
testants who  scramble  for  honors  beyond  their  experience  or  reach. 
The  controversy  as  to  General  Putnam's  relation  to  the  battle  of 
Hunker  Hill  alone,  has  burdened  the  minds  of  many  authors,  and 
tried  the  brains  of  thousands  of  readers  who  could  not  see  the  impor- 
tance of  the  discussion.  But,  Bunker  Hill  was  to  be  occupied.  The 
decision  was  made.     The  emergency  was  pressing. 

General  Ward,  advanced  in  years  and  feeble  in  body,  was  unequal 
to  active  service,  and  lacked  that  military  acuteness  and  decision 
which  the  crisis  tlemanded.  He  had  no  alternative  but  to  obey  the 
instructions  of  the  committee  of  safety  and  the  council  of  war. 


.I. 


•775- 


HUNKKR     HII.I,, 


95 


Mr.  l?,uicroft  clearly  states  an  important  clement  of  pressincj  im- 
portance at  the  time.  "  The  (Icci-^iitn  was  so  sucklen  that  no  fit  pre- 
paration could  be  made.  The  nearly  total  want  of  amnumiliou 
rendered  the  service  ile-peratelv  darin;^." 

The  decision  to  occiijjy  the  hill />/<v/^'-<Vi!'  .sv///';/.  As  in  fact  trans- 
pired, the  success  was  only  limited  by  scarcity  of  jjoudcr.  That 
-liould  lia\-e  been  furnished  or  the  expedition  witlulrawn.  Prescolt 
an;l  I'lUnam  had  favored  the  movement,  and  urcjeil  it  uj)on  the  coun- 
cil of  war.  Wart!  and  Warren  wished  to  avoid  a  Ljenera!  en^a^^ement, 
and  the  ex])enditure  of  powder  necessarily  involved  in  occupyin<f  a 
post  so  exposed  to  British  attack.  The  latter,  liowever,  concurred  in 
the  fm.d  ilecision,  and  on  the  da\'  of  action  left  his  place  as  president 
of  the  l'ro\incial  Con<^rcss,  and  traveled  seven  miles  to  bear  part,  as 
he  offered  his  life,  in  the  battle  of  Hunker  Hill. 

I'oriiiation  of  tlic  co))iiiian(i.  Colonel  William  Pre>cott,  of  Peppcrill, 
Massachu-^etts.  was  eat^er  to  lead  the  enteriprise,  and  was  intrusted 
with  its  execution.  The  men  detailed  to  form  the  detachment,  were 
for  tile  most  part  from  his  own  regiment  and  those  of  Colonels  Frye 
and  Hridge.  The  three  colonels  were  members  of  the  council  of  war 
which  had  been  organized  on  the  twentieth  day  of  April,  when  (Gen- 
eral Ward  assumed  command  of  the  arni)-  about  Boston. 

Captain  Thomas  Knowlton.  of  Putnam's  regiment,  who  afterwards 
fjll  ii  ;;:allant  fight  on  Harlem  Plains,  at  the  head  of  the  Connecticut 
Rangers.  "  Congress'  Own,"  was  to  lead  a  detachment  of  two  hundred 
men  tlrafted  from  the  Connecticut  troops. 

Colonel  Richard  Gridley,  chief  engineer,  with  a  company  of  artil- 
lery, was  also  assigned  to  the  command.  An  order  was,  In  fact,  issued 
for  the  first  named  regiment  to  parade  at  six  o'clock  on  the  evening 
of  the  sixteenth,  "  with  all  the  intrenching  tools  in  the  encampment." 
The  original  purpose  was  also  to  have  the  detachment  number  one 
thousand  men.  The  field-order,  however,  covered  about  fourteen 
hundred  men.  Frothingham,  in  his  valuable  "  Siege  of  Poston," 
shows  conclusively  that  the  force  as  organized,  including  artificers  and 
drivers  of  the  carts,  was  not  less  than  twelve  hundred  men. 

Cambridge  Common  was  designated  for  the  rendezvous.  Beneath 
the  elms,  solemn  with  that  occasion,  that  band  of  earnest  men,  fresh 
from  peaceful  homes,  but  hurrying  into  the  fiice  of  battle  for  home  antl 
country,  was  formed  in  perfect  silence  for  the  last  duty  which  was  to 
precede  the  onward  movement. 

Rev.  Samuel  Langdon.  president  of  Harvard  College,  invoked  the 


ft  -.' 


lii' 

rffPj 

II  -i 

,. 

f'k 

H  ■ . 

i.  '^ 

f^^ 

inn 


^:t 


'8,  ,       .      ""•'•-Il.f,        ; 

'  ilill,, '  i  ,„. 


if 


I*'  -i 


1    "Mi^ 


'hJ  : 


96 


ISLNKER    HIM. 


1 1775. 


favor  of  high  heaven  upon  their  mission,  and  witli  a  benediction  pecu- 
li.ir  to  his  stern  and  stately  carria;^e,  dismissed  them  to  their  silent 
march. 

"  It  was  soon  after  sunset,"  says  Bancroft  ;— "  then — as  the  late 
darkness  of  the  mid-summer  cveninL;  closed  in,  tiiey  marched  for 
Charlcstoun,  in  the  face  of  tiie  proclamation  issued  only  four  days 
before,  by  which  all  persons  taken  in  arms  against  their  sovereign,  were 
threatened,  under  martial  law.  with  death  by  the  cord  as  rebels  and 
traitors." 

The  command  moved  silently  but  rapidly,  crossed  Charlestowu 
Neck,  and  then  halted  for  consultation  and  definition  of  the  enjoined 
dut\'.  Major  l^rooks,  of  Colonel  Jiridge's  regiment,  here  joined  with 
a  small  detachment,  as  well  us  a  company  of  artillery  with  their  guns. 

On/rrs.  The  confused  account  of  instructions  given  on  this 
expedition  is  significant  of  the  want  of  system  tlien  existing  in  the 
American  camp.  There  has  also  been  a  needless  worry  about  the 
matter,  according  as  partisan  authorities  have  selected  favorites  for 
the  honors  of  the  day.  No  general  officer  was  embraced  in  the  detail, 
and  no  general  officer  asserted  authority  over  the  operations  of  the 
eventful  twenty-four  hours  that  followed  the  advance  movement. 

.Such  as  ere  present  at  an\-  time,  ad\'ised  as  occasion  required, 
worked  hard  antl  well,  but  enforced  no  personal  authority  over  the 
command  especially  assigned  to  the  duty. 

Frothingham  furnishes  ample  evidence,  that  written  orders  from 
General  Warel  designateil  Hunker  Hill  as  the  summit  to  be  occupied, 
and  that  these  orders  were  to  be  communicated  to  the  command 
after  crossing  the  isthmus.  The  first  order  issued  after  the  halt,  was 
the  tletail  of  Captain  Nutting's  company  with  a  small  det.ichment  of 
Connecticut  men,  to  patrol  Charlestown  and  the  adjoining  shore.  A 
second  consultation  took  place  after  the  command  reached  Bunker 
Hill.  Captain  M.ixwell's  company,  from  Prescott'sown  regiment,  was 
detailed  for  patrol  of  the  shore,  and  to  keep  watch  of  the  British 
works  at  Copp's  Hill,  directly  opposite,  and  of  the  ships  of  war 
then  anchored  within  a  short  distance  of  the  peninsula. 

The  Annual  Register,  1775,  thus  indicates  the  fleet  ;  Si>i//rrsi-/,  68 
guns,  Captain  Mdw.ird  Le  Cros  ;  Ccrlwriis,  36  guns.  Captain  Chads  ; 
Giasgoxc,  34  guns,  Captain  William  Maltby  ;  Lively,  20  guns,  Captain 
Thomas  Bishop  ;  luxlcon, guns.  Captain  Linzee,  and  the  Sym- 
metry, transport,  with  18  nine-pounders. 

The  details  thus  made,  not  only  to  watch  those  ve.ssels,  but  to 


['775- 


177S-] 


BUNKER    HILL. 


97 


occupy  Charlestown,  not  only  discharged  their  duty  well,  but  by 
availiii;,'  themselves  of  houses,  proved  active  annoyances  to  the  left 
winf^  of  the  British  army  in  its  ultimate  advance  upon  tt  e  American 
works. 

Occupation  of  the  licights.  The  chief  enijineer,  Colonel  Gridlcy, 
laid  out  the  intrenchments  at  '*  Breed's  pasture  "  shortly  after,  first 
known  as  Breed's  Hill.  This  was  done  after  careful  consultation  with 
Colonel  I'rcscott,  Captain  Knowlton,  and  other  officers,  and  for  the 
purpose  of  establishin;^  a  position  givini^  the  cjuickest  control  of  the 
beach,  in  cise  of  the  landing  of  British  troops.  The  cliL^ibility  of  the 
situation  will  be  noticed  in  the  "  military  notes  "  bel()n;4ing  to  the 
record  of  the  action. 

Packs  were  unskuii^,  arms  were  stacked,  the  intrcnchin<;  tools  pre- 
viously unloaded  from  the  carts,  were  brouijht  forward,  ami  the  troops 
were  noiselessly  distributed  for  duty.  The  bells  of  Boston  struck 
twelve ;  and  the  new  day,  so  fatal,  so  memorable,  began  its  history,  to 
the  dull  thud  of  the  pick-ax  and  the  grating  of  shovels.  Those  men 
kneiv  lunv  to  handle  their  tools  ! 

Martin  states,  as  a{)pears  from  a  foot-note  in  Frothingham's  his- 
tory, that  "  about  a  thousand  men  were  at  work,"  and  that  "  the  men 
dug  in  tiie  trenches  one  hour,  and  then  mounted  guard."  All  night 
that  work  went  imi,  in  solemn  stillness,  only  relieved  by  the  sentries' 
monotonous  and  encouraging  "  alfs  tuell,"  which  sounded  from  the 
battery  across  the  river,  and  from  the  decks  of  the  shipping.  At  dawn 
of  day,  the  redoubt,  about  eight  rods  square,  had  been  nearly  closed, 
presenting  a  face  nearly  si.v  feet  high,  with  such  hasty  accommoda- 
tions behind  the  parapet,  as  would  bring  the  men  to  a  convenient 
position  for  delivering  fire. 

More  than  once,  Colonel  Prescott  and  other  officers  quietly  drew 
near  the  river,  to  be  assured  that  no  small  boats  were  afloat,  and  that 
the  apparent  security  was  not  the  prelude  to  a  surprise.  He  was 
evcryv.here  present  to  inspire  zeal  and  hope,  and  Bancroft's  statement 
tlat  General  Putnam  himself  visited  the  works  during  the  night  and 
encouraged  tb.e  men,  is  verified  by  respectable  authority,  and  the  con- 
temporaneous statement  of  soldiers  who  had  no  possible  inducement 
to  befog  the  narrative  of  events.  The  character  of  his  aid  rendered 
during  the  entire  day  is  perfectly  consistent  with  this  statement. 

The  situation.  With  daylight,  the  outline  of  the  intrenchments, 
and  the  throng  of  busy  workers,  brought  to  the  notice  of  British 
sentries  the  night's  aggressive  work.     It  had  veiled  the  work  of  the 


y. 


^i-: 


f 


\      ^' 


i 


If  I 


S   '! 


I    If 


'       II"'- 


'M;|   ' 

iii;.\Ki;i<  iiii.i.. 

;i(lv.iiicin;.(  ji.itriols.  Tiic  colonists  were  in  cirnist !  'Ilu;  l.h'cly  put 
a  sprini,'  <iii  licr  i.al)lr  and  (ipcncd  fnc.  'I'lu:  Ij.ittiry  of  Ciiijjj's  Kill 
responded.  'Ilic  rn.if  nf  cannon  a\\()l<c  llic  slc't|)in;^f  i;anison  of 
Hoston  ;  and  uliilc  tlic  streets  resoundctl  with  tlic  swift  transit  of 
messenj^ers,  and  I  lie  tramp  of  assembling  battalions,  and  tlic  house- 
tops were  ci'owded  with  anxious  observers,  the  <iuick-ened  and  patient 
laborers  were  perfect in^(  their  preparations,  res(jhile  of  puri)ose  to 
meet  face  to  fact;  the  veteran  troops  of  (ieorf^e  tlie  Third.  The  viij- 
orous  action  of  tin;  land  batteries  and  ships,  only  waslt'd  their  powder 
and  ball.  One  man  fell,  and  to  ccjiivince  his  cornrat'es  that  there  was 
no  time  for  fear  or  rest,  Colonel  I'rescott  walked  the  parapet,  openly 
e.xposed,  and  re-ins|)ire(l  the  men. 

("ontinuous  labor,  under  hi;4h  pressure,  be;.;aii  to  wi'ar  upon  the 
stoutest.  /\t  nine  o'clock  a  council  of  war  was  called.  The  activity 
of  the  Hoston  i^arrison,  the  accumidatini;  array  of  boats,  and  all  the 
activities  ot  thai  city,  were  propiietic  of  a  resolute  pur|)ose  to  resent 
the  offensive  movement  of  the  Americans,  ami  still  no  reinforcements, 
no  relievinL,r  l)arty,  had  appeared. 

The  rations  hastily  issued  for  twenty-four  hours  of  duty,  had,  as 
u^ual  with  raw  and  over-worked  troops,  become  nearly  e.xhausted,  and 
urgent  retpiests  were  made  that  men  should  be  relieved,  by  others 
who  were  fresh,  and  that  reinforcements  shoul'  be  sent  for,  with  an 
ample  sujjply  of  lood.  In  this  emergency  Major  John  J5rooks  was 
dispatched  to  head-(|uarters  tcj  present  these  demands. 


NolK.     As  with  tlio  sliiild,  <iiii' 


oU,  tl 


!(■   rcvt'i^c,  \il-,i'r 


(kml 
I 'res 


>l(;  aspcc 
coll,  for 


t  of  Uk:  (.oiiunand  .it  Uimkcr's  .iiul  liii-cd's  Hills 


so  in.iy  critics  ij^iiore  the 
The  credit    which  is  due  to 


lyiiii;  ■■iiid  drfciidiiif;   the  lillcr,  is   ]i<  ifcclly  ciinsi.stciil  with  Ihc  uiiivcrs:il 


induslry  of  I'utiuuii,  elsewhere', 
del 


Kxl 


reiiu:  p;irlisaiis  o 


f  eilln 


ist   viohite  the  hiws  > 


ice  .'iiid  iin|ie.i(h  uiliies^es  who  are  the  chief  authority  for  other,  more  imi)ort.-iiit   facts  of 


American  hi-l 


or  \'. 


Null..      Moiilliiiis  {'oiiit  (.r  Morion's  I'oiiU,  both  are  family  names  of  that  jieriod  ;  each 
adoi)ted  by  lepiitalile  .uitlioriiy.     'llie  author  lias  ])reserved  hotli,  in  connection  with  Hill 


or  Point. 


Ni 


I  injuslic 


is  (l(jiie.     Life  is  too  .short    aiid    history  too   remiss,  for  settlement 


uf  this  doubtful  point. 


1775 


^ 


CHAPTER    XVI. 


ni'NKi:R  iiiLi..    riiK  i'ki;i'.\KAriON. 


Ri:iXI'"01\(:i",MI':\rS.  Gciur.il  I'utnain  was  very  early  at 
lua(l-(|iiart(.r,i  of  llie  army  at  Clainhridj^i;,  and  urL^cd  tliat  an 
.nlditidiial  force  lie  sent  to  (]liarlesto\vn  Ileit^lits  to  reinforce  Colonel 
I'riscott's  command,  (ieneral  W.ird  fiii.dly  const'tited,  so  I'.ir  as  to 
order  one-third  of  (Joiornl  St.irk's  re;_;iment  to  llu;  front.  Tin;  sc()iiel 
will  show  tliat  this  was  timely  ,ud. 

.Major  IJrooks  met  General  I'utnam  and  pushed  forward  on  his 
errand,  whih:  the  j^^encral  himst.'lf  |)roceeded  dircctl}'  to  tlu:  field  of 
(l,in;.Hr. 

(jencral  Ward  i^ave  little  heed  to  the  up^^ent  demand  of  .Major 
I5io(j1s^,  (Uclinin;.;  fm"lher  to  reduce  his  own  force,  Ic^t  the  British 
;^'.n'rison  should  make  a  movement  upon  'Jamhridj^e,  and  thu-^  imperil 
the  salely  of  accumidatin;^'  sl(jres,  ,ind  even  that  of  ;  lu:  <:ntirt'  army 
1  he  connnitlee  of  s.ifety  was  in  session.  Rich.ird  lJ(,'vons,  one  of  its 
nio^l  valuable  members,  is  credited  with  tiie  inlluiMice  whicli  per- 
su.ided  ihein  to  furnish  additional  reinforcements.  C'olonel  .Sweet 
'elates,  that  orders  were  also  issut;d  to  recall  from  C^heUea  the  com- 
panies there  stationed,  in  order  to  increase'  the  force  at  he.ul-quarters. 

The  committet:  rested  under  a  urave  responsibility.  " 'I'heir  entire 
siip|)ly  of  |)owder,  which  could  be  obtained  north  of  the  Delaware," 
accordin;,;  to  IJ  incrofi  and  (jther  eminent  authority,  "  w.is  twenty- 
sewn  halt  b.urels,  and  a  present  from  Connecticut  of  thirty-six  iialf- 
rre'ls  more."  Bancroft  adds:  "The  army  itself  was  composed  of 
m]),inies  iiicompK;le  in  numbers,  enlisted  chiell)'  within  si.v  wet;ks, 
•(Mumanded,  many  of  them,  by  officers  unfit,  i^nioiant,  and  untried, 
:-;alliered  from  separate  colonies,  and  with  no  reciprocal  sLibt)rdination 
l)iit  from  courtesy  and  opinion." 

Fearful  to  waste  ammunition,  solemnly  bound  to  have  ix^jard  to 
'lie  whole  army  and  ultimate  ends,  as  well  us  con.strained  to  support 


M 


Da 
eo 
c 


Pi 


H 


■,V!<lt 
;  J  ■ 


Il  J 


11  i 


i 


TTT' 


I 

f  V 


f  \r- 


KX) 


UUNKKR    nil, I.. 


II775. 


the  movement  whicli  tliey  had  tliemsclves  enjoined,  it  is  not  strange 
that  cahn  deHberation  foreran  the  decision  of  the  committee  when  tlie 
apjieal  of  Major  Hrooks  was  made. 

It  was  tlicrefore  as  kite  as  eleven  o'clock  wiien  the  whole  of  tlie 
New  Hampshire  re^^iments  of  Stark  and  Re.id  were  ordered  to  re- 
inforce Prescott.  This  detachment  readied  its  destination  in  time  to 
participate  in  tlie  .iction,  although  not  until  after  the  lantling  (jf  tin; 
liritish  troops. 

S'u'ci/  credits  the  regiments  of  Colonels  Brewer,  Nixon,  Wood- 
bridge,  and  Major  IMoore,  with  a  contribution  of  three  hundred  men  each. 

J''ri>///ii/i^/i<i///  shows  conclusively  that,  "  several  of  the  companies 
of  Little's  regiment  were  elsewhere  (Mi  duty,  one  at  Gloucester,  one 
at  Ipswich,  one  at  Lechmere's  Point,  and  some  at  West  Cambridge  "; 
but  adds  that,  "  hunt's  ct.Miipany  arrived  on  the  field  near  the  close 
of  the  battle." 

Bancroft  carefully  compiles  from  official  rejjorts  and  depositions,  a 
statement,  approximately  as  correct  as  can  be  derived  from  existing 
evidence,  and  thus  states  the  force  which  "  hastcneil  to  the  aid  of 
Prescott. 

"  ()f  lissex  men,  (Little's  regiment)  at  least  one  hundred  and 
twent\'-five  ;  of  Worcester  and  Middlesex  men,  (Mrewer's)  seventy  or 
more,  and  with  them,  Lieutenant-C(jlonel  Buckuiinster  ;  of  the  same 
men,  (Nixon  s)  fifty  men,  led  by  Nixon  himself;  forty  men  (Moore's) 
from  Worcester;  of  Lancaster  men,  (Whitcomb's)  at  fifty  privat  js, 


wi 


th 


no 


officer  higher  th.ui  captain. 


The  hot  day  wore  out  its  hours,  as  the  tired  troops  resting  from 
their  assigned  duty, — panted  for  water,  hungered  for  food,  and  waited 
for  the  enemy  ;  and  neither  food  nor  reinforcements  appeared  in  view, 
while  the  hostile  forces  were  rapidly  marshaling  for  attack. 

The  surrounding  waters  were  halt  sea  water,  or  its  brackish  mix- 
ture with  the  flow  from  the  Charles  and  Mystic  rivers,  and  no  fresh 
water  was  easy  of  access.  A  conviction  that  they  were  deserted 
began  to  sjjread   through  the  ranks,  that  they  had   been    pushed  for- 


warc 


wan 


ras 


hly,  \x\ 


H)n  an   ill-considered    enterj)rise,   and   that   there  was 
ting  the  disposition  or  nerve  to  undertake  risks  for  their  support 


or  rescue. 


It  was  at  such   a  moment,  terrible   in  its  doubts  and  grand  in  its 


resolution,  that   Se.h   Pomeroy, 


then 


seventy  years  of  age,  havi 


wisely  declined  his  commission  as  Brigadier-general,  found  hi*  way  tt 
the  redoubt,  musket  in  hand,  to  fight  as  a  private  volunteer. 


:i?' 
'¥ 


1775] 


iu;nki;i<  iiii.i.. 


toi 


Jl 


And  it  was  just  then  that  Dr.  Joseph  Warren,  President  of"  tlie 
I'rovinc  ial  Congress,  loved  and  iionored  of  all,  the  undoubted  patriot, 
and  alreaily  monumental  for  worth  and  courai^e,  added  his  presence 
and  the  beams  of  his  animation  to  cheer  the  falterint;  and  faint.  He 
alhO  declined  command,  servetl  under  I'rescott,  ami  plied  his  musket 
with  the  best  when  the  crisis  came  on. 

Wanl  himself,  when  the  embarkation  of  the  second  British  detach- 
ment furnished  evidence  that  Cainbrid;4e  was  not  in  pei  il,  hurried 
other  troo()s  toward  the  isthmus,  but  too  late  to  avert  the  swift 
cat.istrophe. 

Dis/'ositioit  of  tlic  Atihrican  forces.  U[)on  completion  of  the  re- 
doii!)t,  it  became  painfully  evident  that  the  preliminary  work  wis  not 
\et  complete.  A  new  line  of  breastwork,  a  few  rods  m  lenj^th,  was 
ha>til\-  c.irried  backward  and  a  little  to  the  left  ;  and  ver\-  hasty  efforts 
were  made  to  streiii^then  a  short  hedye,  and  establish  a  line  of  defense 
t'oi  a  hundred  and  twenty  rods  in  the  same  direction,  thereby  to  con- 
nect with  the  stone  fence  and  other  protection  which  ran  perpendic- 
ularly toward  the  Mystic  river.  'Ihis  retreatint;  line  was  be^.Mui  under 
the  [)ersonal  direction  of  Prescott  himself,  but  was  never  fully  closed 
up.  A  piece  of  springy  grounil  on  this  line  was  left  uncovered  by 
any  shelter  for  troops  actin;^  in  its  rear,  or  passim^  to  and  fro  behind 
the  main  lines.  The  stone  fence,  wliich  took  its  course  nearly  to  the 
river,  was  like  those  so  common  in  New  England  at  the  present 
day.  Post.s  are  set  into  a  wall  two  or  tliree  feet  high,  and  these 
are  connected  witli  two  rails,  making  the  entire  height  about  five 
feet. 

Fresldy  mown  hay  which  lay  around  in  winrows  or  in  he,i[)s,  was 
braided  or  thatched  upon  these  rails,  affording  a  slioiv  o{ slu'ltcr,\\\\\\Q. 
the  top  rail  gave  resting  place  for  the  weapon.  In  front  c*"  this,  an 
ordinary  zig-zag,  "  stake  and  rider  "  fence  was  established,  and  tlie 
space  between  the  two  was  also  filled  with  hay. 

This  line  was  nearly  six  hundred  feet  in  rear  of  the  front  face  of 
the  redoubt,  and  near  the  foot  of  Bunker  Hill.  To  its  defense  Pres- 
cott assigned  Connecticut  men  under  command  of  Captain  Knowlton, 
supported  by  two  field  pieces  on  the  right,  adjoining  the  open  space 
alre.uly  mentioned. 

Still  beyond  the  rail  fence  eastward,  towards  the  river,  and  extend- 
ing by  an  even  slope  to  its  very  margin,  was  another  gap  which 
exposed  the  entire  command  to  a  flanking  movement  of  the  enemy, 
Ludangering  the  redoubt  itself,  as  well  as  the  more  transient  works  of 


.  i. 


I'i 


lit    ; 


1 

If 

1 

1 

1 

Jiitf 

p 

i  11 

1'    S'     ^H  1  1 

III  it 

iitir' 

f  ^    ^ill 

*       Ml 

'n 

Hi 

III 

1^ 

"•■«'"" 

1 

1 

i  1 

'"'   ■     ir     , 

' 

103 


BUNKKR    HIM.. 


11775. 


defense.  T(i  anticiiJatc  such  a  movement, subsequently  attempted,  an 
imperfect  stone  wall  was  (juickiy  thrown  toi^ether  by  the  assisi.vnce 
of  (."olonel  Stark's  (letachmeiit,  whose  timely  arrival  had  cheerci'  the 
.spirits  of  the  worn  out  pioneer  command. 

Meanwhile,  I'utn.iin  was  everywhere  present  to  encoura5:;e  tiie 
men,  and  siiijurinlendi.  li  the  establishment  of  liL^ht  works  on  Hunker 
Hill  summit,  to  cover  the  troops  in  case  of  forcible  ejection  from  the 
advanceil  defenses.  He  caused  tlie  ititrenchine;  tools,  no  loiv^er 
needed  at  the  front,  to  be  taken  to  that  position.  In  spite  of  his 
entreaties  and  commands,  some  who  thus  carried  the  tools,  tlirew 
tlum  tlown  upon  reaching.;  the  >uinmit,  and  took  refuLje  behind  the 
iNthinas  ;  others  returned  to  their  places  at  the  front. 

His  movenuiit,  which  wouhl  have  been  a[)preciated  by  well  dis- 
ciplined troops,  carried  with  it  the  suLjLjestion  of  a  coiitiiv^ency  which 
defeated  its  purpose  in  the  hands  of  men  not  soldiers.  Putnam's 
efforts  accomplislu'd  nothini;  of  value  in  the  preparation  of  ulterior 
defenses.  The  time  was  too  short,  the  control  of  men  too  feeble  ;  and 
the  or;4ani/..ition  ,uul  discipline  of  the  reinforcements  which  arrived, 
were  too  slack  Un-  tlieir  imnieiliate  subjection  to  .luthority,  while  tlie 
advanciiiL;  enemy  b.'^^MU  to  absorb  the  whole  attention.  Prescott's 
f'rce  at  the  redoubt  had  droppetl  off  to  less  than  ei;^ht  hundred  men 
V,  hen  Colonel  John  Stark  .urived.  "  Next  to  I'rescott,  he  brou,t;ht 
the  l.irijest  number  of  men  into  the  field."  siys  Bancroft.  The  l?ritish 
v.'ere  alread)-  landing,  as  they  crossetl  the  isthmus  uniler  a  heav\-  fire. 
The  execution  of  that  movement  was  characteristic  of  their  brave 
commander,  ,ind  well  calculated  to  imi)art  the  courage  which  af'"er- 
ward  sustained  his  men.  When  Captain  iJearijorn,  advised  a  quick 
step,  he  decided,  that  "  one  fresh  man  in  an  action  was  worth  ten 
fatigued  ones,"  and  then  deliberalely  advanced  to  his  position. 

As  he  desceULled  the  s  iuthern  slope  of  Hunker  Hill,  his  eye  took 
in  the  whole  i)l,in  of  prei)aration  for  the  battle.  He  saw,  as  he  after- 
ward related  the  attair,  •'  The  whole  way  so  plain  upon  the  beach 
along  the  Mystic  river,  that  the  enemy  could  not  miss  it."  He  went 
to  work.  Reed's  regiment,  which  had  been  detailed  with  Starks'  early 
in  the  morning,  upon  the  importunity  of  Putnam,  was  at  the  rail  fence 
with  the  Connecticut  men.  With  ever\-  possible  strain  upon  the  New 
Hampshire  men,  this  last  obscruction  was  not  sufficiently  perfected  to 
cover  Starks'  command,  .so  that  their  ultimate  defense  was  made  while 
many  were  kneeling  or  lying  down  to  deliver  fire. 

No  other  troops  than  those  already  named,  arrived  in  time  to  take 


1775. 


I77?.| 


HrSKl 


HIM. 


103 


rou^ht 
?riti^li 

,)•  tire, 
brave 
iif'-er- 
(luick 

rth   ten 

■c  took 
after- 
beacli 
e  went 
s'  early 
il  fence 
ic  New 
cted  to 
e  while 

to  take 


part  in  the  action,  and  the  total  force  which  eventually  pi  ticipated 
in  the  battle  did  not  exceeil  fourteen  hundred  men. 

Six  pieces  of,  artillery  were  in  parti, d  uu-  ,it  different  times,  but 
with  inconsiderable  practical  effect,  and  five  of  these  were  left  on  the 
fu'Id  uiien  the  retreat  v.'as  made. 

/'//(•  /r///(////;^  'The  embarkation  of  the  British  troops  was  the 
si;^nal  for  renewed  activity  of  the  fleet. 

The  base  of  Breeil's  Hill,  .and  the  low  i;round  extcmliiv^  to  the 
ri\er,  was  swept  by  .1  fire  so  hot,  that  no  troops,  if  .any  had  been  dis- 
posable for  such  a  movement.  ct)uld  have  resisted  the  Lindini;. 

Perfect  silence  i)erv,ided  the  .\meric.in  lines.  A  few  ineffectual 
cannon  shots  were  fired,  the  i;uns  were  soon  taken  to  the  n.-ir,  and  a 
•^till  deeper  c.dm  enveloped  the  hill.  The  d.iy  was  intensely  bri;4ht 
•  iiid  hoi  Har|_je  after  bar;^e  dischars^ed  its  fully  equipped  soldiery, 
then  returned  for  more.  This  brilliant  display  of  force,  nowhere  sur- 
passed for  splendor  of  outfit,  precision  of  movement,  ,L;allant  bearin^j, 
and  perfect  disci])line.  was  spread  out  over  Morton's  Hill  in  well 
(irdered  lines  of  matchless  array.  With  [)r()fessional  self-possession, 
these  men  took  their  noonda)-  meal  at  leisure,  while  the  barges 
returned  for  still  .another  ilivision. 

.Simultanecnisly  with  this  reinforcement,  the  roar  of  artillery  was 
lieartl  from  beyond  Hoston.  .\s  if  to  threaten  (General  Ward,  then  at 
('and)rid^e,  and  (iencral  Thom.is,  who  with  several  thousand  M.issa- 
ciuHctts  men  w.is  then  at  Roxbury,  and  to  w.uMi  both  tli.it  they 
could  sp.ire  no  more  troops  for  the  support  of  I'rescott  ;  or.  from  the 
apprehension  tii.it  an  attempt  mi;:jlit  be  made  by  the  Americans  to 
force  an  cntr.mce  to  the  city  over  Boston  Neck,  the  batteries  which 
covered  the  Neck  opened  forth  a  heavy  fire  of  shot,  shell  and  car- 
casses u[)on  the  villat^e  of  Roxbur}'  and  its  defenses.  It  was  no  less 
.111  indie. ition  to  the  silent  \-eomen  on  the  hill,  that  mortal  danger 
deni  indeti  a  supreme  resistance. 

The  crisis  w.is  at  hand.  The  veterans  were  ready.  The  people 
Were  also  ready. 

The  shaft  of  war,  in  the  grasp  of  the  trained  legions  of  Great 
ISrit.iin  was  poised,  and  to  be  hurled  at  last  upon  the  breasts  of 
I'.nglislinieii,  whose  otTense  was  the  aspiration  to  perpetuate  and 
develop  the  principles  of  English  liberty. 

It  w.is  a  blow  at  Magna  Charta  itself,  a  home  tlirust,  suiciilal,  and 
hopeless,  exce[)t  for  evil !  Its  lesson  rolls  on  to  attend  the  march  of 
th 


ii 


'n 


e  centuries. 


i 


h  : 


'  f 


'!■  (' 


III     ■'■" 
1 


!  Hi'ir 


H^in  r 


1 

jkjyLv, 

CHAPTER   XVII. 

BUNKKK    II II. I..      TIIF.    MATTLE. 

IT  was  nearly  three  o'clock  fif  tlie  atUMii(H)ii  of  the  seventeenth  of 
June,  in  tlie  yc.w  of  our  Lord  out:  thousaiul  seven  liunched  and 
seventy  five,  that  tlie  solid  mass  of  silent  veterans  wliich  hail  landed 
upon  Moulton's  Point,  .and  liad  prepareil  tlu'niselv(rs  w  ilh  due  deliiD- 
eration  to  execute  the  order  of  the  d.i\'  moved  forward  to  ,itt,;ck  the 
.American  army,  then  intrenched  on  tiie  summit  of  Breed's  Hill. 

To  General  llowe  himself  w.is  intrusteil  the  responsibility  ot 
bre.iking  up  the  .American  left  win;^.  to  envelope  it.  t.d<e  the  rcdo'.bt 
in  the  re.ir,  .and  cut  off  retreat  to  Ihmker  iiill  and  the  ni;i':i  l.tml. 
The  li;4ht  inf.intr\',  therefore,  moved  closely  .don;^  the  .Mystic  river, 
thre.itenin;^  the  e.vtreme  left,  while  thi;  yren.idiers  directed  their 
advance  upon  the  stone  fence,  with  their  left  winLj  tlemonstratin;^ 
toward  the  unprotected  t;ap  u'hich  was  clearly  exposed  between  the 
fence  and  the  short  breastwork  next  the  redoubt.  General  Pii^ot,  who 
commantled  the  left  wing,  adv. meed  directly  ag.iinst  the  redoubt 
itself. 

The  movements  were  heraldei.',  by  a  profitless  artillerj-  fire  from 
.Morton's  Hill,  but  this  soon  ceased,  for  tiie  solid  shot  all  ready  for  use, 
Vvcrc  desij^ned  for  twelve-pounder  guns,  .and  those  in  position  had  the 
caliber  of  sixe.-.  The  prom.pt  onler  to  use  only  i^^ra/>t\  Wd-^  followed 
by  an  adv.ince  of  the  ])icces  to  the  edi^e  of  an  old  brick-kiln,  the 
spongy  ground  and  heavy  grass  not  permitting  their  ready  h.mdling 
at  the  foot  of  tiie  hill  slope,  or  even  just  to  its  right.  The  guns,  thus 
advanced,  thereby  secured  a  more  effective  range  of  fire  upon  the 
skeleton  defenses  of  the  .American  centre,  and  an  eligible  position 
from  which  subsequently  to  effect  a  more  ilirect  fire  upon  the  exposed 
portion  of  the  American  front,  and  upon  the  breastwork  and  redoubt 
themselves. 

The  advance  of  the  British  army  was  like  a  solemn  pageant  in  its 


f^ilt^ 


17751 


BUNKI'.R    1111,1. 


105 


Steady  headway,  and  like  a  parade  for  inspection  in  its  completeness 
(if  furnisliineiit.  This  army,  bearing'  tiieir  l<na[)s.icl<s  .md  tlu;  full 
cMiiiipment  for  campai.Ljn  service,  moved  forward  as  if  by  the  ver>- 
force  of  its  closely  knit  columns  it  m  1st  sweep  away  all  obstructions, 
;iiul  overturn  every  barrier  in  its'.'.iy.  liut  rii;/tt  in  //w  way  \Vd9,  a 
c.ilin,  intense,  antl  enerijiziny  love  of  liberty. 

It  was  represented  by  plain  men  of  the  same  blood,  and  of  equal 
(larini;.  Contrast  marked  those  opposinLj  Encjlishmen  very  distinctly 
that  summer  afternoon.  The  plain  men  hai  Med  plain  fire-locks. 
Ox-herns  held  their  powder,  and  their  pockets  held  the  bullets. 
L'oatlcs-^,  under  the  broiling  sun,  unincumbered,  un.ulorneil  by  plum- 
a'T  or  service  medals, — looking  like  vagabonds  alter  their  ni.;lit  of 
Lihor,  aiul  their  tlaj- of  hunger,  thirst  an  '  .-aiting  this  /iir  obstruction 
was  trul\'  ill  the  way  of  that  advancing  splendor.  IClated,  conscious, 
assured  of  victory,  with  firm  step,  already  quickened  as  the  space  of 
separ.ition  lessens,  there  is  left  but  a  few  rods  of  interval — a  few  steps 
only,  and  the  work  is  done. 

A  few  hasty  shots  inii)ulsively  fired,  but  (piickly  restrained,  drew 
an  innocent  fire  from  their  front  rank.  The  pale  men  behiml  the 
mock  defense,  obedient  at  last  to  one  will,  answered  nothing  to  that 
reply,  and  nothing  to  the  audible  commands  of  those  steady  columns, 
waiting  still. 

It  needs  no  painter  to  make  the  scene  seem  clearer  than  it  appear^ 
from  the  recital  of  sober  deposition  .uul  the  record  of  surviving  par- 
ticipators on  either  side.  History  has  no  co'itradictions  to  confuse  or 
explain  away  the  realities  of  that  fearful  tragedy. 

The  left  wing  is  near  the  redoubt.  It  \^  not /ting  to  surmount  a 
bank  of  fresh  earth  but  six  feet  high,  and  its  sands  and  clods  can 
almost  be  counted,  it  is  so  near,  so  iasy, — sure  ! 

Short,  crisp,  and  earnest, — low  toned,  but  felt  as  an  electric  pulse 
from  redoubt  to  river,  are  the  words  of  a  single  man  —of  Preseott  ! 
W.irren  by  his  side  repeats  it  !  That  word  runs  quickly  along  the 
impatient  lines.  The  eager  fingers  give  back  from  the  waiting  trigger. 
'•  .Steady  men  !  "  "  Wait  until  you  sec  the  white  of  the  eye  !  "  "  Not 
a  shot  sooner!"  "Aim  at  the  handsome  coats!"  "Aim  at  the 
waist-bands."  "Pick  off  the  commanders!"  "Wait  for  the  word, 
every  man,  steady  '  " 

Those  plain  men,  so  patient,  cm  already  count  the  buttons,  can 
read  the  emblem  on  the  belt-plate,  can  recognize  the  officers  and  men 
whom  they   have  seen  on  parade  at  Boston  Common.     Features  grow 


sill 


Ik'  1 


I  •■ 


ft 


ii; 


'  I 


m4i 


^^     .'i.? 


'       ii 


.<tl 


io6 


HUNKER   IIH.L. 


['775 


more  and  more  distinct.  Tiie  silence  is  awful.  These  men  seem 
breatliless — d.''ui .'  It  comes,  t/iat  li'ord,  the  word,  waited  for — 
'^  Fire  !  "  On  the  right,  the  Hght  infantry  tjain  an  equal  advance, 
almost  at  the  same  instant  that  the  left  win_g  was  treadinj^  so  near  the 
humble  redoubt.  Moving  over  more  level  ground,  they  quickh'  make 
the  greater  distance,  and  have  passed  the  line  of  those  who  marched 
directly  up  the  hill.  The  grenadiers  also  move  uj)on  the  centre  with 
the  same  serene  confidence,  and  the  interval  has  lessened  to  the 
gauge  of  space  which  the  spirit  of  the  impending  word  defines.  That 
word,  zvaits  behind  tiie  centre  and  the  left  wing,  as  it  lingers  behind  the 
breastwork  and  redoubt.  Sharp,  cle.ir,  and  deadly  in  tone  and 
essence  it  rings  forth — "  Fire  !  " 

From  redoulit  to  river,  along  the  whole  sweep  of  devouring  flame, 
the  forms  of  brave  men  wither  as  in  a  furnace  heat.  The  whole  front 
goes  down  :  For  an  instant  the  chirp  of  the  cricket  and  the  grass- 
hopper in  the  freshly  cut  grass,  might  almost  be  heard,  then  the 
groans  of  the  suffering,  then  the  shouts  of  impatient  yeomen  who  leap 
over  obstacles  to  pursue,  until  recalled  to  silence  and  to  duty. 

Staggering,  but  reviving,  grand  in  the  glory  of  their  manhood  and 
the  sublimity  of  their  disci[)line,  heroic  in  the  fortitude  which  restores 
them  to  self-possession  ;  with  a  steady  step  in  the  fice  of  fire,  and 
over  the  bodies  of  the  dead,  the  remnant  dare  to  renew  the  battle, 
Again,  t)ie  deadly  volley,  and  the  shaitered  columns,  in  spite  of 
entreaty  or  command,  move  back  to  the  place  of  starting,  and  the 
first  shock  of  battle  is  over. 

A  lifetime  wh.:n  it  is  past,  is  but  as  a  moment !  A  moment  some- 
times, is  as  a  lifetime  !  Onset,  and  repulse  !  Three  hundred  lifetimes 
ended  in  twenty  minutes, 

Putnam  hastened  to  ]  nker  Hill  to  gather  scattering  parties  in  the 
rear,  and  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  reinforcements  across  the  isthmus, 
where  the  fire  from  the  British  shipping  was  maintained  with  destruc- 
tive energy.  ]-?ut  the  battle  at  last  had  to  depend  m.iinly  upon  the 
men  who  had  toileil  all  night,  and  who  had  gained  confidence  and 
firmness  by  the  e\[)erience  of  those  eventful  hours.  Nothing  could 
bring  the  reinforcements  in  time. 

The  British  troops  ra[)idly  re-formed  their  columns.  Never,  on 
other  battle  fields,  did  officers  more  gloriously  evince  the  jierfection 
of  discipline,  and  the  perfection  of  self-devotion.  The  artillery  was 
ou.shed  to  the  front,  and  much  nearer  to  the  angle  made  by  the 
breastwork  next  the  redoubt,  and  the  retiring  line  through  the  open 


1775- 


BUNKER   HILL. 


lo; 


[Tap  to  \t^  left.  Tlic  American  officers  animated  their  men,  and  added 
fresh  caution  not  to  waste  a  single  shot.  The  c,Hins  of  Gridley  and 
Callciidcr  were  temporarily  employed  at  the  unprotected  interval  near 
the  breastwork,  and  then  withdrawn  to  the  rear.  The  company  of 
tile  l.itter  officer  became  scattered  and  never  returned  to  the  fitjht. 
Thi;  remainder  of  tlic  line  kept  up  to  duty,  and  resumed  the  silent 
waiting  which  had  been  so  impressive  before  the  attack  began. 

The  British  columns  again  advanced,  and  deployed  as  before 
across  the  entire  extent  of  the  Ainerican  lines.  The  ships  of  war 
redoubled  their  effort  to  clear  the  isthmus  of  advancing  reinforcements. 
Shot  and  shell  cut  up  the  turf,  and  dispersed  the  detachments  which 
had  reached  the  summit  of  Hunker  Hilt,  and  the  companies  which 
had  been  .  ,sted  at  Charlestown  to  annoy  the  British  left,  were  driven 
t')  the  shelter  of  the  redoubt. 

Charlestown  had  aheady  been  fired  by  the  carcasses  which  fell 
through  its  roofs,  and  more  than  four  hundred  wooden  houses  kin- 
dling into  one  vast  wave  of  smoke  and  fiame,  added  impressiveness  and 
terror  to  the  scene,  while  a  favoring  bree/;e  swept  its  quivering  vol- 
ume away  from  the  battle  field,  le.iving  to  the  .Vmerican  forces  a  dis- 
tinct and  suggestive  view  of  the  returning  tide  of  battle. 

Nearer  than  before,  the  British  troops  press  on  !  No  scattering 
shots  anticipate  their  approach  this  second  time.  It  is  only  when  a 
■.[>  ICO  of  hardly  five  rods  is  left,  and  a  swift  plunge  could  almost  fore- 
run the  rifle's  flash,  that  the  word  of  execution  impels  the  bullet,  and 
the  front  rank,  entire,  from  redoubt  to  river,  is  swept  away.  Again, 
ag.iin,  the  attempt  is  made  to  inspire  the  paralyzed  troops,  and  rally 
them  from  retreat  ;  but  the  living  tide  flows  back — flows  back  even 
to  tile  river. 

Another  twenty  minutes,  hardly  twenty-five,  and  the  death  angel 
has  gathered  his  battle  harvest,  five  hundred  sheaves  of  human  hopes, 
a->  when  the  Roval  George  went  down  beneath  the  waters  with  its 
piiceless  vrdues  of  human  life. 

At  ilv.  first  repulse,  the  38th  regiment  had  halted  under  the  shelter 
of  a  stone  vail  by  the  road  which  passes  around  the  base  of  Breed's 
Hill,  between  the  slope  and  Morton's  Hill.  At  the  second  repulse,  the 
same  regiment  supported  on  its  left  by  the  5th,  held  a  portion  of  its 
command  in  check,  just  under  the  advanced  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
gradually  gathered  in  the  scattering  remnants  for  a  third  assault. 

The  condition  of  the  British  army  is  one  of  grave  responsibilities 
and  grave  issues.     That  which  had  the  color  of  a  simple  dispersion,  and 


U.L 


it:mr 


I!    : 


\  ^  i*=  ■  .1. 


', 

, 

i': 

1  '1 

;      1 

,;:|i,l.||. 


'  .  \<'    I 


loS 


UUNKKK   HILL. 


'775 


piinishniciit  of  lialf  oiL;;inizcd  and  half  armed  rebels,  begins  to  assume 
the  characteristics  of  a  "forlorn  liopr,"  in  a  mcist  desperate  striii^gle. 

"A  Dtoment  of  tJic  day  icas  critical  y  said  Biiri^oyiic. 

"  A  continuous  blaze  of  musketry  incessant  and  destructive,"  says 
StCiliiian. 

The  British  officers  pronounced  it,  "  downright  butchery  to  lead 
the  men  afresh  against  those  lines,"  says  Gordon. 

"  Of  one  company  not  more  than  five,  antl  of  another  not  more 
than  fourteen  escaped,"  sa}'s  Katnsay- 

"  Whole  platoons  were  laid  upon  the  earth  like  grass  by  the  mow- 
er's sc\the."  says  Lossiui:^. 

"The  British  line  tot.dly  broken,  fell  back  with  precipitation  to 
the  landing  place,"  sa\s  Mars/tall. 

"  Most  of  our  grenatlicrs  and  light  inf.mtry.  the  moment  they 
presentetl  themselves,  lost  tliree-fourths,  and  many  nine-tenths  of 
their  men.  .Some  had  only  eight  and  nine  men  a  company  left,  some 
onl\'  three,  four,  aiul  five."  is  the  statement  of  a  British  letter,  dated 
July  5th,  1775,  and  cited  b)-  Frot'ii)ii^liani. 

"  A  shower  of  bullets.  I'he  field  of  battle  was  covered  with  the 
slain,"  says  Jtotla. 

"  A  continuous  sheet  of  fire,"  says  Bancroft. 

"  The  dead  lay  as  t/iic^'  as  sheep  in  a  fold,"  said  Stark. 

It  w.is  just  at  this  protracted  interval,  yet  less  than  a  single  hour, 
that  each  army  evinced  the  great  (jualilies  of  their  common  blood. 

Clinton  and  Burgoyne  had  watched  the  progress  c>{  events  from 
Copp's  Hill,  anil  with  true  g.illantry  and  courage,  the  latter  threw  liim- 
sclf  into  a  boat  with  reinforcements,  and  volunteered  to  share  the 
is:.ue  of  a  thinl  advance.  Four  hundred  marines  adtiitional  to  the 
1st  battalion  which  h.ad  remained  at  the  landing  place,  hurried  across 
the  narrow  river,  and  these  united  with  the  47th  regiment  under 
General  Clinton,  were  ordered  to  flank  the  retloubt,  and  scale  its  face 
to  the  extreme  left,  while  General  Howe  with  the  principal  part  of  the 
grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  supported  by  the  artillery,  undertook 
the  storming  of  the  breastworks  bending  back  from  the  mouth  of  the 
redoubt,  and  .so  commanding  the  entrance. 

The  remnants  of  the  5th,  3Sth,  43d,  and  52d  regiments  under 
General  Pigot,  were  ordered  to  connect  the  two  wings,  and  make  an 
attack  upon  the  redoubt  in  front. 

A  demonstration  was  also  made  against  the  American  left,  more 
to  occupy  its  attention  than  to  force  the  defenses.     The  artillery  was 


4 


"775 


1775 


BUNKKR    HILL 


lot 


to  ailvaiicc  a  few  rods,  aiul  tlicii  swiiv^  about  to  the  left,  to  sweep  the 
breastwork  fur  Howe's  advance. 

Tlic  prei)arati()ns  were  nearly  complete.  It  onl\'  remained  to  brini; 
the  men  to  their  duty.  Knajjsacks  were  unsluni;,  every  needless 
incumbrance  was  laid  aside,  and  the  troops  moved  forward  stripped 
for  fi.^dit. 

Tile  Dower  of  discipline,  the  eneri^^y  of  wise  commanders,  and  the 
force  of  ever)-  possible  incentive  whicli  could  animate  llritish  veterans 
(if  proud  antecedents,  and  estabhsheil  lo)'alt\',  combined  to  make  the 
movement  as  memorable  as  it  was  momentous. 


Witl 


th 


ini  tile  .American  lines  the  preparation  involved  ecinal  rcspon- 


si 


;)iiit>',  but  uiuler  fearful  tliscouragement.  I'ew  of  the  troops  had 
three  rounds  of  .imnuinition  left.  Durin;^  the  second  attack  a  part 
of  the  men  loaded  wiiile  others  fired,  and  the  expenditure  of  powder 


was  commen.>ur.ite  with  the  results 


Ti 


le  remaining  cannon  car 


tridi 


OS 


were  ecoiioinica 


lly 


tlis 


tribute 


ana 


h 


ere  was  no  lon^^er  an\-  hope  that 


su 


bstantial  .lid  would   come  to  their  relief.      Ihere  were  less  than  fifty 


bayonets  to  the  entire  command,  and  gloom)'  apprehensions  began 
to  be  entertained,  but  not  at  the  expense  of  a  firm  purpose  to  fight 
to  the  last. 


\) 


uriiu 


the  afternoon  General  Ward  sent  forward  his  own  reLnmeiit 


and 


th(.)>e  of  Patterson  and  (jia.'dner.      The  last  named  off 


icer  led  tiiree 


liuiulre 


d  of  his  me 


n  sa 


fel)- 


across  tlie   isthmus,  re.iclied 


H 


unker 


Hi 


and  commenced  to  throw  uj)  earthworks  under  tiie  direction  of  (jen- 
i  'al  I'utnam,  but  was  soon  ordered  to  the  lines,  and  was  mort.illy 
wounded  wiiilc  executing  the  order.  Kcw  of  his  men  .actually  par- 
ticipated in  the  fight,  the  majority,  after   his  fall,  returning  to  Hunker 


Hill.     Adjutant    Febiger,  a    Danis 


h    officer 


athered    a  ])ortion    of 


Colonel   Gerrish's  regiment,  readied  the    redoubt 


as 


th 


e   last  action 


coinmeiicec 

late. 


aim  did 


'ood  service,  but  the  other  regiments  were  t 


oo 


I'utnam,  impressed  with  the  critical  nature  of  anotlier  attack,  de- 
voted himself  wliolly  to  an  attempt  to  establish  another  position  on 
bunker  Hill  for  accumulation  of  reinforcements,  and  ^. point  of  rcsist- 
itiiL,\  in  case  the  advanced  positions  should  be  abandoned,  but  he 
could  accomplish  nothing  in  the  face  of  the  activity  of  tlie  shipping, 
now  delivering  its  fire  at  short  range. 

Within  the  redoubt  itself,  and  along  the  slender  line,  all  was 
.-•esolution  and  attention  to  iluty.  Colonel  Prescott  appreciated 
thoroughly  the  purpose  of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  sudden  wheel  of 


n 


M 

,1 

I 


'■  ^ 


i 


■■,T;4'!ir, 


•^mn^rmmmmm 


mmm 


1 
1 

;| 

Ml 
I'fl    , 

n    . 

( 

\r- 

li 

1  '» 

1 

f' 

:    '■  ' 

'     1           ' 

;'    '       1 

;!' 

h 

!* 

'i 

;  1 

1  lO 


IRNKKK    1111,1,. 


1775 


the  Hritisli  artillery  to  tlie  left,  indie. ited  their  power  to  concentrate 
its  fire  upi>n  h\>  lines  of  retreat,  and  the  rcduetion  of  the  redoubt. 
The  i)rder  was  i^ivcn  to  reserve  ever\-  shot  until  the  enemy  shoukl 
come  within  twent)-  yards.  One  ninL;le  volley  was  delivered  as  the 
attack  was  niaile  at  the  s.une  moment  upnu  three  sides  of  the  ill  fited 
work.  I'or  an  instant  the  cohimns  were  checked,  hut  in  another  tluy 
(.lashed  forward  with  bayonets  fixed.  I'hose  who  fust  surmounted 
the  parapet  fell.  Maiur  I'ilcairn  w.is  mortall)' wounded  .is  he  er.teretl 
the  worK<  Lieutenant-colonel  .Vbercrombie,  Majors  Williams,  and 
Si)eedli)ve  >hareil  his  f  ite.  .V  siiv^le  artillery  cartrid^^e  w.is  distributeil 
for  a  last  eflort,  and  then,  inlermin;.;led  with  the  assailants,  fr^htiuL; 
with  clubbed  L;anis  and  stones,  the  L';arrisijn  )-ieldetl  the  contest,  and 
each  for  himself,  under  Prescotl's  order,  ni.ule  a  ipiick  retreat.  I're^- 
cott  and  Warren  were  the  last  tn  leave,  .uul  the  latter,  just  without 
the  redoubt,  shot  throu;.^h  the  head,  ;4'ave  life  to  the  cause  he  had  su 
valiantl)'  defended. 

liut  uilh  the  ca[)ture  of  the  redoubt,  the  struL^L^le  w.is  not  ended. 
Major  Jackson  r.diied  (iardner's  men  on  Himker  Mill,  and  with  three 
com[)anies  of  \\  .ird's  regiment  and  Febiger's  part)-,  ,in  effort  was  made 
to  cover  the  retreat,  ami  .i  viL;orous  fire  was  for  .i  short  time  maintained 
upon  the  adv.mcinLj  enemy.      It  saveil  more  than  half  of  the  garrison. 

At  the  rail  fence  and  clear  to  the  river,  St. irks',  Colt's.  Keed's,  .md 
Chester'^  companies  twice  repulsed  .m  .ilt.ick,  anil  by  a  resist. nice, 
prolonged  as  lung  .is  their  jjowiler  held  out,  t'ney  affordeil  oi)i)i)rtunity 
for  the  tugilives  Irom  the  reiloubt  t<>  m.ike  g  xkI  their  retre.it.  Then 
they  .ilso  fell  b.ick,  in  no  precipit.ile  llight,  but  with  a  f.iir  front,  .md  .i 
steadiness  worth)'  of  their  br.ive  resist. ince. 

Putnam  ni.ide  one  more  effort  to  halt  the  men  at  Hunker  Hill,  but 
without  bayonet.s  or  amnjunition,  worn  out  in  physical  strength,  and 
hopeless  of  a  successful  resistance,  the  retre.it  became  general,  and  the 
da>'  closed  with   their  occup.ition  of  the  held  works  of  rros[)ect  Hi" 
and  other  defenses  ne.uest  of  appro. ich. 

The  British  .irni)'  occupied  Bunker  Hill,  but  did  not  pursue  be- 
yond the  isthmus,  (iener.il  Clinton  .idvisetl  an  immediate  ..tt.ick 
upon  C.imbridge,  but  Gener.il  ilowe  declined  the  attempt.  Both 
armies  were  too  worn  out  to  renew  battle,  and  Colonel  I'rescott's 
gallant  offer  to  ret.ike  the  position  if  he  could  have  three  fresh  regi- 
ments, fi)und  no  res[)onse  from  the  committe  of  safety  and  ci)uncil  of 
war.  Both  .irmies  lay  on  their  arms  all  night,  equally  apprehensive 
of  attack. 


m 


f 


but 
and 
,1  tlic 
li" 


177? 


HUNKER   HH.I,. 


I  I  1 


Tlic  lossc-;  arc  given  as  officially  stated,  and   as  adopted   hy  Stetl 
man,  and  Hancroft. 

Bntiih  casimltics.  Nineteen  officers  killed,  and  seventy  wouiuied  : 
of  rank  and  file,  two  hundred  and  seven  killed,  and  seven  hundred  and 
fifty-ei;4ht  wounded.      Total  casualties.  '054. 

American  casualties.  Om..-  hundred  and  forty  five  killed  and  miss- 
in;^,  <ind  three  hundred  and  four  wounded.      Ti'titl casualties,  449. 

Thus  eacli  army  lost  nearly  one-third  ot  ilie  forces  l.)rou_L;ht  into 
real  action. 

Thus  brief  is  the  record  of  a  b.ittK',  whicli,  in  less  than  two  hom> 
tlestroxed  .1  town,  laid  fifteen  lunulred  men  Lipon  the  battle  fiekl, 
equalized  the  relations  of  veter.ms  .ind  mihli.i,  arousetl  three  nii'ilions 
of  people  to  a  diMlnite  strui^;4le  for  National  Indi'pendence,  and  fiirly 
inaugurated  the  Wiir  for  its  accomphshment. 

N'oiK.  I'lu'  pnMiipt  iiccii|i,\tion  of  I'lo^poct  Hill,  icfenod  10  in  llie  text,  \\»as  in  keep 
iiii;  with  lieiiei'.i!  rutn.^m's  purpose  to  resist  .it  every  point  ;  ami  ilie  nUini.ile  value  of  this 
piisiiiou  wliieli  lie  otcnpied,  u^  lie  stateil  to  ll;o  "  t'oniinillei'  of  S.ifety,"  "  willmut  liavint; 
•my  orders  tVom  any  per>on,"  wa>  vi'iy  deterniinin:;  in  il^  lelalions  lo  llie  siej^e.  lis 
advanced  llankin;;  jio  t--  of  l.ecliniere  I'oiiit,  (_'ol)lile  Hill  and  I'loui;lied  lidl,  al'leruards 
devilo[)ed  by  (.leneral  \Vashini;ton,  eoinbiiied  their  cro^^  lire,  and  lllu^  sealed  I'liarlestouii 
.Neck,  .A  piolraeted  hall  on  DuiiUer  Hill,  as  appear^  from  notes  on  llie  lialtle,  would  have 
liei-ii  fauil  to  the  whole  detachment;  hut  lii-.  occupation  of  Prospect  Hill  wa^  eminently 
jiiiii.  ious. 

Nou;.  (jeneral  Washington's  rejiort  to  Congress  states  the  casualties  at  r>uiiUe; 
Hill,  hy  ivj^imeiits.  It  has  alrea<ly  appeareil  that  the  ori;aiii/ation  of  the  eomniand  was 
loo-ely  and  hastily  elTeeted  :  hut  the  ]mipose  u as  so  far  reali/.ed  that  about  the  rdiuired 
minilni  of  men  ai'compaiiied  t'oloiiel  l're>e>)tt. 


I  oi  (iM  1,  .  i|    k: 
f  rw^      

ia\ii 

N  r. 

Kll.l.l.h 

\V 

ilMi 

3'' 
23 

4 

45 

5 

2 

25 

8 

6 

5 
-') 
46 

'} 

7 

I 

.1). 

Ml-^ING 

4 

I.iltle 

....              7 

lirewer 

I  2 

Ciiidlev 

Mark 

...            I^ 

\Vondhrid"e.  .  . 

Scatumon 

Ihid-e 

....            17 

\\  hilcomb 

.     .  .              ^ 

...          2 

Waid 

<  icrii>he 

....              1 

Keed 

....              1 

Ov: 

M. 

. .  .           I 

I'rc-colt 

....           JT 

Iio.jiiile 

6 

1  ■.miner 

I'alter-  jii 

Nixon 

1 

K 

&  M, 

■i 

■•'r, 


r;^: 


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I'  . . 


■MM 


\ 

1 

-♦ 

:-i    , 

•r 

•"    ■      H 

.;i 

r  "i. 

4 

•'     ' 

CHAPTER   XVIII. 


BATTLE   OF    HUXKKR    IIII.L.     NOTES. 


J 

I 

\^' 


THE  sicf^c  of  Boston  was  protractcil  until  tlio  sprin^Lj  of  1776.  It 
will  be  well,  thcrcfon.',  to  devote  a  short  space  to  the  examina- 
tion of  the  niilitar\-  relations  which  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  sus- 
t.iined  t(j  the  investment  of  that  city.  It  will  also  aflbrd  material  for 
a  clearer  appreciation  of  the  battle  itself. 

The  evacuation  of  ]>oston  was  matle  iiccissiiry  by  tlie  ultimate 
American  occupation  of  Dorchester  HeiLjhts.  The  decision  of  the 
l^ritish  council  of  war  made  tlurini:^  the  month  of  April,  in  which 
Clinton.  Burgoyne,  and  l'erc>-  cone  rred,  ant!  which  decision  afiirmed 
the  necessity  of  an  immediate  occupation  of  Dorchester  ileii.dits,  was 
therefore  correct  ;  but  Howe  postponed  action  until  a  peaceable  occu- 
pation was  impossible. 

The  correspondin;j^  course  of  the  "  Committee  of  Safety  "  in  that 
direction,  showed  a  like  appreciation  of  the  stratetjic  value  of  the 
position;  but  their  means  were  too  limited,  ,ind  the  time  hatl  not 
arrived  for  their  action.  The  Americans  burned  their  harbor  lii^ht- 
house  (juite  earl)'  durinif  the  investment,  and  the  inner  harbor  itself 
was  unsafe,  unless  absolutely  under  the  control  of  the  British  forces. 
Charlestown  Heii^hts  was  therefore  more  important  for  i)rotection  of 
the  shi[)pini,f,  and  afforded  a  better  base  for  active  oper.itions  than  did 
Bostiin  itself.  It  was  therefore  sountl  military  policy  for  tiie  British 
army  to  seize  the  positions  named  as  soon  as  the  fnst  attemjit  was 
made  to  invest  the  city. 

The  ostensible  theory  of  the  crown  was  to  reconcile  the  colonies  ; 
but  tile  actual  policy  and  the  physical  demonstrations  rejjelled,  and 
did  not  conciliate.  Military  acts  which  were  done  easily  by  force,  and 
which  should  have  remained  undone,  were  done  !  Military  acts  which 
were  sound  upon  the  basis  of  anticipated  resistance  were  not  done. 
Threats  and  blows  to\vard  ihose  supposed  to  be  incapable  of  defense 


■* 


1 


d 


.* 


■V 1 1  !•: 

IJATTLK  OF   IU!i:i:i)S  IIIM. 

1)11 

Bi  \ki:r  miij.. 


Cuuii'iliil  iihil  l)r,i«n  h}  t,'"l.rurrin:;t,iri 


-U  .1  itti'iirfith 


Scale  of  lVI  K<rtl». 

2"  10  (.. 


^r-  school  Hill        f-^-     V    .<-....;.,....•  ^^     :'^^^ 


U'lllldll;/ 


'I? 


'•t'fi/,,ir 


''5 

■'!1 


f^J 


■  ''it 


'.'* 


I 


'  '111 


■  ? 


V 

•i 

I   i 

\ 

\\     \ 
* 


I775-] 


nUNKKK    llll.i. 


113 


were  freely  expended.     Operations  of  war,  as  against  a  competent 
and  skillful  adversary,  were  i.Ljnored. 

Inasimich  as  the  liritish  authorities  assumed  that  their  f»jrce  w.is 
adequate  for  any  military  purpose,  whe?^  opposed  to  the  IVovincia! 
militia,  the  b.ittle  of  lUmker  Hill  in  all  its  phases  must  be  jud|^ed 
critically  as  a  military  demonstration. 

The  occupation  of  Charlestown  I  Iei::;hts,  which  had  been  pro- 
iiomiced  furrssitry,  was  also  assumed  to  he /ritsi/'/r,  and  without  risk 
to  IJostiMi  itself  It  was  undertaken  witii  the  purp(jse  announced  by 
General  Gai^e  in  advance,  that  he  would  burn  Charlestown  if  its  citi- 
zens committed  overt  acts  of  hostility.  'I'o.say  nothin;^  of  the  value 
of  the  town  to  a  British  s^arrison  for  Huids-er  llill,  its  destruction  had 
no  value  as  .1  military  measure.  It  was  one  of  those  wanton  acts 
which  treated  men,  women,  and  children,  as  parts  of  an  openly  hostile 
force,  and  the  town  itself  as  part  of  a  hostile  country.  It  expressed 
venj^cance,  not  the  spirit  of  negotiation.  Its  destruction  violated 
every  eleinent  which  bore  in  the  direction  of  restored  British  sui)rem- 
.ic>',  and  had  no  apology  consistent  with  a  sincere  desire  for  the 
honorable  pacification  of  aroused  passions. 

A  still  greater  mistake  was  made  in  the  conduct  of  the  occupation 
itself;  and  its  mere  statement  shows  how  daring  was  that  pre-occu- 
pation  by  the  Americans,  and  how  utterly  the  British  commander 
failed  to  appreciate  the  character  of  the  men  with  whom  he  was 
waging  war.  It  may  very  v,'ell  be  suggested  that  General  Howe  had 
largel)'  imbibed  his  impressions  of  the  real  state  of  .d'fairs  from  General 
Gage,  whose  ill-judged  conduct  had  precipitated,  if  it  had  not  largely 
induced,  the  conflict. 

The  mistake  is  thus  stated.  Irrespective  of  inexcusable  delay 
after  the  movement  hati  been  pronounced  necess.iry,  the  method 
adopted  was  only  an  armed  expression  of  contemjit  for  the  o])posing 
militia,  entirely  unbecoming  any  wise  commander.  The  law  of  mili- 
tary action  recpiires  the  use  of  adecpiaie  force  for  a  proposed  end,  but 
does  not  imply  or  .varrant  a  needless  waste  of  life  or  property. 

General  Clinton,  when  advised  of  the  action  of  Colonel  Prescott, 

promptly  suggested  the  proper  counter  movement.     Precisely  as  the 

fire  of  the  ship[)ing  cut  off  reinforcements  for  the  Americans  on  the 

seventeenth  of  April,  so  would  a  prompt  occupation  of  the  isthmus, 

under  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  have  enabled  the  British   commander  to 

have  seized  Bunker  Hill  summit  in  the  rear  of  the  American  works,  and 

would  have  placed  those  works  at  his  mercy.     A  similar  landing  along 
8 


I 


I 


>  I  \ 


111   NKI  k    111  1,1.. 


II77S 


'1  ' 

1  '  • 

i; 

•a    ifi 

1  iji 

I  ■:  -f  ■ 

''     ;  2 

^  ' 

;  ^    '   < 

I , 


11 1 


r 


tlic  Mystic  river  Wcliiiul  tliu  slciulcr  ilcfcnscs,  would  have  .icconiplislicd 
the  same  result.  liij  advance  as  inadi',  hail  the  single  element  of 
sii])poscd  invincibility,  as  aLj.iiiist  a  timid,  un()r!.;.ir.ized,  and  ill-armed 
advers.u)'.  .As  aL;ainst  .i  mere  mnb,  it  \vt)uld  h.ive  carried  moral 
weight,  -uiiiiM  li.ue  been  just  the  thin;^.  .Assertion  of  .luthnrity 
///<//,  is  not  nurel)'  to  vanciui^h  force,  but  to  restore  public  con- 
fidence in  law.     Its   very  momentum,  when    put  in  motion,  ;.jener.illy 


does 


th 


e  \\i )rl<. 


.\s  aL^.unst  a  iletachnu-nt  out  of  nearly  twenty  thou- 
sand men  who  represented  public  sentiment  itself,  ,iiul  would  make 
no  terms  while  .irnis  were  used  to  assert  prero;..jative.  it  was  uniViilitary, 


mere  waste — iiii.iiu 


ss. 


t    iiad   phxsic.u   cour.r^e,  without    tiie  mora 


th 


il 


sanction  which  is  so  essential  to  hi;^hest  militarv  success. 

The  movement  wruny[ly  beL;un,  w.is  bailly  in. matted.  It  was 
Clinton's  own  sii;4|.;estion,  mailc  at  the  moment  of  his  gallant  enlist 
ment  in  the  enter|)rise,  and  when  the  risk  .seenietl  e.xtra  hazaitlous. 
that  secured  the  degree  of  success  actually  attained,  lie  atlvisetl 
concentr.ition  of  the  assault  ui)on  the  redoubt,  bec.iuse  it  commandetl 
the  otlu'r  defenses.      I'-veii  this  mo\inunt  would   \\a\v  been  of  doubt- 


fi 


1 1  success. 


if  the  .\mericans  hati  be 


en  supplied  with  ammunition — i 


f 


two  half-barrels  of  the  Connecticut  powder  then  .it  Cambridge,  could 


h.ive  been  poured  throu: 


rh  tlu 


m-barrels  {)f  the  earnest  defender: 


The   (/</(M'of  the    movement   was  equallv  faultv.     The   fo 


rce   as- 


signed to  the  att.ick  was,  .ifter  it  hail  landetl,  deemed  insuffici<.nt,  .ind 
re-inf(»rcenients  were  obtained.  One  half  of  the  force  that  first  landed, 
could  have  passed  along  the  shore  of  the  Mystic  river  unobstructeil, 
and  could  have  turiu;d   the  .\meri 


can 


-■ft  long  before  Colonel  Starks' 


commaiul  came  ui)on  the  field.     When  the  liritish  troops   were   lei- 
surely dining,  the  question  of  sending  re-inforcements  had  been  only  a 
little  while  decided  in  the  .Americ, 
The  Hritish  "eneral,  with  a 


m  cami) 


Oil  niiiitarv  training,  and  as  will  more 


lully  appear  here.dier,  with  sound  strategic.il  coiice'ptions  as  to  army 
operations,  and  of  undoubted  physical  courage,  was  seldom  ready  at 
the  right  time,  invariabl)-  w.iited  for  reinforcements,  and  )tcvcr  improved 
success. 

His  army  fortified  Hunker  Ilill,  but  besides  the  loss  or  disabling 
i)f  more  than  a  thousand  men,  to  demonstr.ite  the  invincibility  of  his 
troops,  he  had  actually  thrown  away  all  the  prestige  of  their  past 
reputation,  and  enfeebled  the  power  of  his  own  will,  as  well  as  the 
cap.icity  of  the  troops,  for  offensive  measures  against  the  American 
;;rmv. 


1 


17751 


lillNKKK   IIIl.L 


I  \ 


It  of 


rincci 

noral 

niity 

ci  (li- 


ra 


iiy 


:ni)u- 
n.ike 


t.ir 


y^ 


noral 


was 

iilist- 


ions, 


VI  set! 
lulcd 

OLlbt- 


)— It 


ou 


Id 


rs. 


as- 


anc 


lUCU, 

ctcd, 

;uks' 

Ici- 


.ly 


11  ore 
inny 

ly  at 


aliiiir 


fh 


IS 


past 
the 


rican 


It  is  of  interest  to  the  reader  to  tiotice  the  characters  wlio  fr^miMl 
in  tills  action,  tii  it  they  may  see  how  fir  its  lesson   m  idi-  an  iinjires- 


^l')n     11 


[jon  their  future  inilitary  operations  in  America. 


(ieneral  Clinton  proved  his  cap.icity  to  a])pielien(l  the  situation,  to 
vi-e  and  execute  a  purpose,     (ieneral  Uur;_;()yne  saw  the  whole  bat- 

s   would    fi;;lit.      l.ord    I'erc)'  afterward 


aiui 


;iu 


w    that   I'rovinci.i; 


iniaiuled    a   division    at    hoii'j    Island,   White  ■  Plain '.,  Hrand\'wine, 


CDin 


,intl   ni   o 


ther  important  actions.  Lord  Rawdon,  tiuii  a  lieutenant, 
who  received  in  his  arms  the  body  of  his  own  c.iptain  (  ll.irris  of  the 
5tli  inf.mtry),  .is  he  was  shot  from  the  parapet  of  the  reilouht,  w.i-- 
afiiTwards  to  win  his  Laurels  ;it  Cai.lden  and  I  lohkirk's  llill. 

with  regard   to   the   ori^^in  d  occupation 


It  the  battle  be  examined 


he  hei'jlits   i)\-  the 


Ann 


\\K\\.n  forces,  some  addition. d  elements  are 


e.\no>ed.      It    is  known    th.it   alter   due    consultation,  C'i>lonel  ( irid 
(.lieined  best  to  fortify  Breed's  I  {ill  ;  am!  at  the     inie  time,  it  w.is 


e\- 


th. 


intention  to  estat)lisli  a  secomt  |)osition  upon  liuuker  11  ill.  as  soon  as 
n -inlorcements  should  come  upon  the  ground.  The  spirit  of  the 
ler  was  the  occupation  of  the  Charlestown  Heights.     .\t  that  time 


oil 


tile  local  distinctions  aflerw.irds  reco'iiii/.ed  dill  not  obtain,  and  li 


d' 


llill  was  knoun  as  a  ])asture,  a  dependent  slope,  if  not  essentially  a 
i),irt  of  Hunker  llill.  which  represents  the  suinmit  of  the  peiiinsul.i. 
It  W.I-.  im[)ossible  for  I'rescott  not  to  anticipate  the  .arrival  of  re-inforce- 
iiu.iits  in  time  to  hold  t-'ie  summit  also;  .and  in  th.at  view,  he  fortified 
tile  proper  position  to   prevent  a  permanent   lodgment  of  the  British 


tl'DOp- 


If  he  had  occu[)ied  liunker  Hi!!  proper,  the  Hritish  forces  if  wi 


sel\- 


Icil,  wouk 


1  h.ive  pained  Iheed's  llill  without  loss.  — woultl  have  secured 


ale   position    tor  accumul.itin;.,^   their   forces,  and    .in    eipi 


illv 


rood 


osition  lor  a 


b.itt 


cry  to  play  a;4'.uns 


t  th 


e  summit. 


It  is  profitless  to  ijo  back  and  iiKpiire  wiiether  the  America 


ns  were 


justified  in  their  offensive  movement,  in  view  of  the  crude  or;_jani;',atioii 


ot  their  arm\',  and  the  scantv  sunn 


ly  ,.f  1 


lowtler  then  in  store. 


Th 


u,in''er  th.it  the 


Hrit 


ish  ijarrison  would  assail  their  incomplete  mtrench- 


iiRiits,  wasin  f.ict  avertetl  by  the  expression  of  conscious  ])ower  which 
the  American  .advance  and  resistance  indie, ited.  Its  moral  effect  was 
.IS  threat  as  if  their  larye  numbers  represented  similar  couraL^e,  similar 
(.apacity,  and  the  military  resources  to  back  them.  The  committee 
of  safety  and  the  council  of  w.ir,  seem  to  li.ive  .n)prehended  the  situa- 
tion, and  by  the  applic.Uioii  of  proper  coura;j;e  and  that  j^ood  sense 
tAliich   largely  underlies   all   military  success)   to   have   struck  a  blow 


'.:(:, 


/ 


'1 


I 


TW/ 


m6 


nUNKKk    nil, I,. 


II77S. 


;},, 

If 

lit 

II 

i  •! 

f  \ 

H 

H 


l.'i'  « 


wliicli  in  fact  iiUiinid.itcd  the  l^ritish  commander,  and  dissuaded  liim 
Trom  an\'  rurtlu.T  lilts  uitli  provincial  militia. 

!l  made  a  sqiiar'}  issue  between  the  coimtr\'  and  the  Ihilish  army. 
It  was  11(1  IdiiL^er  an  isMie  hctuieii  citizens  and  tiie  state.  Franklin 
stated  trul\-,  when  .ulvi-^ed  of  the  facts, — "  The  kinij  lias  lost  his  col- 
onics."     Kn^lish  statesmen  made  the  s.mie  assertion. 

It  is  true  that  the  Americ.m  .irmy,  tl.cn  encamped  about  Hoston, 
was  at  no  point  fully  prepared  to  meet  veteran  troops.  The  hesita- 
tion of  the  British  army  to  force  their  defenses,  however,  was  one  of 
the  stron^e-'t  elements  of  th.it  defi-nse  ;  while  assumption  of  the 
offensive  was  not  only  tin-  best  employiiunt  of  the  half  idk;  .and 
inip.itieiit  militi.i,  but  the  best,  method  of  insurini^  success. 

()!i1\'  disci|)lined  ni'.-n  can  p.itientl)-  st.ind  I'lre  under  exposure. 
Habit  renders  the  casu.ilties  but  the  necess.iry  incidents  to  duty. 
Raw  troops,  however,  must  be  pushed  forward  ;  and  in  the  enthu- 
siasm f)f  an  adv.mce,  tlie  casualties  are  Inst  si,^ht  of,  anil  thus  militi.i 
sometimes  cipial  the  most  brilli.iut  i:fforts  of  veter.ms  in  the  line  of 
d.iriuL;  .•ulveiituri\ 

Men  thus  pushed  forward,  r.irely  know  exactly  when  they  arc 
defeated,  .iiul  take  a  victory  b\-  sur[)rise.  If  they  /iir/f,  they  recocjnize 
danL;er,  feel  its  power,  and  defeat  is  cert.iin.  It  was  thus  that  the 
Americiii'-  were  enabletl  to  realize  from  the  offensive  a  result  beyond 
the  real  scope  of  their  milit.iry  traininij;  .and  by  the  memory  of  Lex- 
in;j;ton  lln-vwe'e  led  to  ri^^htl)' estimate  both  the  offensive  and  defens- 
ive v.iliie  of  pr.,\'ctinL^  e.irth-works.  however  iiiartifici.il  and  defective. 
The  iiitiii'idnal  w.is  thus  enabled  to  do  his  best. 

The  company  or<j;aniz.itions  were  so  crude,  th.it  the  men  y^^  diffei- 
ent  companies  were  intermin;.jled,  and  the  pressure  of  imper.itive 
necessity  bec.ime  the  substitute  for  orj^^.miz.ition  and  disciiiliiie.  They 
had  few  officers,  these  for  the  most  part  inexperienced,  and  each  man 
acted  for  himsilf,  under  the  ijjener.il  direction  of  i'rescoit  and  his  chief 
associates.  Tlu'  file-firiiv^  of  rei^ular  troops  could  not  li.ive  surpassed 
the  intense  vii^or  of  that  .ictu.ill\'  delivered. 

The  result  was  the  best  possible  ex\i\  of  the  conflict.  The  imp.a- 
tience  of  the  two  armies  to  have  a  flight  was  gratified  ;  the  British  army 
was  pr.ictic.illy  shut  up  in  Boston,  and  the  American  army,  as  they 
now  realized  tile  necessity  for  more  thoroui^h  training;,  and  the  .iccu- 
mulatioii  of  military  supplies,  secured  opportunities  to  perfect  their 
liefenses,  .uul  thereby  compel  the  evacuation  of  Boston. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 


THE    NORTIIKRN   CAXVAICS.     I'KKLIMIXARY   OI'KR.Vl'IONS, 


f^}. 


^T( )  I'xpcditioii  durin;^  the  American  RcvolutiDti  li.ul  less  clcmcnta 
^  of  [)crin,incnt  viduc  than  those  whicli  were  undertaken  aL^.unst 
Can.ida  diiiini;-  the  \ear  1/75.  Great  results  were  anticipated,  but 
nunc  were  realized.  The  obstacles  were  too  substantial,  ami  failure 
was  inevitable.  Wonderful  endurance  and  <^reat  [ihysical  coura;^c 
were  manifested,  antl  these  were  accompanied  by  a  prodiL^ious  amount 
of  f.ith,  but  there  was  neither  ability  nor  o[)portunity  for  works  com- 
mensurate with  tin;  f.iith.  Certain  Acts  of  Parliament,  known  as  the 
('.niaili.m  Acts,  were  as  offensive  to  Canadians  as  otiier  legislation  was 
to  Americans;  but  the  former  were  not  pressed  to  the  extremity  of 
armed  resistance.  The  i>e(jplc  themselves  havin;^  no  harmony  of  le- 
lii,nous  or  political  views,  were  equally  divided  in  lauLjuage  and  race. 

Neither  did  the  Canadians  invite  the  aid  of  the  colonies.  The 
hyijolhcsis  ih.u  Canada  would  blend  her  destiny  with  that  of  New 
lMiL;!aiul,  aii'.l  wtnild  unite  in  resistance  toiiie  crown,  cert.iinly  involved 
some  identity  of  interest  as  well  as  of  action.  But  the  characters  of 
the  two  people  were  too  unlike  to  be  unified  by  simple  opposition  to 
I".nL;lish  legislation,  and  Canadians  had  no  antecedents  such  as  would 
piompt  a  hearty  sympathy  with  New  lingland  and  its  controllin;^ 
iiK.rcd  sentiment.  Neither  was  there  such  a  neighborly  relation  as 
admitted  of  prompt  and  adequate  aid  from  one  to  the  other,  in 
emer;^r(j,n^ji.^  calling  for  a  combined  effort. 

As  a  base  of  operations  for  a  British  army  moving  upon  the  col- 
onies, Canada  had  the  single  advantage  of  being  less  distant  from 
f.ngland  than  an  Atlantic  base,  and  many  supplies  could  be  procured 
without  the  expense  and  delay  of  their  transportation  across  the 
Atlantic;  but  between  Canada  and  the  American  colonies  there  was 
til  actual  wilderness. 

Hence  a  British  offensive  movement  from  Canada  involved  con- 


'Mji 


'It 


ii8 


Till-:    NORI'IIKRN    CAMI'AHIX. 


[1775. 


J    f. 
i    ' 

hi  ' 


1 


•*'  r,iil|!:,i,, 


r"']'''in 


staiit  w.i.sto  of  men  and  materials,  a  deep  line  throui;]!  an  uninhabited 
or  hostile  rej;ion,  and  such  a  constant  backin;^,  as  was  both  inconsist- 
ent with  the  resources  of  the  base,  and  with  a  correspondinc;  support 
of  armii's  restin;^  upon  the  sea  coast. 

The  Jiritish  j^overnmeiit  was  not  read)- for  o[)erations  so  extensive 
and  so  exiiaustive  of  men  and  treasure  ;  neither  did  it  realize  the 
necessity  for  that  expenditure.  There  wen-  two  alternatives,  one 
illustrated  by  (ieneral  Carleton's  plan,  viz.,  to  liold  the  forts  of  Lake 
Champlain,  as  advanced,  defensive  pMsilions  ;  and  the  other,  that  of 
lUn\L;o\-ne,  to  strike  throuLjh  the  country  and  depend  upon  support 
from  the  opposite  base. 

Idle  true  dete'ise  of  the  colonies  from  such  expedition^  depended 
upon  the  prompt  seizure  and  occupation  of  the  frontier  posts.  An 
yVmerican  aihance  upori  Canada,  was  not  only  through  a  country 
strateL,n'caIly  bad,  but  the  diversion  of  forces  for  that  purpose  en- 
danfjercd  the  [general  issue,  and  entrusteil  it-  interests  to  the  guar- 
diansliip  ot  an  <irmv  already  insufficient  to  meet  the  pressing  demands 
of  the  crisis. 

The  occupation  of  New  York  in  1775,  by  an  adequate  British 
force,  would  have  infinitely  outweigiied  all  possible  benefit  from  the 
comi)lete  conquest  of  Canada.  At  the  very  time  when  Washington 
couid  hardly  hold  the  l^ritish  garrison  of  Boston  in  clieck, — when  he 
had  an  a/erage  of  but  nine  rounds  of  ammunition  per  man,  he  was 
recjuired  to  spare  comjianies,  ammunition,  anil  supplies  for  a  venture, 
profitless  at  best. — with  the  certainty  that  reinforcements  could  not 
be  supplied  as  fast  as  the  enemy  could  draw  veteran  regiments  from 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  to  defend  or  recover  Canadian  soil. 

In  giving  a  rapid  outline  of  this  first  attempt  of  the  colonies  to 
enlarge  the  theatix"  of  active  operi. lions,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the 
initiati'.c  liad  been  taken  iiefore  General  Washington  had  been  elected 
commander-in-chief,  and  that  Congress  itself  precipitated  the  final 
movement. 

A  passing  thought  is  noted,  as  historic  characters  now  come  into 
view. 

The  crater  of  passion  casts  out  every  kind  of  clement  that  has 
been  seething  and  boiling  under  pressure.  .So  the  impulse  from  Lex- 
ington and  Concord  brought  :o  the  surface  some  elements  of  great 
variety  of  value  and  endurance.  .Arnokl,  then  living  at  New  Haven, 
and  commanding  the  company  still  known  as  the  "  (jovern.or's  Guards," 
was  so  heated,  that  he  could  not  wait  for  orders  or  pre[)aration  ;  but 


■5* 


•« 


177? 


11  Hi   NORrilKRN'   CAMPAKJN'. 


119 


rusiieii 


, liter  t.ikitv^'  ammunition  by  force,  started  with  fort}-  of  iii>  men  for 
C.inibri(l;4e  on  tlie  tliird  day  after  those  skirmislies  occurred.  He 
for  Ticonderot^a  without  men,  as  soon  as  lie  could  h.uuUe  a 
commission.     He  was  one  of  tlie  heroes  of  Quebec. 

Lee  was  another  man,  who  with  hardly  less  ambition,  eccentricity, 
a-id  lack  of  moral  force,  had  every  volcanic  symptom,  -with  more  of 
ini!itar>-  knowledj^e,  and  sufficient  worklly  wisdom  to  be  careful  that 
Congress  made  up  the  loss  of  income  which  his  patri<itism  would 
involve.  What  Arnold  was  to  the  northern  expedition,  Lee  fore-prom- 
ised  for  a   more   rational,  and   a  truly  legitimate   expedition  to   the 

thern  colonies,  when  they  were  afterwards  threatened  by  Clinton 
d  Tarker. 


sou 


an 


This  digression   [)ur[)osely  associates   with    two    prominent    ea 


rly 


niilitarv  mo\cmen 


ts.  the   t 


wo  men  w 


ho  started  forth  at  the  outset  as 


meteoric  lights,  challenging  i)lace  as  stars  of  the  first  magnitude,  and 
going  out  in  darkness. 

The  two   expeditions  to  Canatla  only  anticipated  the  fate  of  their 


ailers. 


Hotl 


1    expeditions    are    associa 


ted 


with    o 


th; 


r    aiu 


re 


ated 


opera 
the  war, 


tions  which  liive  character  to  the  campa '411  of  1776,- -the  first  of 


The  facts  arc  as  follows : 

Arnold  arrived  ;it  Cambridge,  and  immediately  proposed  to  the 
Committee  of  Safet}*.  that  he  should  be  sent  to  capture  Ticonderoga. 
lie  was  promptly  commissioned  as  colonel,  was  supplied  with  money, 


i)'uvuer, 


lead,  and    ten    horses,  and   was 


ith 


lutnonze 


d  t 


o  enlist  not  to 


exceed  four  hundred  men  for  the  enterprise.  Learning  that  a  sim- 
il.ir  expedition  had  already  started,  he  entrusted  his  recruiting  to 
p.ulies  selected  for  the  purpose,  and  joined  the  other  enter[)rise  at 
Castleton,  its  place  of  rendezvous.  Here  he  founjj  luh.in  Allen  in 
command,  and  after  a  vain  effort  to  assert  authority  by  virtue  of  his 
eonimission,  he  followed  its  destinies  as  a  volunteer.  Upon  reaching 
thehcadofLakeChamplain.it  was   found    that   boats  could   not   be 


•jcured  for  the  whole  force,  and  .Mien,  who  took  the 


leac 


ith 


tiian  ninety  men,  crossed  over  to  the  fort,  surfjrised  the  small  gar- 
rison by  night,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  tenth  day  of  May  took 
command  ol  Ticonderoga.  .\carly  two  hundred  cannon  of  all  sorts 
were  included  among  the  trophies  of  the  capture.  The  original 
inventory  of  trophies  in  the  handwriting  of  Arnold,  is  now  in 
the  possession  of  Dr.  Thomas  Addis  Emmett,  of  New  York.  Seth 
Warner,  a  volunteer  at  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  afterwards  dis- 


'  i 

rtr 


n 


1     (' 


IP" 


■*'      <■ 


120 


■rilK    XOKTIIKKN    CAMI'AIOX. 


[1775. 


I'    II 


I'M 


m 


.■  '■ 


tingiiislicd  In  active  service,  was  associated  with  Alien  in  this  enter- 
prise. On  tlie  niornin;4  of  the  twelfth  of  May,  Warner  embarked  a 
small  force  in  boats,  and  captured  the  fort  at  Crown  Point,  which  had 
been  le't  with  iinl\-  a  nominal  L;.u'rison  to  protect  the  jjiiblic  jiroperty. 
At  this  juncture,  Arnold  reasserted  his  rij^ht  to  command,  but  the 
colony  of  Massachusetts  reco;^riiz'ed  the  prior  claims  of  Allen,  llav- 
in<^  been  ji lined  by  fifty  recruits  whom  his  ;iL(ents  had  enlisted,  he 
embarketi  this  force  upon  a  schooner  belons^int^  to  Captain  Skene, 
placed  cannon  on  board,  .uid  captured  St.  John's  with  its  nr)minal 
[garrison,  ;uid  a  kiiv^'s  sloo|)  then  Inmul;  in  the  river  near  the  fort. 


All 


en,  who  had  started  with  one  huiuired  and  liltvmen  in 


bate, 


\ux 


u[)on  the  same  errand,  was  outstripped  by  the  schooner,  and  met 
Arnold,  as  he  returned  from  the  conquest.  An  attempt  to  occupy 
St.  John's  [)ermanentl>',  was  j^iven  upas  soon  as  advised  that  adequate 


Kjrce^ 


nad 


been  ordered  from  Canada  to  maintain  t'> 


•>st. 


Lruiiid  s 


tore 


ce 


'ratln,ill\-  mcre.ise 


d   t 


o  one 


hundreil  and  fift\' 


men. 


With  t 


ie-.e   lie    manned  a  smal 


tleet. 


and  assumed  conimanc 


1  of  tl 


lis 


nnniature    na\v   as    wel 


■  IS     o 


f   Cr 


n\ii 


I'oint.       I'rotests  against    1 


us 


assmnption  ot   so  lart;e  authority.  brouL^ht  a  committee  from  the  Con- 
necticut  rrnxincial   Assemblv  :   and    Massachusetts  decided  that  the 


concpiest  be 
command 


onuei 


to  L'onnecticut,  so  that  ArnoKl  was  not  ri''htfullv 


m 


The  latter  coIon\- at  once  forwarded  four  hundred  men  tn 


arrison  the  two  [)osts. 


A 


rnoid 


lischarired  his  men,  and  returned  t< 


Cambrich^e,  hiLjhlx'  offended.      In  fore  leavin;^'  Crown  I'oint  in  June.  In 


statintr  that  General   Carlcto 


wrote  to  the  Continental  CoULjress  statnit;  mat  ueneral  L-arlctoii  s 
force  in  Canatla  was  less  than  six  hundred  men,  asking  for  the  com- 
mand of  two  thousand  troops  for  the  capture  of  the  whole  of  Canada, 
and  assumed  responsibility  for  success,  lie  had  formerly  traded  with 
citizens  of  Quebec,  was  familiar  with  the  city,  and  claimed  to  have 
assurance  of  hearty  supjiort  if  he  could  have  a  small  nucleus  for  fur- 
ther oiierations.  On  the  second  day  of  June.  Allen  made  a  proposi- 
tion to  the  l'ro\incial  Congress  of  Xew  York,  embod)ing  a  similar 
undertakini/. 


to  rai^ 


Allen  and  Warner  also  visited  Congress,  anil   reipiested  authority 

This  authority  was  not  <nven,  but  a  recom- 


new  re'^iments. 


mendation  was  made  to  the  l*rt)vinciid  Congress  of  New  York,  that 
the  "  (ireen  Mountain  boys,"  so  styled,  should  be  recognized  as  reg- 
ular forces,  witli  the  privilege  of  electing  their  own  t)fficers. 


A   f( 


ormal  expedition 


against  Montreal  was  also  authorized,  and 


(ienerals  .Schuyler  and   Montgomery  were  assigned   to   its  command. 


./* 


B 


THE   NOkTHKRN   CAMI'.MGN. 


avc 

fvir- 
)i)si- 
lilar 


i 


("-CI  1  III:*     *>*.^  i\  I  iir^i\i's     V.Am  I  .  vivj  .>  .  121 

llu'  fiiice  to  be  LMTiployod  consisted  of  tlirer  tliousaiul  New  York  and 
New  I'Liii^l.md  troops,  wliich  were  ordered  to  riMidu/vous  at  Ticon- 
dero'^a  diirini^  the  month  of  Aii;j;ust.  Allen  and  Warner  joined  this 
command. 

Dnrin;^  the  same  month  a  committee  from  Coniijress  visited  Cam- 
hriili^e,  and  persLi.ided  (iener.d  \\'asliinL;ton  to  send  a  second  army  to 
("anada,  ri/i  the  Kennebec  river,  havinL,^  lor  its  objecti\'e  the  capture 
(iflhubec.  Ijardner.  a  town  on  the  Kennebec,  was  made  the  base 
of  ileparture  ;  and  skillful  cari)enters  were  sent  forward  to  prepare  two 
hundred  bateaux  f>r  the  use  of  the  troops. 

.\rnolil  prominently  urL;ed  the  movement,  earnestly  solicited,  and 
fuiall)-  receivetl  the  conim.uul,  with  the  nink  of  colonel  in  the  Conli- 
ut'Mtal  .irmw  fen  companies  of  New  ICn;4land  troops  under  Lieu- 
ti.  iiant-colonels  I']nos  and  C.'hristoiiher  (iieen,  and  M.ijors  . Melius  and 
liil^elow,  and  three  companies  of  ritlemen,  one  from  \'ir_L;inia,  and 
two  from  IVimsvlv.mia,  under  the  command  of  captain,  afterwards 
(iener.d  Uaniel  Morgan,  com|)oscd  this  army  of  invasion.  The  a^^gre- 
;4ati;  force  was  elevc:i  hundred  men.  furnished  with  rations  for  forty- 
nve  days.  Aaron  Jiurr,  then  but  nineteen  years  of  age-,  accompanied 
the  expedition. 

Nmi;. — Tlif  lollduiiiu;  condoiiscd  si:itcim'iu  (.■ml)0(lie'<  Mr.  IVmiiDll's  ircoiil: 
"  I'Ik' KiiMt  ili'cil  which,  ill  liic  iiifaiivvliijc.  w.is  nchicM'd  in  ihc  north,  lici;;iii  in  Con 
Tucliiiil,  w.is  phmnu  i  hy  Iki  sons,  ;uui  uxcculuil  :i'.  her  cost.  ("ol.  S;inuul  II.  Parsons, 
nil  Ills  wav  to  llartlorcl,  crossed  Arnold.  Iioiiiid  for  Massachusetts,  and  from  him  le.ii  iied 
ol  hiass  cannon,  then  at  Ticonderoua.  On  tlie  271I1  ot  .\pril,  he  advised  with  Saiiinel 
WMlis  and  Silas  Deane,  and,  with  three  others,  pi, iniuil  the  c.iptiue  ol  ijic  fori.  On 
lliiirowii  receipts,  they  obtained  money  fioiii  the  public  treasury,  and  on  the  '2^t\\  stt 
fdiward  with  Noaii  I'helpsaiul  Hernard  Koniaiis,  to  carry  forward  their  design.  Cap- 
t:iiii  IMw.iid  Moll,  of  Pre-itoii,  was  made  chairman,  ,uul,  with  live  associates,  proceeded 
on  his  mission.  I  he  men  wen'  to  lu'  riised  from  tiie  New  llampshiie  (Irants,  to  pre- 
vnil  discoverv  of  their  plans,  and  iahan  .Mien  was  enconr.ined  b\'  an  express  messein;er 
10  hold  iheiii  in  leadiness."  Uanerofl's  Hist.,  |]d.  iS;)),  \'ol  l\',  pp.  ?|;i-4.  Conn. 
Hist.  Col.,  \'ol.  I.  j()3-iS3.  The  latter  volume  yives  the  reports  of  .Moll,  l',iisons,  ami 
others  associ.ited  in  the  undcruiking,  with  the  bill  of  costs  paid  by  Connecticut. 


/rA 


/' 

1  ■) 

[ 

• 

'.in 

nty 
om- 
hat 


r( 


and 
md. 


I 


^fp° 


t  ! 


it:; 

1; 

1'  I  »*'fM 

Ml 

n 


CHAPTER   XX. 


EXPEDITIONS  TO  QUEBEC   AND  MONTREAI..     THEIR   VAL'JE. 


o 


X  the  sevciitCLMith   day  of  September,  I 


/  /  :>' 


Arn 


old  s  comma 


II  d 


marched    from  Cambrid;j[e  to  Hedford  ;  sailed  from  Newport  on 
tile  nineteenth,  and  on  the  twentieth,  entered  tlu-  Kennebec  river,  and 


landed  at  (iardner,  Maine. 


A  small  scouting  party  was  sent  forward  to  /f/a.-yr  the  trees,  and 
thus  mark  out  u  route  to  Lake  McL^atltic.  at  the  source  of  the  Chau- 
dic're  river;  and  anotlier  party  was  dispatched  to  Dead  river  to  select 
the  best    point    for  transferrin;^  tlie   bateaux  from  the  Kennebec.     A 

Outline  of  tlie  Atlantic  coast,"  will  indicate  the 


L^lance  at   the  map, 
route  pursued. 


M 


organ  s    corps 


if   rill 


ernen    was  assigned    to  the   advance,  and 


started  on  the  twenty-third    lay  of  September.     The  rest  of  the  com- 
mand embraced  three  divisions,  which   marched   at   a  d.iv's  interval 


bet\ 


g  ch 


ween  them,  each    havmg  charge  oi    its  own  sup])ort.      Lieutenant 


f  it> 


L 


colonel 


E 


nos  wi 


th  tl 


iree  companies  coinm.mded  tiie  rear  division 


rdi 


The    progress   of  the  army  was   impeded    by  a  swift  current,  antl 


from  the   third    tlav   it   became    necessarv   for  men   to  w.ide    in 


deep 


w 
N 


ater  and   force   the  boats  along  by  ni.iin  strength.      U[ 


)on   reaciiiiv. 


ornuwwock 


I- 


uUlS, 


tht 


re  a 


1  diffi 


iculties  o 


f  th 


e  marcn 


an. 


Seven 


days  were  consumed  in  carrying  the  boats  and  provisions  around  the 
falls,  a  distance  of  only  a  mile  and  a  half.  Precipitous  rocks  bounded 
the  river  on  either  siile,  and  the  transfer  was  not  comi)leted  without 
injury  to  boats  as  well  as  provisions.      The  swift  current  of  the  river 


was  connne>.l  withm    closer 


banl 


as   tliev  advan 


ceci 


tlic   e 


dd 


les  anc 


e.vposed  rocks  rendered  it  necessary  almost  daily  to  drag  or  carry  the 
boats  along  the  shore,  and  on  the  tenth  of  October,  wiien  the  army 
reached  the  dii'idc  between  the  Kennebec  and  Dead  rivers,  it  was 
'"ound  that  the  force  had  been  reduced  by  desertion  and  sickness  to 
nine  hundred  and  fifty  effective  men. 


'm 


1775  1 


i;XI'KI)ri'K)NS   TO    QI'KHKC    AND    MONl'KK.Xr,. 


123 


Oil  the  tliirtccntli  of  October,  Arnold  wrote  to  the  commander  of 
the  expedition  from  Ticondero;4a,  giving  his  plans,  and  also  sent  an 
Indian  niessen;j;er  to  his  correspondents  at  Quebec,  with  rejjort  of 
Ins  purpose  antl  proLjress.     This  messen^^er  betrayed  his  trust. 

The  niarcli  of  fifteen  miles  across  to  Dead  riv<;r  was  one  of  severe 
trial.  Three  shallow  pontls  which  were  choked  with  fallen  trees, 
nian_\-  ravines,  (iua;jjmires,  and  swamps,  lay  in  the  way  ;  the  mud  was 
oficn  knee  deep, —the  water  w.is  up  to  the  arm-pits;  and  even  when 
oxen  were  used  for  haulin;,^,  the  men  were  required  to  render  aid 
and  extricate  the  loaded  boats  from  the  mire. 

(')ctober  fifteenth,  the  boats  were  launched  into  Deatl  river,  a  com- 
j)aratively  still  stream,  but  broken  by  shallows,  falls,  and  ripples,  so 
that  in  a  distance  of  ei<^hty-three  miles,  the  boats  had  to  be  carried 
seventeen  times,  with  constant  loss  of  supplies  and  injury  to  the  boats. 
Men  deserted  daily,  some  froze  to  death,  others  who  were  sick  were 
left  behiiul  ir  charge  of  one  or  two  convalescents,  and  still  the  army 
moved  on. 

October  twenty-second,  rain  fell  in  torrents. 

October  twenty-third,  continued  rain  raised  the  river  nearly  eight 
feet  —seven  boats  were  overturned  and  their  contents  lost.  Rations 
lor  only  twelve  ilays  remained  on  hand,  and  the  army  was  still  thirty 
miles  from  Lid<e  Megantic. 

.\  council  of  war  was  held.  Orders  were  sent  to  Lieutenant-colo- 
nels Green  and  linos  to  forward  every  able  bodied  man  for  whom 
rations  for  fifteen  days  could  be  made  up,  and  to  send  all  others  back 
to  Norridgewock  Falls.  Enos,  short  of  provisions,  as  he  afterwards 
claimed,  marched  his  division  of  three  companies  back  to  Cambridge. 

Suddenly  rain  changed  to  snow!  The  ponds  froze  over,  and  the 
ice  had  to  be  broken  with  the  butts  of  muskets  to  effect  a  passage  for 
the  boats. 

The  barges  had  been  hauled  one  hundred  and  eighty  rniles,  and 
h.ui  been  carried  forty  miles.  The  men  began  to  go  without  shoes. 
Clothing  was  in  rags  ;  their  limbs  were  torn  by  briars  ;  provisions 
became  scarce  ;  their  dogs  were  eaten  for  food  as  well  as  all  their  cat- 
tle ;  fish,  plants,  and  roots  made  up  their  chief  diet.  Blankets  not 
worn  out,  were  continually  wet  or  frozen,  and  hemlock  boughs  sup- 
plied the  demand  for  shelter  and  bedding.  Marvellous  was  the 
endurance  of  those  men  ;  and  as  if  in  his  element,  Arnold's  courage 
never  abated,  his  cunfidence  in  success  never  failed  him.  It  was 
indeed  a  great  ordeal,  but  a  great  triumph  would  compensate  for  the 


■■;  /y  T 


V 


.'■.■  V 


'fsi. 


4 


I 


If 


«»■ 


*  I 


i 
t 

i 
^    i 

^  1    ■ 

it 

!' 

*    ' 

1 

IB 

V 

< 

1 

f 

'f 

i 

Ml 

i4! 

It 

■  '     ; 

■4  , 

'.''  "  ; I 


124 


KXri:i)I  I'KiNS   TO   (.)UEUi:C   and    MoN  rRK.VL 


I '775. 


siifferiiiui,  if  it  oiily  sccurrd  the  surprise  of  Qurbcc  ami  tiie  con(]ucst 
of  Cm. Ill, I. 

l"'()r  thri'f  clays  tin-  arm)-  restctl  near  Mount  I?i;^clo\v.  A  iiu.iint 
tradition  is  cited  by  Lossin;^,  which  asserts,  "  that  this  t)ft'icer  whose 
name  is  still  iilentified  with  the  mountain,  visited  its  to;)  to  behold  the 
towers  of  Ouebec." 

Lake  Met^.mtic  was  reached,  and  another  inventory  of  supplies  was 
t.d<en.  Less  than  three  days'  rations  remained.  Starvation  seemed 
to  be  the  inevitable  destiny  of  the  entire  command. 

()ctol)er  twenty-seventii,  Arnold  started  with  five  boats,  some 
i/iii^oiit  canoes,  ,ind  less  th.m  seventy  men,  to  seek  the  ncirest  I'rench 
settlements  for  the  i)urch.ise  ot  pr^  i\isions.  The  L;overnment  h,ul  fur- 
nished him  with  .1  thousand  iloli.irs  before  his  ilep.irture,  so  th.it  he 
felt  confident  of  success  amon;j;  the  French  provincials.  The  C'hiu- 
diere  river  llowed  with  impetuous  velocit)',  three  of  the  boats  were 
dashed  in  pieces  uipon  rocks,  .t.ul  the  part)'  were  in  the  utmost  peril. 

October  thirtieth,  they  re.iched  .Serti;4,in,  seventy  miles  from  Lake 
Megantic,  were  kiiuil>-  received,  purchased  flour  .uul  cittle,  antl  sent 
them  Ijack  to  the  .irmy  in  cliarL^^e  of  some  Cm, uli  ins  .iiul  Indi.ms.  Li 
a  {c\\  days,  the  troops,  having-  lost  all  their  bo.its,  [gathered  by  small 
det,ichments  at  Serti;^an,  and  the  army,  reuniteil,  was  within  twenty- 
five  miles  of  Ouebec.  l'\>r  thirty-two  ilays  of  that  m.irch,  no  huin.m 
beini;"  h.ul  been  met  with  in  the  wilderness,  and  the  trail  made  by 
the  troops  was  obliterated  as  soon  as  made.  Retreat  hail  become 
worse  th,m  to  .uK'ance. 

Xoxi.'mber  ninth,  the  remnants  of  the  expedition  reached  Point 
Levi,  opposite  Ouebec,  and  there  est.djlishcd  their  base  of  operation:? 
for  the  conquest  of  Canada.  But  the  garrison  of  Ouebec,  small  as  it 
was,  h,ul  been  forewarned;  the  outworks  were  undergoing  repair,  and 
all  boats  had  been  removed  to  the  other  siile  of  the  river.  Ai\  imme- 
diate advance  just  ,it  th,it  time,  might  have  secured  the  capture  of  the 
city.  The  garrison,  or  such  officers  as  had  been  entrusted  with  the 
news  of  Arnold's  e.xpedition,  had  no  faith  \\\  his  ability  to  complete 
his  march,  and  the  people  were  so  ajiprehensive  that  resistance  would 
involve  the  ruin  of  the  city,  that  the  opportunity  was  ripe  for  an  im- 
mediate and  bold  assault.  Hut  Arnold  had  to  builii,  capture  or  pur- 
chase boats  before  he  could  advance  to  conquest.  I  lis  resolution  was 
still  equal  to  the  emergency,  and  the  men  were  put  at  work. 

As  if  to  test  his  endurance  to  the  utmost,  a  furious  tempest  of 
wind,  r.iin,  and   sleet  set  in,  and   the  army   was  again   in   peril.     He 


rr?! 


KXI'l'.lJlTIONS    VO    t.)UEI5i;(:    AND    MOMKliAl, 


12: 


mt'cjht  overcome  the   terrors  of  tlie  wilderness,  but  the  tempest  ums 
Ill's  m.ister  I 

Tlie  e\i)eilition  to  Montreal  was  beiiv^  organized  at  TicDiuleroira, 
when  tile  attention  of  the  reader  was  inviteil  to  Arnoki's  journe\' 
throuL;h  the  wiUli'rness. 

General  Schuyler's  ill  health  t^reatly  retarded  operations,  and  he 
soon  found  that  the  stren;4th  of  the  army  which  was  hastily  tj^atherin;4 
at  that  post  was  onl)-  in  mere  numbers  and  the  physic.d  capacity  of 
individual  men.  There  was  no  discipline,  no  respect  f(jr  officers,  but 
a  perfect  independence  of  thou;^lit,  jud_L.',ment,  and  action,  with  no 
time  for  projier  preparation  and  iii>truction.  Unless  the  advance 
could  !)(-■  lu-aily  simultaneous  with  that  of  Arnold,  both  expeditions 
would  lose  the  objective  in  view. 

It  is  just  here  that  some  attention  ma)-  be  cjiven  to  the  theory 
which  led  General  Washington  to  authorize  these  demonstrations 
against  Cinad.i. 

He  believed  that  the  occupation  of  Montreal  and  Queliec,  while 
tlu'\'  were  almost  di.'stitute  of  reguLir  troops,  and  the  season  of  the 
\ear  precluded  reinforcements  from  luiglaiid,  would  afford  tlie  best 
opportunity  for  testing  the  peo[)le  of  Canada,  and  would  also  furnish 
them  a  basis  for  the  assertion  of  independence,  if  ti.ey  were  ripe  in  sen- 
timent for  such  a  movement.  His  well-conceived  circular  addresses 
which  were  largely  distributed,  as  will  as  the  [lolic)'  which  he  enj(jined 
upon  the  officers  and  men  of  both  e.\]K'ditioiis,  were  eminently  wise 
and  inspiring.      lie  judgeil  tlie  Canadian  o[)ponents  of   15ritish  policy 


b>-  tlu 
that 


)ff. 


e  expression  ot  leelmg  wliicn  pervaded  tlie  coU)nies,  ami  assumed 


dthi 


\'er\-  many  won 


Id 


dly 


ivail   tiiemselves   ot   the   opportunity 


f  th 


which  the  presence  of  colonial  troops  would  afford  for  tlirowing  otTthe 
yo':e  of  the  mother  country.  It  seemed  clear  that  General  Carlcton, 
having  no  fears  for  Quebec,  would  concentrate  at  Montreal  all  effect- 


ive 


fo 


rces 


for  th 


.f  '1 


ie  recovery  ot    liconderoga  and  Li 


d  Ci 


mvn 


)int. 


Ul 


)on 


the  supposition  that  Carleton's  troops  did  not  exceed  seven  or  eight 
hundred  regulars,  and  as  many  provincials,  he  decided  that  an  .irmy 
jf  three  thousand  men  would  be  atlecpiate  for  operations  from  Lake 
Champlain  to  Montreal.  This  estimate  was  a  correct  one.  Popular 
demonstrations  had  indeed  been  made  in  the  portion  of  C.mada  l\'ing 
.south  from  Montreal,  which  indicated  sympathy  with  the  American 
movement.     This  expression  of  feeling,  however,  was   rather  for  the 


-01 


:-H: 


^*^-s,[ 


■  ..    :VH 


mm 


■Pi 


1 1    II 


11 


i!      > 


!!f 


120 


i:,\l'r,|)' 1I(»NS    lO    ()UKBKC    AM)    MOXIRKAI,. 


[1775 


purpose  of  kcci»in;j  on  friendly  terms  with  the  American  troops  who 
tlire.iteiieil  the  boriler,  th.m  to  indicate  ti\eir  readiness  to  take  up 
arms  for  themselves  as  a  people. 

Arnold  had  freelj-  tleci.ircd  his  opinions,  and  claimed  ii>  have  pos- 
itive knouledi^e,  th.it  tiie  provincials  desiretl  to  act  in  fuU  concert  with 
the  Anurican  forces.  The  occupation  of  Montreal  was  therefore 
regarded  as  both  practicable  and  wise  ;  and  it  was  near  enou.Ljh  to  the 
Sorel  river  and  Lake  Champlain  to  be  well  supported,  so  long  as  the 
Ihitish  army  was  not  augmented  along  the  Atlantic  ctx'ist. 

There  w.is  still  another  consideration.  The  navigable  waters  of 
the  .St.  Lawrence  exposed  Montreal,  which  was  on  the  north  side  of 
the  ri\er.  to  naval  attack  ;  and  tlu  strategical  character  of  Quebec  was 
so  positive,  as  to  make  the  occupation  of  any  part  of  Canada  very 
haz.irdous,  so  long  as  that  fortress  was  left  for  a  base  and  rendezvous 
of  British  armies  and  fleets.  Thus  the  capture  of  Quebec,  as  well  as 
of  Montn.'.il,  w.is  necessary  to  any  substanticd  control  of  Canada  itself. 
The  concurrence  of  Washington  in  the  proposed  e.\[)edition  of  Arnold, 
was  therefore  predicated  upon  the  possibility  of  striking  quickly,  and 
by  surprise,  before  a  substantial  defense  could  be  interposed,  and  did 
not  provide  for  the  contingency  of  a  formal  siege.  No  artillery  was 
furnished,  because  not  within  the  scope  of  the  proposed  duty,  and  its 
transportation  would  have  been  impossible. 

Upon  the  assumption  that  Congress  was  rightly  advised  of  the  sen- 
timents of  the  Canadian  people,  the  expedition  was  rightly  planned. 
As  a  matter  of  histor\',  its  signal  fulure  repressed  the  j)ublic  avowal 
of  Canadian  s\mp.itli\'  with  the  American  Rex'o'lution,  and  demon- 
strated the  bad  policy  of  attempting  such  distant  enterprises  as  were 
not  essential  to  colonial  defense  proper. 

Still  another  element  entered  into  the  calculations  (^f  the  Ameri^ 
can  Congress  and  affected  its  action.  That  body  early  in  June,  dis- 
claimed all  purpose  to  oj)erate  against  Canada. 

Bancroft  states,  that  the  invasion  of  Canada  was  not  determined 
upon  until  "  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  by  the  British,  governor, 
his  denunciation  of  the  American  borderers,  and  the  incitement  of 
savages  to  raids  against  New  Kngland  and  New  York,  had  made  that 
invasion  a  substantial  act  of  self-defense." 

The  letters  of  Washington  to  Schuyler,  Arnold,  Wooster,  Mont- 
gomery, and  to  Congress,  show  clearly  that  he  estimated  the  difficul- 


I775-] 


KXPHDITIONS   TO   QUEBEC   AND   MONTUEAr. 


12: 


tics  tli.it  attcMulcd  bnth  cxpcdition.s,  and  the  coiuiiii^cncics  whicli 
iwaitcd  their  execution. 

\\'asiiiiv.;ton  wrote  earnestly  on  the  fit'tli  of  October,  "  th.it  if  Carle- 
ton  is  not  driven  from  St.  Joiin's,  so  as  to  be  obliged  to  throw  hini- 
self  into  Quebec,  it  must  fall  into  our  hands,  as  it  is  left  without  a 
regular  soldier,  as  the  captain  of  a  bri^;  from  Quebec  to  lioston  s.i\s. 
Many  of  the  inhabitants  are  most  favorably  dispersed  to  the  .\nierican 
cause,  and  that  there  is  there  the  largest  stock  of  ammunili(Mi  ever 
collided  in  America." 

\  second  li.'tter  of  the  same  date  states  that  "  .\rn(jld  expected  to 
reach  Quebec  in  twenty  days  from  Se[)tenil)er  twent\'-sixth,  and  that 
.\Iont;4oniery  n'lUst  keep  up  such  ap[)earances  as  to  fix  Carlcton,  and 
prevent  the  force  of  Canada  from  bein^  turned  on  Arnold,"  but,  "  if 
penetration  into  Canada  be  given  u[),  .Xrnold  must  also  know  it  in 
time  for  retreat."  And  again,  "  This  detachment,"  Arnold's,  "  was 
to  take  possession  of  Quebjc  if  p  is^ible  ;  but  at  any  rate  to  m,d<e  a 
diversion  in  favor  of  General  Schuvler." 


m 


I    :\v^.-r, 

\    'WW 


\i\ 


iiii. 


The  narrative  will  now  follow  the  second  expedition  in  its  course. 

In  spite  of  bad  health,  .Schuyler  worked  vigorously  to  hasten  the 
organization  of  his  army. 

ihe  Green  Mountain  boys  reorganized  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 
July,  and  elected  the  gallant  .Seth  W.irner  as  their  lieutenant-colonel, 
in  place  of  Ethan  Allen.  IJoats  were  built  with  great  rapiility,  and 
yet,  as  late  as  the  sixth  day  of  .Vugust.  the  maximum  force  that  was 
v.illing  to  cross  tlie  border  did  not  exceed  twelve  hundred  nun,  and 
the  supply  of  powder  was  insufficient  even  for  these.  Washington 
then  wrote  to  Schuyler:  "  In  the  av'icle  of  powder  we  are  in  danger 
of  suffering  equall>-  with  you." 

Meanwhile,  Maji^r  John  Brown,  a  discreet  and  brave  officer,  liad 
been  sent  to  Canada  to  learn  the  condition  and  disposition  of  the 
British  troops.  On  his  return  about  the  middle  of  August,  he  reported 
the  number  of  regulars  in  Canada  to  be  about  seven  hundred  men  ; 
that  nearly  half  this  number  was  at  St.  John's,  and  that  tlie  Canadian 
militia  were  disaffected  towards  their  officers,  who  Iiad  been  purpo-  'ly 
selected  from  the  old  French  nobility  of  the  frontier. 

On  the  seventeenth  day  of  August,  Montgomery  arrivi^d  at 
Ticonderoga. 

Upon  receiving  a  letter  from  Washington  that  "  not  a  moment  of 
time  was  to  be  lost,"  Schuyler  suspended  his  negotiations  with  cer- 


''  ■7-;'.i 


'^<U 


mi 


7 

1-- 


*•  "-hi 


)  .( 

; 

I     1 

i 

m 

' 

t    ' 

Ji  1; 

!    . 

hi   ' 


)  \ 


i 


.n- 


128 


r\i'i:iirii(i\s  to  (.trr.ni'c  .wn  momrkai. 


I '77?. 


tain  Iiuiian  tril)i.:^  whom  ho  had  met  in  council  at  Albany,  and  joined 
the  army.  The  first  objectise  point  of  importance  was  the  rechiction 
of  St.  John's,  .ilreail)'  will  |j;arri-.oneil,  and  tjroatly  strengthened  since 
the  visit   of  .\rnoKl  in   tlie   spriiv^. 

MontL^omery  started  witli  .i  httle  nn)re  than  a  thonsaiul  men,  but 
was  so  retanled  b\'  storms  as  not  to  ri'.icii  Isle  I. a  Motte  until  Sep- 
tember thiird.  On  the  fourth  Schuvler  joined  him.  and  they  advanceil 
to  Isle  .\u\  Noi\.  ( )n  the  sixth  tlu'}-  emb.irked  for  St.  John's.  The 
eiUirpri>i'.  uiuKrlakcn  w  ithout  .irtilk'r)',  f.iileil,  as  did  a  second  attempt 
of  a  similar  force  on  tlu'  tenth. 

Schu\-lir's  ill  health  com])elled  his  return  to  Ticonderojj^a,  but  with 
infinite  resolution,  s\-stem,  and  patience,  lie  jjuslud  forward  supplies  to 
Montijomery,  wlu)  assumed  the  active  command  with  a  force  aug- 
mented to  about  two  thousand  men.  Week  after  week  passed  by, 
and  little  progress  was  matle  in  the  reduction  of  the  i'ort.  The  diffi- 
culties of  his  po-,ition  were  mainly  those  of  discipline.  All  wanted  a 
voice',  ami  few  recognized  tlie  fact  that  in  a  regiment  of  fwv.  hundretl 
men.  there  could  not  be  fi\e  hundretl  lo/oiii/s.  The  single  ([uestioii 
of  the  location  of  .i  battery  was  m.idc  to  hinge  upon  what  the  men, 
not  the  commander,  ileemeil  l)est.  An  unauthorized  and  unfortunate 
enterjjrise  occur' ed  just  at  this  moment,  still  n»ore  to  embarrass  the 
army. 

I'.than  .Alk'n  was  emleavoring  to  recruit  Cuiadian  voluntee'rs  near 
('hand)l)\  .\lter  partial  success,  ami  without  consulting  Montgom- 
ery, he  resolved  to  surprise  Montreal  as  he  had  captured  Ticonderoga. 
\\c.  fiiled,  was  t.iken  prisoner  by  General  Prescott  and  sent  to  I'^ng- 
huul.  His  hasty  enterprise,  undertaken  with  inadequate  forces,  com- 
promiseil  mau)  Canadians,  and  repelled  others  who  had  been  ready 
to  join  his  command. 

On  'he  twenty-sixth  of  Octrber,  (ieneral  Washington  wrote  to 
Schuyler  the  following  consolatory  words :  "  Colonel  Allen's  misfor- 
tune will.  I  hope,  teach  a  lesson  of  prudence  and  subordination  to 
others  who  may  be  too  ambitious  to  outsliinc  their  general  officers, 
and  regardless  of  onler  and  duty,  rush  into  enterprises  which  have 
unfavorable  effects  on  the  public,  and  are  destructive  to  themselves." 

Justice  to  Allen   recpn'res  the   statement  that   Major  Brown   had 
pledged  his  aid    in  the  enterprise,  and  to  furnish   two  hundred  men 
Brown    had   assured  him   that  Montreal  was  practically   defenseless 
Allen  crossed  the  St.  Lawrence   from  Longucnil,  September  twenty- 
fourth,  upon  the  supposition  that  Brown  had  crossed  the  river  higlier 


r 


«775l 


K\ri:i)iri()Ns   vn  ()uhi)Ki:  and  mu\  ii<i;ai.. 


129 


11]),  aiul  w.iri  w.iitiiv^  for  liis  arriv;il.  M.ijur  Hidwii  must  have  known 
lliat  such  ;u)  LMitL'ipiisc  iiccilcd  MuiitL^ouiory's  sanction,  and  was 
unwise  ;  but  his  faihiro  to  suppml  AIIlmi,  coni])cllcil  the  latter  to  fij^lit 
aj^ainst  ovcrwhehninL;  numbers.  (jenerai  Carleton  also  collected 
iieail)'  a  tliousand  I'rovincial  militia,  but  their  de:;ertion  was  so  imme- 
diate that  he  was  soon  left  with  only  .1  nomin.d  command  of  less  tliaii 
three  liuiulred  men.  At  thi^  juncture  lie  wrote  to  (iener.il  llowc 
that  "  the  .\inericans  had  poisuiud  the  mimls  of  the  Canadians." 

(  )n  the  eiLjhteenth  day  of  October,  Major  Ihown,  aided  by  many 
citizens,  then  ori;ani/ed  as  a  battalion  umler  James  Livinj^ston  of  New 
^'ork,  who  had  resided  at  Chambly,  .md  w.is  very  popular  with  the 
people,  ca[)tured  the  fort  at  that  place,  sent  the  prisoners  to  Connecti- 
cut, .uid  turned  over  to  the  American  army  the  troi)lues,  whicli 
included  nineteen  cannon,  ant!  most  valuable  of  all,  one  hundred  .md 
twenty  barrels  (six  tonsi  of  powder. 

General  Wooster  arri\cd  just  at  this  time,  approved  of  Mont- 
gomery's ;.^eneral  phnis,  aided  him  to  .idvance  his  batteries  to  a  com- 
mandin;j^  position,  and  thereby  made  the  investment  of  St.  John's 
complete.      The  ijarrison  had  no  hope  except  from  Canada. 

(leneral  Carleton  had  by  this  time  a;jjain  collected  a  mixeil  and 
unreliable  force  of  nearly  eight  l"Mulred  men,  and  made  an  attempt 
to  cr(jss  the  St.  Lawrence  ;it  .N.  .real,  but  was  thrust  b.ick  by  War- 
ner's (ireen  Mountain  bo\s,  .uul  a  portion  of  the  second  New  \'ork 
regiment.  On  the  third  day  of  November  tlie  garrison  of  .St.  John's, 
consisting  of  nearly  five  hundred  regulars,  more  than  h.df  the  Ihitish 
regular  force  then  in  Can.uia,  and  a  luindred  Canadians,  bec.inie 
prisoners  of  war,  among  them  Aiulrc, — and  this   siege  of  tiftv  days 


iMUleil 


As  an  evidence  of  the  peculiar  state  of  the  regiments  at  that  time, 
ii  is  to  be  noticed  that  oi;e  of  them  mutinied  because  Monttjomerv 
iilowed  the  prisoners  to  retain  their  extra  suit  of  clothing,  instead  of 
treating  it  as  plunder. 

On  the  twelfth  of  November,  Montgomery  took  possession  ot 
Montreal,  and  the  expedition  of  the  left  zone  of  operations  attained 
ifs  objective. 

The  British  flotilla  was  also  captured,  together  with  General  Pres 
cott,  the  captor  of  Allen,  but   General  Carleton   escaped   under  very 
favoring  circumstances,  and  thus  was  enabled  to  participate  in   the 
defense  of  Quebec. 


W^ 

''^M. 


v.- 


'  :;!. 


'■  ■    'I'  J 


r        -  H I 


'I 


il 


!l 

1:1 


i 


it 


i! 


i    I. 


H    ' 


It 


l-^.  ^  - 

CHAPTER   XXI. 


THE   ASSAri.T    ri'ON   OUEHEC. 


"  "^  f  "'IIP'  drums  beat  to  arms,  and  the  city  was  tliorouj^hly  aroused 

_|_  It  was  liardly  liaylii^lit  on  tlic  niDniin;^  of  November  ninth. 
I775,wlien  Arnold's  men  a[)peareil  upon  tlie  river  shore,  just  ojjpositc 
tile  citadel  ofCjuebec.  His  dariiv^  spirit  was  moved  to  an  immediate 
adv.'ince.  That  instant  of  time  was  one  of  those  wiiich  contain  vast 
possibilities,  and  Arnold  was  a  man  peculiarly  prompt  to  seize  oppor- 
tunities for  darini^  adventure. 

lie  resolved  to  cross  at  all  iuizards,  with  numbers  however  small, 
if  canoes  or  any  other  noatin<;  fabric  could  be  applietl  to  the  move- 
ment of  men  ;  but  it  was  just  then,  as  already  stated,  that  the  Storm 
Kinjj  helil  mastery  by  day  and  by  night  for  three  successive  days,  and 
even  Arnold  must  obey  and  w.iit. 

During   this  interval   there  '  1   substantial  chan<Tcs    in  the 

character  and  condition  oft''  .1  of  Quebec. 

Colonel   Allen    McLe;  iiad   been    operating    with   General 

Carleton  in  the  western  /.  ,  nad  abandoned  it  upon  the  successful 
advancement  of  Montgomery's  army  to  Montreal,  and  retreated  in 
safety  to  Quebec,  reaching  that  foi-tress  with  one  humlred  and  seventy 
"  Royal  Scotch,"  on  tlie  twelfth  day  of  Novcm!)cr. 

On  the  fifth,  one  hundred  carpenters  arrived  from  Newfound- 
land. The  deputy-governor,  Cramahe,  had  in  fact  commenced  to 
repair  the  defenses  as  early  as  September,  and  the  arrival  of  Arnold 
was  at  the  last  moment  of  possible  success.  Two  vessels  of  war,  the 
Lizard  and  the  Hunter,  lay  in  the  harbor,  and  the  crews  of  merchant 
vessels  were  also  impressed  into  the  service. 

Arnold,  unapprised  of  the  reinforcement  of  the  garrison,  took 
ad\  antage  of  his  enforced  delay,  and  secured  thirty  birch-bark  canoes 
for  '.hr  use  of  his  troops.     On  the  night  of  the  thirteenth  of  Novem- 


1775- 


TIIK   ASS.MM/r   UPON   QirKMKC 


I?  I 


n 


biT,  by  niakinpf  three  trips  for  the  purpose,  he  crosseil  the  river  witii 
seven  hiiiKhid  and  fift\-  ineti.  I ).iyli;^'lit  revealed  liis  movements,  ami 
preveiiteil  his  rcliirn  to  I'oiiit  Levi  lor  tiie  last  (Ictai-limeiit  of  one 
huiulred  and  fifty  men.  and  all  the  ladders  which  had  been  prepareil 
for  storminff  purposes. 

The  l.inilinj;  had  been  made  at  Wolfe's  cave,  a  dee[)  noteli  in  the 
hank  up  the  river  just  below  .Sillery.  and  indelibly  associated  with  the 
name  of  that  brave  soldier  who  captured  Quebec  in  1759.  Was  the 
name  suj^^estive  ?  'I'iiat  was  indeed  a  little  arm/  which  .-\rnold  was 
about  to  hurl  aijainst  tlie  parapets,  where  Wolfe  ''iji-dhafipy"  in  victory. 

The)'  climbed  the  steep  ascent  undisturheil,  took  their  position 
about  half  a  mile  in  front  of  .St.  Ursuh".  ba?.tion,  between  the  j^Mtes  of 
.St.  John  and  .St.  Louis,  aroused  the  garrison  by  loud  huzzahs,  and  sent 
forward  a  formal  lla^^  with  the  dem.ind  for  immediate  surreiuler. 

At  that  very  moment,  the  army  of  Arnold  was  but  poorly  pre- 
pared for  meetiii;^  an  enemy.  ( )ver  one  hundred  of  their  muskets 
were  unserviceable,  many  cartrid^^es  were  ruined,  and  much  powder 
was  spoiled.  A  careful  inspection  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  sound 
ammunition  only  avera;j;ed  five  rounds  per  man. 

The  lla;4  elicited  no  reply;  and  a  second  flag,  accompanied  by 
threats  of  terrible  things  unless  the  surrender  should  be  immediate 
and  complete,  was  fired  upon. 

It  was  entirely  unnecessary  for  McLean's  Royal  Scotch  to  make  a 
sortie  upon  the  American  arm\-.  Their  steadfast  hold  upon  the  city, 
not  only  repressed  any  efforts  of  disaffected  citizens  to  open  the  gates 
to  that  army;  but  was  a  warning  to  Arnold  that  his  victory  must  be 
won  by  storming  the  fortress  itself. 

It  is  historically  true,  tiiat  Morgan,  Febiger  and  other  officers  of 
ecjral  merit,  painfully  realized  the  contrast  with  those  expectations 
which  had  inspired  their  departure  from  Cambridge,  and  had  sustained 
tiiem  in  the  perils  of  the  wilderness. 

.Arnold  now  learned,  for  the  first  time,  of  the  re-inforcements 
which  liad  reached  Quebec ;  and  was  also  advised,  by  personal 
acquaintances,  tlui^t  a  sortie  from  the  city  would  soon  be  made,  and 
that  general  Carleton  had  escaped  from  Montreal  and  was  on  his  way 
to  the  city. 

For  two  or  three  days  the  formalities  of  a  blockading  force  were 
kept  up,  guards  were  posted  upon  the  roads  leatling  to  Lorette,  St. 
Foy  and  Three  Rivers,  thus  cutting  off  all  country  supplies  of  wood 
or  meat  which  were  intended  for  the  garrison  ;  [-"ut  on  the  nineteenth 


'j''n, 


..Hi 


:'..  v< 


»r  :  ■ 


it!;.  <■•    ,r  I'pi 


SEBSe 


'32 


'irri-:  assault  uroN  qukijec. 


[1775 


Arnold    retired    to    Point    Aiix    Trembles,    to   await    the  arriva 


1  of 


Mont;: 


ornery. 


On  that  very  day,  Washington  sent  a  comnnunication  to  Congress 


in  which  the  folk-winL:  words  occ 


ur 


"  It  is  likely  tluu  Cjeneral  Carleton  will,  with  what  force  he  can 
collect,  after  the  snrrender  of  the  rest  of  Canada,  throw  himself  into 
Qucb 


ec,  an 


d  th 


ere  make  liis 


St  effort. 


Carleton  was  at  Aux  Trembles  in  the  morning,  barely  missed 
Arnold,  ami  entercil  Quebec  during  the  afternoon  of  the  nineteenth. 
lli^  first  official  act  was  to   require  all  pei       .s  who   refusetl   to   aid 


in  defense  of  the   citv,  to  leave   it  within  four  days 


pon  rem  ova 


)f  tl 


lesi 


d; 


inuerous  ele*  lents,  his  available  force  consisted  of  at  least 


three  hundred  regulars,  three  hundred  and  thirty  Anglo-Canadian 
militia,  five  hundred  and  forty-three  French  Canadians,  four  hundred 
and  eighty-five  seamen  and  marines,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty 
.artificers,  fit  for  duty. 

The  sole  dependence  of  Arnold  was  now  upon  IMontgomery,  and 
he  sent  Captain  Ogden  with  an  urgent  recjuest,  that  he  wouUl  come 
to  his  aid  with  artillery  and  at  least  two  thousand  men. 

That  officer  had  indeed  occupieil  Montreal,  which  was  an  open 
cit\-,  but  b\-  reason  of  the  expiration  of  terms  of  enlistments  and  the 
unwillingness  of  the  troops  to  serve  .ui\'  longer,  so  far  from  home,  he 
was  let't  w  ith  on]\-  about  ei"]it  hundred  men  as  the  month  of  Novem- 


ber drew  to  its  close.      I-lven  the  (ir 


een 


Mountain   bo\'s  had  returned 


home,  greatly  to  his  disgust.     The  loss  in  numbers,  however,  did  not 


Offi 


cers  and  men  were  auKe 


represent  the  real  state  01   his  army 

fractious,  dictatorial  and  self-willed.     'I'liej'  claimed  the  right  to  do 

just  as  they  pleased,  and  to  obej-  such  orders  onl>'  as  their  jutlgment 

approveil. 


G 


1  Sch 


leneral  bcHuyler's  letter  books,  and  orderly  book,  and  the  letters 
of  Montgomery  written  during  th.it  campaign,  are  ver)-  extraordinary 
exhibitions  of  the  characters  of  the  two  men,  of  their  appreciation  of 
the  issues  of  the  day,  and  of  their  wise  and  unremitting  efforts  to 
secure  an  exact  and  thorough  army  discipline.  The  aspiration  for 
national  liberty  had  evoked  a  sense  of  personal  liberty,  which  was 
eminently  destructive  of  all  real  liberty. 

The  American  army   at   Montreal,  at   Ticonderoga  and  at  Cam- 
bridge, was  so  intractable  and  s-j  short-sighted,  as  very  nearly  to  fulfill 


Milt 


on  s  anotneLrm 


thi 


License  they  mean,  when  they  cry  Liberty 


The  effort  of  .Montgomery  to  provide  humanely  for  prisoners  of 


'775] 


THE   ASSAULT    UI'OX   (^UKBEC. 


133 


war,  was  not  only  treated  witli  contempt,  but  was  made  the  excuse 
for  insubordination  and  outraije.  On  one  occasion  he  tendered  his 
resignation  ;  but  canceled  it  when  due  apoloyy  was  made.  Schuyler 
had  trouble  in  the  same  direction,  and  ofhcers  refused  to  take  clothing 
unci  iood  to  sufferiiiLj  prisoners  until  lie  made  his  authority  stringent. 

^Vnother  difficult)'  grew  ciut  of  the  refusal  of  trcjops  to  serve  under 
<renerals  from  other  ci^lonies  than  their  own.     Colonies  had  their  dis 
tinctive  milit.iry  cotles,  \.hich  limited  the  oblig.ition  of  the  men.     To 
serve  in  the  continental  army  involved  some  abnegation  of  self,  and 
the  surrender  of  the  iiidiviilual  will  to  that  of  authorit\". 

Monigomery  could  not,  at  that  time,  go  to  the  support  of  Arnold, 
without  leaving  a  C()m|)etent  officer  in  command.  It  seemed  as  if  the 
.uniies  at  liconderoga  and  Montreal  were  about  to  melt  iwwiv  entire- 
1)' ;  ;uul  Ixith  generals  were  ready  to  retire  from  the  service,  when 
W.ishington  addressed  them  a  letter,  quite  characteristic  of  himself 
and  of  the  crisis. 

"  God  knows,"  wrote  Washington, '' there  is  not  .1  difficiik)- that 
you  both  (.Schu\'ler  and  Montgomer\-)  compl.iin  of,  which  I  liave  not. 
in  an  eminent  degree,  experienced,  that  I  am  not  everv  ilay  experi- 
encing ;  but  we  must  be.ir  up  against  them  and  make  the  best  of 
mankind  as  they  are,  since  we  canm,"  have  them  as  we  wish.  Let 
me  therefore  conjure  j'ou  ami  Mr.  Montgt)mery  to  lay  aside  such 
thoughts  (of  leaving  the  service) ;  thoughts  injurious  to  _\'ourselves  and 
extremely  so  to  your  country,  which  calls  aloud  for  gentlemen  of  your 
abilities." 

Late  in  November,  General  Wooster  arrived  at  Montreal.  With 
a  p.itriotism  chanicteristic  of  the  man,  and  especially  complimented 
b_\-  Washington,  this  officer  waived  his  rank  in  the  Connecticut  army, 
and  accepteil  continental  assignment,  which  was  below  that  of  Mont- 
gomery by  one'day's  date  of  commission.  He  took  command  of  the 
Montreal  district,  and  ALTiitgomery  with  .about  three  hundred  men 
and  a  few  pieces  of  artillery,  started  for  the  relief  of  Arnold  aiul  the 
capture  of  Quebec.  A  sufficient  sup[)l\-  of  clothing  which  had  been 
captured  upon  the  first  occup.ition  c^f  the  city,  was  taken  on  board  the 
vesseL.  for  Arnol  '"s  command. 

Montgomer}-  landed  at  Point  Aux  Trembles,  on  or  about  the  first 
day  of  December,  and  swelled  the  combined  army  to  a  force  of  nearly 
one  thousand  men.  This  included  the  detachment  originally  left  at 
Point  Levi,  which  had  subsequently  crossed  the  river  with  safety. 

The  strongest  fortress  in  America  defended  b\-  two  hundred  heavy 


.'^■4ii| 


Vi 


7 


f    m 


f  ;, 


'■''       s*"^.  ^  ■       ' 


(  ' 


■if-  ;• . 

ip-i*'^  -«,... 


■  I 

'I  ,• 


'3t 


TIIK   ASSAULT   UPON   QUEBKC. 


ri775. 


fc 


I:  i 


cannon,  anl  a  ij;arrisnn  of  iumiI)'  or  (luitc  two  thousand  cflcctivo  irien, 
was  to  be  snhjictcd  to  tlic  assaults  of  this  haiulful  of  nu:n. 

Thi.'  advance  was  made  duriiiLj  a  diivin;^  snow  stoiin,  tln-ouL;h  drifts 
ten  feet  hi^di  ;  and  \-et  tlie  arni\'  was  cjuartered  in  houses  of  thi'  suburb 
of  St.  Roche,  on  the  Cliarlcs  river,  bcfor.-  dark,  December  fift'i. 

J  )ecem!)er  sixth,  Montj^omery  dcmaiuied  the  surrentler  of  the  city. 
This  communication  eh'citin;^  no  resjionse,  another  w.is  sent.  Tliis 
contained  exaggerated  statements  of  ids  force,  and  tln'catcned  dire 
resuhs,  if  resistance  should  be  prolonged.      Xo  repl)-  w.is  made. 

l)rcend)er  ninlii.  a  batter\-  of  six  small  guns  and  two  mortars  was 
establi'  ed  about  sewn  hundred  yards  h'om  St.  John's  gate.  'I'he 
grounu  W.IS  too  hard  for  earthworks,  and  snow  with  watt;r  poured 
over  it  and  fro/en,  su])[)lied  the  filling,  which  with  gabions  and  fas- 
cines was  matic  to  answer  for  cover  to  the  battery.  'I'he  small  caliber 
of  the  guns  rendered  them  useless,  and  on  the  .sixteenth  of  December 
it  was  tletermined  to  resort  to  assault,  as  tlie  onl)-  means  of  gaining 
access  to  Ouebec. 

At  this  juncture,  tliree  of  Arnold's  captains  refused  to  serve  under 
him  any  longer.  'I'lieir  time  of  service  would  expire  at  the  end  of  the 
month,  antl  there  was  ever)'  indication  that  open  niutin)-  v ould  re- 
;ilace  the  harmony  which  had  thus  far  prevailed.  .An  earnest  appeal 
from  Montgomery  restoretl  them  to  dut_\'. 

The  wealhiT  had  become  so  cold  that  men  coukl  not  handle  their 
iirms  t-xcept  for  a  tew  minutes  at  a  tinn;,  and  the  month  was  drawing 
to  its  vml.  On  Christmas,  the  officers  held  a  coimcil,  and  re-olved  to 
ni,d-;c  an  a<s,iult  as  soon  as  the  weather  would  permit.  The  next 
night  w<is  one  of  inttmsc  cold  even  for  that  latitude,  and  great  suffer- 
ing ensued.  Succeeding  moderation  of  temi)erature  induced  imme- 
diate preparation  for  ofle-nsive  action  ;  but  it  was  not  until  tlie  night 
of  the  thirtieth,  when  but  one  d.iy  of  legal  service  remainetl  for  ;i 
large  portion  of  the  troops.that  the  preparations  were  comi)lete. 

The  arm>'  was  divided  into  four  divisions.  The  Canadi..ns  about 
two  hundred  in  nundjer,  under  Colonel  Livingston,  of  C'hambl)-,  and 
Major  l^rown  with  liis  own  companies,  were  to  tlemonstrate  in  front 
of  St.  John  and  St.  Louis  gates,  and  at  Cape  Diamonil  bastion,  wliile 
Montgomery  and  .Xruold  were  to  make  /'i>i/(r  fide  att.icks  throng 


ower  town. 


Th 


li  the 
signal  for  these  attacks  was  t(;   be   a  tlischarge  of 


rockets  at  Cape  Diamond. 


Montgomer}-  connnanded  the  New  York  militia  and  a  part  of  the 


East 


ern. 


He   was    to  advance   from    the    south  and  west,  directly 


TIIK   ASSAUI.T    UPON    QUKliKC. 


'35 


uiulcT  Cape  Diamond,  while  Arnold  from  the  north  anl  west,  witli 
Lamb's  artillery,  MorLjan's  rillcmcn,  and  other  troops,  was  expected  to 
l>ass  alon;4  the  head  of  the  stone  jetty,  and  meet  Mont'^omery  at 
Mountain  street,  when  an  attempt  would  be  made  upon  the  city  by 
the  rear,  at  Prescott  i^ate. 

Mont;j;omery  moved  his  men  to  Wolfe's  cave,  ami  at  le.ist  two 
miles  up  the  river,  and  then  foUoweil  the  n.urow  [)assa_L;e  which  is  left 
between  Cape  Diamo.u!  and  the  river,  llis  course  was  almost  directly 
north-east,  and  in  the  face  of  driftiuL;;  snow,  which  soon  chaiiL^ed  to  fine 
li.iil,  reiideriii!^  it  impossible  to  reco<^nize  his  men  at  the  distance  of  a 
few  feet,  and  ecpially  impossible  to  communicate  orders  except  by 
niessent^ers.  Men's  breathiuLr  soon  covered  the  face  with  ice,  the 
sinj^le  trail  liecame  hartl  anil  slip()ery  after  a  few  had  led  the  way,  atid 
the  m.uxh  was  aloni,^  a  ledL;e  where  a  single  careless  step  would  pre- 
eipit.ite  a  man  to  an  ab\ss  on  the  rii^ht. 

Unexpectedly,  ami  half  an  hour  too  soon,  tlie  rocket  si;^Mial  put 
the  garrison  on  the  alert.  Lanterns  Hashed  on  the  parapet,  and 
.\L)ntL;omer\-  with'  a  mere  handful  of  men  had  just  i).isseil  under  Cape 
Diamond,  while  his  [principal  force,  with  the  ladders,  still  struggled 
through  the  snow  half  a  mile  in  the  rear.  It  was  a  uioment  of  intense 
interest  ! 

The  first  barrier  of  timber  and  pickets  extending  from  the  slate  rock 
iipon  which  Cape  Diamond  rested,  to  the  river  precipice,  had  been  left 
to  its  intrinsic  excellence  as  an  obstruction,  and  was  without  a  guard. 

ILitchetsand  saws  made  cjuick  work!  Sending  a  messenger  to 
the  rear  to  hurry  men  forward,  Montgomery  with  his  aid,  Mcl'herson, 
and  parts  of  Cheesem.m's  and  iMott's  companies,  pushed  through  this 
b.irrier,  and  advanced  upon  the  second,  which  consisted  of  a  log-house, 
lucip-JKiLHl  for  muskets,  and  defended  by  two  pieces  of  cannon. 

The  pathway  now  descended  and  a[)pr()ached  the  foot  of  King's 
Yard.  Only  three  or  four  men  could  march  abreast,  yet  Montgomery, 
as  soon  as  sixty  mei\  were  collected,  advanced  to  force  the  defenses. 
A  master  of  a  tr.msport  with  a  few  seamen,  and  not  more  th.ui  thirty- 
eight  militia,  manned  tiie  block-house.      I'lie  forlorn  hope  \v«is  already 


.ithin  a  hundred  feet  of  the  b.uricr.      >L)nt', 


■om 


ery  shouted,  "  Mei 


if  New  York,  you  will  not  fear  to  follow  where  your  general  leads 


l)ush  on,  (Juebcc  is  oun 


Suddenly  the  lighted  matches  sparkled 


like  fire-Hies  in  the  gloom  ;  a  whirl  of  grape-shot  swept  the  narrow 
pathwa)',  and  Montgomery,  iMcPherson,  Chcescniun,  and  ten  others 
were  instantly  killed  1 


i1-  i 


tm 


« r 
i' 


Ii 


s»^ 

! 

♦" 

I'M 

(■. 

t 

•■■li 

\-i 

j     ( 

It     \ 


i  ^*' 

>.^o 


I  up;  assault  iji'ox  f^i;i:i!i.c 


'775. 


II  v.iiii,  *  ',i]»t,iiii  .M')ll    111 


(1    tli(.-  siirvivurs  tu  rriicw  llir  ,iil\.in( 


A  cMiitiniiMii-,  lire  rimii  \\\r  Iddij-IioIi'-.  ol  tl 


Hull  ii-  ,1 


11(1 


ri[>'Mt< 


f 


(lisili.irv  ''  '11  '.'rape,  win 


ii)\\(>\\.rj\  1>\'  the  ill-  .1  lilt   n(  III  I-  hall  ,  I  roll  I  the 


lli'U'ln   .   In   II' 


■  lit 


MI)      1  111'       M   fill'      III       I   I  )ll 


Hut, 


aini    .i-i   il.iyli;_Mit    hi';.;.iii  to 


,il)i)i'.ir,  1  III    will) 


Ic  ilil.K  liiiii'iil  CDiilil  1)1'  'I'l-ii  ill  lull  rctri'.it. 


Mi)ii1",iiiii(  ry  lay  >tirr,iiiil  mlil  iiidiatli  ;   hiil   hi.  iiU'iii'ir)',  li()ri()r(;t 


)y  till 


arri  .nil  wliH 


li  n  .(  iii'd  lii-,  hi)ily,  .nil!  Niiiiiil  it  with  the  hmiors 


of  War,  i  ,  iM  r   alhiiiii'i.r  ])raiii';   ami    that    pripi 


sijoiit-iii'  on 


ollci  111'.'  ol 


fill-  ,  aiKJ  irii'ii'l  1  alil-. 


•liial    tiibiili:   i-,  the 


liic-s,  ami    iimiiT 


AriioM  iiloM.il    on    liii    (•naiiil  witii    cijiial  pioiiii) 
(.■(|iially  ti)iii;-;  ri-.ki.      'I  hi'  uc  hail    ;;oi;m'(1,  and  liad  l)i'iii  Ion  'd  upon 
the  ^liorc  ljy  tin:  heavy  liiU:s,  m)  that,  hi-,  iiii-ii    .dso  wen:  loiifiiH  d  to  a 


narrow  pa-.sa;.;i.'   al 


)ii"    tin-  rmk.      'I  III'  norlii-ea^l  storm  hiat  wit 


I  nil . 


broken  firie  iijjon  tlieii  lill  llaiik,  .uid  t  In;  i'ddi"s  of  wiiul  which  einicd 
al)oii!  tip    Jilt",  liltif.  '.'iiMt  drilli  ill  their  i)atli. 


/Xriiold  led    the  advaiuc    with  merely  Wvn   pit  ked  m 


<.'ii. 


Ml 


jr'.'aii  s 


rilleiiieii    am 


1  I,  mil)' .  ail  illerv   lollowed,  the    killer    dia!.|"iii'/    a    lield- 


P' 


ece  on  ,i  sled 


1 1  was  soon  .ihamloiied. 


Ahead)'  they  liail  passed  tlie  slom;  jetty  ;  had  passed  tlie  I'alacc 
}^ate,  .iml  were'  piishiii|.;  forward  into  the  narrow  street  of  .Saiill  an 
Malelol,  where,  under  a  projeelin.^  loik  in  .i  narrow  passa;.;e,  a  harrier 
had  Ijeeii  eslai)lis!ii  d  .iinl  was  stroiiidy  supported. 


lie'  .KJvaiKC  nail    hi  en  so  la 


r  III. nil',  .iml   .is  \'et  no   reiiorl    of  fire- 


arms ^.ive'  nolii  e-  ih.il  ( ,'olonel  I  jvin;;sli)n  ii.id  in.uie  iiis  demon ->ti.it  ion 
before  St.  John's  |.jale',  to  oci  iip)'  llie   ;;,irrison,  .iiid  divert  tlnii-  .itteii- 


lion    Iroiii    tiu;   assault  upon 


the  1. 


)\ver  town. 


Jiiil 


in    Its    pi, ice,  th 


i)L',it  ol  dnims,  and   tlie  ro.ir  ol   c.imioii,  ijavc   warniii-.'  ol   the  hot  wcl 


come  Willi 


h  .iwailed  tile  ass.iilailts. 


A  storm    of  !.;r.4je  and  musketry  received  Arnold's    .idv.uicc'  !     At 


liie  first  disciiai'^e  liis  ri^dit    knee  w.is  siiattcred  hy  a  mil 


>kct  1 


^.lll,   .UK 


he  was   1,11  lied    hack    to    St.  Koilic.      Morj.;,in   ami  l.,imh    i),i,si:(l    on, 
planted  kidders,  and  tile  first  Ij.irrier  w.i.s  ^.liiicd. 

At  llie  end  (jf  tlie  s.imc  street,  and  not  f.ir  I'rom  the  ar.ticipated 
union  witli  Mont_L;omeiy's  column,  a  second  Ij.irrier,  supported  by  a 
well  defended  stone  house,  was  in  the  way.  (Jnce  it  w.is  surmounted 
by  Morgan,  but  only  to  le.ii  ii  ill, it  .i  slron;,j  force  was  posted  in  its 
rear.  Seizing  li(ju-.t.s  lor  cover,  and  aiisweriii;.;  back  tlie  fire  Iron)  other 
liouses  across  tile  street,  t  lie  li;.;ht  continued  for  lie. irly  lour  iiours. 
Ij^norant  of  the  localities,  but  determined  iu;t  to  recede,  Mori^'an 
f(ju^ht  on.      Lamb   was  wouinJed,  ne.irly  sixty  of  his  men  h.id   fijlen. 


775.1 


THi':  Ass.M-i.r  t;i'o.\  ()i'i-.i!i:f;. 


'?; 


.iml  -till  the  <'X[)(:(tc(l  (  i;iiiin.iiul  nf  IJlmi  burn  (IhI  not  conic  In  Ins  siij>- 
piiit.  A  well  CDiiccivcil  suitic  liuni  tlic  '.'.il.icc  j;.iti.'  Ii.id  Ik  en  made 
iniilir  (icncr.il  ( i.iilcton's  <ji(lcr  ,  and  iJcaiborn',  cuinjian)',  dividrd 
niti)  tuo  dctai  iinicnts,  wdc  alrcaiiy  |ii"isonijr.s  u(  war. 

1  lopclc-is  ril  siuic^i,  nn-.n|)]j<)itiil,  destitute  ul  aniniuiiition,  and 
vMtliDiit  bayonets,  a])|)ii  i d  of  tlie  late  o|  Mont;M)iiu;ry  and  lii  .  c^n- 
jiaiiions,  Mfii;.;an  also  suni  ndeied  In,  command,  and  ciitcTcd  Ouchic, 
hill  ,is  a  |)i"isoiu:i'  of  war.  1  liiis  f.iiled  the  seiond  movement  a.thc 
I'lisl  tailed;  .in<l  lour  hnndied  and  Iweiity-a.x  olTu  eis  and  men,  one 
hall  of  the  eiiliic  Amciu.m  loi(c,  weic  with  him  jjiisoncrs  ot War. 

J  lie)'  were  cai)tivcs,  hut  lei  it  he  i((  DKJed  to  the  i)cr])<lual  iileiil- 
oiy  of  (ieiieral  Carlelon,  thai  these  i,  .iptue,  were  liealc-d  with  soldiirly 
respecl.  VViicn  his  officers  com])lainc-d  ol  hi,  kindness  toward  reix-ls, 
his  answer  w.is  cliarac  t  eii^'.ic,  and  more  and  in  ■  to  h"  v.ducd  as 
lMi;;l.ind  and  .America  enjoy  the  fruits  ot  conn  .d  ixMce. 

"  .Sinci:  we  liav(.'  tried  in  vain  to  make  tin,  .  aikiiowledM,-  us  .is 
brothers,  let  us  at  least  s<iid  lliem  away  dis])ose(l  to  rc;.;ard  u  ,  ,i ,  first 
tuusins." 

Arnold  wilhdrc:w  to  .i  diitance  ol  three  miles  lidin  llie  town, 
iiitn  nched  himsell  as  well  as  he  (oiild,  coiitiiied  hi-,  operations  tu 
shiillin;^  tin;  cit)'  oil  Ircjiu  supplies,  and  liis  shaii-  in  the  cainpai;^ii  oi 
1775  closed. 

Idle  invasion  of  Can.ula  came  lo  a  full  slop.  The  invaNion  of  the 
col(jiiics  was  to  toiiow  its  .ibandonmcnt.  <  )\  the  brave  men  uho  look 
l)art  in  those  e.xcitiii^  events,  many  had  a  Inline  hiiloiy;  .uul  their 
alter  conduct  will  bear  lestiuKjii)'  of  the  vahu;  i;l  the  experience  which 
so  lliorou;.^lily  tc-sli(l  their  patriotism  and  v.ilor. 

Mor^.in  was  (iencral  A]()r;.;.in,  ol  .\b)r'.;airs  rillemeii. 

Mei^s  ,tiid  J'"ebi^'er  arc  assoti.ited  with  the-  forlorn   hope  of  Stony 

I'oillt. 

(ireene  defended  Red  Hank  on  the  l)elaw<ire. 

'I  hayer  was  heroic  at  I'cjrt  Miflliii. 

Lamb  fuu^dit  at  Moiit|^oinery  and  Yorklown. 

Oswald  is  identified  with  Monmouth. 

Portcrficid  was  killed  in  the  battle  <jf  ('anideii. 

Many  ol  tiicse  be^Mii  their  trainiii;,;  at  Bunker  I  lill,  .and,  through 
the  wiklerncss  and  before  Quebec,  continued  their  education  in  the 
art  01  war. 


\'    ' 


1  'v.JJ^.-W.i.: 


;'J-v..:ir 


M- 


m   ' 


mmw 


1  .  .  J 


M 


III  ■:•    1 


CIlAPrRR     XXH. 

c;a.\ii'.\I(.n  oI'    1775.    r.Kii.i'   Mi-.MKnN. 

Till'".  ( ,ini|).ii'Mi  <jr  1775  w.i.  I  li.iiMi  Icii/.cd  by  f.jicatcr  offensive 
.utivily  on  tlic  part  ol  tin-  t.  (■loiiiit  ■  than  (if  Iht;  Itritisli  lro(;|>s. 
I  111  ilrli  UMVr  IcllUIKd  the  oir(,ir.i\c.  Ilic  m  (  iijiatlon  ol  (  !li.ilit:slowii 
lici;^iits  was  su|)j)ltnK:nl( d  by  the  uiva-inn  n\'  (  anada.  TIk;  inipiilst; 
which  suiToiiniliil  Huston  uith  t  In- unlit  ia  i>i  .\(;\>.'  fai; 'land  necessarily 
inaile  that  (anip  the  lic,id-(|uatt(is  ol  the  /Xnnricm  army,  and  the 
captnie  ol  Boston  its  ])riinary  1  ibjii  1  iv<-. 

At  all  other  si  a  ]Mjrl  cities  there  was  disaffe(tion  of  the'  jieriple, 
and  jiartial  assertion  mI  loitc  ;  hnl  there  u  <  re  no  Hiilish  ;4arrisi)ns  to 
support  the  Hritish  ;.;c)veriiors,  .iml  tew  occLsioiis  lor  ojxai  rupture. 
1  he  polity  ot  (  ouvress  still  i  onipre|ieiid((l  the  possibility  ol  an 
an  lit  able  settkinenl  of  t  he  diflii  ull  ies  with  the  mot  her  tuuiitry. 

1  he  l.u  I  is  also  l()  be  iiotiieti,  tli.il  the  luilitia  liom  Xortheiii  New 
I'"ji;.;l.ind  were  ]ieculiarl)' cone  eiiied  in  the  (jeleiise' ot  their  own  border, 
be;aiiselhe  lort.s  upon  Lake  ( :haiii|)l.nn,  its  navi;.;able  uatt-rs,  and  the 
presiaue  nt  itiilisii  troops  in  Canada,  alluided  the  oiil)'  then  existiii;.; 
opporliimt)  for  I'lritisli  DlTensivi:  niovemeiils.  I  here  u,is  no  external 
force  which  (.ould  be  emploved  to  disturb  the  investment  of  JJoston, 
and  none  wliith  was  disposable  for  oci  iip.il  ioii  ot  Atlantic  polls.  It 
was  therelore  a  wise  straletjic  movement,  to  tala:  tin  contiol  ot  1  .ake 
(ihamplain,  to  hold  its  fori-,  (or  di  ieiisivi.'  purpose  s,  and  so  d(  nioii- 
strate,  in  force,  as  to  ward  off  Hritish  attack.  An  adeeiii.ile  army  of 
invasion  from  (,"anada,  it  in  secure  possessiejii  of  'licuiidertv^ja  and 
Crown  Point,  snpported  by  armetl  vessels,  wonid  be  a  constraint  upon 
New  York,  the  (ireen  Mountain  country,  and   New  Ilampshire. 

These  elements  dictated  the  milit.iiy  movements  of  J 775.  1  lie 
few  minor  operations  of  the  year,  includin;^  that  at  (jieal  Uriih^'e, 
\  irj.;inia,  in  1  Jecember,  were  only  sii^iiilicant  of  an  increasing  sentiment 
()l  liostility  to  any  comprcjiiiise.     (hi   the  other  hand,  wherever  there 


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CAMTAKiN    OF    1/75. 


139 


were  no  expressions  of  force,  and  no  committal  of  overt-acts,  there  was 
evidence  afforded  throiiL,'h  many  citizens,  that  they  wished  to  avoid 
siicii  acts  and  constrain  sonic  settlement  with  (ireat  Britain. 

It  needed  just  sucii  a  protracted  suspension,  or  withiioUlinijj  of 
open  hostilities,  over  tlie  countr)'  at  lartre  ;  and  jusi  such  a  display  of 
torce  about  Boston,  to  preiMfc  the  colonics  for  real  war,  and  at  the 
same  time  tlcvelop  an  ann\-  and  test  both  officers  and  men.  The 
army  was  organised  at  (  ambrid^^e.  Washington  was  so  doubtfid  of 
some  of  the  appointments  of  j^eneral  officers  that  he  withheld  for  a 
time  the  delivery  of  commissions  which  h.id  Ijcen  entrusted  to  his 
char;4e  when  he  left  I'hiiadelphia  U)  assume  command. 

The  character  and  composition  of  the  arm>',  or,  tlie  iiniilts, — the 
\arious  and  distinctive  systems  ailopti'd,  and  the  jealousies  ami 
antagonisms  which,  prev.iiletl,  have  been  illustrated  b)-  incidents  of  the 
northern  campaij^n. 

They  were  infinitely  provokin;^  and  provokin^jly  constant  !  Gen- 
(  ral  Schuyler  .'.ffrmcd  that  "  if  Job  had  been  a  (general,  in  his  situation, 
his  memor)'  had  not  been  so  famous  for  patience."  \V'ashin;^ton 
assured  him  that  "  he,"  Schuyli:r,  "  only  had,  upon  a  very  limited 
scale,  a  sample  of  his  own  perpetual  Iri.ds." 

No  sooner  had  the  troops  assembled  than  a  set  rcpu[^nance  was 
manifested  to  all  proper  instruction  in  the  iletails  of  Minor  Tactics. 
"  'J'hey  had  been  trained  to  have  tiieir  own  way  too  loni;,"  saitl  W'ash- 
in;;ton.  (iuard  duty  was  odious!  Superiority  by  virtue  of  rank,  was 
denied  I  The  abuse  of  places  of  trust,  and  their  prostitution  for  selfish 
entls,  was  constant,  i'rofanity,  vuli^arity,  and  all  the  vices  of  an 
undisciplined  mass  became  friL;htful,  as  soon  as  any  immediate  danger 
pitsscd  by. 

The  jTood,  the  faithful  and  the  pure  were  hardly  less  restless  under 
the  new  restraint ;  and  few  appreciated  the  vital  value  of  some 
absolutely  supreme  control.  The  i)ublic  mone)s  and  public  pro]ierty 
were  held  to  belong;  to  everybody,  because  Cont;ress  represented  every- 
body. Commands  were  considered  despotic  orders,  and  exact  details 
were  only  another  form  for  slavery. 

Such  was  the  state  of  tliini;s  when  Washington  assumed  command 
at  Cambridge. 

Even  officers  of  high  position,  whether  graded  above  or  below 
their  own  expectations,  found  time  to  indulge  in  petty  neglect  of  plain 
instructions,  and  in  turn  to  usurp  authority,  in  defiance  of  discipline 
and  the  paramount  interests  of  the  colonics  at  large. 


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140 


CAMI'AION   OF   i7;5. 


[1775 


W.ishiiv^tdu  ijjavc  the  army  work  in  perfoctiiii;  cartli-works,  build- 
iiii^  rL'(!()iil)t>,  and  policiii;^  the  camp, — eiilorciMl  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath,  i.(iurt-in,irtiali'(l  officers,  ami  tried  M>liliers  h)r  swearing, 
gambliuL;,  fraud,  and  lewilness  ;  introduced  .1  thorouL^b  system  of 
^uard  and  picket  iluty,  and  made  the  nii^hts  subservient  to  proper 
rest,  in  the  place  of  dissipation  and  reveb)-.  (iood  order,  (/iS(i/>///ii\ 
was  the  first  purpose  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

These  statements  fill  far  below  a  fiir  review  of  the  situation  as 
[;i\en  b)'  Washiiv^^ton  himself. 

The  /(;i,7'.v//(".f  of  w,ir  became  his  next  care.  The  army  was  ileficient 
in  every  element  of  supply.  The  men  who  held  their  colonial  obliga- 
tions to  be  supreme,  came  and  went,  just  as  their  engagements  would 
permit,  antl  the  comfort  of  their  fimilies  reipiired.  Desertion  was 
consiilered  as  nothing,  or  ;it  the  worst  but  venial,  arid  there  were 
times  when  the  .\meric  in  .uniy  before  Boston,  through  nine  miles  of 
investment,  was  less  in.  numbers  than  the  British  garrison  within  the 
city. 

The  deficiency  in  the  number  of  men  was  not  so  conspicuous  as 
in  the  matter  of  jiowder.  ieail,  arms,  tents,  horses,  carts,  tools,  and 
medical  stores.  (.)rdinary  provisions  were  abundant.  The  country 
about  Boston  fed  the  men  generously  ;  but  it  was  difficult  to  convince 
the  same  men  that  all  provisions  must  go  into  a  general  ct)mmis- 
-.niat,  and  be  issued  to  all  alike,  and  that  stores  must  be  accumulated, 
and  neither  expended  lavishly,  nor  sold  at  a  bargain  as  soon  as  a  sur- 
plus was  on  hand. 

.Such  ivems  as  cordage,  iron,  horse-shoes,  lumber,  fire-wood,  and 
every  possible  article  that  could  be  used  by  an  army  for  field  or 
frontier  service,  were  included  in  his  inventory  of  essential  ston  ;  and 
in  his  own  expenditure  of  the  most  trivial  item  of  public  property,  he 
kept  a  detailetl  and  exact  account. 

Of  the  single  article  of  powder,  he  once  stated  that,  "  his  chief 
supply  v/as  furnished  by  the  enemy,"  as  during  one  period,  the  armed 
vessels  which  patrolled  the  coast  captured  more  powder  than  Con- 
gre.';s  had  been  able  to  furnish  in  several  months. 

On  the  Ivvcnty-ninth  of  November,  Captain  John  Manly,  who  was 
the  most  prominent  officer  of  this  hastily  improvised  navy,  captured  a 
British  store-ship  containing  a  large  mortar,  several  brass  cannon,  two 
thousand  muskets,  one  hundred  thousand  flints,  thirty  thousand  shot, 
thirty  tons  of  musket  shot,  eleven  mortar  beds,  and  all  necessary 
implements  for  artillery  and  intrenching  service. 


I775J 


CAM1'.\1(-N    OF    1775. 


141 


The  str;itc.t;ii.-al  value  of  clu'  (>i)i.'r;itions  during  1775,  u;is  limitiul 
by  defective  iliscipline.  bad  logistics,  .■.uul  the  changeable  character  of 
the  army.  Schuyler  and  Montgoniery,  who  deservedly  shared  hi-- 
confidence  and  commanded  his  respect,  performed  their  work  full)' 
up  to  the  limit  of  the  means  furnisheil. 

The  feeble  results  realizeil  fmni  the  invasion  of  Canada,  ilo  not 
impair  the  proposition,  that  its  direction  from  luM(i-(|uart'.T.  howcd 
a  clear  conception  of  t!ie  >trate;4ical  relations  of  the  points  involvctl, 
and  the  proper  methods  by  which  to  attain  success. 

The  deep  line  of  operations  which  left  no  track  through  the 
wilderness  would  have  been  a  memorable  folly  as  an  independent 
movement.  When  it  attempted  to  strike  the  capital  of  Canada,  which 
was  at  the  same  time  the  base  of  <iperations  .md  of  supjilies  for  thi' 
entire  British  provinces,  at  a  time  when  its  last  garrison  was  fir 
advanced  towards  Lake  Ch,implain,  it  liad  method. 

When  taken  in  connection  with  the  American  movement  on  the 
lel't,  which  had  for  its  purpose  the  ilestruction  or  capture  of  those 
atlvanced  troops,  it  became  a  bold  enterprise  of  a  thoroughly  scientific 
and  well  related  value. 

When  it  had  the  supposed  assurance  that  the  peo[)le  of  Canada 
were  really,  and  only  neeiled  the  nucleus  for  org.miz.ition  and  prac- 
tical revolution  against  a  common  adversary,  it  combined  sound  strat- 
egy with  the  wisest  military  policy. 

When  it  contemplateil  the  fact  that  the  principal  military  stores 
of  Nt)rth  America  were  at  Quebec,  and  that  its  possession  substan- 
tially controlled  the  St.  Lawrence,  overawed  all  Canathi,  ami  com- 
pelled England  to  employ  a  great  army  to  recover  its  possession,  if 
recoverable  at  all,  it  becomes  memorable  for  its  concci)tion  .uul  its 
illustration  of  the  science  of  war. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  Washington's  Orderly  book: 
'•  November  fifth.  As  the  commander-in-chief  has  been  apprised  of  a 
design  formed  for  the  observance  of  that  ridiculous  and  childish  cus- 
tom of  burning  the  effigy  of  the  Pope,  he  cannot  help  e\-[)ressing  his 
surprise  that  there  should  be  officers  and  soldiers  in  this  arnn-,  so  void 
of  common  sense  as  not  to  see  the  im[)ropriet)'  of  such  a  step  at  this 
juncture,  at  a  time  when  we  are  soliciting,  and  have  really  obtained, 
the  friendship  and  alliance  of  the  people  of  Canad.i,  whom  we  ought 
to  consider  as  brethren  embarked  in  the  same  cause,  the  defense  of 
the  general  liberty  of  America.  At  such  a  juncture  and  in  such  cir- 
cumstances to  be  insulting  their  religion,  is  so  monstrous  as  not  to  be 


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142 


CAMI'AKiN    (tl-    1775. 


r»775 


suffered  or  cxcu'^cd  ;  indeed,  instead  of  offcrincj  the  most  rcMiiotc  insult 
it  is  our  dut>'  to  adilrcss   jiublic  tli.inks   to  tliusc  our  bretlircn,  as  to 
them  \vc  arc  so  niucli  iiidrl)tcd   tor  cviny  late   happy  success  over  the 
common  enemy  in  C'.uiada." 

T/iC  liosiiit;;  tVi  iits  0/  thr  year  were  full  of  discourai^ins^  ft;aiures. 

As  early  as  September  there  was  no  money,  and  l)ut  little  clothing. 
Economy  in  the  use  of  powder  was  more  than  balanced  by  its  poor 
cjuality  and  its  waste  tlirou;^h  l),ul  niana;^feinent  and  iiiackvpiate  store- 
houses for  its  protection.  l''iri:  wood  w.is  scirce,  and  the  troi)[)s  whose 
time  was  soon  to  expire  were  unwilling  to  work  in  adv.mce  for  the 
comfort  of  those  who  were  to  succeed  them.  A  large  number  of  the 
Connecticut  trt)ops  had  been  enlisteil  for  six  months,  and  their  time 
would  ex|)ire  November  thirteenth. 

Washington  was  determined  to  mak .  a  deci.-ive  movement  whiU- 
the  army  was  at  its  best  estate.  'I'he  l?ritish  had  adv. meed  their 
works  bej'i^nd  Charlestown  Neck,  upon  the  m.iin  land.  As  a  counter- 
movement,  with  the  hope  that  it  would  lie  resisted,  \\',i-.hington  put 
his  ami)-  in  readiness  to  lesist  an  att.ick,  antl  commenced  the  thorough 
fortification  of  I'loughed  Mill  and  Cobble  liiU,  and  aho  increased  the 
strength  of  works  at  Lechmere  I'oint,  hoping  to  elicit  an  attack  from 
the  enemy. 

The  British  troops.  howe\er,  made  no  counter  demonstration,  and 
after  twenty-four  hours  of  preparation,  these  redoubt>  were  capable 
of  defense  against  the  whole  l)riti>h  arm)',  lie  also  entertained  a 
purpose  to  assault  Ht)ston  itself  and  to  burn  the  city  if  it  seemed  to 
be  a  military  necessity.  Lee  opposed  the  movement  as  impossible, 
and  the  council  of  war  concurred  in  the  postponement  of  such  an 
enterprise. 

Meanwhile  the  citizens  of  sea-coast  towns  began  to  be  anxious  for 
their  ow  n  .safety.  A  British  armed  transport  cannonaded  Stonington. 
and  other  vessels  threatened  New  London  and  Norwich.  All  these 
towns  begged  Washington  to  send  them  troops.  Governor  Trumbull, 
of  Connecticut,  whose  extraordinary  comprehension  of  the  military 
as  well  as  the  civil  issues  of  the  day,  made  him  a  firm  supporter  of 
Washington's  policy,  ever  reliable  and  ever  just,  incjuired  his  opinion 
upon  this  very  matter. 

Washington  wrote :  "  The  most  important  operations  of  the  cam- 
paign cannot  be  made  to  depend  upon  the  piratical  expeditions  of  two 
or  three  men-of-war  privateers." 

Gage  had  been  ordered  home,  and  left  October  tenth.     General 


I775.1 


CAMPATGN   OF    1775. 


143 


IIouc  .issiimcd  commiiul   over  all  the  Atlantic  Colonies  from  Nova 
Scotia  to  West  l'"Ii)ii(l.i  iiulusivc. 

Ot'fiiisivc  procl.iinatiiiiis,  hid  in  policy,  fruitless  for  Ljood,  and 
involving  the  imnu.'diate  crushing  out  of  all  sympathy  from  those  who 
were  still  loj'al  to  the  crown,  marked  his  advent  to  command.  Me 
threatencil  with  military  execution  any  who  should  leave  the  cit)- 
without  his  written  consent,  enjoined  all  the  citizens  to  arm,  and 
phict'd  WasliiiiL^ton  undir  the  necessity  of  takin;,;  active  measures 
ajjainst  all  "  who  wen;  suffiTid  to  stalk  at  lar;4e,  doini;-  all  the  mis- 
chiet  in  thi'ir  powur."  Up  to  this  time  the  officers  of  the  crown  and 
neutral  citizens  had  not  been  interfered  with  by  the  American  author- 
ities. Actin;4  under  his  orders,  Admiral  (iraves  determined  to  Ljive 
Ljreater  efficiency  to  his  small  fieet,  and  Lieutenant  Mowatt,  under 
I^H'neral  instructions  to  burn  all  towns  that  fitted  out  or  sheltered 
jirivatcers,  be^^an  his  work  by  the  destruction  of  l'"aImouth,  now  Port- 
land,  Maine. 

An  Ainerican  privateer,  soon  after  sent  by  Washin;^ton  to  the  St. 
Lawrence  river,  to  cut  off  two  lirii^antines  which  had  left  Eni;i;ind 
witii  su])plies  for  Quebec,  plundered  St.  John  Island.  Washiui^ton 
sent  back  the  citizen-[)risoners,  and  restoied  all  tlieir  private  effects, 
lenouncinL;-  the  movement  as  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  all  civ- 
ilized warfare. 

Crowded  by  these  multiplying^  demands  upon  his  resources,  and 
equally  conscious  that  there  would  soon  be  neither  army  nor  supplies, 
equal  to  the  emcrc:jency,  he  made  an  independent  appeal  to  Con- 
tjress,  coveriuL^  the  whole  ground  of  his  complaints  and  his  recpnsi- 
tions. 

He  wanted  money, — a  thoroughly  organized  commissariat, — a 
Itcrmaiient  artillery  establishment, — more  adequate  control  over  all 
troops, — a  longer  term  of  enlistment,— an  enlargement  of  the  rules 
and  articles  of  war,  and  power  to  enforce  his  will.  lie  also  a•^ked  for 
a  separate  organization  of  the  Navy,  antl  that  it  be  placed  upon  a 
sound  footing,  as  to  men  and  vessels. 

Coiii^/'fss  acted  upon  these  recommendations.  On  the  fourth  of 
October,  a  committee,  consisting  c<i  Benjamin  l'"raid<lin,  Thomas 
Lynch,  of  South  Carolina,  and  Benjamin  Harrison,  of  X'irginia,  started 
for  Washington's  camp,  with  three  hundred  thousand  dollars  in  Con- 
tinental money,  and  after  a  patient  consideration  of  his  views,  advised 
the  adoption  of  his  recommendations  by  Congress.  A  council  of  the 
.New  England  Governors  was  called  to  meet  this  committee. 


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144 


CAMPAIGN    OF    1 775. 


[1775 


At  this  inteiview,  ;i  new  orgnnization  of  the  army  was  determined 
upon,  fixing  the  force  to  be  employed  before  Boston  at  twenty-tixrec 
thousand,  three  luindred  and  seventy-two,  officers  and  men. 

Washington  submitted  to  tin's  committee  his  plan  for  attacking 
Boston.  It  was  approved,  and  Congress  soon  after  authorized  him  to 
burn  the  city  if  necessary  to  the  prosecution  of  military  operations 
against  the  IJritish  army. 

October  thirteenth  ;  Congress  authorized  the  building  and  equip- 
ment of  one  cruiser  of  ten  and  one  of  fourteen  guns. 

October  thirtieth  ;  one  vessel  of  twenty  and  one  of  twenty-six 
guns  was  authorized.  A  naval  committee  was  appointed,  composed 
of  such  men  as  Silas  Deane,  John  Langdon,  Christopher  Gadsden, 
Stephen  Hopkins,  Joseph  Hcwes,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  and  John 
Adams. 

November  twenty-eighth  ;  a  code  of  regulations  was  adopted  for 
the  navy,  and  on  the  thirteenth  of  December  the  construction  of 
thirteen  vessels  of  war  was  authorized.  As  some  of  these  vessels  are 
necessarily  noticed  in  the  course  of  the  narrative,  their  names,  them- 
selves memorial  of  the  crisis,  are  given. 

"Ordered  to  be  built  at  Philadelphia,  the  Washington,  32  guns; 
Randolph,  32;  Effingham,  2S,  and  Delaware,  24;  at  Portsmouth,  the 
Raleigh,  32;  at  Boston,  the  Hancock,  32,  and  the  Boston,  28;  at 
Providence,  the  W.^rren,  32,  and  the  Providence,  28;  at  Annapolis, 
the  Virginia,  28  ;  at  New  London,  the  Trumbull,  28  ;  at  Poughkecpsie, 
tin;  Congress,  28,  and  the  Montgomery,  24  guns. 

Among  the  officers  commissioned  December  twenty-second, 
Nicholas  Biddle  appears  in  the  list  of  captains,  and  John  Paul  Jones 
among  the  lieutenants. 

As  the  year  approached  its  close,  the  British  leveled  their  advanced 
works  on  Charlesto wn  Neck,  and  concentrated  their  right  wing  in  a 
strong  redoubt  upon  Bunker  Hill,  while  their  left  wing  at  Boston 
Neck  was  more  thoroughly  fortified  against  attack. 

Congress  now  intimated  to  Washington  that  it  might  be  well  to 
"  attack  on  the  first  favorable  occasion  and  before  the  arrival  of  rein- 
forcements." 

Washington  replied  that  he  "must  keep  his  powder  for  closer 
work  than  cannon  distance." 

November  nineteenth,  Henry  Knox  was  commissioned  as  Colonel 
vice  Gridley,— too  old  for  active  service  ;  two  lieutenant-colonels  and 
two  majors,  as  well  as  twelve  companies  of  artillery,  were  authorized, 


1775-1 


CAMPAIGN   OF    1 775. 


■45 


and  thus  the  American  artillery,  as  well  as  the  navy,  was  put  upon  a 
substantial  basis,  with  Knox  as  its  chief. 

The  year  closed,  with  the  prospect  that  the  army  would  be  imme- 
diately replaced  by  raw  troops  ;  and  in  spite  of  the  advances  made 
toward  a  substantial  paper  organization,  the  period  was  one  of  the 
most  perilous  of  the  war. 

NoTK.  The  fate  of  the  American  navy  is  worthy  of  record. 

♦Washington;  32,  destroyed  liy  the  British  in  tliu  Dehwvare 1778 

Ivandiilpli,  32,  blown  np  in  action  with  tlie  \'armoiitli,  64 1778 

*ICflhigliani,  28,  destroyed  l)y  the  liritisli  in  the  Delaware 1778 

l>cLiware,  24,  captured  by  the  IJritish  in  the  Delaware 1777 

Raleigh,  32,  ca])tured  by  the  Experiment  50,  and  Unicorn,  22 1778 

Hancock,  32,  taken  by  Rainbow,  44,  and  Victor,  lO 1777 

Boston,  28,  captured  at  Charleston 17S0 

Warren,  32,  burned  in  the  I'enobscot  by  the  Americans 1770 

Providence,  28,  captured  at  Charleston 1780 

*Vir£;inia,  28,  taken  by  British  fleet  near  Cape  Henry 177S 

Trumbull,  28,  taken  by  Isis,  32,  and  General  Monk,  18 17S1 

*  Congress,  28,  burned  in  the  Hudson  to  avoid  capture I777 

*Montgomery,  24,  "      "      "         "  "       "         "  1777 

Andrea  Doria,  14,  burned  in  the  Delaware  to  avoid  capture I777 

The  Alliance,  32,  (afterwards  built  and  identilied  with  La  Fayette,  was  sold  after  the 
war,  and  converted  into  an  Indiaman. 

The  Confederacy,  32,  was  taken,  off  Virginia,  by  a  ship  of  the  line 1781 

Queen  of  France,  18,  captured  at  Charleston 1780 

*  Never  went  to  sea.    (Reference  is  made  to  Cooper's  naval  history,  for  the  fate  of  the  other  vessels, 
not  incidentallv  mentioned  in  connection  witli  the  British  occupation  of  tlie  Atlantic  ports  > 

10 


.;r'"'.-— *. 


1^1 


:ff  ?f 


He 


»  t'Mf  3i< '  < 


t*«t»i 


1|K 


ClIAPTI'K     XXIII. 


M 


i    I 


Bl  ■     i 


If 


CAM I'AiGN  ()".•■  1776.    iiosroN  i;vA( :i;a  I  i.i).    concukkkni"  events. 


T 


III'"-  yt'.ir  17/0  ciil;ir!.;iil  the  tlicilrr  of  i)|)(iatiniis.  '1  iu:  (Iciiioii- 
■  tiMt  ioii  Ixforc  Host')','  ;ill, lined  jl-,  (.hjci  t  ivc  ;  ar.il  ill':  city  was 
cvaciiatiil  !))■  the  l?iifisli  lrr)<)[)s.  At  allntluT  points  ol  aetivi'  snvici; 
llu;  Americans  were  driven  lo  tlie  defensive;  and  it  was  not  until  the 
nioiitli  111  I )(  ( (inher,  of  lli.il  )'ear,  th.al  tlier'//(7/.s/,-v /v////;/,  at  Trenton, 
inip.iiti-d  a  new  eliaratter  to  tiie  struL;;4le'  and  interrupted  tlie  j^eiier.d 


success 


of  the  royal  I 


lorees. 


<  )n   the  thirtiel  h    il.iy  of   l)ecenil)er,   Ailmiral   Shuldhani    hrouj.dit 
rcinior(  enieiits  lo(iiiieral  llo'.veand  at  the  same  lime  took  conmi.md 


.fall 


na\al  lorct.s,  r/)':  (iravcs,  relieve 


'Jhe  t 


roo|)s  m   ;^arrison  were  ki'|)t  imdtr  tiie  most  ri;.;id   disciplme 


Cjeneral  llowe  exacted  tlu'  most  formal  ohservanee  of  all  military 
ccrcniou)',  and  issued  orders,  sharpl>-  rcprimandin;.;  some  soldiers,  who 
liad  i)een  careless  in  nniuitc  details  (jI  personal  niMtne.s  and  outfit. 
An  order  of  January-  thirteenth  particulai  ly  calls  those  to  account, 
'•  wliose  hair  was  not  smooth,  hut  h.idly  powdered;  who  had  ntj  frills 
to  theirshirts,  whose  linen  uas  dirt),  whose  le;.;;.;ins  hun^  in  a  slovenly 
manner    about    thiir    kne-es,    and    other    unscjldicr-like    ne<;lccts," — 


which  must  be  inmiidia 


lely 


rcmeitled 


A I 


inusements   were   also    i.rovided    lor   the   entertainment    of   the 


troojis,  a  theatre  was  opened,  ami  a  sense-  of  perfect  security  |)ervadetl 


all  rank's. 


w 


i  he  condition  and  style  of  doini;   thinj^rs,  in   the  adversary  army, 
as  (juitc  in  contrast  with  all  this  nursiiiL;  process,  s(j  j^ood  in  itself — 


so  inefficient  for  real  work  .it  the  time. 


I" 


)V  many  weeks  it  liad  been  a  m.itter  of  the-  ;^rr(Mtest  concern  witii 


Washinj^ton,  how  to  ki-ep  u[)  appear.mces  of  military  preparation, 
while  all  thinj^rs  were  in  extreme  confusion.  He  had  to  ilenionstr.ite, 
as  if  urgent   to  att.ick  the  city  at  the  first   moment,   whili;  the  extra- 


nif'-i 


CAMI'AKiN    or     1770. 


'17 


ordin.iry  opcr.itiiMi  was  ;^^oin<^f  on,  of  ilishaiuliiv^  oiu.'  army  and  i  rciliiiLj 
aiiotluT  in  its  jjlacc,  dircclly  in  front  of  an  enemy. 

l'aiouL;li  lias  hciMi  said  to  indicate  tiic  ilifliculties  ol  lii.il;  opciMtioii. 

\V',.sliJn!.;toii,  a^  well  as  ilowe,  iiail  ideas  resiHLtin;.f  militars'  ilis 
(i|)linc,  and  he,  also,  issued  orders  ii|)on  tin;  habits,  personal  he.iriu", 
and  want  of  neatness  amon;.^  t  hi'  men,  elo-^in^.j  on  one  ot'ca-iion  tliui 
<:mphaticaliy,  "  ('ards  and  |_;aines  ol  tlianee'  are  iJiohihiled.  At  this 
tinu:  of  public  distres-,,  men  may  lind  enou;.;li  to  do,  in  the  service  of 
their  (jod  and  i.:oimtr\',  without  ahandonin;,;  them. elves  to  viieand 
inmioralit)."  "it  may  not  \}c  amiss  for  the  troop,  to  know,  that 
ii  an}'  man  in  aition  s!i;dl  presume'  to  sl.ulk,  hide  hiueiell,  oi-  retrtat 
fri>m  the  en''iny  \';ithout  the  orders  of  ids  commanding',  offuer.  In-  \\  ill 
l)e  instantly  shot  dnw  n  as  an  example  ol  cowaidice  ;  (cwnn/s  lumiiy; 
lou  J rcijittiilly  (Ir.uoih  ii'lid  llic  iu  si  /eriiird  troops  by  then  tlnsliinllY 
lic/nivior," 

Ali'anwiiile,  (unerai  (ireeneke|)t  ins  little  army  well  in  iiand.  On 
the  lourtli  of  Jamiary,  lie  wrote,  from  i'ros|)ect  llill,  "  I  he  ni;dit 
•  dler  tile  old  lido|)s  went  off  I  could  not  liave  miHleied  seven  hun 
(lied  men,  m  itw  it  hslandiiu'  tin:  ic-tmiis  of  tlie  new  iiilisled  troojjs 
■iiiKMinted  to  nineteen  hundred  and  n|)ward.  I  am  stroii^;  encjuv.ii  to 
defend  myself  a;.;ainst  .dl  tiu;  force  in  iJostoii.  ( )m- sit  nation  has  been 
iiiticak  I  lad  llu:  enemy  inien  li.!l)' accpiainted  with  our  situation,  I 
(annol  pretend  to  say  what  ini;.dit  have   i)een  the  conse(|uences." 

W'asliiu'^ton  wrote  to  (!oii[.iress  Januaiy  Hrst,  leaviie.j  the  kist  word 
hldiik,   lest    the    letter  should    miscarry.      "It    is   not     ])erhai)s    in    the 
powiM"  of  liistory  '.o  furnish  a  case  like  ours;   to  maintain  a  post  within 
musket  sliot   of  tile  eiieni}',  within   that   distance    oi    twenty  old    lirit 
isii  re!:;iments,  without ." 

'iiic  winter  was  mcinorahlc  for  its  mildness. 

"(jiv(,;  me  powder  or  ii'i\'  was  Wasiiini^ton's  I'jatailation,  ulieii 
wriliirj;  to  a  friend.  It  was  his  iiiteiuion  as  soon  as  the  river  iro/.e 
over  to  march  directly  to  l)0-,ton,  across  the  ice.  ilie  [jrcseiice  of 
siii[)s  of  war  prevented  ,my  attempt  b)'  the  use  of  small  l)oats  wliile 
tile  river  remained  open.  1  here  had  l)een  "  one  sinL;l(.'  freeze,  and 
some  [Ji'etty  stron;^r  ice,"  and  iie  suddenly  [)roposed  to  tlie  ccamcil  tliat 
tlje  o;  ^  rtimity  Ix;  seized  at  once  to  cross  over  and  take  c)r  biiiii 
l5oston.  On  the  twenty-si.vtii  of  I'eljruary,  lie  wrote  to  Jcjseph  Keed, 
.sayin^f, — "  I'teiiold,  lliou;^ii  we  have  lu.en  waitin;_;  all  tlie  )'car  loi  tiiis 
favorable  ever.t,  tiie  enter])rise  was  thouLdil  too  liazardous.  1  did  not 
tliink  so,  and  1  am  sure  yet  that  the  enterjirise,  if  it  had  been  under- 


\\ 


i"v  '■" 

1 

■  1' 

r 

iv 


JF  iil*. 


il 


1 


I  ' 


■^  t 


'  1> 


III 


m 


1 

1 

1'  ^1 

i! 

t 

148 


CAMPAIGN   OF    1 776. 


fiTTft. 


taken  with  resDliition,  must  have  siKCccdcd  ;  t^'ithoitt  it  any  •a'ouUl  fail, 
and  I  am  preparing  to  take  post  on  1  )()rcli(,'sti:r  Hci^i^lits,  to  try  if  the 
enemy  will  he  so  kind  as  to  iDme  out  to  us." 

"  What  I  liavc  said  nsi)t(.lin;4  the  detcTininatinn  in  council,  and 
the  possessintr  of  J)orcliesler  Heights,  is  spoken  iindrr  the  rose."" 

A  t^^rcat  iin|)rovement  had  been  made  in  the  ordn.mcc  department, 
throui;!)  the  _L;reat  business  ca|)acity  of  Colonel  Knox.  He  made  .i 
journey  to  h'ort  Geori^e  durin;^  the  preceding:;  December,  and  by  the 
latter  part  of  I'\bruary,  iiad  hauled,  up(jn  sleds  over  the  snow,  more 
than  fifty  pieces  of  artiIK:r\'  from  that  fort  to  Cambridj^e.  This  had 
enabled  In'm  to  niaki;  the  armament  at  Lechmcre  I'o'Ut  very  formida- 
ble, and  by  the  .uldition  of  several  half-moon  batteries  between  that 
point  and  Roxbury,  it  was  possible  to  concentrate  nearly  every  mortar 
which  the  ,irmv  had  upon  the  city  itself. 

Durint^  the  fu->t  week  in  January,  Washin<^ton  w.is  advised  tliat 
Genera!  Clinton,  relNMn;^  upon  the  new  troops  which  arrived  with 
Admiral  .Shuldhani,  was  t(j  be  iletailed  witli  an  indejientlent  command 
for  some  remote  expedition,  or  at  least  beyond  tiie  waters  of  New 
Enc;land. 

Helievinc;  that  New  York  must  be  the  immediate  objective  <.A  such 
a  movement,  he  ortlered  General  Lee,  then  upon  detached  service  in 
Connecticut.  "  to  take  such  volunteers  as  he  could  (piickly  assemble 
on  his  march,  and  put  the  city  of  New  York  in  the  best  posture  of 
defense,  which  the  season  and  circumstances  would  .admit  of."  Lee 
had  already  written  to  the  commander-in-chief,  uryint;  "  the  imme- 
diate occupation  of  that  city,  the  suppression  or  expulsion  of  certain 
tories  from  Lon^  Island,"  and  tliat  "  not  to  crush  the  serpents  before 
their  rattles  are  s^rown  would  be  ruinous." 

Tiie  control  over  disailected  citizens  on  Long  Island  had  .already 
been  desired  Ijy  the  New  York  convention,  and  Lord  Sterlin;^,  then  at 
Llizabcthtown  with  his  regiment,  was  ready  to  cooperate  with  any 
otlicr  f  >.:es  that  mi;:;iit  be  available  for  the  [)ur|)0se,  as  "none  could 
be  sp.ired  from  Cambridge." 

Lee  entered  New  York  with  two  regiments  from  Connecticut, 
amounting  to  nearly  fifteen  hundred  men,  on  the  same  day  that  Clin- 
ton cast  anchor  near  Sandy  Hook.  Notwithstanding  the  assurances 
of  th.it  officer  that  he  called  to  consult  with  Governor  Tryon,  and 
that  he  was  imperatively  ordered  to  the  south,  fortifications  were 
immediately  begun  at  New  York  and  Brooklyn  Heights.  This  was 
tiiTiely,  and  a  matter  of  military  obligation. 


1776.1 


CAMI'AION'   OF    1776. 


149 


It  must  bi:  noted  ill  tliis  connection,  tiiat  (iciu.T.ii  Lcc  li.ul  secured 
tnjops  from  Connecticut,  ,ind  placed  tiiein  upon  a  continental  basis  of 
scrvict;,  when  lie  was  instructed  oid)'  to  a-isenible  volunteers  for  a 
special  (hit)-,  and  thereby  deliberately  exceeded  his  authority.  One 
of  tlicsc  re<,nments  had  bien  disbanded  by  order  of  Coni^ress  ;  and 
its  reassembling^  as  a  rei^inient  of  the  ontiiiental  army,  althoir^h 
couiiteMiaiiced  by  the  authorities  of  the  colon)-,  was  a  bn-ach  of  military 
subordiiialion  on  the  i).ut  of  Lee.  Neither  did  he  lu:^itate  as  to  the 
style  of  laiV-juaije'  in  which  he  spoke  (jf  Conj^ress  itself,  lie  was 
'  eiiuall)'  unjust  to  the  Icidin;^  men  of  the  New  York  conve'iition.  The 
exact  condition  of  M.uih.itt.in  Island  must  be  stated  in  this  connec- 
tion, as  some  writers  i)ersistently  claim  that  New  York  failed  in  duty 
at  this  juncture.  The  Hritish  fleet  controlled  the  adjoinin;4  w. iters.  It 
could  destroy  the  city;  but  the  city  had  neither  llu:  numbers  nor  the 
guns  to  make  any  substantial  resistance.  There  was  a  t^'eiier.il  under- 
standin;^  that  each  party  should  attend  to  its  own  business  ;  that  the 
officers  of  the  crown  would  keep  within  the  technic.d  line  of  their 
duty,  and  that  the  citizens  would  not  interfere.  CJ)nL;ress  had  no 
troops  to  spare,  ami  there  w.is  a  L;ener.d  suspension  of  public  arming;, 
except  to  keep  u[)  the  armies  already  in  the  field.  This  was  of  itself 
a  great  uiidertakin^:;.  The  precipitati(jn  upon  C(Mi!.jress,  or  upon  special 
localities,  of  exacting  issues,  was  therefore  unwise.  The  ili>alfecietl 
citizens  of  New  Y<jrk  were  not  forgotten  ;  neither  were  the  [)atriotic 
leaders  who  responded  i)roniptIy  in  1775. 

The  movement  of  Clinton  was  a  fortunate  opportunity  for  bringing 
this  condition  of  armed  neutrality  t(j  an  end,  and  it  was  accomplished 
peaceably  and  at  the  right  time. 

It  is  to  be  admitted,  however,  that  Lee  asserted  a  very  high  i)rerog- 
ative  in  this  his  first  independent  command,  and  that  it  cilli'd  forth 
criticism  from  Washington  as  well  as  Congress.  ,\  committee  of  that 
body  met  him  at  New  York  and  accommodated  the  oc^  ipation  to  the 
judgment  of  all  well  disposed  citizens.  His  denunciation  of  the 
"accursed  Provincial  Congress  of  New  York  "  was  characteristic  of 
Lee's  temperament,  his  erratic  career,  and  his  subordination  of  all 
things  to  the  wishes  of  Charles  Lee,  but  it  was  neither  politic  nor 
becoming  a  great  commander. 

On  New  Years  day,  Norfolk,  Virginia,  was  bombarded  and  burned 
under  the  direction  of  Lord  Dunmore.  This  was  one  of  a  series  of 
acts  perpetrated  by  the  colonial  governors,  which  induced  a  second 
series  of  southern   demonstrations  in   behalf  of  independence,  very 


V '  '<■. 


n 


' .,' 


:•    :  ■ 


•  i 


■i 


lis  I 


150 


CAMI'AIGN   OF    1 776 


[!77b 


similar  to  tlin^^u  wliich  attcndfjc!  their  attempt  to  disarm  tlic  pcoplo 
diirinc:^  tlie  spring  montlis  of  1775. 

Sparks  emboli ics  the  matter  thus  clearly.  "  These  expeditions 
were  undertaken  at  the  sii;j;st;''tion  of  the  colonial  jj^overnorsand  zealous 
partisans,  whose  hopes  and  wishes  betrayed  them  into  a  deplorable 
iijnorance  of  the  state  of  the  country  and  character  of  the  people." 
Lord  Dartmouth  himself  jilanned  this  expedition,  and  sent  instructions 
to  Lord  [[owe  under  date  of  Oct(jber  twenty-second,  1775.  directins^ 
liim,  "  to  ;j;ain  possession  of  some  res[)ectable  post  to  the  soutluwird, 
from  which  to  mal<e  sudden  and  unexpected  attacks  upon  sea-coast 
towns  durin;^  open  winter."  Clinton  had  orders  "  to  destroy  any 
towns  "  that  refused  submiss'.'ii.  Lord  [3unm.ore  protested  against 
sending  seven  regiments  from  h-elan(.i  to  North  Carolina  upon  tlie 
solicitation  of  (luvernor  .M.irtin  of  that  colony,  while  he  was  living  in 
the  very  hot  bed  of  rebellion  itself,  and  almost  defenseless. 

Lord  [[owe  himself  advised  that  New  York  should  be  tlie  first 
objective  of  attaclv,  and  the  permanent  base  of  future  army  movements. 

.After  these  essential  diversions  to  contemporaneous  matters,  whicli 
had  their  ([uickening  clement  to  inspire  Washington  to  offensive 
measures,  the  narrative  takes  up  the  closing  scenes  of  the  siege  of 
l^oston. 

The  month  of  ["ebruar)'  was  drawing  near  its  close.  Washington 
determineil  to  delay  no  longer  to  test  Ids  strength  against  tiie  gar- 
rison of  [Boston.  [  [e  collected  forty-five  bateaux,  eacli  capable  of 
transporting  eiglity  men,  and  built  two  floating  batteries  of  great 
strength  ami  light  draught  of  water.  Fascines,  gabions,  carts,  bales 
of  ha)-,  intrenching  tools,  two  thousand  bandages  for  wounds,  and  all 
other  contingent  supplies  that  might  be  needed  were  gathered,  and 
placed  under  the  guard  of  [)icked  men. 

GeneralThomas  Mifflin,  quartermaster-general,  who  [lad  originally 
accompanied  him  from  Philadelphia  as  an  aid-dc-cavip,  was  thoroughly 
aroused  to  the  importance  of  the  impending  movement,  lie  shared 
the  confidence  of  Washington. 

The  movement  was  carried  througli  witii  that  inflexibility  of  pur- 
pose which  marked  W.isliington's  c.ireer  during  crises  of  imminent 
peril.  It  seemed  as  if  the  very  fact  of  his  submission  of  a  military 
movement  to  a  council,  awakened  questions  as  to  its  feasibility. 
Joinini,  in  connection  with  his  statement,  that  Napoleon  never  seemed 
to  provide  for  a  retreat,  adds,  that  "  when  Napoleon  was  present  no 
one  thought  of  such  a  provision." 


i7;b.J 


CAMr.MGN   OF    1776. 


ISI 


The  great  acts  of  Washington's  career  were  performed  when  he 
was  clotlied  with  ample  authority  by  Congress,  or  tlic  emergency 
forced  him  to  make  his  own  will  supreme.  This  was  the  reason  which 
led  Congress  at  last  to  emancipate  him  from  the  constraint  of  councils. 
If  he  doubted,  others  dmibted  ;  if  he  was  persistent,  he  inspired  the 
courage  and  nerve  wliich  secured  results.  He  was  in  such  a  mood 
on  the  first  day  of  March,  1776.  He  had  a  plan,  a  secret,  and  he- 
kept  it  secret  until  the  hour  for  e.xecution. 

Just  after  sunset  of  that  New  England  spring  evening,  from  Lech- 
mcre  Point,  [)ast  Cobble  Hill,  and  through  the  long  range  of  encir- 
cling batteries,  clear  to  Roxbury  lines  on  the  right,  every  mortar  and 
cannon  which  could  take  the  range  opened  their  fire  upon  the  quiet 
city.  It  was  a  test  of  the  location,  range,  and  power  of  the  ailversary's 
lire.  That  fire  was  returned  uith  spirit,  and  when  morning  dawned 
the  American  camp  resumed  its  quiet,  the  men  were  kept  within  their 
lines,  and  only  behind  the  head-tjuarters  at  Cambridge  was  there 
ceaseless  activity,  where  Putnam,  Thomas,  Knox,  and  Mifflin  were 
"  putting  the  iiouse  in  order  for  nn)ving  day." 

On  the  night  of  the  third  of  March,  the  bombardment  was 
renewed,  with  equal  vigor,  and  as  promptly  answered  ;  and  again  the 
camp  was  still  and  patient.  One  shot  had  reached  Prospect  Hill 
hut  no  appreciable  damage  accrued  to  the  American  works.  Some 
houses  had  been  penetrated  in  Boston,  and  si.\'  soldiers  were  wounded 
in  one  guard-barrack.  Places  of  safety  began  to  be  hunted  out;  and 
artificial  obstructions  were  arranged  for  a  cover  from  the  random  shot 
and  shell ;  but  no  special  parade  was  ordered,  no  detail  was  moved 
forth,  to  silence  the  offensive  batteries,  no  scheme  was  put  on  foot,  to 
break  up  the  investment.  No  excited  commander  tendered  his  ser- 
vices, to  lead  a  forlorn  hope  against  Cambridge,  to  seize  and  try  for 
treason  the  arch-commander  of  the  defiant  Colonists.  Bunker  Hill 
was  in  sight  !  Red  uniforms  were  conspicuous  in  the  sun-light  ;  but 
these  had  no  promptings  to  an  assault  upon  earth-works,  which 
screened  twenty  thousand  men  and  were  the  work  of  months. 

The  fourth  of  March  closed,  and  the  night  was  bright,  mild  and 
hazy.  The  moon  was  at  its  full.  It  was  a  good  night  for  rest. 
Surely  the  Americans  cannot  afford  such  waste  of  powder  !  They 
impoverish  themselves  :  but  Boston  is  safe  ! 

But  on  the  night  of  the  fourth  of  March,  and  through  all  its  hours, 
from  "  candle-lighting  time,"  to  the  clear  light  of  another  day,  the  same 
incessant  thunder  rolled  along,  over  camps  and  city ;  the  same  quick 


!    1 


111   I. 


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f'■*^, 


fliHf» 


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l'3:^ 


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.i 

1 

|i 

15: 


CAMI'AKIN    OF    1776. 


[1776. 


flashes  sliowcd  tliat  fin-  was  all  aloiv^  tlu-  line,  and  still,  both  camps 
and  city  dra},'i;e(l  throui^h  the  ni;_;lit,  \vaitin<;  for  the  day-light  tu  test 
the  work  of  the  iii<;ht,  as  ilay-li;^dit  had  done  before. 

7 wo  slroiiji^-  rt doubts  capl^id  Ihrclicstir  Hd^i^lti's  ! 

"  If  the  Americans  rct.iin  possession  of  the  heights,"  said  Admiral 
Shuldham,  "  I  cannot  keep  a  ship  in  the  harbor."  Mowe  wrote  to 
Lord  l)artmouth,  "It  must  have  bein  the  employment  of  at  least 
twelve  thousand  men."  "  They  were  raised,"  wrote  an  officer,  "  with 
an  expedition  ccjual  t(j  that  u{  the  (jenii,  belonging  to  Aladdin's 
kimp." 

"  The  rel^els  have  done  more  in  one  night  tiian  my  whole  army 
would  iiave  done  in  a  month,"  said   Lord  Ilowe. 

"  Lerliaps,"  said  Heath,  "  tiiere  never  was  as  much  work  done  in 
so  short  a  space." 

The  works  were  I'iry siiitp/r  of  construction.  The  earth  was  frozen 
to  the  depth  of  eighteen  inches.  lUit  liurdlcs,  fascines,  and  bundles 
of  branches,  and  abatis,  cut  from  apple  orchards,  had  been  supplied 
in  great  cjuantities,  and  large  bales  of  compressed  hay,  which  were 
proof  against  any  ordinary  cannon  ball,  had  also  been  furnished,  so 
that  t!ie  heaping  up  and  arr.mging  of  these,  undei  the  direction  of 
Rufus  Putnam,  according  to  apian  thoroughly  digested,  was  but  easy 
work  for  a  class  of  soldiers  peculiarly  handy  with  the  material  em- 
ployed. On  the  tops,  there  were  barrels,  filled  with  stones,  having 
for  their  ultimate  purpose — to  be  rolled  down  hill,  and  thus  discon- 
cert the  advance  of  any  regulars  from  Uoston.  The  manner  of  d(jing 
this  work  was  also  very  simple. 

Eight  hundred  sokliers  marched  very  (juietly  out  of  Roxbury, 
after  dark,  on  the  previous  evening,  and  placed  themselves,  a  part 
between  Jioston  and  Dorchester  Heights,  and  a  part  at  the  east  end 
of  the  peninsula,  opposite  Castle  Island.  Men  with  tools,  and  a  work- 
ing party  of  twelve  hundred  soldiers  under  General  Thomas,  followed 
the  advance.  Then  three  hundred  carts,  loaded  with  the  proper 
material,  followed. 

To  thwart  curiosity,  and  prevent  impertinent  interference  with 
the  work  which  Washington  had  ordered  to  be  done,  some  of  these 
large  bundles  of  hay  had  been  placed  in  a  long  row  along  the  most 
exposed  part  of  the  way,  so  that  carts  passed  to  and  fro  all  night  be- 
hind this  cover,  and  the  moon  itself  was  unable  to  betray  the  secret, 
even  if  some  sentry  at  Boston  Neck  had  accidentally  allowed  his 
eyes  to  turn  away  from  the  rival  exhibition  of  shot  and  shell  practice. 


1776.] 


CAMI'AKJN   f)F    177^). 


>53 


ThiTe  was  a  north  wiiul  that  iii^ht  which  took  all  the  sound  of  the 
rolling  carts  into  the  country  heh)w  Uoston.  This  was  also  very 
matter  of  fact,  but  of  real  service. 

Durin;^  liiis  time,  Cienerals  (irc(;ne  ,nul  Sullivan  were  standing  in 
front  of  four  tliousand  men  iicir  h'ort  Number  Two,  as  indicated  on  the 
map,  witii  bateaux  and  floating  batteries  manned  for  crossing  to  Hos 
ton,  if  the  garrison  ^lioidd  move  out  and  interfere  with  the  order  of 
the  day.  The  incessant  firing  all  night  seems  to  have  been  but  play- 
ing a  trick  upon  the  garrison.      It  was  of  course  ix  feint. 

Tile  silent  movement  of  the  two  tliousand  men,  and  of  the  three 
hundred  carts  was  not  as  at  Huiik(;r  ilill,  a  forl(>rn  hope  affair.  It  was 
not  hurried  nor  expensive  of  strength  ami  patience.  i\cliefs  came 
and  went,  and  the  system,  order,  and  success  that  marked  each  hour, 
could  not  have  been  better  realized  by  daylight.  An  eminent  his- 
torian explains  this  movement  in  a  few  words,  and  tells  it  all. 

"  One  unexpected  combination  concerted  with  faultless  ability,  and 
suddenly  executed,  liad  in  a  few  hours  made  (ieneral  Howe's  position 
at  Boston  untenable."     This  was  "  Cjranil  Str.iteg)-." 

(ieneral  Howe  immediately  detailed  Lord  Percy  with  twenty-four 
hundred  men  to  dislodge  the  Americans  from  D(jrchester  Heights. 
The  command  moved  liy  boats  to  Castle  Island  first,  for  the  jiurpose 
of  making  a  night  attack.  During  the  afternoon  a  storin  came  up 
from  the  south,  increasing  to  a  g.de  ;  rain  [)oured  in  torrents  all  night ; 
some  of  the  boats  were  driven  on  shore  ami  the  project  was  abandoned. 

By  the  tt:iith  of  March  tlie  Americans  had  fortified  Nook's  Hill, 
and  this  drove  the  British  troops  from  Boston  Neck.  Might  liundred 
.shot  ard  shell  were  thrown  into  the  city  during  that  night. 

On  the  morning  of  the  seventeenth  of  March,  the  British  troops 
embarketl  in  one  hundred  and  twenty  crowded  transports  for  Halifax, 
the  total  force  including  seamen  of  the  fleet  being  not  quite  eleven 
thousand  men.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  historians  differ  as  to  the 
damage  done  to  private  property  by  the  retiring  garrison.  Distinc- 
tions of  property  are  always  lost  sight  of  in  war.  This  evil  attaches 
to  its  skirts  and  follows  its  track.  General  Howe  issued  an  order  for- 
bidding plunder,  and  he  is  entitled  to  this  credit.  Washington  did 
not  give  him  tinr;  to  watch  its  execution,  but  took  charge  of  the  city 
himself  as  soon  as  possible. 

Five  thousand  troops  under  Ward  entered  as  the  last  boats  left. 

General  Putnam  was  placed  in  command,  and  on  the  twentieth 
Washington  entered  at  the  head  of  the  whole  army. 


'       ^sj     t 


I  ' 


154 


t  AMPAIC.N    OF    1776. 


r'77f> 


Fur  ten  d.i)-s  the  liiiti>h  Ikct  was  weather  bound  in  Nantasket 
Roailr.,  then  bore  away  tor  II.iHfax.  Vahiable  stores  were  left  be- 
hind, incUidinj;  two  hinnlicd  dwA  rifty  cmnon,  liaif  of  them  serviceable, 
and  these  were  still  farther  increased  by  the  c.iptnre  of  store-vessels 
which  entered  the  harbor  without  knowletlge  of  the  evacuation  of  the 
city. 

The  siejje  of  l?oston  was  at  an  end.  Less  ih.in  thirty  lives  had 
been  lost  durinij  the  investment,  ami  New  ICn^land  was  freed  from 
the  presence  of  British  troops. 


t  a 


I  p 


NoTK.  A  niaini-iiripl  iiairalivt;  of  (lie  uxporii'iuc  oC  Mr.  lltlw.ud  Stou'  il'.uiii^  tlu' 
sic^jc  ol  llo>tuii,  lic^iiK'^  i)orlr,''t  sketches  uf  llic  l!riti»h  ronimaiulcis,  relates  lii^  alteiulitij; 
upDii  a  perforiuaiiee  ut"  the  [ihiy,  "  li.istoii  I>e>iej^e(l,"  at  I''aiu'uil  Ilall,  in  eo!ii|iaiiy  wiili  his 
mollier,  upoii  llie  iiivitatimi  of  Lieutenant  llaloy  of  the  l>rili-.li  Koiirtii  re^iineut.  Diirinj; 
the  play,  compo.seil  by  ( ieiieiiil  Ilurgoyiie,  and  mi  liie  iii^lit  of  March  31!,  "one  cannon  iiali 
from  the  American  liatleries  whiz/ed  directly  over  the  roof,"  "another  struck  Dr.  Cooper's 
.Moetinj;  House."  li  was  the  lirst  denionsti.ition  tli.it  ihe  city  was  in  real  danger.  Mr. 
Stow  was  then  but  a  boy,  but  states,  tliat  he  remembers  perfectly  well  that  "  Cieneral  linr- 
j;oyne  suddenly  came  upon  the  staije,  and  ordered  the  ofliccrs  to  their  posts,"  and  that  him- 
self and  mother  were  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  a  sentry,  who  met  them  near  the  Liberty 
tree,  for  a  safe  e-cort  home.  .Several  ol  the  officers  were  his  mother's  i.uiest-,  Colonel  C'leve 
land  amoi.j;  the  number.  O'l  one  occasion  he  accompanied  one  of  the  officers  to  the  Neck 
where  the  British  artillery  made  a  test  of  the  Roxbury  lines.  The  author  aekiiowleilges  the 
courtesy  of  Mr.  A.  S.  Barnes  for  the  perusal  of  the  manuscript,  which  abounds  with  inri- 
denlb  of  if.teiest. 


i. 


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112  ill.; 

CHAPTI'R    XXIV. 


A-' 


'"?/ 

t/''  I 


WASHINGrihN    Ar   Ni:\V   YORK.     Al'Rll.   H)  JULY,    1776. 

Till'-    Hritish  troops    cv.icuatcd    linslon  on    llic    scvcnti;ciith    of 
March,  1/76,  but  did  not  leave  Nanlaskct  Roads  until  tun  d.iys 
.ilteruanl. 

W'ashiiiL^ton  had  rcisun  to  believe  that  Gencnil  Ilowe  would  make 
New  York  liis  imniediate  objective.  I  lis  movement  to  Halifax  was 
such  a  yrave  military  error,  that  its  apoloL,')'  must  be  derived  from  the 
fact  that  his  ileet  Ir.iiisported  more  than  a  thousanil  loyalists,  and  a 
lari;c  quantity  of  their  person.il  effects. 

The  British  government,  however,  had  not  held  on  to  Boston  so 
long,  without  some  suspicioi.  that  it  was  attachin;^  a  false  value  to  that 
occup.ition.  It  was  treatinij  a  post  as  vitally  important,  which  had 
no  St.  ateg^c  value  whato'er  in  detcrniinin;^  the  result  of  the  war.  As 
soon  as  it  became  impossible  to  break  up  the  investment,  the  base 
should  have  been  chani;ed  to  (ine  which  had  real  offensive  value. 
Failure  in  an  inmiaterial  issue  only  gave  to  that  failure  a  gravity  far 
beyond  the  importance  of  the  issue  itself,  impaired  its  own  strenp;th, 
<ind  developed  an  adversary  army  of  permanent  resistance. 

During  the  fall  of  1775,  Lord  Dartmouth,  as  ajipears  from  the 
British  archives,  expressly  advised  that  Boston  should  be  evacuated, 
and  that  Newport  or  New  York,  or  both,  should  be  occupied  by 
strong  armies  well  supported  by  a  coivipetent  naval  force.  This  was 
not  a  random  suggestion,  but  it  appears  from  one  of  his  letters,  that 
he  considered  Newport  as  the  key  to  an  absolute  control  of  all  the 
New  England  colonies.  This  matter  has  been  adverted  to  under  the 
topic,  "  Base  of  operations,"  and  is  again  mentioned  in  connection 
with  the  events  which  immediately  followed  the  enforced  evacuation 
of  Boston. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  after  General  Howe  embarked  his  conti 
mand,  Washington  began  to  plan  for  the  future. 


Si:       !         '"!'- 


]-l>' 


156 


WASHINGTON  AT   .NEW    YORK. 


[1776 


,.ri/'h;.^' 


On  the  eighteenth  day  of  March,  and  before  the  main  army  had 
entered  Boston,  General  Heath  was  ordered  to  march  to  New  York 
wilh  five  regiments  of  infantry,  and  a  portioii  of  the  field  artillery. 

On  the  twenty-seventh,  when  the  British  fleet  actually  put  to  sea 
and  left  the  coast,  he  ordered  the  whole  army  to  the  south,  with  the 
exception  of  five  regiments,  which  were  left  as  a  garrison  command, 
undc  Major  General  Ward.  On  the  same  day  General  Sullivan 
marched.  Another  division  marched  on  the  first  of  April  ;  and  on 
the  fourth  of  April,  General  Spencer  left,  with  the  last  brigade. 
General  Washington  started  for  New  York  that  evening. 

Owing  to  the  badness  of  the  roads,  which  threatened  to  delay  the 
troops,  and  the  great  number  of  small  inl.;ts  from  Long  Island  Sound 
which  had  to  be  crossed,  or  avoided  by  a  march  through  Connecticut, 
Washington  reejuestod  Governor  Trumbull  to  reinforce  the  New  York 
garrison  with  two  thousaml  men  from  western  Connecticut,  and  also 
requested  the  commanding  officer  at  New  York  to  apply  to  the  Pro- 
vincial convention,  or  Committee  of  Safety  of  New  Jersey,  to  furnish 
a  thousand  men  for  the  same  purpose.  As  an  apology  for  this  addi- 
tional expense,  he  wrote  to  Congress — "  Past  experience,  and  the 
lines  i'  Boston  and  on  l^oston  Neck,  point  out  the  propriety  and  sug- 
gest the  necessity  of  keeping  our  enemies  from  gaining  possession 
r.nd  making  a  lodgment. 

Before  leaving  Cambridge,  he  had  perfected  his  arrangements  for 
the  movement  of  the  army,  so  that  vessels  should  meet  the  regiments 
at  Norwich,  Connecticut,  and  thereby  save  one  liundred  and  thirty- 
seven  miles  of  land  travel ;  had  written  to  (reneral  Lee,  who  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  Canada  and  then  to  the  Southern  Depart- 
ment, that  he  must  not  take  south  with  him  the  guard  which  had 
been  '  'ailed  from  regiment:;,  to  escort  him  to  New  York:  had  pre- 
pared detailed  instructions  for  Colonel  Mifflin,  Quarter-master  Gen- 
eral, under  which  he  was  to  procure  barracks,  forage,  quarters  and 
supplies  for  the  army,  by  the  time  of  its  arrival  at  New  York  :  had 
ordered  two  companies  of  artillery,  with  shot  and  shell,  to  report  to 
General  Thomas,  then  ordered  to  Canada,  z/W  Le'=",  ordered  south  : 
had  so  digested  an  itinerary  for  the  marching  divisions  and  brigades 
that  they  would  not  crowd  one  upon  anotlier  during  their  march  : 
had  instructed  Ar  mid,  recently  p.omoted,  that  shot  and  shell  might 
he  made  at  a  furnace  not  far  from  Montreal:  had  proposed  a  new 
and  more  complete  system  for  keeping  the  pay  accounts  of  officers 
-ind  men-  had  corresponded  with  the  governors  of  all  the  New  Eng- 


HMHi 


1776.] 


WASHINGTON   AT  NEW   YORK. 


•57 


land  States,  upon  the  necessities  and  possible  contingencies  of  the 
crisis,  and  had  provided  for  the  anticipated  incursions  of  small  bodies 
of  the  enemy  upon  the  exposed  towns  of  the  New  England  coast. 

Such  were  some  of  the  branches  of  Logistics  which  underwent 
review,  and  left  him  iVee  to  go  to  his  new  head-quarters,  with  all  ante- 
cedent details  in  process  of  execution.  One  of  his  last  acts  was  to 
inquire  into  an  alleged  instance  of  an  officer  carrying  on  trade  in  sup- 
plies while  holding  a  commission  in  the  arm.y. 

All  the  acts  referred  to  are  particularly  noteworthy  at  this  early 
stage  of  the  army  organization,  before  field  operations  had  been  prop- 
erly commenced. 

Washington's  journey  to  New  York  was  made  via  Providence, 
Norwich  and  New  London,  for  the  purpose  of  inspecting  and  expe- 
diting the  embarkation  of  the  troops.  His  first  act,  after  arrival  at 
his  destination,  was  to  detail  four  battalions  as  a  reinforcement  to 
the  army  in  Canada,  sending  them  by  water  to  Albany,  "  to  ease  the 
men  of  fatigue."  He  also  sent  five  hundred  barrels  of  provisions  to 
Schuyler's  command.  Brigadier  General  Thompson,  with  Colonels 
Greaton,  Patterson,  Bond  and  Poor,  accompanied  the  division,  which 
sailed  from  New  York  April  twenty-second. 

An   immediate  communication  to   the    New  York  Committee  ot 
Safety  laid  down  the  law  that  further  correspondence  with  the  enemy 
must  cease  :  that  "  we  must  consider  ourselves  in  a  state  of  peace,  or 
war,  with  Great  Britain,"  and  enfirced  his  views,  with  emphasis. 

Late  at  night  on  the  twenty-fiflli,  Washington  received  an  order 
from  Congress  to  send  si.x  battalions  to  Canada,  in  addition  to  four 
already  sent,  and  requested  hirn  to  report,  at  once,  whether  addi- 
tional regiments  could  be  spared  for  that  purpose.  General  Sullivan 
accompanied  this  division,  and  with  him  were  such  men  as  Stark, 
Reed,  Wayne  and  Irvine.  Washington  declared  that  "  there  was 
danger  by  this  division  of  forces,  that  neither  army, — that  sent  to 
Canada,  and  that  kept  at  New  York, — woukl  be  sufficient,  because 
Great  Britain  would  both  attom[)t  to  relieve  Canada  and  capture  New 
York,  both  being  of  the  greatest  importance  to  them  "  if  they  have 
men." 

On  the  twenty-eighth  of  April,  the  whole  army  at  New  York 
amounted  to  ten  thousand  two  hundred  and  thirty-five  men,  of 
whom  eight  thousand  three  hundred  an!  oi.j  were  presewt,  and  fit 
for  duty. 

The  Orderly  Book  at  this  time  re,j'.,^es  certain  disorderly  conduct 


.r- 


.K 


I 


.  't- 


fmi 


i  ■;: 


158 


\v.\siiiN(;i(<N  Ai   m;\v  vokk. 


1'77'' 


fif  the  soldiers,  ill  these  meinoiahle  words.  "Men  arc  not  to  carve 
out  rcine(li(;s  for  tlii;msL'lv(;s.  If  the)' arc  injured  in  any  res[)cct,  there 
arc  IcL^al  modes  to  obtain  nhcf,  and  just  com[>Iaint^  will  always  be 
attended  to  and    redressed." 

Klujdc  l-iland  calle-d  for  troops  to  protect  her  ports,  and  two  reyi- 
incnts  of  her  militia  were-  taken  into  continental   pay. 

l)m'in;4the  month  of  May,  advic^-s  wcrt;  rt'ceived  that  Oreat  I'litain 
had  madfr  a  contract  ui'h  various  i'.uropean  States,  for  certain  niili- 
tarv  cont iii;;enti  :  thai  the  sentiment  in  Canada  h.id  been  chan_t^cd 
to  tiiat  of  antipatli),  and  that  continual  (ii^a-.ter  was  attending  all 
military  operation-  in  that  1  Jepailmeiit.  On  the  twenty-fourth  of 
Ma_\'  \\'a-,lim;.',ton  wrote  to  Sc!iu\'ler  :  "We  expect  a  vc:ry  bloody 
sunnmr  .it  Xe'A  \'oil:  ,ind  (.'anad.i,  .as  it  is  there-,  I  piesuine.  that  the 
^;rcat  elfort^  of  the;  i.-ne'Uiy  will  br  .aimed,  ,ind  I  am  sorry  to  s.iy  th.at 
\vc;  are  not  eitlni'  in  men  or  ,irm-,  pnpared  for  it." 

(lei'cral  I'utnam  was  placed  in  command  at  New  \'ork,  .and  (len- 
er.al  (irei  ne-  took  char'^e  of  the  defenses  on  Brooklyn  llei;^hts  ,ind  of 
their  completion. 

June  hr^t,  ( Jav.M-e-;s  resolved  that  si\-  ihous.ind  ,iddition,il  militia 
should  1)1  euiployed  fi'om  Mas-^achu-ictts,  New  1  lanipTliire,  Connec- 
ticut, .and  Xew  \'ork,  to  reiriforci:  the  .army  in  (.'anada,  .end  that  two 
thou-i.ind  Indian-i  sheaild  i)c-  hired  toi-  the  same  fielcl  of  service. 

'1  hrec;  commisiioui-is,  .Messrs.  l''r.uiklin,  ('hase,  and  Carroll,  had  been 
appomtcal  by  C"on;.;re^s  i''ebru,iry  fifteenth,  uitii  in->tiaiction^,  to  vi^it 
Can.ida,  .and  Icaru  tin;  actual  condition  of  tiie  armv'  and  tlh;  temper 
of  the  people.  'Idiese  ;^entlcinen  .accompanied  bv'  Rev.  John  Cairoll, 
afterward  archi)i,-,ho[)  of  iialliuiore,  arrived  .tt  Montre.d  on  the  twenty- 
ninth  day  of  .\piil,  ,md  reported  that  "  ne.;li;^^ence,  misinana;4eiiient, 
and  a  coinbin.alion  of  unlucky  incident-)  had  jiroduced  a  confu-,ion  .and 
disorder  th.it  it  w.is  muv  too  kite  to  remedy."  The  ill  health  of  Dr. 
I''r.anklin  compelled  his  immediate  return  ;  the  other.-,  rcan, lined  until 
the  ,irin_\'  be'.^ui  to  ev.acuate  Canada. 

'I'o  the  ])ropo-^ilion  to  hire  Indians,  (jener.d  .Schuylc:r  replied  ih.at, 
"if  tin-,  number,  two  thous.and,  can  be  prevented  from  joiniu'^^  the; 
enemy  it  i-  more  than  can  be  expected.  I  hey  h.ive  but  one  maxim 
in  their  .alliance-,  with  tiie  whites,  which  is  to  .adhere  to  the  stron;re-.t 
side,  u  h(  re-  they  ,irc:  p.aid  most  hber.ally  .iiid  run  llu:  least  risk." 

I  he  commiTsioners  wrote  from  .Montre.d,  [^iviu;^  .a  most  terrific 
picture  of  the  condition  of  the  troops,  "  who  were  thorouj^hiy  dis- 
or^.tnizid,  h.df-st.irved,  and  visited   b)-  tlie  scour^^e  of  the  small  pox." 


1776] 


"VASIIINMON    Al     NKW    VOKK. 


'59 


(iciunil  W(;(/.stf.r  was  rccillud  as  too  old,  inefficient,  and  ill-suited  to 
the  command. 

General  Tliom.is  die'd  of  the  small  pox  on  the  ^icond  day  of  Jiiik;, 
and  was  sncceedeil  in  command  by  f  ieneral  Sullivan.  'Iliis  officer  had 
already  written  l(tt<'rs  to  Cieneral  \\'ashin;^ton,  "clearly  'ndicatin;.; 
that  Ik;  was  ainn'n;.(  at  the  command  of  ("anada,"  hut  he  filled  to  advise 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  actual  <;xtremily  to  which  the  army 
had  l)een  reduced.  'I'he'ie  letters,  althou;^di  marked  personal,  were 
f  irwarded  to  Coiv^ress  with  the  followin;^  conuueiit. 

"lie  (Sulliv.in)  is  active,  spirited  and  zealously  att.iclu.'d  to  the 
cause.  Ili;  has  hi->  wanli  and  his  fuihles.  The  litter  an;  manifested 
in  hi-^  little  tincture  of  vanity  which  now  and  tlien  leads  him  into 
einb.'xrras-^ments.  His  wants  are  common  to  iis  all.  lie  w.mts 
e.\[)crience  to  itkjvc  on  a  lar;,;e  scale  ;  for  tin;  limited  ami  coiitracteci 
knowled'^e  which  any  of  us  h.ive  in  military  matters  standi  in  very 
little  stead,  and  is  (luickly  overbalanced  by  sound  jiuhnnent  and  some- 
acijuaintance  with  men  and  books,  (^special!)'  when  accompanied  by 
an  t;nterpii  liii;,^  ;_reiiius,  which  I  mu^t  do  (ien(;ril  Sullivan  the  justice 
to  say,  I  think-  he  posst;ss(;s.  Cou;^'r(;ss  will  theref  jh;  d(;termine  upon 
the  propriety  of  continuin;.;  him  in  ("anada,  (jr  sendin;.;  antjther as  th(;y 
shall  see  fit." 

f iates  was  immedi.itely  sent  to  take  command  of  the  troo[)s  of  the 
b'nited  ('olonies  in  Canada,  with  ])owt:r  to  appoint  his  own  staff  and 
a  department  staff,  and  a  larj^e  discretion  over  officers  as  well  .is  troops, 
a,nd  over  their  appointment,  discipline,  .and  reincjval  for  c.iuie.  In 
(iiiieral  Schuyler,  stiil  in  comm.ind  of  the  northern  de[)artment  below 


(^anad.i,  w.is  entrusted 


;n<;  respon^ibili 


ty  of 


makiu;4  ,i  treaty  with  the 


.-51  X 


Nat 


loll' 


and  the  earliest  p 


ibl 


)ossiL)lc  coin 


plet 


ion  i> 


f  !■■ 


)rt  .Stanwix. 


On  the  tlr 
Xew  Ynvk  bv 


'f  J 


ui 


u;,  Ctni^nx'ss  resolved  to  reinf  )rce   the  army  at 


nrteen  thousand   ei'dit  iuiii 


drcd 


militia  from 


jnnsyl 


vaiii, 


elaware,  .ind 


.M; 


ant 


15y  till-  twenty-ninth  of  June,  forty  i')ritisli  shi[)s  were   reported  as 


liaviii;^^  been  si^;hted   off  .S.uuly  lb 


r 


le  crisis  whicii  had  already 


VLSI 


te<l  (J 


;inada  w.is  on  tJie  wiii'^ 


for  N 


ew 


(jr|. 


W'a  .liin^;toii  m  connection  with  I'utnam  had  previously  laid  out 
the  fortifications  which  bore  iiis  name,  liad  critically  inspected  the 
progress  of  all  <li;fenses  about  New  York,  and  entered  so  closely  into 
calculations  (;f  their  value  as  to  lay  down  the  followiii'f  instructions  fcjr 


officers  and  men. 


Not  to  tb.row  aw.iy  fire  ;   fire  first  with  b.ill  and  shot, 


that  thi 


i,  (,»!'"«;:-, 


m 


I  i 


1       KJ* 


Pjf 


: 

IB'  f 

i' 

, '  *'  f, 

1 1 

> 

j  P'Hi 

i6o 


WASHINGTON  AT  NEW   YORK. 


[1776. 


brigadiers  should  order  a  circle  to  be  marked  round  the  several  re- 
doubts, by  which  their  officers  are  to  be  directed  in  giving  orders  for 
the  first  discharge."  "  Small  brush  to  be  set  up  to  mark  the  line  more 
distinctly,  and  make  it  more  familiar  to  the  men,  who  are  by  no  means 
to  be  ordered  to  fire  before  the  enemy  arrive  at  the  circle." 

Such  arc  some  of  the  leading  military  features  of  Washington's 
career  while  at  New  York  during  the  early  summer  of  1776. 

The  colony  felt  confidence  in  his  capacity  and  judgment,  and  with 
the  exception  of  certain  special  localities,  the  people  were  meeting  his 
demand  for  means  and  supplies  with  as  much  promptness  and  cheer- 
fulness as  could  have  been  expected. 

Throughout  the  colonies  there  was  a  rapid  gravitation  toward  a 
permanent  union  and  the  assertion  of  national  independence. 

That  Declaration  was  made  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1776.  It  was 
a  birthday  of  momentous  peril.  From  Canada  to  the  Carolinas,  the 
armies  and  fleets  of  Great  Britain  were  about  to  strike  together,  and 
still  the  people  faced  the  responsibility  squarely. 

Within  a  few  weeks  at  furthest,  the  blow  would  reach  New  York, 
and  yet,  before  it  fell,  the  other  fields  of  operation  were  to  be  heard 
from,  and  their  im])rcssions  were  to  give  character  to  the  struggle. 

The  narrative  will  now  take  up  the  history  of  operations  within 
the  two  extreme  zones  of  active  war,  and  then  resume  the  history  o^ 
the  expedition  against  New  York. 

Note.  It  has  not  l)ci'n  deemed  neccssaiy  to  enter  into  the  details  of  ficneral  Tee's 
brief  administration  while  at  New  York,  (■«  n^wft,  to  tlie  Soutii.  The  visit  of  Sir  Ilunry 
Clinton,  ostensibly  to  visit  (Jovcnior  Tiyon,  iiisjiircd  fears  that  Ik;  would  bombard  the  city. 
Lee  llireatencd  summary  destruction  to  the  prisoners  and  )iroperty  of  loyalists,  if  a  gun  were 
fired.  He  was  energetic,  self-willed  and  efficient ;  but  forever  bore  with  impatience  the 
yoke  of  responsibility  to  Congress  for  his  official  acts. 


1 

11 

M 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

AMERICAN   ARMY    UKIXKN  FROM  CANADA. 

FIVE  thousand  men  perished  by  disease  or  the  casualties  of 
battle  during  the  last  two  months  of  the  campaign  for  the  con- 
quest of  Canada,  which  commenced  in  1775  and  ended  early  in  the 
summer  of  1776. 

Arnold's  expedition  reached  Quebec.     Montgomery  also  reached 
Quebec.     At  the  end  of  their  assault,  the  remnant  of  both  commands 
was  less  than  five  hundred  effective  men.     Up  to  March  first,  1776, 
including  all  reinforcements,  the  number  never  exceeded  seven  hun 
dred  able-bodied  men,  present  at  one  time  for  duty. 

During  the  month   of  March  the  army  increased  to  about  seven 
teen  hundred  effective    mm.     The    detached  guards,  upon  (3rleans 
Island,  at  Point  Levi  and  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  left  but  a  small 
force  to  protect  earth-works,  to  .say  nothing  of  the  absurdity  of  any 
assault  upon  Quebec. 

Smallpox  broke  out  in  the  camp.  Many  enlistments  were  to 
expire  April  fifteenth,  and  no  rational  reason  could  be  urged  upon 
the  dispirited  men  to  induce  their  reenlistment. 

Supplies    became  scarce,  and    continental  money  had    no    \alue. 

Arnold  made  prochimation  on  the  fourth  of  March,  that  paper  money 

tl'.cn  put-  in  circulation,  would  be  redeemed  in  (our  months,  and  that 

those   vho  refused  to  take  it  should   be  treated  as  enemies.     Already 

every  promise  of  .sympathy  fiom  the  people  had  vanished,  and  when 

General    Wooster  arrived  to  take  command  on  the  first  of  April,  he 

found  that  the  army  itself  was  fast  melting  away.     That  there  had 

been  much  kind  feeling  toward  the  colonies  on  the  part  of  very  many 

Canadians  is  manifest  from  the  success  which  attended  the  efforts  of 

Colonels  Livingston  and  Allen  and  Major  Brown  to  organize  Canad'  m 

battalions  as  soon  as  Montgomery  appeared  in  force  before  St.  John. 

Ramsey  writing  in  1793,  particularly  notices  the  fact  that  the  Ameri- 
II 


i.mM 


■■h"i 


i/ 


m 


p 


Mi 


1 6. 


ami:ri<\\  akmn-  duivi:\  i'R(im  canada. 


ilT76. 


can  cx[)rcss  nicsMCiif^crs  freely  ijassed  between   Montreal  ami  Onebec 
without  molestation,  every  where  receiviiiL,^  kind  lii  atnieiu  ;  and  that 


Mr.  r 


rice  actuali\'  advanced  five  tiioim.u 


Uld( 


.ns  in  specii;  to  reheve 


the  embarrassments  of  the  officers  who  could  not  purchase  supplies 
with  continental  money.  This  was  a  lar^e  amount  nhen  it  is  con- 
sidered that  Coni;ress  was  able  to  send  but  a  little  over  sixteen  thou- 
sand dollars,  at  a  time  wlien  a  hundred  thousand  was  actually  needed. 

On  the  second  day  of  .AjMil  General  Woo.iter  examinetl  the  Brit- 
ish works  and  declared  his  inir[)ose  to  beijjin  .ictive  work.  A  few 
small  cannon  and  two  .^mall  mortars,  then  in  jjosition,  were  vij^orously 
exercised  to  see  what  they  could  do  :  but  their  liL;ht  nu.'lal  was  sinii)ly 
insi_t;nificant  and  made  no  impression  upon  the  parapets  of  Quebec. 

Uurin;^  this  time,  scattered  all  the  way  from  Albany  on  the  Hud- 
son river  to   Montreal,  there  could  have   been   found    companies  of 


the  reiriinents  which  Congress   1 


l.Ul  sc 


nt  to  C<7>:ai/(i,  and   which  Wash- 


in 


Ljton  and  the  colonies  could  so  po^-jy  spare  at  such  a  crisi:^ 


On   the  da\-  of  W'ooster's  sham  cannonadinir,  y\rn 


okl  s  Horse 


fe 


with  him  arul  bruisetl  his  wounded  limb,  so  that  he  was  confined  to  the 
bed,  and  to  hi-,  retlectioiis  upon  tlie  progress  of  the  campaign  thus 
far  realized.     As  --oun  as  able  to  move  he  retired  to  Montreal  on  leave 


ifab 


sence. 


A^ 


an( 


prini;  appro, ichetl   and  the  ice  broke  up,  the  i^round  thawed, 
1  it  became  simply  impossible  to  move  troops  over  the  intermeiliatc 


countr}-  to  their  sui)port,  and  the  river  was  n 


)t  sufficienth'  open    foi 


transportation   purposes. 


On   the  first  of  Mav,  (Jeneral   Thomas, 


man  of  culture,  wi>dom  and  coura;^e,  as->umed  command  of  the  troops, 
then  amountini:;  to  hardh-  nineteen  hundred  men,  of  whom  less  than 
a  thousand,  includin_Lj  officers,  were  fit  for  dut)-.  Among  those  really 
effect 
f  k 


ive,  no 


t  less  than  three  hundred  claimed  a  discharge,  their  term 


o 


;al  service  h.iviug  ex[)ire 


d.     'Jlu 


)re\'ious  sei)aration  o 


f  the 


armv 


into  deta.chments,  for  the  sake  of  bloi.k,iding  Ouebec  and  cutting  off 
supplies  from  the   country,  involvi'd  the  constant  use  of  three  ferries, 


so  that  it  was  i 


inposMi 


ble   upon  any  siiort   notice   to  rails'  more   th 


an 


three  hundred  men  U)  n.  -,ist  an  attack,  am!  even  the  medicil  appoint- 
ments could  not  be  kept  up  to  their  best  efficiency. 

At  the  time  of  his  arrival  the  army  v.'as  increased  to  the  nominal 
strength,  all  toKl,  of  about  three  thousand  men  ;  but  this  accession 
was  siiiiply  a  contribution  to  the  grave,  a  stimulus  to  the  growing  dis- 
like of  the  provincials,  and  the  assurance  of  a  more  speedy  expendi- 
ture of  supplies  and  an  ultimate  retreat. 


tif 


1776.] 


AMKKICAN   ARMY    DRIVKN   FROM   CANADA. 


■^'3 


The  ice  was  moving  rapitlly.  Reinforcements  were  known  to 
have  left  England  aim  IrelanU,  :ind  there  was  no  possibility  of  sub- 
stantial, offensive  activity. 

A  fire-ship  was  prepared  and  floated  toward  the  shipping  then  in 
the  channel,  but  it  did  no  harm,  and  the  men  in  charge  had  a  narrow 
escape  from  capture.  The  su[)ply  of  [)o\vder  had  been  reduced  to 
one  hundred  and  fift)'  barrels,  and  the  store  of  provisions  on  hand  was 
barely  sufficient  f(jr  six  dajs  of  economical  use. 

A  council  of  war  was  held,  and  .in  immetliate  retreat  to  the  Three 
Rivers  was  decided  ujjon  as  the  only  means  of  saving  the  army  from 
starvation  or  capture. 

Orders  were  issuetl  for  the  emb.u'kation  of  the  sick  and  the  artillery 
except  one  gun  ;  ami  orders  were  also  sent  to  Orleans  Isl.uul,  Point  Levi, 
and  other  ooints  where  detachments  were  stationed,  in  order  to  make 
the  utmost  expedition  before  the  garrison  should  learn  of  the  design. 

On  the  very  next  (\w,  during  the  confusion  incident  to  the  emer- 
gency, the  frigate  Sur[)rise,  the  Isis,  54,  anil  the  sloop  of  war  M.irtin, 
arrived  with  two  companiesof  the  rvventy-nintli  regiment,  which  were 
promptlj'  landed  as  well  ,is  a  considerable  force  of  marines. 

General  Carleton  did  not  wait  for  these  new  forces  to  rest,  but 
sallying  forth  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  with  ne.irly  a  thousand 
men  and  si.x  pieces  of  artillery,  he  made  a  vigorous  attack  upon  the 
American  position.  One  piece  of  artillery,  and  about  three  hundred 
men  constituted  the  resisting  force  then  available,  and  General  Thomas 
wisely  retreated,  and  in  order,  but  with  necessary  precipitation. 

Nearly  a  hundred  prisoners,  beside  the  sick  in  hospital,  his  stores, 
baggage,  and  artillery  were  captured,  and  with  these,  nearly  two  tons 
of  powder,  and  five  hundred  muskets,  which  had  arrived  that  very 
morning  from  Cieneral  Schuyler.  Some  of  the  sick,  many  of  them 
still  suffering  with  the  small-pox,  dragged  themselves  along,  thoroughly 
desperate  in  their  purpose  to  work  their  way  homeward  rather  than 
remain  as  captives,  and  the  retrograde  movement  was  not  interrupted 
until  the  army  reached  Deschambault,  about  fifty-eight  miles  loward 
Montreal.  The  command  made  no  halt  during  the  march,  and  the 
night  was  one  of  fearful  terrors  to  the  hungry  and  weary  command, 
staggering  through  woods,  streams,  and  swamps,  with  everything  to 
discourage,  and  nothing  to  hope  for  except  to  escape  from  the  con- 
quest of  Canada. 

Dr.  Gordon  writing  from  Roxbury,  July  nineteenth  of  that  year, 
says,  "  Their  condition  could  not  be  expressed  in  words." 


111 

\:w\ 


'»'  !l 


n> 


164 


AMKKICAN   ARMV   DRIVKN    FUOM   CANADA 


1 177^'. 


The  ,'irmy  rcstcil  .1  few  days  at  Dcschambaiilt.  A  council  of  war 
decided  that  there  could  be  no  safety  short  of  Sorel.  The  British 
fleet  had  followed  fast  after  them,  and  were  even  then  at  anchor 
at  Jacques  Cartier,  only  nine  miles  below  their  camp.  This  fleet  had 
been  Iar<jely  increased.  On  the  eij^hlh  of  M.iy,  the  Nicjer  ship  of  war 
arrived  from  I  lalifax,  convoyin<^  three  transporfs  and  brinijin^r  the 
I'Virty-seventh  rejjiment,  and  on  the  tenth  tiie  Triton  arrived  with 
otiier  trans|)orts  loaded  wilii  vi  tcrans  :u\t\  tiu;  liuropean  continj^ent. 

General  Thomas  jjroceed'jd  directly  to  Sorel,  where  he  found  four 
rec^iments  awaitinL,^  orders.  Additional  battalions  arrived  in  a  few 
days.  Here  he  was  t.iken  down  with  the  small-pox,  and  died  on  the 
second  June. 

On  the  first  of  June,  (ieneral  Reidesel  arrived  with  Hrunswick 
tror)ps,  and  HurL^oyne  with  troops  from  Ireland.  These  reinforce- 
ments swelled  the  command  of  (jener.il  ("arleton  to  nine  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  eiL,dity-four  effective  men,  and  pre[)arations  were 
made  to  take  the  offensive  in  force,  and  expel  the  American  troops 
from  Canada. 

General  .Sullivan  arrived  at  3o''<-'l  "'i  the  sixth  of  June,  and  assumed 
command.  His  words  were  to  the  point.  "I  can  reduce  the  army 
to  order,  and  put  a  new  face  upon  our  affairs  here." 

To  Washin;^ton  he  wrote,  — "  I  am  determined  to  hold  ihc  most 
important  posts,  so  loncj  as  one  stone  is  left  upon  another."  He  did 
not  appreciate  the  position,  neither  did  Con<Tress. 

A  single  minor  operation  of  this  disastrous  campaign  is  worthy  of 
mention  at  this  stage  of  the  narrative. 

Tiiere  is  a  narrow  pass  in  the  .St.  Lawrence  river  above  Perrot 
Island,  nearly  forty-three  miles  above  Montreal,  and  a  projecting 
point  called  the  Cedars. 

Sir  John  Joli;son,  who  had  previously  stirred  up  Indian  aggression 
upon  New  York  settlements,  had  received  a  British  commission  as 
Colonel,  and  was  engaged  in  exciting  the  Indians  of  the  north-west, 
and  from  Detroit  eastward,  to  offensive  movements  against  the 
American  forces  then  in  Canada. 

Colonel  Hedcll  of  New  Hampshire,  who  had  been  associated  with 
Colonel  Livingston  and  Major  Brown  in  the  capture  of  Chambly, 
during  1775,  had  been  assigned  to  post  command  at  the  Cedars  with  a 
garrison  force  of  three  hundred  and  ninety  troops  and  two  field  pieces. 

On  the  fifteenth  of  May  a  hostile  force  consisting  of  forty  regulars 
of  the  Lighth  regiment  from   Detroit,  one  hundred  Canadians,  and 


1776.] 


AMKKICAN    ARMV   DRIVKN    FROM   CANADA. 


1^^5 


five  hundred  savaj^cs  under  Colonel  Headie  and  C.iptain  l''()stcr,  hut 
without  artillery,  descended  from  the  lakes  and  approached  the  furt. 

Colonel  Hedell  hastened  to  Montreal  for  reinforcements,  Ijavin^^ 
Major  Butterfield  in  command. 

Major  Sherburne  started  f(jr  the  fort  tlie  ne.Kt  day  with  one  hun- 
dred and  forty  men,  and  was  suon  f(jllowed  by  General  Arnold  with  a 
still  larger  detachment.  The  facts  as  stated  by  (iordon,  Stedman, 
Marsiiall,  H.uicroft,  and  other  writers,  liritish  and  American,  do  not 
substantially  differ  from  the  finding  of  the  standing  committee  ui)on 
Indian  affairs  which  was  re[)orted  to  Congress,  and  ailopted  by  that 
body  on  the  tenth  of  July,  1776,  except  as  to  the  extent  of  injury 
done  by  the  Indians.  Conijress  received  an  exaggerated  report  of  the 
matter.  A  brother  of  General  .Sullivan,  who  was  one  of  the  prisoners, 
wrote  shortly  after  the  so-called  massacre  that  "  Captain  Ffjstt.-r  treated 
them  well  after  the  surrender,  (jr  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability." 

The  transaction  is  memorable  as  one  of  the  incidents  attending  the 
evacuation  of  Canada,  and  more  particularly  as  the  occasion  of  a 
formal  notice  to  (jenerals  Howe  and  liurgoyne  on  the  part  (jf  Con- 
gress, that  the  Amtricans  would  measure  out  exact  and  literal  retal- 
iation for  any  departure  from  the  rules  and  usages  of  honorable  war- 
fare. Maj(>r  Hutterfield  having  plenty  of  ammunition  and  provisions 
for  nearly  thirty  days,  without  permitting  his  officers  to  sally  out  and 
attack  the  enemy  as  they  desired  to  do,  surrendered  his  whole  com- 
numd  upon  the  simple  condition  that  they  sIkjuM  be  prisoners  to  the 
British  forces  and  not  to  the  Indians,  and  that  their  baggage  should 
not  be  plundered. 

On  the  day  following.  Major  Sherburne,  who  brought  reinforce- 
ments, was  attacked  as  he  approached  the  fort,  and  fought  with  great 
courage  for  nearly  an  hour,  but  finally  surrendered,  when  hotly  pressed 
by  superior  nundjers,  and  upon  advices  of  the  fate  of  the  garrison. 
A  cartel  of  exchange  was  enforced,  coupled  with  the  condition  that 
"  they  would  not  in  words,  writing  or  signs,  give  the  least  informa- 
tion to  government  enemies,  or  to  their  adherents  now  in  arms,  in  the 
least  prejudice  to  his  majesty's  service,"  thus  practically  doubling  the 
exchange,  and  this  was  made  the  condition  of  tlieir  exemption  from 
Indian  outrage. 

Captain  Foster  stated  in  the  preamble  to  the  cartel,  that  he  "  found 
from  their  threats  and  menaces  that  the  inevitable  consequences  of 
savage  custom,  to  put  prisoners  to  death,  would  ensue  ;"  hence  the 
stipulations  made. 


I 


'.1! 


■     ■'      ■i'' 


% 


tu. 


V  Sl> 


'■[ 


i66 


AMKKICAN    AKMV    I)RI"1:N    TKOM    (  ANADA. 


[■77^'. 


The  Hiitisli  took  .1  str(ni<4  position  ;it  Vauclnuil  ,1111!  Tcrrot  Island. 
Arnold,  with  scvc-n  hmuhcd  men,  made  an  attempt  to  dislodj^e  them 
and  rescue  the  prisoners,  but  the  British  eonuiiander  so  p<)siti\il)' 
thrcatenetl  to  turn  tiie  prisoners  over  to  tin;  huhans  in  c.ise  ofattaik 
that  Arnokl  himself  sii^ned  the  proposed  cartel,  withdrew  from  St. 
Anne  to  I,,i  CliiiK'  and  tin  n  returned  to  Montre.il.  It  was  an  illus- 
tration of  tlu:  lar  rcachin;.',  effects  of  the  cow.inlice  or  incompetency  of 
a  sini;le  post  coniniamUr. 

The  narrative  left  (icner.d  Sulliv.m  .it  Sorel,  and  (leneral  Carle- 
ton  on  the  eve  of  a;^r(^ii-ssive  action. 

/  The  rendc/vous  appointed  tor  the  advanciii;,;  liritish  troops  was 
at  Thri-e  Rivers,  alxiut  etpiall)- distant  from  .Montreal  .uiil  (Juebec, 
and  (ieni'ral  i-'raser  liad  taken  command  of  that  -.talion. 

liurc^oync,  Riedcse!  and  I'l;iilii)s  had  start('d  !>)•  Luul  and  water, 
to  concentrate  the  armj-  at  that  point. 

General  Nesbit  was  near  Three  Rivers,  on  transports,  under  con- 
voy, (iordon  puts  the  British  iTfective  force  at  thirteen  thousand 
men  but  he  makes  no  allowance  for  the  pt'rcenta;.jc  of  non-effectives, 
clerks  and  del,  ch.meiits,  which  reduce  an  arni\-  within  twenty-four 
liours  after  a  re;.,adar  muster,  l'"ew  of  the  battalions  sent  to  America 
were  full,  and  any  estimate  of  forces  based  merel)-  upon  the  numljer  of 
battalions,  is  invariably  an  error. 

At  this  statue  of  cdlairs,  (jeneral  .Sullivan  h.i\in^  a  force  of  al^out 
five  thousand  men  at  Sorel,  called  a  council  of  war  and  resolved  to 
occupy  and  hold  Three  Rivers,  lie  was  untier  the  impression  that 
the  British  force  at  that  post  was  less  than  seven  hundred  men. 
probably  not  more  than  five  hunilred  for  duty. 

Colonel  St.  Clair  was  already  at  Nicholet  with  nearly  eis^ht  hun- 
dred men.  Colonels  Wayne,  Ma.\wcll  and  Irvine,  with  sufficient  force 
to  make  an  agi;reyate  of  two  thousand  men,  were  sent  down  the  river 
and  through  Lake  St.  I'eter  to  join  him.  The  comr  and  of  the  expe- 
dition was  assigned   to  Cicneral  Thom[)son. 

Chief  Justice  Marshall,  in  his  life  of  Washington,  supplies  a  fact  In 
this  connection  wliich  reconciles  other  historical  accounts,  and  shows 
that  during  the  four  days  which  intervened  between  the  death  of 
General  Thomas  and  the  arrival  of  General  Sullivan,  General  Thomp- 
son was  in  command,  and  that  he  sent  St.  Clair  to  Nicholet  for  the  pur- 
pose of  surprising  the  British  post  at  Three  Rivers.  General  Thomp- 
son, under  the  order  of  General  Sullivan,  whom  he  must  have  advised 
of  the  state  of  affairs,  on  his  arrival,  reached  Nicholet,  a  little  after 


r. 


IT1(>. 


AMI.KICAN    AU.MV    DKIVIA'    lK<tM   CANAHA. 


167 


midnis^Iit,  or  carl)'  ill    \\\r   morning,  ofthc  scvtiiulot  June.      lie  kept 
liis  roinmaivl  uiiilcr  lovrr  durin:.;  i.lu' clay,  and   .ros.srd  llic  Si.  I,au- 


rcncc  early  in  tin;  tvuning  of  llic  seventh, 
Their  inovenient  w.is  not  ;i  secret.      If  il  liai 


.in. lint;  at  Punit   I  )ii  f.ac. 

:r[\,  the   n--,nh  u  1  udd 


have  ijeen  fully  as  disastrous.  With  nuininn  hj^iit  the)-  I'duuiI  tiieni- 
.selves  flanked  by  a  s\vani|)  and  eoiiiMelleil  U)  niareh  .doiiLj  the  river. 
Tllis  e.vpiisi'd  them  lo  tlie  lire  of  the  sliippini;  which  tile)' li, id  safely 
passeil   uiiiUr  eover  dI    the   iii;^ht,  to  tiie    fire  ot   aitillei)-  uhieh   liad 


)een  laiiclid  (H 


1  tl 


\c  he.ic 


h  l)\'  Cieiu  r, 


ih 


ree  tunes  their  numl)ef,  and  to  a  el.iss  .ol   risks   never  eonleinplatei 


'  r.iser,  to  eon 
f 


llicl 


with  a   ioree 


in  tlieir  detail  "  to  take  and   occupy  'I'liree  Rivers. 


W 


leri:   Wayne   went    there  was  ,1  flL;ht,  alwajvs.      Tiiat    was   his 


)USi!iess. 


U; 


mere  I 


ft  tl 


lus  sums  ui) 


tl 


le    sci'lle 


The  short  darkness  of  (hat 


latitude  was  soon  over;  as  ilay  bewail  to  apjiear,  tiie  ,\inei  ieaiis,  who 
were  marehiiv_,r  under  the'  bank  of  tiie  river,  were  cannoiia(K.'d  from  the 
ships;   undismayetl   they   took  their  wa\'   tlndu^h   a  thickl\-  wooded 


swain[),  above  tlieir  knees  ui  mud  and  water;  ami  alter  a  iTiost  weari- 
some .'itruL;^!!:  of  lour  hours  reached  an   oi)en  piece  (jf  i;round,  where 

and  lorced  the 
eohimn  .e'aiiifct 


tl 


ley  eiiueav 


ore 


to  toiin. 


\V, 


0' 


i\-m:   IjCLian    tile  atl 


party  to  run  ;   lus  t:ompanions  tlieii  pressed  lorw.i 


d  in 


the  breast-works,  which  covered  tlu;  main    boi 


1)-  of  1 1 


le  eneni)', 


11 


le 


y 


displayetl  undi^pLited  L;allaiitry  ;   but  beiiiL; outnuinbered  three  to  one, 
were  compelled  to  retire." 

One  hundred  and   tilt)'  prisoners  were 


Tl 


ic  battle  was  soon  over. 


left  in  the  hands  of  the  Hritish  troops,  includi 
and  Colonel  Irvine. 


11 -r 


leneriil 


'Ih 


omuson 


The  men,  scattered  and  disheartened,  found  their  boats,  and  Three 
Rivers  was  not  taken, 

Sullivan  wrote  —"  I  now  think  only  of  a  !.;Iorious  ileath,  or  a  vic- 
tory obtaineil  aj^ainst  superior  numbers." 

The  Con<4ressional  commission  had  alread)- .idvised  that  Canatla 
l.e  .ibandoned.     Comjress,  however,  voted  to  susta.in  the  olfensiveand 


Sul- 


was  still  legiskitiiiLj  to  maintain  that  arm)'  as  late  as  Jul)'  eighth 
livan's  eTficers  finally  acUisiil  retreat. 

The  British  lleet  came  u[)  the  river  umler  a  favorable  wind  on  the 
fourteenth  of  June,  and  when  they  were  within  one  hour's  sail  (jf  Sorel, 
Sullivan  broke  u[)  his  camp  and  st.irted  fur  St.  John's. 

Arnold  held  on  to  Montreal  with  three  hundred  men  until  ihe  fleet 


i 


ill 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


'^ 


/. 


A 


y. 
^ 


^~ 


1.0 


I.I 


1^    12.2 


110 


I 


1.8 


11.25  i  1.4   i  1.6 


V] 


<^ 


/2 


v: 


/;'^' 


/^ 


<*' 


\ 


iV 


\\ 


'% 


<^ 


I 


■■n 


^    .     ^vf 


,%< 


1 


t6S 


AMERICAN    ARMY    DRIVEN   FROM    CANADA. 


[«776. 


V  Mr 


'^i'  -  :l 


was  within  twelve  miles  of  the  city,  and  then  crossed  to   La   Trairie, 
without  interruption. 

Sergeant  Lamb,  of  the  Ro}-.il  Welsh  Fusileers,  then  a  private  sol- 
dier, published  his  diary  of  tlv;  events  of  that  campaign.  He  says — 
"The  sufferings  of  the  y\mericans  were  indeed  great,  obliged  to  drag 
their  batteries  up  the  rapids  of  the  Sorel,  by  mere  strength,  often  to 
their  middle  in  water,  and  encumbered  with  great  numbers  laboring 
under  that  dreadful  disease,  the  small-po\,  which  is  so  fatal  in  Amer- 
ica. It  was  said  that  two  regiments,  at  one  time,  had  not  a  single 
man  in  health,  another  had  onl}'  six,  and  a  fourth  only  forty,  and  two 
more  were  nearly  in  the  same  condition.  While  the  Americans  were 
retreating,  the\-  nere  daily  cUino\-etl  by  the  remonstrances  of  the 
inhabit.uits  of  Canada,  who  had  either  joined  or  befriended  them. 
Many  of  the  Canailians  had  taken  a  decided  part  in  their  favor,  ren- 
dered them  essential  services,  and  tliereb}'  incurred  the  heavy  penal- 
ties annexed  to  the  crime  of  supporting  rebellion.  These,  though 
Congress  had  .assured  them  but  a  few  months  before,  that,  '  they 
would  never  abandon  thein  to  the  fury  of  their  common  enemies  ' 
were  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  left  exposed  to  the  resentment  of 
their  rulers." 

*     On  the  seventeenth,  says  Bancroft,  •'  all  that  was  left  of  the  in- 
vading army  met  at  St.  John's." 

"  On  the  eighteenth,  the  emaciated,  half-naked  men,  broken  in 
strength  and  in  discipline,  too  weak  to  have  beaten  off  an  assault 
from  the  enem\',  as  pitiable  a  spectacle  as  could  be  seen,  removed  to 
Isle  Aux  Noix,  where  Sullivan  proposed  to  await  express  ortlers  from 
Schuyler."  This  island  was  low,  badly  supplied  with  water,  and  so 
unhealthy,  that  Sullivan  retired  to  Isle  La  Motte,  where  he  received 
orders  from  General  Schuyler  to  retire  to  Crown  Point,  which  post  he 
reached  during  July. 

Colonel  Trumbull  visited  the  post,  and  thus  states  the  condi- 
tion of  the  trooi)s.  "  I  did  not  look  into  a  tent  or  hut  in  which  I  did 
not  find  either  a  dead  or  dying  man."  "  I  wept  till  I  had  no  more 
power  to  weep,"  said  a  pliysician  who  attended  the  troops. 

"  Everything  about  chem,  their  clothes,  their  blankets,  the  air, 
the  very  ground  they  trod  on,  was  infected  with  the  pestilence." 
•'  More  than  thirty  new  graves  were  made  every  day." 

Serccant  Lamb's  statement  was  not  cxai.,  "^erated.  The  ofificial 
muster  rolls  showed  that  on  account  of  sickness  or  inoculation,  there 
were  single  regunents  without  a  m.ui  fit  for  duty. 


I77f>'] 


AMERICAN  ARMY   DRIVEN   FROM   CANADA. 


169 


Canada  was  free  from  the  pressure  of  American  troops.  Burgoyne 
re-occupicd  St.  John's.  Gates  had  superseded  SulHvan,  and  he  was 
promised  additional  troops  to  tlie  number  of  six  tliousand  men,  viz., 
three  from  Massachusetts,  fifteen  hundred  from  Connecticut,  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  from  New  Hampshire,  and  seven  hundred  and 
nftv  from  New  York  ;  but  none  entered  Canada.  The  death  of  Mont 
gomery  was  the  pivot  event  of  the  entire  campaign. 

His  plan  contemplated  the  establishment  of  strong  posts  at  Jacques 
Carticr,  the  Narrows,  and  at  ^Montreal,  and  the  occui)ation  of  the  plains 
of  Abraham  by  ten  thousand  men.  More  than  this  number  was 
actually  assigned  to  operations  in  Canada,  but  if  all  hid  reached 
Quebec,  they  could  not  have  been  maintained  at  that  number,  unless 
all  other  operations  were  sacrificed. 

A  committee  of  Congress  gave  good  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the 
invasion,  viz.,  7indcrtaken  too  laic  in  the  fall, —  enlistments  too  short  and 
the  consequent  haste  \s\yiQ\\  forced  iininattire  expeditions  for  fear  there 
would  be  no  men  to  undertake  them — want  of  specie,  and  the  small- 
pox. 


h'  ". 


i:  i 


iji'!' 


t'F 


}#S 


U  i   ^  nil'  ■■':' 


U  I 


y  i 


CHAPTER   XXVI. 

BRITISH   PREPARATIONS.    CLINTON'S   EXPEDITION   UNFOLDED. 

IT  will  give  interest  to  the  narrative  to  introduce  to  the  reader 
those  British  regiments  wliich  were  assigned  to  duty  in  America, 
early  in  the  year  1776,  so  that  they,  as  well  ns  the  American  officers 
who  figured  early  in  the  war,  may  be  recognized  as  acquaintances  when 
the  battle  issues  shall  bring  them  face  to  face. 


Gary's. 

Abercrombie  s. 

riaviland's. 

Carlctoii's. 

Maitlaiid's. 

ClaveriiiLj's. 

T.  Grant's. 

Pomeroy's. 

Armstrong's. 

A  detachment  of  the  65th  regiment  was  then  at  IlaHfax. 

Five  companies  of  the  Royal  Artillery  were  also  stationed  at  Boston. 

THKN    IN   CANADA. 

7th  Foot     .     .     .     Berlier's.  26th  Foot,     .     Lord  W.Gordon's. 

Slh      "       ...     Armstrong's. 

This  regiment  was  in  charge  of  the  upper,  or  western  parts  of  Canada,  including 
Niagara  and  Detroit.  One  company  of  Roy.U  Artillery  was  at  Quebec,  one  at  Mon- 
treal, and  one  " im>alid"  company  at  Newfoundland.  McLean's  regiment  was  par- 
tially organized  in  Canada,  and  its  scr\'i(C  has  already  been  noticed. 

AT   ST.    AUGUSTINE. 

One  company  of  Royal  Artillery,  and  part  of  the  14th  Foot,  Cunningham's.  The 
other  companies  were  with  Lord  Dunmore  in  Virginia,  or  at  Halifax. 

ON   THEIR   PASSAGE   FROM   IRELAND  TO    BOSTON. 
17th  Foot        ,     .     Monkton's.  46th  Foot    .     .     .     Vaughan's. 

^^\\\     "...     Massey's.  53d      "       ...    James  Grant's 


STATIONED 

IN   BOSTON. 

17th  Dragoons  .     Preston's. 

43d   Foot 

4th  Foot 

.     Hodgsin's. 

44th      " 

5th      •• 

.     Percy's. 

45th      •■ 

loth      " 

.     Sandford's 

47th      •• 

22d          " 

.     Gage's. 

49th      " 

23d    •• 

.     Howe's. 

52d      •• 

35th     " 

.     F.  H.  Cam 

pbell's. 

63d   - 

38th    ■• 

.     Pigot's. 

64th   " 

40th 

.     Hamilton's 

. 

65th   " 

m 


m 

I  iiiiratiii  J'osi/ions 


(i  iinJ  Dnmv  k  Col.  Cmriitdhit 


.^^■n 


\S''       'II  x  wi  t. 


170* 


m 


i??^! 


15th  Foot 

53'1       " 
37th      " 


BRITISH    I'KKPARATIONS. 


171 


READV    K)    SAIL  TKOM    i.OKK    TO    AMERICA. 

Civ.iiis'.  421I  I'oDl  ..     .     .  Lord  Murray's. 

Coniwallis'.  541)1    "       ...  Frederick's. 

Coote's.  57tli    "       ...  Irwin's. 


OHDERKIl    I'OK    ISOSION. 

ifith  I)r.ii;oons,  Hiuj^oytic's,  .ind  om-  liiousarid  ol  ilic  Kiiit;'s  ( iuards.  tobe  drafted 
from  liircr  ifi^iiiieiils.  to  iir  comm.inijcd  l)y  Colonel  Matthews. 

Tlu!  2(jtii  Foot,  (leslinccl  for  nuebec.  were  ordered  to  s.iil  so  as  lo  arrive  as  e.irly 
as  the  iKivi},Mlioii  of  the  St.  I.awreiiei'  would  perrriit.  Il  has  been  already  noticed 
how  that  rc};iliieiit  obe\ed  the  ordei  t(;  llu:  very  lelter. 

c)K1)l;ri;i>  tu  he  i\  kivMuni.ss  kor  k.mi;  vkkaiion   'io   sah.    ikom    iki;i.a.M) 

10  ijuKiiKc  IV  Arkii,.  1776. 
9lh  I''ool  .     .     .     LiL;oiiier's.  341)1  l''oot  .     .     Lord  (J.iveiulish's. 

2olh     "...      !'.irl<er's.  53d        "      .     .     LI|))iiiistoin:'s. 

241)1     "...     'i"a)lor's.  62(1        "     .     .     Jones. 

TliL-  two  i  Ii[.;liI,iiKl  b;iltalions,  viz.,  Lord  John  Murr;iy's  and 
Fra.scr's,  ucre  to  voiisi.st  each  of  one  thousand  men.  The  niarchiiii^ 
rcoimeiils  for  tlie  American  service  were  to  consist  of  twelve  com- 
panies of  fifty-si.v  rank  aiul  file,  each  coini)iiny,  while  two  companies 
of  each  battalion  were  to  remain  inGre.it  Jiritain  and  Ireland  for 
rccruitinL,^  piiri)oies. 

It  will  be  seen  that  each  battalion  sent  to  America  only  si.x:  com- 
panies, iiisleatl  of  ei_L(ht,  two  battalions  formin;^  tiie  reijiment.  Tlu" 
use  of  tlie  cerm  battalion  in  coimecti(jn  with  tlie  British  army,  v  ill 
therefore  be  construed  nominally  as  half  .1  re;4iment;  while  the  Ameri- 
can rei^iments  had  but  one  battali(jn,  and  the  terms  are,  ordinarily,  con- 
vertible expressions  wlien  referrin;^  to  tile  latter  army. 

The  nominal  colonel  of  a  Hritisii  rcyiment  then,  ;is  since,  may  also 
be  a  ^ener.d  officer,  and  the  American  reader  will  do  well  to  bear  this 
in  mind,  since    I'ercy,  (irant,  Cornwallis,   I'iLjot,  and    many  colonels 
already  named,  are  scarcely  known  to  po|)idar  history,  except  by  thci; 
lii^h  rank,  which  was  in  the  nature  of  a  brevet. 

The  recruits  for  the  rei^nnients  ordered  to  America  were  especially 
enlisted  to  be  dischar.Ljed  at  the  end  of  three  years,  or  at  the  end  of 
the  war,  at  the  option  of  the  kino;. 

During  the  winter  of  1775-6,  the  UritLsh  i;overnment  entered  into 
treaties  with  the  landgrave  of  I  lesse  Cassel,  the  Duke  of  Hrunswick, 
and  the  hereditary  prince  of  licsse  Cassel,  ruling  tlv  princi[)ality  of 
Manau,  by  which  men  were  hired  to  do  military  seivice  in  America. 
This  was  done  by  arbitrary  iinpressinent.  The  force  thus  fuHkished 
amounted  to  seventeen  thousand  and  three  hundred  men. 


A^^: 


111!- 


ili'l? 


11- ? 


Mt 


*t 


Jiff? 


17- 


BRITISII    rkKI'ARATIONS. 


['77f'. 


riie  prince  of  Waldcck  also  tendered  a  regiment,  which  was 
accepted,  and  with  other  troops  from  that  state  was  sent  forth  under 
the  command  of  tiie  veter.m  I^irori  Riedesel. 

Tiiere  never  was  a  doubt  ainoii;jj  military  men  as  to  the  bad  mili- 
tary policy  of  this  arraiv^ement.  The  men  were  paid  by  their  own 
state,  but  the  state  was  paid  a  much  larger  rate  b)'  Grciit  Britain,  so 
that  it  was  a  s[)'.'culation  entircl)- ;  but  it  robbed  the  l-lnglish  crown 
of  prestige,  UKuldened  the  colonists,  and  was  unworthy  of  a  great 
nation  which  was  still  claiming  from  the  colonies  the  allegiance  due 
to  paternal  authoritx'. 

These  treaties  were  stubbornly  opposed  in  both  houses  of  parlia- 
ment. A  few  extracts  from  the  debate  will  illustrate  the  priucii)les 
laid  down  untler  the  title  "statesmanship  in  war." 

"  An  army  of  foreigners  is  now  to  be  introduced  into  the  15ritisii 
dominion,  not  to  protect  them  from  invasion,  not  to  deliver  them 
from  the  ravages  of  an  hostile  army,  but  to  assist  one  half  of  the 
inhabitants  in  massacring  the  other,"  said  the  duke  of  Richmontl, 
adding:  "Unprovided  with  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  for  the 
cruel  puri)ose  tlcsigneil,  or  unable  to  prevail  upon  the  native^>  of  this 
country  (Mngland)  to  lend  their  hamls  to  such  a  sanguinary  business, 
ministers  have  api)lied  to  those  foreign  [)rinces  who  trade  in  human 
blood,  and  have  hired  armies  of  mercenaries  for  the  work  of  destruc- 
tion." "The  colonies  themselves,  after  our  example,  will  apply  to 
strangers  for  assistance." 

The  bill  passed  the  Commons  by  a  vote  of  242  to  ,sy,  and  the 
House  of  Lords  by  a  vote  of  icj  to  32.  A  protest  was  made  in  strong 
words,  one  single  sentence  of  which  will  illustrate  the  folly  of  the 
policy,  and  its  bearings  upoa  the  future.  "  We  have  reason  to  appre- 
hend that  when  the  colonies  come  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  is 
forming  alliances  and  hiring  foreign  troops  for  their  destruction,  they 
may  think  that  they  are  well  justified  by  the  example  in  endeavoring 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  like  assistance,  and  that  l""rauce,  Spain,  and 
Prussia,  or  other  powers  of  Europeunay  think  they  have  as  good  right 
as  Hesse,  Ihunswick,  and  Hanau  t(}  interfere  in  our  domestic  quarrels. 

Led  inham  declared,  that,  "the  landgrave  of  Hesse  had  his  pro- 
totype in  Sancho  Panza,  who  said  that  if  he  were  a  prince  he  should 
wish  all  his  subjects  to  be  blackamoors,  so  that  he  could  turn  them 
into  money  by  selling  them  ;  that  Hesse  and  Brunswick  rendered 
Germany  vile  and  dishonored  in  the  eyes  of  Europe, — a  nursery  of 
men  for  those  who  have  most  money." 


1776.] 


nRITISII    PKKI'ARAIIONS. 


173 


The  King  wrote  personal  letters  to  Catharine  of  Russia,  asking  tor 
twenty  thoiisaml  men.  She  re[)lie(l  "th.it  tiicre  were  other  means  of 
settling  the  dispute  in  America,  than  by  force  of  arms,"  and  declined 
to  furnish  any,  although  the  application  was  made  for  a  much  less 
force,  subsenuently  to  the  first  refusal. 

The  States-Cieneral  of  Holland  were  also  requested  by  the  king 
to  dispose  of  their  Scotrh  brigade,  for  service  in  America;  but  the 
proposition  was  declined  and  strict  neutrality  was  maintained. 

During  the  war  that  followed.  Brunswick  furnished  a  total  of  seven 
thousand  and  twenty-three  men,  ■' amounting,"  says  H.incroft,  "  to 
more  than  one-sixth  of  the  able-botlietl  men  of  the  principality." 

The  Hessian  force  originally  designated  at  tour  thousand  men,  was 
ultimatel)-  increased  to  twelve  thousand,  besides  three  corps  of  artil- 
lery, three  hundred  chasseurs  and  three  hundred  dragoons. 

Lieutenant  Generals  I)e  I  leister  and  Knyphausen  commanded 
these  troops,  the  former  having  senior  command.  Among  the 
Colonels,  Donop,  Rahl,  Wurmb-Minigerode  and  I  oos  were  better 
known  than  others,  in  their  connection  with  tlie  wars. 

If  Great  Britain  had  drafted  from  England  and  Wales,  a  quota 
of  troops,  proportionally  equal  to  the  drain  made  upon  the  industry 
of  Ilanauand  Hesse  CasscI,  through  those  treaties,  she  would  have 
raised  an  army  of  more  than  four  hundrca  thousand  men. 

It  is  the  affirmation  of  history  that  Hesse  Cassel,  Brunswick  and 
Hanau  matured  bitter  fruit  by  their  sale  of  men,  and  that  it  did  not 
pay. 

According  to  the  estimate  laid  before  parliament,  there  would 
be,  including  the  foreign  mercenaries,  about  fifty-five  thousand  men 
for  American  service  without  counting  Canadians,  Imlians  and  other 
Loy.ilists,  who  were  estimated  at  four  thousand  more  ;  and  that  the 
greatest  possible  allowance  for  possible  deficiencies  could  not  reduce 
the  number  below  forty  thousand. 

These  troops  were  put  in  motion  with  commendable  activity.  Sir 
Peter  Parker  and  Earl  Cornwallis  were  ready  to  sail  from  Cork  by  the 
twentieth  of  January,  but  were  detained  until  the  thirteenth  of  Eeb- 
ruary.  through  technicalities  as  to  the  authority  of  the  king  ;  and  legis- 
lation was  deemed  necessary  by  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland 
before  he  would  permit  the  departure  of  the  expedition. 

The  squadron  consisted  of  forty-three  vessels  and  more  than 
twenty-five  hundred  troops  ;  but  it  had  not  left  the  Irish  Channel 
before  a  severe  storm  drove  many  of  the  ships  to  Cork,  Plymouth, 


I  '<i 


:...  ;ii 


>  n 


■fc**"*'.' 


*t"^"  :     I 


1/4 


nRITISII    PRKrAKATIONS. 


['776. 


m'  I 


n  t 


lir  ft 


I'ortsnioulli  ami   other  harbors   for  refuge.     The   larger  portion  was 
speedily  collected  and  sailed  for  Cape  Fear  river,  North  Carolina. 

Meaiuviiile,  the  loyal  governors  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina 
were  doing  llicir  part  ii*.  the  preparation  for  active  operations  under 
instructions  from  the  king.  In  the  former  colony,  Lord  Dunmore  had 
already  armed  slaves  and  thus  held  out  the  threat  of  a  servile  war  ; 
but  the  influence  of  Lee  and  Henry  and  other  men  of  strong  will, 
and  their  self-sacrifice  and  wide-spread  po[)ularity,  kept  him  under 
rome  restraint,  since  he  had  not  the  force  for  a  boldly  offensive  action. 

Governor  i\Lirtin,  of  North  Carolina,  had  promised  the  king  to 
raise  ten  thousand  men  and  that  nuniber  of  arms  had  been  ordered  to 
the  colony.  Upon  receiving  positive  assurance  that  the  regular  troops, 
applied  for  during  the  lall  of  1775,  had  been  detailed,  and  ordered 
to  sail  for  Wilmington,  he  began  to  assert  vice-regal  powers.  Not 
daring  to  trust  himself  away  from  Wilmington  and  the  ship  which  was 
both  his  head-quarters  and  home,  he  appointed  one  Donald  McDonald 
to  the  offic<;  of  brigadier  General,  gave  Donald  McLeod  the  next 
position,  and  sent  thein  out  with  thirteen  other  Scotchmen,  to  raise  an 
army  for  the  king.  They  induced  him  to  believe  that  at  least  four 
thousand  men  could  be  put  under  arms  before  the  arrival  of  regular 
troops.  A  force  of  nearly  eighteen  hundred  men  was  gathered,  and 
on  the  twenty-seventh  of  February  they  attacked  the  Wilmington 
and  Newbern  minute-men  and  the  militia  of  Craven,  Johnson,  Dobbs 
and  Wake  counties,  who  were  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Caswell, 
afterward  Brigadier  General,  and  Colonel  Lillington,  at  Moore's  Creek 
Bridge. 

The  result  of  this  hot  skirmish  was  quickly  determined.  McDonald 
was  taken  prisoner  ;  McLeod,  Campbell  and  several  other  leaders  were 
killed,  and  the  whole  command  was  dispersed.  Thirteen  wagons, 
three  hundred  and  fifty  muskets,  nearly  fifteen  hundred  country  rifles 
and  two  medicine  chests,  just  from  England,  were  among  the  trophies 
which  the  colonists  bore  away  in  triumph.  A  box  of  gold  of  the  value 
of  fifteen  thousand  pounds  sterling,  which  was  the  chief  reliance  of 
McDonald  in  his  work  of  recruiting,  was  another  accjuisition  of  the  day. 

This  event  happened  quite  opportunely  for  the  Americans.  Gen- 
eral Lee  had  been  ordered  to  the  Southern  department,  and  it  was 
known  that  General  Clinton  intended  to  attack  the  coast  at  some 
eligible  point.  During  the  few  weeks  following  the  affair  at  Moore's 
Crock  Bridge,  nearly  nine  thousand  citizens  of  the  colony  organized 
in  behalf  of  the  common  cause  of  colonial  independence 


I776.J 


BRITISH   PRKPAKATIONS. 


175 


It  is  worthy  of  note  tli.it  North  Cirolina  ever  after  was  C':;nspic- 
uously  faithful  to  lier  obli<;atioiis,  and  no  local  organization  jfained  any 
considerable  headway  against  the  national  sentiment  of  the  people. 

Colonel  Moore  was  in  command  of  the  Continental  re;j[ulars,  and 
the  advent  of  Clinton  was  anticipated  without  apprehension.  The 
colonists  were  reatly. 

On  the  third  of  May,  Sir  Peter  Parker  and  Earl  Cornwallis  entered 
Cape  Fear  river  with  twenty  transports. 

General  Clinton  had  already  reached  Wilmin<Tton,  After  leaving 
New  York,  he  first  entered  Chesapeake  Hay  to  have  a  conference  with 
Governor  Dunmorc. 

During  the  month  of  April,  beginning  with  the  eighteenth,  when 
the  Ann  and  Isabella  arrived  with  a  part  of  the  Seventeenth  regiment, 
thirteen  transports  ha''  reached  Cape  Fear  river  in  advance  of  the 
flag-ship. 

The  united  forces  ,jf  Clinton,  General  Vaughan,  and  Earl  Cornwallis 
were  too  large  to  be  of  special  service  upon  the  North  Carolina  coast, 
and  Charleston  was  finally  adopted  as  objective  of  attack.  Kefore  his 
departure,  Clinton,  acting  under  instructions  from  the  king,  issued 
from  on  board  the  Pallas  transport,  a  formal  proclamation  of  an  un- 
popular nature,  denouncing  persistent  rebels,  conventions  and  con- 
gresses; offering  pardon  to  all  penitents  except  Colonel  Howe,  of  the 
continental  army,  and  Mr.  Cornelius  Ilarnet,  and  closed  his  duties  at 
Wilmington  by  sending  Cornwallis  on  shore  with  nine  hundred  men, 
to  lay  waste  Hrunswick.  Colonel  Howe's  house  and  mills  were  burned, 
and  some  injury  was  done  to  the  town  of  a  profitless  nature,  only 
aggravating  the  people,  and  the  army  took  sail  C>r  Charleston  harbor 


I 


CMAPTl'K    XXVII. 


riiK  Ki:rriiLic  or  south  Carolina. 

DEFKN'Si:. 


I'REI'ARATIQNS   FOR 


AOU.AINT  old  map  beariniL^dritc  AuL^'ust  31st,  1776,  was  found  in 
London  durin<;  the  year  1S75.  ICIcvcn  companion  maps  were 
l<nmd  with  it  in  a  rudo  atlas  called  "  The  North  American  Pilot," 
which  the  tremulous  old  man  whoi^uarded  the  street  book-staii'  said, 
"  ouj^ht  to  be  worth  a  shillinij."  Mis  judgment  was  respected,  and  a 
shillin|:j  bought  the  relic  ! 

Those  maps  jM-oved  to  be  the  record  of  official  work  done  by  Gas- 
coine,  Fisher,  Blamer.  and  other  officers  and  pilots  in  his  majesty 
(jcorge  the  Third's  service,  for  the  special  information  of  officers, 
soldiers,  and  seamen  who  should  have  occasion  to  perform  military 
duty  anywhere  upon  the  coast  of  North  America. 

The  special  map  which  bore  the  d.ite  already  given,  was  "  An 
exact  plan  of  Charleston  and  harbor;  From  an  Actual  Survey,  with 
the  Attack  of  Fort  Sullivan  on  the  28th  of  June,  1776,  by  his  Majesty's 
Squadron  commanded  by  Sir  Peter  Parker." 

The  soundings  and  bearings  are  profusely  indicated,  as  they  were 
tested  during  June,  1776,  for  the  use  of  the  fleet  »vhich  subsequently 
made  the  attack,  and  with  due  allowance  for  an  extraordinary  per- 
spective view  of  the  city,  which  seems  to  have  puzzled  the  ingenuity 
of  the  draughtsman  himself,  the  chart  is  c.Kcellc.it  and  very  complete. 

In  the  attempt  to  throw  ourselves  more  than  a  century  into  the 
past,  to  study  its  facts  and  their  lessons,  it  is  certainly  but  just  that 
we  include  the  topography  of  places  as  it  was  then  viewed  by  con- 
temporaries, so  that  we  may  seem  to  stand  by  their  side  as  the  scenes 
and  actors  pass  by. 

On  the  right  of  the  harbor  entr.ince  to  Charleston,  there  was  then, 
as  now,  a  low  sandy  island  called  Sullivan  Island.  Marshes,  thickets, 
and  trees  abounded. 


177^'.] 


TiiK  i.'Kruni.ic  OF  SOUTH  caromva. 


177 


1i. 


Northward,  near  by,  but  up  the  coast  a  short  distance,  tlicn^  was 
then,  as  now,  a  larger  island  called  Long  Island.  To  tiic  left  of  the 
harbor  entrance,  there  was  then,  as  now,  a  larj^e  islantl  of  several 
thousand  acr  with  Cummins  Point  and  I'ort  Johnsi-11  defnied,  and 
this  was  James  Island. 

U[)on  .Sullivan  Island  a  fort  had  been  bet:jun,  and  was  "  unfinished," 
accordin.Lj  to  the  (juaint  old  map  ;  but  on  (.'ither  side  of  it  was  a  small 
redoubt,  and  near  the  entrance  of  the  fort  was  a  "  mark-tree,"  to  i^uiile 
pilots  as  they  made  the  port.  Just  across  the  intervenin:^  water  and 
marsh,  a  little  more  than  a  mile,  was  an')ther  redoubt  at  Mt.  Pleasant, 
(Haddrell's  point),  and  close  by  two  houses,  marked  Jonathan  Scott's, 
and  Mr.  Poaiv^'s,  was  "The  American  Army." 

The  channel  mark  shows  seven  feet  of  water  at  low  tide,  between 
Sullivan  Island  and  the  "American  Army."  At  the  north  end  of  this 
islanil  there  apjjcar  to  be  some  earth-works,  and  these  are  occupied 
according  to  the  map,  bj-  fifteen  hundreil  Provincials,  "  intrenched^  to 
oppose  the  landing  of  Clinton's  army. 

On  Long  Islaiul  a])pears  "  Ikitish  forces,  fifteen  hundred  men 
under  General  Clinton,  landed  June  the  ninth,"  which  were  to  .''ttack 
Fort  .Sullivan  by  land.  Between  Long  Island  ami  the  main  land  there 
is  imlicated  deep  water,  and  betweeti  Long  Islaiul  and  Sullivan 
Island  the  water  varies  from  eighteen  inches  to  seven  feet  at  low  tide. 
The  deepest  water  of  the  harbor  entrance  is  in  the  north  channel 
close  by  Sullivan  Island,  and  very  near  to  the  "  unfmished  "  fort,  and 
thirteen  feet  of  water  is  indicated. 

"  On  the  bar,  the  low  water  at  neap  tides  is  twelve  and  a  lialf.  and 
high  w\ater  is  seventeen  and  a  half  feet.  At  spring  tides,  low  water  is 
eleven  and  a  half,  and  high  water  is  nineteen  feet.''  All  other  chan- 
nels range  from  five  to  nine  feet  of  water,  so  that  ships  had  to  go 
near  where  the  fort  was  built  if  they  were  bound  to  Charleston,  ami 
for  this  reason  Colonel  Moultrie  built  the  fort  at  that  point.  Such  is 
a  brief  suggestion  of  the  attack  upon  Fort  Sullivan,  and  of  the  cause 
of  its  failure. 

It  is  obvious  that  there  is  no  depth  of  water  which  will  give  to  a 
naval  force  a  choice  of  position  or  room  to  wear  on  or  off  at  will  ;  that 
a  landing  which  can  not  be  made  through  the  marslies  of  the  main 
land,  must  be  made  upon  Sullivan  Island,  so  as  to  control  the  bridge 
of  the  Americans  if  possible  ;  that  the  small  channels  with  seven  feet 
of  water  must  require  boats  for  a  passage,  and  that  there  must  be  some 
sohd  landing  place,  or  there  can  be  no  efficient  landing  at  all  under  fire. 
12 


<   'III 


•f 


T^ 


I -IS 


t:ik  republic  of  south  caroliw. 


[177'^ 


Km 


»i 


llllH 


■?-::;■ 


Tlic  historical  antecedents  of  Fort  Sullivan  and  its  defeiidcrs 
require  some  attention,  and  then  a  narrative  of  the  attack  and  defense 
will  test  the  accuracy  of  the  quaint  old  map. 

The  attack  upon  Fort  Sullivan  was  but  four  days  after  Congress 
had  solemnly  asserted  tliat  '•  all  persons  abidiii;^  within  any  of  the 
United  Colonies,  and  deriving  protection  from  its  laws,  owed  allegiance 
to  the  said  law,"  and  charged  the  guilt  of  treason  upon  "all  members 
of  any  of  the  United  Colonies  wlio  should  be  =  Jherent  to  the  king  of 
Great  Britain,  giving  to  him  aid  and  comfort." 

Its  issue  was  as  expressive  ,is  that  of  Bunker  Hill,  of  the  stubborn- 
ness of  the  defensive,  and  it  afforded  an  exa  Pi)^'  well  calculated  to 
inspire  the  troops  which  were  then  at  New  York  awaiting  an  attack  in 
force.  The  people  of  South  Caroh'an  were  ripe  for  just  such  a  deed 
of  valor,  and  deserved  success. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  during  April,  1775,  a  secret  committee 
of  citizens  took  the  colonial  muskets  and  cutlasses  from  the  pn.blic 
magazine  for  the  use  of  the  patriots.  This  act  was  followed  by  seizure 
of  povder,  and  a  wide-spread  effective  organization  of  the  militia. 

Thomas  Corbett,  one  of  the  committee,  and  acting  by  its  authority, 
took  possession  of  a  mail  package  just  from  England,  and  obtained 
frc  ,n  it  the  private  dispatches  which  announced  the  purpose  of  the 
British  mini->try'to  subdue  the  colonics  by  force  of  arms. 

These  dispatches  were  addressed  to  Governor  Dunmore,  of  Vir- 
ginia, Governor  Martin,  of  North  Carolina,  Governor  Campbell,  of 
South  Carolina,  Governor  Wright,  of  Georgia,  and  Governor  Tonyne, 
of  Augustine.  These  dispatches  were  sent  to  Congress,  and  had  a 
positive  effect  upon  their  action,  but  they  were  especially  influential 
in  stirring  up  the  people  of  Charleston  to  prepare  for  the  worst. 

A  dispatch  had  previously  been  found  upon  a  vessel  captured  in 
northern  waters,  dated  at  Whitehall,  December  twenty-third;  1775, 
stating  that  seven  regiments  were  in  readiness  to  proceed  to  the 
Southern  colonies,  and  that  they  would  in  the  first  place  proceed  to 
North  Carolina,  thence  to  Virginia  or  South  Carolina  as  circumstances 
should  pijint  out. 

A  letter  from  Governor  Wright  himself,  addressed  to  General 
Gage,  and  requesting  "  that  a  detachment  of  troops  be  sent  to  awe 
the  people,"  was  also  intercepted,  and  another  was  substituted  with 
a  counterfeit  of  his  signature,  saying  that  "  the  people  were  again  come 
to  some  order,  and  there  would  be  no  occasion  for  him  to  send  troops." 

The  excitement  attending  the  news  from  Lexington  di  '  not  sub- 


1776.] 


THE   REPUBLIC  OF  SOUTH   CAROLIXA. 


179 


side,  but  seemed  to  decide  the  people  of  South  Carolina  to  make 
it  the  occasion  for  permanent  resistance  to  British  supremacy.  Two 
regiments  of  foot  and  one  of  rangers  were  organized.  The  field 
officers  of  the  l""irst  regiment  were,  Colonel  Christopher  Gadsden, 
Lieutenant-colonel  Isaac  linger,  and  iVIajor  Owen  Roberts;  and  of 
the  Second  regiment.  Colonel  William  Moultrie,  Lieutenant-colonel 
Isaac  Mottc,  and  Major  /Mexander  Mcintosh.  Among  the  captains 
were  Charles  C.  and  Thomas  Pinckney,  Francis  Marion,  Peter  and 
Daniel  Horry,  William  and  Benjamin  Collett,  Francis  Muger,  and 
Charles  Motte.  William  Thompson  was  elected  colonel,  and  James 
Mayson  was  elected  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Rangers. 

A  council  of  safety  was  appointed  by  the  Provincial  Congress, 
June  sixteenth,  1775,  consisting  of  Henry  Laurens,  Charles  Pinckney, 
Rawlins  Lowndes,  Thomas  Ferguson,  Arthur  Middleton,  Thomas 
Heywood  Jr..  Thomas  Bee,  John  Huger,  James  Parsons,  William  H. 
Drayton,  Benjamin  Elliott,  and  William  Williams. 

During  the  month  of  July,  seventeen  thousand  pounds  of  powder 
was  taken  from  a  brig  near  Augustine,  and  by  the  twentieth  of  Au- 
gust more  than  thirty  thousand  pounds  had  been  accumulated  in  the 
storehouses  of  Charleston  and  Dorchester.  The  militia  of  Georgia 
had  secured  nearly  an  equal  anK.nint. 

After  midnight  of  the  fourth  of  .September,  James  Island  was 
occupied,  including  I'ort  Johnson,  under  the  direction  of  Henry 
Laurens,  President  of  the  Provincial  Congress,  and  Colonel  Gadsden's 
regiment  became  its  garrison. 

Colonel  Moultrie  occupied  .Sullivan's  Island,  and  during  the 
month  of  November,  a  regiment  of  artillery  was  organized,  and  the 
work  of  fortifying  all  prominent  points  of  the  city  and  adjacent  islands 
was  systematically  commenced.  Iladdrell's  Point,  was  occupied  for 
this  purpose  on  the  seventeenth  of  December.  During  January,  1776, 
Colonel  Moultrie  began  to  build  a  fnscine  battery  on  Sullivan's  Island, 
and  on  the  fifteenth,  tiie  discipline  of  the  troops  had  become  so  well 
advanced  that  every  company  had  its  designated  rendezvous  in  case 
of  alarm,  and  nearly  seventy  guns  were  in  position.  IMoultrie  states 
in  his  memoirs,  that  "  everybody  supposed  that  two  small  armed 
ships  could  take  Charleston,"  but  he  never  believed  that  they  could 
not  sink  ships,  as  well  as  Frenchmen  or  Spaniards  could  do  it.  This 
impression  however,  had  its  good  effect.  The  men  were  drilled  in  the 
exercise  of  extinguishing  fires,  planting  ladders  and  whatever  might 
be  required  in  case  the  city  was  shelled  and  set  on   fire.     Governor 


.': 


U;>JKIJ 

t  '• 

fj^fi 

\^,      . 

^  t    W 

t '. 

i£l  ,4! 

ir- 

|!;.:'    \ 


i8o 


THK    RFPUBLIC  OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA. 


[1776. 


ruiii  ! 


lih 


K    •■ 


i   I 


ijllHl 


>*^!ff, 


^«n' 


Erfe! 


Campbell,  successor  to  (lovernor  Wright,  had  by  this  time  become  a 
rcsi(.lent  upon  tlie  ■^loop  of  w.ir  Lamar,  as  the  Governors  of  \'ir<;inia 
anti  North  Carolina  had  already  made  ships  of  war  their  place  of 
refuge,  and  thus  tleclared  their  distrust  of  the  people  and  inability  to 
conciliate  or  govern  them. 

The  council  of  safety  ordered  the  detachment  on  Sullivan's  Island 
"to  fire  upon  ships,  boats  or  other  vessels  which  should  attempt  to 
pass,  approach,  or  land  troops  on  the  island."  Moultrie  describes  the 
island,  as  "  quite,!  wilderness  and  a  thick,  deep  swamp  where  the  fort 
stands,  with  live  oak,  m\'rtle  and  palmetto  trees. 

On  the  second  of  .March  he  !u\;an  to  build  a  large  fort  capable  of 
containing  one  thousand  men.  Two  regiments  of  riflemen  were  also 
authorized,  and  these  were  officeretl,  respecti\'ely,  by  Colonels  Isaac 
Huger  and  Thomas  Sumter. 

South  Carolina  thus  boldl\-  led  the  way  to  general  independence 
by  asserting  her  own,  under  John  Rutletlge  as  Presitleiit.  with  Henry 
Laurens  as  Vice  President,  and  William  11.  Drayton  as  Chief  Justice. 
.\n  army  and  navy  were  cre.ited  ;  Privy  Council  and  Assembly  were 
elected,  and  the  issue  of  si.K  hundred  thousand  dollars  of  paper  money 
was  authorized,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  coin  :  and  the  first  Republic  of 
the  New  World  began  its  life. 

I  .aureus,  as  well  as  Moultr.e,  Muger,  Pickens  and  Warren,  already 
commissioned  in  the  colonial  militia  regiments,  had  served  with  credit 
in  the  old  Cherokee  war  of  1760-1. 

Massachusetts  had  begun  the  year  with  substantial  freedom. 
.South  Carolina  put  all  the  machinery  of  a  nation  into  operation  with 
the  opening  spring. 

!})•  the  twenty-sixth  of  April  one  hundred  heavy  guns  were  in 
position. 

On  the  thirty-first  day  of  May  a  large  British  fleet  had  been  re- 
ported as  within  twenty  miles  of  the  harbor's  mouth,  and  on  the  first 
day  of  June  the  squadron  of  Admiral  Parker  began  to  appear  within 
view  from  Haddrell's  Point. 

The  month  of  June,  1776,  was  an  important  period  in  the  life  of 
the  young  Republic  of  South  Carolina. 

The  men  who  toiled,  endured,  and  fought  out  an  issue  which 
secured  the  inviolability  of  her  soil  for  nearly  three  years  of  the  national 
struggle,  were  men  who  had  entered  upon  military  service  with  a  real 
purpose  to  make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  art  of  war.  Their 
long  period  of  preparation  and  drill  was  destined  to  bear  its  natural 


(i  I 


r776 


THE    REPUBLIC   OF  SOUTH   CAROI-INA. 


i8i 


fruit  and   to   confer  perpetual    honor  upon  those  wlio  liad  so  early 
anticipated,  appreciated  and  prei)ared  for  the  stru;4;4le. 

The  militia  about  lioston  had  been  suddenly  summoned  to  become 
soldiers  and  lo  meet  all  the  tleinands  which  military  service  exacts  of 
disci[)lined  troops,  without  the  antecedent  preparation  for  s(j  formi- 
dable a  responsibility,  and  this  at  the  very  outset  of  the  war,  before 
experie-nce  iiad  demonstrated  the  importance  of  system,  obedience 
and  self-sacrifice,  if  physic. il  force  were  to  he  employed  to  advantage, 
at^ainst  the  thorou;^h  veterans  of  (ire at  Ikitain. 

The  orders  and  familiar  instructiiMis  whicii  had  been  ;^iven  as 
<j;uides  to  Moultrie's,  (jadsden's  and  Thom[)son's  re;_;iments,  bore  the 
impress  of  careful  thouj^ht  ;  and  there  was  a  deliberate  steadiness,  in 
the  preijaration  for  invasion,  w  hich  was  nowhere  surpassed  in  colonial 
experience.  The  material  was  <piite  homoi^eneous  and  the  men  who 
were  selected  as  officers,  were  so  selected,  as  it  was  claimed,  for  the 
Very  purpose  "f  yettin;,;' the  best  men  fir  their  resjjective  trusts.  The 
contest  was  ,  >  largely  dei)endent  upon  her  own  citizens  in  the  first 
;)lace,  th, It  there  was  very  little  of  jealousy,  or  the  clashin;,^  of  person, d 
.unbition  at  the  time,  ami  the  lessons  of  more  than  a  year  of  national 
^iruys^le  were  not  lost  siyht  of  in  the  hour  of  pcv\\. 

President  Rutled_L;e,  .ifterwards  t^hief  Justice  of  the  United  States, 
was  endowed  with  a  rare  ficuU\-  of  judj^ini;  men  ani.|  issues  by  practi- 
cal tests,  and  his  saijacity,  nerse  and  inllexible  will,  more  than  the 
valor  of  Moultrie  and  his  com[),inions,  secured  the  victory  achieved. 
It  was  throuL;h  iiis  deliberate  and  unchanging  purpose,  that  Moultrie 
was  enabled  to  achieve. 

The  month  of  June  was  full  of  that  type  of  painstaking  and  clieei- 
ful  waiting  which  gave  to  Bunker  Hill  its  pf)ssibility  and  its  history. 

Cjeiieral  Armstrong  arrived  from  the  north  late  in  .\pril,  assisted 
with  his  counsel,  and  was  [MMCtic.dly,  if  not  formally,  in  commantl  of 
the  South  Carolina  troops  ui)on  the  arrival  of  the  liritish  fleet. 

On  the  fir-it  day  of  June,  177'),  the  city  of  Charleston  was  full  of 
life  and  labor.  Colonel  Pinckney's  regiment  was  [)rompt  to  take  the 
])laces  assigned  to  the  companies  upon  an  .darni.  Negroes  were  on 
tiuty  with  the  tire-engines,  bringing  fire-hooks,  a.xes,  and  all  things 
i)efore  provided  for  an  emergenc)' ;  the  batteries  were  manned,  and 
additional  defenses  were  begun.  Tr.iverses  were  made  in  the  princi- 
pal streets,  >ind  light  works  were  thrown  up  at  every  point  which 
afforded  a  ready  landing  from  boats. 

The  lead  sash,  then  so  common,  were  taken   from   churches  and 


•y 


If  '  ■  I     »  B; 


5  TfSs  '•■' 


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lit  H 


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i8: 


Tin-:  REPUiu.ic  OF  sourii  Carolina. 


L1776. 


houses  to  be  run  into  bullets,  while  in  response  to  swift  messengers 
sent  into  the  country,  the  niiiuitc-nien  bcj^Mn  to  .•isseinl)!e  and  <^o  to 
the  places  which  were  to  be  p.irlially  under  their  char;:je.  Ware- 
houses and  other  buildini^^s  aloiiL;  the  river  front  were  demolished,  and 
their  sites  and  materials  were  used  to  establish  additional  defenses. 
Wlierever  any  necessary  work  was  to  be  done,  liowever  Mumble,  scr- 
^'eants  were  sent  with  a  i^uard  detail,  and  the  duty  was  performed  with 
expedition  and  system. 

On  James  Island,  Colonel  Gadsden,  then  the  commandintj  otficer 
at  Charleston,  had  established  a  we'll  arr.ins^ed  camp,  with  tents  and 
all  necessary  protection  for  the  ordinary  ;_;arrison  of  fu'e  hundred  men. 

Tliat  force  was  now  increaseil,  and  .1  battery  was  established 
directly  opposite  the  city  for  the  use  of  the  artiller)-  companies  which 
reported  to  him  in  case  the  shippin;^^  should  pass  Fort  Johnson  in 
safety. 

Colonel  Moultrie  was  rapidly  completing;  the  exposed  faces  f)f 
I'ort  Sullivan,  and  new  works  were  beL^un  alon;^^  the  coast  east  of 
Mount  Pleasant,  to  command  the  shore  opposite  to  Sullivan  and 
Lon^j  Islands.  Sumter's  and  Thompson's  reL;iments  Iiatl  reported  to 
Moulti'ie  for  dut}-.  June  third,  he  notified  I'resident  RutIe(.lL;e  that  a 
tender,  wliich  had  been  in  compaiu'  with  two  lar_Lje  ships  and  a 
schooner,  was  takinij  soundinj^s  from  neat  the  post  of  his  advanced 
guard  all  along  I-i>ng  Inland. 

Jiuie  lourlh,  (lemral  Charles  I.ec  arrived,  and  on  the  ninth  was 
placeil  in  general  command.  lie  had  kept  pace  with  Clinton  from 
Boston  to  New  \'ork,  thence  to  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  and 
arriveil  at  Charleston  nist  as  that  officer  was  apprtiaching  its  coast  to 
join  in  the  effort  to  cajjture  and  occui)y  its  harbor  defenses. 

Lee  was  in  his  element,  that  of  indei)endenl  commanil,  oidy  re- 
strained b\'  the  authority  of  President  l\.ut ledge,  who  was  as  resolute 
as  Washington  himself  when  convincetl  of  duty.  Lee  made  imme- 
diate inspection  of  all  {)reparations,  and  was  tireless  in  his  work.  He 
insisted  from  the  first  that  Fort  .Sullivan  would  be  a  mere  "  slaughter 
pen,"  and  must  be  abandoned,  i'his  opinion  In;  maintained  until  the 
fort  had  actually  ie[)elle(.l  the  enemy;  and  only  Moultrie's  persistency 
and  faith,  backed  by  the  president,  prevented  the  aband'jnment  of 
that  position  and  the  inevitable  loss  of  the  city. 

Moultrie  says  in  his  memoirs,  "  I  never  was  uneasy  on  not  having 
a  retreat,  because  I  never  imagined  that  the  enemy  couUl  force  me  to 
that  necessity."     Notwithstanding  Moultrie's  faith  in  the  sufficiency 


1776.1 


TIIK    RKPUnUC   OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA. 


>83 


of  his  defense,  Lcc  never  rested  easy  until  a  lari^e  force  iiad  been 
employed  to  bcL^in  i  second  briil^^e  to  Sullivan  Island  ;  the  first,  which 
had  bi.en  made  of  noatin;^  hoi^sheatls  with  plank  stretches,  having 
proved  c.ipable  of  sustainini;  less  than  two  hundred  men  at  a  time. 

I.ee  brou<^ht  threat  reputation  ;  equal,  said  Moidtrie,  in  its  en- 
courac^ement  of  the  troops,  to  a  reinforcement  of  a  thousand  men. 
He  adds,  "The  officers  could  not  at  first  reconcile  themselves  to  his 
hasty  and  rouj^h  manners,  but  he  tau^^ht  us  to  think  lightly  of  the 
enemy,  and  gave  a  spur  to  all  our  actions." 

Lee  had  fears  that  Colonel  Moultrie's  "  good  temper  and  easy 
nature  "  interfered  with  proper  discipline,  and  repeatedly  calls  atten- 
tion to  this  matter  in  letters  written  to  him  iiefore  the  battle.  Mis  own 
orders  to  the  troo[)s  indicate  a  sound  appreciation  of  all  that  consti- 
tuted a  good  soldier,  ami  his  experience  before  Boston  had  prepared 
iiim  to  find  a  body  of  militia  of  the  same  character  as  those  which 
first  invested  that  city.  A  few  extracts  from  his  official  pa[)ers  illus- 
tr.ite  his  views.  "Soldiers  running  at  random  wherever  their  folly 
directs,  is  an  absolute  abomination  not  to  be  tolerated."  "  When  you 
issue  any  orders,  tlo  not  suffer  them  to  be  trified  with."  "  Let  y(jur 
orders  be  as  few  as  possible  ;  but  let  them  be  punctually  obeyed." 
"  I")o  not  tease  men  wMth  superlluous  duties  or  labor,  but  enforce  what- 
ever is  necessary  for  the  honor  and  safety  of  your  garrison."  "  Post 
a  commissioned  officer  at  the  be.icli  to  prevent  the  monstrous  dis- 
orders I  complain  of."  "  If  you  expend  your  ammunition  without 
beating  off  the  enemy,  spike  your  guns,  and  retreat  with  all  the  order 
possible."  "  Never  fire  without  a  moral  certainty  of  hitting.  One 
hundred  and  fiftj-  yartis  is  the  maximum  for  muskets,  and  four  hun- 
dred for  cannon."  "  Distant  firing  encourages  the  enemy,  and  adds 
to  the  pernicimis  persuasion  of  the  American  soldiers  that  they  are  no 
match  for  their  antagonist  at  close  fighting.  It  makes  them  cowards, 
is  childish,  v'';ious,  and  scandalous." 

Lee  was  vigilant,  by  night  and  daj',  and  as  soon  as  he  understood 
exactly  what  was  expected  to  be  dune  through  his  authority,  he  dis 
charged  his  duty  promptly  and  efficiently,  and  was  one  of  the  first  to 
congratulate  Colonel  Moultrie  upon  his  final  success. 

June  seventh,  a  flag  from  Admiral  Parker  was  fired  upon  by  an 
ignorant  sentry,  but  Moultrie  apologized  for  the  oversight  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  General  Clinton,  in  return,  sent  a  i)roclamation  to  the 
colonists  similar  in  character  to  that  issued  at  Wilmington. 

June  eighth.  Colonels  Thompson's  and  Sumter's  regiments  were 


\% 


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184 


TiiE    RI-;rUULIC   OF  SOUTH   CAROLINA. 


['776 


ordered  to  I-on;^  Isl.uul  to  dislodLijc  the  IJritish  troops  who  were  effect- 
ing a  landing;  but  this  iinpractic;il)le  order  of  General  Lee  was  modi- 
fied, and  they  took  position  upon  the  northeast  end  of  Sullivan  Island. 

June  tenth,  the  Hritish  fleet  came  o\er  the  bar,  except  two  ves- 
sels. On  the  eleventh,  the  North  (Carolina  ami  ^'irginia  Continental 
troops  arrived,  increasing  the  Anieric.m  forces  to  six  thousand  men, 
of  whom  twenty-five  hundred  were  regulars.  On  the  twelftli  the 
British  fleet  made  a  demonstratiiMi  as  if  to  attack,  but  were  lirivcn  off 
by  a  heav)-  scpi.ill  of  wind.  On  the  fifteentli  (Jlencnd  Lcc  i)lact'd  Gen- 
eral Armstrong's  ci)mmand  at  ll.iddrell's  Point  ant!  tjrdered  .Moultrie 
to  rcpt)rt  to  him  as  his  immediate  commanding  officer.  On  the 
twenty-third  the  fleet  made  movement  preparatory  to  an  attack,  but 
a  contrarj-  wind  defe.ited  tiieir  pur[K)se.  On  the  twenty-fourth  the 
Muhleiiburg  regiment  arrived  from  Virginia  well  equii)petl  and  in  a 
high  state  of  discipline. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  Clinton  made  a  vain  effort  to  reach  the  main 
land.  On  the  twenty-sixtii  tiie  Experiment.  50,  also  crossed  the  bar. 
On  thj  twent)-stventh,  Lee  sent  scouting  parties  in  boats,  along  the 
coast,  and  an  effort  was  made  under  his  orders,  to  remove  the  buoys 
which  had  been  established  by  the  surveying  parties  sent  from  the 
fleet.  The  enemy  made  no  movement  that  was  not  watched,  aiul  four 
miles  of  earth-works  had  been  completed  along  the  shore. 

Thus  four  weeks  of  pre[)<u'ation  passed  by. 

The  American  forces  gained  confidence,  numbers  and  discipline: 
while  the  Hritish  fleet  and  army  had  just  reached  the  positions  which 
were  neces.sary  for  offensive  action. 

Horry's  and  Clark's  regiments  were  on  the  island  or  at  Iladdrell's 
Point,  while  Isaac  Motte  and  Francis  ^Llrion,  were  comrades  of  Moul- 
trie in  the  hour  of  final  danger. 

It  was  the  eve  of  battle.  Admiral  Parker  had  drilled  his  marines 
and  seamen  in  the  motions  of  climbing  the  parapet  of  the  fort  and 
entering  the  embrasures,  and  he  was  confident  that  two  rounds  of  fire 
would  prepare  the  way  for  an  assault  ;  while  Clinton,  too  heedless  of 
warnings  as  to  the  depth  of  intervening  water,  had  his  army  in  hand 
as  he  confidently  hoped,  for  occupation  and  victory. 


'       !">      Hf 


CHAPTER   XXVTII. 

CLINTON'S   EXPEDITION.     ATTACK   ON  FORT  MOULTRIE. 

FORT  Moultrie  was  laid  out  for  four  bastions,  but  on  the  twcnty- 
ei<^Mitli  day  of  June,  1776,  the  west  and  north  faces  of  the  main 
uiirk  were  nearly  open,  and  only  the  two  bastions  on  the  channel 
front  had  been  sufficiently  advanced  to  receive  guns.  The  soft  and 
spongy  but  tough  palmetto  trees  which  abounded  on  Sullivan  Island, 
had  been  dove-tailed  together  in  a  series  of  c(^,nnccting  pens,  and  these 
were  filletl  with  sand,  so  that  the  parajiet  was  si.Kteen  feet  in  thickness, 
and  sufficiently  high  to  protect  the  gunners  and  garrison.  Tnirty-one 
guns  were  in  position.  Only  twenty-one  could  have  a  combined  fire 
at  the  san)e  time,  and  the  ammunition  on  hand  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action  of  that  date  did  not  average  thirty  rounds  to  the 
piece. 

It  was  evident  very  early  in  the  morning,  that  an  immediate  assault 
was  impending.  Colonel  Moultrie  visited  the  advance  guard,  which 
was  on  the  northern  extremity  of  the  island  three  miles  from  .Sullivan, 
very  soon  after  the  break  of  d.iy.  He  found  that  Colonel  I'iiompson 
had  completed  the  light  breastworks  which  were  to  face  the  channel 
between  Sullivan  Island  and  General  Clinton's  camp,  and  that  one 
eighteen  and  one  si.\  pounder  gun  had  been  well  locatetl  for  resisting 
a  landing  by  the  British  troops.  In  the  myrtle  bushes  near  the 
beach,  and  well  covered  by  son)e  drifted  sand  hills,  there  had  been 
secreted  a  company  of  expert  riflemen.  Three  hundred  "  good  shots  " 
from  Thompson's  own  regiment,  supported  by  nearly  as  many  from 
Colonel  Cl.uk's  North  C.uolina  regiment,  two  hundred  of  Mcjrry's 
men,  and  the  "  Raccoon  Rifles,"  made  up  the  entire  conuiiand,  and 
their  officers  inanii'ested  full  confidence  in  their  ability  to  resist  any 
attack. 

Moultrie  had  just  finished  his  inspection  of  these  preparations 
when  the  movement  of  the  troops  from  the  opposite  beach  to  their 


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1 86 


CLINTON  S    r.XI'KlM  IION. 


[1776. 


boats  and  lloatiiiL;  batteries,  warned  him  that  the  time  hail  come  for 
liini  to  be  at  liisown  post  of  dani^er.  Mottc,  his  second  in  commanti, 
and  Marion  wholiad  l)een  his  heutenant  in  the  old  Clierokee  war,  were 
anxiously  au.nlin,;  his  arrival.  Aire, id}'  the  na_L;-shij)  of  Comimulore 
I'arker  was  llyiiiL;  sij^nals  for  Chnton's  arm_\' to  crois  Breach  inlet  to 
Sullivan  Ishmd,  ami  attack  tlie  main  fort  in  tlie  rear,  ami  tiie  ships 
had  shaken  out  top-sails  in  readiness  to  advance  to  their  own  proper 
position  in  the  channel  ne.irest  the  fort. 

Moultrie  was  on  horseback.  He  says,  "  I  hurritxl  hack  to  the  fort 
as  soon  as  pi)ssil)le.  When  I  ;^ot  there  I  found  that  tlie  ships  were 
.dready  umier  >ail.  I  immediately  onlere^l  the  lon;^  roll  to  heat,  and 
officers  and  men  to  their  posts,  when  the^hips  came  s.iilin;^'  up,  as  if  in 
confidence  of  victory.  We  had  ,-carcely  manned  our  L;uns.  They 
were  soon  abreast  i^i  tiie  fort,  let  !4o  their  .inchors,  and  beL;"an  tiieir 
attack  most  fm-iousl)-." 

The  fort  was  designed  fir  a  thousand  men,  l;u'.  was  occupied  by 
Moultrie's  own  re^^iment  onl_\-,  and  ])art  of  one  artillery  compan>', 
makiuL,^  a  total  of  four  hundred  ane!  thirls'-five,  includiiiL;  officers  and 
nun. 

(ieneral  Armstrong  was  in  command  of  a  force  of  fifteen  hundretl 
men,  and  a  poitioii  of  the  artillery  re;4iment  at  lladdrell's  Point,  and 
Cieneral  Lee  took  up  his  head-quarters  for  the  d.iy  at  that  post.  1  lie 
l''irst  regular  South  Carolina  regiment,  under  Colonel  (jailstleii,  still 
occupied  I'ort  Johnson,  on  James  Isl.md,  and  a  force  of  ne,ul\-,  or 
quite  twenty- five  hundred  men  was  pr.iperly  iHsposed  fir  the  pro- 
tection of  the  city  it>elf,  and  its  earthworks  and  batteries,  A  large 
force  of  negroes  was  briskly  at  work  endeavoring  to  complete  some 
■idditional  wiirks  ;  and  another  body  had  charge  ()f  the  fire-engines 
and  other  fire-apparatus,  as  when  the  first  alarm  four  weeks  before 
hail  called  the  city  to  arms. 

Tiie  cpiaint  okl  map  referred  to,  so  accur.ite  in  its  description  of 
the  harbor,  and  in  all  chief  respects  in  full  h.irinony  with  offici,il 
reports,  is  erroneous  as  to  Clinton's  force,  which  consisted  ot  over 
twenty-one  hundred  foot,  light  infantry,  and  grenadiers,  and  nearly 
seven  hundred  seamen,  making  a  total  of  nearly  three  thous<uid  men. 
Hut  the  old  map  thus  correctly  represents  the  location  of  the  advanc- 
ing vessels. 

The  Solcbay,  28,  Capt.iin  'I'homas  Symonds,  led  the  van  of  the 
first  division  ;  the  Experiment.  50,  Captain  Alexander  Scott  ;  the 
Bristol,  50,  flag-ship  of  Sir  Peter  Parker,  Captain   John  Morris  ;  and 


»<-. 


17, '■ 


ci.iNioN  s  i:\ri:iiri  iiiN. 


187 


the  Active,  j8,  Cipl.iin  William  Williains  followed.  A  second  division 
of  three  lii^Iit  fri;^.ites  ;  the  Si)h)'iix,  20.  Captain  Aiitlu)ny  Hunt  ;  the 
Acla;on,  2S,  Captain  Cliristoplier  Atkins  ;  and  the  Syren,  jS,  Captain 
Tobias  I'^iirneaux,  inoved  on  a  cinir.>.e  fnrtiier  to  the  sonth,  with  orders 
to  pass  the  line  of  battle  shii)s,  and  ;_;,iin  a  i)«sition  westward  ot  the 
fort,  so  as  to  sweep  its  (jpi.;n  side  with  .in  enfilatlini^  fire,  and  L;ive  llieir 
larboard  broadsides  to  the  redoubts  and  earthworks  on  Haililrell's 
Point.  The  Thunder  Bomb,  mortar  ship,  S,  Captain  Janies  Reid 
commander,  tcjok  its  position  south-east  by  south  from  the  salient 
angle  of  the  e.ist  bastion,  with  Colmul  janies,  throwin;^  shells,  and 
Covered  by  the  Frienil^hi[),  _'2,  Captain  ("iiarKs  Hope.  Tiie  Ranj^er, 
sloop.  C.ipt  liu  Ro;^er  Willis,  and  the  St.  l>awrence  schooner,  8,  Lieu- 
tenant J.  N.  (iraves,  lay  off  Breach  inlet,  which  separated  .Sullivan  and 
Long  Inland,  to  act  in  concert  with  the  small  boats  which  were  to 
land  the  troops  of  t."linton. 

The  plan  of  attack  w,is  well  conceived,  and  was  sustained  with  a 
persistent  gallantry  nowhere  surpassed  in  naval  annals. 

It  was  nearly  eleven  o'clock  when  the  first  division  advanced  under 
easy  sail,  and  disregarding  the  first  few  shots  deliveretl  troni  the  fort, 
let  go  their  anciiors  ami  opened  fire.  rheTluinder  Homb  was  already 
.It  work,  and  the  roar  of  guns  from  tlie  northward,  brought  notice  to 
the  quickened  garrison  that  this  double  effort  to  win  their  post  was  at 
its  issue.  That  garrison,  under  the  order  of  Moultrie,  "  mind  the 
commodore,"  "  mind  the  fifty  gun-ships,"  wasted  few  shots  upon  the 
frigates,  but  steadily,  and  as  rapidly  as  the  supply  of  powder  would 
give  them  chance,  swept  the  quarter  decks  of  the  heavy  vessels,  from 
about  noon  until  sunset. 

The  first  bro.'ulside  firing  from  the  fleet  cmbeddeci  balls  in  the  pal- 
metto logs  ;  but  scattered  no  splinters,  dis[il.iced  no  material  and 
afforded  no  ho[ieful  sign  of  the  anticii)ated  victory.  Moultrie  writes, 
*'  The  Thunder  Bomb  had  the  bet!  of  her  mortar  soon  disabled,  she 
threw  her  shells  in  good  direction,  and  most  of  them  fell  within  the 
fort  ;  but  we  had  a  morass  in  the  nii(.ldle  that  swallowed  them  up 
instantly,  and  those  that  fell  in  the  sand,  in  and  about  the  fort,  were 
immediately  burieil,  so  that  very  few  bursted  amonti  us." 

In  the  midst  of  the  action  the  flag  ship  swung  round,  with  her 
stern  to  the  fort.  Every  available  gun  was  trained  upon  the  ship  and 
with  terrible  effect.  Ca])tain  Moore  lost  an  arm  and  was  carried  below. 
"At  one  time,"  says  Kdnunu.  Burke,  then  editor  of  the  Annual 
Register,  "  the  cjuarter  deck  of  the   Bristol  was  cleared  of  every  per- 


3 


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IM 

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1 88 


CI. IN  11 1\  S    r.XI'lDITION. 


'. '  77f>. 


I    ! 


son  but  till'  Commodore,  who  stood  aloiio. — a  spectacle  of  intrepidity 
and  firmness  wliich  have  seldom  been  equaled,  never  exceeded." 

Until  the  position  of  the  ship  was  shifted,  there  was  every  proba- 
bility th.it  she  would  be  sunk  at  anchor. 

It  was  ju--t  then  that  the  fire  from  the  fort  i)(;4an  to  slacken,  for 
want  of  p(jwder  ;  but  within  an  hour  it  was  resumed  with  increased 
vi;^or.  Rutletii^e  had  not  fori,n)tten  Moultrie,  neither  had  he  lost  faitii 
in  his  capacity  and  skill.  The  followinjj  note,  written  in  pencil,  con- 
veved  his  s\ninathv  with  the   successful  resistance  thus  far  sustained. 

"  Dkar  Sik, 

I  send  you  jtxi  pmuuls  of  powdir.  \'oii  know  our  colk'i'iioii  is  nut  very  great. 
I  should  tliink  \ou  may  In;  supplied  IVoni  Iladdnll's  Point.  Honor  ,ind  VicruRV, 
my  i^^ood  >ir,  lo  \au,  and  our  w'oriliy  countrymen  will)  yciu.         N'onr-,, 

J.  Kuri.i;i)(;K." 

"  P.  S.     I)o  not  make  too  free  with  your  cinnon." 

"  Cool  and  do  mischief." 

This  wise  postscrii)t  wr.s  a  caution  aj^ainst  that  rapiil  firinej  so 
common  with  imskilled  tjunncrs  who  over-heat  their  pieces,  end.mi^fcr 
the  lives  of  their  comrades,  and  impair  the  acciu'acy  of  the  aim  and 
ranches.  It  was  now  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  firing,  to 
the  northward,  which  beo;an  at  the  time  of  the  naval  attack,  had  ceased. 
Clinton  had  loatlcd  his  boats  ami  attempted  to  cross  to  Sullivan  island. 
The  men  couUl  not  wade  throut^h  the  deep  water:  and  the  loaded 
boats  could  do  nothing  upon  intermediate  shoals,  with  a  depth  of  less 
than  eighteen  inches.  The  withering  fire  of  the  American  rillemen 
who  were  under  close  cover,  renderetl  every  vigorous  effort  to  force 
the  army  to  the  shore,  a  sure  delivery  of  the  command  to  entire 
destruction. 

William  Falconer,  writing  on  the  thirteenth  of  July  from  Long 
Island,  where  Clinton  remained  until  his  departure  for  New  York, 
says,  "  If  the  shijjs  could  have  silenced  the  battery,  the  army  was  to 
have  made  an  attack  on  the  back  of  the  island,  where  they  had  about 
one  thousand  men  entrenchetl  ///>  tt>  their  eyes.  They  would  have 
killed  half  of  us  before  we  could  have  made  our  landing  good." 

General  Clinton  made  two  attempts,  and  finding  that  it  was  equally 
impossible  to  reach  Sullivan  island  or  the  main  land,  on  account  of 
the  marshes,  he  very  wisely  saved  his  troops  from  further  effort. 

The  second  division  of  the  squadron,  under  top-sails  only,  .sailed 
smoothly  by  the  flag-ship,  and  by  the  Solebay,  while  the  broadsides 
ol  those  ships  were  first  testing  the  palmetto  fort.     The  quaint  old 


I77'-'.  I 


CMMON  S  EXrHOFTloN. 


189 


map,  locates  tlK'in  a  littlr  tiniL'  after  tliat,  thus — "  A—^i;;n)iin<i."  They 
had  run  upon  tlic  "  middle  ground  slioal,"  near  where  Futt  Sumter 
was  afterward  built.  "  f/usi'  three  frii^ntvs  locrc  to  have  ,i;v>u'  to 
the  'ivestivani  of  the  fort."  "■  Actceon  scuttled  and  set  on  fire  on  the 
29///." 

Lee  crcjssed  to  Sullivan  Island  during  the  fi;^d\t,  to  incjuirc  into  the 
condition  of  the  fort,  and  returneil  with  the  conviction  that  the  defense 
would  be  successful.  Moultrie  says.  "  we  opened  our  temi)orary  ijate, 
to  admit  tieneral  Lee.  Several  of  the  officers  as  well  as  myself  were 
smokin;^  our  pipes  and  givin;^  orders  ;  but  we  laid  them  down  when 
he  came  in." 

The  day  was  menior.ible  for  its  incidents.  Captain  Scott  of  the 
Experiment,  as  well  as  Captain  Morris,  lost  an  arm.  Forty  were  killed 
and  seventy-one  were  wounded  on  the  Bristol ;  her  hull  was  struck 
.seventy  times,  the  masts  and  riL^j^ini;  suffered  severely,  and  a  half  hour 
of  additional  c.\[)osure  would  have  been  fatal.  The  L.xperiment  had 
twenty-three  killed  and  fifty-si.x  wounded.  The  vessels  slipjied  their 
cables  at  dark,  and  retired  nearly  tliree  miles  from  the  .scene  of  conflict. 

Within  the  fort,  behind  the  palmetto  lojjs  and  sand,  where  the 
people  in  shirt  sleeves  were  handling;  cannon,  there  were  heroic  deeds 
performed  well  worthy  of  record  with  those  of  the  battle  deck.  "  At 
one  time,"  says  Moultrie,  "  three  or  four  of  the  men-of-war  broadsides 
struck  the  fort  at  the  same  instant,  which  gave  the  merlons  such  a 
tremble  that  I  was  apprehensive  that  a  few  more  such  would  tumble 
them  down."  "  Our  flag  was  shot  away!  Our  friends  gave  up  all  for 
lost!  Sergeant  Jasper  perceiving  that  the  flag  (blue,  with  a  silver 
crescent  in  the  dexter  corner,  corresponding  with  the  cap  ornament 
of  the  South  Carolina  troops)  had  fallen  without  the  fort,  jumped 
through  one  of  the  embrasures  and  brought  it  up  through  heavy  fire, 
fixed  it  upon  a  sponge  staff,  and  planted  it  upon  the  ramparts  again." 
Twelve  men  were  killed,  and  twenty-four  were  wounded,  nearly  every 
casualty  having  occurred  from  shot  which  entered  the  large  embra- 
sures of  the  fort.  When  Sergeant  McDonald  received  his  mortal 
wound,  addressing  the  .soldiers  who  were  carrying  him  to  the  doctor, 
he  begged  them  "  never  to  give  up,  they  were  fighting  for  liberty." 
His  words  are  to  be  remembered  with  those  of  another  of  the  same 
blood,  "  England  expects  every  man  will  do  his  duty," 

With  the  next  morning,  there  came  a  clearer  view  of  the  result 
of  the  battle.  The  Actaion  was  burned  by  her  crew  as  they  abandoned 
her.     The  Sphynx  had  fouled  with  the  Syren  and  lost  her  bowsprit. 


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Hoth  vessels  uont  off  with  the  tide  aiul  joincil  tlic  first  division,  aiul 
tlic  na;^-slHi)  wliicli  v's  also  clisabK-d  for  further  offensive  operations. 

The  liritish  troops  lini^ered  on  Lon;.y  Island  for  nearlythrec  weeks. 
Falconer  thus  describes  his  own  condition  under  date  of  July  thir- 
teenth. "  We  have  been  encamped  on  this  island  for  nearly  a  month 
past,  and  have  lived  upon  nothin;_;but  salt  pork  and  pease.  We  sleep 
upon  the  seashore,  nothiiiL;  to  shelter  us  from  the  violent  lalns  but 
our  coats  anil  miserable  paltry  blankets.  There  is  nothiuL;  that  i^ro.vs 
upon  this  island,  it  beiiv^  but  a  nierj  sand  bank,  but  a  few  bushes 
which  harbor  millions  of  mos([uitoes.  Our  killed  and  wounded  num- 
ber between  two  and  three  hundred,  and  numbers  die  daily  of  tiieir 
wounds." 

General  Clinton,  with  his  comm.ind,  left  under  the  convoy  of  the 
Solebay  fri;4ate,  and  reached  Stateu  Island  on  the  first  of  Auj^ust. 
Useless  ilifferences  arose  between  that  officer  and  Commodore  Parker. 
Each  did  his  tluty  [gallantly  antl  well.  Neither  had  the  ri^^nt  to  blame 
the  other  for  the  .ilternations  of  deep  and  shoal  water,  which  rendered 
impossible  the  success  of  either. 

South  Carolina  and  the  American  Congress  united  their  testi- 
monials of  gratitude  and  honor  to  the  men  who  achieved  the  victory, 
and  after  more  than  a  century  of  national  life,  the  American  Repub- 
lic reaffirms  the  tribute  which  was  given  by  the  Palmetto  State  ;  and 
the  fort  on  Sullivan  Island  is  only  to  be  remembered  as  Fort 
Moultrie  ! 


CHAPTEK    XXIX. 


THE  TWO   ARMIKS    IN   JUr.Y    AND   AT  '.USl',    177^.. 

THE  month  of  July,  1776,  bc;^r;i„  \yit\i  tlic  saddest  sliow  for  a  vast 
expenditure  of  men  and  money  tliat  could  oppressa  peo[)le  just 
entering  ujjon  a  ;^reat  war.  I'he  story  of  the  expedition  to  Ca,  ada 
was  a  tra'^edy  of  woe  which  carried  mourniiiLj  to  many  households, 
and  demand'*d  great  wisdom,  endurance,  and  faith,  if  the  costly  sacri- 
fice was  to  be  converted  into  hopeful  promise  for  the  future. 

The  lesson  was  one  which  had  for  its  text  the  primary  importance 
of  thorough  discipline  as  the  chief  requisite  of  well  applieil  physical 
force,  and  most  impressively  decl.ired  a  fact,  that  the  casualties  of  the 
battle-field  are  but  few,  when  compared  with  the  waste  which  belongs 
to  bad  loi^istics. 

Individual  courage  was  not  wanting.  Capacity,  self-sacrifice,  and 
great  daring  were  well  supplied  ;  but  these  elements  had  not  been 
sufificiently  coinbincd,  systematized  and  concentrated,  at  the  expense 
of  all  individual  choice  and  preferment.  It  was  hard  to  make  it  under- 
stood that  even  veteran  soldiers  are  like  obedient  cliildrcn,  at  the  same 
time  strong  and  weak.  They  obey,  but  expect  a  complete  outfit  of 
food,  clothing,  and  all  the  essential  elements  of  success.  Improvidence 
in  expenditure  will  nocessarilj-  result  where  there  is  a  lavish  supply, 
which  costs  the  individual  nothing  ;  but  with  fresh  troops  who  have 
not  learneil  to  husband  everything,  even  short  intervals  for  rest,  the 
dependence  upon  authority  is  constant  and  absolute,  even  in  minute 
matters  which  would  be  absurd  in  civil  life. 

These  remarks  furnish  a  brief  epitome  of  the  experiences  of  the 
American  army  up  to  July,  1776.  The  fireside  mourning  over  the 
Canadian  sacrifice  had  not  so  depressed  the  people,  however,  that 
hope  was  laid  aside.  The  impending  contest  at  New  York  began  to 
absorb  attention,  and  awakened  fresh  energy  and  will.  It  was  at  such 
an  hour,  when  the  consciousness  of  great  disaster  ivas  lost  sight  of  in 


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I'77f'. 


tlic  iIi.iii.ukI  f'!"  a  still  ■nv.MliT  (Tfurl,  that  IIk;  icvdbciatious  IVoiii  I'(jrt 
Moultrii:  rcanirm'.-il  llu;  1ct-,(jii,  that  the  iiKJividiial  soldii.T  was  fully 
I  <|ii.il  to  duty,  if  his  ]j<:is(>iiai  iii<li,-])i:ti(lc:iici:  could  be  oiin;  iiu.r;,jcd  ill 
till'  iiitidiil  iudcpi.ndi.ncL' just  asserted. 

lo  accomplisii  this  essential  condition  of  success,  was  the  task 
uhicli  had  to  devolve  ujjon  ^olrll.•  adeipiale  in.'spoiiTihle  authorit)',  and 
the  Ann  I  ii  an  ( ^Mi'^resi  laid  thi^  hurdiMi  upon  the  coiiiinaiider-in  chief 
of  its  ariiiiii. 

The  Uritisli  [govern irieiit  had   |)lace(l  its  share  of  tin;   issue   in  the 
liandT  of  .'vdiniral  and  (ieneral  Howe,  tackin^r  ,,n  l(j  their  instructions, 
iiowever,  the  contiiK^eiicy  of  concurrent  o])erations  from  (!anada  also. 
A  brief  stateuKMit  of  the  relations  of  both  arinie-s  will  Ik;  the  intro- 
duction to  the  skirmishes  which  made  up  the  b.itlle  ol  Lon;.;  Island. 

(ieneral  Howe's  lleet  ol  transports  sailed  from  Halifax  June  tenth, 
iindi'r  s!:ron;^"  convoy,  made  offiie^  at  .Sandy  Hook  on  the  tw<;nty- 
ninth,  and  on  the  n.cond  d.iy  of  Ju!)'  dropped  anchor.  On  the  fifth, 
this  (leet  ol  one  hundred  and  twenty  seven  s(|uare-ri;^f;u.(l  vessels,  Ije- 
sides  smaller  crafts,  effected  the  landiiv^  of  (ieneral  ilowe's  army  on 
•St  ile;i  i  land.  A  portion  of  the  .Scotch  bri;.4ade,  three  companie'-- 
ea'.ii  ol  the  lolly-second  and  seventy-first  rej^imeiits  joined  the  sijuad- 
ron  (iff  Nantucket,  iiavin;.;  made  for  Hoston,  direct  from  ICiif^laiid,  aiuJ 
the  total  force  amounteu  to  about  nine  thousand  two  iiun(h"ed  men, 
undir  deiierals  llowe,  i'i^^'ot,  (iraiit,  and  Jones.  Hurin;^'  llic  voya^'c, 
t  wo  of  the  trans]jorts  carrying  the  Scotch  brii^ade  w<re  ca[>ture(l  by 
yXmeric.in  armed  vessels  after  a  short  en;.^fa^ement,  ancJ  taken  into 
liostfjii.  Ijeutenaiit  colonel  Campbell  of  the  seventy-first,  with  si.\- 
teen  (jther  ollicers,  and  four  hundred  ,ind  fifty  men  were  repcjrted  by 
(ieneral  H>jwe  as  anion;.;  the  missin;.;  then  taken  captive,  including 
(jeiieral  William  I'askine.  General  iio'  ■  himself  reached  Sandy 
Hook  on  the  tweiily-fiftii  of  June,  in  the  fast  sailini^  fri^^'ate  (jrey- 
hound,  ami  liekl  a  secret  conlerciiice  with  (jovcrnor  'IVyon  on  board 
the  ship.  -\s  the  result  of  this  inlcuview,  he  determined  to  land  his 
entire  force  at  (jraveseiul,  and  the  fleet  actually  took  position  in  the 
(jraveseiul  ctjve  on  the  first  (jf  July  for  tliat  purpose.  'I'iie  key  t(j  his 
cliani;e  of  purpose  is  found  in  some  letters  sent  to  Lord  (iermaine  by 
a  disi)atch  vessel,  July  sevcntli.  He  wrote  as  fijilows  :  "  I  liad  been 
informed  durin'j  the  ni^ht  of  a  .strong  pass  upon  a  rid^^e  of  cra^j^y 
heij^hts,  cfjvered  witli  wood,  that  lay  in  the  route  the  army  mu.st  have 
taken,  only  two  miles  from  the  point  of  the  enemy's  encampment,  and 
jeven    from  Gravcsend,  whicii  the  rebels   would    undoubtedly  have 


•;iii    iWM  AKMir.s  i\   [i;i.v  and  ai:(;i.si-,  1776. 


i')l 


<)>-cii;)i'-'l  h'Torc   tlic   l,in;;'s  troops   coiil'l  '.n-t  up    to  it  ;  aii'l    froiii    tin: 
mimittst  (IcM  ri|)tioii,  jmi'Mii;.;  ,111   .ittack   upon  llii-.   jjosl  so  strong  hy 
nature,  ami  so  nrar  the  IVonl  oi  tin:  enemy's  works,  to  he-  too  liazanl- 
ous  an    at  tempi    l)e(ore    tin'    arrival    of  tlie    troops   with    ("ominrxlon: 
llotliam,  daily   e-xperted,  I    ilei  lined   tlie   undertakin;;."      "1    projiosi; 
uaitin;.r   for    the    l',n;.disli    fleet    or    the  arrival    of    i  ,ieutenant-'^;(;neral 
Clinton,  in  r<Mdiness  to   proct:ed,  unless   by  some    iinexjieeled   c:lian;.;<.' 
of  eircurnstances  in  llic;    ineanw  liile\  it   should    he  found   exp(.di<;nl    to 
act    will)  the   jiresent    for((.-."      "In   case  Lii:uteu,int-;.;eneral  ("linton's 
southern    ojierations    should    jtrevenl  his  joiniu;.';  the   army  here,  1  am 
.ij)l)rehe?isive    the   j)oss(;ssion    of  Rhode    jsl.ind,    though    of  the    most 
iu)|)ortant  natun:,  nnist    be   deferred    until    the  arrival    of  the    second 
embarkation  from  l'.uro|  .:,  unhss   (ieneral  (Jarlelon    shouM    penetrate 
early  into    this    province,  which  may  enable    uk;  to  spare  a  corps  ade- 
quate to  that  service  "  ;  "  Hut,  as  J  must  i:sti;cm  an   imprcssifjii   upon 
lilt'  enemy's  principal   force   collected    in   this  quarter,  to   be  the-  first 
object  of  my  uttc-nticjiis,  I  shall  hold  it  steadily  in  view,  without  losin;^ 
si;dil    of    these    which    coinjjaratively    may    be    esteemed    cjllalerai." 
'I'hese  (|uotatioiis    show  that  the  very  best   possible    slr.il(.';4icai  move- 
ments had   been  selected  by  the  Hritish  (Jabinet   ,ind   its   advisers,  for 
tile  prosecution    of  tin;  w.ir.     'Jlie-    adetpiale    force  was  not    supplied. 
Th-i  late    of  (Clinton's  ex|)edili<jn  southward  was   unknown   at  date  of 
the  dispatch  of  General  Howe. 

[t  will  be  se(Mi  that  four  armies  were  to  act  with  substantial  unity 
of  time,  and  so  wiik:ly  apart  that  the  American  army  could  not  ^ive 
alternat(;  attention  toaiiy  two  of  the  four.  Three  of  these  operations, 
those  at  .\ew])ort.  New  S'ork,  and  southward,  were  sujiported  by 
fleets  ;  t'le  third  was  to  descend  from  Canada  with  the  moral  support 
which  the  f.iilure  of  tiie  American  invasion  conferred  upon  the  veteran 
let(ions  of  the  Hritish  army. 

One  si'^'aal  restraint  upon  a  L,reneral  ])lan  of  o[)eralions,  otherwise 
excelKiil,,  was  the  monstrous  under-estimale  of  the  coura;.;e,  numbers 
and  purposes  of  the  American  |)eoplc:,  which  stuck  so  fast  t<j  the  min- 
istry that  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  Yorktown  itself  could 
make  the  (.'rror  intelli^nble.  Admiral  Howe  arrived  July  twelftli  with 
an  admirably  eipiipped  sijuadron  and  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty 
transports  loaded  with  troops.  On  the  same  day,  two  men-of-war, 
the  lMi(/,'nix,  40  ^runs,  and  the  Rose,  20  t^uns,  safely  passed  the  bat- 
teries at  r.iulus  Hook  and  (jreenwich,  and  thus  early  interrupted 
Wasli:nyt(jn's  communication  with  Albany,  and  the  northern  army. 
'3 


•  '*','> 


*» 


iii 


:>  s 


•2;!!;  •'  I 


194 


rill 


TWO  AKMii:-;  IN  iri.v  and  Arcrsr,   1776. 


1776. 


■  ":«'Si 


i.iif 


II I  'i 


i  H  1; 


['■■<■  » 


iff?!^ 


On  Ihc  next  cla\'  a  flaL,^  w.is  srnt  to  the  American  head-quarters  for 
tlie  purpose  of  openiiiL:;  ne<^otiations  for  a  settlement  of  the  issues 
between  the  moilier  emintrN' and  the  coloiiiis.  Admiral  Howe  had 
been  deputized  to  act  jointly  with  hi^  brother,  as  commissioners,  in 
this  Ijeh.ilf.  The  propo-^ition  was  so  weak  that  it  had  no  favor  wliat- 
ever,  (jeneral  W'.ishiiis^ton  described  their  errand,  in  a  letter  to  (jen- 
eral  Schuyler,  in  thi-se  terms,  "  Commissioners  to  dispense  p.irdon  to 
repenting;-  sinners." 

Much  unreasonable  censure  has  been  cast  upon  (icneral  Howe 
and  his  brother,  for  their  reluctance  to  acklress  Wa^hin^ton  in  liis 
official  character,  as  if  it  implied  tliscourtesy  on  their  p.irt,  or  the  te.ir 
that  the)-  would  wai\e  some  legal  rights  of  the  crown,  b)-  the  most 
ready  access  to  the  American  authorities.  It  is  only  necessarv  to 
cite  the  American  war  of  I.S61-5,  when  the  same  reluctance  of  tne 
United  States  to  address  the  Confeilerate  officers  by  their  title,  em- 
barr.issed  the  exchange  of  i)risMni'rs,  as  in  1776,  while  it  h.ul  not  tin: 
weight  of  a  fe.ilher  in  determining  tiiL  real  status  of  the  parties,  or 
the  battle  issues  themselves.  Adjutant-general  i'.itterson.  of  the 
British  army  had  an  interview  with  Washington,  on  the  twentieth 
day  of  July  ;  mutu.d  courtesies  were  exchanged,  but  no  business  was 
done,  as  there  was  no  real  basis  of  compromise  in  the  instructions  of 
Lord  Howe. 

Admiral  Howe  says  of  Colonel  Patterson's  interview  :  "It  was 
more  polite  than  interesting  ;  however,  it  induced  me  to  change  my 
superscription  of  the  address  u|)on  the  letter,  whi.h  had  been  (icorge 
Washington,  F,sc|r.,  for  the  attainment  of  an  end  so  desirable; — refer- 
ring to  the  effort  to  secure  the  exchange  of  General  Frescott.who  had 
been  taken  prisoner  at  Montreal,  and  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
sevent\-first  regiment,  just  captured  at  sea. 

C digress  h.id  its  own  1  )eclaration  of  Independence  engrossed  upon 
p  irchment  oti  the  nineteenth  of  Jul)',  tor  the  signature  of  members, 
and  freely  disseminated  L<jrd  Howe's  proposition  throughout  the 
colonies,  so  little  did  they  regard  it  as  having  a  single  element  of  value 
in  the  interests  of  peace.  There  was  another  good  reason  for  the  free 
publication  of  the  document.  Rumors  of  a  sensational  character 
were  as  thick  and  absurd  as  in  more  modern  times.  General  Robcr- 
deau  notified  "Washington,  on  the  nineteenth  of  August,  in  all  serious- 
ness, tliat  a  "  post-rider  had  told  w  ith  great  confidence  that  General 
Howe  had  proposed  to  retire  with  the  fleet  and  army,  and  was  willing 
to  settle  the  present  dispute  on  any  terms  asked  by  Washington  :  that 


Kill 


1776 


'riir;  two  ai'.miks  in  jlm.v  and  atgi  si-,  1776. 


'95 


this  c.inic  from  .111  (iffii-cr  wlm  ums  ready  to  swear  to  it,  Ijut  as  it  mii^ht 
h.ive  a  tciidem}'  to  lull  the  inhabitants,  he  made  it  tlu^  subject  of  an 
express." 

This  was  based  upon  another  rumor  that  I'Ln;^lancl  and  I'rance 
were  at  war.  (ieneral  VVashinj^ton  was  compelled  to  publish  an  (jrder 
rebnkiniT  the  recklessness  of  tjossip- mongers.  This  was  more  impor- 
tant, since  many  of  those  who  oppimod  the  w.ir  on  account  of  business 
rel.itions  with  the  Hritisli  civil  authorities,  were  most  active  in  words, 
while  lacking  courage  to  take  up  arms  on  either  side. 

On  the  first  day  of  August,  Generals  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  reached 
Staten  Island  witii  l.ieir  united  command.  On  the  twelfth  Commo- 
(lore  Hothani  arrived,  having  convoyed  .i  fleet  of  transports  which 
landed  twenty-six  hundred  British  troops  ami  eight  thousand  four 
hundred  1  [essians,  and  a  supply  of  cam])  equipage  for  the  entire  artny. 
On  the  fifteenth  Sir  I'eter  I'.irker  arrived  with  twenty-four  sail  from 
tile   south. 

Admiral  Howe  made  one  more  effort  to  press  the  proposition  ol 
the   British   Cabinet   to   a  favor.d)le   consideration   by  the   American 
Congress,  bitt   witliout  effect.      His  high  character  and  sincere  desire 
lor  peace  are  ever  to  be   lu)nored,   no  less  than  his   real  merit  as  a 
n aval  commander. 

'1  he  .\nierican  preparations  were  far  less  perfect,  but  equally 
earnest  with  those  o'' the  British  army. 

The  Declaration  of  Independence,  made  on  the  fourth  tlayof  July, 
was  favorably  adopted  by  .Maryland  on  the  si.xth,  on  the  ground  that 
"  the  king  had  violated  his  compact."  and  the  people  were  without  a 
government;  thus  starting  out  upon  the  original  basis  of  all  govern- 
ment, as  heretofore  discus /,cd.  I'ennsylv.uiia  and  New  Jersey  followed 
on  the  eighth  and  New  York  on  the  ninth.  Other  colonies  rapidly 
accepted  the  action  of  Congress  and  entered  ujjon  a  more  systematic 
organization  of  tlie   militia. 

On  the  ninth  of  July,  .Mass.ichusetts  was  engaged  in  hurrying  three 
additional  regiments  to  the  Northern  arm\-,  then  having  its  head- 
quarter.-i  at  Crown  Point,  and  Congress  ordered  fifteen  lumdreil  .iddi- 
tional  troops  to  be  raised  for  the  same  destination.  On  the  nine- 
teenth, Washington  ordered  three  of  the  eastern  regiments  to  join 
the  northern  armv. 


Crown  I'cMiit  was  soon  abandoned,  in  accordance  with  the  recc 


.m- 


mcndations  of  a  board  of  officers  convened  July  seventh,  acting  upon 
the  advice  of  General  Gates,  but  contrary  to  the  judgment  of  W'asli- 


El  7    ' 


^m 


Hi 


ig6 


mi;   iwo  AkMii.s  in  jim.v  and  AUOUiST,  1776. 


[I77f>. 


1  i 


,.{:: 


iiit^ton  ;  ami  TicondcroLja  alone  <if  the  iioitlicin  posts,  rrmainrd  in  the 
occupation  of  the  Aniericm  army.  Tlie  evacuation  of  Crown  Point  is 
mentioned  in  this  connection  as  only  one  of  the  annoyin;^  elements  of 
the  crisis,  ulien  eacli  ik'tached  (d'ticer  seemed  reaily  to  exercise  the 
prerogative  of  a  commander-in-chief.  I'liirre  were  sanitar)-  con>idera- 
ti.ms  to  be  re<;arded,  on  account  of  tlie  remains  of  tiie  scourtje  of  tiie 
small-pox,  but  (ieneral  Carleton  deemed  its  possession  of  such  military 
importance  that  he  soon  occupied  it  for  his  head-([uarters. 

Tin-  defense  of  Brooklyn  HeiLjhts  was  ilecided  to  be  essentia!  to 
the  most  efficient  prosecution  of  the  war.  I'o  '^ive  value  to  this 
tleci-^ioii,  it  was  necessary  to  |)iX)vi(K.'  for  all  possible  demonstrations 
which  la_\'  within  the  re.ich  of  the  Hriti->h  na\.d  forces.  From  Hrook- 
1)11  to  Kin;_;s  Hrid;^e  thi'  distance  was  nearl\'  fifteen  miles,  with  the 
nav'j^able  w.iters  of  the  Ihulson,  East  ri\er  and  Il.uiem  creek,  to  be 
watciied,  and  their  shores  to  l)e  amply  j^uarded.  The  battery  on 
I'aulus  Hook,  then  an  island,  was  on  the  \ew  JiMsey  shore,  makiiiij 
two  ferries  for  communication  \vilh  lirooklyn.  .iiid  the  entire  force  of 
the  ret^ular  artiller)-  reL;iment  of  Colonel  Knox  was  re[)orted  at  (July 
five  hundred  and  ei;^dit\-five  men. 

The  official  army  return  for  the  third  of  Au;^nist.  1 776.  gives  the 
.strength  of  the  .Vmerican  armx'a-  follows.  Commissioned  officers  and 
staff,  twelve  huiulred  and  twenty-fi\e  ;  non-commissioned  officers, 
fifteen  hundred  and  two:  present  for  duty,  ten  thousand  five  huiulred 
ami  fourteen  ;  sick,  present  .ind  absent,  three  thousand  six  hundred 
and  seventy-eight;  on  furlough,  ninetj'-seven  ;  on  comm.ind,  two 
thousand  nine  hundred  and  forty-six,  making  a  total  of  seventeen 
thousand  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  men.  Less  than  one-third 
of  this  force  liad  served  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  ami  the  arms 
were  not  onl\-  insufficient  in  numbers,  but  many  of  those  tre.ited  as 
serviceable  would  have  been  condemned,  upon  inspection  for  issue  to 
regul.ir  troips.  The  crudene.ss  of  the  army  oiganiz.it  ion,  and  the 
short  terms  of  service  engendered  neglect  of  such  as  the}-  had,  ;uid 
the  arm)'  h,id  not  learned  that  a  gun  must  be  kept  in  order,  even  if 
the  soldier  goes  barefoot.  The  artillery  was  of  various  patterns  ami 
caliber,  second  h.ind  and  neglected,  or  h.istily  fabricated,  and  the  men, 
who  were  excellent  ritlemen,  knew  very  little  about  the  range  or 
management  of  field  or  siege  pieces.  It  was  just  then  th.it  the 
American  army  was  tc)  renew  the  contest,  no  longer  trusting  in  num- 
bers, but  ag.iinst  superior  forces  fully  ecjuipped. 

Two  days  after  the  muster  of  the  army  above  referred  to.  Gov- 


1776.] 


THE   TWfl   ARMIKS    IN   JULY   AND   AUGUST,    1 7/6. 


'97 


ernor  Trumbull  of  Connecticut  assured  VVashinj^ton  that  "  he  did  not 
.ijreatly  dread  what  the  enemy  could  (Id.  trustinfj  Heaven  to  supi)ort 
us,  .kiiowinLi  our  cause  to  be  righteous."  (  )n  the  seventh,  Washing- 
ton sent  him  .i  cdjjv  of  his  "  Return,"  with  the  laconic  suggestion,  tiiat 
"to  trust  in  the  iustice  of  our  cause  without  our  own  utmost  exertions, 
would  be  /t-iiiptiiii^  Providence."  Trumbuil  responded  in  his  usual 
practical  way,  .md  although  live  regiments  had  already  been  sent  for- 
ward, he  very  soon  e.dleil  out  nine  regiments  more,  and  sent  them, 
averaging  three  hundred  am!  fifty  men  eaeh,  in  time  to  be  present 
when  the  Ihitish  troops  sul)sc(iuentl\'  Luided  in  Westelicstcr  count)'. 

Two  regiments,  including  Colonel  I'ri'scoll's,  were  del.iileil  as  the 
garrison  of  Covernor's  Nl.ind.  The  works  ujxm  IJrooklxii  Heights 
had  been  begun  by  Ceneral  Lee,  but  prosecuted  under  the  j)ersonal 
direction  of  (ieneral  Greene,  who  had  explored  the  country  thoroughly, 
and  knew  the  range  of  each  piece  as  well  as  the  character  of  the 
a].proaches  to  the  works,  lie  was  a  soldier  by  choice,  subordinate  at 
all  times,  and  ambitious  to  attain  excellence  for  himself  and  profi- 
ciency in  his  men.  A  retloubt  of  seven  guns  crowned  the  heights. 
The  exposed  point  of  \\vi\  llook,  which  was  a  combination  of  m.irsh 
and  thicket  and  solid  1  uid,  was  supjilied  with  fw^i  guns,  and  the  in- 
trenchments,  more  than  h.df  a  mile  in  length,  were  protected  by 
abattis  and  four  retloubts,  which  mounted  twenty  guns.  Cireene 
occui)ic(l  thest;  redoubt  .  md  lines  witli  two  regiments  of  Long  Island 
militia,  ami  six  C'ontineiital  regiments,  none  of  which  exceeded  four 
hundred  nu-n  for  tluty.  The  lines  exteiuled  from  Wallabout  1'  ly,  the 
present  navy  yard,  to  the  crock  then  setting  in  from  Govvanus  Bay, 
and  some  adjoining  marshes,  which  were  imi),issable  at  high  tide,  and 
at  all  times  miry,  and  difficult  ofaiiproach. 

The  Pennsylvania  rifle  battalion.  Colonel  Atlee,  Smallwootl's 
Maryland,  anil  Haslet's  Delaw.u'e,  whicii  had  ju>t  joined  the  army 
from  the  south,  were  added  to  the  garrison,  and  were  placed  in  Stir- 
ling's brigade  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty- >e\enth,  bel'orc  the  attack 
was  made. 

The  total  nominal  strength  of  the  American  army  about  New 
York  on  the  twent\-si.\th  of  .\ugu^t,  including  the  sick,  non-effectives 
of  all  kinds,  and  those  without  arms,  was  a  little  over  twenty-seven 
thousand  men.  I'he  Connecticut  regiments  which  last  joined,  brought 
such  arms  as  thej-  could  |)rovide  for  themselves,  and  were:  but  so  many 
citizens,  with  nominal  organization,  but  neither  discipline  nor  experi- 
ence in  military  drill. 


198 


Tlir.   -IWf)    AKMIKS    IN   }Ul.\    AND   Al'CilSI',    1776. 


1776.1 


m 


[i  ' 


I 


On  the  firticiuli  of  Au<;ust,  CinHMie,  "  tln'n  confiiud  to  his  l)i(l  with 
a  laj^iiv^  tV\ir."  wrote  to  \V.ishiii;_;toii  tli,it"lu'  Impi'd  thrnn'^ih  tlic 
assi-^t.inci;  nt  Providi'iiLH-  to  he  :il)K;  to  ride  before  an  attack  sliould  be 
ni.ulc,  l)iit  trlt  ;.;reat  anxiety  as  to  the  result." 

Such  was  tlic  rcl.itive  state  of  reachness  with  which  the  Hritish  and 
American  armies  aw.iitcd  conflict.  Repeatotl  storms  and  hit^h  winds 
post[)oneil  the  lan.'.iiv^  of  the  former  troops,  and  the  hitter  army  was 
accnmulatiii;.;  in  numbers,  Init  anticipating  the  comin;^  issue  with  tlie 
conviction  th.it  ttie  ordeal  would  be  one  of  surpassing  trial  atul  danger. 


.\nt*  :i 


i  il 


chapti<:r  XXX. 


BATTI.K   OF    I.oNC,    ISF.AXI).     I'Ri;i'.\R.\riON'S. 


TIIM  Hrilisli  coinm;inder-in-cliicf  (Ictcriniucd  to  attack  tlie  Amer- 
ican works  on  Brooklyn  Ilcights  aiul  thereby  secure  a  land- 
lootins^  for  operations  a^aiii-^l  tlie  citj-  of  New  York,  wliich  w.is  directly 
across  Mast  River  and  less  than  tiiree-lourths  of  a  itiilc  distant. 

The  tiefei^se  of  Fort  Moultrie  had  indicateil  the  kind  of  resistance 
which  provincial  troops  could  oppose  to  an  attack  by  n.ival  forces, 
and  the  .ulvance  had  to  be  made  across  I.on;^  Island,  unless  a  ct)m- 
billed  movement  shoukl  be  attempted  llirnu;^!!  l-i>ni;  I>land  Sound 
ami  up  the  llud^on  river,  to  occup^y  the  country  north  of  Manhattan, 
or  New  York,  isl  uul.  'I'hi;  latter  plan  would  enclose  the  American 
army,  as  the  JJritish  army  was  cau^^ht  at  Hoslon  ;  while  the  occupation 
of  tlic  iieii^hts  of  15r()oklyn  would  i)e  a  counterpart  to  tin;  American 
possession  of  Dorchester  IIeii;hts  during  the  previous  June. 

The  movement  was  well  devised,  wt  I!  '^upjiorted  and  fnthfully 
executetl.  In  determining  the  force  .ictually  einplo\ed  in  the  attack, 
reference  is  mule  to  the  leport  of  Admir.il  llowe,  who  states,  that 
"on  the  twenty-second  of  Auj^ust  the  whole  force  th.en  destined  for 
this  service,  consisting  of  about  fifteen  thousand  inn.  was  laiideti 
before  noon  :  and  that  on  the  twenty-fifth,  an  additional  corps  of  Hes- 
sian troops  under  deneral  I  )e  1  leisler,  witii  t!;eir  artillery  ami  baijgatje, 
were  conveyed  to  Gravesend  iiay."  This  made  the  effective  force 
twenty  thousand  men,  leavin;^  at  lea.st  four  thousand  upon  Staten 
Island,  besides  the  sick.  The  latter  force  included  one  brij^ade  of 
Hessian  troops.  On  the  twenty-seventh  il.i\-  of  Au^^ust,  (lencral 
Howe  maile  official  report  of  the  rank  and  file  of  lii^anii)-,  as  twenty- 
six  thous.md  two  luindred  and  fort\-se\en  nun,  exclusive  of  the  bat- 
talion of  royalists  under  BriL^adier-;.;eniral  1  )e  1  .ance\'.  In  quoting 
the  Returns  of  (ieneial  Howe  which  were  laid  before  the  House 
of  Commons,    (jcncrai    Clinton  says,  that    "he  (Howe;  luui    24,464 


20O 


BATll.I-;   (>[■'    I.(>N(;    ISI.ANO.       TKI  I'AkAlloNS. 


[1776. 


:f.  i 


M*' 


ffffT" 


cffativis  fit  for  duty; — a  tot, il  of  26,980,  offiCLMs  not  iiiclmlcd,  who, 
wluii  .uUlcd,  iiiiiouiit  to  31,625  men."  Sir  (icoi'i^u  Collier,  wiio  was 
present  at  tlie  landin;,;  of  tlie  army,  says,  tli.il  "the  arm\-  with  Howe 
on  Loni;'  Inland  amounted  to  upwards  of  twent)'  thousand  besides 
those  wlio  remained  on   St  iten    Island." 

The  admirable  logistics  exhii)iti'd  in  the  whole  movement  rccpiires 
fuller  det.iil  of  narrative  than  woukl  be  desirable  in  a  more  general 
historj-. 

The  iJrilish  ami)'  proper  consisted  of  an  advance  corps,  a  reserve, 
and  seven  briL;.uIes,  constituted   as   follows: 

J/u^  lufviiiiii  lor/^s  : — -l-'our  b.ittalions  of  lii^ht  infantrv  and  the 
light  dragoons.  T/if  j-isi'nr  : — four  battalions  of  grenadiers,  with 
the  33d  and  42d  regiments  of  foot. 

First  ]?rig.ule  :  the  44th,  15th,  27th  and  45th  regiments. 

Second  Brigade:  the  5th,  2Sth,  55th  ar.d  49th  regiments. 

Tliinl  Hrigatle  :  the  loth,  37th,  3Sth  and  52d  regiments. 

Fourth  Brigade:  the  17th,  40th,  46th  .ind  55tii  regiments. 

Fifth  llrigade  :  the  22d,  43d.  54th  and  63d  regiments. 

Sixth  Hrigaile  :  the  23d,  44th,  57th  antl  6.j.th  regiments. 

Seventh  Urigade  :  the  7iht  Highland  regiment.  New  "^'ork  com- 
panies and  the  Royal  Artillerj-. 

Colonel  Doiiop's  corps  embraced  the  Hessian  grenadiers  and  ch.is- 
sours;  and  (ieneral  De  Heister's  coiinnand  consisted  of  two  brigades. 

Some  of  tliese  regiments  are  at  once  to  be  recognized  as  among 
those  which  were  largely  depleted  in  the  actii)n  on  Breed's  Hill  ;  but 
the  number  of  battalions  whicli  lantied,  confirms  the  estimate  given 
by  Admiral  Howe  and  Sir  George  Collier. 

The  debarkation  was  signally  perfect.  More  than  four  hundred 
transports  were  within  the  arms  of  Sandy  Hook.  Ten  linc-of-battle 
ships  and  twenty  frigates  were  their  escort  and  protection.  Seventy- 
five  flat  boats,  eleven  bateaux  and  two  galleys,  all  built  for  the  pur- 
pose, in  ten  distinct,  well-ordered  divisions,  simultaneousl}-  touched 
the  beach  and  landed  the  reserves  and  advance  corps,  four  thousand 
strong,  near  the  present  site  of  Fort  Hamilton,  and  within  two  hours 
after  the  signal  had  been  Ljet.  Five  thousand  additional  troops  were 
landed  with  equal  celerity  and  order,  a  little  further  down  the  bay. 
The  transports  came  up  in  their  designated  succession  to  deliver  the 
regiments  to  the  long  line  of  waiting  boats,  and  before  twelve  o'clock 
of  the  twenty-second  of  June,  fifteen  thousand  men,  with  artillery, 
baggage  and   stores,  had  been   placed  on  shore,  without  mishap   or 


|.<*^f 


(1 

Ki 

:vc 

ck 

>■>■• 
or 


ITTf'l 


liAI'TIi:   OF   I.ONC    ISLAM).  — PRKPAKATI' INS. 


20 1 


delay.  On  tlu'  tUL'iity-fiftli.  tlu' (li\  isimi  (jf  (iiiu  r.il  Do  1  kilter  \v,is 
tran.sporti-'d  to  ("ilivl^liuI  cove,  and  inaik:  tlicir  '.iiulin^^^  with  ccjiial 
skill. 

On  tlic  t\vcnt)-Nixlii,  a  naval  clivi-r-^itm  was  att^'iiiptcd  up  Xvjw 
York  l)a)',  to  alarm  the  posts  on  ( ioviii'.or's  l^l.iiul  and  \icd  Hook,  ami 
induce  the  belief  that  an  attack  w.is  to  be  lu.ide  upon  the  city  itself. 
It  so  far  succeeded  as  to  delay  the  movement  of  reinforcements  then 
untler  orders  for  l>rookl)'n  ;  jjut  .1  stroir^r  north-e.ist  wind  compelled 
the  lleet  to  drop  down  the  ba_\'  and  come  to  anchor.  'I'iie  Roebuck 
alone  reaclu'd  Red  lloik,  but  accomplished  no  mischief,  and  soon 
drojjped  out  oi  fire. 

General  Liiinvallis,  with  the  reserves,  ten  iiittalioiis  of  li_L,dit  in- 
fantry, .md  Dollop's  cor[)s  of  Hessians,  h.id  been  advanced  to  the 
vicinity  of  Flatbush  immediately  after  landing  on  the  twenty-second, 
to  leain  whether  tlie  pass  throui^h  the  hills  ,it  that  point  'iad  been 
occupied  by  the  Auu.Tic.uis.  Ui)oii  iiiidin;^  that  it  IkilI  been  so  occu- 
pieil,  ami  th.it  a  redoubt  and  intrenchments  hatl  been  inter[)oseil  in 
liis  way,  his  command  was  not  puiiie^l  to  an  attack,  but  encamped  in 
front  of  Flarbusli.  The  main  army  occuj)ied  a  line  e.xteiulinL;  from 
the  co.i.it  lhruUL;h  Cirave^eiid  to  I'latlands,  .iiul  active  pre[)arations 
were  at  oin:e  made  lor  an  immedi.ite  aii\ance. 

The  long  raiv^e  of  hills  extending;-  from  the  N.u'rows  to  Jamaica 
was  known  to  have  tour  passes  avail. ible  for  the  movement  of  troops 
with  arlillei)-.  1  lie  most  direct  road  was  that  aloiv,;-  the  ba)-,  cutting; 
thn)Ugh  the  hills  just  back  of  Red  Lion,  where  Martense's  Lane  joins 
the  usual  thoroughfare,  at  the  cdj^e  of  the  present  Greenwood  cem- 
etery. .\  secoiul  was  directly  in  front  of  Flatbush,  and  this  road  led 
directly  to  the  American  intrenchments.  Thj  third  w.is  by  the  road 
from  Flatbush  to  IJedford.  The  fourth,  which  extended  as  far  as 
Fhishing,  crossed  the  Bedford  and  Jamaica  ro.id  nearly  three  miles 
east  from  the  t'lrst  named  town.  Reference  to  the  map,  "  Haltle  of 
Lont;  Island,"  which  is  built  upon  the  United  States  Co.ist  Survey 
Chart,  will  indicate  the  respective  relations  of  these  ro.ids  to  an 
advance  upon  the  American  position.  The  dis[)osition  of  the  British 
army  is  to  be  particularly  noticed  for  its  exact  comprehension  of  the 
situation,  and  the  assurance  of  success  which  tint  disposition  secured. 

Durinij  the  morning  of  the  twenty-second,  at  the  time  of  the  first 
landing,  Colonel  Hand's  American  regiment  had  deployed  along  the 
coast  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the  movement,  if  attempted  only  by 
a  moderate  force  ;  but  the  regiment  fell  back  to  Prospect  Hill  as  soon 


202 


I!AI  ll.I',    OF    LONG    ISLAM). —PKMPAKA  II' iN'^. 


U':(> 


m,  ?  ■ 


i  I' 


rp- 


'g  ■'  l!i 


?'l!     '    %• 


as  adviscil  of  its  rc.il  cli.iractrr.  It  docs  not  appear  fiMin  the  official 
archives,  or  other  rcspniisiblc  autiiority,  that  ho  advisi'd  the  coin- 
in.indiiiy  ^^eiieral  of  the  laiidin;^  of  the  aiUlitioiial  corps  on  the  same 
d.i\-,  nor  tii.it  ,my  adc(iuate  \'idette  system  was  einploj-ed  to  secure 
an  intellij^eiu  impression  as  to  the  ultimate  design  of  the  British 
arm)-. 

On  the  twenty-sixth.  General  Dc  I  leister  occupied  Flatbush,  and 
thereby  L,neatlystrenL;theneil  the  conviction  that  an  advance  would  be 
uKulc  in  force  from  that  point,  but  durini^  theeveninLj,  Ivirl  Cornw.dlis 
withdrew  his  own  cituiinand,  and  joineil  General  (dinton  at    h'latlinds. 

.Slioitl)-  .ifter  nine  o'clock,  (J 'lU'raUdinlon  with  the  li^^lit  dragoons, 
two  battalions  of  lii^ht  infmtrv.  the  reser\e  under  Cori)\\,illis,  (except 
the  fort)--second  regiment  which  had  i)een  detached  to  thi-  left  of 
(jeneral  Ilei-^ter.)  .ind  the  portion  of  the  sevcnty-tirst  re;_;inient  which 
escaped  ca])ture  at  sea,  with  fourteen  pieces  of  artillery,  moveil 
throuL^h  New  Lot-^,  near  the  present  East  New  York,  and  before 
three  o'clock  in  the  niorniiv,;',  arri\ed  within  h,df  a  mile  of  the  pass 
u  liich  he  intended  to  force.  A  n.irrow  caisuway  built  throuijh  a  marsii, 
and  known  as  .Shoemaker's  l)rid;_;e,  which  only  adn\ilted  of  the  passage 
of  a  sinL;le  column  at  a  time,  was  [)a-^si'd  without  inti  n  Liiition,  and  a  halt 
was  then  ordered  for  re-formation  of  the  coniiiiin  1. 

Lord  Percy  followed  with  the  main  arm_\-,  win  di  consisted  of  the 
(ju.irds.  tlu:  Second,  Third,  and  Fifth  bri^^ades,  ai.d  ten  field  i>iece>. 
dlie  h"ort\-ninth  re;4iment.  with  four  medium  t welw-pour.ders,  and 
the  bai^f^atje  l)rou;_;lit  up  the  rear.  Tet-cy joined  ("lintou  at  least  .i  half 
liour  l)cfuie  d,i\i)reak.  A  >mall  American  p.itrol  was  captured,  the 
pass  was  occupied,  the  heij^lus  were  reacheil,  antl  the  troops  were 
allowed  an  interval  for  rest  and  refreshments,  pri.-par  ilor)-  to  a  further 
advance. 

There  was  now  open  before  this  powerful  column,  a  clear  and 
direct  route  to  Brooklyn  IIeiL;hts  by  the  rear  of  all  advanced  posts. 
Thus  fir,  the  r)riti>h  riL^ht  win;^  had  profitably  em])loyed  the  hours 
and  realized  its  ininu.diate  objective,  without  loss  or  al.irm  to  the 
cncm\'.  An  immediate  advance  upon  the  .\merican  intrenchments 
would  have  been  successful,  but  costly  in  life.  This  was  nt)t  the 
ori;4inal  purpose,  anil  tiie  success  already  realized  was  more  than 
should  have  been  anticipated. 

During  this  time.  General  l)e  1  leister,  under  instructions,  only 
lioiionst rated  toward  the  American  force  which  held  the  Flatbush 
pass,  and  Colonel  Miles  of  the  American  army,  who  was  posted  toward 


Li!:, 


>:-<,,  I 


HMll.K    OK    1,1  ISO    I>I.AMt.    -I'KI'.l'AKA  IIO.NS. 


203 


the  Ik'dford  ro.id.  aiul  C'n'oiul  W'jlli-;,  wlin  was  posted  acniss  that 
road,  seem  t<i  haw  had  110  intiin  ilii>ii  that  a  Mritish  force  h.id  ah'iaily 
turned  their  Hank,  arid  was  advaiK'in;.;  between  tlieir  own  position  and 
the  American  hnes. 

Occasion. il  firiiv^  took  pkice  ;d)iiiit  I''l.itl)ush,  Imt  no  niorr  tli.m 
was  incitient  to  ,inta;^n)nistic  furee  ■.  occiipyiM;^  i)if.itinns  witiiin  short 
ranu;e.  Tiiey  seiMii  to  have  le^arded  the  I'"latl>iish  pass  as  seriously 
tlireatened,  and  the  heav)'  force  in  front  ^ave  cohir  to  this  opinion. 
Gener.d  (irant's  command  could  he  seen  from  Prospect  Hill,  and  the 
comparative  passivit)'  of  lleister's  division  woukl  have  sutr;^ested  th.it 
he  was  withiioldinLi  att.iek,  in  order  to  give  General  Grant  an  oppor- 
tunity to  .tdwiiuv'  !))■  the   h.ubor  road. 

(jeneral  (Jr.mt  also  mo\ed  kite  in  the  ewnin;^  with  the  Vourtii  and 
SJNth  l)iiL,f.ides,  and  re.ifiuci  Red  Lion  just  before  midni'^ht.  His 
.idv.mcc  was  pronii^tl)'  checked  !)>'  a  !i\ely  fire  from  a  det;.  hnient  of 
Miihti.i  proper!)'  posted  before  the  p.iss.  This  skirmishin^;  was  m.iin- 
taini'tl  until  earl)'  dawn,  lie  adv.inced  slow!)',  witlioul  crowtliii;^  the 
Americm  jjickets.  )'et  [)i\ssed  fninly  on,  as  if  assured  of  abundant 
support. 

Washini^ton  liid  been  .uKi-^rd  of  tlie  landini^  effected  on  tlu; 
twenty-second,  ,ind  tli.it  "  ('mIoiuI  11. mil  h.ul  fillen  b.ick  to  I'rospcet 
Hill,  burning  wheat  and  such  other  propert)'  as  might  !)e  of  iinnudi- 
atc  use  to  the  British  troops."  Si*:  regiments  were  sent  to  reiiilorce 
the  g.irrison  on  the  heights.  These  regiments  ranged  in  number  from 
three  hundred  to  four  hu:idred  men.  Orders  were  sent  to  (ieiieral 
Heath,  then  at  the  north  end  of  M.iiiliatl.m  island,  to  be  prep.ired  to 
forward  additional  troo[)s,  and  five  regiments  from  the  cit)-  force  were 
placed  in  readiness  to  cross  East  river,  as  soon  as  it  sliouKl  be  clearl) 
determined  whether  General  Howe  was  making  a  final  movement  to 
cover  a  positive  attack  upon  Xew  York,  or  really  designt?tl  to  make 
the  occupation  of  llrookl)'n  Heights  his  single  immediate  obji  ctive. 
The  absence  of  General  (}reene  bec.ime  a  m.itter  of  serious  concern. 
In  a  letter  to  Ct)ngress,  d.ited  the  twenty-third,  Washington  says, 
"  I  have  been  obliged  to  appoint  General  Sullivan  to  the  command 
on  the  island,  owing  to  General  Greene's  indisposition." 

When  Colonel  Ihiiul  fell  back  to  Flatbiish  on  the  twenty-second, 
and  gave  notice  of  the  first  landing,  the  sinall  picket  force  at  that  pass 
was  increased,  by  order  of  General  Sullivan.  In  a  letter  to  Washing- 
ton, written  on  the  twenty-third,  he  says,  "  This  afternoon  tiie  enemy 
formed,  and  attempted  to  pass  the  road  by  Bedford.     A  smart  fire 


•m 


"':( 


k-f 


U^' 


,.<!' 


'  i!  ' 


i "«  : 


Nl 


tii 


rW' 


ri!  1;! 


H  iHi 


'f 


^ff"'' 


1-i; 


iil: 


■■If      Jtl! 
lit; 


■1? 


-•SI 


204 


I'.Ain.l.    <'!•    l.d.Nti    l>I,.\M).— I'KI' r.\K.\l  IONS. 


1 1 77'' 


cnsiiL-il  l)i.turiii  tluin  and  tlu'  liflciucn.  Tlic  offici-r  sent  off  for  a 
rcinfoiciimiit  uliitli  I  uiikiril  immi-'cli.itcly.  A  luimhcr  of  musketry 
can'c  up  to  the  .issi^l.ince  ot"  the  ritlcmeii.  wliosi-  fire,  with  that  of  the 
field  pieces,  e.uised  a  retreat  ol  the  eiieniy.  1  have  ordered  a  party 
out  tor  prisoners  to-niL;ht.  We  have  driven  them  a  mile  from  their 
former  station.  These  tliiiiLjs  .ir^ue  well  for  us,  ,iiul  I  ho[)e  .ire  so 
niaii)'  preludes  to  a  j^eiieial  victory."  This  confidente  of  (jeneral 
Sullivan  was  hardly  less  unfoundeil  than  his  faith  in  the  success  of 
operations  in  Cauaila,  and,  as  in  that  casi',  he  was  immediately  super- 
sede il. 

Un  the  next  day  General  I'ulnam  w.is  assij^ned  to  the  command. 
On  the  twenty-si.xth,  \Vashin;^ton  wrote  to  that  officer,  to  "  stop  the 
scattcriuLj,  unnieaniiv^  .ind  wasteful  fuiiiL;',  which  prevents  the  possi- 
bility of  distinL;uishin_L;  between  a  real  and  fdsc  alarm,  which  prevents 
dcserter>  from  .ippro.ichint;  our  lines,  and  must  continue  so  lon^  as 
every  soldier  conceives  himself  .it  liberty  to  fire  when,  and  .it  wh.it  he 
pleases."  "('lU.inis  are  to  be  particul.irly  instructed  in  their  duty."' 
"  A  bri,L,Mtiier  of  the  (la\'  is  to  remain  const. uitly  upon  the  lines,  that  he 
may  be  upon  the  spot,  to  command  .md  see  that  orders  are  executed." 
"Skulkers  must  be  shot  down  on  the  s[)ot."  "The  distinction 
between  a  well  regul.ited  army  ami  a  mob,  is  the  yooel  order  .md  dis- 
cipline of  the  iormer,  and  the  licentiousness  and  disorderly  behavior 
of  the  latter,"  "  The  men  not  on  duty,  are  to  be  compelled  to 
remain  at,  or  nc.ir  their  respt  ctive  cam[)s,  or  qu.irters,  that  they  may 
turnout  at  a  nujment's  warning:  nothiuL;  bemy  more  probable  than 
that  the  enemv  will  allow  little  time  enou;_;h  to  prepare  for  the  attack." 
"  Your  best  men  should  at  all  h.iz.irds  prevent  the  enemy  passing  the 
woods  and  approaching  your  works." 

On  the  twenty-sixth  W.ishington  reported  to  Congress,  that,"  the 
fleet  had  Hdlen  dou  n  to  the  Narrows,  th.it  the  tents  had  beei.  struck 
on  Staten  Isl.md,  and  he  w.is  led  to  believe  that  the  main  army  had 
landed  u[)on  Long  Island  and  would  m.ike  their  grand  push  there." 

The  force  on  Long  Island  at  the  time  of  the  battle,  was  not  quite 
eight  thousand  men,  inclusive  of  Stirling's  brigade,  which  crossed  the 
river  in  the  morning.  During  the  subsequent  debates  upon  this  battle 
in  the  British  House  of  Commons,  and  the  ex.imination  of  witnesses 
who  had  particip.ited  in  the  action,  Cornwallis  testified,  "  It  was  re- 
ported that  they  (the  Americans)  had  six  or  eight  thousand  men  on 
Long  Island."  General  Howe,  on  the  other  hand,  reported  the  Ameri- 
can force  which  occupied  the  woods  alone  at  ten  thousand  men      This 


m(>] 


IJAiri.K   OK    I.ON'G   ISLAND.— rUKrAKAl  IONS. 


205 


was  nearly  oiK-h.ilf  of  tlir  cffoctivc  force  of  the  uliolc  /Vmcrican  army 
about  New  Yorl  While  tlie  exact  luiinljer  may  not  be  ascertained, 
it  is  bi'st  to  settle  upon  some  final  standard,  so  that  an  approximate 
estimate  can  have  its  place  in  history.  That  standard  must  be  the 
official  returns,  with  only  those  (pialifications  which  equally  valuable 
contemporaneous  judgment  wiil  warrant.  The  "  ration  returns  "  then 
made,  vindicate  the  above  judgment  of  tivj  force  at  the  post.  The 
disposition  of  the  Americ.in  ailvance  po^ts  before  Brooklyn  w.is  of  the 
feeblest  kind,  in  view  of  the  impeiitliiiLj  advance  (jf  tiie  British  army. 

Johnson's  New  Jersey,  and  llandshaw's  Massachusetts  rej^iments 
were  established  at  Prospect  Hill.  Colonel  Hand's  was  also  there; 
Miles'  Pennsylvania  rifles,  and  Wyllis'  Connecticut  were  at  or  near  the 
Bedford  pass.  Three  field  pieces,  and  (Jiie  howitzer  were  in  the 
redoubt  and  intrenchments  before  Flatbush.  (leneral  Sullivan's  re- 
port contains  the  following  :  "  Lord  Stirlin;^  commanded  the  main 
body  without  the  lines.  I  was  to  have  commanded  under  General 
Putnam  within  the  lines.  I  was  uneasy  about  a  road,  through  whicli 
I  had  often  foretold  that  the  enemy  would  come,  but  could  not  per- 
suade others  to  be  of  my  opinion.  I  went  to  tlie  hill  near  Flatbush  to 
rcconnoiter,  and  with  a  picket  of  four  hundred  men  w.is  surrounded 
by  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  by  the  very  road  I  had  foretold,  and 
whicli  I  had  paid  horsemen  fifty  dollars  for  patrolling  by  night,  while 
I  had  the  command,  as  I  haJ  no  foot  for  the  purpose."  "  I  often 
urged,  both  by  word  and  wnting,  th.it  the  enemy  would  first  try  Long 
Island  ;  and  then  New  York,  which  was  completely  commanded  by  it, 
would  fall  of  course.  In  this  I  was  unhappy  enough  to  differ  from 
almost  every  officer  in  the  army,  till  the  event  proved  my  conjectures 
were  just."  General  Sullivan  was  second  in  command.  Lord  Stirling 
was  at  the  fort,  until  awakened  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  twenty-seventh, and  assigned  to  duty  on  the  extreme  right.  The 
standing  order  of  Washington  required  a  general  officer  to  be  always 
on  the  lines.  General  Sullivan,  in  the  absence  of  all  other  officers,  and 
as  so  recently  responsibJe  for  the  whole  command,  does  not  success- 
fully limit  his  responsibility  to  that  of  fighting  well  the  little  escort  to 
his  reconnoitering  trip. 

General  Putnam  already  advanced  in  years,  and  wholly  unac- 
quainted with  the  outposts,  seems  to  have  left  undisturbed  the  exist- 
ing picket  arrangements  when  he  took  command.  It  has  been  seen 
that  Washington  had  ordered  the  careful  observation  and  guard  of 
all  approaches.     As  General  Sullivan  claimed  that  he  always  expected 


m 


t\  s> 


t  '1  ;     ' 

ilk  '^ 


2o6 


BATTLE   OF   LONG   ISLAND.— PREPARATIONS. 


[1776. 


'  J. 


t  I 


I 


the  British  advance  to  be  made  upon  IJrooklyn,  he  must  as  a  soldier 
be  held  to  certain  implied  presumptions  which  he  alone  could,  and 
never  did,  adequately  explain. 

The  simple  facts  are  that  the  Jamaica  road  was  not  guarded.  The 
force  at  all  outside  posts  up  to  the  attack  upon  the  pickets  at  Red  Lion, 
on  the  harbor  road,  was  but  a  little  over  three  thousand  men  ;  and 
when  that  attack  was  made  it  was  assumed  to  be  conclusive  of  the 
piM'pose  of  General  Howe  to  make  that  route  his  line  of  operations 
af^ainst  the  American  works.  There  is  no  other  hypothesis  which 
would  warrant  the  exposure  of  troops  on  that  road,  subject  as  they 
would  be  to  lose  their  line  of  retreat,  if  General  De  Heister  should 
advance  upon  the  centre.  He  was  in  fact  nearer  the  fort  than  Red 
Lion  was. 

The  British  army  was  prepared  to  fulfill  its  duty.  The  American 
army,  without  Greene,  failed  to  understand  the  position,  and  was  not 
ready  for  duty. 

N'dtk.  (Fciiith  lulitioiiA  Tiir  American  Arin\  was  nut  strong  cnoutcli  t(^  dcl'ond 
all  appruaclirs  li\  the  Jamaica  Road,  c\cn  if  all  had  been  closely  watched,  (jeneral 
Sullivan  believed  that  the  repulse  of  the  det.ichment  \>-hicli  approached  Hedlord,  and 
referred  to  on  pages  203-4,  gave  hope  of  success;  and  yet,  as  he  had  formed  the 
opinion  that  the  British  would  attempt  some  Hank  movcnient,  he  seems  to  ha\e 
suspected  the  possibility  of  such  a  movement  as  actually  took  place  from  the  caIiyiiu- 
left.  The  patrol  referred  to  on  page  202,  as  captured  by  General  Howe,  is  thus 
accounted  for  by  Henry  P.  Johnston,  Esq.,  the  pains-taking  author  of  \'ol.  HI, 
Memoirs  of  the  Long  Island  Historical  Society  (1878),  p.  151).  "On  the  night  of  the 
26th.  General  Sullivan  excicised  the  same  authority  he  had  exercised  in  making  other 
details,  and  sent  out  a  speinal  patrol  of  live  commissioned  olTicers  to  watch  the  Jamaica 
Pass:  Adjutant  Jeronimus  Hoogland  and  laeif.c'iiants  Rcbcrt  Troup  and  Edward 
Dunscomb  ;  and  the  other  two  were  Lieiiter.ani  Gerrit  \'an  Wagenen,  a  detached 
ofT.cer  of  McDougall's  old  regiment,  and  a  Lieutenant  (jilliland,  who  with  Van 
Wagenen  had  crossed  to  Long  Island  as  a  volunteer,"  The  documents  cited  by 
Mr.  Johnston  conlirm  this  ;tateinent. 


.%■■■■ 


.•t't 


CHAPTER    XXXI. 


BATTLE    OF    LONG    ISLAND. 


THE  twenty-seventh  day  of  August,  1776,  was  a  day  of  struggle 
from  its  first  hour. 

The  narrative  Ijrought  General  Grant  into  conflict  with  the  pickets 
of  the  American  out[)osts  on  New  Yoric  Bay,  just  about  midniglit  of 
the  twenty-sixth.  The  picket  was  commanded  by  Major  Burd,  of  the 
Pennsylvania  flying  camp.  This  camp,  it  will  be  remembered,  was 
established  by  authority  of  Congress  for  the  concentration  of  ten 
thousand  men  who  were  to  be  placeil  under  instruction,  san  ultimate 
reserve.  The  exigency  hurried  nicUiy  of  these  regiments  to  New  York 
before  they  had  in  fact  been  fully  organized. 

The  picket  at  Red  Lion  held  firmly  to  their  post,  supported  by  a 
portion  of  Huntington's  Connecticut  regiment,  and  aided  by  the  early 
presence  of  General  Parsons,  who  had  just  before  received  the  appoint- 
ment as  brigadier-general.  He  was  a  lawyer,  without  military  ante- 
cedents, and  had  been  with  the  army  but  a  few  weeks. 

Major  Burd  was  captured  during  the  pressure  of  General  Grant's 
advance  guard  upon  the  picket  line.  Messengers  were  dispatched  to 
head-quarters,  and  at  three  o'clock  General  Putnam  sent  General 
Lord  Stirling  to  the  relief  of  the  picket,  with  orders  "  to  stop  the 
advance  of  the  enemy."  Colonel  Atlee,  of  the  Pennsylvania  mus- 
keteer battalion,  was  pushed  forward  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  by  which 
the  British  ...ust  approach,  and  a  p'^rtion  of  three  companies  uniting 
with  the  original  advance  guard,  maintained  such  vigorous  skirmishing 
just  back  of  Red  Lion,  as  to  check  the  advance  of  the  enemy  until 
quite  late^  in  the  morning.  Nearly  midway  between  the  American 
lines  and  Red  Lion,  a  well  developed  ridge  extended  from  the  general 
line  of  hills  across  the  traveled  road,  nearly  to  the  shore  of  the  New 
York  Bay.  The  ground  in  front,  to  the  southwest,  was  low  and 
marshy  at  places,  while  an  orchard  occupied  the  slight  upland  immc- 


20S 


BATTLE  OF   LONG   ISLAND. 


['77f>. 


m. 


fii, 


(liatcly  in  front  of  this  ricl;4e,  wliicli  General  Stirlintj  selected  as  his 
point  of  ri'sistdiiic.  In  order  to  ciieck  the  British  advance,  and  tjive 
time  for  the  formation  of  the  troo[)s  then  rapidly  approaching^  from 
Brooklyn,  Colonel  Atlee  promptly  concentrated  his  reL,nment  and  the 
retirinjT  picket  n^uartl  upon  the  side  of  the  main  hills,  so  as  to  have  a 
superior  position  from  which  to  open  fire  upon  tiie  British  columns, 
then  [)reparinLj  to  dc-ceiul  from  the  summit  ne.u"  the  pass  to  the  low 
ground  and  orchard  which  they  must  cross  in  order  to  attack  Slirliii;^. 
This  movement  of  Colonel  Atlee  to  hii^h  L;jrounil  which  was  well 
wooded  and  adapted  to  his  desi_L;ii,  was  made  untler  a  fire  of  grape 
shot,  with  the  loss,  accordiu'g  to  his  report,  of  but  one  man. 

It  is  necessary  to  state  in  this  connection  that  the  rei)()rts  of  Stir- 
h'n<^,  Alice,  and  other  officers,  written  on  the  nii^ht  of  the  twenty- 
seventli,  and  on  the  twcnt)'-eiujhth,  while  they  were  prisoners,  arc 
necessarily  niea;^cr  in  detail,  and  have  value  simply  for  the  facts  w'th'* 
their  immeiliate  personal  knowledi^e.  Those  facts  only  are  here  em- 
bodied which  arc  consistent  with  the  record  as  gathered  from  addi 
tional  sources.  Statements  and  omissions  are  therefore  alike  to  be 
reganled,  in  order  to  make  the  narrative  as  full  as  the  facts  will  war- 
rant, and  military  orders  themselves  are  to  be  l.u'gely  inferred  from 
acts  done.  ICach  claims  for  himself  sufficient  credit  for  good  conduct, 
while  none  assume  responsiliility  for  neglect. 

Colonel  Atlee  had  barely  reacheil  the  wooiled  slope  referred  to, 
w'licn  (ieneral  (i'Miit  moved  the  twenty-third,  forty-fourth,  ami  a  part 
of  the  seventeenth  British  foot  to  the  right,  up  the  hill,  overlapping 
Atlee's  command,  and  having  as  their  evident  pur[)ose  to  flank  him  first, 
then  to  crowd  him  back  upon  .Stirling,  and  so  flank  the  entire  command. 
Stirling  had  already  formed  his  line.  It  consisted  of  Sm  diwood's 
Maryland  battalion,  Haslet's  Delaware  battalion,  their  colonels  being 
absent  as  members  of  court-martial  in  New  Vork,  and  a  part  of 
Kiechline's  rifle  battalion,  just  then  coming  upon  the  ground.  Cap- 
tain C.irpenter  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  was  already  in  sight,  and 
soon  after  joined  the  brigade.  Stirling  sent  Captain  Stedm.m  with 
two  Delaware  companies  t<j  support  Colonel  Atlee,  with  orders  to  take 
distance  still  more  to  the  left,  ami  prevent  the  enemy  from  gaining 
higher  ground  for  their  flank  nKjvement.  (jeneral  Parsons  was  also 
placed  on  the  left  with  so  much  of  Huntington's  regiment  as  was  on 
the  ground.  Two  vigorous  attacks  were  made  upon  Atlee  without 
success.  Both  were  repulsed  with  considerable  loss,  as  the  character 
of  the  ground  and  the  intervening  woods  gave  confidence  and  effi- 


■':^i 


m(,.] 


nAIII.K   OK    I,ONC.    ISLAM). 


20g 


ciency  to  the  American  troops.  After  the  second  repulse,  Colonel 
Atlee  nuuic  a  quick  advance  to  force  a  good  position  which  the  IJritish 
held,  but  was  forced  back  by  a  heavy  fire  from  a  superior  force.  I  lis 
Lieutenant-colonel,  Caleb  I'arry,  was  killed,  as  well  as  I^ieutenant- 
colonel  Grant,  of  the  fortieth  British  foot.  The  British  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  durin;^  these  attacks  was  a  little  over  sixty  officers  and 
men,  includiivjf  Lieutenant  Colonel  Moncktoii  of  the  forty-first,  dan- 
gerously wounded. 

The  Hritish  centre  and  left  had  now  formed  in  two  lines  for  an 
advance  upon  Stirlin.;  ;  their  left  having  bi;en  relieved  from  pressure, 
moved  on  in  a  single  line  as  originally  dejjloyed.  Ca[)tain  Carpenter's 
guns  were  prom[)tIy  moved  nearer  the  hill-side  to  command  the  road, 
and  a  spirited  action  was  maintained,  at  arms'  length,  for  nearly  two 
hours,  with  considerable  loss  on  both  sides,  and  little  advantage  to 
either.  The  distance  to  the  American  lines  was  much  less  than  three 
miles,  the  disparity  in  force  was  nf)t  sufficient  to  warrant  the  sacrifice 
and  risk  of  assault,  and  the  general  ])lan  of  the  combined  liritish 
movement,  rendered  such  an  attempt  unnecessary.  It  was  enough 
for  the  Ihitish  left  v.ing  to  be  able  to  hold  Stirling  fast  where 
he  was. 

The  sound  of  firing  had  already  been  heard  in  the  direction  of 
Flatbush.  SlKirtly  before  eleven  o'clock  it  was  heard  to  the  rear  of 
Stirling,  ami  the  real  issue  of  the  da)'  ajjproachcd  its  solution.  Stir- 
ling retreated  hastil)-,  but  in  order  ;  and  was  soon  confronted  with  fresh 
columns  which  wi-re  rapidly  advancing  toward  the  road  which  ran 
from  the  U[)per  .Mill,  to  M.itbush.  Orders  were  given  for  the  men  to 
seek  their  own  safety,  by  crossing  the  marsh  to  the  Yellow  Mill,  or 
otherwise,  each  for  himself.  The  tide  was  alreatl\'  coming  in,  aiul 
promptness  alone  could  save  any  of  the  command.  Alice  and  Par- 
sons fell  back,  along  the  hill,  skirmishing  as  they  retired.  The  ammu- 
nition wagon  of  Huntington's  regiment  had  joined  the  detachment, 
but  llie  increasing  volume  of  fire  gave  impi;ralive  warning  no  Icjnger 
to  delay  retreat.  Parsons,  with  a  few  men,  attempted  to  cross  the 
F'latbush  road  and  retreat  toward  Hell  (iate.  llis  men  scattered  and 
he  entered  the  works  in  the  morning,  having  escaped  through  the 
thick  woods.  Atlee  found  himself  in  danger  of  capture  by  a  Hessian 
detachment,  and  turning  to  the  right  surrendered  to  the  forty-second 
Highland  regiment,  which  was  on  I)e  1  leister's  left,  and  had  advanced 
over  Prospect   Hill. 

General  Stirling,  with  four  hundred  men  of  Smallwood's  Maryland 
M 


Fi    1 


h  ^'  i. 


,1' 


il      '; 


w.     -i 


it;         S 
i  (;.'■: 


210 


BArri.K   OK   LONG   ISLAND. 


[1 77*1 


*■    ,■  <!■ 


m  I, 


M  i 


I 


.*B 


l.K 


.jit 


battalion,  f.iccd  liis  new  opponent,  ami  mailc  a  grasp  to  control  the 
road  which  led  into  South  Hrooklyn  and  thereby  ct)ver  the  causeway 
at  the  Upper  Mill.  This  would  at  least  have  secured  a  retre.it  for  the 
other  troops.  It  was  too  late.  Cornwallis  had  already  occupied  the 
Corte!\ou  house,  and  held  fast  to  his  position  with  constantly  increas- 
ini;  forces.  An  attempt  was  then  made  to  force  a  passage  to  fort 
Box,  the  redoubt  at  the  nearest  point  on  the  .\merican  lines,  but  this 
was  foiled  b)-  the  skillful  interposition  of  a  force  of  grenatliers  and 
two  guns. 

Finding  this  avenue  of  escape  closed,  and  that  the  arm\'  of  Grant 
was  fast  approaching,  StirUng  moved  rapidly  into  the  w.xxis  to  the 
right,  up  the  slope  of  the  hill,  only  to  be  confronted  by  a  Hessian 
column  which  hid  crossed  over  from  Prospect  Hill,  lie  :iurri'ndered 
to  General  De  1  leister  in  person. 

Thus  elo-^ed  the  operations  of  the  right  wing.  It  was  marked  by 
great  couraL;e,  [)ertinacity  and  presence  of  mind.  ;ind  the  disposition 
of  Stirling's  brigade  was  such  as  to  meet  every  retiniremeiit  that  could 
be  expected  of  a  force  hardly  exceeding  seventeen  hundred   men. 

A  single  del.ichment  of  prisoners  had  been  taken.  Lieutenant 
R.igg  and  twenty  men,  of  the  second  regiment  of  Marines,  as  desig- 
nated in  General  Howe's  official  report,  although  not  nameil  on  the 
Roster  of  the  army  as  lamled,  mistdok  the  well  ecpiipped  south- 
ern troops  for  Hessians,  and  fell  into  their  hands  as  subjects  of 
exchange. 

The  retreat  was  a  trying  one,  but  without  consideraliie  loss,  except 
that  of  the  battle-field  and  of  prisoiiers.  E.xaggerated  reports  were 
current  at  that  period,  as  to  the  number  of  men  drowned,  or  suffo- 
cated, while  crossing  the  head  of  Gowanus  Bay.  Many  of  the  men 
abandoned  their  arms  and  equipments  and  swam  the  narrow  belt  of 
deep  water,  but  no  reasonable  construction  of  offici.il  or  personal  in- 
formation will  place  the  number  of  drowned  men  at  more  than  seven, 
and  Colonel  Haslet  mentions  onl)-  one.  The  Maryland  and  Dela- 
ware regiments  fought  like  veteran  troops,  and  maintained  their  repu- 
tation on  subsequent  battle-fields.  A  loss,  in  killed,  wounded  and 
missing,  of  two  hundred  and  fifty-nine,  tells  the  whole  story;  and  in 
the  last  struggle  to  force  the  lines  of  Earl  Cornwallis,  the  Maryland 
troops  made  repeated  assaults  under  a  heavy  fire,  with  commendable 
spirit  and  coolness. 

While  General  Grant's  division  was  thus  actively  engaged,  the 
division  of  General  Heistcr  was  contented  with  an  .active  cannonading 


mb.] 


BATTLK   OF   LONG   ISLAND. 


211 


of  the  American  redoubt  and  intrcnchmcnts,  where  General  Sidlivan 
was  really  and  necessarily  in  conmiand,  before  Flatbush. 

Generals  Howe,  Clinton,  I'ercy  .md  Cornw.illis,  after  ri'stiiiLj  their 
troops  on  the  Jamaica  road  near  licdforil,  slill  undi.icovcrctl  b)'  the 
Americans,  beyan  their  advance  a;^ain  at  half-past  eiyht  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  The  li;j.ht  infantry  and  lii^ht  dragoons  passed  beyond 
]^etiford  and  bore  to  the  left,  and  south,  directly  across  the  l'"l,itbush 
road.  1  he  alarm  had  been  already  given.  A  det.ichment  of  the 
(iuarils  and  oiu'  grenadier  com[)any  with  three  pieces  of  artillery  soon 
joined  them  and  commenced   a    spirited  attack    upon  the   alarmed 


troops  who  were  rapidlv  retiring  i\om  I'rospec 


t  Hill. 


he 


II  n 


ty-third 


foot  and  another  detachment  of  grenadiers  pushed  across  the 
Heights  under  the  \'ery  fire  of  the  American  lines  lu  cut  off  Stirling's 
retreat  A\\i\  unite  with  General  Grant.     The   .Second  Ljrenadiers,  and 


tl 


le  tielachment  of  the  Seventv-first,  followed,  in  time  to  defeat  Stir- 


in";  s  last  eitort  to  escai)e. 


A 


s  soon  as  tienera 


G 


Clint 


on  s  guns  openec. 


fire,  l)v  lleister,  thus  notified  liiat  the  tin: 


),id  come   f  >r  his  action. 


)rdered  Colonel    Dunop   with    the\'agers  to   ad\ance   in  ope 


n  order, 


usmg  only  the  b ayon'.-t,  and  put  his  whole  command  in  quick  motion 
to  suppiut  tlii^  iinpetujus  onset.     Several  light  field  pieces,  charged 


with  urape,  w  ere  sent   in  aelxance  to  clear 


th 


e  u 


av.      The  America! 


army  was  between   two  fires.     Single  positions  were   held  for  a   fe 


w 


moments  w  ith  obstinacy  and  gall.uitr)',  but  in  a  lew  momi'iits  more, 
the  crushing  force  of  two  fronts,  enveloped  each  party  in  lurn,  aiul 
the  whole  commuiul  brt)ke  up  into  small  detachments,  seeking  per- 
sonal safety  in  tlighl  or  hiding  places. 

The  Ihitish  loss,  as  officially  stated,  including  Hesjiansand  Ma- 
rines, was  five  officers  killed  .md  twenty-one  wounded  and  missing; 
fifty-eight  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  killed,  and  three  hun- 
dred and  sixteen  wounded  and  missing. 

The  British  return  of  American  prisoners  made  a  total  of  ona 
thousand  and  ninety-seven,  including  si.xty-seven  woundetl  officers 
and  men. 

Ui)on  this  list  there  are  reported  Generals  Sullivan,  W'oodhull 
and  Stirling.  General  Woodhull,  with  more  than  two  hundred  militia, 
was  capturetl  on  the  twenty-eighth,  near  Jamaica,  as  elsewhere  stated, 


but 


;il)pear  on  the  return   referred   ti 


Upon  a  muster  of  the  two  Penns)'iv,iui.i  rifle  battalions,  and 
Colonel  Atlee's  mu'^keteer  battalion,  the  day  after  the  b.ittle,  "  after- 
wards carefully  compared  with  the  accounts  which  came  by  a  Hag  of 


I        tiT,;jj| 


f 


21  J 


liAl  !l,l';   (>l    I,0,N(i    LSI, AMI. 


mh 


truce,"  till  ir  lut.il  <)\  killi.il,  woiiiidcd  aiul  iilisiiii'^,  .uldid   ii|i  two  liun- 
(liiil  ,1111 1    ic VI  Illy    even. 

U\K'\\  .1  Hv  i  lull  III  I  In;  w  hull:  nt  mils  it  ;i|)|)iMriil  that  llir  i  .i  ii.iltics 
of  St  II  liii;;'  .  Ill  i;;,  II  I.  \mi  i:  oiir  li.ill,  .iiiil  llio  r  ol  tin-  M.ii  yl.iiii  1  li.it  t  .ilion 
\\c-ir  oin    |.)iiit|i  III  lli(-  'i; ',;.', I'li'ili;    lovii",  ol    tin    i  nliir  il.i\-. 

Till-  /\iiiirn.iii  t  ,1  ■u.tltii'i,  i'\'(  lusivt.'  Ill  tin-  l.oii;'^  I  .l.imi  iiiiliti.i, 
wi  1 1-,  ,1  .  Ill  ,11 1)'  .1  . 1  .III  1)1  a  .1  11  t.iiiii  il,  iiiiii-  Iniiii  In  il  .iml  ,i  viiil)'  iilJH'crs 
,1111 1  II  nil,  ,tii<l  I  111'  Iti  It  i  .Il  I  .1  ,ii.ill  ii'  >  loot  II 1 1  jii   I   loin   liiiiii  li  I  i|. 

'rill-  li.ilt  |i  III  I. on;',  I  l.iinl  li.nl  to  In-  loin'lit.  II  tin  i.iotr.ntiij 
r(jsi',t, lilt  r  III  I'liccil',  I  iill,  .iinl  llic  siu  i,f  ,  Jul  ililiii  '■  ol  I'oit  MmiiIihi-, 
c  II  .ill  il  .111  iiinlin-  I  t  iiii.iti;  ol  tin;  (.ip.uityol  iiiiiitii  .nnl  im\v  Iioo|)-i 
wlnii  (..uriiil  hy  liii-.ist  worl; ,,  .iinl  tlnnhy  i  ii  ^  inli  n  il  .i  l.il  i  coii- 
li(l(  iu;i-  t  li.it  t  In  \siiik'>  oil  iliooklyii  I  Iri;'_li1  ,  i  oiiM  In  .il  o  In  M  ,i;;.iiiist 
.1  well  ri|lll|i|ii(l  Mil  I.III  ,lllll\',  ll  irn.lllll)  (Irllioll  tl.ili  il  tli.it  lio  rr- 
sisl,ilU(:    (//    I///    lolilil     ill     l-.(.](t    ilji,   Ullllolit    iolll|>lrli    ill    I  ijillllr.        I  in- 


Iciim:  u. 


.1. 


iiiuil  to  lie  .1  l.iiliin    liMiii   llic  111  ,t,  iin|i|n  mliiit   ol  tin- 


(  no  1 11  1.1 1  loll  ol    ,1    ii.umI  loi(  r.       I  In-   lolr  \  ,il\n-    ol    t  111-    aih  .1111  r    po.'its 
.iinl  111  i.iriliil  |inki:ls,  kiy  in    llit-    as'.in.iin  i-   ol    piolmrM  il   i'-',i,i.iiuc, 
and  iiol    111    .1    Till. illy  siucc, slid    ii-siit.iiu  i.-.       I  In-    iilliiii.tti-   loiir.iol 
(iiin  i,d    I  io\M-,  tli.il    i.'l    ii-'.Mil.ir    ,i|ii)i  o.u  In   .,  \\,i'.   iin  a  it  .ilik-,  .iinl    the; 


rcMilt   w.n.  .iliiiosl   ii.Tt.iiii. 


W 


liiii:;toii    w.is    w  isi-  III  hi  >  [lUi  |i 


to 


iii.iki:  the  .ic<iiiisiliiiii  ,is  tostlyas  pos  ,ihli;  to  hi,  .nlvci  i.uy."  lie 
iiiidid  tiiin-  lo  iiK  ii-asc  and  disi  iiniin:  his  .iriiiy.  (  )ia  iiii.ilioii  .iinl  1  he 
stiinulii  1  III   .11  tioii  aloiu.  I  oiild   dolhi,. 

1 1'>'  di  ni,indi-d   th.il    N(-w  N'oik   should    he 


ll   tl 


111-  111    ine  toiiii 


I  In-  |)io|i 
llild     to  till-    l.i  ,t  pu  viibic    llloliirlit. 

J.i)-'s  |)ro|)Oiilion  to  Iniiii  .iiid  .ih. union  il  wilhoiil  .i  slnnv  ol  resist- 
aiiii:  w.is  Hot.  lln:  way  lo  ni.ikc  tin;  ,iiiiiy  slron;;  Im  liiliin-  cinlcivor. 
Its  iniiindi.iU;  .ih.iudoniiK.nt  uoiild  h.ivc  iiivolvid    tin-  (K;mor,ili/,ilii>ii 

n    ill  ni.iiki;d  i.oiitr.isl  willi  his 

the 


In;    ii:si-ilaiice    so  WKu;tie(l 


of  lln;  (;iitiii-  .iriii)-,  .iiid   would  li.i\,i- 

t  Iinl  I  1  to  ll     I  Ol  i;    Hosloll    lo    ll(-l-,i;ll 

inc. nil    l)i;tw<;i:n    llu:   ]).irlii-s    al    issue   and    in.ide  the  iiect:ssity  more 

pressiii;.;    (or   tin;    drvelopiinnl    ol    resourci;-.    e<ju.il    to   tin;    iiicrc.ised 

!.;r.ivity  oi    t  In-  strin^f-de.      (jciicr.il    llowe  ehecked   his  troops,  as  lliey 

ai:ti-d  uiidi  r   tin    iinpidsi;   ol"  success,  .iinl    were    re.idy  lo   ass,iiilt    ihe 


Aiinriciii    uoii 


In    lln-,    niiu  h   (  iilu:isi:d   di  l.iy 


In:    was  ii-'U 


I.     A 


repulse  wouiil    li.i\'i;    |ji-t;n    iiini. 


Washiiu'toii  crossed   llie  river  with 


three  re'.Miin  Ills  aller  ihe  b.illle  be^.iii,  so  tiiat  he  could  h.ive  inel  an 
assault  willi  iie.irly  as  m.iiiy  men  .is  could  h.ive  Ijeen  broui;ht  to  the 
attack  and  thoroughly  handleil  ;   but   with  ch.uacterislic  reslinj;  afler 


177'' 


ItAIII.I';    0|-    l.dSC    ISLAM*. 


!«,^ 


an  cxf  rli'iii,  ;iih1  li.il)ilu.il  uiiilrr  <■  ,t  ini.itc  ol  t  lie  s;ij;.itit)' .mil  w.ilvcfiil- 
nt-ss  of  liis  advcis.ii)',  lluwc  l.nliil  \<>  iiiijU'ivi-  hi.  mk  res  .  ]ljs 
enemy  <;s(:.t|)<(l  ;  ollui  Int  tic  InM  .  ui-n;  in  illii  .1  i,it>-  tin-  t.ip.K  ity 
ii\u\  niilit.iry  genius  ol  the  opposiii;;  'iiiKial  in  (hirl,  .mil  other 
in:};l(;i:ts  to  improve  >ucl' >.s  wiri;  to  wnst  lioin  iii  .,  ( j'.-nciMJ  Howe's, 
lianils,  every  subst.inlial  heiielil  whicli  so  (iltcn  fell  williin  their 
}.;rasp. 

Null'.  {/■I'liitli  /  i/ilinn  )  "  I  111  II  iiitoK  r  Micnis  ili.it  I  .mil-  mil  iliiiiiii'  llir  liir<" 
111)1111.  I  Diisi'.li  il  111  (III-  kiT.jliiiilil-^  mI  I  )ciU;.;l.i'..  S.IJ.M-  .mil  Si  Icjiii,  1  Dir.l  iliiliiif;  W.iils- 
wiiilli'  1  Iiii».vmIi-,  <  li.iilt  ■,  \\i  Ml  '.  I.I  .Ml  I  IimijmH''.  I.I  iL'.iili  ,  .1111 1  N  I.I  I,  vMlli  .M.iji  mil  ,iiii| 
lllliil|illli>'s  nil  II,  m   llii    II  '.I  ol  ilii    1,1  ic.iiji     ■      Vi.l     I II,  .\|i  111.  I,    I.  I  1 1    I    Si, I    ,  |.    liiij. 

Nmis  Ufinlli  /  Jilnni]  Scr  iiM  i  .1  IVa-r  l' 1 7  'I  hi-  liillmvin;'  milii,  mil  in 
Iniii','  .AhIiki-'^  lull  111  llii-  pii-si"  •  iMii  III  l>i'ii|.iiiim  I  )iiii;..|.r  ■,,  l.'i|,  M  iilillctown, 
(  ,.i,ii  .1'.  |..iil  1,1  <  i.lmii  I  Will  l)..ii;'l.r  '  '  (li.lii  limiU-.,  is  |, ill, I  r. In. I  in  \'..l.  Ill, 
.Miniuir.  I,  I  llr.l.  '1,1  ,  |,.  (I.  nl  <>iii'iii.il  I  »..i  niiH  nis  It  inili(..ilis  lln:  i..ilc  ul 
W.rJiinv.lmi  Ik  <inlii  i|..ilr  ,iii\    .il.iini   111  llii    |.ii.|.i,m  .1   |i  In  .11. 

"lll.M,    (jl   .\K  I  I.I'  .,     I.U.M,     I  ,l..\.Mi,    .All;.^      Jijlll,    177^) 
/',lii'/,\    Sl   I  l.li  \.N,      / 

(  lilllllil  M     II,    (  fICIII      S 

As  lln  Ml  k  .III  .'III  ■  nciilnlir.iiii  I-  In  llir  ,\  1  nn  ;iiiil  I  iiiii|)'i  :i|i-  ci  |,i  cliil  I  Ins 
.illi'i  11111,11  li  mil  till'  ll\  iiiL'  I  .iin|.  Ill  jl  I '  i'\  iiiiili  !  ( i<  III.  Ml  II  I  I ,  u  In  I  IS  Iiiiiim  II  .11 1 1  . 1  il, 
:iii.|  1  mil  IS  w.mli  il  Im  llir  li.iii|is,  ilii'  c  1 ,111111. ini  I  inn  lilln  iis  nl  kiti|s.  ;iii-  inmn  ili.ilrly 
In  li.u  I'  sin  II  sji  k  irinm  I'll.  I  liiy  .iii-  tu  l.ikc  llii'ii  A  1  ins  :in<l  Ai  1  iHllliininls  :iiiil  In- 
I  mnlin  III!  In  :ili  Ollnri  In  llir  (iciil  I  li  is|ii|,il,  is  :i  iimlc/vmis,  :inil  linn  in  i  inss 
|ii|.Mllni ,  mull  I  lln-  ijini  limis  ul  llir  I'rlsnn  :i|i|..,iiilri|  llnir,  l.ikilif^^  I'liirhil  .liiri  hulls 
limil  l)l.  Mm(.;.iii.  As  lln-  il  me  Inn  is,  1111. Ici  (iciil  .Mrnii  in  r\|iri|(il  lliis 
.illriinimi.  111  '  (ictn  III  |:|i,|  iisrs  In  irlirvr  :i  |,n,|i<irl  inli.ilr  Nlllnl'ii  ul  l<(';.^iiiirlits,  ;ii|i| 
lii.iUr  .1  I  li.iii;.'r  ill  llir  siln.ilimi  ul  llii'in. 

I  III  I  niiiiii.iiniiii;.>  iillii  IIS  III  Rr^iiiKMIIS  ;iir  llirirlnir  In  {>:ii:iilr  llicir  lliril  will)  llicir 
Ai  ins,  .\i  .  niiiirriiiriils  :ini|  KiKijiSui  ks,  ,it  7  u'l  Im  k  ,  .il  llir  I  Ir.nl  ul  the  it  l'Jir:itiipiii(..'tils, 
;ilii|  llnir  u'.iil   Im   nnlris." 

Smiic  sii|i|,nsiit  iIlii  the  troops  were  thus  put  iiinirr  iiriiis,  for  ;i  possililr  sally  to 
iii|iiiii|.l  unik  lirlnrr  llir  liins.  A  sall\  wuiilil  lir  lln-  li.illlinl  siif.;j.Mslimi  of  :i  j'ost 
I  mimi.iniU  1 ,  il  lir  li.nl  cmilnlrncr  in  sin  1  rshliil  ilrlciisr.  'llir  nnlri  .  il.il,  .is  \\i\\  :is 
lliai  ulinli  proviilrd  traiisportaliuii  lor  the  vvliolc  army,  explains  U  .isliiii;.;tun's 
purposu. 


fl 


i-^'-'-. 


i>'  ' 


X  • 


It' 


II! 


■M'.: 


m 


V 


'  '  tj 


It 


«^ 


-1 


if 


mm. 


H■^^ 


i  t 


PI 


\v>* 


■   iL> 


♦ttSi 


I 


cii.M'ii'.K  xxxn 

Ki:i  kl.AI     I  r.')  .1    l.i»N(,    ISLAM;. 

'III'.    I'llti   li     .illii)'     Mlt    du'.sli     \t<\iiii-    I'lM'il.lyii,    opfiiiil    liMi  s    ()t 
.i|i|ii  I  i.M  li,  I  ri'(  1 1  1 1  .uii'i|ii.it(.-   \s  or  1,',  1 1)   lilt   .111)'  ,"i  t  \r  (i  1)111  I  Ih; 
•',.1111  on,  .hmI  .iw.iiti  '1  till'  ii|jii,il  I'.ii  .  ')!  the  |)ii  I:  .nid     ll'l^•r|. 

W  It  Inn  til'-  Aiiii  I  ii  .III  Ini'' .,  .i  (  1 1!  n  .il  ix.iniiii  it  ion  '<!  c-vry  <li  I'-iis- 
ivi'  .i|)|ili.iiii  <■  'ii  |)ositi()ii  w.r.  III. I'll;  \)y  W'.i  .liiii;' lull  in  |)ir.iiii.  lie 
li.iii  1  ii  ".nil/Ill  ,1  '.IrMii;.',  'I'l  .11  liniiiil  I'li'  tii'-  ii-lhl  ol  Sinliii;',  .it  llic 
t  iini  tli.it  oII'k  cr  iii.u!':  In.  i-.ii  iii-  ,t  i-K'H  l  \'>  ;',.iin  tin-  j;-;  ,;!;:,  n  .■.;  i  ii|)ii(i 
Ii)'  (  111  iiw  .illi  .  .it  t  lie  <  Ditiiyuii  liDii  .i;  ;  ii  it  tin:  wilt  iiii  ivrnnnt  uttln- 
liiili^li  ;'i  iii.iiiii  r  1  ail'),,  till-  l.nc  oi  tin-  int  ri  lu  lini'  ill  .,  within  Inll 
\ii  A  1)1  till-  ;;.!!  I  i  .1)11,  ninli  ii'l  any  icinluK  iim  iil  Id  .it  ii  liir;  dimply 
iiii{)i)  .  alili'. 

I  111-  iii;;lil.  w.is  ■,])int  \>y  tin-  niiii  in  ''t  ii  ii"l  Iniiiii; ;  tin:  ililmiscs, 
.mil  ill  I'Miliii'- , ,  Id  i'i-  i  ,1  .my  .it  t.n  1;.  'I  In-  dKh  <i  .  .mil  niiii  vsIid  Ilh! 
ill  ..i|)]ji  .iiiil  iliniii;;  tin:  d.iy  wi-n:  ,iiiii-ii';  tin-  In-  i  ni  llir.uiny.  <  >l 
till-  ; '1-1 II  1,1 1  odii  I  I  .  t  ii.it  1 1  in.iin'il,  tin  ( 'unini.iiiili  r  iii-i  im  I  .ilmii-  iii- 
.s|jiir(l  (  Diiliili  111  i:.  ill-  sj)i:iit  tin:  iii'dit.  in  vi  ,it  in; ;  t  In-  ;.' ii.ini,  aiiij  ,il 
cirl)'  ilawn  nl  tin;  t  wriily  i  i;;lit  !i,  In-  \\-.ri  .li'/iin  in  tin-  triiulii  ^,  jn-r- 
1)11. illy  .it  tint  ivi-  Id  .ill  liit.iil  1,  .mil  (  lii:i,-riii;.;  tin:  iin:n  \>y  :ilrDii;.;  .iini 
liopi  fnl  'ADiil  ,.  ( niicr.il  .Milllin  .i|-rivi:il  lji:|i)i':  iiddii  \Mtli  tin:  wull 
(liilliil  n  "jinnit  .  of  (iIdvi  r.  .\I.i-i-,.i(  hii.rl  Is,  .iiiil  dI  .Slin:  .unl  .\I.i;..;aw, 
I'i  nii-.ylv.mi.i.  Tin-  <iit  Ini  a'.i  wii  \^liiili  f;ri  ciril  tlnii  .iinv.il  v.Mi  .m 
invi)lnnt  .iiy  1 1  iLiit  i:  ol  irsjji  i  l  Idt  t  Iid  ■■  well  i  (iiii|)|)i;ii  Iidd|j  ,,  uIid  Ii.kI 
|jt;i:n  :-.iii  cnil  .it  .i  i  I. ill'  \\ cit  Ini'  .dMii-i  ,,  sd  "  |i|'  anl  dI  Inii-  ,ii'n,'-i  .ind 
I'lin:    lialiiiT..         1  In      '.uii.dii    w.i,    iidw    fully    inm.-     iIidii  .md     Ii'dii;^. 


K.iiii  hi-;,'. Ill 


Id  fall    hi'.uil)'.      "  A   iiDi  t  licaiti 


liDDii  w.r-.  Din-  1)1  <-.\t  n  nn:  di   i  niii 


I'  "  :,i  I    in,  .md   tin;  >ilU;r- 
iDi't  .md  t  li.il.       I  in;  t  I'I  111  in  1  llil'Dunli 


til 


L'  IDV,   niDi 


iiid,  lill(;d  will)  w.ili;!' 


LODklll^      W.l   .    III! 


J)l)  v.iblc,    lIlU    llDDj 


)a 


wen;  uilliDiit  Iciils  or  ollni-  sli(;ll'.;r,  llic  Mipply  ol  Ijl.mkcLs  was  iiiadc- 


•  iii.tti    lor  ii.ilf   tin;   coinui.iiid,  .md   the  .'iMimniiitiDii  itaclf    w.is    j.;ri 


ally 


Akj' 


^/'A 


-11^"  • 


m  < 


/<«.f//'//     '1.5   I',  ,i»\,. /x    *'..       -xv      T 


*i^ 


s 


^^ 


j  *  //        I//'./,/,.,      ''f 


k^'i.     ■s..l\       ////    ^^ 


(fef.  ,.rv|: 


^5^  r'  ^ 


Jfltrfttjt  i 


■iiX^ 


HrUi.v/i 
f/<:s.\iit/t.s' 


'«! 


Mii 

I  if 


(;, 


y^ 


I'kit'i 


•  77'' I 


KKIkl.Al    ri:<>\I    1,(.\(,    ISI.AM). 


"5 


IlllUnd     to.      UMIlt     of     |i|.)[)rr     |)r<^t(^  ti'ill.       (icMrr.ll     \\'.l-.llill;.;l<in     ti)f)I< 

iicitlii  r  list  nnr  sli-,|),  Init  •-p'Ut  lii-.  riitiic  tiiiii',  1)\'  iii;;lil  .iii'l  d.i}',  ;i-. 
.utivrl\-  1)11  (lilt)'  .1-.  ii  III.'  wi-if  till-  smIc  pii'kct  ijpiiii  wlioiii  tlic  s.ifcty 
<;\  ,ill  (lt:|)i'iiil'cl.  Siu  li  littlr  -.I.'iiiiidiiii'.;  lii'i,'  ii->  u.it  pr.ut  ir.ibli;  u,is 
i'iK'<)iiiM;^cii,  so  that  the  IJiiti^h  liMip-.  wcw.  kcpl  iimlir  tlu;  imin  r-.^i<iii 
ill, it  it  w.is  iisclc^-.  tu  ii~.k  Mil. ill  (lit.Lliim'iit  ■,  uutsi(l(!  1)1  tli'ii'  own 
.;u.uil  line-..  I'lii-,  \v,i-i  tMiiipni  ^.ltl.■(l  l)y  tihii  dVi  iiiiiiiiiii;.;  .idj.uiMt 
pints ')|  tlio  i-liMil.  tiiiK-T.il  \V)iiillnill  with  iiidii;  tli.iii  Iwn  liiiinlicd 
lililiti.i  Will.' c.ipt  ui  111  iluiiii;;  tin  il.iw  m-.n  J.iiii.iici,  \>y  iJil.iiuy's  pio- 
\im'i.il  loy.ilists,  uIid  li.nl  cinsvcil  uvcr  tioiii  Statcii  I^LukI,  ami  took 
lively  iiitrn;-.t  iii  all  i>[)i:iMtii)ii.-i  in  >>inall  \ill,i;4c->  wiiiih  were  occupieul 
l)y  "  rLVDlutioiiisti." 

Jlii-  rain  was  ^d  inces.i.inl,  and  ai  ediiip.iniid  \>y  .i  wind  so  vii)leiit. 
that  the  Britiih  tioups  kept  within  their  teiit^,  and  their  wurks  m.ide 
sIdw  |)ii>;^'ress  tuward  eDinplrtiDii.  harin;.^  the'  i nine  iii;.;ht  dI  the 
t went\-e-i;.;htli,  as  (luiin;,j  the  |)re'vii)U^  tii^ht,  Wa'^liiirMuii  and  his 
aids,  made  the  eiitiii'  -eiiti}  rMUinU  with  pe-rii)die  ex.ictne-,,,  .ittiiidiiiL; 
ti)  iiM'.ter-.  reipiii  ill;,;  iiotiee,  ,ind  iinpartni;.;  to  tin;  ;.;iiaid  t  lu:  ^Diilideiuc 
which  Mieh  attentions  .ilmic  could  seeurc.  !  lie  twmty-ninlh  w.is 
. mother  d,iy  of  clouds  .ind  storms.  The  liiili-li,  howiver,  improved 
c\'ei\'  ces-ati'Mi  ol  he, ivy  rain,  to  prosecute  work  iipnii  their  trendies, 
wliieh  li.id  heiii  -.t.uted    at  ,i  di^t.iiKe  ul"  ;uiiidi\;d  NMnK  liom  I'orl 

ruln.im,  the  present  \V.i~.liin ^ton  I'.irk.  ll  they  h.id  worked  duriiij^ 
the  hour-.  wlii;n  the  Anii-riciii  trcjop^  stood  in  watei'  iinprotectetl, 
silently  u.iitin;^  upon  tin:  mownient-.  of  the  investiiij^  ,irni)',  the)'  could 
iiave  opened  lire  by  the  eveiiin;4  (jf  that  d,i\'.  More  lli.ui  once  in 
suhsiipient  c,inii)ai;4iis,  (General  Howe  suspended  movements  , it  crit- 
ic.il  times  bec.uise  of  r.iin,  when  his  adversary,  less  comfortably  pro- 
\i(.lei!  tor  .md  protected,  treated  the  r,iin  a-,  no  obst.icle  in  the  w.iy 
of  impending;  po-,sibk;  duty. 

It  is  just  here,  as  one  instance,  that  the  vohmiinoiis  discussions  ,i^ 
to  lines  of  policy  and  ,ictioii  h.ive  becloutled  the  n.irr.itivc  of  the  war 
for  American  independence  ;  ,ind  the  opinions  of  councils  of  war,  of 
gencr.il  officers,  of  committees  of  public  safety  and  of  Con;.,'ress,  have 


)ien  coniusi'i 


1  .md 


m.ide    to  decl.ire  irreccjiicil.ible    ineoiisi-,lrncies,  as 


il  the  retre.it  troin  l.on;^^  Island  ,ind  New  York  h,id  no  iiuiiiisic  neces- 
sity, but  wa-  the  aciideiit  ot  ni,ijwrit\'  opinions.  The  Americ.m  and 
Uritish  archive^  .md  biojr.ipiu' .iie'  tull  of  contempor.meoiis  letters  .md 
humble  d.ita,  which  it  would  recpiire  volumes  to  cpiote,  but  which 
have    but   one    possible    conclusion,    -that    Washini^ton    of   his    own 


'' 


m 

,..-.(■;..  » 

m  1 

'■.^^     1 

:  -.-4  St     1 

1  ■ 

H ' 


3l6 


RKTUrAT   FROM    I.OVO   ISf  AND. 


ii77h 


jutl^mi-'iit,  ami  actiii;^  ii[)ijn  tin-  s.iinc  philosophy  which  made  the 
dcffiisi.'  of  Hrookljii  necessary  in  the  thst  instance,  resolved  to  cvhcu- 
ate  till-  llei;^hts  in  tine  tiino  withonl  a  decisive  battle. 

\V'ashin|.jt()n's  polic>'  was  to  postpone  all  issues  which  h.id  a  deter- 
mining character,  .nul  were  beyond  mastery  by  his  army,  to  we.ir  out 
the  ol'tensive  by  avoiding  its  strokes,  and  thereby  to  ^.lin  the  vantaj^e 
ground  fortm-nin;^  upon  it,  when  thus  worn  out  or  over-confident,  and 
off  its  ^niard.  I'lu;  necessities  of  the  American  cause  called  lor  LiriviU 
Sfrn/fX']',  ami  ini[)roved  Li\<^/s/ii:<!  rather  than  d/in/,/  / iu/i<s,  because 
his  arniv  was  une(|ual  to  the  latter  uid  largely  dependent  for  its  suc- 
cess upon  the  wisdom  with  which  its  undoubted  courage  couUl  be 
made  av.iilable  in  the  interest  of  the  new  nation.  The  retreat  from 
Brooklyn  was  characteristic  of  this  polic\-.  The  men  were  kept  up  to 
duty  as  if  any  hour  would  commaml  their  utmost  energies  in  self-de- 
fense ;  but  he  hail  his  own  plan  to  develop,  and  this  he  liid  not  sub- 
mit to  his  aids  or  iiis  officers,  until  it  war;  matured  .ind  nearly  ripe  for 
execution.  How  well  he  kept  lii^  own  counsel  will  be  seen  by  his 
action. 

The  following  order  was  sent  to  General  Heath,  then  command- 
ing officer  at  Kin;_js'  Uridine,  through  General  Mifflin,  very  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  twenty  ninth  of  August. 

Li  INC,  Island,  Al'oust  29x11,  1770. 
••  Dkar  Gknkkai. — Wc  luive  many  hatfalioiis  from  New  JiTst'v  wliicli  are  com- 
mg  os-er  this  evening' to  iclifve  others  here.     You  will  please  therefore  to  ordiT  every 
tlal  l)uUiinie(l  boat  and  other  crat't  at  vour  jjost,  tit  fi      ''"aiispDrliiiLf  trii(i|)s.  ilowii  to 
New  York  as  soon  aspos^il)le.    'I'liey  nuist  l)e  nin  oiiie  of  Colonel  lliitcliin" 

son's  men  and  sent  u  itiiout  the  least  delay.     '  ^  order  of  tiie  Gener.il. 

11  affectionately  Yours, 
"To  Maj.  ("ii  n'i,  IIi'.Ain."  Miri'i.iN." 

Commissary-general  rrimibiiU  also  bore  an  order  to  Assistant 
Quartc'-master  Hughes,  by  which  he  was  instructed  "to  impress 
every  kind  of  craft,  on  either  side  of  New  York,  that  could  be  kept 
afloat,  and  had  either  oars  or  sails,  or  could  be  furnished  with  them, 
and  to  have  them  all  in  the  East  river  by  dark." 

After  these  oTicers  had  started  upo'i  tiieir  missions,  Washington 
continued  his  watchfulness  and  visitations  to  all  parts  of  the  camp, 
summoning  a  council  of  officers,  however,  to  an  early  evening  inter- 
view. He  submitted  his  plan  to  that  council,  and  with  this  result : 
"At  n  ce-u.ii-il  of  war  held  at  Long  Island,  August  29th,  1776,  Pres- 
ent:  His  Exi  j'.lency  General  Washington  ;   Major  Generals  Putnam, 


1776.] 


KI'.TREAT  FKMM   LONG   I;iLAND. 


217 


S/>fHtrr,  BiT^adicr  Generals  Mifflin,  McDoui^ixU,  Parsons,  Scott, 
I  i  'ads'vorth,  Fclloivs. 

It  was  submitted  to  the  consideration  i)f  tlie  council,  whether,  under 
all  circLinistances,  it  is  not  eligible  to  le.ive  Loni;;  fs!oii(i,.nu\  its  depen- 
dencies and  remove  to  Nrio  Vor/:.  UnanimousI\  agreed  in  tlie 
affirmative,  (ieiuial  Putnam,  Sanil.  11.  I'arsoiis,  Thos.  Spencer,  Jno. 
Morin  Scott,  '["ho-..  Mifflin,  James  W'adsworth,  Alex.  Mcl)ou;j;all." 

I'".i;.;ht  re.asons  were  alsr)  as>iL;iK'd  for  this  action. 

The  date  of  the  council  shows  that  its  action  wa-  'lot  the  oricjin 
of  the  retreat,  (ieneral  Ile.ith  acted  with  such  prumptne.-,s,  that 
althou|.;h  more  than  fourteen  miles  from  Brooklyn  when  he  received 
the  order  for  trans[)ortation,  he  properly  conceived  its  import,  and  so 
faithfully  exicutetl  it,  as  did  Quarter-master  Iluyhes  also,  that  the 
boats  reached  the  fool  of  Ih-ooklyn  IIeii;lits  just  at  dark  that  after- 
noon. 

At  about  eii^lit  o'clock  the  rei^iments  were  put  under  arm.s,  as  If  to 
make  a  salK-  upon  the  l^ritish  lines.  General  Mc1Jou<_,m11  was  stationed 
at  the  shore  to  reLjulate  the  embarkation.  Colonel  Glover's  regiment, 
which  had  been  recruited  at  .Marblehcad  and  other  sea-coast  towns 
of  Massachusetts,  was  very  appropriately  distributed  in  the  boats  to 
act  as  sc.imeii,  and  (ieneral  Mifflin  with  the  three  regiments  which  he 
had  brought  o\er  on  the  previous  ila\',  ami  those  of  Hand  and  Small- 
wood,  were  desi_Ljnated  as  the  new  j.juard  and  ^.irrison  of  the  intrench- 
meiits  and  redoubts.  As  the  latter  occui)ied  the  works  the  old  t^uard 
passed  directly  to  the  heights,  and  the  retjiments  last  recruited,  and 
least  drilled,  took  the  lead  in  crossing  the  river.    (  See  note,  pa,i:;e  213.) 

From  about  nine  o'clock  until  nearly  midnight,  through  wind  and 
rain, — company  by  company, — sometimes  grasping  hands  to  keep 
companionship  in  the  dense  gloom, — speechless  and  silent,  so  that  no 
.sound  should  alarm  the  enemy,— feeling  their  way  down  the  steep 
steps  then  leading  to  Fulton  ferry,  and  feeling  their  way  as  they  were 
passed  into  the  waiting  water-craft,  these  drenched  and  weary  men 
took  passage  for  New  York.  The  wind  and  tide  were  so  violent  that 
even  the  seamen  soldiers  of  Massachusetts  could  not  spread  a  close 
reefed  sail  upon  a  single  vessel  ;  and  the  larger  vessels,  upon  which 
so  much  depended,  would  have  been  swept  to  the  ocean  if  once  en- 
trusted to  the  current.  For  three  hours,  all  the  boats  that  could  be 
thus  propelled,  had  to  depend  upon  muffled  oars.  The  difficulties 
of  such  a  trip,  on  such  a  night,  can  be  realized  better  by  a  moment's 
reflection.     There  is  no  record  of  the  size  of  the  waves,  or  of  narrow 


'•K 


2l8 


RETRl'AI'   FROM    I.OXO    ISLAM). 


1'776 


...c 


^■■i:' 


r : 


escapes  from  upset,  no  intimation  that  there  was  competition  in  enterinc; 
the  boats  and  rivahy  in  choice  of  place — that  each  boat-load  was 
landed  hastily  and  that  the  boats  themselves  were  leaky  and  unsafe  ; 
but  any  person  who  propnsis  to  himself  an  imaginary  transit  over 
the  Ivist  river  under  their  circumstances,  can  supply  the  data  he  may 
need  to  ajipreciate  the  i)rocess. 

General  McDougall  himself  doubted  whether  nine  thousand  men 
couid  be  thus  transferred  before  mornintj  and  advised  its  postpone- 
ment until  another  ni^ht,  but  there  was  to  be  no  ces  tion  of  the  task 
until  its  proper  work  was  done. 

It  was  about  niidni;4ht.  just  as  the  title  turned,  that  the  north-cast 
wind  wliich.  h;'.;i  ste.idily  prevailed  for  more  than  three  days,  and  had 
kept  the  Briti.-h  fleet  in  the  lower  bay,  spent  its  stren!:;th,- — the  water 
became  smooth,  the  sk)-  was  clear,  and  the  boats  '•  lonied  to  the 
water's  edge,"  and  ;j;uided  safely,  beL;an  to  make  productive  trips.  A 
south-west  winti  sprani;'  up  by  one  o'clock.  I'A'erythin;^  that  could 
carry  sail  now  took  its  ])art  in  the  mo\-ement,  and  with  more  than 
four-foltl  celerity,  tlu'  transfer  of  troops  continued.  It  was  in  tiie 
midst  of  this  jirosjierous  undertakiuL;  that  there  occurrt'd  one  of  those 
uiiL'xpected  incidents  which  for  ;i  time  threatened  the  re.u"  of  the 
army  with  destruction.  Washington  sent  Colonel  .Scammel  toGenenu 
Mifllin  to  hasten  all  the  troops  forward.  The  covering  party  was  put 
in  motion,  but  returned  promi)tl\'  to  their  places;  and  the  error  was 
not  discovered  by  the  British  sentries.  Reference  was  m.ule  to  this 
affair  inidertlu'  subject  of"  Retreats."  Irving  states  that  Washing- 
ton calmly  replied  to  Mifflin,  who  cited  orders,  "It  is  adreadftd  mis- 
take. Unless  the  troops  can  regain  tin;  lines  before  then"  absence  is 
discovered  by  the  enem\-,  the  most  disastrous  consequences  are  to  be 
apprehended."  One  soklier  wrote,  "  when  the  order  came,  it  was  so 
much  sooner  than  we  expected,  that  a  rumor  went  through  the  bat- 
talion that  the  liritish  Dragoons  were  at  our  heels,  .and  some  of  the 
men  halted,  kneeled  tlown,  and  prepared  to  resist  a  charge."  A  he.avy 
sea-fog,  driven  in  from  the  .\t!antic,  hung  above  Long  Island  and  the 
lower  bay.  while  the  peninsula  of  New  York  was  uncovered.  This 
increased  the  danger  of  panic,  but  also  prevented  discovery  of  the 
misadventure. 

The  military  stores  ar.d  all  guns  which  were  not  too  heavy  to  be 
hauled  through  the  mud,  were  safely  placed  on  the  transports,  and 
with   the  last  boat-load,  Mifflin,  and   last  of  all,   Washington,  took 


passage. 


.77''] 


RKTREAT  FROM    LONG   ISLAND. 


;ii: 


IS 
JC 

so 
at- 


be 

aik' 
ook 


On  the  d.iy  followin;^  the  troops  and  stores  were  also  reinovrd 
from  Governor's  Island  in  safety,  and  the  evaeuation  was  complete. 

•♦  Whoever  will  attend  to  ;>.!!  the  details  of  this  retreat,"  says  liotta, 
"  will  easily  believe  that  no  military  operation  was  ever  conducted  by 
ofre.it  captains  with  more  abilil>'  and  prudence,  ov  under  more  favor- 
able auspices." 

(General  Howe  st.ites  in  his  dffici.d  report,  that  on  the  twenty- 
ninth,  at  nit;ht,  the  rebels  evacu.ited  their  intrenchments  and  Red 
Hook,  with  the  utmost  silence.  .At  dax'break  of  the  thirtieth  their 
flight  was  discovered,  tlie  pickets  of  the  line  took  pt)ssession.  and 
those  most  .advanced  reached  the  shore  opposite  to  New  York  as 
their  rear  t;uard  was  yoin;^  t)v'er,  and  fired  some  shot  among  them." 

Prompt  .ictioii  as  soon  as  General  Hcjwe  h;nl  notice  of  the  retreat, 
would  have  secured  the  ca[)ture  of  Washington  himself.  Sledman, 
after  statin;^  that  Gener.d  Howe  was  advised  very  early  that  the 
retreat  w.is  in  progress,  and  delayed  for  some  time  before  giving  the 
order  to  Lord  Percy  to  advance  upon  the  works,  thus  wonderfully 
philosophizes  upon  the  event :  "  In  reviewing  the  actions  of  men,  the 
histori.m  is  often  at  a  loss  to  conjecture  the  secret  causes  which 
gave  them  birllu  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  Ainerican  army  lay 
almost  entirel\-  at  the  will  of  the  English.  That  they  were  therefore 
suffered  to  retire  in  safety  has  by  some  been  attributed  to  the  reluc- 
tance of  the  commander-in-chief  to  shed  the  blood  of  a  people  so 
iiearK'  allied  to  that  source  from  whence  he  derived  all  his  authoritv 
and  power.  We  are  r.ither  inclined  to  adopt  this  idea  and  to  suppose 
motives  of  mistaken  policv,  than  to  leave  ground  for  an  imagination 
that  the  escape  of  the  Americans  resulted  from  any  want  of  exertion 
on  the  part  of  Sir  William  Howe,  or  deficiency  in  tiie  military  science. 

In  the  range  of  "  historical  antl  military  criticism  "  which  the 
author  has  adopted,  it  is  his  purpose  to  furnish  a  correct  record,  and 
leave  the  facts  to  the  interpretation  which  tlie  principles  stated  will 
evolve.  It  is  however  but  justice  to  General  Howe's  military  knowl- 
edge to  state,  that  the  element  of  character  heretofore  unfolded,  was 
the  cause  of  his  failure  it  Brooklyn,  He  was  wanting  t'/i  details, 
sluggish  when  instant  action  was  vital,  and  could  not  improve  success. 
The  strategical  features  of  his  operations  on  Long  Island  were  admira- 
ble ;  and  the  American  army  was  saved,  through  equally  admirable 
Logistics.     (.Sec  note,  page  213.) 


CHAPTER    XXXIII. 


THE     AMERICAN    ARMY    Ri:riRi:s    FROM   NFAV   YORK. 


m 


i    -i 


Ki 


iki 


M  Hi  retreat   of  WashiiVTton   from  Long  Islaiul   saved  his  army. 

J|_      When  the  "  forty-ciL;ht  sleepless  hours,"  durini:^  which   he  had 

been  CDnstantly  in    ilie  saddle,  or  equally  active  on   foot,  had   passed 

away,  that  army  was   indeed  in  New  York,  but   under  circumstances 

of  hardly  less  peril  than  before. 

"The  militia,"  said  \\'a-hinc;ton,  "are  dismayed,  intractable,  ami 
impatient  to  return  home.  Great  numbers  have  L;one  off,  in  some 
instances,  almost  by  whole  rei;in)ents,  by  half  ones,  and  by  companies 
at  a  time,"  and  adds,  "  when  their  example  has  infected  .another  pai*^^ 
of  the  army,  when  their  want  of  discipline  and  refusal  of  almost  every 
kind  of  restraint  and  government,  have  produced  a  like  conduct,  but 
too  common  to  the  whole,  and  an  entire  disreg.u'd  of  that  order  and 
subordination  so  necessary  to  the  well  tloing  oi  an  arm_\-,  and  which 
iiad  been  inculcated  bjfjre  as  well  as  the  nature  of  our  militar)- estab- 
lishment would  atlmit  of,  our  condition  is  still  more  alarming,  and 
with  the  deepest  concern  I  am  obliged  to  confess  my  want  of  con- 
fidence with  the  generality  of  the  troops." 

He  made  an  urgent  appeal  to  Congress  to  establish  a  regular  army, 
or  to  enlist  men  for  the  w.ir,  and  laid  before  them  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation,  and  llic  impeutlinif  necessitv  of  retiring  from  New  York 
itself.  He  put  the  plain  question,  whether,  in  that  event,  the  town 
should  be  left  standing  for  British  winter-quarters. 

"The  number  of  men  present  fit  for  iluty,  on  the  second  day  of 
September,  was  under  twenty  thousand."  An  order  was  issued  on 
the  same  day,  "  for  a  new  .arrangement  of  the  troops,  in  order  that 
they  might  act  with  union  and  firmness."  Three  grand  divisions  wore 
organized. 

General  Putnam's  division,  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Generals 
Parsons,  Scott,  Clinton,  Fellows  and  Silliman,  was  assigned  to  duty  in 
the  city  and  its  vicinity. 


^.f« 


«77f'l 


Till-:   AMKKICAX   ARMY    KKTIRKS   FROM    NKW    VORK. 


;2i 


Tlie  cciUtr  division,  under  Gcnrnd  Spencer  during  General  Greene's 
illness,  uas  ordered  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  immediately  to  Har- 
lem, to  prevent  the  enemy's  l.uulinLj  on  the  island.  It  consisted  of 
the  brigades  of  Nixon,  Heard,  McUuugall,  Wadsworth,  Douglas,  and 
Chester. 

General  Heath,  with  the  brigades  of  General  Mifflin  and  General 
George  Clin'on,  were  ordered  to  Kings  Bridge  and  its  vicinity.  Colonel 
Haslet' h-    regiment  was  assigned  to  Mifllin's  brigade. 

September  third,  Congress  resolved  that  "  two  oi  the  North  Caro- 
lina battalions  be  ordeied  to  march  with  all  expedition  under  General 
Moore,  to  reinforce  the  army  at  New  York,  that  one  continental  bat- 
talion be  ordereti  from  Rhode  Island  to  New  Yoik,  and  that  the 
States  north  ofVirginia  be  recommended  to  send  all  the  aid  in  their 
power." 

On  the  same  day,  Putnam,  writing  from  Bloomingdale,  declares, 
•'  there  are  so  many  places  where  the  enemy  can  land  in  superior 
force,  that  he  advises  the  fortification  of  Mount  Washington,  Harlem 
Heights,  and  the  Jersey  shore,  and  to  take  all  measures  requisite  to 
defend  the  passage  of  the  North  river."  He  adds,  "  I  know  that  this 
doctrine  gives  up  York  to  destructinn,  but  what  are  ten  or  twenty 
towns  to  the  grand  object.  If  Howe  gets  to  Albany,  our  north- 
western army  must  quit  Ticonderoga  or  fall  a  sacrifice,  liurgoyne 
need  never  come  from  Canada." 

Se{)tember  fourth,  Gener.il  Washington  reprimanded  such  "  dia- 
bolical practices  as  robbing  orchards,  gardens,  and  straggling  without 
arms  or  pur[)ose,  and  advises  that  the  roll  be  called  three  times  a  day, 
to  keep  the  men  to  iluty." 

September  fifth,  (ieneral  Greene  urged  a  general  and  speedy  re- 
treat from  New  York,  and  that  a  council  be  convened  to  take  action 
upon  that  question. 

September  eighth,  Washington  reported  the  militia  of  Connecticut 
then  with  him,  "  as  reduced  from  si.x  to  two  thousand  men,  and  in  a 
few  days  their  number  was  but  nominal,  twenty  or  thirty  to  some 
regiments,"  so  that  "  they  were  discharged  with  a  recommendation  to 
Governor  Trumbull  that  it  was  about  time  to  begin  dealing  with  de- 
serters." On  the  same  day  he  reported  to  Congress  that  a  council 
which  he  had  convened  on  the  sixth  was  opposed  to  retiring  from 
New  York,  although  they  acknowledged  that  it  "  would  not  be  tenable 
if  attacked  with  artillery,"  and  adds  significantly,  that  "  some  to  whom 
the  opinion  of  Congress  was  known,  were   rot  i  little  influenced  in 


I 


m 


( 'i 


»*» 


14'  ^' 

nil     ami; Kit  AN"    AKNU'    KKIIKKS    IKoM    NIW    YORK. 


[1776. 


their  opinions,  as   tlu'V   wi'i\-    li  il  to  suspect   tliat   Con.:;iiss  wished    it 
to  be  ictainc'il  at  all  liazarcU." 

Washingldii  ixali/.ed  daily  that  it  was  useless  labor  and  expense  to 
line  the  ri\crs  of  New  York  u  itli  tHld-utuk-^,  which  w<iuld  reipiire  a 
l^urrison  ot' tiu)u>and-;,  so  I01V4  as  the  rivers  themselves  wi:re  under  the 
control  of  a  lari^e  naval  force  .uid  a  veteran  army. 

'I'hat  arm\-  iiad  already  extended  its  ri;^dit  wiii^,'  as  fir  as  Fiushinu.' 
and  Hell  Ciate.  with  posts  at  15usluvick,  Newtown,  and  Astoria.  Mon- 
tressor  and  Ihichanan  isl.nid^,  now  W.ird's  and  Randall's,  liad  been 
abandoiu'ti  b_\-  the  Americans  and  occu|)ied  In-  the  Ihitish.  Several 
frigates  had  pa^Mcl  betw  ecn  (jo\  ernor's  l.-.land  ami  the  peninsula  known 
as  Ked  llook.  and  smaller  vi.'r^srls  took  position  ,it  the  head  of  Wall- 
about  Ha}-,  a;id  Newt"u:i  inlet,  where  the)'  i'ound  ilcpth  of  water,  ami 
immunity  from  the  hre  (^f  the  American  ,^uns. 

'I'he  entire  I'.ast  river  front  of  Ww  \'ork  isl.uul  was  thus  exposed 
to  incursions  which  could  be  made  more'  quickly  than  troops  could  be 
concentrated  lor  resistance.  Appeals  to  the  nortliern  States  were 
indeed  favorably  entertained,  .and  M.issaehusctts  made  a  tlraft  of 
one-fifth  of  her  .iblebcjdieil  male  population,  certain  exiiosed  Idealities 
an<l  certain  cl.isses  of  perMi)iis  alone  excei)ted  ;  and  on  the  fourteenth, 
Con<;rc-->  authorized  a  total  of  ei^^dity-tlve  regiments  to  be  enlisted  for 
a  term  of  five  vears.  These  were  apiwrtioned  to  the  respective  States. 
All  this  was  of  little  immedi.ite  value  to  the  army,  .\pplication  had 
been  made  to  W'ashinj^fton  for  troo])s  to  L,Mrrison  h'ort  Mont;4omer\-, 
on  the  Hudson  river,  but  none  could  be  spared;  and  the  ehibor.ite 
works  erected  .it  Km;,;'-.  lhid;_;i',  and  tiience  southward  to  Harlem 
Plains,  were  of  no  pr.ictic.d  v.ilue  to  the  arm)'  which  occu[)ied  the 
lower  part  of  the  i--l,md. 

In  W'a-ihinLjton's  letter  of  the  ei^dith  of  September  the  followin;^ 
words  occurred:  "Men  of  discernment  will  see  that  b)- such  works 
and  preparations  we  h.ive  dela\ed  the  operations  of  the  c,im[).ui;n  till 
it  is  too  kite  to  efU'Ct  any  c.ipital  incursions  into  tiie  counlr\'.  It  is 
now  obvious  th.it  the)-,  (the  Ihiti^h  .irni)';  mean  to  enclose  us  on  the 
i.sland  of  New  York,  by  t,ikin;4  post  in  my  rear,  while  the  shippinjj; 
secures  the  front,  and  thus  oblige  us  to  fight  them  on  their  own  terms, 
or  surrender  at  discretit)n."  "  Lvery  measure  is  to  be  formed  with 
some  apprehensit)n  th.it  all  our  troops  will  not  do  their  duty.  On 
our  side,  the  w.ir  should  he  defensive  :  it  has  even  been  called  a  w.ir 
of  posts;  we  should  on  ,ill  occasions  avoid  a  general  .action,  and  never 
be  drawn  into  a  necessity  to  put  anything  to  risk.      Persuaded  that 


I77f..] 


TiiH  amkkica;;  akmv  ki:tiri:s  from  nkw  vokr. 


it  would  he  piTsuniptuous  t<i  draw  out  our  vouul:  troops  into  oprii 
^fround  aL;'.iiiist  tlirir  superi<ir^  in  nuiubcrs  and  di^>ciplino,  I  liavc  never 
s[)ari'd  till'  .s[)atle  and  [lickaxc.  hut  1  have  no 


)t  found  tliat  reaihness  to 
tlcfenil,  even  stron^^  post.N,  at  al!  lia/ari!>,  which  is  neees>,iry  to  derive 
the  L;re.itest  bciieiit  from  tin  in.  I  am  sensible  that  a  retreatinij  army 
is  encireled  with  diflicnkies  ;  that  decliniiv^  an  en;,;a;4ement  subjects  a 
general  to  reproaeh  :  but  wlien  the  file  of  America  m.iy  be  at  stake 
on  the  issue,  wt.-  should  pnitr.K  t  the  war,  if  possible.     'Ihat  the  enemy 


mean  to  winter  m 


N 


e\v 


on 


there  cm   i)e  no  doubt  ;  that  the\-  can 


drive  us  out ,  is  e(pially  clear  :   nothiivj;  seems  to  remain,  but  to  deter- 
mine the  time  ol  tluir  takuv^'  |)ossession." 

'I'he  followinj^    is    the  journal   eiilr)-    upon    receijjt    ' '"   the    letter 
referred  to  : 


Tui;>i>\\',  .SV/A 


lO,     I 


-6. 


A  letter  of  the  ei;^hth  from  (iener.il  W.ishiiV-jton,  with  sundry 
[lapers  inclosed,  was  read  :  whereupon, 

J\iS(>/:i,/,  That  the  president  inform  (icneral  \\'ashin;^t(jn,  it  was 
bv  no  means  the  sense  of  Coiv/ress,  in  tiieir  resolve  of  the  vl  inst.mt, 
rcspectin;^  New  S'ork,  that  the  army  or  any  part  of  it  should  remain 
in  that  city  a  moment  lonL;"er  th.m  he  sh.dl  think  it  projier  for  the 
public  service  th.it  troops  be  continued  there." 


W 


The  resolution  referred  to  embr.ice 
1 


1  til 


Is  Clause 


T 


lat  General 


isliin^Ljton    be   ac(iu.iinted   th.it   Loni^ress   wnuM    have  special  care 


taken,  incase  he  should  find  it 


necessar 


V  to   iiuit    New  York,  that 


no 


<lam;i;4C  be  dom;  to   the   said   city  b\- his  troops,  on    their  le.iving  it 
the  l"onL;ri 
th 


h.-iviiiLT  no  doubt  ot    l)ein'''  able  to  recover  the  same, 


th(Mit;h  the  (.luniy  slioiiKI  for  a  time  ha\'e  possession  of  it. 


DuriiiLT  the  two  weeks  which 


succee 


ded  the  retreat   from  I 


)rooki\-n. 


■fv 


le 


Ih 

)n 

ar 
er 
at 


tne  arm_\'  w.is  r.ijjidl)  ladin.;  awa\\  while  raw  recruits  were  ^atherini; 
to  siippl)'  the  \acant  files,  as  durin;^'  the  Inst  week  «>f  the  _\ear,  before 
IJoston.  Ihe  comi).ir.iti\  e  inactivity  ol  the  British  trot)ps  w.is  matle 
the  occasion  of  new  ])ropositions   for  settlement  of  the  difficulty  be- 


twi^m  the  two  countries,     (ieiiera 
bearer  of  Lord  Howe's  mcssav. 


1  Sull 


ivan  W.IS  sent  to  C  tumress  as 


Jol 


111 


uiams, 


alw.i 


rd 


lilrui'fe  .iiul 


Dr.  I'lanklin  were  elected  as  a  committee  to  meet  l.i>rd  1  lowe  .md  state 
the  position  which  the  Uniteti  States  assumed.  Franklin  ur!4ed,that 
a  recoj^nition  of  Americ.m  Iiule[)endence,  to  be  followed  by  a  tre.ity 
of  alliance  and  fiiendshi[),  would  be  for  the  best  interests  of  both 
nations.  Lord  Howe,  thorouLjhly  anxious  to  secuie  an  honor.ible  end 
to  the  conflict,  was  so  limited  by  his  instructions  that  submission  was 


h 


;24 


IIII',    AMI'.MCAN    AKMV    KI'IIKIIS    FkOM    NIAV    \n\[K. 


[•77''' 


ft 


I)    ■ 
11 

I' 


tlic  iiulispcnsablc  clement  to  success  in  liis  niissiun.     'llic  interview 
onl\'  re-asserted  the  impossibility  of  compromise. 

\iy  the  ttiUli  (if  September,  Washint^ton  bryan  the  removal  of 
valuable  stores,  preparator)-  to  ultimate  retreat  from  the  city.  On 
the  eleventh  (ieiur.ils  (ireene,  Ni.Kon.  Miflliii,  Heall,  Parsons,  Wads 
worth  and  Scott  uniteil  in  a  recpiest  for  a  new  council,  for  the  pui- 
jiose  of  re-consitlerinij  their  former  action.  On  the  twelfth,  the  coun- 
cil met.  I'he  vote  is  thus  recorded.  'l"o  recoiisitler  :  Gi'/zini/s  J>rit//, 
Scctt,  /'(//iiu's,  Wiuisi^orth,  Nixon, McDougall,  Porsons,  Mijfliii,  Greene 
.iiul  Putihini. 

'I'd  .idliere  :  (ienerals  S/'i'/icer,  Cliiitini.  Ilratli.  The  council  also 
decided  lliat  ei_^ht  thousand  men  shoulil  be  left  fur  the  defense  of 
.Mount  Washington  and  its  dependencies.  \  brief  examination  of 
the  "  Returns  of  the  ami)'  "'  "  in  the  service  ijf  the  United  States  of 
America,  in  .mil  near  the  city  of  New  York,"  at  that  time,  will  have 
\aluein  this  connection.  The  weakest  ami  stron;_;est  rei^iments  of 
several  brigades  .ire  selected  as  types  of  the  i;eneral  condition  <jf  the 
army,  and  the  ll;^ures  indicate  the  r.mk  and  file  oid_\\ 

In  l'ar-;ons'  briLjade,  the  rcLjiments  of  lIunlin}.;ton  and  T)'ler  are 
placed  side  b)-  side,  JIiuitin_i^foii's  reL,niiient,  Total  348.  .Sick  169. 
7'y/rr's  regiment.  Total.  567.  Sick,  147.  The  former  ret;iment  had 
seen  service  :  the  latter  was  new.  In  .Silliman's  bri^jade.  J/i/in/a/i's 
regiment.  Total  J37.  Sick,  ^79.  '/7/t>////'Si'n's  regiment.  Total  416. 
.Sick  24 ^ 

In  .Mifllin's  brigade,  composeil  of  the  regiments  of  IIii)id,  S/iee, 
Mcii^iiu'.  .llhi\  Mius,  Wani,  llutchiiison,  and  JIasht:  already  famil- 
iarly known.  .Atlee's  regiment.  Total  243.  .Sick  r>o.  Slice's  regi- 
ment.     Total  499.     Sick   142. 

In  McDougall's  brigade.  McDougall's  regiment.  Total,  428. 
Sick,  loS.      Sm.illwood's,  Total    5S4.      .Side    161. 

The'  eohinms.  headed  "wanted  to  complete,"  and  "alterations 
since  last  return  "  have  been  used  elsewhere,  as  the  basis  for  estimate 
of  the  loss  incurretl  in  the  skirmishes  on   Long  Island. 

The  foregoing  statement  is  imp.irtial  and  indicates  the  condition 
of  the  army  which  was  preparing  to  leave  New  York. 

The  Council  h.id  decidetl  to  retreat,  just  when  the  strong  arm  of 
force  was  ready  to  drive  them  out. 

There  w.is  hardly  time  to  do  the  work  with  decorum,  to  say  little 
of  military  order. 

On  the   thirteenth  of  September   several   frigates   entered    East 


tion 
of 
Ittle 
Last 


.  776.1 


TiiK  AMi:i<u.\N  Ai;\iv  Ki.;i'iui:s  krom  ni:\v  mikk. 


river  and  comin;iml(jil  tliL-  works  near  the  foot  of  Tliirteonth  street, 
and  tile  wliole  army  was  ens^ai^ed  in  reniovinL,'  stores  and  heavy 
artilliry.  (ieiu'r.d  I'utn.ini  was  detailed  with  a  command  of  four 
tlioiismd  nuMi  to  covir  the  retreat,  while  the  rcmainin;/  ili\i.sions 
nio\cd  to  Kin;4's  Hriil,m-  ami  Mount  Washini^ton. 

(  )n  Saturda)' tlie  fourleentii  of  SejUi'mljer,  win'le  at  his  head-<|uat- 
ters  at  the  house  of  Ro!)(.mI  Murray,  Washiiv^ton  noticed  that  "  about 
sunset  six  more  vessels,  one  or  two  of  them  men-of-war,  passed  uji 
the  Mast  river  to  liu:  station  occupied  by  others  on  the  previous  d.iy." 
"  In  ;i  half  an  hour"  he  "  receivt'd  two  expresses,  one  from  Colonel 
S.'.rL^ent  at  llorn'-^  lIof)k  illell  (iate),  liivinjj;  an  account,  that  the 
encni)'.  to  tin:  amount  of  three  or  four  thous.ind.  had  marched  to  the 
river  and  w  ere  endjarkin;^  for  Montressor's  Island,  where  nundjcrs  of 
them  were  then  encamped"  -  the  other,  from  (ieneral  Mifflin  "that 
uucommou  and  formiilable  movements  were  discovered  amonij  the 
enemy."  "These  haviuLj  been  confnmcd  by  the  scouts  sent  out  by 
himself,"  \Vashin<^ton  "  jjroceedcd  to  Harlem,  where  it  was  sup- 
posed, or  at  Morrisania  op])ositc  to  it.  tlie  principal  attempt  to  Land 
would  be  made.  '  llis  head-cpi.irters  were  then  transferretl  to  tin- 
house  of  Ro<i;er  Morri.s  very  nearly  at  tiu-  centre  of  the  iheatic  of 
operations. 

The  nii^ht  passed  without  an  attempt  at  landiuLj.  Ivirly  the 
next  morniuLj  three  ships  of  war  passed  up  the  Hudson  and  took  ;i 
position  near  Rloomin^i^dale,  thus  "  puttin;^  a  total  stop  to  the  removal, 
by  water,  of  any  more  proxi-^ions  "  and  other  stores.  About  eleven 
o'clock  the  ships  in  the  I'.ast  ri\er  be^; m  a  heav)-  cannonadillL,^ 

The  Hritish  ilivision.s  which  had  i)een  desii^iiated  as  the  force 
which  was  to  land,  under  cover  of  this  scpiadron,  had  alri,idy  em- 
barked upon  flat-boats,  barj^es,  and  i^alleys,  at  the  head  of  Xewtown 
inlet,  and  were  carried  with  a  fivoring  tide  directly  to  Kipp's  Hay, 
where  they  disembarked. 

The  liLjht  infantry,  Hritish  reserve,  Hessian  chasseurs,  and  i;ren- 
adiers,  constituted  the  first  division  under  the  command  of  (iener.d 
Clinton,  havin;^  with  him  Generals  Cornwallis,  Vaucjhan,  and  Leslie, 
and  Colonel  1  )onop. 

"  At  the  first  sound  of  the  firin;^',"  writes  Washington,  "  I  rode 
with  all  possible  dispatch  towartls  the  place  of  landinj^^  when  to  my 
surprise  and  mortification,  I  found  the  troops  that  had  been  posted 
in  the  lines,  retreatint^  with  the  utmost  precipitation;  and  those 
ordered  to  sup[)ort  them,  Parsons  and  Fellows'  brigades,  flyinij;  in  every 
IS 


liiiiii 


236 


Tin:  .\mi;kic.\n  .\:.m\    kiwikks  from  m;\v  vork. 


1776. 


•Isf 


Bli 


m^ 


.'i .  i  '3 


M» 


iliri'clioii  and  in  tlic  utmost  confusion,  notwitlist.uulin^^  tiu:  LlToits  of 
their  lJiiicimIs  to  foiin  tlirni.  I  used  every  mean-;  in  iii)-  i)t)\ver  to 
rally  antl  L,'et  tlicii  in  order,  i)ut  my  attempts  wcir  tViiitle-s  ,ind  in- 
eflectnal,  and  on  the  appearance  of  a  small  party  of  the  enenu'.  not 
mure  than  >i.\ty  or  seventy  in  numher,  their  disor(.ler  increased,  and 
ihe\'  ran  away  without  firin;;  a  shot." 

The  indi;4iiation  of  W'.isliiiv^ton  at  this  "disgraceful  and  d.istardly 
conduct,"  carrietl  him  directly  amon;^-  the  fu;_;itives  ne.u'est  the  enemy, 
and  e.\i)oscd  him  to  deatli  or  ca[)ture.  More  than  once  afterw.inls,  a 
similar  darinj^  rallied  fuj^itives,  but  the  panic  on  this  occasion  was 
wild,  unreasoniuLJ,  and  impossible  of  control.  Its  story  has  been 
drajied  with  hii;h  color-.'d  fiction,  until  a  credulous  man's  fiith  in  one 
h.df  of  the  camp  rumors  which  stole  into  histi)r\,  would  convict  the 
American  commander  of  lunacy.  That  with  tir.iwn  sword,  impetuous 
command,  and  fearless  exposure  of  his  person,  Washington  did  his 
best  to  retrieve  the  disaster,  is  undoubtedly  true,  so  that  he  seemed, 
in  the  stron;4  figure  of  General  Greene,  to  seek  death  rather  than  life. 
All  beyond  this,  so  thoroughly  examin-'d  by  .Mr.  ilancroft,  is  fodlish 
tradition  or  ct)ntenii)oraneous  c.imp  gossip.  A  court  oi  impiiry  whicii 
reported  ( )ctol)cr  tweiUysixth,  failed  to  fi.x  responsibility  for  the 
-panic.  It  appeared  trom  the  testimony,  liowever,  that  (jenei.d  Par- 
sons rallied  a  portion  of  the  tr<)ops  under  Washington's  own  eye  ;  but 
that  almost  immediately  they  g<it  hold  of  some  field  rumor  .md  ran  in 
every  direction. 

j-'indiiig  all  efforts  to  check  the  retreat  to  be  fruitless,  Washington 
hastened  back  to  ilarlem  Heights,  i)ut  the  arm\'  in  condition  to  meet 
the  enemy,  sent  out  reconnoitering  parties  in  all  directions,  and 
di.  .otcd  himself  to  restoration  of  order  and  the  exigencies  of  the  hour. 
VV'hile  confident  that  Irs  new  jjosition  w.is  aim  ist  impregnable,  a 
single  paragraph  in  his  report  to  Congress,  which  in  hi-,  haste  was 
unsigned  and  forwar  1  d  b)'  his  secretary,  will  indicite  his  grea'est 
apprehension  lor  the  future.  "  We  .ue  now  encamped  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army  upi^n  the  heights  of  Ilarlc-m,  where  I  shoukl  liope 
the  enemy  would  meet  with  a  retreat  in  case  of  an  attack,  if  the  gen- 
erality of  our  troops  would  behave  witii  tolerable  bravery  ;  but  experi- 
ence, to  my  great  affliction,  has  convinced  me  that  this  is  a  matter  to 
be  wished,  rather  than  expected." 

The  disaster  was  the  more  humiliating,  since  the  roster  of  the 
army  :ihow's  that  Parsons"  brigade  was  composed  of  the  regiments  of 
Huntington,    Prescott.   Ward,   Wyllis,    Durkee,  and   Tyler,  some  of 


i::'- 


Till".   AMI-klCA.V    AKMV    Kl/llU'S    KRdM    M  \V    \  n\iK. 


--/ 


w!iiv.h  had  hcli.ivcd  wril  iiikKt  prfvinns  Grr,  ami  tlu'ir  rrtiirns  showi'd 
■•  picsi-iit  "  at  tin-  prL'vinus  inii-^tir,  "fit  lnr  diit_\-,  in-  on  coMun.iiul,  an 


aj^'j^nv^ati-  of  one  thousand  nine  luindn.'d  and  thirt\' 


■xcl 


U->1\T     o 


f 


orfk-ciN  ioinniissif)ncd  and  non-rominissioncd  and  musicians."  It  i.s 
.uiothe^r  HhHtiMliun  of  llic  sUan^i.'  [)ivot  events  th  it  occur  in  all  mili- 
tary iMitcrpriscs. 

(iencral  I'litnam's   command    was  ;_jrcatly  endan-^fercd    !)\- this  mis. 
conduct.      l''ilonel  l)ono])'s  Hessians  moved  dircctl)-  t'or  tiie  cit\',  but 


hvt 


le   timiK-  occuD.ition  of  the  road   iniarest   the  Hudson  river,  I'ut- 


n.un  extricated  his  division  without  suhstaiitial  loss. 

riu'  luavy  can  n 'Ml  and  a  lar^e-  ([uantity  ot"  pro\i-,ions,  camp  kettles, 


ti'iits,  and  other 


^en 


lials  to  tlie  comfort  of  the  ,iri 


n\',  were  sacri 


ficed 


h_\-  tile  ener;_,ntic  .ictioii  of  I'linton,  who  .ilmo^t  invariably  realized  the 
best  fruits  of  success. 

The  I'lrilisii  ,irmy  at  once  marched  to  the  !iei<^hts  of  IncleMibur;^,  or 
.Murr,iy"s  (Iill,  ,ind  a  subsequent  deb.irkation  of  troops  w.is  advanced 
so  far  northwanl  .i-  to  make  a   chain  of  i)ost-;  across  the   island  from 


IMooinin't-dale  to  II' 


)rn 


ir 


)ok,  I 


1  -ar  I  [ell  ( iate.      ( ieiura!  Howe  estab- 


lished his  i)\vn   !!ead-(piarte'rs  at    the  i?ei'kniaii    mansion,  mu    lar   from 
those  ju~t  vacated  in'deneral  \\'a~-liinL;ti>n  on  Murr.i)-  Hill."''" 

Hefore  f  )ur  o'clock  in  the  aiternoou.  the  Anu'rican  ll  i;^  tlisappcared 
from  I'ort  ( leor^u',  aui!  .\'ew  N'ork  was  in  the  hands  of  the  British 
.irmw 


'li     ± 


■•■  !!. 


kl:^ 


.,.„ 


*  Al  the  Murniy  Iiou-io,  (';\pi.iin  Natlum  If.ili',  of  Kiiowlloir.s  t 'Dinifcticut  Riuij^lts, 
ncfivcfl  his  iiistrucli(ii>^  Irniu  ^V.l^,hillJ;tcl|l  to  vi>it  i.oiij;  Nl.iiid  ami  Difluin  accural  ■  knowl- 
i'c|_;c  oflhc  luovemL'iit.s  of  tlie  l'.iili>li  .tnny.  At  tlie  liccknian  iiouse  on  the  t\voii;y->.ccoiul 
day  of  Soptemher  he  w.is  execmcd  as  a  spy. 


nssiiii;  ailil 


Hale  was  liaiij^cil  upon  an  .ip] 


Kut-cis'  orchard  iiear  (lie  pres- 


ii  inioiscciion  of  East  Broadway  and  Market  StreeU  ' 


CHAPri-:K  XXXIV. 


iiAki.i;M  iii;i(iiirs  ami  \|(1mi\,  1776. 

Till"-  AiiK-ricm  aiiiiy  spent  its  first  ni^lil  dii  Il.irlcm  llcii^hts. 
A  period  of  tittcen  lunirs  of  l.ibor  w.is  followfd  l)y  in, my  hours' 
cxposurr  umlcr  i.iiii,  wit  hoiit  tiiil^,  w  illi  liinilcd  rations,  no  iitfn>ils 
lor  cookiii;^-.  anil  the  consciousness  that  inaii)-  comforts  h.id  been 
sacrificed  by  a  needless  [)aiiic. 

^.)n  ihe   following'  da_\'  a  ■spirited  skirmish  revived   thi'ir  s[)irits,  and 
evinced  the  value  of  coura;^u.'  aiul  promptness  in  .iction. 

Tile  official  accounts  of  this  affiir  which  were  made  up  by  the  two 
t;enera!s-in-chief  wiiile  the  facts  were  fresli  in  mind,  are-  combined  so 
as  to  indicate  their  respecti\'e  .ippreciatioii  ot  the  real  is>ue.  1  hey 
Confirm  the  opinion  th.it  reports  ot  ol"ficer>.  as  to  tacts  not  within 
their  personal  know  ledi^e.  are  secoiulrate  testimonx':  that  veiy  humble 
d.it.i  arc  often  ver}-  material  to  the  appreciation  ot  an  is-,ue  ;  that  the 
princip.il  t'eatures  of  an  en;4a;4ement  are  necessarily  the  objective-,  ot 
an  otTicial  report,  and  th.it  the>e  mi)'  lack  .iccur.icy  throui^h  the  luis- 
direction  which  a  sin;j[le  error  of  tact  may  imp.irt. 

Gener.d  Ilowe  .s.iys,  '•  On  the  lOth  in  the  inornin,^,  .i  kn-e  part)- 
of  the  eiieui)-  haviiiL;  p.Hsed  under  cover  of  the  woods,  ne.ir  to  the 
o.dvanced  posts  of  the  army,  the  Second  .md  lliird  li.itt.ilions  of  li_L,dit 
infantr)',  supported  by  the  l'"orty-second  infantr_\-,  pushed  f)rw,iril  .md 
drove  tiiem  back  to  their  intrenchinents,  from  whence  the  enemy, 
observing'  the\-  ueri:  not  in  force,  att.icked  them  with  ne.ir  three 
ihousar.d  men,  which,  occ.isioned  the  march  of  the  reserve  with  two 
held  jjieces,  .1  b.itt.ilioii  ofllessi.m  ;_;re'nadiers,  and  the  company  ot 
chasseurs  .md  tiekl  pieces,  reiiulsed  tile  enemy  with  consider. ible  loss, 
aiul  obli;^i-d  them  to  retire  within  their  works.  l'"rom  the  accounts  of 
deserters  it  is  .ij^reed  th.it  they  had  not  less  th.m  three  hundred  killed 
and  wounded,  and  anionj^  them  a  colonel  and  major  killed.     We  had 


I'-ll 


V/V*V/f  I"  ''^^ -'/.-./  , 


i) 


5? 


NcmffonKCLLE 

fl O-nS^  f- '  ■-■■! ty-^^-' -.' /In /.sin t    //A  r,t/./^., 


\> 


O^*"^ 


r///iws,l(r/{-. 


^r/ri,i/f.t  3  'Wf'-ssiaii  Salt  - 


^■J/r/an/f\     Ca/frp/li'U  rintt /?rair/t  by  CW.  C/irrifffPi . 


OOw« 


^ 


tii^'i  -  (. 


)  i 


J 


.-''' 


J|f^ 


:7''.l 


HAKMIM    HKir.FtTS   AND   VK'INITV,    1 7-6. 


229 


eit^lit   officers  wounded,    fourteen    nun    killed,    and   .ibout    seventy 
wounded." 

Wiisliin;_;t(jn  thus  reports  to  Con^^MX-ss  :  "About  tlic  time  of  the 
post's  departure  witii  my  letter  of  the  i6th,  the  enemy  ap[)cared  in 
several  lar^t^e  bodies  ii[)on  the  plains  about  two  and  a  lialf  miles  from 
ijencc.  I  rode  down  lo  our  .idvauceil  post  to  put  matters  in  a  proper 
situation  if  th'.;y  shoulil  attem|)t  to  come  on.  Wlien  I  arrived  I  iuard 
a  thiiiL,',  which  I  was  informed  was  between  a  party  of  our  ran^xTs 
uiuler  the  conunand  of  I^icutenant-coIoiU'I  Knowlton,  and  an  advance 
party  of  the  enem\'.  Our  men  came  in  and  tokl  me  that  the  body 
of  the  enemy  wlio  ki  pi  themselves  concealed,  consistetl  of  .djout 
three  huiulreil  men.  as  near  ai  they  could  guess.  I  ininudialely 
ordmetl  three  conii)anies  of  Colonel  Wcedon's  Vn"L;ini,i  reL;iment, 
under  Major  Leitch,  and  Colonel  Knowlton  with  his  ran^jers,  to  try 
aiul  get  in  the  rear,  while  a  disposition  was  making  as  if  to  attack 
them  in  front,  and  thereby  draw  their  allei\tion  that  way.  This  t(Jok 
effect  as  I  wished  on  the  part  of  the  eneni)'.  On  tlie  appearance  of 
our  part)'  in  front,  they  immedialidy  ran  ilown  hill,  look  [)ossession 
of  some  fences  and  bushes,  ami  a  smart  firing  beg.m,  but  at  too  great 
a  distance  lo  do  much  executicjii  on  iiillier  side." 

"The  parties  under  Colnnel  Knowlton  and  -Major  I^citch  iiiduckily 
began  their  .ittack  too  soon,  as  it  was  rather  in  ll.iid-:  than  in  rear.  In 
a  short  time  Major  Leitch  was  brought  off  woimdeil,  having  received 
three  balls  in  his  side,  and  in  a  short  lime  Colonel  Knowlton  got  a 
wc.und  which  provetl  murl.d.  lln;  men  conliiuied  the  engagement 
with  the  greatest  nstilul'oii.  l''inding  thai  they  wanted  a  support,  1 
advanced  jjart  of  Cohjiiel  (irifliths,  and  Colonel  Rich.irdson's  Mary- 
land regiments,  who  were  nearest  the  scene  of  action.  These  troops 
charged  the  enemy  with  great  inlrei)idity,  and  drove  them  from  the 
wt)od  iiuo  ihe  [)lain,  and  were  pushing  them  from  thence,  having 
silenced  their  fire  in  a  greal  measure,  when  I  judged  it  prudent  to 
order  a  retreat,  fearing  the  enemy,  as  I  have  since  found  was  re.dly 
the  case,  v;ere  sending  a  large  body  to  su[)i)ort  their  party.  We  luul 
about  forty  wounded,  the  number  of  slain  is  ve.y  inconsiderable,  liy 
a  sergeant,  who  tlesertcl  from  the  enemy  and  came  in,  I  find  that 
their  party  was  greater  than  I  imagined.  It  consisted  of  the  Second 
battalion  of  light  infantry,  a  battalion  of  the  Royal  Highlanders,  the 
l'"orty-sccond  regiment,  and  three  companies  of  the  Hessian  riflemen 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-general  Leslie.  The  deserter  reports 
that  their  loss  in  wounded  and    missing  was  eighty-nine,  and   eight 


k 


m 


MBHBH 


If    II 


II  M      I 


lit! 


:l 


fill 


■i 


Wr 


%  fl 


230 


HARLEM    HKICIirs   AM)    VICIXll'Y,    I776, 


''776 


killed.  In  tlu.'  latter,  his  account  is  too  small,  as  our  pcoi^c  discovered 
and  buried  double  that  nuiMber.  This  al'fiir,  I  am  in  hooes,  will  be 
attended  with  many  sahit.iiy  conseciuences,  ,is  it  seems  to  have  greatly 
inspirited  the  whole  of  our  troops." 

It  api)ears  that  both  generals  were  nearly  correct  as  to  the  forces 
ultimately  brought  into  the  field  by  the  adversary.  (Jeneral  Howe's 
attention  was  not  called  to  the  matter  until  the  skirmish  between 
small  jiicket  det.ichments  of  the  two  armies  had  induced  Washington 
to  advance  willi  reinforcements,  and  this  was  taken  to  be  an  original 
ad\Mnce  in  force.  The  English  deserter,  a  sergeant,  with  i)rofessional 
exactness,  gave  an  accurate  account  of  the  condition  of  things  as  he 
obtained  it  on  the  field;  and  the  American  deserters,  terrifieil  under 
fire,  as  naturally  over-estimated  their  danger,  and  the  consequence  of 
the  skirmish.  The  fill  of  Knowlton  rmd  Leitch  was  known  to  them, 
and  after  the  loss  of  the  two  commautling  officers  the\-  abantloned 
their  companies.  The  sergeant's  st;itement  of  the  British  casualties 
was  also  substantially  correct,  and  Washington's  presence  at  the  scene 
of  action  eriabled  him  to  test  it.  (General  Howe's  ignor.mce  of  the 
origin  of  the  skirmish  also  lent  color  to  the  deserter's  exaggeration 
<">f  American  losses,  and  gave  to  the  whole  the  character  of  a  deliberate 
i'.ssault  u[)on  his  front,  instead  of  the  collision  of  advance  guards  sup- 
ported by  reinforcements  as  occasion  required,  .\nother  version 
iilu'-trrites  the  difficultv  of  getting  f.icts  amid  the  excitements  of  a 
campaign. 

Gencal  Greene,  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Cooke  bearing  date  the 
seventeenth,  states,  that  "'  on  the  previous  day  about  a  thousand  of  the 
enemy  attacked  the  advance  post,  and  that  by  the  spirited  conduct 
of  General  Putnam  and  Colonel  Reed,  Adjutant-geiu.'ral.  our  people 
atlvanced  upon  the  plain  ground  without  cover,  attacked  them  and 
drove  them  back;  that  his  excellency  ordeied  a  tinielv  retre, it,  having 
discovered  or  concluded,  that  the  enemy  would  send  a  large  reinforce- 
ment, as  their  main  army  lay  so  near  by." 

In  connection  with  this  letter  there  is  a  third  history  of  the  trans- 
action, which  indicates  very  strikingly  that  the  American  officers  were 
beginning  to  see  the  importance  of  having  no  more  panics.  Adjutant- 
general  Reed  wrote  to  his  wife  that  •'  General  I'utnani,  (leiieral  (ireene, 
Mr.  Tilghinan  and  others  were  in  it."  The  excitement  incident  to  actu- 
ally chasiiig  a  party  of  British  troops,  had  a  very  hap{)y  effect  in  re- 
storing the  confidence  of  the  men.  Reed  had  his  horse  shot,  and  while 
attempting  to  stop  a  runaway  soldier,  "the  rascal  presented  his  piece 


I77f'.l 


iiAKi.KM  iii:i(;nTS  and  vicinity,  1776. 


^3> 


I 'I  Is,    : 


and  snapped  it  at  liini,  at  about  a  rod's  distance."  Seizing  a  musket 
from  a  soKlier,  tlic  Acljutant-;^cneral  snapped  it,  also,  but  it  missed 
fire.  Me  tlien  "  cut  the  coward  over  tlu^  head  and  hand  with  his  sword, 
and  tile  mai*.  was  prompt!)-  trii-d  and  sentenced  to  deatii."  He  sa\s, 
"  1  suppose  man}-  pi.Tsiuis  will  think  it  was  rash  antl  imprudent  for  so 
many  officers  of  our  rank  to  ;^o  into  such  an  action,  but  it  was  really 
to  animate  the  troops  who  were  cpiile  dispirited  and  wouUl  not  l;o  into 
danger  unless  their  officers  led  the  way." 

Colonel  Knowlton  was  greatly  mourned.  His  gallantry  at  Bread's 
Hill  identified  him  with  the  first  battle  of  the  war,  and  he  seems  to 
have  been  as  nearly  fire  i)roof  and  panic-proof  as  any  man  in  the 
service. 

I'"or  four  weeks  the  American  army  maintained  its  position.  While 
occasional  skirmishing  took  place,  the  periocMcal  home-sickness  broke 
out  again,  with  contagious  virulence.  Desertions,  and  the  expirations 
of  short  enlistments,  seemed  to  defy  all  attempts  at  thorough  discipline. 
Orders  were  so  frequently  overruled  or  modifieil,  that  Washington 
was  compeiled  to  publish  the  ft)llowingon  the  seventeenth  of  .Septem- 
ber :  '•  The  loss  of  the'  enemy  yesterda_\-  would  uiidoui)tedly  have 
been  much  greater  it  the  orders  of  the  Commantler-in-chief  had  not 
in  some  instances  been  contradicted  by  inferior  officers,  who  however 
well  they  may  mean,  ought  not  to  presume  to  direct.  It  is  theref  u'e 
ordered  that  no  officer  commanding  ,1  party,  and  having  received  orders 
from  the  Commander-in  chief,  depart  from  them  without  counter 
orders  from  the  same  authority;  and  as  many  may  otherwise  err, 
through  ignorance,  the  arm}-  is  now  accpipinted  th.it  the  general's 
orders  are  deli\ered  by  the  Adjutant-gener;il,  or  one  of  his  aid-de- 
camps, Mr.  lilghmanor  Colonel  Moylan,  the  Ouarter-mastcr  General. 

Brigade  majors  were  recjuired  to  report  twice,  d;i;!y,  of  the  loca- 
tion and  condition  of  their  command;  plundering  antl  desertions  were 
punished,  the  organizations  of  the  medical  staff,  upon  the  basis  of 
examination  of  candidates,  was  pushed  forward,  .and  tlie  minutest 
tletails  which  conduced  to  the  discipline,  comfort  or  s.ifety  of  the 
troops,  entered  into  the  routine  of  work  which  laid  its  own  burden 
upon  the  Commamler-in-chief 

The  .St.ite  of  M.issachusetts  sent  General  Lincoln  i         mmaml  of 
her  drafted  men  ;  General  Cireene,  was  placed  in  conim.md  across  the 
Hudson  river,  in   New  Jersey,  (lenerals  Sullivan  ;md  Stirling  were  at 
once  exchanged,  and  the  armies  were  at  comparative  rest. 

On  the  fifth  of  October  the  Army  Return  was  made  up  by  Adju- 


f\ 


%]•>■ 


mmm 


iiari.i;m  iiKitiiris  anh  \uimi\,   \;~('k 


[m(. 


«•   I. 


lli' 


tciiit-gcncral  Joseph  Rccd  with  the  foUowinL;  exhibit  ;  Tdtal  nf  rank 
and  ^ile,  twLMity-fivc  tliou^and  seven  hundred  and  tliirtv-five  nu  n,  of 
whom  eiL;ht  thousand  and  seventy-five  were  sick  or  on  fui"hnit;ii  : 
wanting;  to  conipK'te  tiie  reyinients  eleven  ihon-^and  two  inmdred  .md 
se\  ent)-one.  A  fdot-iiotc  states  that  "deneral  I.incohi's  Massachu- 
setts Mihtia,  computed  at  fnur  thousand  men,  are  so  scattered  and  i_L;no- 
rant  of  tlie  forms  of  returns,  that  none  can  be  i;ot."  The  fourteen 
brigades  nominally  comprised  forty-four  regiments.  Major  ]5ackus' 
light  horse  nundiered  one  hundred  and  fiftN'-eiglit,  and  C'olonel 
Knox's  artiller)'  numbered  {'wv  hundred  and  eighty  rank  antl  file,  in- 
cluding >icK  and  those  on  furlnugh. 

On  the  eighth  of  ()ctiiber  the  arm}-  in  New  Jersey  under  General 
Moore,  exhibited  a  total  of  six  thousand  five  lumdred  and  tort_\-right 
officers  and  men.  stationed  at  the  Ambcn's,  W'oodbridge,  I'.li/abeth- 
town.  Xew.nk  and  Fort  Constitution,  .ifterward  h'ort  J,ee.  On  the 
ninth,  the  I'luenix  aiul  Roebuck  safely  passed  the  forts  and  went  up 
to  Dobbs  l'"err\-  ami  took  possession  of  two  vessels  belonging  to  the 
Americans.  (  )n  the  tenth  (jeneral  Greene  re[)orted  his  "  surgeons,  as 
without  the  least  p.u'ticle  of  medicine,"  that  "  the  regimental  surgeons 
embezzle  the  public  >tores  committed  to  their  care  so  that  the  regi- 
mental sick  suffer,"  and  that  "  the\'  >hould  h,i\e  the  benefit  of  the 
general  hospital." 

On  the  eleventh.  Adjutant-general  Keed,  in  a  letter  to  his  wife, 
expres>ed  his  pur[)ose  to  resign.  He  was  disgusted  with  the-  [)re- 
dominating  leveling  si)irit,  --the  ei|uality  between  ofllcers  and 
men,  antl  sa\'s,  "  ICither  no  di-,cipline  can  be  established,  or  he  who 
attempts  it  must  become  odious  antl  iletestable,  a  position  which  no 
one  will  choose.  Yesterda}-  morning  a  captain  of  horse  who  attends 
the  (lener.d,  from  Connecticut,  was  seen  shaving  one  dl  his  men  on  the 
parade  near  the  house.  I  have  expresseil  myself  of  ami  to  some  peo- 
ple here,  w  ith  such  freedom,  after  the  affiir  of  the  fifteenth,  that  1 
believe  many  of  tiiese  wi>h  n)e  away.  My  ide.i  is  sht)rtly  this,  tliat  it 
France  or  some  other  power  does  not  interfere,  or  some  tends  arise 
among  the  enemy's  troops,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  stand  them  till 
spring." 

Notwithstanding  all  that  has  been  said  and  reiterated  as  to  the 
looseness  of  disciplin'.>,  the  prime  difficulty  was  not  with  the  r.mk  and 
file.  In  a  report  made  to  the  Maryland  Council  of  Safety,  by  Colonel 
Smallwood,  he  properly  states  what  was  still  the  chief  bane  of  the 
.irmy — "  could  our  officers  be  brought  to  a  proper  sense  of  their  duty 


o 
\o 
lis 

\c 

I)- 

I 

it" 

rise 
till 


776. 


HARI.KM    IIKICrirS    AM)    VICIMIV,    1776. 


233 


and  (li;^Miit\-,  ,111(1  tlir  \vri;^ht  of  the  army,  the  ciu.iny  niiL;ht  In-  eheckcd 
ill  their  course  ;  for  this  yoii  ma)-  rely  upon,  however  their  parade 
nia)'  indicate  the  contrary,  yet  it  is  a  fact,  they  are  .is  mueli  afraid 
ami  cautious  of  us,  as  we  can  he  aiiv  of  us  of  them.  I'luir  olficcrs 
alouc  i^ivc  the  superiority.  Our  Commander-in-chief  is  an  excellent 
man,  and  it  wduKI  be  haj)[)y  for  the  United  St.ites  if  there  was  as  much 
propriety  in  ever)'  department  below  him.  It  is  not  owiiiLj  to  any 
want  of  precaution  in  him  that  discipline  is  not  e.v.icted  with  more 
rigor.  Much  must  tlepeiul,  resptctiii;^  this,  on  the  superior  officers 
iie.Kt  under  him  in  command,  and  lure  there  seems  to  be  a  total 
ignorance  of  and  inattention  to  tiiat  s_\stem,  so  necessai"\'  to  render  an 
army  formidable." 

At  this  time  General  Howe  himself  notified  Lord  Germaine  "  that 
he  no  longer  expected  to  finish  the  comiiaign  until  spring,  that  the 
provincials  would  not  join  the  Englisii  army  in  any  considercdjle 
luimbers,  that  additional  foreign  troops  should  be  hired,  and  th.it  at 
least  eight  men  of  war  should  be  sent  frcjm  Kngl.md  b\-  the  I'ebru.ir}- 
en.suing." 

Such  are  \\  few  of  the  incitleiits  which  attacli  to  the  four  weeks  of 
interrupted  luiiitary  action  while  the  .\merican  army  remained  at 
Harlem    Heights. 

The  location  w.is  admirable  to  resist  an  advance  from  New  York 
itudf.  'i'hree  liius  of  iiitienchments  extended  across  the  narrow 
neck  of  land,  liardl)-  half  a  mile'  wide,  between  the  iludson  and  Har- 
lem rivers.  These  iiUreiichments  were  embr.iced  within  less  than  a 
mile,  from  near  one  hundred  and  fort}--fifth  street  northward;  and 
just  within  the  upper  line,  was  the  house  of  Colonel  Morris,  occupied 
b\-  W'.ishington.  Fort  Washington  was  .still  a  milt;  beyond.  On  the 
east  side  of  the  Harlem  river,  and  as  tar  as  Throgg's  Neck,  detached 
redoubts  and  earthworks,  called  alarm  posts,  were  established,  so 
that  the  whole  front,  from  the  Hudscm  to  Long  Island  Sound  was 
under  guard. 

October  eleventh  was  designated  by  Washington  for  his  personal 
inspection  of  the  troo[)s  at  their  alarm  posts.  It  was  timely,  and 
within  twenty- four  hours  of  the  advance  of  the  British  army. 


the 
.ind 
)nel 
the 
uty 


''^  ^ 


CIIAPTKR    XXXV. 


OI'KRA  riONS  NEAR  NKW  YORK,  WIIITF.  I'l.AIXS,  CIIA'ITERTON  lUlL. 


t     > 


fi 


ON  tlic  twelfth  cla\'  of  Oclobcr,  1 776.  (".ciural  Hdwc  hi,;;an  tlie 
execution  of  his  [/uin  to  cut  off  Wasliin^ton's  arni_\-  from  New 
Kn^^land  antl  upi)er  New  Vo-k,  .iiul  fasten  it  to  it>  own  hues,  for  future 
capture.  Unwilh'nL;  to  attemj^t  the  costl\-  enterj)rise  of  storniinj^"  the 
cragtj)-  and  broken  heii^lits,  when:  the  wliole  countr\-  was  defen>i\e 
by  small  parties  ay^ainst  superior  force,  and  to  force  so  man\'  succes- 
sive lines  of  earthworks  and  redoubts,  he  re>olved  to  move  from  the 
coast  of  I.oul;  Island  Sound,  across  to  the  Hudson  river  wheie  his 
ships  were  lyint^,  and  also  to  occupy  the  entire  rear  of  the  .\meric<in 
army  by  this  movement.  It  was  a  repetition  of  the  nun'ements  which 
l^ained  l?reiokl)"n  IleiL^lUsand  .\ew^^>rk  ("ity.  Il  would  also  put  him 
in  water  communication  with  New  \'cirk  and  Staten  Island. 

The  (niards,  I.iL,dit  Infantr)',  Reserve,  .iri  iJonop's  Hessian  corps, 
were  embarked  upon  larL;e  vessels,  and  were  transferred  from  the  eity 
to  Froy's  Neck,  (once  known  as  Throckmorton's,  or  Tlirock's  Neck)  on 
the  same  d.iy,  in  s.ifet)-.  As  soon  as  the  landiuL;  had  been  effected,  it 
was  found  that  the  tide  swept  behind  the  Neck  and  det.iched  it  froni 
the  main  lainl,  mi  that  e\en  at  low  tide  it  wnuld  be  impo>>il)le  totr.ins- 
fer  the  artiller)-  '^itliMut  a  bridge.  Colonel  Hand's  American  Ritles 
had  already  taken  ip  the  p!  ud^s  of  the  bridi^e  which  had  been  built 
to  the  Neck;  and  the  c.uiseway  which  letl  to  the  channel  was  covered 
by  earthworks  and  the  additional  reL;iments  of  Colonel  Graham  and 
Colonel  I'rescott.  Colonel  Pepperill  was  also  within  sui)porting 
distance.  One  three  pounder,  under  direction  of  Lieutenant  Ilrwint, 
and  a  six  pounder,  in  chari^e  of  Lieutenant  Jackson,  of  the  .irtillery, 
were  trained  u[)on  the  beach,  (leneral  Howe  placed  the  troops  in 
camp,  aiul  awaiteti  reinforcements. 

Lord  Percy  had  been  left  at  McGo wall's  I'ass,  with  three  brigades 


*f*r 


1776.1 


orKKAnoN.S    NEAR   NEW    V(JKK. 


^35 


to  cover  New  York,  and  the  troops  at  Fliishiiv^  were  ordered  to  cross 
at  once.  By  reference  to  the  map,  "  Operations  near  Ne\s'  York,"  the 
position  of  tiie  army  will  be  understood. 

On  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth,  the  Frst,  Second,  and  Sixth 
hriL^ades,  ami  the  Third  Ilessi.m  battalion  joined  frt)m  Flushini^,  and 
on  the  eiijhtccntli,  the  cunibiiicii  commands,  includin;^  also  the  ^gren- 
adiers, were  transferred  Id  I'ell's  roint,  thereby  turning  the  position  at 
Weslcliester,  anil  lamliiiL'  near  the  mouth  of  Hutchinson  river.  'I'his 
entire  country,  rou^^h  .md  broken  as  it  was,  was  also  divided,  where- 
ever  cultivated,  b\'  slone  walls  or  fences,  as  in  later  limes,  so  that 
when  the  army  advanced  luw.ird  Xew  Rochelle,  skirmishing  became 
frecjuent.  Coh.mel  Glover  w  ilh  his  regiment  made  S(;  persistent  a  re- 
sistance wilh  a  forct.;  of  >even  hundred  and  fitt}'  men  behind  one  ot 
these  walls,  .is  to  check  the  advance  gu.ird  until  it  was  strongly 
reinforced,  .uul  earned  for  himself  honorable  mention  in  orders. 

On  the  twenty-first,  General  Howe  advanced  his  right  and  centre 
two  miles  beyond  New  Rochelle,  where  he  remained  in  camp  until 
the  twenty-tifth,  waiting  for  still  .additional  reinforcements,  (iener.d 
J)e  I  leister  w.is  lel't  for  the  same  length  of  time  at  the  camping-ground 
whicli  Howe  had  fir.il  occupied.  During  the  same  week,  (jeneral 
Knyphauser  .urived  from  I'Lurope  with  the  Second  division  oi'  Hes- 
sians, the  regiment  of  Waldeckers,  one  thousand  strong,  the  .Sixth 
loot,  .and  the  Third  light  dragoons. 

These  troops  were  jiromptiy  transferred  from  .Staten  Island,  and 
landed  at  Mj'er's  Point  on  the  twenty-second,  taking  post  near  New 
Rochelle.  'This  position  secured  the  base  of  General  Howe's  further 
advance;  and,  as  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  ma[),  afforded  the 
proper  st.irting  point  f>r  General  Knyphausen's  subsequent  movement 
against  Fort  Washington. 

As  soon  as  General  Knyphausen  was  established,  General  Ue 
Heister  moved  forward  to  overtake  General  Howe,  and  the  army  en- 
camped within  four  miles  of  White  Plains,  their  fixed  objective.  On 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,  the  army  advanced  within  .djout  a 
mile  of  the  court-house  and  village.  It  had  thus  moved  parallel  with 
the  river  Bronx,  over  a  distance  of  at  least  thirty  miles  of  rough 
country,  and  was  now  ready  to  wheel  t<i  the  left,  cross  to  the  Hudson, 
and  cut  off  W^ashington's  retreat,  while  at  the  same  time  excluding 
supplies  for  his  arm)-  from  Connecticut  on  the  east.  By  this  date  the 
ships  of  war  had  pushed  up  the  Hudson  as  far  as  Tarrytown,  and 
from  White  Plains  there  was  a  good  road  across  to  that  village. 


it'  >■ 

if  I 


■.    ';f 


i     •  ! 


'm 


M* 


HV 


\-fit. 


236 


(>I'i:rai'i>)n.s  ni:ak  ni;\v  vokk. 


[1776. 


It  li.ul  bcrii  a  ililTkuk  ami  embarrassing;  marclitV.  im  ihc  first.  The 
Uroiix  was  narrow,  but  ran  .ilonLj.i  steep  r.m^e  o\  hills,  thiekl)' worxlcd, 
ant!  ,is  thickly  set  with  iinderL^rowth,  thorn  Ijuslies.  ami  briars.  A 
brief  r.iiii  storm  (Msily  niacle  the  stream  impassable.  Tiicrc  were  no 
roads  of  even  surface,  and  the  vVmerican  rillemen,  now  in  their  element, 
ining  upon  the  left  il.ink,  and  watched  for  opportunity  to  do  mischief. 
A  steady  movement  in  column  was  impossible,  and  the  officers  had 
to  depend  entirely  upon  ce»untr)'men  for  information  as  to  the  ch.ir- 
acler  of  the  couutiA'  and  the  location  (jf  the  roads.  Very  much  had 
been  expected  of  the  re^^iment  of  cav.dry  which  h.ul  just  arrived. 
I'lu}-  were  at  fust  a  source  of  terror  to  new  troops.  Washington  had 
instructed  the  men  that  in  a  country  wlierc  stoie  fences,  craLjs,  and 
ravines  were  so  numcious.  the  American  riflemen  needed  no  better 
opportunity  to  pick  off  the  riders  and  supply  the  arm_\'  with  horses.  A 
reward  of  one  hundred  dollars  was  offered  any  soldier  who  would  briiv^ 
in  an  .u'meii  trooper  and  his  lujrse.  The  futs  confirmed  his  jud;^- 
inent,  and  the  cavalry  were  of  ver\-  little  service  durin;^  that  c.un[)ai;4n. 
On  the  twenty-second.  Cjeneral  Stirling;  sent  Colonel  Haslet  out 
with  a  scouting  i)arty,  which  crosseil  the  Bronx,  attacked  the  Queen's 
Rangers,  a  roy.dist  corps  under  Major  Rogers,  captured  thirty-si.x, 
leit  as  many  on  the  tTcld,  and  carried  away  sixty  nuisket-^.  Colonel 
llaiul's  regiment  also  had  a  skirmish  with  the  Hessian  Yagers,  near 
M.nnaroneck,  with  considerable  success  and  creilit.  Thi;ir  entire  march 
had  been  subject  to  such  annoyances  and  interruptions. 

While  the  Ihitish  .iriny  thus  advanced  upon  its  mission,  tiie 
American  army  had  abandoned  New  York  Island,  leaving  a  small 
garrison  at  Fort  Washington,  still  holding  fast  to  King's  Bridge.  As 
.soon  as  the  British  movement  becune  general  ami  well  defined,  and 
the  main  ami)'  reached  the  northern  shore  of  Long  Island  .Sijund, 
Washington  transferrcLl  his  headquarters  to  Valentine's  Hill,  ordered 
all  needed  supplies  to  be  forwarded  to  White  Plains,  and  pushed  his 
own  army  along  the  west  bank  of  the  Bron.x,  division  by  division, 
establishing  earthworks  at  every  prominent  point,  and  making  a 
chain  of  small  posts  throughout  the  whole  distance.  His  object  was 
to  crowd  the  British  army  t(jward  the  coa^t,  and  use  the  shorter 
inttrior  line,  which  was  at  his  service,  to  thwart  the  plans  of  General 
Howe,  and  place  himself  in  a  position  to  fight  his  army  on  favorable 
ground  of  his  own  selection,  and  at  advantage.  Time  was  now  an 
element  of  real  value.  Howe  gained  a  fair  start  on  the  twelfth  of  the 
month,  but  lost  five  days  at   Frog's  Neck,  and  four  days  more   near 


17/0.] 


orKRATIONS   NKAK    NI'.W    YORK. 


237 


New  RdchrlK'.  Washitv^ton  already  lia<l  a  depot  nf  ('oimecticiit 
sii|ipli'.s  at  White  I'laiiis.  and  pimIdiv^ccI  lii^  left  toward  that  point 
with  ;^reat  vi;^or,  as  soon  as  \\c  t'nimd  that  Ifowe  would  not  attack 
from  the  cast,  as  he  had  alreaily  declined  to  attack  from  the  sinith. 

On  the  twelfth,  when  rn--.t  advisrd  of  the  landiiv.j  upon  I'ro^i's  Neck, 
General  tlre'ene,  tlun  a'  l'"i>rt  I.ee.  asked  authority  to  cross  with  the 
brijjjades  of  Ni\on,  C"lint(jn  and  Ivolierdeau,  and  take  part  in  tlu'  coin- 
int^  issue.  ( )n  the  sixteenth  Washin^^ton  called  a  council  of  w.u'. 
Tin.'  ri'Corii  is  i^dviii  literally,  to  correct  erroneous  impressions  as  to  the 
participants  in  proceedings  which  had  important  bearin;^s  upon  future 
operations  ami  responsibility  theretbr 


"  rUOCI-.I.I»I\(;S    OV   A  Cnt:\CIL    or   rrF.XKR At,    OlTICKRS." 

"  At  a  council  of  war  luld  at  the  head-cpiartirs  of  (ieiieral  I.ee, 
October  i6th.  I77''>:  Present,  I  lis  Ivvcellency,  General  \\'ashini;ton. 
Major    Generals    /,,<■,  Putiiatn,    ILatli,   Spcncii\   Siilii\ 


■(111. 


B 


ritraiiier 


Generals  f.oni  Sliiiiiti;;,  Miflliii,  McDoiigalL  riusous,  Xi.voii,  IWids- 
icortli.  Sit'/.',  FJ/ows,  Clinton,  and  Lincoln.     Colonel  Knox,  command- 


ini 


artillery 


"  The  ( ieneral  read  sundry  letters  from  the  convention  AmX  particu- 
lar members,  of  the  turbulence  of  the  disaffected  in  the  upper  part  of 
the  State  :  and  also  sundry  accounts  of  deserters  showinL,^  the  enemy's 
intention  to  surround  us." 

"After  much  consideration  and  debate  the  follow  iui^  qr.estion 
was  stated  ;  whether,  (it  havin<^  a[)peared  that  the  obstructions  in  the 
North  river  have  proved  insufficient  and  that  the  enemy's  whole  force 


were  m  our  re, u',  on  rro^s  lomt)  it  is  now  dei'ined  possible  in  our 
situation  to  prevent  the  enemy  cuttin<^  off  tlie  communications  with 
tlie  country  and  compelling;'  us  to  rii;ht  them   at   iliscretio 


n. 


Agrifti  ;  with  but  one  dissentin^^  voice  [y'v/...  tieneral  Cliut(>u)\.\\.\t 


it  is  not  possible  to  prevent  the  communication 


be 


in'"'  cut  off?  "  and 


that  one  of  the  consequences  mentioned  in  the  question  must  certainly 


foil 


ow 


"  Agreed ;  that  Fort  Washington  be  retained  as  long  as  possible." 
Lee  joined  on  the  fourteenth,  only  two  ilays  before  the  council, 
and  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  grand  division  at  Kings- 
bridge,  with  instructions  to  assume  no  direction  in  affairs,  or  active 
dut)',  until  he  should  become  acquainted  with  the  e.xisting  arrange- 
ments and  relations  of  that  post. 


't  *" 


?38 


oi'i-.kA  I  IONS    M'AK    NKW    YOKK. 


I77h 


Jii-^t  l)r(()ic  iro-.iiii;_;  tile  ri\t  r  to  icpoil  lor  iliitv    lu-  wiotr    the    lol- 


luuin"  1(  Iter  to  (icnri.il   datrs 


■;   !■ 


MV    Dl    \K    Ci  \  I  IS       1  \Milr  I 


I'liKI    CoSWl  I  I' I  |n\,    l>,f.>K-r    1),    177(1. 
lis  SI  lull    Ili.llmilS.       lii|(i|i(l\\ I  \\  ill  ilrsi  I  ihp 


I  he  posit  II  111  i>|  ciiir  ,11  in\ ,  \\  III!  ll  111  III  .■  IphmsI  I  ijn  iiut  .i|i|i|  i>\  c.  /•//</  //.■>.  I  Ik  I  ipii- 
J{ll-ss  srriii  to  slllllililr  CMIV  sl(  |i.  1  do  Hot  Ilicill  one  01  tvso  1  .illlc.  Iillt  llli'  wllolf 
st.iUlc.  I  li,!\i'  h(  I  11  \(  i\  ticc  III  ijiliMi  iiii;  iii\  o|iniiMii  to  'i  111.  Ill  iiu  <'|iiiiioii  (  iiii- 
cr.il  \V.islnii;;loii  is  iniii  li  to  lil.iiiir  III  not  liirii.inii;;  'ilii  Willi  li'.ij;ii,il  loii,  iiiili'ss  llii-y 
ictl.llll  tlMjii  ullhllK'ili'    llic  .IIIIIN    \<\  Ihrir    .ilisilh!  Ilitil  lili-iii  c.  ♦  1-  ♦ 


111.'     1: 


lllllll.ll  il\'      l)Cl\\  ictl      tin 


ntlu CIS,     it     \\  ill     1)1       K  IIH  llll)i   I  ciI, 

u.is  ciilinly  (.1111  ,i -tint  with  tlnif  iiiliin,ic\'  lirloir  tlir  w.ii,  .iihl  ill. if 
l)ot  li  li.ni  l)ci  11  I  iflii  ,is  ill  ill.-  lititisli  .iiinv.  I'his  Icltrr,  hi)\vf\ci,  111 
I  oniUX'tioM  with  sill)  ^(■l  |iirilt  lui  ir-^pi  iiiiK:iu  c,  will  li.iw  s|)n  l.ll  \  .iliir 
111  (Klciiiiitiiir;  the  milit.iiy  siilioiiliii.itii  in  and  piistnidl  ilisiiplnu-  ul 
ihr  t  w  1 1   null. 


Sc\riMl    ttnii.it  r.issiiu'iits    .ittnii 


the      .\ 


lllclIi.MIl     Illc)\  riiHIlt     .it 


I'li-t.  1  ill-  iini  j)ii.u'\'  uliiiitl  to,  hiloic  the  loiiiuil,  liviui  loiiiily 
■  itiil  \  ii  iiiil)  ,  w  .1-.  ili_i  III!  (1  (il  ^.iiilii  iiiii  iin|)i>i  l.iiu  r  li  ir  ,i  ilit.ul  to  w.ittli 
llif    ili^.ilU-rtril  (li^t  IK  ts,  |)iit  .1    inoic    sriiuiis    iii.iltn   \\,i.    llir    w.iiit    ot 


loui 


W 


i^liin  'ton  ,il  oiKr   iiiipo;  tiiiicil   ( lovtjnior  'I'liiiiihiili   o 


)t     (oil 


nrCtU'Ul,    \\ho>r    KMillHTs   MfllU  il    ,ls   I  Nll.lUstli'ss  ,1-  Ills   I  J.ll  llot  |  ,111    ,11K1 


lisilMiii,  to  send  a  siippK   to  W'iiitc  i'l.ii 


111- .  ,111(1  it  was  sent. 


Oil     till-     tW  i-llt_\-sl'loIl(l     (ij     (  )i  lobiT,    while     (icIUImI     ilowr,     lor    till.- 

.si'Cotiil  tmu:.  UMs  "  .iw.iil  iii;,;  ii  iiilou  ciiuiits,"  two  miles  .liio^e  New 
Koilulli',  (Iciu.T.il  ilialh's  iiU.iiur  ih^iiioii  tiinK:  .i  iii;_;lit  ill. mil, 
rciichcil  L'h.ittiiloi!  Ilill  .It  il,i\li;;lil,  .iihl  in  tin;  alUiiiooii  wrir 
cil;_;a;.u'il  in  slretr^flhciiiii;.;  tlic  ilcteiisis  at  Wliili;  IM.iiiis.  ( i(..'iui-.il 
Sullivan's  lUvi-iion  .inivfd  tin;  iiu.M  ni;.4lit,  and  (iciuiMl  Lord  Stiilino 
imnudi.itcK  alter.     ()ii  tin-  l\vrnt\'-tliird  \\'asIiiii''ton  isl.ihlislird  liis 


Ik. id  iju,!!  ters  at    iIk'  saiiu-   p 
Division  ioiiu'd  W 


(  )ii    till-   t  wcnt_v-si.\t  h  Lrc'.s  Cii.inil 
tirr  .\i 


ivisioti  |oiiu'd  \\  .islHilL^toii,  and  tlu'ttitiir  .  Viiici  ic.iti  .iriii)- was  aw.iit- 
ini;  ( iiiur  il  llowi's  ailvatu'c,  hi.'hind  rapiill)- auL;nuntiii;4  breastworks, 
im  cli;.;iblc  oround  for  defense. 

WasliinLiton's  position  was  no',  iiilrinsical!)'  the  best  for  final  de- 
fense; but  lie  liiul  selected  ati  ultiinatc  [lositioii,  wliieli  iuirilled  all  the 
coiiditions  ot  a  possible  retre.il  from  the  fust.      His  lell  w.i,  protected 


by 


o\v  ''round,  oiiU'  accessible  willi    di 


lliciiltv.      1  lis  iidil 


was  nic 


t  by 


ii  bend  uf  the  river  liron.K,  .ind  wiiiK:  one  line  of  iMrthworks  was  in 
front  of  aiul  controilcJ  the  iipjier  I'oniiecticut  road,  the  two  successive 
lines  to  the  rear  were  upon  a  ;4t,idiKil  ascent  very  capable  of  vigorous 


177 


Di'i.K.M  iitNs  m:.\i<  m;\v  vim;k. 


-'3') 


•lircii^f.  \\i-  .iNo  (.'(Hitrnllrd  tilt-  rii.ids  that  Icil  \M'-!  w.ml  to  tin: 
IIu<Ui)ii  rivcc.  SiiiiU'vvlMt  .kK  nuiil,  .nid  h, '.nils'  ,i  inilr  l'>  tin-  '.mitli- 
wc^t ,  CImI  tcitoii's  I  I  ill  wM-i  (II  rii|(ic(l  hy  I  la  .K  t's  ii'i^imnil,  Mi|>|iMrtL'cl 
by  I  inn  lal  Mil  )> 
•I 


1)1  i     iiji',  w  Inch   I  mitaiiicd   I  n^ 


tllf      lllDSl 


riMialilc  ir'Muii  111  .  Ill  t  lie  ai  my 

.till    I 


I'uliind  tllf  iiitcii'U  liiii-  cil  till-  Aiiu.T- 

th 


KMii  ciu  aiii|iiiicnt    \\a-.-ilill    iii'Mu'i'  j'k  Mmd,  int  n  i-ly   <  •iiniiiaiiiliii;^   ili< 
|Ki-^st's  thiiiii  di   tin    hill    hy  liir  i'lck-.k!!!   A\\i\  iiii|n'r   raiivl'AVii  n)ad> 
( iiiicial  I  ,ii-  cntiiisi'd  till'  |)'  lathni  taken  !()■  the  army  mi  In  >  ai  ri\'al 


hut 


he   stialc'.'K'  I 'iM-^idciat  iipii  ■;   w  hu  h    ,ri  m  to   hav<-  iiidin.i 


W 


i^ii- 


iii;.;li)ii    til  ha\i-    takiii  hi-^  t;!iiiiiid,  iii  i  ^  Milid'ni  i-  lliat    he    had  a  m'i'uic 
ultimate    di'li'iisi-  ill   e.i-^c  dl    iailuii'  to   iiiaiiilaiii  \hr  lii  ,t,  \\i  re  sound, 


and    leali/fd    In.    |)iui>i 


It    1,   to    I 


)!•     i-.pecl 


illv   noted    that    W'.ii 


iii'jtoii,  Mi]u-iioi  ill  luniihei-,  to  hi^  advi-r  .ai  y,  ua^  ill  a  >iliiatioii  ainl 
III  one  o|  his  mood,  \\hen  he  toiiilnl  h.illK',  m\^\  .idopied  the  l.ic-,1 
coinse  to  iii\  ite  .ill.n  k. 

(  )n   the  I  wen  t>-el;  dull  of   (  )i  lohei    the  .irmii-  .  I  llU-^  lollfiollled    e.n  h 
other. 


It   \\ill    heiioliecd    th.it   adiii'el    ,id\'.iiice    upon  W.aslhii' 'Ion's  lines 


W  oilld    suhjeii     (  ieller.ll     I  I  (  r, 
ll.mk  or   le.ir,  unie-,-,  the  |,iii 


.niiiy   to    .11)   .itt.u'k    upon    their   leU 
n  idi.itteiton's  I  lill  dioiild    he  rn-4  dii- 


lodl'ed.        .\lld  \el   I  he  i  llHieull  le  .  o|   .1  de^eelll    Irolll   the  hill  Would   ll.lVi 


.ikeiied  -.mil   ,1  nio\einent.  and  iii.ide    It  Iruitlei-^,  il    he   li.id  i   hi 


een- 


Iratfd   Ills    .iini\- 


illd 


)rokell   W  .islliir'toii    ,    celllle.       (leili'ial    (    Imtol) 


ollld    lliulollhledl)-    Il  i\'e    m.lde    the     .lltae^k.       (ieller.il     ll.i'Ai;     pl.ued 


(  lener.il   I  .eslie  in  (.0111111. m 


1  ot"  a  d 


i\i  .1'  HI,  uii  n  oi'li 


rs  tw   d 


Islo, 


the 


iiiierie.ms  ,inc|  oi  eun\'  I.  hat  te  it  on  s  I  lill.     d'hii  ili\  id  cd   hi-,  toree,  and 


Icll  the  lU.iii)  ho  '\'  i)as-,ive  spectators  of  llu-  luovciiieii 


t.       Ihetl 


IV'Isloll 


consisted  ot    the  second   Hrilish    l)riL;.ide,   dollop's  lI(.'Ssi,m    t;rcii.idi 


ers. 


th 


e  1  icssi 


lan  rcLfimciil  l^ossber'',  and  (  olouel  k.du  s  llessiaiis,  mu^in 


111 


lot.ll   joice,  .ICCordilV'   to  (iellei.il   jli 


iliicial  rc|)orl,  ot  lour  thou- 


sand men,  or  vei)-  luuiy  oiie-tlnrd  ot  the  armv.  At  the'  time  of  this 
detail, ( ieiiei.il  Howe's  aiiU)'  \\,is  .sU|)erior  in  mimheis  to  ih.it  in  his  iiu- 
medi.itc  troiit,  hecausc  ot  the  ociupalioii  of  ihc  hill  l)\'  llu'  .\nierii.an 
e.\tri:mc  li.^dit. 

I'he  lr(i()[)s  crossed  tlu;  river  Hronx  with  some  clifticiilty,  and  then 
had  to  cliiul)  .1  ilillicull  ascent.  The  Hrilisli  superiority  in  artillery 
was  more  than  coin|)ensated  by  the  American  position,  and  .irtillery 
was  of  little  [iractical  value.  Capt.iin  Alexander  Hamilton  served  two 
liyht  L;uns  .a  the  centre,  ,uid  .is  the  liritish  biii;ade  crossed  the  Hroii.K 
.iiul  usceiuK'd  the  hill  lu;  delivered  effective  lire;  and  Sm.dhvood's 
re;;iment  supported  by  Kit/ern.i's.    made    two  successful  ch.tr^'.es  down 


fPT 


1:^ 


sr 


M' 


Hi'.  J   ). 


240 


(il'IkAlloNS    NKAR    NI.W    MiKK. 


II77'>. 


tin;  iiill  .mil  ilicclaxl  ihc  .nlv.mcc.  To  spi'cl.itdrs  at  Wliitr  IM.iiii-.  it 
apiHMrccl  as  if  a  I'liial  antl  coinplrto  rcpulsi'  liail  hocii  .uliirvid.  At 
Vliis  crisis.  Culoiu-l  Ualil.  !)>•  .1  siuKU'ii  and  well  pn-^-^cd  niDvmuiU  lu 
the  lift,  riMi.luil  ami  tiirnni  tin-  AnuriiaM  v\'j,\\\.  tlani<  .nnl  stuod  iipmi 
the  summit,  wiiilr  Dniiop  i)i)klly  cliars^cd  up  t!u'  \\u\-  <>{  tin-  iiili  to 
tlu'  Kft  (if  tile  Ihitish  hiii^adr.  Tlu'  Anuiii.m  troops  oVLruhchnrd 
by  ihi-.  attaik,  iVil  liacl<  to  ,1  second  position  oil  the  i-i;^'iit  of  thi-  army, 
and  General  Leslie  could  not  pursue  without  tlirowini;  himsclt'  in  the 
rear  of  \\'a-hin;.;ton,  or  .it  lea-^t  exposin;^  himsell  to  be  entirely  cut  oil 
from  ( iemr  il  I  b  '\ve. 

Haslet's  Dila^arc,  and  Sm.illwood's  Maryland  had  ac;ain  con- 
fniiU'd  their  reputation,  and  with  Hrooks'  .M.issachusetts,  Webb's 
(Jonnecticut.  .ind  Kitzema's  New  \'()rk  had  fouL^ht  with  commendable 
spiiit.  and  .is  hjiv^' as  consi.-.tent  with  s.ifety  tor  themselves  and  the 
Americ.m  ri'^ht  win;^'.  (leneral  I'utnam  li.id  been  sent  to  their  sup- 
))ort  as  soon  .is  the  .iffair  .ippeared  (.loublhil,  but  w.is  too  Lite  to 
rvili:em  the  Contest. 

Colonel  ll.islet  afterwards  wrote,  th.it  //r  w,is  first  ;issi;4ned  to  the 
command  of  Chatterton's  ilill  with  his  own  rej^iment  and  a  force  of 
militi.i  ;  th.it  the  latter  lied,  anil  that  three  companies  of  .Smallwood's 
Mar\  ianil  ;ilso  retre.ited  precipitate!)'  ;  that  tjener.il  McDou^mU's  com- 
m.md  supi)orted  //i/Ji,  .uid  w.is  so  dangerously  pi. iced  in  his  le.ir,  th.il 
he  was  in  ilaiv^er  from  their  fire;  lh.it  upon  his  .ulvice  (ieneial 
McDou;^.ill  cluin;_;ed  his  jxisition.  Much  is  assumed  1)\-  this  oltker, 
which  is  not  supported  by  other  authoiity.  Colonel  (jr.iham,  who 
eommanded  the  re;^iment  of  New  York  militi.i,  w.is  trieil  before  .1 
court  marti.il  for  unnecessarily  abandonin;^  two  stone  fences  where  he 
h.id  bct-n  placed  by  Colonel  Reed.  The  position  woukl  have  had 
v.ilue  if  properly  supported.  The  evidence  w.is  conclusive  as  to  his 
personal  br.ivery,  .ilthoui^h  some  of  his  officers  f.iiled  him,  and  that 
his  retreat  w.is  in  pretty  j^oo  1  order,  and  was  directed  by  superior 
authority.     C.iptain  Hamilton  also  brought  off  his  i^uns  in  safety. 

Colonel  Smallwood  was  wounded,  and  forty-six  of  his  re<^iment 
were  also  amouij  the  killed  and  wounded.  The  total  loss  was  reported 
at  ninety,  but  Dr.  Bird,  who  visited  the  h.ospitals,  stated  that  it  was 
not  less  th.tn  one  hundred  and  twenty.  Marshall  sa)'s,  "  between  three 
and  four  hundred."  General  Howe  "estimated  the  American  loss  at 
two  hundred  and  fifty."  The  returns  and  contemporaneous  letters 
fix  the  loss  at  one  hundred  and  thirty.  General  Howe's  report  at  the 
close  of  the  year  mentions  no  prisoners  as  taken  between  the  twelfth 


1 


I77'''.l 


OPKKATIONX    \i:.\K    NIAV    VokK. 


-••1' 


and  the  ^ixtciMith  of  Novcinl)^,'!- ;  l)iit  umliT  tlic  ciption  "White 
I'l.iins,"  ciiuiiiiiMtrs  ioiir  (jftlccrs  and  t  liiity-l'ivc  privates.  As  this 
niimlxr  wrn-  f  ikcii  iMiIy  on  the  ni.iivli,  it  docs  not  i  iitiT  into  the 
casuaUics  at  (Jhatterton's  llill. 

'I'hc  loss  oftln-  Hiitish  i)ri;;adr  was  or(i(iall_\-  rcporti'd  h>'  Gen- 
ii d  !,e:  :ic  as  on"  haiuiicd  .\\m.\  fit'tv-foiir.  I  Jcntcnant-colonel  Carr, 
of  the  Thiity-rdtli,  Captain  (ioar  ol'the  I"ort)'-nint  h,  and  Dciniiij^r  of 
tin;  'rwenty-eii^iitli  re^^inieiits  were  anion;^'  tlie  killed.  Tiie  ilessial, 
h)ss  incre.isi'd  tht;  total  casualties  of  the  eonmiantl  t(}  two  hundred 
and  thirty-one. 

The  heaviest  portion  of  this  loss  was  incurred  in  the  attempt  to 
scale  the  cliff,  just  after  crossin;^  the  river. 

On  the  twenty  ninth  tlie  armies  rested,  (ieneral  llowe.  "  w.iited 
for  reinforcements."  \V',ishinL;ton  removed  his  sick  to  better  (piarti-rs 
and  l)re[jared  to  move  to  his  selected  ultimate'  pi. ice  of  resistance.  On 
the  thirtieth,  Lord  Percy  arrived  with  the  third  brij^.ule  and  two  bat- 
talions of  the  fourth  brij.jade,  and  the  ne.\t  ilay  was  desis^'vited  for  an 
assault  in  force.  The  day  was  stormy,  and  for  twenty  hours  the  rain 
and  wind  suspended  the  movement.  Hatteries  were  planted,  however, 
for  a  sul)se(iiieiit   advance,  "  ii.h\i titer  pcniiittiii-^.'^ 

iJurin;;  til, it  ni^ht  \\'ashinj;ton  retired  nearly  five  miles,  to  Xort'' 
Castle  Heii^hts,  from  which  he  could  not  be  di.slodyed  by  the  entire 
15ritish  Ibrce,  and  the  "  liattle  of  W'iiite  Plains,"  had  been  fought  at 
Chatterton    Hill. 

The  Ccnut-house  at  White  Plains  was  subseciuentl\'  burned  by 
lawless  Americans,  for  wdiich  the  ]5ritish  troops  were  in  no  way  re- 
sponsible. Washington  burned  his  excess  of  forage,  and  stores  that 
could  not  be  removed,  and  in  a  prompt  order  thus  denounced  the 
burning  of  the  public  buildings  : 

"  It  is  with  the  utmost  as';onishment  ami  abhorrence,  the  general 
is  informed,  that  some  base  and  cowardly  wretches  have,  last  night 
(November  5th)  set  fire  to  the  Court  house  and  other  buildings  which 
the  enemy  left.  The  army  may  rely  on  it,  that  they  shall  be  brought 
to  justice,  and  meet  with  the  punishment  they  deserve." 

The  horrors  of  civil  war  began  to  develop  fruit.  The  soldiers 
plundered  towns,  and  the  British  took  without  discrimination  of  per- 
sons, what  they  wanted.  Citizens  became  alarmed,  and  infinite  issues 
were  involved  in  the  integrity  and  faithfulness  of  Congress  and  its 
defenders. 


16 


r 


CHAPTER    XXXVI. 

()I'i:r.\tk)N's  near  ni:\v  yokk.   wiini:  i'i,.\i\s  to  fort  wash- 

INC.  ION. 


•ff 


*        .P'' 

),iiii,i.. 


If;, 


5  '" 


0\  llu:  si'cond  diiy  of  November  General  Knyphauscii  broke  up 
liis  camp  near  New  RociielK:.  and  at  e\eiiinL;  eneamped  at  the 
north  end  of  New  Vurk  Island.  (  )n  the  fifth  (leiieral  Howe  left 
Wliite  rUuns,  and  durin;^^  tlie  afternoon  of  the  si.vth  enc. imped  at 
Dobbs  I'\Try,  on  the  e.ist  bank  of  the  Ilndson  river.  Tluis  the  arm\' 
abandoned  the  teiiii)orar)'  l)ase  at    New  Roclielle. 

General  Howe  dnw  his  supplies  from  vessels  which  were  already 
at  Dobbs  ]err_\-,  while  the  Hessian  commander  had  direct  water- 
cominunic  itiiin  witli  New  York  city,  in-  Harlem  creek.  B\'  tiie 
fourteenth  General  Knyphausen  had  accumulate.  '  a  larije  number  uf 
flat-boats  ami  bar^^es  for  the  more  rapid  tnmspoi ution  of  his  troops 
toward  l'"ort  \Vas!iin;_;ton.  Reference  is  had  to  niajjs  entitled  "  Opera- 
tions near  New  \'iirk,"  and  "  Ca[)ture  i)f  l'\)rt  \\'.ishinL;ton." 

The  barracks.it  Fort  Iiulepeiulence  had  been  burneil  by  Colonel 
Lasher,  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morninij  of  the  twent\'-eiL,dith  of  Octo- 
ber, and  three  hundred  stands  of  arms,  out  of  rei)air,  five  tons  of  bar 
iron,  spears,  shot,  shell,  and  numerous  additional  valuable  stores,  had 
been  abandoned,  in  the  hurried  retreat  to  Kinysbridire,  General 
Greene  cr<jssed  over  ami  leathered  I's  many  as  he  could  procure 
wagons  for,  and  inteiuled  to  have  used  the  lumber  of  the  barracks,  but 
for  their  premature  and  improvident  destruction.  On  the  sixth, 
Washington  informed  Congress  of  these  different  movements,  and  that 
"  he  expected  the  enemy  to  lead  their  forces  against  Fort  Washington, 
and  invest  it," — and  that  "  Howe  would  probably  make  a  d(;scent 
into  New  Jersey."  A  council  of  war,  that  day  convened,  unanimously 
agreed,  "  that,  if  the  enemy  retreated  toward  New  York  it  would  be 
proper  to  throw  a  bod\'  of  troops  into  New  Jersey,  immediately:  " — 
that    the   troops   raised   on  either  side  of  the   Hudson  river  should 


m(y.] 


opr.KAIlDNS   NKAU   NKW    V')|;K. 


243 


occupy  t!ic  siclo  wlicrc  they  liad  been  enlisted,  .uul  tint  ;i  force  of  three 
thous.iiiil  iiu-n  would  he  Mecess.uy  for  the  crrctioii  .uid  defense  of  posts 
and  passes  in  the  IIi;j;l>l,uul-..  which  included  PccUskill.  and  all  moun- 
tain spurs  which  comniandrd   the  river. 

(icner.d  \\',i>hiii;.;ton  wrotr  to  (jovenior  Liviiifjston  that  General 
Howe  "  niu-.t  umUrtake  soinethin;^'  on  accoiinl  of  his  reputation, 
that  he  wouKl  prtihably  yo  to  New  Jersey,  .md  then  ur^jed  that 
the  militia  be  in  rcatliness  to  sup[)ly  the  places  of  those  whose  terin 
would  soon  i.'xpire."  To  Giciiu;  he  wrote  in  the  s.ime  terms  uii  the 
seventh  ;  addinl^^  "  they  can  h.ivt:  no  capital  object  in  View  unless  it  is 
Philadelphia."  It  was  then  known  that  General  Carlcton  retired  from 
Crown  point  011  Saluiday  the  second  of  Xovenibir,  so  that  there  w.is 
no  daML^er  of  a  ih'iti-h  movement  u[)  the  Hudson.  On  the  ei;^hth  he 
wrote  to  Gener.il  Greene,  "  The  late  passa;^e  of  the  three  vessels  up 
the  Ncjith  river  is  so  plain  .1  proof  of  the  inefficiency  of  ,dl  the  ob- 
structions we  have  thrown  into  it,"  referrincj  to  sunken  vessels  with 
submarine  abati.  desi'.'.ed  bv  (iencral  Putnam,  "  that  I  can  not  but 
think  it  will  fully  justify  a  chaiv^e  in  the  disposition  which  has  been 
made.  If  we  c.ui  not  i)re\eiit  vessels  passin;^  up,  ami  the  enemy  ;irc 
l)ossesscii  ol  the  surroundin;^'  countr)',  what  wdu able  pur[)ose  can  it 
.mswer  to  hold  a  i)ost  from  which  the  expected  benefit  can  not  be 
h  id  •'  I  .im  therefore  inclined  to  thiid<  it  will  not  be  i)rudent  to  haz- 
artl  the  men  and  stores  at  Mount  Washiiv^ton  ;  but  as  \-ou  are  on  the 
spot,  leave  it  to  you  to  idve  such  orders  as  to  ev.icuiitiny  Mount 
Washington  as  you  jud;^^e  best  ;  .uul,  so  far,  revokinij  the  order  given 
Colonel  Magaw  to  tlefend  it  to  the  last." 

(ieneral  Gr  :ene  wasalso  ordered  to  remove  all  stores  not  necessary 
for  defense,  adtling,  "if  the  iidiabilaiits  will  not  drive  (jff  their  stock, 
destroy  it,  with  hay,  grain,  etc.,  since  the  enemy  would  take  it  without 
distinction  or  satisfaction." 

General  Greene  had  anticipated  a  movement  into  New  Jersey  late 
in  October.  It  was  evident  that  tliere  must  be  an  end  to  the  pursuit 
of  Washington's  army  by  General  Howe,  and  he  was  well  assured  that 
that  pursuit  wouKl  end  at  White  Plains. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  October,  he  sketched  an  itinerary  which  is 
of  value  as  giving  a  measuro  of  distance  by  which  to  appreciate  the 
subsequent  movements,  as  reported  at  tlieir  occurrence.  It  is  as 
follows : 

"From  Fort  Lee  to  Hackensack  bridge,  nine  miles  :  water  carriage 
from  this  pLice. 


I 


244 


OPERATION'S    NKAR    NKW    YORK. 


['776. 


* 


■'■i.l 


'"From    Ilackciisack  to  Equacanaui^di,  five    milos  ;    water  carriage 
from  this  place. 

"From  EquacaiKuigh  to  Springfield,  sixteen  miles;   to  a  landing  at 
Xewark. 

"  From  Springfield   to   ]?ouiull)rook,  nineteen   miles;  seven  miles  to 
a  landing  at  Brunswick. 

"  Fro  n  HoLuulbrook  to  Princeton,  twenty  miles;  twelve  miles  land 
carriage  to  Delaw.irc  river. 

'  From    Prmceton    to     Trenton,    twelve     miles  ;    water  carri.ige    to 
Philadelphia." 

Mis  estimates  for  st(Mes  of  flour,  pork,  hay,  and  grain,  including 
allowance  fur  su[)plying  troop-  passing  and  repassing  from  th.c  differ- 
ent States,  is  given  as  an  index  of  his  forethought  in  the  line  of 
logistics. 

■'  Two  thousand  men  at  T'ort  Lee  for  five  months  ;  at  Ilackeiisack 
a  supply  fjrtlie  general  hospitcd — -the  trocjps  to  have  Iresh  provisions; 
at  luiiiacniaugh,  fjr  the  troops  at  Newark  and  Flizabelhlown,  and 
to  subsist  the  main  army  in  passing  to  I'hiladelphi.i  ;  at  .S[jriiigfield  a 
week's  pruvisi(jns  for  tULUt)'  thousand  men  on  their  way  to  Philadel- 
phia ;  at  .'ioundbrook  the  same;  at  Priiicetcjii  the  same  ;  at  T"enton 
to  sub^i.it  tweiit}-  lliou-i.uid  men  for  three  months."  The  period  at 
i.vlich  this  forecast  of  the  future  was  made  is  worthy  ot  notice. 

Xo\cinbt  r  ninth.  President  Hancock  notilied  W'ashingtun  of  the 
restoration  of  a  money  alluwancL'  u[)on  reenlistment,  and  of  tlu,-  pas- 
sage of  a  resolution  that  the  American  army  might  be  unlisted  for 
three  >ears  or  during"  the  war. 

•At  this  time  more  than  oiu'-/i(iljW\c  enlistments  of  the  army  were 
on  the  extreme  limit  of  their  service,  and  re[)orts  of  its  condition  were 
frecl)-  c  'ated  in  New  York.  The  militia  of  that  State',  then  at 
Fort  Wa.-^hington,  upon  the  pledge  of  General  IFjwc  that  "  he  would 
guarantee  to  them  the  blessing  cjf  [^eace  and  a  secure  enjoyment  of 
their  liberties  and  properties,  as  well  as  a  tree  and  general  pardon," 
were  determined  not  to  reenlist,  and  became  fractious  and  insubor'i- 
nate.  Governor  Livingston  notified  Washington,  under  date  ot 
November  ninth,  tiiat  he  liad  received  his  letter  above  referred  to, 
and  th.ii  in  case  of  an  a[)[)reliended  inv.ision  he  would  c.dl  (uit  the 
men  to  rei^el  it. 

On  the  s.une  date  with  Livingston's  letter,  Greene  admitted  the 
failure  of  the  river  obslructicjiis  to  do  their  work,  adding,  "but  upon 
the  whole  I  cannot  help  thinking  the  garrison  is  of  advantage,  and  I 


ff 


lyyf'.l 


OPKRATIOXS    NKAR    NEW    YORK. 


^43 


cannot  conceive  tlie  g.'irrison  to  be  in  any  cjreat  danger ;  the  men  can  be 
broucyht  off  at  anytime,  but  the  stores  may  not  be  so  easily  removed; 
yet  I  think  they  can  be  Ljot  off  in  s[)ite  of  thi:m,  if  matters  j^rovV  des- 
perate. I  u  as  over  there  last  evenin!.r ;  tiie  enemy  seems  to  be  dis- 
posing matters  to  besiege  the  place,  but  Colonel  Magaw  thinks  it  will 
take  them  till  December  expires  before  they  can  carry  it." 

On  the  same  date  Washington  ordered  the  first  division  to  cross 
the  Hudson  at  Peckskill;  llu;  second  to  cro'is  the  d,iy  following. 

A  brief  ri)itonie  of  the  details  in  logistics  which  occupied  ihe 
attention  of  the  Ann'rican  Gommaiuler-in-chief  during  the  last  four 
hours  before  he  f(jllo\ved  thc.ic  divi•^ions  into  New  jersey,  is  pregnant 
with  military  and  historical  suggestions. 

To  (leiicral  Lee  he  commits  certain  trusts  ;  "  that  all  tools  not  in 
use  be  gcjt  together  and  deliveretl  to  the  c[a:irterinaster-general  ;  that 
the  commanding  officci-  of  artiiler}- fix  cc;nvenient  places  for  the  unin- 
terrupteil  manuficturc  of  mu-.kct  c.irtridges  ;  that  nu  troops  be 
suffered  to  leave  cam[)  until  army  accoutrements  and  tents  are  ac- 
counted for.  or  tlelivered  upon  [iroper  receipt  ;  that  the  conlingency 
of  an  attack,  in  ease  the  threatened  movement  to  Xew  Jersey  be  but 
a  feint,  be  proxided  tor;  and  that  all  stores  and  baggage  not  for  imme- 
diate use,  \)c  sent  northward  of  the  Croton  river  ;  that  in  case  of 
change  of  post,  all  hay  be  destroyed,  so  that  the  enem)-  can  not  get 
it  ;  that  supernumerary  officers  of  regiments  greatly  reduced  be  dis- 
chcU'ged,  or  annexed  to  some  brig.ule  ;  that  provisions  and  forage  be 
laitl  in  for  winter  quarters  ;  that  it  is  imi)ortant  to  remember  in  delib- 
eration, thai  the  militia  of  Massachusetts  slautl  released  from  their 
contract  on  the  seventeenth  inst  iiit,  ami  the  Connecticut  militia  are 
not  engaged  for  an\'  fixed  pwriotl." 

The  closing  paragr.iph  of  this  remarkable  order,  thus  briefiy  out- 
lined, is  matericd  to  an  api)ieciation  of  the  future  C(HU-se  of  il\e  officer 
intrusted  with  inese  duties.  It  is  given  with  official  exactness,  is 
placed  in  Italics,  and  reads  as  follows  : 

"  //  ///r  enemy  should  remove  the  ivhole  or  the  greatest  part  of  their 
foree  to  the  ivest  side  of  the  Hudson  river,  I  have  no  doubt  of  your 

,  leavine'  the  militia  and  invalids  to 


po 


Spli 


eove, 


iiee(t 


the  frontiers  of  Connect ieut^  etc.,  in  ease  of 

(iiven  at  headquarters,  near  the   White  JV''in^,  the    \oih  day  of 


November,  1776. 


To  Major-general  Leel 


vGE  Washington. 


i,* 


246  (H'|-,I^\ri()\S   NKAR   NF.W    VDRK.  [r;;.). 

WashIn£^toii  wrote  to  Ck ivcriMr  I.iviiv^ston  in  sul>-;t,iiice,  tlidt  tlu^ 
bounties   offered   by  New  York  wocild  deter  enlistim  ills  in  States  not 


nviiv. 


nUlltli 


hec;ui-e,  "  troops   emharl 


in   tlie  sainc  cause  and 


doin'''  the  same  duties,  will   not   lon'_:  .ict  toLiether  with  harnionv  f( 


cll 


ffc 


rent  pays. 
To  C 


nione 


K 


nox   lie  made   a  su;:^iTestion   a-;  to  a  partition  o 


f  tht 


utiller\- aniiMi'j   dilferent   commands,  unless  liowe   shoiuii   throw  his 


li< 


di 


whole    force   into    the   ji'rsey: 
addin;^  thi-^  iiara^^raj)!!  : — 


and 


end  his  course   to 


inac 


leli 


)ma. 


It  is  uiiiU'Ct.'-^sar)-  to  .uld    tliat  if  tin;  arm\'  of  the  enemy  should 
llv 


wiioll\-  or  pretty  L^enerally  throw  themselves  across  the  Ne,rth  river, 
(ieneral  Lee  is  to  follow."  ToGener.il  Mifflin  :  "  that  as  enlistments  arc 
to  expire,  many  will  not  re^•nlist.  hence  tents  and  stores  delivered,  arc- 
to  be  collected  and  saft'ly  dejjosited  ;  tents  to  he  repaired  against 
another   season,  intrencliin'j'   tools    to    \n'    collccti 


or 


placed   wnere 


jener.u 


slloul 


hrect,  and  ina'jfa/anes  ot  tor.e'e  he  provide 


To  (■ 


lOM'riior  Irumiiull  lie  sent  .1  particular 


.'tter  (M  I 


letail,  clo.- 


\n'j 


T 


n  ca-e 


th 


e   enemy  should    make    a    prt'ttx-  Lijeiieral    ri move   to  the 


J'"rse_\'s,   that    part   of  the   army  undi;r  (ieiier.il  I.ei 
probabl}'  follow;  notice  of  li'liii  It  I  iioic  <:^ivi\' 


wil 


mori.;   tiian 


To  Ezekiel  Checvers,  commissary  of  military  stores  : 

"  /\s   the    arin_\-,  ('at  least  part  of  it)  is  near  tb.e  period  of  di- 


■olu- 


tion," — arm\-  and  other  stores   issued  to  continental  troops  or  militia 
are  to  be   recovered:   unserviceabU;  arms  that  can  not  be  repaired  by 

to  bt'  Dacked  and  sent  to  the  Board  of 


tlie  armorers  o 


f  tl 


le   armv,  are 


War,  other  stores  to  be  put  in  a  safe  place  near  the  winter  (juarters  of 
and,  "  it   is  unnecessary  to  adil.  that  the  troops  of  Gen- 


tile  troops 


era 


1  I. 


ee  wil 


also  cross 


the  Hudson  riveraf  it  sh 


ould 


be  n 


ecessarv.  in 


conse(iuen 


ce  f)f  their  throwiiV-T  their  force  ov 


vx. 


O 


ne  !. 


eiieral  order  reads  like  so  m 


re 


;iny  orders  of  later  date,  tliat  it  is 
ferred  to  in  connection  with  the  historical  statement,  that  the  or- 
ganization and  support  of  the  American  armies  in  the  war  of  1861-65, 
was  substantially  based  upon  legislation  which  reprochiced  the  system 
adopted  during  the  war  of  1775-17!^!.  The  order  is  as  follows: 
"  Colonels  to  examine  the  baggage  of  troops  under  marching  orders  ; 
tents  and  spare  arms  to  go  first  in  the   w.igons.  then  the  proper  bag- 


tratrc  t) 


f  the 


re"inu;nt  ;  no   chairs, 


tabl 


es,  hea\}'  chests  or  otiier  [)er- 


.sonal  baggage,  to  be  put  in,  as  it  'vill  certainly  be  thrown  off  and  left  ; 
no  officer  of  any  rank  to  meddle  witli  a  wagon  (jr  cart  a[)propriatod  for 
any  other  regiment  or  public  use;  that  no  discharged  men  be  allowed 


m  I 


1776.1 


OPKKATIOXS   NliAR   .\i;\V    VOKK. 


247 


to  cany  away  arms,  camp  kettles,  utensils,  or  any  other  public  stores ; 
rccruitiiiL,^  officers  so  detailed,  to  procectl  with  their  dut)-;  no  boys 
or  old  men  to  be  enlisted,  .iiid  if  so,  to  be  returned  on  the  hands 
of  the  officer,  with  no  allowance  for  any  expense  lie  may  be  at." 

On  November  twelfth,  at  I'eekskill,  ju-.t  before  crossiuL,^  the  river, 
Washington  having  spent  the  previous  ilay  in  a  visit  to  the  Highlands 
in  the  vicinity  of  West  Point,  specific.dly  instructed  General  Heath 
that  "his  division  and  the  tmops  at  I'orts  Constitution,  M(jntgomery, 
and  Inde|)endence,  as  well  as  Colonel  Lasher's  regiment,  were  under 
his  command  for  the  security  of  the  above  i)osts,  the  passes  through 
the  Highlands  from  this  place,  and  on  the  west  side  of  the  river." 
Cjeneral  Heath  at  once  convened  a  council  of  war  and  divided  his 
troops  in  accordarice  with  the  tenor  of  Washington's  orders.  By  the 
fourteenth  all  the  troops  of  the  arm_\'  belonging  to  States  which  lay 
south  of  the  Hudson  river,  excepting  Smallwood's,  already  on  its 
march,  had  been  safely  moved  across  the  river,  and  Washington  him- 
self reached  (jeneral  Greejie's  headquarters  that  morning.  i\t  this 
time  a  fleet  of  nearly  three  hunch'cd  sail  lay  at  Sandy  Hook  with  a 
large  number  of  British  troops  on  board,  and  their  destination  was 
suspected  to  be  Rhode  Island,  Philadelphia,  or  South  Carolina. 

On  the  twelfth,  (ieneral  (jreene  had  written,  "  1  expect  General 
Howe  will  endeavor  to  possess  himself  of  Mount  Washington,  but 
very  much  doubt  whether  he  will  succeed  in  the  attemjit." 

When  Washington  arrived  at  Fort  Lee,  the  J5ritish  army  had 
already  removed  from  Dobbs  Ferry  to  Kingsbridge.  Li  hi^  rei)ort 
of  this  fact  to  Congress,  the  following  sentence  directly  follows  the 
amiouncement  :  "  it  seems  to  be  generally  believed,  on  all  hands,  that 
the  investiiigof  I'ort  Washington  is  one  object  they  have  iPi  view."  '•  I 
propose  to  stay  in  the  neighborhood  a  few  days  ;  in  which  time  I  expect 
the  design  of  the  enemy  will  be  more  disclosed,  and  their  incursions 
made  in  this  cjuarter,  or  their  investiture  of  Fort  Washington  if  they 
are  intended."  This  letter  regards  the  anticipated  investment  very 
calmly.  Washington  establishetl  his  headquarters  at  ILickensack 
bridge,  nearly  nine  miles  from  Fort  Lee.  The  garrison  of  Fort  Wash- 
ington liad  been  previously  reinforced  from  the  Hying  camp  and  on 
the  fifteenth  it  numbered  nearly  three  thousand  men.  W.ishingt(jn's 
personal  report  placed  the  garrison  at  about  two  thousand.  His 
estimate  was  too  low,  for  at  the  close  of  tUe  jear,  a  revised  list  of  the 
prisoners  taken  on  the  sixteenth,  v/as  made  up  and  settled  upon,  as  the 
basis  of  exchange,  at  two  thousand  six  hundred  and  thirty-four. 


248 


Ol'KRATIONS   NEAR    NEW    VOkK. 


[1776. 


I    l^^i- 


K;  •«■'.■.  '  ' 


Tlic  fort  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Majfaw,  of  Pennsylvania. 
He  was  a  man  of  coiiraj^c  and  capacity.  Colonels  Rawlini^s,  Catlwal- 
lader  anil  Haxter  were  his  chief  associates,  and  to  each  was  entrusted 
a  commantl  bearin;,;  upon  the  defense  of  tlie  fort.  Major  Olho  H. 
Williams  with  a  Maryland  rille  battalion,  was  alsu  attached  to  Kaw- 
lings'  conim.ind. 

Fort  Washinijton  was  a  hastil\-  built,  open  earthwi>rk.  .md  .accord- 
ing to  Graydon,  "  without  a  tlitch  of  any  consecjuence,  and  with  no 
exterior  defenses  that  could  entitle  it  to  the  name  of  a  fortress  in  an)- 
degree  capable  of  sustaining  a  siege."  There  was  no  well  within  the 
fort  proper,  so  that  water  was  procurable  only  from  tiie  Hudson  river, 
nearly  three  hundretl  feet  below. 

Southward,  within  less  tluin  two  miles,  were  the  interinr  lines  of 
the  old  defenses  whicii  were  built  when  W.ishington's  arni_\'  wa.-.  on 
Harlem  lleights.  Colonel  Cadw.dlader  was  statii)ned  there.  East- 
ward was  a  ridge  called  Laurel  Hill,  a  i)art  of  Fordham  Heights,  aiul 
at  its  nortli  end  was  a  slight  defense  afterwards  known  as  l'\)rt  Georife. 
Opposite,  on  the  prolongation  of  the  Mount  Washington  ridge,  was  a 
iort  subsecpientl)'  known  as  Fort  Tryon.  15etween  these  somewhat 
commanding  positions  tiiere  was  a  deep  and  rock}'  ravine  through 
which  ran  the  old  Albany  road.  The  river  ritlge,  with  a  slight  inter- 
ruption near  Tubby  Hook,  continued  as  far  as  Spuyten  Devil  Creek,  1 
where  light  earthworks  had  been  built,  known  as  "  Cock  Hill  Fort." 
Still  northward,  across  the  creek  on  Tetard's  Hill,  was  Fort  Independ- 
ence. iM'om  the  point  where  the  Alban\-  roatl  left  the  passantl  ttu-neil 
towards  the  Harlem  river  was  a  valley,  and  much  marsh)-  land  ;  but 
across  the  Harlem  river,  opposite  Fcrt  (ieorge-,  and  as  far  as  Williams, 
or  Dykeman's  bridge,  the  ground  was  high  again,  and  the  British  had 
erected  two  redoubts  to  cover  the  landing  of  Generals  Matthews  and 
Cornwallis.  General  Howe  thus  gave  liis  opinion  of  Fort  Washington  : 
"  The  importance  of  this  post,  which  with  Fort  Lee  on  the  opposite 
shore  of  Jersey  kept  the  eneniy  in  command  of  the  North  river, 
while  it  barred  the  communication  with  New  York,  by  land,  made 
the  possession  of  it  absolutely  necessary."  This  is  the  identical  argu- 
ment used  by  Gene:al  Greene  for  its  "  retention  to  the  last  possible 
moment." 

In  Washington's  report  of  November  sixteenth  occurs  this  par;, 
graph  .  "  Early  this  morning.  Colonel  Magaw  posted  his  troops,  partly 
in  the  lines  thrown  up  by  our  'rmy  on  our  firsc  coming  thither  from 
New  York,  and  partly  on  a  commanding  hill  lying  north  of  Mount 


Mm^il 


I 


ly 
in 
nt 


1:76.1 


OPKRATK^tN'S    XKAR    Ni:\V    VOKK. 


T\ 


\c   naiM' 


249 


,^rai)li 


VVasliiiv^ton,  t//f  iinrs  /'ciiii:;  all  to  tlic  soutJnvord! 
now  placed  in  italics,  lias  siL^iiificaiice,  as  the  facts  imlicatcd  enabled 
the  I'rilish.  who  o[)crate(l  fiom  the  north  and  east,  to  enter  the  open 
sides;  and  in  fact,  practically,  to  disrei^ard  the  greater  portion  of  the 


nominal  lines  o 


)fdef, 


cnse, 


1  )ii'ectl\' eastward  of  the  redoubt  ilself.there  was  no  defense,  other 


lie 


than  that  assured  1)_\- the  steepness  and  rouL;hness  of  tin:  ascent.     T 
fort  was  first  bviilt,  in  order   to  command  the   Hudson  river;  and  the 


princi[)al   portion  <■ 


\  tl 


le   lnie.~ 


innncdiatcly   northward,   I 


laU   a    river 


front,  but  was  nearly  open  toward  the  rear. 


J) 


uriii'. 


the   a 


ft 


ernoon  of  the  fifteenth,  the   l^riti^h  ;irran!^em<;nls 
havin;^  been  perfected  for  an  a^s;ullt  on   the  following  da_\',  Adjutant- 


'eneral 


Patt 


er.son  was  sen 


t  to  the  fort  with 


I  perempttir>-  deman 


d  for 


its  surrender,  with  the  a.lternative  ''to  be  put  to  tli. 


c  SlOOf/ 


i: 


111  reply, 


Colonel 


M, 


iL'.iw  decl.ired  th.it 


lie  w(nikl   ueteiul 


tl 


le  pos 


t  to  tlu 


.ist 


extremit}',"  vei}-  Ljenerousl}'  (lualifyin;^  a   portion  of  (lenerai  Howe's 
ultimatum,  as  follows, — "  1   think  it   rather  a  mist. ike,  than  a  settled 


purpose 


.f(; 


eiieral  Howe  to  act  a   part   so   u 


nw(;rtliv  of  himself  and 


the  Ihili'.h  n.il 


ion. 


Greene 


iini   .•i".iin 


ord 


ered 


.M; 


to  "  defend   the  place   until  hearinij  from 


rtlered'  (General    Heard's  brit^ade   to  hasten   uj) — sent 
m  Colonel  Maijaw  to  W.ishin^ton,  then  at   Hacken- 


llie  de>p.itch  fro 

sack,  ;uid  crossed  over  to  the  iort. 

Washington  immedi.itely  returned  to  Fort  Lee,  and  started  across 
the  river  to  determine  the  condition  of  the  garrison  himself.  He 
sa)  s  : — "I  had  parti)' crossed  the  North  river  when  I  met  General 
Putnam  ,ind  (jeii(.ral  (jreeiie,  w'.io  were  just  returning  from  thence,  and 
tlu'V  infoniu  (.1  me  that  the  troops  were  in  high  spirits  and  would 
make  a  good  defense,  and  it  being  late  at  night,  I  returned." 

The  .attack   upon   Port   Washington  was  admirably  planned    and 


ad 


mira 


bly 


ex'jcu 


ted. 


Pile  Pearl  was  stationed  in  the  North  river, 


says  General  Mowe,  "to  cover  the  march  of  the  llessian  troops  and 
fiank  the  American  lines."  C)n  the  night  of  the  fourteenth,  thirty 
flat-boats  under  the  command  of  Captains  Wilkinson  and  M(jlly, 
passed  iij)  the  Hudson,  eluded  the  vigilance  of  (iener.d  Greene  and 
Colonel  Magaw,  entered  Spuyten  Devil  Creek  ,ind  thus  reached  King's- 
Hridgc. 

riircc    distinct  assaults  were    ordered,  and  a  fourth  movement, 
which   was   at   first  inteiuled  as  a  feint,  was  converted  into  ;i  spirited 


attack,  at  a  critical  moment.     The  marginal  notes  on  the 


map, 


indi- 


\  ,. 


M 


■.'1  ■  i 


^1 


^  i 


!if 


M 


'SO 


OPKRATIONS    NI:AK    XKW    V(iRK. 


[1776. 


catinc:j  the  troops  assi<^nccl  to  each  cokiinn,  are   from  General  Howe's 
"Orderly   Honk." 

I-'rom   thi'   north,   alon'^  the    rid'e,   scatterinLT  the  little  'niartl  at 


Cock  Hill  l"<,rt.C 


nil  nel  l\aiu,  on  liie  riL^iit,  moved  steadily  u[)()n  I'ort 


ly 


r\'(in.  cniwdin'r  Colonel  Rawliiv's  back  bv  wei'dit  of  numbers,  n 


e.irlv 


to  the  fort  itself      (\ 


leiieral    Kny])l).iust'n  ui 


ith  tile  left  of  the    Hessi; 


cohmin  I1  lol;  the  sidr  o 


ft! 


le  ridsje  even    down  to  tlu:   ravine,  and  after 


eoilsKlerahle 


>ss  uliiK-  ri'.'htiiiLf  his  w,i\- throiii'h  woods  and  ovm'  rocks 


ai^ainst  a  s])iril(.;d  resistance,  joinedi  ("oloiicl  R.dil  near  the  fort. 


Lord  I'ercN'  .idv 


mo'd 


om  th(.'  south,  and  w.is  checked  for  a  littk 


u 


hile  b\-  Cadwall.ider,  who  h  i^-in'/  too  small   a    force    to  dcfeiKl  tl 


entire  lines,  was  then  compe 

.f 


to  fil 


ack  to  the  interior  or  norti 


I'm  line  of  works,  which  hail  no  c;uns   in  i)osition  as  support   to  jus 
resistance. 

,\t   this  advance  tlu'   divi-^ioii   of  M.itthews  and  C 


ornw;iiiis,  wl'uli 


had  been  in  readiness.  Landed.  althou;_;h  umK'r  he.ivy  fire,  imshed  bae 


the  resistiii"-  force,  and   moved  over 


I. 


:uirel 


to  t.ike  the  worl 


in 


the  centr( 


A 


s    soon    .as   .ulxaseo 


that    Lord    I'ercv   h.'id   carried   t! 


le 


.idv.ince-work  to  the  sou 
to  l.ind   ;uul   cor)jK'rate  wi 


th.  G 


eiieral 


H. 


iwe   OK 


lered  Colonel  .Sterling 


th  M.ittlu:w'sdivi>ion. 


At  th 


pom 


t  of 


Lie- 


ark.ition   there   were  liL;ht 


r:\ 


rth 


work's  .als(T,   w 


hicl 


1   were   stubboriib.- 


held   1))-  the  Americms.     C.idwall.idi.r,  st.'eiii;^  that  the  success  of  this 


movement  would  interpose  a  force  111  his  rear,  sent  .1  det.ic;imeiit  to 
assist  in  opposing  the  l.indin;^' ;  but  upon  fiilure  to  check  it,  the  de- 
tachment too  ra]iidl)'  retreated,  losiiiLj  (jne  hundred  .iiiil  seventy  men 


,is  i)risoiu:rs. 


.oionci 


M, 


I'^iw  also  se'Ut   a  det.achmeii 


t   fi^ 


)m   till 


fort 


for  the  same  jnirpose,  when  he  s,iw  the  boats  aiiproachini;'  the  landing;'. 
The  whole  wei^^ht  of  thi:  Ik-itish  left  and  centre  was  now  con- 
ver_Ljed  upon  .1  direct  assault  ii[)  the  steep  .isceiit  in  front  of  the  fort 
itself.  It  was  m.ide  under  heavy  fire,  but  with  unw.iverin;^-  steadiness 
and  speedy  success.     All  the  British  divisiijiis   were  thus  within  the 


exterior  liiu 


an 


d  tl 


le  'Mrrison  w 


,is  crowded  into  a 


.pace 


desiirned  fi: 


on 


ly 


a  thous.ind   men.      Surrender  or  rescue  was   inevi 


tabli 


M, 


e'aw 


asked  f( 


ir  live  hour:i    parley 


A  half  hour  oiilv  was  sjiven,  am!  the  sur- 


reiuler  ensue 


4oon  a 


"ter;  but  \\',ishin''ton    had   been  notified  of  tl 


le 


demand.      Washiii"! 


on  sa\'s. 


I  sent  a  billet  to  Colonel  .\L'i!jaw  direct- 


incr  liim  to  hold   out,  and  I  would  endeavor  this  cvcnimj  to  brii 


,(f 


tl 


le  irarrison  1 


f    the  fort 


ress  coul( 


1    not  be  maintained,  as  1   did  not 


expect  it  could,  the  enemy  bein;^  ])ossessed  (jf  the  adjacent  [ground. 


R 


awiuT's  an 


.1  Williams  were  wounded  on   the  left,  and  Colonel 


1 7 -6.  J 


o|'|;K.M1i)NS   NKAk    MAV    \()\<K. 


251 


Haxtcr  fell  on  L.iunl  Hill.  OAonvA  Miller,  of  tiie  l-'ifth  I\nnsylvaiiia 
battalion,  was  aUt)  killed. 

The  American  luss  in  killed  and  wounded  did  not  exceed  one 
hundred  and  thirty. 

I'he  15ritish  rei^inieiits  lost  in  killed,  wounded,  and  luissiivjr,  one 
hundred  and  twentx'-t'ij^ht,  and  tin:  Hessian  troops,  three  hundred 
antl  twenty-six.  ,\inoii;_;  the  rej^inients  enL;a;4ed,  the  lollowiuL;  were 
consjjicuous  in  subseciuent  sta;4ts  of  the  w.ir :  viz.,  those  ol  Ivalil, 
Donop,  Losber^,  Stein,  Nessenibach,  and  Dittforth. 

On  the  seventeenth,  an  additional  number  of  flat  boats  was  sent 
up  the  North  ri\'er  |jy  Admiral  Howe,  and  on  the  eii^htcenth  Corn- 
wallis  crossed  o\'er  ne.irly  op[)osite  Yoiikers,  at  <i  point  not  sufficiently 
w. itched  and  defendeil,  with  six  thous.iiid  men.  I'"ort  Lee  was  aban- 
doned, the  American  arm)' fallin;,;  behind  the  1  l.ickeiisack,  ami  then  to 
Aquackanonck. 

Two  officers,  one  quartermaster,  three  surt^^cons,  and  ninety-nine 
privates  wi:re  tidceii  pii^oners  at  I'Ort  Lee. 

'Jhe  loss  in  jiublic  >lori;s  b)-  the  capture  of  these  furts,  includin<j 
those  taken  at  Valentine's  Mill  and  left  on  the  march,  was  a  serious 
one  to  the  American  army,  and  embraced  besides  shot,  shell,  twenty- 
eight  hundred  muskets,  and  four  hundred  thousand  cartridges,  at  least 
one  hundred  and  sixty-one  cannon,  ranging  from  three  to  thirty-two 
pounder^,  and  several  hundred  tents. 

(Jn  tile  cajjluie  ot  I'ort  I  .ee.  General  Greene  wrote  to  Governor 
Cooke  of  Rhode  Ishuui  under  date  of  December  first,  that  "  the  enemy's 
pubiualiwn  of  the  canuiju  and  ^,lore-,  then  takei".  is  a  grave  t'alsehood  ; 
not  an  article  ot  military  stores  was  left  there,  or  nothing  worth  men- 
tioning. The  evacuation  of  I'ort  Lee  was  tletermined  upon  several 
days  belore  the  enem\'  landed  abcjve,  and  happily  all  the  most  valu- 
able stores  were  over." 

(ieneral  Washington's  rei)ort  of  the  twentj'-first  of  November,  the 
day  alter  its  capture,  says,  "  we  lost  tin  whole  of  the  cannon  that 
were  in  the  tort,  except  two  twelve  pounders  and  a  great  deal  of  bag- 
gage, between  two  ami  three  hundred  tents,  and  other  stores  in  the 
quartermaster's  department.  The  loss  was  inevitable.  i\s  many  of 
the  >tores  had  been  removed  as  circumstances  and  time  would  admit 
ijf.     The  ammunition  (of  Fort  Leej  had  been  happily  got  away." 

Tliis  apparent  di-screpancy  of  statement  is  given  for  the  following 
reasons. 

It  indicates  the  purpose  of  the  author  to  rely  in  the  first  instance 


J  5-' 


f'pi:K\iio\s  \i:.\K  N'l.w  n'(ii;k. 


t<776 


,n 


Ml    -^ 

lis 


ll 


upiiii  (itVu  i.il  k(])i)its,  Muster  IvuIU,  and  R'tiinis,  and  lo  ri  concilc 
coiitlicts  1j)- tlir  use  of  outcmp  >rar\' p  ip'-T-i  ,ind  Icttcis,  and  llir  apj)!!- 
calimi  i>f  i^MVci  iiiii;^'  ])ri;uiplcs  ;  and  lu'caust',  a-,  si'cii  hv  rcfiirmcL-s  tu 
opcratiMiis  at  liiMoklyii,  llarlcni,  and  ( 'liattcrtun  llill,  the  iL-nik-ncy 
of  individnali  to  throw  ic:-,pi)n^il)ilily  npon  Dthcis  wIilmi  there  was  any 
nn -advent  u  re,  was  a-,  coniinnii  then,  a  >  at  all  other  peiiods  ul  human  his- 
tory from  the  day  that  the  forbidden  I'rnit  was  eate'n  in  the  re;.;ion  of 
I'aiadi-.e.  It  miHl  be  remembered,  ho  i.r\-,:r,  that  tin;  re-[)orls  of  com- 
inandin;.;  offiiers  are  very  ot'ten  but  ^ii:uni  iries  of  ;_;eii(MMl  re'sult  ;  and 
that  only  eweptioiial  ease's  of  merit  or  "hMni-'rit  at.taeii  to  such  reports. 
It  would  l)e  iiUjios^ible  to  name  iVt  r\biii/\\  and  llie  nearer  that  attempt 
is  made,  the-  more  tluue  uill  remain  to  be'  (liT.ati--fn-d.  (irt;ene  had, 
in  f.ict,  removed  the  ^ritirdl  stores  ,ind  ,i  porli(jn  of  those  of  the  I'ort 
proper;  but  tiie  report  of  General  \Va^hiiv^4on  corrobonites  that  (jf 
(ieneral  Howe,  (ieu'-ral  (jreene  was  smartin;.^  under  in  ilicious  criti- 
cisms, and  his  strou'^  lan^nia.4e  was  erruileoUT  \\\  the  letter,  IjuI  ju.-.t  m 
its  ;4eniM'al  ^uli^tance. 

'i'lieral  W.i^hin^M on  himself  is  not  without  sonn.'  ineoii-ii-iteiicies 
of  stateaneiil  as  to  the  capture-  of  l'"ort  \\'a-.hin;_;uon,  and  these  are 
important  eU:ments  of  justice  in  slaliiv^  the  matter  exactly  .is  it  trans- 
pired. It  w.is  then  that  the  fn'st  (h'slinct  iusubordiu.ition  of  (jineral 
I^ee  had  its  expression,  and  calumnv'  seems  to  have  been  the  current 
ne'.vs  of  the  cri-i-.  Xo  event  duiin;^'  the-  war  had  calli'<l  lorth  more 
[)artisan  discussion.  It  -allows  the  import.iuce  (jf  ;^ivin;_;  full  credit  to 
real  coura'^'c  and  (general  wisdom,  and  the  folly  of  ULj^n'avalini;  a 
disaster  or  mi.^t.ike  of  jud;.Mn'iit  into  a  char_L;e  of  weakne^^s  or 
incompetenc)-. 

In  a  letter  to  his  brother,  Wa^hin'^rt,,)!!  says,  "  what  adds  to  my 
niortifuatioii  is.  that  tiiis  -post  .after  the  last  shi[)s  went  p.ist  it,  was 
held  contr.uy  to  my  uashcs  and  ojiinions,  as  I  conceived  it  to  be  a 
ha/.aulou  oiu,'.  ...  I  did  not  c.ire  to  ;^ive  an  alisolulc  order  for 
vvithdrawin;4  l)ic  garrison  till  I  coidd  ;^et  round  and  .-.ee  the  situation 
of  tilings,  and  then  it  became  too  late,  as  the  fort  was  invested.  .  .  . 
1  had  ;^nven  it  as  my  opinion  to  (ieneral  (jreeiu:,  under  whoso  care  it 
was,  tliat  it  would  be  best  te>  evacuate  the  place  ;  but  as  the  order 
was  discretionar)',  and  his  opinion  differed  from  mine,  it  unhappily 
was  delaj'cd  too  lou'^^  to  my  j^n'eat  j^rief." 

Washington  was  not  an  entirely  exceptional  m.in,  Jjut  a  great  man. 
He  must  be  dealt  with  by  his  merits,  'i'iic  fads  are  simply  these. 
I'utnam,  who  built  the  post,  and  had   yreat  faith  that  he  was  to  close 


'77^'.  I 


Ol'l.l'A  IIONS    M:AR    M'.W    N'()1;K. 


tlic  iiv(.r ;   rirccnc   coinin.indii);.;  on   tlic  Jersey  side,  who  was  anxi 


ou^ 


to  have;  no   more   retreats; 


md  (loloncl  Ma'riw,  tlie  brave   jjost  com- 
mander, must  have  siitisjlitf  WHs/iiit^/dn  tlial  he  could,  as  lie  wrote  on 


tl 


le  seventh, 


tak 


e  some  risk  to  hold  it. 


Ill's  letter  written   after  his  arrival,  showe'd   his  intention  to  watch 


tl 


le  lint  I  A\ 


mo\(inents  ;  and  the  invtstment  had  not  f/icn  h 


eeii 


mad  I 


It  is  to  he  inferred  from  his  own 


•tter  that   he  could  have  wi 


ithd 


raw  11 


the  [garrison.  His  arm)',  only  three  thousand  nn:n,  was  in,ide(iu,ite  to 
rtMiiforce  it,  without  sacriticin;.;  all  held  movements  and  shuttiiv^r  him- 
self up  for  ca|)ture.      lie  was  not  prepared  to  t.ake  responsibility  after 


fl 


le  (I'CU 


le.l 


iction  of  his  'H-neral  officers  and  Compress,  and  the  drift 


of  public  sentiment  was  in  a  direction  that  would  have  made  its  early 


evacuation  a  '^rcater  disaster  than  its  defense. 


It 


s  loss  fjuickenec 


1  tl 


le 


action  of  (Ioivmcns,  and  ultimate!)'  secured   to  \\'ashin;jt(jn  inde])end- 

lere  is  no  occasion  for  conv(,Mtiii;.,r  this  e|)isoilo  of 


ence  ol  action  :   but  tl 


the  war  into  a  harsh  jud;4inen 


t  of  either  (ir 


eiMie  or 


W; 


ishm'ftoii. 


Th 


ordeal  was  one    w 


,'hicl 


1  would 


1    have  tried  any  commander,     (iovernor 


Jonathan   rrumbull  of  ( 
and 


onnecticut  had  ///i' opinion,  and  ins  conscience 


wisdom  uisi)ued  mauv 


.v-uotes  to  the  conduct  of  the  war. 


wiotc;  to  the  American  commandei'-in-chiei  as  follows:  "  Tiie  loss  of 
]'"ort  Wasliin;_;ton  with  so  man)'  of  our  brave,'  men,  is  indeed  a  most 
unfortun;ite  event.  Hut  thoui;h  we  are  to  coiisiiler  and  improve  like 
di.'iapiioiiitments,  yet  we  are  by  no  means  to  despair,— we  are  in  this 
way  to  be  pre{)ared  for  help  and  deliverance." 


f:^ 


J'!'- 


«r 


M  '1 


'■/^' 


ii:,^      t 


i .(         •!  • 


'sis 


CHAPTHR     XXXVII. 

F'l.ANS  AND  C()UNTI;K    PLANS.     FORT   WASIIINfiTON    TO  TRKNCOM. 

C^  !■'.  \  I",  I\.\  1 .  1 1(  )\\'I'"- in.it  urcd  ,1  pl.iii  (i(  (iijcratifiiis  uliitli  (.Icai  ])• 
J[  iiifliiatcd  lliat  lu-  ei)iii])r(lu-ii(h(l  tin:  ;,',ravit)'  oi  the  innlcrtak- 
III;.;  \vln\,li  tlic  ISiitidi  ;_,n)vcriiinciil.  had  asaiiii(;d.  It  had  so  iiimh  uf 
trill'  \', (hie  tli.it  it  would  he  diflkult  to  iin])ro\a:  it  aft'.r  nion-  than  a 
ct'iitmy  ol  iikkIciii  iiiililai}'  i  xiJciiciK  r.  Tli.it  phiii  |)id|)o-cd.  that 
an  .iniiy  of  tiMi  thoiHand  nn'ii  should  Ik;  t'staiilislicd  at  Newport, 
Khodc  I  daiid,  ot  wliitdi  forti;  at  Ici^t  tlu'cc-fourth^  shouM  .k  t  ofTcn- 
sivc.'Iy  aijainst  tlu;  .\i:\v  I'ai'.d.unl  .Stales,  p.irticul.irly  Hoston  .iiid  \itin- 
ity  ;  -tiiat  twenty  thoiis.md  nu:n  should  Iji:  jil.ue'd  ,it  New  \'ork,  ol 
wliii  h  seventeen  thous.iiid  men  sliouM  he'  availaijle  lor  fiehj  >er\ice  ; 
-  that  ten  thousand  men  should  eod[)erate'  with  this  arm)-,  soulli- 
uard  ;  and  that  ten  thousand  men  should  be  sent  to  the  .Southern 
.St.ites.  'I'iie'  New  Jeise)'  ioutiiiv;ent  u'as  added,  in  onh  r  that  an 
ade(|uate  toice'  (roinllu;  .\ew  \'' ai;  loiiini.iiid  nii,:.dit  he  directed  up  the 
Hudson  ri\er,  to  cooperate'  with  lr<Jop-,  lia\in;.;  t  heir  own  b.ise'  on  the 
.St.  Law  reiu;e.  I  his  recpii.^ition  lor  troops  w.is  .sent  to  tlie  Dritish 
L;<)Veinmeiit.  It  hears  upon  iti  face,  its  si;uiifH;aiu:e  ;  and  iiiueh  oi 
(jeneral  Howe's  indecision  and  careruhu--.s  of  nioveineiit  must  he 
attributed  to  some  maturin;.;  c<jiiviction  of  the  character  of  th''  contest 
which  h,i,d  been  driven  into  his  mind  durin;_[  hi^  tarec'r  from  l)oston 
to  h'ort  Lee.  'J'lie  modern  reader  must  be  impressed  with  the  belie! 
that  such  a  force,  .so  disposed,  would  h.ive  fulfilled  .dl  the  strate;.dc  ele- 
ments re(]uired  fi^r  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  is  certainly 
true  that  the  necessity  fur  such  a  recjuisition  for  troops  mu-^t  have 
restrained  the  Jkitish  (ieneral  in  chief  in  his  (jperatiuns  in  New  Jersey. 
The  eIal)orate  controver.sy  between  Ibnve  and  C-linton  does  not 
imjjair  his  judiMneiit  in  this  respect  ;  ami  while  constitutional  tempera- 
ment and  certain  vaj^arics  of  per.soiial  habit  slipped  in  at  nearly  every 


('ii//i/n/f-t/ 'if/i/ /ht/wn  fi\  /li/  (lU/iH'ihi/i 


> — -'  "T — ^ 


.  \llirl  II  nil . 

Hi  ill. \/,. 
//'  \ iiiiiii . 


I  ■  Sim'' 


I 


W  \ 

'1'   :"fT 

[1  :      1 

*lai 


^. 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


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i^ 

I.I 

e 

i^ 

mm 

11-25  111.4    il.6 


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V 


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.«? 


>> 


'( 


iii 


17-6.] 


PLANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS. 


255 


crisis  to  rob  him  of  the  best  fruits  of  skillful  [)rL'parati<)ii,  this  single 
scheme  for  quickeniiiL;  the  war  to  a  conclusion,  must  [40  upon  record 
to  his  credit  as  a  soldier.  It  was  in  substance  the  cabinet  policy;  but 
indicated  an  ap[)reciation  of  the  means  required  to  carry  out  that 
policy.  A  ra[)id  summar)-  of  events  up  to  the  b.ittle  of  Trenton  is 
important  in  this  connection  so  that  the  closing  operations  of  1776 
may  have  their  appreciative  value  in  an  estimate  of  the  cliaracter  and 
operations  which  entered  into  the  permaiient  history  of  the  struggle. 
General  Clinton  sailed  from  New  York  iJeccmber  first  and  landed 
at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  on  the  ninth,  with  a  little  over  three  thou- 
sand men.  This  was  the  scjuadron  which  had  so  long  demonstrated 
near  Sandy  Hook,  creating  doubts  in  the  mind  of  Washington  as  to 
its  ultimate  destination. 

Major  General  I'rescott  and  Lieutenant  General  Percy  accom- 
panied Clinton.  Sir  Peter  Parker  commanded  the  naval  forces.  The 
effect  of  this  movement  was  to  susp  nd  for  a  time  the  movement  of 
Massachusetts  troops.  .Si.\  thousantl  men  were  nearly  read)-  to  march 
to  General  Washington's  support,  under  General  Lincoln,  in  place  of 
troops  whose  terms  of  service  had  e.>cpired. 

The  Northern  American  army  had  at  that  time  two  Major-generals 
on  duty,  each  claiming  .con^nand,  but  amicably  settling  the  differ- 
ence so  far  as  surface  manifestations  were  apparent.  General  Gates 
had  joined  Schuyler,  and  b)-  the  retreat  from  Canada,  lost  his  distinct- 
ive department.  He  preferred  to  retain  command  of  the  troops 
which  he  brought  back  ;  but  this  was  incompatible  with  the  situation, 
which  was  handled  by  .Schuyler  with  great  integrity,  patriotism  and 
energy.  Congress  settled  the  matter  by  declaring  that  "  they  hatl  no 
design  to  invest  General  Gates  with  a  superior  command  to  General 
Schuyler,  while  the  troops  should  be  on  this  side  of  Canada."  Schuy- 
ler actively  engaged  in  fitting  out  a  licet  for  the  control  of  Lake 
Champlain,  which  was  placed  under  the  command  of  Arnold.  This 
fleet  was  equipped,  made  a  good  fight  with  that  of  General  Carleton, 
but  was  either  cai)tured  or  withdrawn  to  the  south  under  the  guns  of 
Fort  Ticondert)ga.  i\\\  operations  in  that  department  were  suspended 
when  General  Carleton  withdrew  from  Crown  Point  and  returned  to 
Canada.  On  the  ninth  day  of  November  General  Gates  made  an 
official  report  of  the  troops  serving  in  the  northern  Department,  show- 
ing a  force  of  seven  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-five  "  effective 
rank  and  file,"  present  for  duty  and  on  command,  anil  three  thousand 
nine  hundred  an^.  sixty-one  sick,  present  and  absent.     The  terms  of 


)  M 


I 


i    !  t 


!   > 


256 


PLANS  AND  COUNTER   PLANS. 


L1776, 


n^ 


enlistment  of  ni.iny  ic;4imcnts  wore  to  expire  between  that  tlate  and 
tlic  ninth  of  J.inuar\-  cnsuin<;,  so  that  after  General  Gates  joined 
W'ashinijton  with  a  portion  of  the  Northern  ami)-,  there  remained  for 
duty  at  Ticonderoga,  Mount  Independence  and  l'"ort  George,  on  the 
first  of  December,  only  two  thousand  three  hundred  and  eii^hty-four 
men.  General  Lee  still  commanded  a  j^rand  division  at  North  Castle 
Heights.  This  force  numbered  on  the  sixteenth  of  November,  when 
the  assault  was  maile  upon  Fort  Washinj^ton,  seven  thousand  five 
hundred  and  fiftyfour  "  effective  rank  and  file  present  for  duty  and 
on  command."  His  report  of  November  twenty-fourth,  shows  the 
somewhat  hu\Lrcr  force,  of  seven  thousand  eight  hundred  and  twenty- 
four  men.  The  enlistments  of  a  threat  majority  of  these  troops  were 
however  close  to  their  limit,  and  he  ultimately  crossed  the  river  with 
less  than  thirty-four  hundred  effective  men. 

The  division  of  (leneral  Heath  with  headquarters  at  Peckskill,  and 
commanding;  the  North  ri\er  defenses,  was  also  reported  on  November 
twenty-fourth,  as  numberintj,  effective  rank  and  file,  present,  and  on 
command,  four  thousand  and  sixteen  men.  The  army  of  Washington 
was  mustered  at  Newark  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  November,  and 
amounted  to  five  thousand  four  hundred  and  ten  men  for  duty. 

Colonel  15radle)'s  brigade  which  was  to  go  out  of  service  December 
first,  had  but  sixty  men  present.  The  largest  brigade,  that  of  General 
Heall,  twelve  hundred  strong.  crAv  had  bitt  ii  locck  to  serve.  The  en- 
listments of  only  twenty-four  hundred  and  one  men  extended  beyond 
January  first,  next  ensuing.  On  the  first  of  December  a  general 
return  of  the  army  was  made  at  Trenton,  with  the  following  result. 
The  command  consisted  of  four  brigades,  including  sixteen  regiments, 
and  numbered  M'ith  officers  and  staff,  four  thousand  three  hundred 
and  thirty-four,  of  whom  one  thousand  and  twenty-nine  were  sick,  and 
two-thirds  of  the  sick  were  absent. 

Th.e  foregoing  official  data  are  substituted  for  general  statements 
as  to  the  condition  of  the  American  army.  The  army  movements 
vvere  as  follows.  The  American  army,  compelled  to  abandon  the  space 
between  the  Hackensack  and  Passaic,  crossed  the  latter  river  at 
Aquackanonck  on  the  twenty-first  day  of  November,  burned  the 
bridge  after  a  brief  skirmish,  and  followed  the  right  bank  of  the  Pas- 
saic river  to  Newark,  reaching  that  city  on  the  twenty-third,  and  New 
Brunswick  on  the  twenty-ninth.  Here  also  a  vigorous  skirmish  took 
place  with  the  columns  of  Cornwallis,  which  liad  orders  "  to  go  no 
farther."     Washington  moved  on  to  Princeton,  and  then  to  Trenton, 


1776.; 


PLANS  AND   COUNTER    PLANS. 


:57 


wlicrc  he  arrived  on  the  third  of  December.  I  [e  iinmedia;  ely  obtained 
boats  from  Philailelphia,  and  for  a  stretch  of  seventy  miles  above  that 
city,  secured  everythiii^^  that  could  float,  and  on  the  fifth,  havini^  re- 
moved all  heavy  military  stores,  thus  reported  to  ConL,n-css  his  action. 
"As  nothin;^  but  necessity  obIi|_;ed  me  to  retire  before  the  enemy, 
and  leave  so  much  of  Jersey  u  iproteccetl,  I  conceive  it  my  tluty,  .uul 
it  corresponds  with  my  inclination  to  make  head  ai^^ainst  tliciii  so  sooti 
as  there  shall  be  the  least  prol.-lnlity  of  doin;^  it  ivith  propriety.     That 


th 


e  countrv  mi'dit  in  some  mi-asure  be  covered,  I  left  two  brisj-ades, 


consistin^f  of  five  VirL;inia  regiments,  antl  that  t)f  Delaware  which  had 
just  arrived,  containing  in  the  whole  about  twelve  hundred  men  fit  for 


cu 


ity,  u 


lU 


ler  the  command  of  Lord  Stirlim 


and  General  .Stephen    at 


Princeton,  until  the  baggage  and  stores  could  cross  the  Delaware,  or 
the  troo[)s  under  their  respective  commanders  should  be  forced  from 
thence.  I  shall  now  march  back  to  Princeton,  and  then  govern  my-- 
self  by  circumstances  and  the  movements  of  General  Lee."  Wash- 
ington also  stated  that  if  the  troops  confidently  expected  (Lee's)  had 
joined  him,  he  should  have  made  a  stand  both  at  Hackensack  and 
j}runsvvick,  .nul  that  "  at  any  event  the  enemy's  [iroj^ress  would  have 
been  retarded."  Upon  advancing  toward  Princeton,  ne  met  Stirling 
retreating  before  superior  forces,  and  fell  back  to  Trenton,  and  on  the 
eighth  he  was  ov'er  the  Delaware. 

On  the  twelfth,  he  heard  that  Lee  was  in  Jersey  with  over  four 
thousand  effective  troops  ;  but  neither  his  own  staff,  nor  a  messenger 
sent  by  Congress,  succeeded  for  some  time  in  finding  out  the  location 
and  movements  of  that  officer,  although  his  letters  invariably  assumed 
great  importance  for  his  successive  plans  and  positions. 

An  order  had  been  sent  to  General  Schuyler  on  November  twenty- 
sixth,  to  forward  all  the  Jersey  ancJ  Pennsylvania  troops  then  in  his 
department  to  Washington.  Jiy  the  thirteenth  of  December,  the 
British  columns  which  had  crossed  the  Mudson  with  Cornwallis,  or 
joined  from  New  York,  were  concentrated  at  Brunswick. 

General  Howe's  •'  first  design  extuiided  no  further  than  to  get  and 
keep  possession  of  East  Jersey.  Lord  Cornwallis  had  orders  "  not  to 
advance  beyond  Biuuswick"  ;  "  but  on  the  sixth,"  continues  General 
Howe,  "  I  joined  his  lordship  with  the  Fourth  brigade  of  British,  under 
command  of  Major-general  Grant."  On  the  seventh,  Cornwallis 
marched  with  his  corps,  except  the  Guards,  who  were  left  at  Brunswick, 
to  Princeton,  which  the  Americans  had  quitted  on  the  same  day.  Corn- 
wallis delayed  seventeen  hours  at  Princeton,  and  was  a  whole  day  in 
17 


m 


■4 


ri 


:?5.S 


rr.ANS  AND   COUNTER   PLANS. 


[1776 


',?.■: 


li^' 


1':^       1 


ii! 


«. 


marchiiv^  tuclvf  miles  more  to  Trenton.  I'lii.s  corps  marcl'od  in  two 
divisions,  one  of  wi-.Ieli  readied  Trenton  ju>t  as  the  .American  rear- 
t,niard  had  crossed  ;  the  otb.er  led  by  Cornwailis  in  i)ers(jn,  Ijroke  (;lT.it 
Maidenhead  ;ind  rn.irehed  to  Corve'll's  l\'rr_\-,  in  some  e\i)ectation  of 
fmdinLj  boats  there  ami  ii'  the  nei_L,dd)orhootl,  sufncient  to  pass  the 
river;  but  the  enemy  had  taken  the  precaution  to  destroy,  or  to  secure 
on  the  south  side,  all  tiie  boats  that  could  possibly  be  employed  for  that 
purpose.  Cornwailis  remained  at  PenniuLjton  until  the  fourteenth, 
when  the  cantonments  having'  been  arraiiLjed,  the  British  army  was 
placed  in  winter  quarters,"  "  the  weather,  '  as  stated  In*  (ieneral  Howe, 
"  having  become  too  severe  to  keep  the  llekl." 

Such  were  the  relati\e  positions  of  the  retreating;  American  arm\' 
and  the  British  army  which  followed  its  march.  It  was  h.uiUy  a  pur- 
suit, in  the  proper  military  sense.  General  Howe,  however,  ccMiipli- 
mentcd  Cornwailis  in  general  orders  as  follows:  "  I  cannot  too  much 
commend  Lord  Cornwailis'  good  service  during  this  campaign  ;  and 
particularh'  th'  ability  and  conduct  he  tlisplayetl  in  the  pursuit  of  thi' 
enemy  from  Fort  Lee  to  Trenton,  ,1  distance  exceeding  eight)-  miles, 
in  which  lie  was  well  supported  by  the  ardor  of  his  troops,  who  cheer- 
fully cjuitted  their  tents  and  heavy  baggage,  as  impediments  to  their 
march." 

hi  a  careful  estimate  of  probabilities,  it  is  tlifilcult  to  determine 
liow  Washington's  ami)' could  h.ive  been  saved,  if  General  Howe  had 
not  limited  Cornwailis  by  exact  orders.  It  the  latter  had  lell  ilrmis- 
wick  and  followed  closely  uptjn  Washington's  retreat,  the  c.ipture  of 
the  American  army,  or  its  utter  di>[)ersi(jn,  would  have  been  sim[)ly  a 
matter  of  course. 

A  memorable  episode  of  the  war,  which  largely  alVected  the  cam- 
paign under  notice,  and  had  its  sequel  in  subseciueut  events,  must  be 
considered  in  this  connection.  On  the  fourteenth  of  December  the 
armies  were  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Dekiware  river,  as  ah^eady  stated. 
On  the  previous  day  at  a  country  house,  three  miles  Iroin  his  com- 
mand. General  Lee,  who  was  second  in  command  of  the  American 
armies,  was  leisurely  resting  after  fmishing  a  letter  hereafter  cited, 
when  he  was  surprised  and  made  prisoner  of  war  by  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel Harcourt,  who  was  on  a  scout  to  find  out  that  which  puzzled  Con- 
gress and  its  general  in  chief, — the  location  of  General  Lee.  He  found 
General  Lee  at  Baskingridgc,  the  best  possible  location  from  which 
easily  to  have  joined  Washington.  Lee's  division  accompanied  by 
General  Sullivan,  had  marched  to  Vealtown,  only  about  eight  miles, 


I776.J 


PLANS   AND  COUNTKR   PLANS. 


'■SO 


on  tho  previous  day.  He  left  Ciiathain  and  rode  at  least  three  miles 
outside  of  the  left  flank  and  to  the  rear  of  his  arm>-,  and  spent  the  nij^ht 
at  Whiiv>'s  Tavern.  He  was  not  at  breakfast  until  ten,  when  he  was 
sumrnaril\- ordered  out  of  his  house  and  taken  away  in  mornin;^  (//.v- 
Itabillc,  without  hat,  hoots  or  cloak,  ui)on  the  horse  of  ALajor  Wilkin- 


son 


then  picketed  before  the  h 


ouse. 


M; 


lor 


Win 


i\nisi)n  escaped 


r 


roni  orders   ah 


eady  cited  it  appears  that   (leneral   Washington, 


before  undertaking^  his  original  movement  southward,  gave  the  neces- 
sary instructions  that  the  main  army  then  at  North  Castle  Heights 
would  soon  follow.  The  necessities  of  the  crisis  compelled  him  to 
advance    in    person,  toward   Philadelphia,  and   occui)y   ^1'^'   ^\cV\    of 


crreatest  d.uvjer. 


The 


rel.itions  ( 


.f   C 


J en era 


1   L 


ee  as  a  subordma 


te  of- 


ficer, anil  the  gravit_\''of  the  issue,  give  significance  to  i^ai^ers  of  which 
a  few  only  are  cited.     The  letter  referred  to  was  written  in  the  pres- 


ence Ol 


M 


Mor 


W 


ilki 


nson,  a  messenijer   from   General  Gates,  and  was 


not  foKled  when  the  capture  was  effecteil.  A  former  letter  of  Lee  to 
General  Gates,  their  relations  before  the  war,  and  the  Hattering 
advance   b\'  Congress  of  thirty  thousand  dollars  to  General  Lee  to 


enable  liini  ;o  transfer  his    L 


nglish  property  to    America,  force 


them- 


selves to    notice    in    connection    with   this  paper.     The  expletives  are 


omi 


tted. 


l?.\SKi-.NKni(;i'.,  Dcccinlh-r  13,  i; 


Mv  Di'AR  Gai'KS. — Tilt'  inLrciiious  maiKruvcr  of  Fort    Wasl 


rton  h 


as  coin  ■ 


i:lfl\ 


mil 


liiiued  tho  u(>o(ll\' 


fabi 


nc  wt;  liad  liccii  l)uililiivj-. 


Tl 


HTc  ne\X'r  was  S(>- 


Pl 

a  stroke  :—t7//;v  iiom,  a  certain  j^rcat  man  is (ie-ricicnt.     lie  iias  tlirown  me  into 

ly  choice  of  difticulties.     If  I  stay  in  liiis  province,  I  risk 


a  situation  wiiere 


I 


ha\i'  n 


in 


\seir  and  armv 


if  1 


)t  stay,  the  province  is  lost  forever 


our 


councils  have  b'jen  weak  to  the  last  degree.  .Vs  to  what  relates  to  yourself,  if  you 
think  you  can  be  in  time  to  aid  the  Cieueral,  I  would  have  you  by  all  means  j,'o. 
Vou  will  at  least  save  your  army." 

The  above  letter  was  not  written  by  the  Ainericaii  General-in- 
chief  as  might  be  supposed,  neither  was  Lee's  situation,  however  im- 
portant in  his  oviii  judgment,  the  pivot  of  the  struggle.  As  he  was 
under  positive  orders,  his  safe<"v  was  in  obedience :  ^pd  there  was  a 
commander-in-chief  who  based  all  his  actions,  at  that  very  moment, 
upon  such  obedience,  and  Lee  knew  it. 

On  the  twentieth  of  November  the  following  official  order,  si-ned 
by  Grayson,  of  Washington's  staff,  was  sent  to  General  Lee;  '*  His 
excellency  thinks  i-t  wot, Id  be  advisable  in  you  to  remove  the  troops 
under  your  command  to  this  side  of  the  North  river  and  there  await 
further  orders." 


s'i?: 


260 


ri,A\S  AM)   COUNTKR    I'LAN'S. 


[1776. 


^■'►^h 


L  > 

1 


■'  I. 


t  i 


On  the  t\vcnt)'-first  WashiiiLjt.oii  wrote,  "  Unless  some  ncnv  event 
should  oceur  or  some  more  coLjent  reason  jiresent  itself,  1  would  have 
you  move  over  by  the  easiest  antl  best  |)ass>ige.  I  am  sensible  that 
your  numbers  will  not  be  lar^eatul  that  perha[is  it  will  no'  be  ;i|_;ree- 
able  to  the  tr(K)[)s.  N'ou  will  I'oiibtU.'ss  represent  to  then)  tli.it  in 
duty  and  [gratitude,  their  service  is  due  where  the  enemy  make  the 
greatest  impression,  or  si.'cm  to  do  so." 

Washington  wrote  on  the  twenty-fourtli  of  November,  to  urj^e 
"  the  [iropriety  of  sendin;4  frecpient  expresses  to  .ulvise  of  your 
a[)proaches," — on  the  twenty-seventh — -"  my  let  .ers  were  so  full  and 
explicit  as  to  the  necessity  of  you'-  marchin^L^  as  early  as  possible,  that 
it  ir,  unnecessary  to  add  more  on  that  head.  I  confess  I  expected  you 
would  have  been  sooner  in  motion  ;  " — "  the  force  here,  when  joineil  b\' 
yours,  will  not  be  adequate  to  any  Ljre.it  oi)position  ;  "--on  the  fir^t  of 
December,  "  the  enem_\'  are  advancin;^  and  have  got  as  far  as  Wood- 
bridi^e  and  Amboy,  and  from  inOjrmation  ncjt  to  be  doubted,  mean  to 
push  to  I'hiladelijhia.  I  must  entreat  you  to  hasten  your  march  as 
soon  a.s  possible,  or  yom-  arrival  may  be  too  late  to  answer  ar)y  valu- 
able purpose  ;  "  on  the  third,  "just  now  favored  with  your  letter  of  the 
thirtieth  ultimo.  ilavinL,^  wrote  you  fully  both  yeslertl.iy  and  to-day 
of  my  situation,  it  is  unnecessary  to  add  much  at  this  time.  You  will 
readily  a_L(ree  that  I  have  sufficient  cause  for  my  anxiety,  and  to  wish 
for  your  arrival  .is  earl\'  as  possible.  .  .  .  'J'he  sooner  you  can 
join  me  witli  your  division  the  sooner  the  service  will  be  benefited. 
As  to  bringini^any  of  the  troops  under  General  Heath  I  can  not  con- 
.sent  to  it  ;  — "  I  would  have  you  give  me  frequent  advices  of  jour 
ap[)r(jach.  Upon  proper  information  in  this  instance,  much  may 
depend  ;" — on  the  tenth  of  December,— "  when  my  situation  is  directly 
opposite  to  what  you  suppose  it  to  be,  and  when  General  Howe  is 
pressiuL^  forward  with  the  whole  of  his  arm)',  except  the  troops  that 
were  lately  embarked  .  .  I  can  not  but  entreat  you,  and  this  too  by 
the  advice  of  all  the  general  officers  with  me,  to  march  and  join  me 
with  all  your  force,  with  all  possible  expedition.  The  utmost  exer- 
tions that  can  be  made  will  not  more  than  save  I'hiladelpliia.  With- 
out the  aid  of  your  force  I  think  there  is  but  little  if  any  prospect 
of  doing  it."  (3n  the  eleventh  of  December, — "  Nothing  less  than 
our  utmost  exertions  will  be  sufficient  to  prevent  General  Howe  from 
possessing  it,"  meaning  Philadelphia.  "  I  must  therefore  entreat  you 
to  push  oil  with  every  possible  succor  you  can  bring.  Your  aid  may 
give  a  more  favorable  complexioi:  to  our  affairs.     You  know  the  im- 


I7"f' 


ri.ANS   ASM)   COUNTEU   PLANS. 


261 


portancc  of  the  city  of  I'liil,uli'l[)hia  and  tlic  fatal  con^ftiucnccs  that 
nuist  attend  the  h)ss  of  it.  " 

On  tlir  tu\:iily-(iist,  with  W'asliinntnn's  ordiis  Inforr  iiini,  Lcc 
wrote  to  James  IJoudoiii,  TresideiU  of  tile  M.issaehusetts  C'oimcii. 
"  Hefore  tiie  uidoilunate  affair  at  I'ort  \Vashiiv.;li)M  it  was  my  opinion 
that  tile  two  armies,  lliat  on  tlie  east  and  tliat  011  tile'  west  side  of  tiie 
North  river,  must  rest,  each  on  its  own  bottom:  tiiat  tiic  idea  of 
detachin;.^  and  reinforcing;  from  one  side  to  the  otiier  on  every  motion 
of  the  enemy  was  cliimerical  ;  l)ut  to  li.uhor  sucii  a  thou_i,dit  in  (nw 
present  circumstances  is  absolutt;  insanity.  Sliould  the  enemy  alter 
the  present  direction  of  tluir  opLralions,  I  shoidd  never  enterlaiti  the 
tliou^ht  of  beint;  succoretl  from  the  western  army.  We  must  tiiere- 
forc  dcijend  upon  ourselves ;"  and  aij.iin  :  "Affairs  ai)|)e.ir  in  so  im- 
portant a  crisis  that  I  think  even  the  resolvis  of  the  CcjiiL^ress  must  no 
loiiL^er  nicely  wei^di  \\\\h  us.  There  are  limes  when  we  must  commit 
treason  a;,;ainst  the  laws  of  the  Slate,  for  the  salvation  of  the  St.ite. 
'ihe  i)resent  crisis  demands  this  br.ive,  7'irtiii'iis  kind  of  treason.  I'Or 
my  own  p.ut  I'and  I  llatler  myself  ni)'  w.iy  of  thinkin;^'  is  con_L;enial 
with  that  of  Mr.  Howdoin)  I  will  slake  my  head  and  reputation  (jn 
the  measure." 

I.ee  had  written  November  twenty-fourth  :  "  I  have  received  your 
orders,  and  shall  endeavor  to  put  them  in  execution  ;  but  ([uestion 
much  whether  I  shall  be  able  to  carry  with  me  any  considerable 
numbers.  I  sent  Heath  orilers  to  transport  i>vo  thousand  men  across 
the  river;  but  that  Ljreat  man  intrenched  himself  within  the  letter  of 
his  instructions  and  refused  to  part  with  a  siii;_jle  file,  thoui^h  1  under- 
took to  replace  them  with  a  part  of  my  own."  Lee  in  fact  wrote 
insultingly  to  Heath,  who  w.is  as  inde[)endent  in  command  as  him- 
self, antl  even  went  to  liis  post  by  virtue  of  rank,  altiie.u^jh  only  a  j^uest, 
ordered  two  of  He.ith's  re^Mments  to  join  him,  usur:)ing  authority, 
and  only  receded  from  his  position  when  he  realized  liie  nature  of  his 
offense,  and  after  being  constrained  to  receipt  for  the  troops,  as 
"ordered  away  by  myself,  at  this  writing,  commanding  officer  in  the 
post." 

He  wrote  to  Heath  on  the  twenty-sixth:  "The  commaniler  in 
cliief  is  now  separated  from  us  ;  I  of  course  command  on  this  side  the 
water  ;  for  the  future  I  will  and  must  b^  obeyed."  In  the  letter  of 
the  thirteenth,  acknowledged  bv  ^Vashington,  he  wrote:  "  You  com- 
plain of  my  not  being  in  motion  sooner.  I  do  assure  you  that  I  have 
done  all   in  my  power,   and  shall   explain    my  difficulties  when  we 


-r,2 


IM.WS    AN!)   rotlMl.K    I'l.WS. 


\mf'- 


l)otli  li.ivc  leisure.  .  .  Tlir  (l.iv  altir  ti)-n)(ii  I'.iw  we  sli.ill  ]),isstlic 
river.  I  <lii  wi.li  j'nu  would  hind  iiic  .is  lilllf  as  pussiljlc, 
(Icl.iclicd  ;.Min'i.i!s  can  not  liivr  lno  ^ir.it  lat  it  lid:',  unless  tlicy  are 
\(i'y  ini  I  iin|ietenl  indeed  ";  III)  tlie  (c)uitli,  "the  nmlliei'ii  aiiny  lias 
ain.'adv  adv. inied  ne, tier  .Morri-.town  tli.in  I  am.  Shall  pnt  my  .elf  .it 
ttieii"  lie.id  til  nil  It  ici'iV.  We  sli.ill  n|ii)ii  the  whuli;  (niniiDse  .in  army 
(if  live  1  liuM  ^and  ;m  'ud  t  iMups  in  s])irit  >."  <  )n  the  ei;dit  h  of  I  Jiceinhei* 
he  unite  riiiiii  (liatliani  Id  \\'.e.hin;diin  :  "  I  am  cert.iinly  shurked  to 
heartiiat  x'oiir  |mi-(  r  is  so  iii,ide(|ii,ite  to  the  nece.^il  _v  oi"  \'our  sit  na- 
tion. ...  It  will  l)e  riinicnli,  I  am  .iliMid,  to  join  you,  hut  can 
not   I  do  more  seiviic  li)'  .iltackin;;  tlieii-  rear.'" 

(  )n  the  s,ii//r  iliiY  lie  wrote  tlii-.  re]il\'  to  Richard  lleiiry  I  .ee  .iiid 
I'xni.tinin  Uiidi,  A  I  oiiniiitlri-  I  ii<m  (  \'//';riss  ^^-wi  to  hunt  him  up:  "My 
coip-,  tliat  pa  >-.ed  t  he  Nort  h  river  v.ail  .luiount  (lor  we  are  eon  .idi'r.ibl)' 
diniinislied )  to  I  went\'-sr\cn  hundied  ;  in  lael  onr  .irmv  may  he  csti- 
iiialed  at  lour  t  hon-aiid.  !l  I  was  not  taii'dit  tollmik  that  tli",iini)' 
with  (i'lHi.d  \\'.i'-.hin;'ton  had  hern  consider, d)ly  reinlorced,  I  should 
imnieiliatel)'  |oin  him  ;  hut  .is  I  .nn  ,i-.-.ured  he  is  veiy  slroii;;,  I  should 
ima;^iiie  tint  we  can  m.d<e  .i  heller  impression  by  bc-atiii;.;  up  .and 
h.ar.issin'.;  their  delai  lied  ])artie-  in  the  rear,  for  which  purpose  a  ijood 
post  .it  ('h.ithani  seems  the  hest  caK'ulaled." 

On  the  ninth  he  wrote  to  lleatli  :  "  I  think  we  shall  he  stroiv_; 
eiioicdi  uilhoiit  you.  I  .am  in  hopes  here  to  recoiiipier,  il  I  m.iy  so 
express  m\seir,  the  jerseys.  It  u.i-.  re, illy  in  the  hinds  oi  the  emniy 
hefore  my  arri\-,il." 

'I'he  tollowin;;  letter,  (kited  ,it  Morristov.'ii.  Dccemher  (devciitli, 
indorsed  "  /■'/n///  (iiiiifiil  Ace,"  is  .added,  "  W'r  /:ii:'c  llircr  llioiisaiui 
iiini  lin  r  iit  prcsrnt ,  hut  tlirv  urr  so  ill sIuhI  flnil  we  luivr  hrcii  nl'liy^id  lo 
linll  tliisc  /:<ui  /liivs  for  uUiiil  of  s/iors.  SfTi//  rryjiiiriils  I'f  Cmtis  tdr/'S 
(trr  nil  tlhir  iiidnlijint  a^lirrr  tlifv  (utiKillv  ati  is  iiat  cnttiiii.  deiier.al 
I  .ce  has  s(  nt  two  officers  this  d.iy,  one  to  inform  iiim  where  the  I  )ela- 
wari;  can  he  crossed  above 'I'reiiton,  the  olheT  to  examine  tin-  road 
toward  I5urlin;;ton,  .as  (jetierai  f>ec  thinks  lie  can  without  ^reat  risk 
cross  the  :_;re.it  Ihunswick  road  at  ni;..;ht,  and  i)y  a  forced  iii;-^'it  niarcli 
make  the  ferry  below  IUir!iiv^'tf)n.  lioats  should  be  sent  from  riiila- 
delphi.i  to  meet  iiiin.  Ihil  this  scliniic  I/r  only /^ruposis  ij  the  licod  of 
tilt-  cncii/y's  colitmn  ml  •■•(illy  f'oss  tlir  river.  The  unlit  ia  in  tins  part  oj 
the  pro'i'iiuc  scon  snin^'^iiinr.  If  thev  could  he  sure  of  the  uriny  rciuain- 
tn<r  ninoni^st  them,  /  believe  they  would  raise  a  consideralde  number. 

Tiie  it.alicizcd  portions  indicate  the  discrepancy  with  letters  immc- 


nd 

to 
,/>:: 
■ml 

O.lll 

risk 

kch 

illa- 

iof 

toj 

liii- 

mc- 


I'l.ANS   AM)   (•<>I;MI;K    I'I.ANS. 


363 


(li.itt'ly  prcii'iliii;.;,  .1-.  dcil  iiMtni)- of  liK  scUIimI  puipo^c  Id  ,u:t  iiido 
|)fii(UMiliy,  ami  Ic.ivc  Id  \V.isliiii;.;lim  llic  nspoiisihility  tor  tlic  loss  of 
I'hil.icli.'lpliia,  or  oilier  disasti'i's.  Letters  to  I<.im'.1,  (iic.iic,  1  loath, 
'l"niiiil)iill,  .iiid  oliurs  arc  similar,  or  (;v(;ii  worse  in  s|iirit,  and  while 
tedious,  poitioiis  of  tiniii  arc  (  s-.ciitial  clciiicnts  to  a  i:orrcc:t  jiid;;iiiciit 
of  this  olTuer's  coiidml.  W.isliiiv.'.loii  had  provided  ho.it-,,  .md  .u(iui- 
csced  ill  Lee's  sii^;^e>,lioii  tiot  to  er.iiiip  him  hj'  dcfmiii;;  his  exact  route, 
so  that  Washiii^tfjii,  by  Lee's  secrecy,  was  wholly  in  the  d.irk  as  to 
every  detail  of  his  pro'^ress,  and  incurred  repeat(Ml  risks  llirou;.;h  tlie 
expectation  ol  scciii;.;  his  troops  arrive  with  promptness. 

The  capture-  ol  i^ce  was  chaiac  leri/.ed  hy  \Va->hiii;.;lon  t  lius  mildly, 
"  It  was  !)>■  hii  own  folly  and  imi)ru(ience,  ,md  wilhoul  a  view  toe'fect 
•111)'  i^ood  that  Ik;  was  t.ikeii."  (Icntial  Sulli\'.in  sut:c<:i:ded  Lee  in 
cumin. md,  ami  with  (jates  of  the  Noriluiu  ami)',  who  l)rou;^ht  about 
si\  hundred  men,  moved  proiniitly  to  the  Delaware,  crossed  tin;  river 
at  I'hillipsbur;^,  and  jijiiied  \V\ishin<;ton.  i  lu-  aimy  was  reorL;anized 
on  the'  Iwcntieth  lor  fnrlhcr  si.'rvice.  (itmeial  llowe  had  returned  to 
New  \'ork  on  the  thirteeiitli.  The  British  cantonments  embraced 
liurliir^ton,  i^oidentown,  Trenton,  ihun^wick,  ami  other  small  places. 
C'oloncl  iJoiiop,  acliiiL;  biiijadier,  was  stationed  at  Jiordeiitown. 

it  will  be  seen  tli.it  in  one  of  the  most  critical  i)erioils  of  the  w.ir, 
when  the  coinni.iiider-in-chicf  himself  was  an  tri.d,  the  man  who  ii'.-xt 
coininaiuU'd  [)ublic  conrideiice  because  of  his  military  trainin;;,  failed 
him  ;  simpl)'  because  VVashini;t(in  with  'lie  inoilesty  of  .1  true  deare  to 
attain  excellence  in  his  profession,  would  not  p.iss  fuhd  jmh^ment  .md 
enloice  liisown  will  in  dis(jbedienc<-  to  the  will  of  Coii;_;ress.  Coii^Tess 
itself  bcLjan  to  rtali/.e  however,  that  ;i  deliber.itive  civil  boily  was  not 
the  best  commander-in-chief  for  field  service,  .md  that  it  would  have- 
to  trust  the  men  who  did  the  fi^hlint;.  It  .idjourned  on  tlie  twelfth  of 
December  (piite  [jiecipitatel)',  and  .it  the  s.ime  time,  ''  Ri'SolvcU:  that 
until  Congress  shall  otherwise  order,  General  VVashinLjton  be  possessed 
of  full  power  to  order  and  tlirect  all  things  relative  to  the  department 
and  to  the  operations  of  war." 


ri  ^ 


CHAPTliR  XXXVIII. 

WASHINGTON  RKTURNS  THE  Dl  FKNSIVK.     TRENTON  HIS  FIRST 

Or.JECTIVE.     1776. 

OX  the  eleventh  of  Doccmbcr  Washiiii^ton  learned  that  the  Brit- 
ish ti  oops  were  tep.ii' "ni;  hriili^es  below 'I'renton  and  luul  also 
rebuilt  one  which  had  been  ilestroyed  by  the  Americans  at  Crosswicks. 
While  it  seemed  that  this  work  was  preparatory  to  an  attempt  to 
move  down  the  ri*  ;  and  cross  it  at  a  point  nearer  to  I'hihulelphia,  he 
regarded  even  such  a  movement  as  likely  to  expose  the  Ihitish  post- 
detachments  to  attack,  and  bes^an  to  make  his  plans  accordingly. 
His  army  had  increased  to  nearh-  six  thousaiul  effectives,  rank  and  file- 
General  Maxwell  had  been  very  faithfid  in  collecting  boats  to  secure 
the  anticipated  crossing  of  General  Lee's  command,  and  was  familiar 
with  the  country,  so  that  he  was  selected  to  command  at  Morristown, 
which  was  regarded  as  a  valuable  position  for  a  permanent  post. 
Meansvhile  it  was  a  rendezvous  for  troops  ccjming  from  the  north,  and 
a  considerable  militia  force  was  already  assembling  at  that  place. 

To  guard  against  surprise  he  divided  the  river-front  into  sections, 
under  competent  commanders.  These  orders  were  issued  on  the 
twelfth  and  thirteenth  of  December.  The  system  adopted  is  worthy  of 
notice.  Besides  light  earthworks  opjiosite  ferries  and  exposed  places 
easy  for  landing,  and  intermediate  sentries,  small  guard  posts  were 
established  at  short  intervals,  and  "  constant  patrols  were  ordered  to 
pass."  I'oints  were  assigned  for  a  rendezvous  in  case  of  a  sudden 
crossing  where  the  force  detailed  was  not  capable  of  resistance.  The 
troops  were  to  have  rations  for  three  days  always  on  hand,  and  all 
boats  were  to  be  protected  and  kept  in  good  order. 

General  Ewing  was  to  guard  the  river  from  Bordentown  Ferry  to 
Yardley's  Mills  where  he  lapped  on  to  General  Dickinson's  section. 
Four  brigades,  each  with  artillery,  under  Stirling,  Mercer,  Stephen 
and  De  Fermoy,  were  posted  from  Yardley's  to  Coryell  Ferry,  in  such 


M'  ,i 


I"7f') 


WASHINGTON    UKTURNS  TIIIC   OFFENSIVK. 


365 


lo 
In 
Ic 

111 


manner  as  to  fjiianl  every  suspicious  part  of  tlu-  river  an  '.  to  afford 
assistance  to  each  other  in  case  of  attack.  Colonel  Caihvallader  was 
posted  aI)ove  and  below  the  Neshaniiny  rivi  r,  as  far  as  I)uid<s  I'erry, 
at  which  [)lace  C'olonel  Nixon  was  postcM.1  with  the  thirti  battalion  of 
Piiilade!i)hia.  An  order  was  issued  the  same  tlay,  "  requiring  all  able 
bodied  men  in  that  cit>',  not  conscientiously  scrupulous  about  bear- 
ing; arms,  to  report  in  the  State  House  y.ird  the  next  day  with  their 
arms  and  equijjments  : — that  all  persons  who  have  arms  and  accou- 
terments  which  they  can  not  or  do  not  mean  to  employ  in  defense  of 
America,  are  hereby  ordered  to  deliver  them  to  Mr.  Robert  Towers, 
who  will  pay  for  the  same  ;  and  that  those  who  are  convicted  oi  secret- 
ing any  arms  or  accouterments  will  be  severely  punished." 

On  tlie  fourteenth,  whe,  Iviseil  that  (ieneral  Howe  had  actually 
returned  to  New  York,  and  that  the  British  .uMiiy  was  de/initely 
entering;  winter  quarters,  he  felt  the  necessity  and  entertained  a  plan, 
for  immediate  offensive  action.  He  exhau.-ted  appeals  to  Gt)vernors 
and  State  committees  for  fresh  troops,  and  resolveil  to  keej)  his  army 
active  while  its  short  term  of  service  held  out.  His  determination, 
"  to  face  about  c.'ul  meet  the  eneni)'  "  had  onl)'  been  postponed 
through  Lee's  disobedience. 

On  the  fourteenth  he  wrote  to  Governor  Trumbull,  "  The  troops 
that  came  down  from  TiconderoLja  with  Arnold  and  Gates,  may  in 
conjunction  with  my  present  force,  and  that  under  General  Lee.  enable 
us  to  attempt  a  stroke  upon  the  forces  of  the  enemy,  who  lay  a  good 
deal  scattered,  and  to  all  appearance,  in  a  state  of  security.  A  lucky 
bhnv  in  this  quarter  woiild  be  fatal  to  them,  and  would  most  certainly 
raise  the  spirits  of  the  people  which  are  quite  sunk  by  our  late  mis- 
fortunes." On  the  same  date  he  wrote  to  Gates,  "  If  we  can  draw 
our  forces  toc^cther,  I  trust  under  the  smiles  of  Providence  we  may  yet 
effect  an  important  stroke,  or  at  least  prevent  General  Howe  from 
executing  his  plans.  I  have  wrote  to  General  Arnold  to  go  to  the 
eastward"  (Rhode  Island)  "on  account  of  the  intelligence  from  that 
quarter." 

The  closing  paragraph  carries  with  it  the  correction  of  a  statement 
made  in  Hughes'  History  of  England,  that  ./r^wA/ proposed  to  Wash- 
ington the  capture  of  Trenton.  Hughes  quotes  Adolphus,  and  Adol- 
phus  had  it  "  from  private  information,  source  unknown." 

Washington  wrote  to  Heath  on  the  same  day,  "  If  we  can  collect 
our  force  speedily,  I  should  hope  we  may  effect  something  of  import- 


z66 


WASHINGTON    KKI'URNS    IIIK    OKFENSIVF-:. 


[1776. 


i'*'**    -< 


aiice,  or  at  least  give  such  a  turn  to  our  affiirs  a?  to  make  them  assume 
a  more  pleasiiif^  aspect  than  they  now  have." 

On  the  twcntietli  he  \vro>^  sternly  to  Conj^ress,  "  that  ten  days 
more  will  jnit  an  eutl  to  the  existence  of  this  army.  This  is  not  a 
time  to  stand  upon  expense.  Our  funds  are  not  the  only  object  of 
consideration.  If  any  good  officers  offer  to  raise  men  upon  continental 
p8)  and  establishment,  in  this  quarter,  1  shall  encourage  them  to  do 
so,  and  regiment  them  when  they  have  done  it.  If  Congress  disap- 
prove of  the  proceeding,  they  will  please  ;ignify  it,  as  I  mean  it  for  the 
best.  It  may  be  thought  I  am  going  a  good  deal  out  of  the  line  of 
my  duty  to  adopt  these  measures,  or  to  advise  thus  freeK'.  A  char- 
acter to  lose,  an  estate  to  forfeit,  the  inestimable  blessing  of  liberty  at 
stake,  and  a  life  devoted,  must  be  my  excuse."  This  letter,  which  is 
long  and  full  of  important  details,  seems  to  start  Washington  on  a 
career  of  greater  independence  of  action,  and  with  corresponding 
advantage  to  his  army  and  its  work.  lie  had  already  ordered  the 
recruiting  of  three  battalions  of  artillery  :  and  as  Congress  was  then 
at  Baltimore,  more  than  one  hundred  and  thirty  miles  distant,  he  pro- 
ceeded directly  to  work,  under  the  Resolution  which  they  adopted 
before  adjournment.  Major  Sheldon,  of  Connecticut,  who  had  the 
only  mounted  men  then  with  the  army,  ■..  ..;  also  commissioned  by 
him  as  lieutenant-colonel,  to  complete  a  battalion  of  nix  troops,  and 
was  furnished  with  fourteen  thousand  dollars  for  the  purpose. 

In  order  to  learn  the  exact  disposition  of  the  British  forces,  a  scout 
was  sent  out.  On  the  twentieth,  ^Vashington  settled  upon  his  plans, 
and  directed  the  three  regiments  from  Ticonderoga  to  halt  at  Morris- 
town,  where  he  understood  there  were  already  eight  hundred  militia 
collected,  "  in  order  to  inspirit  the  inhabitants,  and  as  far  as  possible 
cover  that  part  of  the  country."  He  adds,  "I  shall  send  General 
Maxwell  this  day  to  take  the  command  of  them,  and  if  it  can  be  done, 
to  harass  and  annoy  the  enemy  in  their  quarters,  and  cut  off  their 
convoys." 

On  the  twenty-first,  Adjutant-general  Reed,  then  at  Bristol,  re- 
ported, "  Pomcroy,  whom  I  sent  by  your  order  to  go  to  Amboy,  and 
on  through  the  Jersej's,  and  round  by  Princeton  to  you,  returned  to 
lUirlingtoii  yesterday."  After  reporting  fully  as  to  Bomeroy's  visit  to 
Cranberry,  Brunswick,  Princeton,  and  elsewhere,  he  adds,  "  In  Bur- 
lington county  he  found  them,"  the  Hessians,  "  scattered  through  all 
the  farmers'  ho^.  es,  eight,  ten,  twelve,  and  fifteen  in  a  house,  and 
rambling  over  the  whole  country. 


1776.] 


WASHINGTON    RKIURNS   TIIK   OFFENSIVE. 


267 


"  Colonel  Griffin  has  advanced  up  the  Jerseys  with  six  hundred 
men  as  far  as  Mount  Molly,  within  seven  miles  of  their  headquarters 
at   the  Black  Horse.     Tiie  spirits  of  the  militia  are  hii;h,  they  are  nil 


for 


supporting  Inm. 


\V 


e  can  either  trive  him  a  stron"  reinforcement, 


or  make  a  separate  attack. 


Some  enterprise  must  be  under- 


taken in  our  present  circumstances,  or  we  must  give  up  the  cause. 
.  .  .  will  it  not  be  possible  my  Dear  General  for  j-our  troops,  or 
such  part  of  them  as  can  act  with  advantage,  to  make  a  diversion  or 
something  more  at  or  .'bout  Trenton.  ...  If  we  could  possess 
ourselves  again  of  New  Jersey,  or  any  considerable  part  of  it,  the 
effect  would  be  greater  than  if  we  had  never  left  it.  Delay  with  us 
is  now  equal  to  a  defeat.  It  is  determined  to  make  all  possible  pre- 
paration to-day,  and  no  event  happening  to  change  our  measures,  the 
main  body  here  will  cross  the  river  to-morrow  morning,  and  attack 
their  post  between  this  and  the  Black  Horse."  Colonel  Reed  was 
then  with  Cadwallader.  On  the  same  day  the  army  return  was  made 
up  showing  a  total  often  thousand  one  hundred  and  six  men,  and  of 
these,  only  four  thousand  seven  hundred  and  seven  rank  and  file  were 
present  for  duty.  To  this  should  be  added  four  regiments  which 
arrived  from  the  northern  army,  twelve  hundred  men  ;  also  Cadwall- 
ader's  Pennsylvania  militia,  eighteen  hundred  men,  and  Sullivan's 
division,  late  Lee's,  three  thousand  men.  The  total  force,  deducting 
the  sick  of  the  added  commands,  numbered  nearly  or  quite  nine 
thousand  men,  but  this  was  the  entire  force  for  all  purposes  what- 
ever. 

On  the  following  day  Washington  thus  disclosed  to  the  Adjutant- 
general  in  confidence,  his  own  matured  plans. 

"Camp  ahove  Trenton  Falls,  zyi  December,  1776. 
Dkar  Sir  :— The  bearer  is  uown  to  know  whether  your  plan  was  attempted  last 
night,  and  if  not,  to  inform  you  tliat  Christmas  day  .it  nig'ht,  one  hour  before  day,  is 
the  time  fixed  upon  for  our  attempt  at  Trenton.  For  Heaven's  sake  keep  this  to 
yourself,  as  the  discovery  of  it  may  prove  fatal  to  us ;  our  numbers,  sorry  am  I  to 
say,  being  less  than  I  had  any  concepl'on  ol ;  but  necessity,  dire  necessity,  will,  nay 
must,  justify  my  attack.  Prei)are,  and  in  concert  with  Griftin,  attack  as  many  of  the 
posts  as  you  can  with  a  pros|)ect  of  success;  the  more  we  can  attack  at  the  same 
instant,  the  more  confusion  we  shall  spread,  and  greater  good  will  result  from  it. 
If  I  had  not  been  fully  convinced  before  of  the  enemy's  design,  I  have  now  ample 
testimony  of  their  intention  to  attack  P'uladelphia,  as  soon  as  the  ice  will  afford  the 
means  of  conveyance.  As  the  colonels  of  the  Continental  regiments  might  kick  up 
some  dust  about  command,  unless  Cadwallader  is  considered  by  them  in  the  light 
»f  a  brigadier,  which  I  wish  him  to  be,  I  desired  General  Gates  who  is  unwell,  and 


I.    i 


)  ■ 
*  I 


'i  i 


l!:>|'j 


1  ti* 


t 


m 


2C8 


WASIIINGION    KKTURXS   HI!-:    ( Jl'FKNSlVK. 


[•TTf- 


applied  for  leave  to  go  to  Philadelphia,  to  endeavor,  if  iiis  lie.dth  would  permit  him,  to 
call  and  stay  two  or  three  days  at  liristol  on  his  way.     1  shall  not  he  particular. 

We  could  not  ripen  matters  tor  our  attack  helore  the  time  mentioned  in  the  first 
part  ot  this  letter,  so  much  out  ot"  sorts,  and  so  much  in  w.int  of  evervthintj  are  the 
troops  under  Sullivan,  etc.  Let  me  know  by  a  caret'ul  express  the  plan  you  are  to 
pursue." 

"  I  am  dear  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

•'  r.KOKOK   WASHINOro.V." 

"  P.  S.  I  have  ordered  our  men  to  be  furnished  with  three  davs'  cooked  rations, 
with  which  and  their  blankets  they  are  to  march;  tor  if  we  ;ire  successl'ul,  which 
lu'.iven  j,'rant,  and  the  ciiiumstance  .  I'avor.  we  may  push  on.  I  shall  diicct  every 
ferry  and  ford  to  be  well  jjuarded,  and  not  a  soul  suffered  to  pass  without  an  officer's 
going  down  with  a  permit  ;  do  the  same  with  you." 

"  To  Joseph  Reed,  I",^(|r.,  or  in  his  absence, 

"  To  John  Cadwall.'.der,  Escir.,  oidy,  at  Bristol." 

Tlic  couiitcrsi;^ii  for  the  day  written  by  Washington  himself,  was 
"Victory  or  Do.ith." 

Tlic  letter  of  Adjutant-general  Reed  supph'es  the  gap,  which  Mr. 
Sparks  refers  to,  in  foot-note  of  "  Writing.s  of  Washington,  vol.  iv — 
page  242,"  where  he  says,  "  Wxa  plan  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of 
the  letter,  is  not  explained." 

In  a  letter  of  Robert  Morris  to  Congress,  written  on  the  twenty- 
sixth,  when  lie  heard  of  the  success  of  the  movement,  he  writes,  "  This 
nianceuver  of  the  General  iiad  been  determined  upon  several  days  ago, 
but  he  kept  it  secret  as  the  nature  of  the  service  would  admit.'' 

Washington  was  as  capable  of  keeping  his  own  counsels  as  was 
Frederick  the  Great,  and  there  is  no  responsible  authority  for  credit- 
ing any  other  man  with  the  pl.m  to  capture  the  garrison  of  Trenton. 
Others  saw  the  exposed  condition  of  the  enemy  :  but  Washington 
acted  upon  his  own  motion.  The  British  troops  in  New  Jersey  were 
so  disposed  as  if  no  enemy  was  within  striking  distance.  And  yet 
every  effort  to  cross  the  Delaware,  or  even  to  procure  boats  for  that 
purpose,  was  met  by  the  fact  that  the  entire  opposite  shore  for  miles, 
was  under  vigilant  watch.  This  alertness  to  anticipate  a  British 
advance,  carried  with  it  the  contingency  of  incursions  from  so  keen  a 
rear-guard  :  and  Colonel  Rahl,  the  post  commander  at  Trenton,  had 
been  one  of  the  most  active  officers  where  hard  fighting  h.aa  been 
experienced,  from  the  twenty-second  day  of  August,  when  he  landed 
upon  Long  Island.  As  the  American  army  controlled  all  the  boats 
on  the  river,  they  had  the  means  of  passage  at  all  times  ready  at  liand. 
From  a  letter  written  by  General  Howe  to  Lord  Germaine  it  appears 


1776.; 


WASHINGTON    RETL'RNS   Till':   OlFENSIVK. 


269 


that  lu-  uiulcrstood  exactly  the  condition  of  Washington's  army,  and 
that  after  tlic  first  of  January  it  would  become  a  skeleton.  This  fact 
exposed  one  of  those  military  pauses,  when  a  force  havin;^  capacity  to 
do,  must  do  at  once,  or  never.  The  obli^jation  upon  Washington  as  a 
soldier  was  imperative,  and  as  already  seen,  he  realized  the  fact. 
General  Howe  and  the  officers  of  the  corps  of  observation  along  the 
Delaware  ii^nond  the  A))U'rican  anny,  and  rested,  anticipating  an  easy 
march  to  PhilacK'lphia.  It  was  just  when  they  should  have  seen  that 
the  last  week  of  the  year  was  the  most  hopeful  for  Washington  and 
the  most  critical  for  their  river  posts.  Already  the  militia  had  demon- 
strated toward  Mount  Holly  and  challengeil  Colonel  Donop  at  Hor- 
dentown  ;  but  they  had  positive  orders  not  to  be  drawn  into  an  en- 
gagement, and  to  retire  upon  the  approach  of  the  Hessians. 

Several  small  stations  had  been  threatened  near  Trenton  itself,  and 
Washington  had  publicly  niade  known  his  purpose  to  measure  out  the 
treatment  of  prisoners,  and  carry  on  war,  by  the  gauge  which  the  British 
general-in-chief  should  adopt.  If  the  weather  allowed  the  Americans 
to  keep  the  field,  it  furnished  the  more  potential  reason  why  the  bet- 
ter equipped  British  army  should  bring  boats  from  New  York,  and 
overwhelm  the  dissolving  ranks  of  the  enemy,  by  a  quick  onset. 

General  Grant,  commanding  at  Brunswick,  wrote  on  the  twenty- 
fourth,  "  It  is  perfectly  certain  there  are  no  more  rebel  troops  in  Jer- 
sey: the)-  only  send  over  small  parties  of  twenty  or  thirty  men.  On 
the  last  Sunday  Washington  told  his  assembled  generals  that,  "  the 
British  are  weak  at  Trenton  and  Princeton.  I  wish  the  Hessians  to 
be  on  the  guard  against  sudden  attack  ;  but  at  the  same  time  I  give 
my  opinion  that  nothing  of  the  kind  will  be  undertaken." 

The  closing  paragraph  destroyed  the  benefit  of  the  previous  state- 
ment, which  showed  that  his  military  forecast  of  an  exposure  to  attack 
was  sound,  .nul  that  he  knew  that  Washington  appreciated  the  oppor- 
tunitv. 


None.  Compare  ahove  with  first  sentence  of  deneral  Gr.int's  rejiort  of  tlic  .ilTair  al 
'rreiUoii,  viz.,  "  On  the  twenty-tilth,  in  the  evenini;  a  party  of  the  enemy  attacked  an  out- 
j;uanl  from  the  p'mt  of  'I'renton.  .  .  whicli  party  was  l)eaten  back."  Wasliington  certainly 
ordered  no  detail  acros-,  tlie  river  to  put  the  Hes>iaii^  oi\  their  ijiiard  a;iil  difeat  liis  sur- 
prise. Hither  Oeiieral  Or.int  look  isp  some  confu-.ed  report  and  liieielVoni  builds  au  arfju- 
nient  to  show  that  Colonel  Rahl  had  timely  warnint; ;  or  the  attack  was  from  some  random 
parly,  not  in  force,  nor  undi  .  re^-ponsible  authority.  It  is  easier  to  presume  General  Grant 
to  h.-we  been  misinformed  than  to  define  the  occurrence.  See  Washington's  instructions 
paj^e  2f)S. 


CHAPTER  xxx:x. 


IIIISSIANS   .SlRrklSKI)    A  I     IKKNTON.     1776. 

OX  the;  twinty-fiftli  day  of  Dt'cmihcr,  177''),  the  rc^inuMits  of 
Aiispaih,  Kiiyphausen,  aiul  I\.alil.  uitli  fift\'  chasseurs,  and 
twenty  h'iflit  chMgoons,  making,'  a  total  effective  force  of  not  quite 
fifteen  hundred  and  fifty  men,  constituted  the  j^.irrison  at  Trenton. 
The  command  li.id  >ix  |)ieccs  nf  ;irtil!ery,  includi.n;,^  two  in  front  of 
Colonel  M.dil's  (|uarte'r^  ;  hut  coiitr.iry  to  the  [)revious  atlvice  of  Colo- 
ni'l  l)(iii(ip.  there  were  neither  field  works  nor  defense  of  any  kind  he- 
fore'  the  ferr\'  or  at  an}-  of  the  ap[jroaches  to  the  town.  One  such  work 
on  the  summit,  at  the  fork  of  Kin;^'  and  (jueen's  streets,  and  one  on 
I-'ront  street,  would  have  seriously  endangered  the  American  move- 
ment, especially  under  the  circumstances  of  severe  weather,  which 
almost  dis.irmed  the  assailants.  It  is  well  known  tiiat  rumors  of  an 
im[)ending  offensive  return  by  W'a^hini^toii  had  reached  Colonel  R.ihl, 
and  that  a  small  picket  guard  had  bei.'U  stationed  on  the  old  IVn- 
nington  road,  half  a  mile  be\-ond  the  head  of  King  street,  and  .mother 
was  in  position,  etpialK'  advanced  upon  the  river  road  leailing  to  the 
next  upper,  or  McC'onkej's  ferry,  past  the  houses  of  Rutherford  and 
Gener.il  Dickinsnn. 

It  was  Christm.is  d.iy,  a  holiday  in  great  t.ivor  with  the  troops 
wliich  Composed  the  g.irrison.  it  is  jjrofitless  for  the  author's  purpose 
to  enter  into  iletails  of  the  manner  in  which  th.it  garrison  observed 
that  holida)',  and  spent  the  night  which  chj-icd  its  enjoyment.  It  is 
enough  to  state  that  military  negligence  was  absolute,  and  that  it  cost 
tlic  comm.mder  liis  life.  That  negligence  lasted  tiirotigh  the  night, 
and  prevailed  up  to  eight  o'clock  in  the  nKjrning.  It  appears  that 
tlie  usual  morning  parade-routine  liad  been  observed,  and  tlie  men 
had  returned  to  their  barracks.  These  barracks,  now  cleft  by  a  street, 
were  still  standing  in  lS75,.ind  showed  tliat  they  afforded  a  good  de- 
fcnsive  position,  if  promptly  occu[)ied  and  firmly  held.      The  disposi- 


U:i 


m(>-. 


HESSIANS   SURrRISKI)   AT  TRENTON. 


2;  I 


tioii  of  the  American  army  for  the  attack  was  eminently  bold  and 
jiiclicious.  Griffin  was  expected  still  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Donop, 
as  if  the  demonstrations  acr(jss  the  river  were  but  the  feverish  action 
of  local  militia.  A  small  centre  column,  under  (ieneral  James  Ewing, 
of  Pennsylvania,  whose  bri^Ljade  reporteil  but  five  hundred  and  forty- 
seven  n.nk  and  file  for  duty,  was  to  cross  just  below  Trenton,  to  occupy 
the  bridge  across  the  Assanpink,  and  thus  sever  communication  with 
Donop's  corps  at  Bordentowii.  .Siill  further  down  the  river,  as  a  con- 
straint upon  the  possible  mo\'ement  of  that  corps  to  the  support  of 
Colonel  Rahl,  the  rii^htwini;  under  t'olonel  John  Cadwallader,  not  yet 
pronuited,  was  ordered  to  cross  at  Bristol,  below  Bordentown,  with 
view  to  a  direct  attack  upon  Donop  from  the  south,  and  thus  cociperate 
with  the  militia  in  that  quarter,  (ieneral  Washint^ton  reserved  for 
himself  the  conduct  of  the  left  winij^,  consisting;  of  twenty-four  hundred 
men,  which  was  to  cross  nine  miles  above  Trenton,  at  McCoid^ey's 
ferry.  Learning  that  Maidenheatl  w.is  almost  without  garrison,  except 
a  troop  of  dragoons,  it  was  the  [)urpo.-.e  of  the  American  commander 
also  to  include  that  sub-post  within  his  raid. 

It  was  also  expected  that  General  I'utnam  would  cross  from  Phil- 
adelphia earl)-  on  the  twenty-sixth,  with  at  least  a  thousand  men. 
The  plan  embraced  the  entire  deliverance  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Delaw.ire. 

The  right  wing  landed  a  portion  of  its  troops  :  but  on  account  of 
the  ice  could  not  land  the  artillery,  and  returned  to  l?ristol.  Cad- 
wallader ex[)ressed  his  great  regret  in  his  report  to  Washington, 
remarking,  "  I  imagine  the  badness  of  the  night  must  have  prevented 
you  from  passing  over  as  you  intended." 

It  was  not  until  four  o'clock  that  Cachv.Ulader  succeeded  in  regain- 
ing Bristol ;  and  Moylan,  who  then  started  to  join  Washington,  found 
the  storm  so  violent  that  he  abandoned  his  purpose,  believing  that 
that  officer  could  not  possibly  effect  a  crossing.  The  centre  column 
failed  to  effect  a  landing  for  the  same  reason. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps,  "Operations  in  New  Jersey,"  "  Opera- 
tions near  Philadelphia,"  "Trenton  and  Vicinity,"  and  "  Battle  of 
Trenton."  The  narrative  will  now  adopt  official  elements  without 
formal  detail  of  the  fragments  embodied. 

The  left  wing  of  the  army  under  Washington,  accompanied  by 
Greene  and  Sullivan  as  division  commanders,  formed  evening  parade 
under  cover  of  the  high  ground  just  back  of  McConkey's  Ferry,  now 
known  as  Taylorville.     It  was  designed  to  move  as  soon  as  darkness 


lii 


272 


lIi:SSIANS  SURPRISKD   AT    TRKNTOX. 


I '776 


h '  \ 

set  in,  so  as  to  complete  the  crossing  at  midnight,  and  enter  Trenton 
as  early  as  five  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-sixth. 

It  was  such  a  night  as  cost  Montgomery  and  Arnold  their  fearful 
experience  untler  the  rock  of  (Juebec.  It  was  cold,  snowy,  and  tem- 
pestuous. A  few  days  of  milder  weather  had  opened  the  ice  ;  now  it 
was  again  rapidly  freezing,  checking  the  current  and  skirting  the  shore. 

The  scanty  protection  of  blankets  was  as  nothing  to  protect  men 
in  such  a  conflict.  There  were  young  volunteers  from  Philadelphia  in 
that  command,  going  forth  for  the  first  time  to  stuii)-  war.  There 
were  nearly  ragged  and  shoeless  veterans  there,  who  had  ficed  such 
storms,  and  the  fiercer  storms  of  war  before.  Stark,  of  Breed's  Hill, 
was  there.  Glover,  the  man  of  Marblehead,  a  hero  of  the  Long  Island 
retreat,  and  Webb  and  Scott,  and  William  Washington  and  James 
Monroe  were  there.  Brain  and  courage,  nerve  and  faith  were  there. 
Washington's  countersign  of  the  twenty-third,  "  Victory  or  Death," 
was  in  the  inner  ch.imbers  of  many  souls,  guarding  manhootl,  quicken- 
ing conscience  and  defying  nature.  This  w.is  all  because  tlie  path  of 
duty  was  so  well  tlefined.  The  order  to  embark  and  cross  over,  had 
been  given.  It  was  short,  and  made  no  allusion  to  the  swift  current, 
the  cold  or  snow.  These  were  almost  negative  facts,  circumstances 
of  delay  and  discomfort,  but  could  not  set  aside  duty.  Those  men 
luid  been  retreating,  ami  had  rested  on  the  bank  of  the  Delaware, 
almost  hopeless  of  better  times.  They  were  now  faced  upon  their 
late  pursuers.  The  "  man  of  retreats,"  and  temporary  positions,  was 
in  his  fighting  mood,  and  men  went  with  him,  counting  no  impedi- 
ments and  sternly  in  earnest. 

"  iVs  severe  a  night  as  I  ever  saw,"  wrote  Thomas  Rodney; — "  the 
frost  was  sharp,  the  current  difficult  to  stem,  the  ice  increasing,  the 
wind  high  and  at  eleven  it  began  to  snow." 

The  landing  of  the  artillery  was  not  effected  until  three  o'clock, 
but  the  army  did  not  march  until  four.  Retreat  could  not  be  made 
without  discovery,  annoyance,  and  consequent  disheartening  of  his 
troops,  and  late  as  it  was,  the  advance  was  ordered.  The  snow  ceased, 
but  sleet  and  hail  came  fiercely  from  the  northeast,  as  the  march 
began. 

A  mile  and  a  quarter  from  the  landing  brought  them  to  Bear 
Tavern,  where  they  reached  the  direct  river  road  to  Trenton.  Three 
miles  and  a  half  more  brought  them  to  Birmingham.  Sullivan  here 
notified  Washington  b\'  a  messenger  that  the  men  reported  their 
"  arms  to  be  wet."    "  Tell  your  General,"  said  Washington,  "  to  use  the 


r}^b.] 


IIKSSIANm   SLUrUISKD   AT   TUil.MoN. 


J73 


bayonet   aiul    penetrate  into  the  town.      The   town   mu-it  be   taken. 
I  am  resolved  to  take  it." 

Here  the  army  divided.  SuHivan's  division  moved  at  once  by  the 
river  road,  toward  Trenton,  tiien  only  four  and  a  lialf  miles  distant. 
Washington  with  (ireene,  took  direction  to  tiie  left,  cros;;  hI  over  to 
the  old  Scotcli  road,  antl  entered  the  Pennintjton  road  one  mile  from 
town.  'liiis  route  was  about  eciuaily  distant  with  tiu>  other  from  the 
points  aimed  at  h)- the  respective  divisions.  \VashinL;ton"s  tlivision, 
as  he  says,  "  arrived  at  the  enemy's  ailvancetl  post  exactly  at  ei<jht 
o'clock  ;  and  three-  minuses  after,  I  found  frcjm  the  fire  on  the  lower 
road,  that  that  division  had  also  got  up."  The  pickets  on  both  roads 
behaved  well,  but  were  (juickly  swept  away  by  the  force  which  already 
hasteneil  to  its  achievement. 

Washini;ton  moved  directly  to  the  junction  of  King  and  Queen 
streets.  The  flying  pickets  hatl  already  given  the  alarm,  and  the 
Hessians  were  beginning  to  rally  witliin  sight,  as  he  rode  in  .ulvance. 
Under  his  direction  Colonel  Knox  placed  I'orrest's  batter}-  of  six 
guns  in  position  so  as  to  command  both  streets,  which  there  iliverged 
at  a  very  acute  angle  ;  Queen  street  running  southward  to  the  Assan- 
pink,  and  King  street  inclining  east  of  south,  to  the  crossing  of  Second 
and  Front  streets,  by  which  Sullivan  must  approach.  Colonel  Rahl 
occupied  the  large  frame  house  of  .Stacy  I'otts.  near  where  Perry  street 
joins  King  street.  Me  promptly  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a  hastily 
gathered  detachment  for  the  purpose  of  advancing  up  King  street  to 
its  sunmiit,  but  Captain  Forrest's  battery  of  six  guns  had  already 
opened  fire.  The  regiment  of  Knyphausen  attempted  to  form  in  open 
ground  between  Queen  street  and  the  Assanpink,  while  a  third  detac  i- 
nient,  cc.npletely  demoralized,  moved  rapidly  toward  the  Princeton 
road  to  esca[)e  in  that  direction.  This  last  detachment  was  met  by 
Colonel  Hand's  rifle  battalion  which  had  been  deployed  to  Washing- 
ton's left,  as  a  guard  upon  that  possible  line  of  retreat,  as  well  as  to 
watch  the  approaches  from  Princeton.  Scott's  and  Lawson's  Virginia 
battalions  had  been  thrown  still  further  to  the  left,  thus  completely 
closing  the  gap  between  Hand  and  the  Assanpink  river. 

While  Rahl  was  gathering  his  own  companies  as  rapidly  as  possi- 
ble, the  two  guns  at  his  headquarters  had  been  j)artially  manned  and 
were  ready  to  deliver  fire;  when  captain  Washington,  with  lieutenant 
James  Monroe  and  an  active  party,  rushed  upon  the  gunners  and 
i)rought  away  the  pieces,  before  a  sufficiently  strong  infantry  support 
could  be  brought  up  for  their  protection.  Rahl  moved  his  companies 
i8 


-'74 


IIKSSIANS   SUkl'KISKI)    AT    TKKNIv)N'. 


:.77^ 


imh 


as  soon   as  fdiiiicd,  aiul   joined    Kn>'pliaus(.Mi's   rcjjimLMit,  but  almost 
immediately  movcil  back  for  the  cover   viii'-ii  the  buildiiv^s  .ifforiied. 

Galloway,  Stediiiaii,  ami  some  other  early  writer^,  have  alleijed 
that  the  Hessians  retuiiieil  to  load  wai^ons  and  carry  olT  their  accumu- 
lated plu!!  '"r.  It  is  ilil'licult  to  rei^ard  such  statements  as  other  than 
traditional  tables.  Individ.uals  may  have  tried  to  save  their  effects, 
but  there  was  very  little  time  to  spare  for  that  business,  and  Colonel 
Rahl  was  too  strict  a  soldier  to  h.ive  permitteil  it  at  such  a   mouunt. 

Captain  l-'orrest's  t;uns  suept  tlu;  open  ;j;round  asNvell.is  the  streets, 
and  the  adjoiniii;^  orch.ird  w.is  equ.Uly  untenable,  hopelessly  expensing 
the  men  to  a  hre  which  coukl  not  be  returned.  Twoofthe^uns 
which  were  aflerwanls  t.d<en.  seen^  to  have  been  cut  off  from  the 
reach  of  the  llessians  when  the>' were  themselves  drifted  eastwaril 
from  their  magazine  and  barracks  by  the  American  control  of  both 
King  .md  (Jueen  streets  ;  and  two  guns  with  the  Kn)-ph.iusen  regiment 
were  of  little  service,  (ieiieral  Sulli\an's  division  entered  the  town 
through  Front  and  Second  streets.  Colonel  .Stark  who  leil  the  column, 
moved  directly  to  the  Assanpink  bridge,  to  cut  olT  retreat  toward 
Bonientown.  but  the  ch.isseurs,  the  light  horse  anil  a  consitlera- 
ble  infantry  force,  at  least  two  hundred  men,  had  already  crossed  the 
bridge  in  retreat  upon  that  post.  St.  Clair  took  possession  of  the 
foot  of  Queen  street,  and  as  Stark  swung  round  and  moved  up  the 
Assanpink,  the  Hessians  were  literally  between  two  fires,  while  the 
additional  enfilading  fire  upon  the  streets  closed  their  left,  and  the 
Assanpink  closed  their  right. 

For  a  short  time  small  parties  of  Hessians  who  had  been  unable  to 
join  their  companies,  kept  up  a  fruitless  scattering  fire  from  houses 
where  they  had  taken  refuge ;  but  the  fall  of  Colonel  R.dil  while 
urging  his  men  to  assault  the  sunnnit  where  W'ashingttm  controlled 
the  action,  and  the  advance  of  Sullivan's  division  which  shut  up  all 
avenues  of  escape  to  Hordentown,  forced  the  Hessians  out  of  the 
town  to  the  open  field  and  orchard,  where  the  whole  command  sur- 
rendered. 

The  American  casualties  were  two  killed  and  three  wounded,  cap- 
tain Washington  and  Monroe  being  amone  the  latter.  Several  were 
badly  frozen  ;  in  two  instances  resulting  fatally.  The  Hessian  casual- 
ties were  given  by  General  Howe  as  forty  men  killed  .and  wounded 
besides  officers;  and  nine  hundred  and  eighteen  prisoners  were  taken, 
of  whom  thirty  were  officers.  Subsequently,  a  lieutenant-colonel,  a 
deputy-adjutant-general,  and  scattering  members  of  the  Hessian  corps 


I776.J 


HF.ssi.ws  snRi'RisF.n  at  ikenton. 


275 


10 

le 


e 

:d 
ill 
ic 
ir- 

\p. 

:re 
l;il- 
cd 
L>n, 
,  a 
-ps 


were  tiiken,  makiiv^  the  total  number  of  prisoners,  as  reported  by 
W.ishin;4ti)n  on  the  t\venty-ci;^'hth  of  December,  at  about  one  thousand." 
The  trophi.'.s  of  war  were  six  bronze  ;^uns,  four  sets  of  colors,  over  a 
thousand  stand  of  .irms,  twelve  drums,  many  blankets  and  other  gar- 


rison sujiplies. 


(iciieral  Howe  savs,  "  This  misfortuiu-  seems  to  h,i\'( 


proceeded  froin  CmIoik-I  Rahl's  (juittin^  the  post  and  .idv.incin.;  to  the 
attack,  instead  of  tlefendint;  the  villa;^fe."  The  fact  is  overlookeil  tliat 
Washiii^^lon's  position  at  the  head  of  Kin;^  and  Queen  streets  with 
artillery,  which  commanded  both  streets,  afforded  .1  very  poor  oppor- 
tunity for  the  surprised  llessians.  The 'more  men  they  t;.ithercil  in 
those  narrow  streets,  the  better  it  was  for  Americin  artillery  practice. 
Rahl  followed  the  instincts  of  .1  soldier,  and  as  he  had  not  the  force 
to  assault  the  eneni)',  and  dispossess  them  of  their  commaiulin;^ 
position  ,,  he  sou;^ht  ijrounil  where  he  could  form  his  comm.ind 
and   fr^ht  as  he  could  ijet  opportunity.     The    movement  of    Wash- 


hich  ih 


11> 


d   I. 


,  .Scott, 

with  his  superiorit)-  in  artillery,  and  the  pressure  of  Sullivan's 
division  from  the  rear  throu;^h  .Secoml  stri  et,  f  )rced  Colonel  Rahl  to 
his  fate.  His  mistakes  had  been  matle  before  the  al.irm  of  battle 
recalled  him  to  duty;  ami  tlun  he  did  all  th.it  time  and  WashiiiLjton 
permitted.  The  disparity  in  casualties  is  accounted  for  by  the  f.icts 
stated.  The  .Vmerican  artillery  hail  its  play  at  will  biryond  musket 
range  and  upon  hii,dier  i^round,  with  little  chance  for  the  Hessians  to 
render  fire  in  return.  .V  few  skillfully  handled  guns  determined  the 
action.  Washington  on  tiiis  occasion  evinced  the  force  of  individual 
will  applied,  under  extreme  necessity,  to  a  determinnig  issue.  The 
battle  occupied  less  than  imc  hour.  Its  fruit  was  like  the  grain  of 
must.irtl  seed  which  develo[)ed  a  tree  under  whose  branches  a  tiiou- 
sand  might  take  shelter,  i  le  marched  back  to  Newtown  wi'f/i  prisoners 
o/iviir,  reacln'ng  his  headijuarters  the  same  night  ;  a  new  experience 
for  the  .\merican  army.  This  countermarch  was  attended  with  great 
hariUhips  and  suffering.  The  entire  distance  marched  by  the  troops 
which  left  Newtown  with  Washington,  was  nearly  thirty  miles,  before 
they  again  reached  their  camp,  and  more  than  a  thousand  men  were 
practically  disabled  for  duty  through  frozen  limbs  and  broken  down 
energies. 

General  Gates  did  not  participate  in  the  action,  having  gone  to 
lialtimore  to  meet  Congress  of  his  own  volition  without  invitation, 
and  without  advising  with  Washington.  Major  Wilkinson  of  his  staff 
was  indeed  sent  to  report  the  fact  to  the  general-in-chief,  and  so  re- 


2/6 


liKSSIANS   SUkl'UISKI)   AT  TRENTONT. 


[1776. 


u.. 


Ml 


ported  while  WasIiiii^toM  was  superintending  the  crossinfr  of  tlie  troops 
during;  the  cveniMt;  of  ilie  twenty-fiftli.  (lenera)  rutnam  made  no 
denioiistration,  tl»r()iii;h  apprehension  tliat  if  he  left  I'liiiadilpliia  there 
would  he  an  upri^inij  nf  royalists  inhis  rear.  Colonel  Griffin,  who  had 
recrossed  the  Di'lawan-  .d'ter  his  first  skirmish  with  (Colonel  Donop 
did  not  return  to  he  Jersey  bank  to  cooperate  on  tlu;  evenin;^  of  the 
twent\-fiflh,  St)  that  the  entire  attack  was  limited  to  the  operations  of 
the  extreme  left  win;,^. 

The  Hessian  troops  were  marched  throu;4h  the  streets  of  I'hila- 
delphi.i  to  prove  to  the  people  that  the  dreaded  ICuropean  veterans 
were  no  lonijer  invincible,  and  the  effect  ujjon  that  city  and  the  States 
of  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  w.is  of  lasting  value  to  the  American 
cause. 

Colonel  Donop  did  not  wait  for  an  assault  upon  his  post.  In  his 
skirmish  with  Griffin  hv  iiad  employed  nea.ly  his  whole  ;j;arrison,  cun- 
sistins^  of  two  thousand  men,  with  little  advantaL;e;  and  upon  the 
arrival  of  the  fr  e^ments  of  R.dd's  command,  lu;  abandoned  the  post 
altogether,  with  the  stores,  his  sick  and  wounded,  and  marched  with 
haste  to  Princeton  Z'iii  Crosswick's  and  Allentown,  and  started  on  the 
next  ila)'  for  South  .\mboy. 

On  the  twent)- seventh,  Cadwallader  crossed  over  from  Bristol 
with  eighteen  hundred  men,  and  reached  Hordentown  the  next  day, 
not  iiitleeil  knowing  that  Washington  had  recrossed  the  river.  Gen- 
erals lowing  and  Mifflin  followed  successively  with  five  hundred  and 
eigh'.  lumilred  men,  but  Mount  Holly  and  Black  Horse  had  already 
been  abandoned  b)'  tlie  Hessians. 

While  the  Continental  troops  who  i)articipated  in  the  battle  of 
Trenton  resteil,  Washington  perfected  his  means  for  further  offensive 
movements.  He  learned  from  a  letter  of  Colonel  De  Hart,  written 
from  Morristown  on  the  twenty-seventh,  the  gratifying  news  that  the 
three  regiments  of  Greaton,  Bond,  and  Porter,  would  extend  their 
terms  of  service  two  weeks.  That  officer  also  reported  that  only  five 
or  six  hundred  Highlanders  re  nained  at  Eli/abethtown,  and  that  the 
outposts  at  Boundbrook  and  in  that  vicinity  had  been  withdrawn  to 
Brunswick.  Generals  McUougall  and  Maxwell,  then  at  Morristown, 
were  instructed  "  to  ctjllect  as  large  a  body  of  militia  as  possible,  and 
assure  them  that  nothing  is  wanting  but  for  them  to  lend  a  hand  and 
drive  the  enemy  from  the  whole  province  of  New  Jersey."  On  the 
twenty-eighth  he  wrote  to  M.ixwell,  "  As  I  am  about  to  enter  the 
Jerseys  with  a  considerable    force  immediately,  for  the   purpose  of 


I77f».l 


IIFSSIANS   SnUI'UISF.n   AT  TRFNTO.V. 


277 


IC 

ir 

'C 


attempt inij  .1  rcc<.)very  of  tli.it  Cduiitr)-  from  tlio  ciK-my,  ami  as  a 
diversion  from  your  ([iiirtL-r  may  ijroatly  facilitati-  this  VL'iit  by  clis- 
tractin;4  and  (liviilin;^  tlicir  troop-;,  [  must  ro(|iiL'st  that  you  willcolli-ct 
all  the  force  in  your  power  toj^ether,  and  annoy  and  distress  them  by 
ev>.ry  means  which  prudence  can  su;4;^est."  To  General  lleatii  he 
wrote,  "  I  would  have  you  advance  as  rapiilly  as  the  se.ison  will  admit 
witli  the  eastern  militia,  by  the  way  of  the  llackensack,  and  proceed 
downwards  until  you  hear  from  me.  I  think  a  fiir  opportunity  is 
offered  of  drivin;,;  the  enemy  entirely  from,  or  ,it  le.ist  to,  ti>e  extremity 
of  the  province  of  Jersey." 

On  the  thir'.eth  \\'ashin;j;ton,  havin;^  a'j.iin  crossed  to  Trenton, 
was  able  to  announce  that  the  continental  ret^iments  of  the  "astern 
{governments  had  agreed  to  remain  si.\  weeks  Ion_L,'cr  in  the  service, 
upon  receipt  of  a  bounty  of  ten  dollars ;  ami  e.n-ncst  messaj.jes  were 
sent  out  in  all  direcl.'ons,  to  eminent  citizens  as  well  as  officers,  to  make 
use  of  the  success  of  Trenton  as  a  stimulus  to  recruit  for  the  army 
and  h.istt.Mi  the  concentration  of  the  militia.  The  responsv,s  were  of 
the  most  encouraLjing  nature ;  but  the  i^n'eat  fact  remained,  that  the 
ordeal  of  the  conversion  of  raw  material  into  soldiers  would  have  to 
be  gone  throiiL;h  again  after  a  few  weeks,  and  every  hour  was  to  be 
improved  to  get  the  Largest  possible  results  out  of  the  service  of  the 
four  thousand  of  okl  troops  who  had  consentetl  to  remain  for  that 
short  period.  The  success  on  the  twenty-fifth  aroused  great  expec- 
tations, and  CcMigress  shared  in  the  confidence  which  the  peo[)le 
extemled  to  th"  Commander-in-chief  of  its  armies. 

Nori:.  Maji>r  Wilkinson  tluis  (k'siiiln'-i  ilie  ilLlivciy  of  (icncial  dales'  Ictt'ir  to  General 
\V.isiiiii;4l(vn,  at  M<('c.iikL'y's  I'ony,  aflcr  (iii-.k,  Dt'conihcT  'Jdlii,  I  foiuid  iiini  :\I(mio,  with 
his  whip  in  his  Iiand,  prciiaivd  tn  iiimuil  his  hor^e.  When  1  presented  tlic  letter  of  Cicncral 
Gates  to  him,  liefore  receiving  it,  ho  exelainied  with  solemnity,  '  What  a  time  is  this  to  hand 
mc  letters  !  I  Where  is  he?'  .Iiisrrii.  '  1  left  him  this  morning  in  Philadelphia.'  What  was 
he  doing  there  ?  '  I  understood  him,  that  he  was  on  his  way  to  Congress.'  He  earnestly 
repeated  :  '  On  his  wav  to  Congress,'  then  broke  the  seal,  and  I  made  my  bow  and  joined 
General  St.  C'lair,  on  the  liank  of  the  river.  This  incident  is  given  in  c  )nnection  with 
another  statement  of  the  same  ollicer,  that  (leneral  G.Ues  said  it  was  his  intention  to  pro- 
pose to  Congress  that  General  Washington  should  retire  to  the  south  of  tlie  Suscpiehanna, 
Tills  ex|)lains  his  failure  to  join  Washington,  The  success  at  Trenton  was  not  anticipated 
•)y  General  Gates, 

Nnn:.  Rahl,  or  R.ill.  Dr,  Frederick  Kapp,  of  Berlin,  in  a  letter  to  Adjutant-fjeneral 
William  S.  Stryker,  of  Trenton,  New  Jersey,  May,  1776,  says,  "  Rail  U  correct."  In  modern 
usage,  the  silent  A,  their  only  silent  letter,  is  dropped  hy  German  scholars.  Hence  Hancroft 
adopts  Kail.  As  Washington,  Sparks,  Irving  at;d  general  history  have  relaincd  the  //,  the 
name  is  retained  as  most  familiar  at  the  period  of  the  war.  It  is  immaterial,  as  the  |iro- 
nunciation,  in  either  case,  would  be  as  if  the  name  were  spelled  in  Kngii-,h,  A'lu/.  Dr. 
Bailey  Myers,  a  German  scholar  of  rei)ute,  and  Professor  Green, in  his  (Jerman  clement  in 
the  Rev.  War.,  retain  Rahl. 


VliU'l 


i 


n 


CHAPTER    XL. 

MISCi:i.l.ANEOUS  EVENTS.     WASIIINT/rON  CLOTHED  WITH  THE 
TOWERS  OF  DICTA  TOR.     OPINIONS  OF  TRENTON.     1776. 


'T    r-. 


WHILE  tlic  land  operations  of  the  Biitisli  ami  American  armies 
were  tluis  constant  durinL^  the  latter  part  of  tlie  year  1 776, 
the  .Americans  made  considerable  pro^jress  in  the  biiildin^^  of  the  ships 
of  war  which  had  been  previously  authorized. 

The  Columbus  and  Ilanideii  were  at  Providence  nearly  ready  for 
sea  on  the  second  of  November,  but  were  soon  shul  up  with  the 
Warren  and  some  smaller  vessels,  by  the  British  occupation  of  New- 
]iort.  The  Alfred  had  sailed  and  had  alreatly  captured  several  valua- 
ble jM-izes.  The  New  Hampshire,  Raleisjjh,  Randolph,  Conj^ress,  Dela- 
ware, Monti,^omer\'  and  several  other  fris^ates  were  nearly  finished  but 
needed  cannon.  Thirteen  had  been  launched,  and  two  ships  of  the 
line  and  five  additional  friijates  were  on  the  stocks  bv  the  twentv-first 
of  December.  At  that  date  Robert  Morris  sent  to  the  American 
Commissioners  at  Paris  a  statement  of  the  condition  of  public  affair^, 
and  then  apologized  for  the  apparently  slow  progress  made  in  fitting 
out  vessels  to  prey  upon  British  commerce,  by  stating  the  want  of 
heavy  guns.  Besides  the  AFred,  however,  the  Reprisal,  Andrew 
Doria  and  Lexington  were  at  sea,  as  v.cU  as  the  sloops  Providence, 
Hornet,  P'ly,  Independence  and  Sachem,  and  the  schooners  Wasp 
Musquito  and  Georgia-Packet.  Privateering  however  monopolized 
the  chief  interest  in  naval  warfare,  because  it  was  lucrative  ;  and  it 
was  with  difficulty  that  suitable  crews  could  be  obtained,  for  other 
vessels  of  all  kinds  had  captured,  according  to  the  official  list,  three 
hundred  and  forty-two,  had  retaken  forty-four  and  burned  five. 

In  aid  of  their  operations  at  home  the  Americans  already  began  to 
count  upon  foreign  assistance.  Correspondence  had  been  opened  with 
agents  at  Paris  looking  to  the  enlistment  of  France  in  the  war;  and 
the  prizes  of  the  American  privateers  had  found  special  favor  in  the 


!i    i 


k 


m 


ized 

id  it 

ther 

iree 

111  to 
with 
and 
the 


•jra* 


T 


r 


#1. 


J*"**  *,     "! 


r?  ■! 


i 

,     t 
1      1 

1 

i 

j 

hhjf- 

1 

4l 

t 

I77f>. 


mimi:i.i..\m;i)iis  kvknts.  — oimnions  ni'  ikiinion. 


-/'J 


ports  of  tli.it  country  and   of  Spain,  by  <'i   skillfu!   avoidance   of  any 
public  act  tliat  would  offend  Great  Hritain. 

Tlic  proclani.ition  uliicli  (icncral  llowc  publishi;d  uhtn  Ids  arm)' 
entered  the  Jerse)s  liad  ri'ceivk'd  its  death-blow  wiien  TrentMii  w.is 
taken  ;  and  ("oiicrress  silenced  the  still  existiu'^  anxietv  for  some   kind 


ot    a  coni])ronnse  by  an  unefjuivocal  course   winch   lett   no  allernalive 


ft 


but  the 


issue  o 


f  batti 


The  British  army  was  theoretically  in  Winter  quarters.     The  (gar- 


rison of    Rhode  Island 


made   no  demonstrations  which  correspon 


ided 


to  the  force  at  disposal,  and  Massachusetts  bad  so  fir  recovered 
from  the  alarm  incident  to  its  fu'st  arri\al  as  to  turn  her  atten- 
tion tn  a  fre-~h  sup])<)i't  of  thr  national  am))'.       Ihe   i 


idddle  and  south- 


ern Stall's  were    also   acti\'i'  in    the    or'M'ii/.ition    of  fresh    battal 


ions. 


New  f 


lundrics  were 


,tal)l 


isncd 


am 


I  an  alteini)t  was  made  to  secure 


.1   ciimpK.te   fielil  outfit    fir   tlu-  arm\',  on  the   new   establishment   of 
eiLlhu-ei'dit  battalions.     ( )ne  huiithed    tlMusand  small  arms  and  two 


luuulretl  hronzr  cannon  were  solicited  ol  r  ranee,  b_\'  way  ot  purchase 
and.  more   needi'd  than  almost   an\-thiiv/   else,  a   -^o 


|i   m    w.is  also 


earnestiv  nv< 


As  tile  certainty  of  another  canii).n;_;n  becai 


lie  appa- 


rent, so 


the  mind  of  WasliiuLft 


on  was  t,isK-cd  to  pro\  ide 


f)r  il- 


up|)ort. 


The  ihitish  ;4overnment  found  itself  compclletl   to  increase  it 


s  own 


ariiu'  aiul 


mult 


ipl\'   tin;  st<jri 


f 


or   irarrison,  su.'L'e  am 


1    t 


lehl 


service. 


(jr(.'at  difficulties  .itteiideti  the  second  effort  to  obtain  trooi)s  from  the 


snia 


11    ( 


iitnian    .States,  the    entire    number    of  recruits  am 


rem  lore e- 


ments  secure'd,  beiii"  onl\"  threi'  thousand  .md  six  hundred  men.      I'iie 


H 


runswicK  and 


aii.ui  recruits,  am 


1  f 


ou 


r  companies 


<i  II 


man 


a''er,- 


wire  sent  to  Can. ida  :  but  the  residue  came  to  (jeiieral  Ibjwe.  The 
reinforcements  from  Great  Ihitain  and  Ireland,  however,  wliich  sailed 
tor  .\nierica  Peforc  J.muary  1st,  1777,  embraced  three  thousand  two 
hundred  .and  fifty-two  men  for  New  York  and  nearly  eii^ht  hundrt.-d 
forC"i:iada.  (ieneral  Howe  increa.ied  his  reipiisitioii  tor  troops  to 
twenty  thousand  men,  .and  tlecl.ired  it  as  his  opinion  that  it  would  be 
im[)ossible  to  o!j^.iiii/.e  the  (".m.idian  .iniiy  suas  to  reach  Alb, my  bef)re 
tor   September   of  the   )ear  1777.      His  prediction  was  subse- 


lum-is 


(jucntly  confirmed  by  experience. 

Tlie  cabinet  coiitem[)'uitevl  tliat  a   very  consiilerable    Indian   force 
could   be  made  auxiliary   t(j   the  re^ul.ir  troops;  but   neither   Howe 


nor  Carleton  h.id  confidence  in  the  measun 


IS  a  ([uestion   o 


f  mill 


t.iry  policy,  it  was  ruinous  to  the  suprem.icy  of  the  cruwn  to  employ 
savages  against  the  colonists. 


in 


i! 


i  • 


ii !: 


^1 


:i 


;8o 


MiscKF.i  .wr.ous  i:vi:\i's. — opixions  or  tkkntox. 


[1776^ 


kj 


r ' 


it  ' 


On  the  part  of  the  Americans,  in  anticipation  of  another  northern 
campaij^n,  l.irge  bateaux  were  built  to  support  a  boom  aikl  ch.iin  at 
Ticonderoga.  Mount  \Vashin<;ton  wa.;  ordered  to  he  fortified,  antl 
I'ort  Stanwix  was  ordered  to  be  put  in  thorouj^h  order  to  anticipate 
Indian  a|j[L;ression  in  conjunction  witii  an  invasion  from  the  north. 
For  the  time  being  it  seemed  as  if  the  American  people  would  heartily 
facilitate  the  orLjanization  of  the  army  up  to  the  demands  of  the  crisis. 

As  early  as  December  seventh  a  citizen  of  l'enns_\lvania  publicly 
proposed  a  Dictator  for  that  State,  to  serve  for  three  or  six  months, 
anil  propoundetl  this  ([ueslion,  "  If, is  not  the  w.uit  of  a  suitable  per- 
son, entrusted  with  such  powers  in  tinu'  of  war,  endetl  in  the  ruin  of 
several  of  the  most  flourishing;  Republics  of  antitpiity  ?  " 

At  last  Congress  realized  the  condition  of  the  army  ami  the  neces- 
sit)'  for  some  controlling  master  spirit  in  the  contluct  of  the  war,  antl 
supplemented  its  action  of  the  twelfth  of  December  by  a  mure  positive 
declaration  on  the  twenty-seventh,  clothing  Washington,  for  the  peri(nl 
of  six  months,  with  enlarged  authority,  of  which  the  following  extracts 
indicate  ihe  tenor.  "  l-'ull.  ample  and  cumplete  powers  to  raise  and 
collect  together,  in  the  most  speed)-  and  effectual  manner,  fiom  any 
and  all  of  the  I'nited  States,  sixteen  battalit^ns  of  infantry  in  addition 
to  those  alreaily  voted  by  Congress;  to  ap[)oint  officers  f(;r  the  said 
battalions:  t(j  raise  officers  and  equip  three  thousand  light  horse,  three 
regiments  of  artillerj-  and  a  corps  of  engineers,  and  to  establish  their 
pay  ; — to  .ippl\'  to  .in\- of  the  States  for  such  <iid  of  the  militia  as  he 
shall  juilge  necessary;  to  ft)rm  such  magazines  of  provisions  and  in 
such  i)laces  as  he  shall  tleem  pro[)er  :  to  displace  and  a[)[H)int  all  offi- 
cers under  the  rank  of  Hrig.idier-general,  and  to  fill  up  all  vacancies 
in  every  other  depiartment  of  the  American  army;  to  take,  wherever 
he  may  be,  whatever  he  may  want  lor  the  use  of  the  army,  if  the  in- 
habitants will  not  sell  it,  allowing  a  reasonable  pM-ice  for  the  same,  and 
to  arrest  and  confine  persons  who  refe  to  take  the  continental  cur- 
rency, or  are  otherwise  disaffected  to  the  Ameiic.m  cause." 

iliese  large  grants  of  power  were  made  when  '*  affiiirs  were  in  such 
a  conditio!;  that  the  very  existence  of  civil  liberty  depended,"  as  Con- 
gress stated,  "  on  the  right  execution  of  military  powers,"  and  when 
''  the  vigorous  decisive  coniluct  of  these  being  impossible  to  ilistant. 
numerous  and  deliberative  bodies,"  it  was  "  confident  of  the  wisdom, 
vigor,  and  uprightnc-^  of  General  Washington."  It  was  under  the 
burden  of  this  responsibility  that  Washington  rested  when  he  closed 
the  year  177O  in  camp  near  Trenton. 


1 
i 


1776.] 


MrSCELLANKOUS   EVKNTS.— OTIMONS   OF  TRKNTON. 


281 


lon- 
\\\cn 
l>uit, 
ioin, 
the 
Ijscd 


It  is  a  matter  of  interest  to  bear  in  mind  a  few  of  the  contempo- 
raneous criticisms  wliich  the  affair  at  Trenton  called  forth  from  Hritish 
and  Iun'o[)ean  authorities. 

"  All  our  hopes  were  blasted  by  the  unhappy  affair  at  Trenton,"  said 
Lord  'i'-rmaine.  "  It  lias  excited  not  less  astonishment  in  the  British 
and  auxiliary  (juarters  than  it  has  done  }oy  in  those  of  the  Americans. 
The  Hessians  will  be  no  UMii^er  terriijle,  ami  the  spirits  of  the  Ameri- 
cans will  rise  aniazin^d)',"  wrote  (jordon,  (juolint;'  from  the  Annual 
Rei;ister  of  Burke.  "  Thus  ended  a  campaii^n  t^dorious  to  the  fame 
of  Washini^ton,"  is  the  tribute  of  riu;,;hes.  Stedman  char|^es  all  the 
fault  upon  (jeneral  Howe  and  his  assiL,niment  of  firei^in  troops  to  the 
posts  on  the  Delaw.ire.  "  The  fact  is,"  wrote  Burke,  "  from  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  precedinii^  campaign,  and  the  vast  superiority  which  they 
perceived  in  themselves  in  army  actions,  the  '  Hessiai^.s'  had  held  the 
Americans  in  too  threat  contempt,  both  as  men  and  as  soldiers,  and 
were  too  a^  t  to  attribute  those  adwuUayes  to  some  extraordinary 
personal  virtue  ami  excellence,  which  were  in  reality  derived  from  the 
concurrence  of  a  number  of  other  and  very  different  causes;  from 
military  skill,  experience  and  discipline  ;  fr(jm  the  sui)erit)r  excellence 
of  their  small  arms,  artiller)-,  and  other  eUL^ines,  furniture  and  supplies 
necessary  for  war,  and  still  more  particularly  to  a  better  supply  and  a 
more  de.xtrous  and  effective  use  of  the  bayonet." 

W.dter  in  his  "  History  of  I-^ngland  on  Christian  Principles,"  says 
of  the  whole  campaiijn  :  "  The  same  want  of  eneri^y  which  prevented 
Sir  William  Howe  hom  makini,^  the  most  of  the  hour  of  success,  also 
preventetl  him  from  maintaining-  the  strict  discii)line  which  is  necessary 
to  kee[)  a  victorious  soldiery  from  insulting  and  injurinij  the  inhabitants 
of  a  country  which  they  regard  as  their  conque  c,  so  that  though  the 
prudent  care  and  i)ains  taken  by  Cicneral  Clinton  and  Lord  Percy 
hindered  the  people  oi'  Rhode  Island  from  having  any  occasion  to 
complain  of  the  contluct  oi'  the  troops  under  their  command,  all  the 
inhabitants  of  the  portion  of  Jersey  and  of  the  tlistricts  on  which  the 
forces  under  the  immediate  management  of  General  Howe  were  can- 
toned, soon  became  bitter  enemies  to  Lngland  from  exasperation  at 
the  injuries  inllicted  on  them,  not  only  by  tl:e  Hessians,  but  by  the 
British  soldiers  ;  and  that  the  Americans  were  inspirited  by  Trenton 
with  the  hope  that  courage  might  compensate  for  their  inferiority  in 
the  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war." 

Lord  Mahon,  in  his  History  of  Lngland,  says,  "  the  posts  that  were 
on  this  occasion  the  most  exposed  had  been  left  the  weakest  manned. 


" 


!<S3 


Misci:i.i,ANF.nrs  kvents.— ()riNio:;s  of  trknton. 


[1776. 


:i 


i 


1     I 


.111(1  undcfcii(Uci  by  a  single  inticiiclimciit  or  redoubt,"  and  adds, 
"  whoever  may  have  the  earliest  devised  this  scheme,  the  merit  of  its 
details  antl  oM-u-ution  beloiv^s  entirely  to  \\'ashin<^toii."  Kiii;_;lit  briefly 
notices  the  action,  addin;^,  "  W'a^hini^ton  went  back  to  secure  his 
prisoners,  and  a;4aiii  crossed  the  Delaware,  the  outposts  of  the  British 
beinc;  abandoned  without  a  struLjL^le  by  panic-stricken  fuijitives." 

A  Lontlon  writer  discourses  as  follows:  "  As  the  capture  of  the 
Hessians  and  the  manonivers  aujainst  the  British  tciok  place  after  the 
surjjrise  of  General  Lee,  we  find  that  Lee  is  not  the  only  efficient  man 
in  the  American  service.  We  find  also  that  the  mere  movin;^' throu<;h 
.1  province  is  not  subduing  it.  Perhaps  the  small  scale  of  our  maps 
deceives  us;  and  as  the  word  America  takes  up  no  more  room  than 
the  woril  YiM'ksl  ire,  we  seem  to  think  the  territory  they  represent 
much  of  the  same  bigness,  though  Charleston  is  as  far  from  Boston 
as  London  is  from  Venice.  It  is  a  bail  rule  to  think  tlie  fate  of 
America  is  to  be  decided  by  the  transient  possession  of  a  few  vili.iges 
and  hamlets.  Our  danger  increases  as  we  penetrate  the  country,  in 
proi)ortion  to  our  distance  from  our  fleet  and  our  dispensary." 

The  Abbe  Raynal,  writing  in  liis  curious  little  book,  "The  Revo- 
lution in  America,"  published  in  l/S'/,  chus  pliilosophizes.  "  The 
effect  of  strong  passions,  and  of  great  dangers,  is  often  to  astonish  the 
mind  and  to  throw  it  into  that  kind  of  torpor  that  deprives  it  of  the 
US"' of  its  powers ;  by  degrees  it  recovers  itself;  all  its  faculties,  sus- 
pended for  a  moment,  display  themselves  with  redoid^led  vigor  ;  every 
spring  of  action  is  awakened,  and  it  feels  its  powers  rise  at  once  to  a 
level  with  the  difficulty  it  has  to  encounter,  hi  a  great  multitude 
there  are  always  some  who  feel  this  immediate  effect,  which  rapidly 
communicates  itself  to  others.  .Such  a  revolution  took  place  among 
the  Confederates.     It  caused  armed  men  to  issue  from  all  quarters." 

Botta  writes  at  fever  lieat  of  that  entire  winter's  campaign. 
"  Thus  by  an  army  almost  reduced  to  extremity,  Philadelphia  was 
saved,  Pennsj-lvania  protected.  New  Jersey  nearly  recovered,  and  a 
victorious  .md  i)owerful  enemy  laid  under  the  necessity  of  quitting 
all  thoughts  of  .icting  offensively  in  ortler  to  defend  itself  Achieve- 
inents  so  astonishing  acc[uired  an  immense  glory  for  the  Captain  Gen- 
eral of  the  United  States.  All  nations  shared  in  the  surprise  of  the 
Americans.  All  eciually  admireti  and  a[)plauiled  the  prudence,  the 
constancy  and  the  noble  intrepidity  of  General  Washington.  An 
unanimous  voice  proclaimed  him  the  savior  of  his  country;  all  ex- 
tolled  him,  as  ecjual  to  the  most  celebr.ited  commanders  of  antiijuit)-. 


'•  I 


Iwas 
Id  a 

L'VC- 

In-n- 
thc 
the 
An 
ex- 
ility. 


I77(j.j 


MISCKI.I.ANKors    KVP:N"TS. — OF'INIONS   OK   TKK\  l()\. 


28j 


His  name  wa'^  in  tlic  mouth  of  all.  All  proclaimed  liini  the  TAniUS 
of  America.  He  was  celebrated  by  the  peii.'^  of  the  most  dislinj^uished 
writers.  The  most  illustrious  persoiiaLjes  of  Europe  l.ivished  upon 
him  their  praises  and  their  con^fratulations."  W'.ishington  thus 
answered  the  voice  of  Coni^ress.  "  Instead  of  thinking  myself  freed 
from  all  rii'il  obligations,  I  shall  constantly  bear  in  mind  that,  as  the 
sword  was  the  last  resort  for  the  prest-rvation  of  our  liberty,  so  it  ought 
to  be  the  first  thing  laid  aside  when  those  liberties  are  finally  estab- 
lished." "  I  shall  instantly  set  about  making  the  most  necessary  reforms 
in  the  army." 

It  was  a  source  of  inspiration  to  the  people,  an  assurance  of  the 
wisdom  of  their  chief  Captain,  and  an  earnest  appeal  to  the  courage 
and  endurance  of  the  army,  as  well  as  a  comfort  to  Washington  him- 
self, that  his  first  offensive  movement  had  been  favored  with  success  : 
but  at  midnight  of  the  thirty-first  of  December,  1 776,  he  realized  the 
solemnity  of  the  hour,  when  in  the  face  of  this  single  brilliant  fact, 
the  peril  of  his  army  and  of  the  cause  which  commanded  his  "  life 
devotion,"  were  again  extreme  and  oppressive. 


II 


CHAPTER  XLI. 

FROM  PRINCETON   TO   MORRISTOWN.    THE  ASSANPINK  AND 

PRINCETON.     1777. 


ON  the  first  day  of  January,  1 777,  tl'.L-  American  General  in  chief 
was  at  Trenton,  New  Jersey  The  Assanpink  or  Trenton  river 
is  a  small  stream  just  east  of  the  town.  At  that  time  the  banks  were 
abrupt,  aiul  the  adjoining;  hill  was  generally  thickly  wcjoded,  hut  with 
occasional  clearings  and  cultivated  tracts  toward  Bordentow..  The 
stream  itself,  quite  inconsiderable  in  the  summer  months,  was  mucii 
swollen  after  rains  or  melting  snow,  and  a  bridge  was  necessary  a  little 
above  the  point  where  it  emptied  into  the  Delaware  river.  The  road 
to  Bordentown  crossed  this  bridge. 

Washington  received  advices  that  Lord  Cornwallis,  who  had  been 
on  the  eve  of  sailing  for  England,  had  resumed  the  command  of  a 
division  and  was  on  his  route  from  Brunswick,  to  attack  him  at  Tren- 
ton. Instead  of  falling  back  and  uniting  the  forces  then  at  Borden- 
town and  Crosswicks  for  a  march  down  the  Delaware  toward  I'hila- 
delphia,  he  ordered  the  troops  then  uniler  the  command  of  Generals 
Mifflin  and  Cadwallader,  the  latter  just  promoted,  to  join  him.  Du- 
ring the  night  of  the  first  and  the  following  morning  these  troops,  three 
thousand  six  hundred  in  number,  arrived  at  Trenton,  thereby  swelling 
the  nominal  force  of  Washington's  army  to  five  thousand  men. 

The  main  body  of  this  army  was  established  along  the  east  bank 
of  the  Assanpink  for  a  space  of  two  miles,  in  successive  lines,  so  as  to 
give  all  the  concentration  of  resistance  which  their  numbers  and  posi- 
tion would  warrant.  Guards  were  established  at  all  points  which 
offered  facility  for  fording,  and  several  pieces  of  artillery  were  planted 
at  the  bridge  and  supported  by  some  of  the  steadiest  of  the  continen- 
tal troops. 

An  advance  guard  from  General  De  Fermoy's  brigade,  was  with 
two  pieces  of  artillery  established  on  rising  ground  well  flanked  by 


1777-1 


I'KOM    rUINCF.TOX   TO    MORRISTOWN. 


285 


tink 

Y  to 

losi- 

liich 

ted 

len- 

/ith 
by 


woods,  .1  little  more  tli.ui  .1  mile  in  advance  of  Trenton.  Colonel 
Hand's  litlcmen  were  pushed  torw.inl  as  far  as  "  I'ive  Mile  creek," 
and  a  small  siipportiiii;  party  occiipii:d  (juite  a  defensible  position  at 
Shebakonk  creek,  where  heavy  timber  .md  uneven  ^tjround  afforded  a 
sjood  position  for  irregular  troops. 

The  weather  had  relaxed  its  severity,  as  is  usual  in  America  at  the 
mid-winter  season,  and  the  frozen  roaiis  had  been  partially  thawed, 
so  that  the  movement  of  troops  havinij  artillery  and  'baiji^ay^e  wat^ons 
WIS  necessaril)-sl()w.  The  Delaware  was  tilled  with  tV.'atinj^  ice,  iarj^e 
masses  were  banked  up  in  its  curves,  ,ind  retr.'at  In  tlu;  west  bank 
was  impracticable  in  the  face  of  an  advancing  enemv.  It  was  also 
argued  by  Washington  that  all  tiiat  had  been  gained  in  the  way  of 
moral  sujjport  to  the  people  of  New  Jersey  would  be  sacrificed  by  an 
attempt  to  withdraw  to  the  southward.  It  was  not  inileed  impossible 
that  the  British  troops  would  ultimately  cross  the  river  and  move 
upon  Philadelphia,  whatever  course  he  might  adopt,  and  he  resolved 
to  do  his  best  to  save  the  army,  and  leave  that  city  to  the  contin- 
gencies of  the  campaign. 

General  Cornw allis  left  Hrunswick  with  the  reserve,  which  was  a 
part  of  his  old  command,  the  Waldeckers,  Colonel  Donop's  Hessians, 
and  the  former  garrisons  of  the  adjacent  posts,  two  regiments  of 
Highlanders,  and  Kohler's  heavy  artillery,  making  a  total  strength  of 
a  little  over  seven  thousand  men.  Cornwallis  led  the  advance  in  [)ei- 
son,  followed  by  the  main  arm\%  leaving,  however,  thre-:  companies 
of  light  dr.igoons,  and  the  .Seventeenth,  l''ortieth,  and  Fifty-fifth  regi- 
ments of  foot  at  Princeton  ;  and  General  Leslie  with  a  small  brigade 
as  rear  guard,  was  still  at  Maideidiead  when  the  leading  battalions 
entered  Trenton.  The  advance  was  met  shortly  after  it  left  Maiden- 
head by  Colonel  Hand's  riflemen,  who  kept  up  a  lively  skirmish  fire 
as  they  .slowly  fell  back,  and  at  Shebakonk  this  resistance  was  suffi- 
ciently spirited  to  require  Cornwallis  to  push  another  regiment  with 
artillery  to  the  front.  Upon  coming  up  to  the  position  where  the 
guns  had  been  placed,  an  additional  delay  was  interi)oscd  to  his 
advance  by  General  Greene.  He  promptly  opened  fire  for  the  express 
purpose  of  keeping  the  enemy  from  reaching  Trenton  in  time  to  make 
an  attack  before  night. 

Washington  visited  the  detachment  when  Greene  took  command 
and  then  returned  to  the  bridge,  to  be  prepared  to  cover  the  troops 
as  they  retired  to  the  lines  closely  pressed  by  the  British  column.  It 
was  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  nearly  sunset  in  America  in 


I  :li 


286 


IKiiM    I'klNCKlON    TO   MOKKISTOWN. 


nn 


H 


the  fatitudc  ol  Trenton,  but  Cornwallis  at  once  threw  skinnishiiiy 
dclacliincnts  aluiii;  the  river  to  feel  tlie  rirdsaiul  i)racticable  crossiiv^.s, 
.iiul  opened  fire  witii  artillery,  near  the  brid;4e  and  above  the  town. 
At  all  points  he  found  wootled  ascents,  aii  .ictivc  adver.sar)-,  and  the 
lieteriniiiatinn  to  yivc  battle  if  lie  should  .ittenipt  tu  force  .i  crossiiv^. 

lie  sent  a  stron;^  column  down  (Juceii  street,  and  made  three 
separate  efforts  to  hjrce  the  bridye-passage,  but  the  fire  was  so  con- 
stant and  (.lirect  that  further  attempt  was  abandoned. 

The  Ihilish  army  hail  made  a  tryinj^  march,  and  orders  were  ient 
to  Princeton  to  forwanl  the  iJLjht  drai^oons  as  well  as  tlie  Seventeentli 
and  l-"ift)-fiflh  rei;iments,  .md  General  Leslie  wa-;  orilered  up  from 
Maidenliead  to  be  prepared  for  monuiiLT  work.  The  armies  were 
separated  less  than  ,i  mile,  and  the  picket  i^Hi.u^is  were  within  li.ul. 
from  sitle  to  side.  L'nder  e.xistin^^  circumstances  Cornwallis  wisely 
declined  a  ni;^ht  attack;  but  his  recoiinoissance  should  have  beon  so 
complete  that  he  could  have  made  an  attack  when  the  American  army 
commenced  its  movement.  lie  sh.ndd  have  antici[)atetl  the  jiossi- 
bility  of  an  .iltack  u[)on  his  own  communications  and  base.  The  can- 
nonading was  kept  up  until  dark,  the  camp  fires  were  lighted  on  both 
sides  of  the  Assanpink,  and  the  armies  awaited  the  issuer  of  another 
day. 

During  the  afternoon  the  hazy  weather  gave  way  to  a  clear  sky, 
and  after  sunset  the  night  became  cold,  freezing  the  ground  h.ird,  an<l 
making  travel  more  easy,  Washington  had  matured  a  plan  of  escipe 
iVoni  his  hazardous  positii^n,  whereby  he  n~iight  avoid  a  battle  with 
superior  and  well  drilled  troops,  without  the  loss  of  prestige  and  the 
inevitable  disastei  which  would  follow  a  retreat  from  his  adversary,  so 
soon  after  the  success  at  Trenton.  Me  was  now  satisfied  that  the 
army  of  Cornwallis  had  gathered  up  its  principal  columns  for  the  pro- 
posed attack.  lie  had  learned  from  reconnoissanccs  ordered  during 
the  latter  part  of  December,  both  the  character  of  the  roads  and  the 
most  expeditious  routes  to  Ikunswick.  He  also  sent  a  small  party  to 
learn  whether  the  British  troops  had  any  detachments  on  the  old 
Quaker  road,  to  the  east  of  the  Assanpink,  and  was  assured  that  the 
path  was  clear.  Colonel  Donop  afterwards  stated  that  he  advised 
Cornwallis  to  send  a  division  by  the  old  road  east  of  the  creek,  which 
would  have  accomplished,  as  against  Washington,  the  very  movement 
which  Ewing  attempted  before  the  attack  upon  Trenton ;  but  his 
advice  was  not  followed. 

Washington  also  assumed  from  reports  of  the  original  force  at 


m 


V 

It 

1^ 


«777l 


FROM    I'lUNiIMOV     li*    MoKKISlOWN. 


•S; 


Hiunswirk  th.it  its  ^rcat  iiiaj:j.izities  of  stores  aiiil  supplies  must  have 
been  left  imder  small  i^uard,  and  believed  that  by  a  (|iiicl<  dash  he 
mij^ht  ca[)ture  or  destroy  them,  it  was  a  bold  strati'L,MC  movement, 
and  .1  fit  companioii-enterprisi'  to  his  fnst  n  turn  of  the  offensive  at 
Trenioii.  A  eouuLil  of  w.ir  w.is  i:i)nvene<l  tor  the  consider.ition  of  the 
niownu-nt.  It  was  promj)tl\'  endorsed  by  tlu-  officers  consulted,  .ind 
was  speedilv  c.irrietl  into  effect.  \o  time  u.is  lost.  The  baLr'ia''e 
wagons  which  had  been  posted  in  the  re.ir  on  the  liortlentown  road, 
were  st.irteil  for  HiirliiiL^ton  under  a  sm.ill  Ljiianl  as  soon  as  it  was 
dark.  The  fires  were  plied  with  dry  rails  from  fences  and  fallen  trees, 
and  short !)■  afti'r  one  o'clock  the  army  w.is  in  molicm  with  .ill  the  lij^iit 
artillery  th.it  could  bi>  taken  .iIoulj.  I'he  we.ither  h.id  been  so  mild 
for  .1  few  d.i\\s  th.it  in, my  of  the  bl.mkets  had  been  |),icked  in  the  b.i;>;- 
^a^e  w.ij^ons,  when  the  army  first  moved  across  the  Ass.mpink,  and 
the  nii^dit  was  si  .''ficientl)' cold  to  c.uise  much  sufferiiii^;  but  the  letters 
of  officers  written  after  arrival  at  Morristown,  show  that  the  m.irch 
was  silent,  orderly.  ;iiul  almost  entirely  without  lialts.  I'he  route 
W.IS  m.ule  somewhat  loiv^er  by  followin;,;  a  new  trail  where  the  stumps 
had  not  been  removed,  until  the  old  Qu.iker  road  w.is  re.iched,  when 
tlie  adv.mce  w.is  m.ide  with  much  more  celerity  and  compactness  of 
movement. 

The  picket  [guards  who  were  left  on  post,  had  been  furnished  with 
ample  sup[)lies  of  fuel  for  the  niL;ht,  and  they  ke[)t  up  their  re<Tular 
round  of  ch.illenf^e,  replenished  their  fires,  and  did  not  decamp  and 
follow  the  ;irm_\'  until  nearly  morning.  A  small  working  party  was 
also  engaged  in  throwing  up  light  field-works  bef)re  the  briilge,  and 
at  one  point  up  the  stre.im,  to  give  greater  assurance  of  w.itchfulness 
anil  pre[)aration  for  an  att.ick. 

Just  before  le.uing  camp,  Washington  sent  a  messenger  to  Gen- 
eral Putnam,  .advising  him  of  hi.i  movements,  and  instructing  him  to 
send  up  troops  to  occupy  Crosswicks,  and  he  .ilso  thereby  secured  the 
.sal'etv  of  his  baggage  tr.iin  which  had  started  down  the  ri\er. 

The  vanguanl  of  the  Americ.m  .irmy  re.iched  Stonv  lirook  about 
sunrise.  Washington  there  re-formed  his  columns,  sending  General 
Mercer  to  the  left,  bj*  the  Ou.iker  road,  and  intended  to  advance  tli- 
rectly  to  the  village  itself,  by  a  lower  road,  under  cover  of  rising  ground, 
and  thus  expedite  his  proposed  movement  upon  Brunswick.  Gen- 
eral Mercer,  u[)on  wheeling  out  of  column,  passed  a  thick  woods  and 
orchard  near  the  Friends'  meeting  house,  and  moved  up  the  creek  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying  the  bridges  and  thus  delaying  pursuit  from 


\  !i 


M  '      1 


1 


288 


1  ROM    I'KIN-CKTON    T(l    MOKKISTOWN. 


I'777. 


, 


■"'    I 


rrciitDii,  as  w xU  as  lo  cut  ulT  fiij^itivcs  from  Princeton.  I  lis  force  was 
coniposcil  of  tlic  remnants  of  Haslet's  and  Smallwood's  re},'iments. 
the  First  Virginia  .md  .1  feu  volunteers,  making  a  total  however  o 
hrss  than  four  hundred  men.  lie  was  rapidly  approaching  the  Trenton 
road,  when  lie  found  his  command  sudilenly  confronted  by  the  seven- 
teenth Hritish  foot,  which  was  rapi<lly  crowding  for  a  commanding 
position  diri'cM)'  to  his  right  toward  Princeton.  This  regiment  had 
received  the  order  of  Curnuallis  to  join  him,  had  already  crossed  the 
Stony  creek  bridge  by  the  (jld  road,  and  h.id  reached  the  sumnut  of 
Millctt's  Hill  wlu'n  Coltiiul  M.iwIkioiI  first  noticeil  the  small  com- 
mand of  Mercer  as  they  passed  in  front  of  the  orchard  near  the  house 
of  William  I'lark. 

Ihe  American  .irni)-  however  was  not  in  sight  and  the  column  of 
Mercer  tlid  not  largely  exceed  Mawhood's  own  force.  Without  any 
hesit.ition  he  recrossed  Stony  Mrook  and  found  hiniself  within  five 
hundred  y.irds  of  their  .i<l\',mce  gu.utl.  (icneral  Mercer  moved  north- 
ward toward  the  same  elevated  gr<Miiid  which  Mawhootl  recognized 
as  commanding  thesituatie)n,  and  h.iving  reacheil  it  Inst,  then  ,ulvanced 
to  the  cover  of  a  zigzag  rail  fence  which  crossed  the  hill,  and  delivered 
fire.  The  liritish  returned  but  one  volley,  and  instantly  maile  a 
steaily,  imi)etuous  charge  with  the  bayonet.  The  onset  was  too  solid 
and  the  defense  too  nominal  for  .Mercer's  command  to  v.  ithstand  the 
attack.  Tliey  fell  back  in  confusion  and  took  refuge  in  Clark's  orchard 
and  other  high  ground  near  the  Friends'  meeting  house.  As  soon  as 
the  firing  began,  \\'a.shington  pushed  additional  troops  to  the  summit 
on  the  left  of  his  advancing  column,  and  this  force,  although  furnished 
with  two  guns,  was  also  assailed  by  Mawhood's  with  such  vigor  that 
several  companies  gave  way,  and  it  api)eared  as  if  they  were  to  follow 
the  fate  of  the  troops  first  engaged. 

Captain  .\eil  of  the  artillery  had  already  fallen,  and  the  British 
attack  was  directed  to  the  capture  of  Captain  Moulder's  guns,  which 
from  their  position  were  beginning  to  tell  upon  their  c  'lumn  with 
effect.  Washington,  as  previously  at  Kipp's  bay,  spurred  his  horse 
through  the  scattering  militia  to  the  front,  and  maintained  his  place 
for  a  few  minutes  in  a  position  of  extreme  personal  danger,  directly 
in  the  line  of  fire  of  the  opposing  troops.  The  men,  in.spired  by  his 
example,  rallied  promptly  to  his  support. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Hritish  troops  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill 
in  the  pursuit  of  Mercer's  flying  column  before  it  came  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  Colonel  Mawhood  that  he  was  entering  the  lists  against  the 


1777] 


FKOM    I'KINCKrON   TO   MORRISTOWN'. 


5S9 


entire  American  nrin>-.  Its  extended  C'lumn  \vr  ■;  tlu-n  in  full  view 
moving  toward  tlie  town  where  the  I''ortieth  and  I'ifty-fifth  were  sta- 
tioned. The  latter  regiment  had  been  in  readiness  to  march  for  Tren- 
ton when  the  action  began,  and  make  an  effort  to  support  the  Seven, 
teenlh  ;  but  Colonel  Hand  had  wiieeled  (5ut  of  tiie  main  column  ami 
taken  liis  position  with  the  troops  which  Washington  had  fir -it  sent 
to  the  support  of  Mercer,  .md  Colonel  Hitchcock  with  equ.d  p.  '">pt- 
ness  turned  the  left  of  Mawhootl  and  cut  hiin  off  from  Princeton  as 
well  as  from  assistance.  Generals  Stirling  and  St.  Clair,  and  Colonels 
I'o  a-,  Patterson  and  Reed  were  also  advancing  upon  the  Fift_\-fiftli, 
and  the  only  avenue  of  retreat  was  toward  Trenton.  Abandoning 
his  cannon,  the  IJritish  command(;r,  already  receiving  the  fire  of  more 
than  four  times  his  own  force,  threw  his  men  across  Stony  Creek 
at  all  practicable  places,  mostly  by  the  bridge,  and  took  refuge  at 
Maidenhead,  where  General  Leslie's  column  still  halted.  The  l'"ifty- 
fiftli,  closcl)'  pressed  by  weight  of  numbers,  and  these  constantly 
augmented,  took  a  position  on  the  high  slo[)ing  ground  immediately 
south  of  Nassai'  Hall,  Princeton  College,  where  a  ravine  separated 
them  from  the  Americans,  and  where  a  small  force  could  make  a  suc- 
cessful resistance  to  a  much  larger  force  of  infantrj-.  l'\\v.  American 
artillery  was  promptly  brought  to  bear  upon  their  ranks.  Several 
regiments  passed  clear  of  the  hill  and  gained  the  main  street  in  front 
of  the  college.  The  doors  of  the  building  were  soon  forced  and  that 
regiment  with  the  Fortieth  attempted  to  escape  to  New  Bruns- 
wick, one  by  the  Kingston  and  the  other  by  the  Rocky  Pliil  route. 

The  entire  action  consumed  less  time  than  its  recital.  The  Brit- 
ish loss  was  heavy,  exceeding  one  hundred  men  in  killed  and  wounded, 
while  two  hundred  and  thirty  were  taken  prisoners,  including  four- 
teen officers.  Captain  William  Leslie,  son  of  the  Earl  of  Levin, 
was  among  the  killed,  and  was  buried  with  cvei)  becoming  token 
of  respect. 

The  American  loss  in  rank  and  file  was  greatly  less  than  the  Brit- 
ish, but  the  efforts  of  the  officers  to  check  them  at  the  crisis  of  the 
panic  cost  valuable  lives.  General  Mercer,  who  had  already  gained 
much  credit  as  an  officer,  and  served  with  Washington  in  the  old 
Indian  war  of  1756-1766,  was  mortally  wounded  while  endeavoring 
to  rally  his  men  near  Clark's  house,  and  Colonels  Haslet  and  Potter,* 
Major  Morris,  and  Captains  Fleming,  Shippen,  and  Neil  were  among 
the  killed.  General  Mercer,  a  native  of  Scotland,  was  an  assistant  sur- 
geon at  the  battle  ot  Culloden,  a  physician  of  high  attainment  at  Fred- 

19  *  See  note  on  jiage  293. 


f 


.'n 


IM 


f  I 


C(J0 


FROM    rKIXCLTON    TO    MORRISH  )\VX. 


1 1 777- 


ericksbuTL;,  Virginia,  when  tlic  American  war  called  him  to  arms,  and 
he  \v  IS  held  in  high  estimation  by  all  who  knew  him,  as  an  officer  of 
great  judgment  and  promise. 

A  detachment  was  immedi.itely  sent  to  destroy  the  bridge  over 
Stony  Creek,  and  the  arm)'  advanced  to  Kingston,  only  about  three 
miles  be)-ond  l^inceton,  on  the  other  side  of  Millstone  river. 

Uijon  reachir.g  that  town,  Washington  hastily  consulted  his  gen- 
er.U  officers  as  to  further  mo\-ements.  General  Greene  had  started 
his  column  up  the  AlilKtone,  on  the  supposition  that  it  was  of  first 
importance  to  reach  some  strong  i)t)sition  where  a  decided  resistance 
could  be  offered  to  pursuit.  The  men  were  cold,  hungry,  and  nearly 
worn  out.  The  greater  part  (;f  the  command  had  been  on  constant 
duty  from  the  time  they  left  Jk)rdentown  and  Crosswicks.  Many 
were  barefooted,  and  no  time  had  been  allowed  for  the  distribution 
of  rations  since  breaking  camp  opposite  Trenton.  Before  the  main 
column  had  crossed  the  Millstone,  the  sound  of  renewed  firing  at 
Princeton  gave  warning  that  the  troops  at  Maidenheatl  were  already 
in  pursuit.  The  possibility  of  striking  the  stores  at  Hrunswick  de- 
pended therefore  upon  being  able  to  do  it  with  no  delay  of  resistance, 
as  a  defense,  however  brief,  would  compel  a  general  action  with  the 
approaching  British  army.  The  latter  had  "  mounted  troops,"  while 
the  Americans  were  practically  without  any.  The  fugitive  detach- 
ments of  the  Fortieth  and  Fifty-fifth  would  certainly  put  the  Brunswick 
garrison  on  the  alert. 

Farther  pursuit  of  these  troops  was  therefore  abandoned,  and  the 
army  moved  directly  and  promptly  from  Kingston,  up  the  east  bank 
of  the  Millstone,  and  the  next  day  secured  a  strong  position  at 
I'luckemin,  when  the  troops  obtained  refreshment  and  partial  rest. 

While  these  events  transpired,  Cornwallis  had  realized  the  con- 
sequences of  under-estimating  the  mental  resources  and  executive 
ability  of  his  adversary.  The  American  lines  had  been  tleserted  while 
he  was  resting  for  a  triumph.  The  camp  fires  still  burned  as  day 
dawned,  but  there  were  no  pickets  on  post,  and  the  bridge  head  was 
uithout  defenders.  The  opinion  expressed  by  Sir  William  Erskine 
the  night  before,  which  is  well  accredited,  that  Washington  would  not 
abide  attack  but  withdraw  his  forces,  was  confirmed,  and  the  report  of 
artillery  in  the  direction  of  Princeton  and  Brunswick,  showed  that 
while  Cornwallis  was  indeed  on  the  Delaware,  his  adversary  was  be- 
tween him  and  his  base,  and  his  very  depot  of  supplies  was  in  peril. 
The  light  dragoons  were  hurried  to  the   rear,  and  the  whole  army 


III 


Mi 


1777-1 


IkOM    rklNCETON   TO   MORRISTOWN. 


291 


/as 
ne 
lot 
of 
lat 

)C- 

ril. 
ny 


followed  with  all  possible  expedition.  The  distance  was  but  ten 
miles,  while  WashiiiLjton  h. id  inarched  very  nearly  sixteen:  and  the 
lirilish  vanguard  approached  the  Stony  Creek  bridge  as  the  American 
rear  guard  was  coinpleting  its  destruction.  There  was  nearly  an  hour's 
del.iy  at  this  ])oint  before  artiller\-  could  be  placed  across  the  creek; 
but  some  of  the  regiments  were  forced  over,  regardless  of  ice  and 
v.. iter,  to  ([uicken  pursuit.  There  was  ;i  1  li;  ional  dela\' at  Kingston, 
as  the  bridge  over  the  Millstone  had  also  been  destroyed,  and  the 
Hritish  arm\'  apparently  unconscious,  or  neglecting  to  examine  the 
trail  of  the  Americans'  retreat,  precipitately  hastened  to  Brunswick, 
where  they  found  the  public  stores  were  in  safety,  but  the  army  of 
Washington  was  nut  there  aw.iiting  capture. 

Cornwallis  also  found  upon  his  arrival  at  Brunswick  late  on  the 
same  night,  that  the  retreating  troops  IkkI  aroused  gre.it  terror  in  the 
small  garriso.i,  and  (ieneral  Matthew.s  hail  already  commanded  the 
removal  of  baggage  and  warlike  stores.  .Seventy  thousand  ilollars  in 
gold  was  at  the  post  ft)r  payment  of  the  troo[)s,  and  this  money  was 
promptl)'  returned  to  New  York. 

The  conoition  of  the  American  army  during  a  rest  of  two 
days  at  I'iuckemin  w.is  one  of  great  suffering,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  a  defense  could  have  been  maintanied  if  Cornwallis 
had  immediately  made  an  attack.  On  the  fifth.  Washington  found 
time  to  send  a  report  to  Congress,  and  to  make  up  dispatches  to 
I'utnam  ami  Meath.  He  instructs  the  former  to  send  on  the  army 
baggage,  to  march  to  Crosswicks,  to  "give  out  your  strength  to  be 
twice  as  great  as  it  is,  to  keep  out  spies,  to  put  horsemen  in  the  dress 
c>f  the  country,  and  keep  them  going  backwards  and  forwards  fov  that 
purpose,  and  to  act  with  gre.it  circums[)ection,  so  .is  to  not  meet  with 
,1  surprise." 

Me  ordered  (ieneral  Heath  to  collect  bo.its  for  the  contingency  of 
the  det.iil  of  part  of  his  force  into  New  Jersey,  and  i  istructeil  him  that 
it  h.ul  beei.  determined  in  council  that  he  should  move  ck)wn  toward 
.\ew  York  with  a  considerable  force,  as  if  with  a  design  upon  that 
city. 

On  the  se\  L'lith  the  American  army  reached  Morristown,  where 
log  huts  were  erected  and  winter  quarters  were  established.  His  own 
headquarters  during  that  winter  were  at  the  old  Freem.in  I'.ivern,  on 
the  north  .side  of  the  public  square.  On  the  seventh  additional  orders 
were  sent  to  General  Heath,  to  Gen  mmI  Lincoln,  who  had  arrived  at 
Peekskill   with    four    thousand    New  England    militia,   and  to  other 


I,  I 


"f 


It 


r 


I: 


if«?>H- 


292 


FROM  rkiNcirroN  ro  morristown. 


L1777 


officers,  nortli  and  south,  in  anticipation  of  ulterior  movcnicnts.  A 
sin_i;le  letter  to  Cjeneral  Heath,  wliich  was  subse([uently  written,  after 
luarin;,;  that  the  latter  officer  liad  ileniaiuletl  the  surrender  of  l'"ort 
Iiuiependence  in  \ery  strong;-  ian;^aiai;e,  and  followed  up  his  demand 
by  withdrawing  his  force,  will  illustrate  the  ilirectness  with  which 
W.ishiiv^ton  beL;an  to  dc.U  with  injudicious  subordinates. 

(leneral  I  leath  was  before  l'"ort  Independence  on  the  cij:;htccnth  of 
J.inu.iry,  1777.  (ieneral  Lincnlu  .uKanced  by  the  Ilutlson  river  road, 
(ieneral  Scott  b\-  White  Pl.iins,  and  Generals  Wooster  and  Parsons 
from  New  Riichelle  and  Mast  Chester.  .\  few  prisoners  were  taken  at 
Valentine's  llill,  and  the  ;4arri.-,t)n  of  nearly  two  thousand  Hessians 
w  ere  allowed  "  twent\-  minutes  in  which  to  surrender  or  abide  the 
consequences."  .\fter  ne.uiy  ten  days  of  dela)' about  Kinj^'s  Ihidye, 
with  his  half  organi/ied  militia  foic-e,  without  barracks  and  under  cir- 
cumstances of  peculi.i  ..posure,  a  sally  from  the  L;arrison  created  a 
p.inic  in  one  reijiment  at  an  atlvance  post,  and  the  entire  army  soon 
withdrew. 

.\s  a  demonstration  towartl  New  York  it  undoubtedly  had  a  great 
effect  ui)oii  (teneral  Iliiwe's  movements,  and  the  plan  itself  was  well 
concei\ed,  well  initiated.  The  di\isionsarrivetl  at  Kini^'s  HridL:;e  with 
remarkable  concert  of  time;  but  there  they  stopped,  and  the  chief 
<ibjective  was  no*^^  realized. 

Washington  thus  wrote,  on  the  third  of  February  :  "  This  letter  is 
adtlitional  to  my  public  one  of  this  date.  It  is  to  hint  to  )-ou,  and  1 
do  it  w  ith  concern,  that  your  conduct  is  censured  (ami  b\-  men  of  sense 
and  judgment  who  have  been  with  you  on  the  expedition  to  Fort 
Inde[)entlence)  as  being  fraught  with  too  much  caution:  by  wiiich  the 
army  has  been  disappointed  and  in  some  ilegree  disgraced.  Your 
summons,  as  j-ou  did  not  attempt  to  fulfill  your  threats,  was  not  only 
idle  but  f.ircical,  and  will  not  fail  of  turiiing  the  laugh  e.xceedingly 
upon   us." 

During  the  winter  and  spring,  skirmishes  were  frequent,  and  often 
with  marked  benefit  to  the  .American  troops.  Washington  issued  a 
counter  i)roclamation  to  that  which  General  Howe  luul  proinulged 
during  the  original  retreat  through  New  Jersey,  and  all  offensive 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  Hritish  forces  were  suspended. 

Mr.  Hotta  thus  justly  sums  u[)  the  relations  of  the  contending  armies. 
"  Washington  having  received  a  few  fresh  battalion.s,  and  his  little 
army  having  recovered  from  their  fatigues,  soon  entereil  the  field  anew 
and  scoured  the  whole  country  as  far  as  the  Raritan.      He  even  crossed 


mi 


1777-1 


l'K(3M    l-KIXCKTON    TO    MORRIS  lOWX. 


293 


this  river  and  penetrated  into  the  county  of  Eiisex.  made  liiniself 
master  of  Newark,  of  I'^lizabethtown,  anil  finally  (jf  Woodbridye  ;  so 
that  he  commanded  tlie  entire  coast  of  New  Jersey  in  front  of  Staten 
Island.  1  le  so  judiciously  selected  his  positions  and  f(jrtified  them 
so  formidably,  that  the  royalists  shrunk  from  all  attempts  to  disIodt;e 
liim  from  any  of  them.  Thus  the  Hriti.-ih  arni}',  after  liavini;  overrun 
victoriously  the  whole  of  New  Jersey  quite  to  the  Delaware,  and  caused 
even  the  city  of  Philadelphia  to  tremble  for  its  safety,  found  itself  now 
restricted  to  the  two  only  posts  of  Brunswick  and  Airiboy,  which  more- 
over coukl  have  no  communication  with  New  York  except  by  sea. 
Thus,  by  an  armv  almost  reduced  to  extremity,  Philadelphia  was 
saved,  Peiuisylv.mia  protected,  New  Jersey  nearly  recovered,  and  a 
victorious  and  powerful  army  laid  under  the  necessity  of  quitting  all 
thoughts  of  acting  offensively,  in  order  to  defend  itself," 


NiiTK  111  p.  289,  C'liI,  .l.imc-;  I'nttrr,  mi-siiij,',  and  ri'pnrti-d  hy  ("icn.  Washiiijrtdti  .is  killed, 
afterward-,  became  Hri);adit'r-gencral  of  I'euns)  Ivaiiia  .Militia,  as  reported  by  .Vdjutaiil-j^eneral 
Slryker  of  New  Jersey. 


Ill: 


CIl.APriCR    XLll. 


Ml.NDK    K\1;N1S,   JAMAKV    1()  jrLY.   1777. 


T 


111",  oprratiotis  of  t)ic  year  1777,  compri-^cd  a  second  invasion  ot 
New  Jersey,  for  the  purpose  nf  tirauiiiij;^  tiie  American  army  into 


I  tlecisive  battle,  a  scries   of  operations  \\\  executi m 


f 


.f   t 


le   ori'^n 


lal 


nil 


ri)iise  of   the    Ihiti-^li    caljinet   to  L,rain   control   of   f-ake'   Cluimplaii 


md  tin 


11 


U(l 


1)11  river,  and  the  u, 


cunation  of  I'hiladilnhia. 


Spirit 


eil 


.kirniisliuv' 


brief 


incLirsi'His,  ,ini 


OIIU 


bnlli 


int   feat  ;  of 


minor   aihen 


tine   ch.iracterized    botii   armii 


i)Ut    .ill  1) 


attl 


es  proper 


are  referable  to  ^n  •  of  the  three  systems  of  eiuleavor  above  indicate 
A  brief  outline  of  miitoi-  lacts  will  '.jive  clearness  to  the  subsec[uer 
battle  detail-. 


f  Washiii'^ton   reinaiiii 


it  M'>rristown  until 


Ihitish  troops  were 


'I  he    headipiaiteM-s    o 
tin-  t\\  ent_\'-fourth  of  May. 

( )i;  the  twent}'  lu'st  of  Januar\'  two  thousand 
withdrawn  from  I\iiodc  l-l.md  to  reinfo.'ce  (jeiieral  llowe  at  New 
\'ork.  (leiierals  S[)e!ici'r  and  .\rnold,  then  in  command  of  about  four 
thousand  .\merican  troops  at  I'roviiK-nce.  were  instrncte<l  to  prepare  a 
1)1.111  f  )r  the  capture  of  Newport  :  i)ut  they  filled  to  secure  .idequ.ite  mil- 
iti.i  sup])ort,  .md  it  w.is  .ibandrmed.     (leneral  I'.irsons,  then  on  recruit- 


iiiLT  service  in  t'onnecticut,  w.is  .ulvis 


t)V 


scent  upou 


.oU' 


I- 


iiKl  ilurni'j  l'el)ruar\ 


W 
Init 


i>liin,rto!i  to  make  a  ih;- 


was  unabk-  to  r.iise 


thv 


necessary  force  until  the>'  were  needed  for  f.jener.11  defense.     Diiriiv^  the 
same  month  ("leiu  r.ii  Kno.\   w.is  disp, itched  to  Massachusetts  to  enlist 

1  during  this  tril)  advised  the  selection  of 


•r\'.  .im 


a  battalion  of  .irtil 
Sprinirficld,  M.issachusetts,  as  tiie  best  place  in  New  I'LnL;land,  f  )r  the 
ostabUshmeiit  of  a  labor.itory  .md  cmnon  fmndry.  (reiieral  Schuyler 
was  instructed  to  dr.iw  from  the  AV:i'  /:i/i^/<t//i/  S/cr/is  the  entire  force 
required  to  resist  the  .iiUicipated  advance  of  C.irleton  from  Canada ; 
because  "  troops  of  extreme  sections  could  not  be  f;\vor.ibly  combined." 
(jener.il  M.ixwell  was  stationed  at  Elizabethtown  to  w. itch  tories  and 


I777-] 


MINOR    KVr.NTS,   JANUARY    TO   JII.V, 


^95 


■M, 


:r 


tlic  movements  of  tlic  Hritish.  Tlic  exchange  of  General  Lee  and  his 
st.itus,  wliether  to  l)e  re|jardc(l  as  a  prisoner  of  war, or  Hritish  deserter, 
was  discussed.  Orders  were  issuetl  repressing  the  phmdering  done 
by  the  American  mihtia;  a  p-rotest  was  sent  to  General  Howe  itgainst 
similar  outrages  pcrpetrateil  by  Hessian  and  l^ritish  troops,  and  the 
usual  difficulties  of  recruiting,  equipping,  and  sustaming  the  American 
army  were  experienced. 

During  the  mnnth  of  March  a  ship  arrived  at  Portsmouth,  New 
Hampshire,  from  l'"rancc,  with  twelve  tliousand  fusees,  one  thousand 
barrels  of  powder,  bl.i.ikets  and  other  militar)'  stores,  and  a  second 
ship  reached  Philadelph.ia  with  eleven  thousand  more  of  similar  arms. 
Congress  assigned  five  thousand  of  the  new  arms  to  Massachusetts, 
three  thousand  to  Connecticut,  and  two  thousand  to  \ew  Hani[)shire. 
On  the  secoml  of  the  month,  Washington  sent  to  Robert  Morris  the 
following  cast  of  the  British  plans:  "  Cieneral  Howe  can  not,  by  the 
best  intelligence  I  have  been  able  to  get,  have  less  than  ten  thousand 
men  in  New  Jersey,  and  on  board  o(  transports  at  Amboy.  Our 
number  does  not  exceed  four  thousand.  His  are  well  disciplined, 
well  officered,  and  well  sup[)licd  ;  ours,  ra.w  militia,  badly  officered, 
and  under  no  government." 

"  His  numbers  can  not  be  in  ashort  time  augmented,  ours  must  be 
very  considerably,  and  by  such  troops  as  we  can  have  some  reliance 
upon,  or  the  game  is  at  an  end.  His  situation  with  respect  to  horses 
and  forage  is  bad,  very  bad,  I  believe,  but  will  it  be  better?  No,  on 
the  contrary  worse,  and  therefore  if  no  other,  to  shift  quarters.  Gen- 
oral  Howe's  informants  are  too  numerous,  and  too  well  acc[uainted 
with  all  these  circumstances,  to  suffer  him  to  remain  in  ignorance  of 
them.  With  what  propriety  then  can  he  miss  so  favorable  an 
opportunity  of  striking  a  capital  stroke  against  a  city  from  whence 
we  derive  so  many  advantages,  the  carrying  of  which  would  give  such 
eclat  to  his  arms,  and  strike  such  a  damp  to  ours  ?  Nor  is  his  diffi- 
culty of  moving  so  great  as  is  imagined.  All  the  heavy  baggage  of 
the  army,  their  salt  provisions.  Hour,  and  stores  might  go  round  by 
water,  while  their  superior  numbers  would  enable  them  to  make  a 
swee[)  of  the  horses  for  many  miles  around  them,  not  already  taken 
off  by  us."  This  letter  foreshadows  the  final  action  of  (ieneral  Howe, 
and  while  it  was  Washington's  opinion  that  the  movement  of  troops 
would  be  overland,  its  statement,  in  view  of  the  course  finally  adopted 
by  General  Howe,  is  given  in  this  connection,  and  the  elaborate  docu- 
mentary matter  which  affords  a  detailed  index  to  the  passing  phases 


T 


'i'  i. 


m 


■  'I 


296 


MINOR   KVENTS,  JANUARY   TO  JUI,V. 


[1777- 


I  ?: 


r 


'™it/t^#«f< 


um 


of  opinion  wliich  prcccdeil  tlic  battle  of  IJrandyuinc,  .uul  the  c.ipturo 
of  I'hihidclphi.i,  is  oniittcil. 

Tiic  same  niontii  of  Marcli  developed  the  fruits  of  tlie  promotions 
made  by  Con^^ress.  StirliiiLj.  .Mifllin,  Stephen,  St.  Clair,  aiul  Lincoln 
were  made  major-i;cncrals,  anil  Anio/if  liuis  oniit/ii/.  lie  tendered  his 
resignation.  hi;j;hly  offended.  l\)or,  ( ilovei-,  I'.itterson,  Learned,  Var- 
niim.  1  Iuniiiii;l(>n,  Geori^e  Clinton,  Wavne,  l)e  ILias,  11, md,  Keed. 
Wcedon,  AluhknbnrL;;,  Woodford,  Sentt,  X.ish,  Lonway,  .md  ("ad- 
wallader  were  appointed  brii^adier-j^ener.Us.  The  List  named  officer 
had  been  appointetl  to  that  graile  by  Pennsylvania,  jnst  after  the  bat- 
tle of  Trenton,  and  declined  the  aj)pointment  of  Congress.  ;\s  most 
of  these  officers  appear  in  the  subsecpant  narrative,  their  n.une- 
are  given.  Their  order  of  appointment  gave  infinite  trouble,  ami 
their  assignment  to  duty  gave  iuldiiional  occasion  for  jealousy  .lUtl 
conllict. 

(jener.d  Wooster  had  already  resigned  and  was  in  command  of  the 
Connecticut  militia.  St.  Clair  acted  as  adjutant-general  .after  Reed  re- 
signed, and  on  the  thirtieth  of  March,  Washington  appointeil  Colonel 
Timothy  Pickering  to  that  office.  General  George  Clinton  h  id  been 
assigned  b)-  Congress  to  the  command  of  the  forts  in  the  lligidands. 
General  McDougall  succeeded  (ieneral  Heath  at  Peekskill,  .md  on  the 
twenty-secoiul  a  British  tleet  ascendeil  the  Hudson,  effected  ;i  landing, 
and  destroyed  the  valuable  stores  at  that  place,  (ieneral  Sulliv.m 
was  so  sensitive  as  to  the  so-ca'led  separate  comm.mds  (.)f  other 
officers,  as  to  call  forth  tlic  following  rebuke  from  Washington,  "  Why 
these  unreasonable,  these  unjustifiable  suspicions,  which  can  .mswer 
no  other  end  than  to  poison  your  own  ha])piness  and  add  vex.itions 
to  that  of  others.  I  know  of  but  one  separ.ite  command  properly  so 
called,  and  that  is  the  northern  department,  and  General  Sidiivan, 
General  St.  Clair,  or  any  other  general  officer  at  Ticonderoga  will  be 
considered  in  no  other  light,  while  there  is  a  superior  officer  in  the 
department,  than  if  he  were  placed  at  Chatham,  15askenridgc  or 
Princeton.  I  shall  cpiit  with  ,in  e.irnest  expostulation  that  you  will 
not  suffer  yourself  to  be  teased  with  evils  that  only  exist  in  tin;  imii- 
gination,  and  with  slights  that  have  no  existence  at  all,  keeping  in 
mind  that  if  there  are  several  distinct  armies  to  be  formed,  there  are 
several  gentlemen  before  you  in  point  of  rank  who  have  a  right  to 
claim  preference." 

General  Greene  was  sent  to  lay  before  Congress  the  necessities  of 
the  army,  and  the  month  of  March  closed  with  an  earnest  appeal  to 


1777] 


MfXiiR    i:Vi:\l'S,    jANL'AkV     lU   JUI.V 


397 


\y  ■ 

so 
lit. 


m 

arc 

to 

of 
111  to 


the  governors,  committees  of  safct}-,  ami  Coii^jrcss,  to  furnish  troops 
and  -suppHes  for  the  impcmh'ng  summer  campaign. 

On  the  third  of  April,  (icneral  W'asliinyton  corrected  a  popular 
im[)ression  as  to  judj^ins^  l^ritisli  forces  by  the  number  of  re;^finieiUs 
reported,  pi. icing  a  very  correct  jud;.Mncnt  ui)on  the  streiv^rth  of  tht' 
Hessian  troops,  l)ut  under-estimating  the  average  of  tlie  Ihilish  regi- 
ments. He  wrote  to  (jovernor  Cooke  of  Rliode  Island,  "The  Hes- 
sian regiments,  when  tlu\-  came  out  complete,  did  liot  exceed  -^ix 
hundred  men  e.ich.  and  the  British  two  hundred  and  fifty  each."  The 
basis  upon  which  the  British  army  was  recruited  for  service  in  .Xmerica 
has  been  previously  stated,  as  (.Irawn  from  official  sources. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  of  April  two  thousand  British  troops  under 
Governor  Tyron  landed  near  h'airfield,  Connecticut,  and  moved  upon 
Danbury,  to  destri>y  public  stores  at  that  point  collected,  (ienerals 
Silliman  and  W'oosler  ol' the  Connecticut  militia,  and  (iencral  Arnold, 
then  on  his  way  to  vi.iit  Congress,  distinguished  themselves  by  their 
gallant  conduct.  Arnold  threw  up  a  breastwork  near  Ridgefield  and 
fought  with  great  spirit,  having  two  horses  shot  under  him  before  the 
British  retired.  (Jeneral  Woostcr  was  mortally  wounded.  The  stores 
however,  including  .sixteen  hundred  tents,  were  ilestroyed.  Arnold 
was  immetliately  [)romoted  :  but  did  not  obtain  the  lineal  rank  which 
he  claimed  to  belong  to  him  and  was  still  dissatisfied.  Early  in  May, 
Greene  was  sent  to  inspect  and  put  in  gooil  order  the  posts  in  the 
Highlands.  The  troops  under  Washington's  immediate  command 
were  at  that  time  organized  in  five  divisions  of  two  brigades  each 
under  Major-gener.ds  Greene,  Ste[)hen,  Sullivan,  Lincoln  and  Stir- 
ling, and  included  forty-three  regiments  from  New  Jersey,  Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware,  IMarvland  and  Virginia,  commanded  by  Briga- 
diers Muhlenburgh.  Weedon,  Woodford,  Scott,  Sniallwood,  Deborre, 
Wayne,  iJeilaas,  Ct)nwa\- ami  Maxwell.  Colonel  Hand  was  also  ap- 
pointed Brigatlier-general.  The  artillery  was  still  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Knox.  The  force  for  duty  was  nearly  eight  thousand  men.  The 
New  York  and  Eastern  regiments  were  near  I'eekskill  or  at  Ticon- 
deroga. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  Ma\'.  Colonel  Meigs  crossed  to  Long  Island 
from  Guilford,  Connecticut,  and  at  Sag  Harbor,  Long  Island,  effected 
the  destruction  of  twelve  brigs  and  sloops,  oI^e  of  these  carrj-ing  twelve 
guns,  and  a  large  quantity  of  British  stores,  the  troops  having  been 
withdrawn  to  New  York  two  days  before.  This  exploit  involved 
ninety  miles  of  transportation,  most  of  the  route  in  whale  boats,  and 


r--  i, 


I.  i 


298 


MINOR  EVENTS,  JANUARY  TO  JULY 


[1777. 


i|  i 


ir-^V 


the  command  safely  returned  in  twenty-five  liours.  On  the  twenty-ninth 
of  May,  General  Washington  moved  his  headquarters  to  Middlebrook. 

On  the  sc\enth  of  Juno  Arnold  was  placed  in  command  of  Phila- 
delphia, to  act  with  Cieiural  Mifflin  in  anticipation  of  General  Howe's 
anticipated  movements  in  that  direction,  and  on  the  thirtieth  General 
Howe  marched  from  lirunswick  toward  Princeton.  His  command  in- 
cluded two  more  regime  its,  which  had  joined  from  Newpjrt.and  with 
the  Hessians  amounted  to  the  splendid  force  of  nearly  seventeen 
thousand  men.  Orders  had  been  given  for  the  army  to  march  at 
eleven  o'clock  of  the  evening  of  the  twelfth,  thereby  hoping  to  cut 
off  Sullivan's  brigade,  which  was  at  Princeton.  After  the  march  began, 
Cornwallis  with  the  right  column  was  directed  to  Hillsborough  and 
De  lleistcr  to  Middlebrook,  turning  off  from  the  Princeton  road,  and 
the  line  was  definitely  prolonged  to  Somerset  court-house,  as  indicated 
on  the  map. 

In  a  subsequent  letter  of  July  fifth,  addressed  by  that  officer  to 
Lord  Cicorge  Germaine,  ho  s.iys  that  his  "only  object  was  to  bring 
the  American  army  to  a  general  action."  The  British  army  rested 
its  left  on  Millstone  river,  while  its  right  held  fast  to  Brunswick,  hav- 
ing the  Raritan  in  front.  Two  redoubts  were  also  erected  in  the  horse- 
shoe of  the  river  bend  before  his  centre,  and  als(j,  near  Brunswick. 
The  subsequent  controversies  between  Generals  Howe  and  Clinton 
do  not  entirely  warrant  the  criticism  by  General  Clinton  of  this  posi- 
tion, as  it  was  natusally  assumed  by  General  Howe  that  Washington 
would  not  rest  passively  in  his  trenches  while  the  British  army  had 
control  of  the  line  of  communication  with  Philadelphia.  In  "  Letters 
to  a  Nobleman  "  General  Howe  is  very  severely  criticised  for  moving 
to  Somerset  court-house,  where  an  unfordable  river  parted  the  armies, 
and  it  is  claimed  that  if  Howe  had  moved  toward  Philadelphia,  Wash- 
ington would  have  given  him  battle.  It  was  however  then,  as  ever, 
inconsistent  with  Washington's  purpose  to  risk  his  army  for  any  cit)' 
wliatever. 

The  New  Jersey  militia  were  posted  on  Lowland  Hill,  near  Flem- 
ington,  to  which  place  Sullivan  had  retired  from  Princeton  as  soon  as 
ho  observed  the  movement  of  General  Howe  to  cut  him  off  from  the 
main  army.  Orders  were  sent  to  forward  from  Peekskill  all  the  con- 
tinental troops,  except  one  thousand  effective  men,  under  Generals 
Parsons,  McDougall  and  Glover,  and  these  trcxjps  were  to  march  in 
three  tlivisions,  at  one  day's  interval,  the  first  two  columns  to  bring 
two  pieces  of  artillery  each. 


i    i 


1cm- 
In  as 
the 
Icon- 
L-rals 
[h  in 
^ring 


1777.1 


MINOR   EVENTS,   JANUARY   TO   J"' Y. 


299 


On  the  twentieth  Washington  received  a  message  that  Riirgoyne 
was  approaching  St.  John's  and  tluit  a  detachment  of  regular  troops, 
Canadians  and  Indians  were  to  penetrate  by  the  Mohawk  valley. 
General  Putnam  was  ordered  at  the  same  date  to  hold  four  Massa- 
chusetts regiments,  then  at  Peekskill,  in  readiness  to  go  up  the  river  at 
a  moment's  notice,  and  to  procure  sloops  from  Albany  and  keep  them 
for  tiiat  purpose. 

Washington  and  Congress  alike  erred  in  their  opinion  as  to  the 
subsequent  operations  of  the  British  army  ;  for  both  alike  anticipated 
that  the  army  of  Canada,  then  more  than  thirteen  thousand  strong, 
would  come  down  to  New  York  by  sea,  and  participate  in  the  advance 
upon  Philadelphia.  As  a  matter  of  military  judgment  their  views  as 
to  the  pro[)riety  of  his  march  proved  to  be  correct,  as  tlu^  proposed 
combined  movement  of  Clinton  from  New  York  and  of  Burgoyne  from 
Canada  actually  failed  because  inadequate  forces  were  furnished  for  its 
execution.  Washington  wrote  to  Schuyler  on  the  twentieth,  upon 
receiving  intimation  of  Burgoyne's  jireparations,  expressing  his  "con- 
fidence in  the  strength  of  Ticonderoga  and  the  facility  with  which 
Putiiam's  troops  could  be  sent  to  its  sup[)ort,  if  threatened,"  adding, 
"he  certainly  will  never  leave  the  garrison  of  Ticonderoj^a  in  his  rear: 
and  if  he  invests  it  to  any  pur[)ose,  he  will  not  have  a  sufficient  num- 
ber left  to  send  one  boily  to  Oswego,  and  another  to  cut  off  the  com- 
munications between  I'ort  Edward  and  Fort  George."  General  St. 
Clair  wrote,  not  to  send  reinforcements  until  they  wore  needed,  for 
"they  would  consume  the  supplies."  Meanwhile  Washington 
strengthened  the  right  wing  of  his  position  at  Middlebrook  by  re- 
doubts, ordered  Arnold  to  watch  Trenton  and  the  upper  ferries,  and 
res  .ed  under  the  belief  that  Howe  would  not  advance  toward  the 
Delaware  and  attempt  a  crossing,  while  his  own  army  was  in  the  rear. 
He  argued  thus  ;  "  Had  they  designed  for  the  Delaware,  on  the  first 
instance,  they  would  probably  have  made  a  secret,  rajjid  march  of  it, 
and  not  halted  as  they  have  done,  to  awaken  our  attention  and  give 
us  time  to  prepare  for  obstructing  them.  Instead  of  this  they  hav' 
only  advanced  to  a  position  necessary  to  facilitate  an  attack  upor  our 
right,  which  is  the  part  they  have  the  greatest  likelihood  of  injuring 
us  in  ;  and  added  to  this  consideration  they  have  come  out  as  light 
as  possible,  leaving  all  their  baggage,  provisions,  boats  and  bridges  at 
Brunswick,  which  plainly  contradicts  the  idea  of  pushing  for  the 
Delaware." 

On    the   morning   of  the   nineteenth,    General    Howe   suddenly 


.    I 


s  ( 


M' 


300 


MINOR    F.VKNTS,   J ANUAUV   TO  JUI.V, 


fi777. 


abandoiud  \u>  position  and  retired  to  Brunswick.  Maxwell  was  at 
once  sent  foruanl  to  t.ike  <i  position  between  Brunswick  and  Aniboy, 
so  as  to  cut  olTdctacheil  parties  or  bat^j^atje,  and  (leneral  Greene  was 
sent  with  three  bri;^.ules  to  follow  the  river,  observe  the  crossitii;,  and 
attack  their  rear  as  soon  as  they  should  leave  post.  The  entire 
American  army  was  put  in  readiness  to  support  the  movement. 

(icncral  Ilowe  started  on  the  twenty-second  e.uly  in  the  morning. 
Morj^an  and  W'.iyne  drove  the  Hessian  riMr-;4uard  forward  upon  the 
main  body  after  a  spirited  action.  It  had  been  Greene's  intention  to 
have  IMa.xwell  strike  the  column  near  i'iscat.iway,  while  he  should 
hold  them  under  fire.  The  messenger  sent  to  Maxwell  with  the  order 
was  captured  or  lost,  and  he  received  his  orders  at  last  only  after  the 
II essi.m  corps  had  joined  the  advanced  troops.  Stirlint;  then  joined 
Maxwell,  and  Greene  carried  the  pursuit  as  fir  as  I'iscataway. 

Washington  })romptly  adv.mciHl  the  arm\-  to  Quibbletown,  now  New 
Market,  upon  the  counsel  of  his  officers,  that  tin;  retreat  wi'.s  genuine  ; 
yet  not  without  suspicion  that  the  whole  was  a  skillfully  developed 
/I'ii//  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  him  from  his  stronghold.  General 
Stirling's  command  was  stationed  in  advance  at  .Metuchen. 

Few  events  of  that  war  involved  more  sharp  di-<cussion  than  the 
advance  and  sudden  retnat  of  Gencr.il  Howe.  The  anonymous 
"  Letters  to  a  Nobleman,"  "  (i.i!lowa)'s  Kellections,"  "  Howe's  Nar- 
rative," and  other  tlocunients  of  the  kind,  still  have  freshness  and  in- 
terest ;  but  none  of  tlu-ni  settle  the  controversy,  ilowe  occupied  a 
position  in  which  he  could  neither  attack  nor  be  attacked.  Neither 
army  was  in  danger  from  the  other,  ///.v  /ivA' was  in  the  field  pro[)er, 
and  his  purpose  was  to  entice  Washington's  army  into  a  jiosition  where 
the  adwantages  would  be  with  himself.  If  he  had  marched  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  Washington  would  have  given  him  a  fight. 
The  chief  fact  indicated  by  his  course,  and  that  is  supported  by  his 
own  defense,  was  the  appreciation  he  began  to  entertain  of  the  char- 
acter of  Washington,  and  he  would  not  engage  at  all  under  risks. 
He  claimed  that  his  force  was  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of  Wash- 
ington ;  but  his  advocates  as  well  as  critics  are  obliged  to  accept  the 
facts  as  already  recorded. 

Steilman,  who  served  in  the  British  general  staff  under  Howe, 
Clinton  and  Cornwallis,  and  whose  volumes  are  among  the  most  inter- 
esting which  were  published  at  the  close  of  the  war,  takes  occasion, 
while  reviewing  the  New  Jersey  campaign  of  1777,  to  pass  judgment 
upon  the  relative  strength  of  the  armies  from  the  commencement  of 


1777.1 


MINOR    EVI:NTS,   JANUARY   TO  Jfl.V 


301 


,1  a 

ither 

icr, 

10  re 

the 

rht. 
> 

his 

uir- 

>ks. 

.ish- 

tho 


operations  on  Lonj^  Isl.nul,  up  to  the  first  of  Jul)-,  1777  As  that 
period  is  under  brief  n'jtice,  his  estimate  is  t^iven  for  periii.incnt 
reference. 

"BRirisii  AMI  Ki  itKi.  I'ORCK  IS  1776." 

Hates,  Jhiliu'i.  RfMs. 

Auijust  ....  24.CXK1 Ui.ooo 

Ni)\ciril)er  ....  2'i/)00  .....     4,5cx) 

December  ....  27,700  .... 


M.^rch 
June 


In  1777. 

27,000 
30,000 


JO"- 


4,500 

8.000 


On  the  twcnty-si.Nth.  General  Howe  put  liis  entire  army  in  motion 
to  resume  the  offensive,  and  .idv.inced  to  Scotch  Plains  ami  Westfield. 

Cornwallis  marched  via  \Voodbritl;j[e,  with  the  rii^ht  \\\n<f  of  the 
army,  at  seven  in  the  niorninij,  while  Ciencral  Howe  in  person  led  the 
left  winij  by  Metuchen  Meetin;^  House,  intending  to  connect  with  the 
rear  of  the  rit^ht  column  at  that  point,  and  then  swin.^  upon  the  left 
of  the  .\merican  main  army.  Cornwallis  with  the  extreme  rii^ht,  was 
to  ;^ain  the  passes  to  Middlebrook".  A  third  body  of  troops  with  four 
battalions  and  six  pieces  of  artiller)-  were  sent  to  Bonhamton,  to 
Icnionstrate  toward  the  American  ri^ht  win;^.  Cornwallis  had  hardly 
p,issed  through  Woodbridge,  when  he  was  confronted  by  .Stirling's 
division.  A  spirited  skirmish  ensujd,  which  was  to  the  benefit  of 
Cornwallis,  whose  artillery  were  of  a  more  effective  caliber  ;  and  he 
crowded  the  retiring  division  as  far  as  Westfield,  and  the  present 
Plainfield,  capturing  three  brass  guns,  and  inflicting  a  loss  in  killed, 
wounded  and  prisoners,  of  nearly  two  hundred  men,  with  a  loss  to  his 
own  command  of  not  more  than  seventy. 

I\Iaxwell,  who  had  been  stationed  near  the  Raritan,  on  the  line  of 
the  original  retreat  of  General  Howe,  retired  without  loss.  Wash- 
ington quickly  comprehended  the  purpose  of  his  adversary,  and 
recovered  the  passes  to  his  old  post  before  Cornwallis  who  had  been 
delayed  so  long  by  Stirling  couKl  accom[)lish  his  purpose,  which  was 
to  seize  them  while  General  Howe  should  threaten  Washington's 
front.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  twenty-seventh,  the  division  of  Corn- 
wallis left  Westfield,  passed  through  Sampton  unopposed,  and  joined 
General  Howe,  who  had  effected  nothing  of  value  by  his  movement. 

On  the  thirtieth  the  British  army  crossed  to  Staten  Island,  and 
the  military  career  of  General  Howe  in  New  Jersey  ended. 


i 


iO. 


MINOR    i;Vi;.\IS.   JANUAUY   TO  JI'I.V. 


['777. 


The  immediate  activity  of  the  sliippin.^'  at  New  York  now  satisfied 
Wasliiii.^ri,,,!  that  a  {hvcrsioii  would  lie  matir  up  the  Hudson  to  draw 
him  in  that  direction,  and  that  operations  toward  I'hiladelphia  wouUl 
be  made  by  sea.  Letters  from  General  St.  Clair  stated  positively, 
that  lUir^'oync  hail  advanced  with  view  to  attack  Ticonderoi^M  and  its 
dependent  posts.  Orders  were  at  once  sent  to  Putnam  to  place  Var- 
num  and  Tarsons'  brii^'ades  at  I'eekskill  to  observe  the  river,  in  tiie 
place  of  Nixon's  which  had  l)een  hurriiil  to  Albany,  and ///<' r.i/<v//- 
t ion  from  Canada  zcas  at  last  on  its  march. 

Tile  narrative  will  follow  the  order  indicated  at  the  opening  of 
the  chapter,  ami  t.ike  under  notice  the  "  Operations  of  Hun^oyne's 
Camp.iiyn." 


)  \ 


'At.  ' 


m 


^»^;'i| 


IM 


S 


I 


im 


i\0 


■  t 


i 


I 


CHAPTER   XLIII. 


BURGOYNE'S   CAMPAIGN  OPENED.     1777. 


ON  the  twenty-second  day  of  August,  1776,  Lord  George  Ger- 
mainc  handed  to  Captain  Le  Maitrc,  an  aid-dc-camp  of  Gen- 
eral Carleton,  then  commanding  in  Canada,  a  letter,  to  be  delivered 
by  him  to  General  Carleton  upon  his  arrival  at  Quebec.  The  aid-de- 
camp found  it  im))ossiblc  to  make  the  passage  on  account  of  ice  in  the 
St.  Lawrence,  and  returned  the  dispatch  to  Lord  Germaine,  at  the 
palace  of  Whitehall,  London. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  of  March,  1777,  the  letter  was  again  sent, 
accompanied  by  the  instructions,  that  it  was  his  Majesty's  pleasure 
that  General  Carleton  should  return  to  Quebec  as  soon  as  he  should 
have  driven  the  American's  forces  from  Canada,  taking  with  him  such 
part  of  his  army  as  in  his  judgment  and  discretion  appeared  sufficient 
for  the  defense  of  the  Province  ;  and  that  Lieutenant-general  Bur- 
goyne  or  such  other  suitable  officer  as  General  Carleton  should  think 
most  proper,  be  detached  with  the  remainder  of  the  troops, — "  to  pro- 
ceed with  all  possible  expedition  to  join  General  Howe  and  put  him- 
self under  his  command."' 

Lord  Germaine  maintained,  that  '•  with  a  view  of  quelling  the 
rebellion  as  soon  as  possible,  it  had  become  highly  necessary  that  the 
most  speedy  junction  of  the  two  armies  should  be  effected:  that  the 
king  had  designated  three  thousand  men  as  the  force  to  be  left  in 
Canada,  and  that  the  remainder  of  the  army  should  be  employed  in 
two  expeditions :  the  one  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-general 
Burgoyne,  who  was  to  force  his  way  to  Albany  ;  and  the  other  under 
Lieutenant-colonel  St.  Leger,  who  was  to  make  a  diversion  on  the 
Mohawk  river. 

It  was  explicitly  stated,  also,  that  the  plan  under  consideration 
"  could  not  be  advantageously  executed   without  the  assistance  of 


■•i 


li.   i- 


i   i| 


si; 


mi' 


¥mn-: 


:\ 


■i'rrtm 


304 


liUKGOYNES  CAMPAIGN  OI'ENKD. 


I '777. 


Canadians  and  Indians."  It  was  "  left  to  the  influence  of  General 
Carlcton  amonLj  those  bodies  of  men,  to  assure  a  <^ood  and  sufficient 
number,  for  the  purpose  in  view." 

Lieutenant  general  Ikiri^oyne  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Quebec 
forthwith,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  wis!' :s  of  the  crown  with  the 
utmost  dispatch.  The  instructions  above  referred  to,  were  so  explicit 
as  to  indicate  the  number  of  men,  and  even  the  particular  detachments, 
which  should  be  respectively  assigned  to  the  enjoined  operations. 
I'he  statement  of  the  details  thus  made,  will  have  interest  during  the 
course  of  the  narrati\e.  The  force  detained  for  the  defense  of  Canada 
was  to  consist  of 

"TIk'  Stli  K;'iit.,  ik(iurtin_!^  100  for  tin-  cxiieditioii  to  tlic  Moli,i\\k        .  46a  men 
Battalion  companies  of  ilic  34tli  ;  (Knliutini;'  100  lor  ilic  expedition 

to  the  Mohawk             .            34S  " 

Battalion  companies  of  the  29tli  and  31st  rcLcimenis           .         .         .  iSi/i  •• 

Eleven  additional  companies  from  Great  Britain          ....  (<\(>  " 

Detachments  fiom  the  Iwd  l)ri,L,Mdes           ......  yy}  '• 

Detacl;ments  from  the  (jerman  troops       ......  650  •• 

Royal  Highland  emigrants 500  " 

■i'ot;ii 3770 

This  assignment  of  troops  for  the  protection  of  Canada  expressly 
and  justly  presumed,  that  the  operations  in  progress  in  different  parts 
of  America  would  confine  the  attention  of  its  people  to  their  own 
necessities,  and  that  the  force  thus  designated  woidd  he  ample  for 
local  defense.  The  assignment  of  troops  to  the  moving  columns  was 
equally  exact. 

General  Burgoync's  command  was  thus  stated  : 

The  grenadiers  aiul  light  infantiy  of  the  army  :  (except  of  tiie  8th 
regiment  and  the  24th  regiment)  :  as  the  .ulvancetl  corps,  undei  the 
command  oi  Brig.idier-geneial  Fraser i56Smen 

First  brigade  :  battalion  comp.mies  of  the  yth,  21st,  and  47th  regimerts  ; 

deduiting  a  detachment  from  each  corps  to  remain  in  C.mada         .     1 194   " 

Second  brigade  :  battalion  companies  of  the  2oih,  53d,  ami  62d  regi- 
ments ;  deducting  50  from  each  corps  to  remain  as  above         .        .     1194   " 

Ail  the  German   troops  except  tiie  ll.niau  Chasseurs,  and   .1  iletach- 

ment  of  650 .         .         .         ,    3217   " 

The  artillery,  except  such  parts  as  sh.ill  be  necessary  for  Canada 

Total 7173   " 

This  command  was  "  to  be  associated  with  as  many  Canadians  and 
Indians  as  iTiight  be  thought  necessary  for  the  service,"  and  when  so 
organized,  it   was  "  to  proceed  with  all  expedition  to  Albany,  and  be 


4a^ 


)      I. 


1777-1 


IURGUVNL'S   CAMI'AKiN'   OrKNKD 


30s 


»!* 


placed  under  the  command  of  Sir  William  Howe."  The  force  which 
was  carefully  assitjneil  to  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  St. 
Lei^er,  was  thus  stated  : 

Dct.u  liiiK'iU  from  the  8th  n  ;;iini'nt 100  men 

Dctaclimont  fioin  the  34.1  li  n;,'inient  100    " 

Sir  Jcihn  Jdlm^oii'^  ri\!4inuMU  1)1"  New  York 133    " 

H;uuui  Ch,iss(  iirs 342    " 

Tui.il ^375    •' 

To  this  force,  there  was  also  "  to  be  added  a  sufficient  number  of 
Canatlians  and  Indians  "  ;  thesame  "  to  proceed  to  Albany,  and  never 
to  lose  view  of  their  intendetl  junction  with  .Sir  William  Howe  as  their 
principal  object." 

The  foregoing  in.structions  arc  the  voice  from  Whitehall  Palace. 
They  read  like  orders  from  a  corps  commander,  who  can  judge  from 
his  daily  returns,  e.vactly  of  the  force  in  hand  for  immediate  use. 

Lieutenant-general  Burgoyne  left  London,  ^Llrch  twenty-seventh, 
and  reached  Quebec  on  the  si.xth  day  of  May.  He  notifunl  General 
Sir  Willi. un  Howe  immediately  of  his  strict  instructions,  and  ex- 
pressed a  wish  that  he  had  sufticient  latitude  of  movement  to  warrant 
a  diversion  tow.irds  Connecticut.  From  the  first  inception  of  the 
enter[)rise,  it  was  declared  to  be  of  necessity  that  Albany  should  be 
the  objective  of  the  march,  "after  the  capture  of  the  American  posts 
which  lay  upon  Lake  Chainplain."  General  Carleton  entered  into  the 
outfit  of  the  expedition  with  w*  much  zeal  and  energy  .is  if  it  had  been 
to  his  individual  credit  to  assure  success.  Hurgoyne  afterward  testi- 
fied that  "  lie  could  not  have  done  more  for  his  brother." 

The  inherent  iliificulties  of  the  movement  were  in  many  respects 
similar  to  those  which  affected  the  American  expedition  to  Canada. 
These  must  be  briefiy  stated  in  order  to  secinx'  a  fair  opinion  of  thv' 
capacity  and  wisiiom  of  the  lieutenant-general  commanding. 

The  Canatlian  \.xoo'^'^,  estimated  for  dX  two  thousand  men,  C(3uld 
not  be  enlisted.  Less  than  two  hundred  reported  for  duty.  The 
pioneers  who  were  to  make  and  repair  roads,  carry  provisions,  and  do 
much  of  the  practical  part  of  the  logistics  of  the  march,  were  not  only 
greatly  deficient  in  numbers,  but  still  more  w.mting  in  willingness  to 
work,  and  fitness  for  the  duty  required  of  them.  Neither  money  nor 
constraint  could  secure  the  rcciuisite  numbers  of  carts  and  horses  for 
the  outfit,  rhe  weather  was  unpropitious  and  the  roads  were  almost 
impassable.  Reference  is  made  to  maj>  entitled  "  Ikirgoyne's  Saratoga 
Ci-.mprtign,"  as  the  first  of  the  series  designed  to  illustrate  its  progress. 
30 


M:ll 


M 


i 

i 

t 

1  (■'„<;■■; 

•■ 

3o6 


BUR00YN1-:  S   CAMPAIGN'   OI'EM'.I.. 


[>777 


The  preliminary  camp  w.is  established  on  the  Hoqiict  river,  on  the 
western  shore  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  the  troojjs  reached  that  station 
as  early  as  tlie  twentieth  day  of  June.  The  Indians,  who  liad  been 
looked  upon  as  v.iluabk.'  auxiliaries,  were  yet  to  be  secured.  In  re- 
sjjonse  to  a  well  circulated  api)eal.  addressed  to  various  tribes,  about 
four  hundred  Irocjuois,  AV^oiuiuins  Abcnacjuies,  and  Ottowas,  met 
(jeiieral  Burs^oyne  in  conference  on  the  twenty-first  tlay  of  June,  at 
his  heatlquarters.  In  view  of  the  odium  which  was  cast  upon  this 
officer  by  an  unwise  proclamation  at  that  time  issued,  il  is  proper  to 
say,  that  in  liis  address  to  the  w.irriors  who  ,iLjreed  to  takt'  up  the 
hatchet  for  the  kin;^^,  he  expressly  stated  the  "  necessit)'  of  restraint 
of  their  passions,  and  that  they  must  be  under  control,  in  accordance 
with  the  religion,  laws  of  warfare,  principles  and  policy  whicli  belonj^ed 
to  Great  Britain," — "  positively  forbiddinc,^  bloc^dshed,  when  not  op- 
posed inarms," — declaring "a<;ed  men,  women,  children,  anil  prisoners, 
sacred  from  the  knife,  even  in  the  time  of  conflict,"  ;ind  otherwise 
in.structint^  the  savacjcs,  that  "  the  war  must  not  be  made  as  when  they 
went  forth  alone,  but  under  the  absolute  will  and  control  of  the  army 
of  the  kin;4." 

His  proclamation  to  the  Americans,  as  well  as  the  address  to  the 
Indian  chiefs,  assumed  all  tliat  could  possibl)-  be  asserted  as  to  the 
guilt  of  rebellion  ;  and  while  extremely  pompous  and  extravagant  in 
language,  j)reshadowed  the  extreme  vengeance  of  savage  auxiliaries 
if  resi.stancc  should  be  prolonged.  It  was  extremely  uni)r()fessional, 
and  more  in  harmony  with  the  abstract  political  dogmas  of  the  crown 
than  with  Hurgoyne's  own  character.  Its  muc'.i  ridiculed  assertion 
of  personal  title,  and  of  royal  prerogative,  was  quite  in  harmony  with 
liis  instructions,  and  somewhat  oflensive  for  its  vanity,  while  it  lacked 
the  wisdom  which  a  better  knowledge  of  his  opponents  soon  inculcated. 
It  aroused  sensible  men  to  a  more  stubborn  resistance,  and  was  more 
effective  than  appeals  of  Congress,  to  induce  the  people  of  New  I-ng- 
land  to  take  up  arms  for  border  defense.  They  knew  well  from  ex- 
perience just  what  a  war  with  savages  meant,  and  they  were  inclined 
to  class  the  British  troo[)s  who  employed  them,  in  the  same  list  of 
enemies  with  the  savages  themselves. 

Washington  issued  a  counter-proclamation.  One  paragraph  is 
worthy  a  space  in  all  records  of  that  war:  and  is  peculiarly  expressive 
of  the  character,  consistency  and  faith  of  the  man,  while  it  affords  an 
index  of  his  firmness  in  the  path  of  duty.      It  leads  as  follows: 

"  Harassed  as  wc  arc  by  unrelenting  persecution,  obliged  by  every 


T 


«777] 


IJUROOVNH'S  campaign   OI'ENEU. 


307 


tie  to  repel  violence  by  force,  urged  by  self-preservation  to  exert  the 
stren,[;th  whicii  Providence  has  given  us  to  defend  our  natural  rights 
against  the  aggressor,  we  appeal  to  the  hearts  of  all  mankind  for  the 
justice  of  our  course  ;  its  event  we  leave  to  Him  who  speaks  the  fate 
of  nations,  in  humble  confidence,  that  as  llis  omniscient  eye  taketh 
note  even  of  a  sparrow  that  fillcth  to  the  ground,  so  He  will  not  with- 
draw His  cmintenance  from  a  people  wlio  humbly  array  themselves 
under  His  banner,  in  defense  of  the  noblest  principles  with  which  He 
has  adornetl  humanity." 

The  arm)'  advanced  \x-  Crown  I'oint,  rested  three  days,  and  moved 
forward  on  the  tiiirti'^th.  The  British  light  infantry  and  grenadiers, 
with  the  twenty-tourlh  Hritish  foot,  some  Canadi.ms  and  Indians, 
with  ten  '.iici:  .'s  of  '.;  ler)-,  marched  down  tiie  west  shore  and  took 
post  wit.iii.  .our  miles  of  liconderoga.  The  German  reserve,  Hruns- 
wick  chas;,i_i.us,  ligiit  infantry  and  grenadiers  followed  the  east  shore; 
and  General  liurgoyne  accompanied  the  fleet. 

On  tile  first  of  July  the  investment  began.  General  IJurgoyne's 
muster  of  that  liate  gave  his  force,  r.ink  and  file,  as  follows: 


IJiiiisii  l<ci,ajl,irs 

German 

Arliilury 


Canadians  and  I'rovinciais  about 
Indians  aljout 
Total  alxHil 


37-4  men 
3016     •' 

473    •' 
7213    " 

250    " 
400    " 
78^13  men. 


As  e.irly  a>  the  tweiit_\--eightli  of  l""ebruary,  one  mdntii  bcfurehe 
left  England,  General  |}urgc))iu'  iinbodied  his  views  in  a  letter  to 
Lord  George  Germaine.  '['he  document  is  a  modi;l  pa[)er  in  its  an- 
ticipation of  the  contingencies  of  tiie  proposed  service;  and  while  the 
general  ideas  of  that  letter  were  incorporatetl  into  his  ultimate  instruc- 
tions, he  was  not  allowed  the  full  regular  force  which  he  deemed 
necessary  for  the  undertaking,  and  his  auxiliaries  from  Canada  and 
from  Indian  tribes  were  too  few  to  be  of  mucii  practical  value,  while 
they  burdened  him  with  an  element  which  did  more  harm  than  good, 
at  times  ot  real  crisis.  His  proposed  diversion  into  New  I'.ngland 
was  predi^.ated  upon  support  from  the  troops  then  at  Newi)ort,  Rhode 
Island,  and  the  assurance  that  there  would  he  adeijuate  and  prompt 
support  from  the  arm\-  at  Xew  Yovk.  He  had,  on  one  occasion, 
advised  that  the  northern  movement  should  be  limited  to  the  occupa- 


II 


11 


ft     ,' ' 


T 


If 


Wi 


1 


IS 


i 

I 

1 


30X 


lUlKOfn'Ni:  S    CAMI'AICN    ori'iNKI). 


I«777- 


tioii  and  firiii  posscssinii  of  ilic  posts  011  Lake  ("li.implain,  and  that  tlic 
tiODps  wliii  Ii  \v(ii-  dist  iiitd  to  i(ii)|)(  ratr  \v  itii  ( ii  n(  lal  I  low  <■  should  j;n 
Iroin  (Jiul)ii.  to  Ni.w  \'oil,,  or  N'lWport,  li\  >  a,  and  ihiis  sriiii<-  tin- 
carHcst  possihh'  fi(  Id  service  in  the  iain|iai;;n  o|  i'//J.  It  lias  Ixen 
shown  ill  another  coniieition  that  (ieiiei.il  llowe  hnnselt  (xpicssed 
t  he  <ipiiiion,  m  ,1  littii  to  I, Old  ( lennaiiii-,  t  hat  ,1  niii\(iijent  hom 
(  aiiad.i  down  tin  llinhoii  iiver  ((in!d  not  In-  supposed  |o  he  o|  prac- 
t  i(  .ll  henelll  hehae  Sept(niper.  (iellei.d  i>ni;Mi)ne  elUount<lecl  tile 
din'u  ult  ies  w  liii  ll  he,  alone,  ant  ii  ip.iled,  .md  niin\'  t  rials  w  Im  h  lionM 
have  lieeii  pared  him  ;  and  jet  he  was  l.n  e  to  lai  e  with  the  Aineiii  a\\ 
anil)-,  within  t  hiil_\--tw()  miles  ol'  Alhaii)',  1)\'  the  niiddli'  ol  An'Mist. 

I  ie  u'.is  \h:{')Ic  '1  ieondero^a  the  hrsl  ul  July,  wilii  llu:  loin  .  alrea<ly 
indie, ited. 

lie  w'.is  ii.iiTldy  eeiiMired  loi  t.il.iir;  with  him  ,111  ,ille;'cd  <\i-i-ss  of 
liea\')- ",nns.  lint  tlie,e  ucrc  distrihuted  on  ships,  or  plaicd  in  the 
lajitiired  posts,  ■,()  tint  the  .irtillei)'  of  his  iiioviii;.;  (ohimndiil  not 
avei,i^;L-  two  pi{s  e-,  to  a  h.itt.ilioii,  tw'ent\'-six  v.nns  in  ,ill,  .md  tin  of 
tlie'-c  were  formed  into  ,i  ■  pi  i  ial  park  under  t  n m  r.il  I'liillips,  to  ht; 
U  M  d  wherever  lleedid,  -o  .i  ,  to  ,e(  ure  a  i.MCatei  comhiind  (  III  et,  as 
with  niodein  hatteiies.  hOiii  howit/eas  .md  t'\o  li;;lit  t\\(  nty  lours, 
lonaituted  hi-,  he.ivy  ordn.mce,  and  the-  remaimlei'  were  li"ht  tliret:s 
and  sixes.  This  I  lanpluinent  of  .utilhi)'  w.is  the  lowest  wliiili  tin: 
ri;oilations  ol  liie  service  admittid  ;  and  there  was  no  re-a-,on  for  him 
to  dolllil  tll.lt  lie  would  he  luilli  il'il  \\ilh  ,lde(pi,itc  t  l.ins])ort,lt  ion , 
until  the  l.iihire  ol  ( '.in.idi.in  .allies  and  of  pro|)er  snp|ioit,  had  pl.n cd 
him  Alnae  tluac  w.is  no  leaned','  lor  ine.i;.;re  resonrct-s  hat  in  the  des- 
p<a,it<'  (  oiillii  I  ol  h.itl  le  .e;,mi  ,t   Mipeiiiiv    niiinliers. 

I  he  .idv.mce  to  i  icoiidi  ro-a  W.is  followed  upwitli  vi';oi-,  Tlu; 
old  iieiuli  |)osts  on  the  hei;;lit  ,,  north  of  the  foit,  h;id  hec  n  p.irtially 
r<:p.iire(l  .md  st  r<iv;th(  ned  by  new  int  rem  liments  ;  and  om;  hlock- 
liouse  had  heeii  erected  oil  a  hill  w  hit  h  conim.mdid  the  northern 
ixtreimty  ot  L.d.i;  <ic(n;^i-.  On  the  secoUil  d.i)-  lA'  Jul)'  these  works 
were  .ih.indoiied  .md  the  woode'ii  defenses  Were  hiirned  hy  t he  Ameri- 
cans, (ieiiei.il  rhillijis  jjrompfl)' (occupied  the  hill, -Mvins^  it  the  ii.mie 
of  Mount   I  lope. 

On  Mount  Independence  opiiosite  Ticonderocfa  tluae  was  a  sl.ir 
furt,  which  conimanded  the  water  p.assa;n-,  .md  .it  the  foot  of  the  hill 
batteries  had  been  established.  These  were  well  sujjplied  with  lie.ivy 
j^^uns. 

(ieneral  Kiedesel    encamped   just  .north   of  this  pijsition,  and   the 


m 


"777- 


IMMvCOVM,  s  CAMI'AICN'   oi-i;\i:r). 


309 


sliips  of  war  were  aiii.liDnd  arms-,  tlic  1,(I<(-  just  williiii  iaii';i-  ot  lln- 
AiiK  ii(aii  lialli  lie-,.  At  tlir  In  ,iil  ot  l.al.<:  ( .'liaiiiplain,  SkuIIi  river,  so 
lallid,  ciiiliii;;  ill  W'lxxl  (icck,  .Hid  ill  lai  t  a  ii.iudw  laic,  unites  with 
I  .al.i-  ( iciHi'c  ;  ,111(1  llic  iiili  rviiiiii;;  1 1  Hi;  Mil-  n\  laiiil,  '.  alk'ii  S-i;.;ar  I  .oal 
Mill,  is  scviii  IiiiikIici!  fee!  aliiu'i-  tin-  iim-  nl  tin-  lal:c,  ,iiiil  (■Driiiiiamli 
I  ii  i>n(l(i(.;>a.  il  ,  slc(  |)  a  u  (lit  liad  liccii  n  ;  ;ai  dcd  l)\'tli(:  Aiiicricaiis 
as  iiiipiaitii  al.'lc  <>\  (u  (  iqiat  i(  m  ;  hut  on  the  lourlliol  July,  laciitcn- 
aiit  iWi^s,  I  oiiiniaiKlill;',  tile  I'litidi  JMi;  ;in((  is,  1  ch  1  miK  lilcicd  the 
Mitninil  and  i('|i<>rt<'(!  th.il  it  (MiiiMiandcd  a  dinil  |)ra(  I  it  al)K'  i'.ui;h- 
ot  hie  n])()ii  lot  ii  1  udnd(  Ti  v',a  and  M'  Mint  I  iidciicndciuc,  ,il  a  ilislaiu.c 
o!  Hot  iiiorc  tiian  rillccii  liuiidicd  yard -.  In  iiu  the  latter,  wliiih  uasllie 
iiioic  di-.taiil  |)iiit.  It  al  >o  loininaiided  llu:  hiid;'/-  ol  i  oiiiinu  liieat  i(  m 
wliii  h  loiinei  ti  il  the  Aiiieiii.m  po-^t.. 

Tliii  l)ri(lt:(.;  liad  a  douhle  piu'ixisc  ;  one  lor  eoiiiiiuiih(  at  i(  di,  aii(| 
the  other  to  prevent  the  paNsa;.',e  ot  ship,  into  South  iivei.  It  was 
supported  1))'  t\\eiity-l\\()  sunken  pici.Ci  ol  lar;.;e  timher  al  nearly 
(  (pial  dist.inee  ■;.  I  !et  \\  1  tai  t  he  ])iers  were  s(  paiat  e  llnal  .,  Iill)'  I  ((.I  loni; 
and  tW(lve  leii  \\ide,  -.troii^^ly  Lisleiud  |();.;etliei  I))'  i  haiir,  and  rivets, 
and  U(ll  .;  I  and  to  'he  piers.  Iietoic  the  hi  id;"  w.i-.  ;i  h()(iin,  .ilso 
in.lde  ol  he.US  tllllhei  ,,  c.ili  hill)'  Ullile(l  h\'  (  liiuhed  liolts  ,uid  (iouhU; 
(  h.iiiis  ol  iiu  h  ,111(1  ,1  h.ili  iron.  l^pon  ihe  n  pi  a  1  n!  1  .ieuieii.int  i  wiss, 
,1  pioneer  (lajii.ind  ,1  hace  (jf  s.ippeis  were  |)ul  to  woii.,  .md  h)  llie 
inoinin;.',  ol  the  tilth  .1  iinlish  Ion  e  t  row  iied  the  aiiiiniil  ol  .Su;.sir 
I -o.d  ilili,  wliieh  w.i,  pioini)tl)'  di;;niried  hy  it,  imup.inli  with  the 
name  ol  " /v/^Y  Dijidiiii!'  A  |)r,i(  lii  .ihje  p.illi  li.id  heen  m.ide  lor  the 
t.'.irri.iLjc  ol  ;.;aii^,  which  were  disiiiouiited  lor  the  |Miipi>-,c,  and  the 
batlcry  w.is  sodii  in  its  new  position. 

While  tlie.e  .irr.iir jeiueiit  ^  had  hei  n  in  pi();;ress  lor  the  eoinpk;le 
isolation  .111(1  I  out  rol  ol    Tieoiidero'M,  t  Iw-  ■miii  .011  o|  1  h'-  on  ,t   w.is  in  it 


UK 


litlerent  to  p.is^in;.;  events.      lts(;\,ii:l  eoiidilion  i.\\iirth)'  oT  iKjlii 


in  older  to  ,i])i)rei  i.ite  the  erioiKoii.  iiii|)r( ->sion  which  (  (in;;rcss, 
(ieiicral  Washiiii^tou  .iiul  the  .Vineru  .ui  people  eiilert, lined,  upon 
iuMrinj^f  of  its  cv.uu.itioii  hy  (leiier.il  .St.  (  l.ur,  without  h.itlle.  In 
proijortion  as  its  deleiise  wa.  desired  .uid  e.\pei  ted,  just  to  tli.it  decree 
did  the  public  jiid;.;inent  impute  l.iult  to  holh  the  iiiiinedi.ile  .md 
remote  coiiim.iiKhr ;  so  ih.it  (ieiier.d  .Schii)  K  r  .is  well  ,is  (ieneral  .St. 
Clair  sulTered  seriously  thron;;h  this  iiu;vit.ihlc  dis.ister. 

I  he  Xoilliern  I  )cp.irtmcnt,  Mvcessarily  so  isolated  from  other 
ficld.s  of  o|)cr.itioii,  W.IS  habitiiially  a  browsing  place  for  aspirants  after 
indci)eiKlent  coinm.iiid,  and  this  ilispositioii  was  .streiiglheneil  by  the 


U  I.? 


^^f 


310 


BUkGOYNKS  CAMPAIGN   OPKNKI). 


I '777. 


mm' 


If 


i:''  *■ 


|.v    S. 


iiatunil  tendency    t(i   repose   its  defense   in  the  h-iiids  of  the    New 
Ent^land  mihtia  wlio  were  most  intiiii.itely  related  to  that  tiefense. 

On  the  twenty-fifth  of  March,  Gener.d  Sclui)-ler  had  been  reh'eved 
from  tlic  conunaiul  by  (iiiieral  Ciates,  but  was  reinstated  in  Ma)', 
after  fairly  present inLj  his  case  before  ConLjress.  He  returned  to  his 
headquarters  at  Albaii\-on  tlie  third  of  June  ami  at  once  tendered  to 
General  Gates  the  eommantl  of  Ticonderoi^a,  as  the  most  exposeil 
and  most  honorable  post  within  the  depirtnunt.  That  officer 
declined  tlie  command.  It  was  his  purpose  to  r.btain  the  command 
of  the  department  itself,  and  lu's  correspondence  is  imprei^nated  with 
the  spirit  of  jealous  aspiration.  While  urginj^  that  .\lbany  should 
not  be  retained  as  headciuarters.  he  wrote,  "  If  General  Schuyler  is 
solely  to  possess  all  powers,  all  the  intelligence,  and  that  particular 
favorit< ,  the  military  chest,  and  const.mtly  reside  in  Albany,  1  can 
not,  with  any  peace  of  mind,  serve  at  TicoiuIeroL^a." 

At  this  perioil  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk  and  its  relations  to 
Indian  oi)erations,  based  upon  British  support  throUL^h  the  lake  port 
of  OsweL^o,  invested  Albany  with  peculiar  value  as  a  centre  of  control. 
In  determining^  the  wisdom  of  Schuyler  ami  Hurijoyne  in  their  subse- 
quent career,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  St.  Leger  expedition 
from  Canada,  (r/si>  IkuI  Albany  as  its  objective,  .-'/r?  Oswego,  l""ort 
S.:hu}ler  iStanwixV  and  the  Mohawk  V.dley,  and  that  bi)th  the  Brit- 
ish armies  were  to  be  w.itched  by  .Schuyler ;  while  Burgoyne  not  only 
had  positive  orders  to  make  Albany  the  objective  of  his  march,  but  he 
was  held  to  a  fiithful  concert  of  action  with  St.  Leger,  in  order  that 
both  expeilitions  should  realize  their  common  objecti\e.  The  drift 
of  .such  action  was  to  incline  Burgoyne  to  m.ircli  ilown  the  west  bank 
of  the  Hudson,  and  it  was  equally  vital  to  the  American  cause  that 
the  dejiartment  commander  should  have  ready  access  to  both  lines 
of  operation  which  thus  converged  upon  Albany. 

Gates  had  accomplisheil  nothing  of  real  value  in  the  preparation 
of  the  lake  jjosts  for  defen--e  during  the  two  months  he  had  been  in 
commantl  of  the  tle'partment,  and  was  still  at  Albau)-  when  Schuyler 
returned,  lie  had  niadi.' a  reciuisition  upon  Washington  for  tents,  and 
when  the  commai,der-in-chief  rei)lieil.  "  .\s  thi;  northern  troops  are 
hutted,  the  tents  must  be  used  for  southern  troops  until  a  supply  can 
be  obtained,"  he  answered,  "  Refusing  this  army  what  you  have  not 
in  your  power  is  one  thing  ;  but  saying  that  this  army  has  not  the 
same  necessities  as  the  southern  army  is  another.  I  can  assure  your 
excellency  the  service  of  the  northern  army  requires  tents  as  much 


I777. 


lU'KCOVNI-.  S   C.\MI'.\1i;N'    (H'KNKl). 


3" 


.H  ;iii\'  sorvicc  I  ever  saw."  I'o  Mr.  I.mvcII,  nt  tlu'  New  ICni^l.md 
(Iclejjatiiin,  ]\c  wrote,  "  I'".itlier  I  am  e\eeeiliii;_;Iy  iliill,  or  unreasonably 
jealous,  it' I  do  not  discover  hy  tlie  s'yie  ami  tenor  ot"  tlie  letters  troni 
IMurristown,  how  little  I  have  to  e.Kpect  from  thence,  (ieiier.ils  are 
like  par.sons,  they  are  all  for  christenin;.^  their  own  chiKl  llrst ;  Init  let 
an  imparti.il  modcr.itin^i;  power  decitle  between  us,  aiul  do  not  sutTer 
soullurn  prejuilice  to  wei;^)!  heavier  in  tiie  balance  than  the  northein." 
In  connection  with  this  outcroi)[)in;4  of  an  api)i-al  to  sectii)nal  fceliniJ 
which  was  tile  exact  couuter[)art  ot  that  exhibited  by  Lee  while  he  was 
at  New  Castle  llei;^dits,  it  is  only  necessary  to  s.iy  that  Washiiii^ton 
used  the  term  soittlurn  only  as  comparin;^  the  operations  of  two  ljco- 
^raphical  ilepartments,  and  not  in  any  personal  •^en^e.  He  statetl  a 
militar\-  tact,  without  urL^ument,  and  the  comluct  of  Gates  is  selt- 
inter[)retinL;. 

(Jn  the  ninth  of  June,  (iates  took  leave  of  .il)sence  and  left  the 
department. 

Schuyler  ordered  all  forts  to  be  put  in  condition  for  service, 
appCidetl  to  the  States  to  forwaid  their  militia,  and  on  the  twentieth 
proceetled  to  inspect  the  imperiled  posts  for  himself.  Generals  St. 
Clair.  De  Rocheternio)',  Poor  and  P.ittersoii  were  then  a^  Ticon- 
dcroga.  The  L;arrison  of  that  [)ost  and  of  Mount  Indepeutlence  com- 
bined amounted  Ut  only  twent\--t"ive  hundrei!  and  torty-si.x  conti- 
neiila}  tioops,  incluilini^  artisans,  and  about  nine  hundred  militia.  A 
council  oi  i;eneral  oificers  concurred  in  the  opinion  that  the  troops 
were  inadequate  to  protracted  defense,  but  that  the  pijsts  should  be 
maintained,  if  i)ossible,  until  the  arrival  ot  reintorcenients,  or  until  the 


stores  ai 


id  ti 


roops  could  l)e  sate!)'  withdrawn. 


It 


was  considered   iiii- 


praiticablc  to  tortity  Su_L;ar  Loaf  Hill.  The  troops  could  not  well  be 
.spared,  it  is  true  ;  but  tiie  possibility  of  its  occupation  b\'  a  hostile 
force  w.is  not  considered  a  serious  (juestion  of  fact. 

During  this  trip  General  Schuyler  t\)un'.l  the  coiulition  of  the  troops 
to  be  beyond  his  worst  apprehensions.  The  clothint^  was  iie.uly 
worn  out,  military  supplies  other  than  pork  .iiid  tlour  had  not  accu- 
mulated as  anticipated,  the  number  of  bayonets  did  not  exceed  a  few 
hundred,  and  there  was  very  little  to  encouraL;e  the  expectations 
which  the  country  entertained  as  to  the  ultimate  strength  of  Ticon- 
deroga  as  a  real  fortress. 

Gener.d  Schuyler  returned  to  .\lbany  to  hasten  forward  additional 
troops.     General  St.  Clair,  still   hopeful  of  iiis  ability  to  resist  assault, 


iM.: 


M 


:i 


m 


:!  I 


r 


1' 


i^'it 


^ 


3'-' 


IU'K(i«i\M:  S   (AMIAICN"    DPKNKD. 


f'777. 


wrote  t')  liim  on  the  I.ist  of  June.  "  shoiilil  tlu-  I'luiny  attack  ii-^,  they 
will  ^o  l)ack  faster  than  thoy  eainc." 

Silniylcr's  own  ai(.l-ile-cam|).  Major  Iknr)'  15.  I.iviiv^^ton.  who 
remaiiieil  at  TicondenM^a  sick,  when  he  left,  wrote  in  a  similar  strain. 
General  Sciuiyler  was  less  sanguine,  aiul  wrote  to  Colonel  Varick  on 
the  first  of  Iul>-  : 

"  TiU'  insufficiency  of  the  fjarrlson  at  Ticonderoj^a,  the  imperfect 
state  of  tlu'  fortifications,  and  the  want  of  discipline  in  tiie  troops, 
•five  me  Ljreat  cause  to  apprehend  that  we  shall  lose  that  fortress,  but 
as  a  reinforcement  is  comint;  up  from  Peekskill,  with  which  I  shall 
move  up.  I  am  in  hopes  that  the  enemy  will  be  i)reventeil  from  any 
farther  pro;^ress." 

The  departure  of  General  Schuyler  from  Ticonderocja  without 
effectual  jjrovision  f)r  the  contini^ency of  its  ahanilonmeiit,  or  waitinj^j 
to  test  its  capacity  for  defense,  was  the  subject  of  grave  criticism,  and 
resultetl  in  a  Court  of  Iiujuiry.  That  court  consisted  of  Major-gen- 
eral Lincoln,  Hrigadier-geiierals  Nixon,  George  Clinton  (the  only  one 
from  Scluij'ler's  State).  Wayne  uiul  Muhlenburg,  and  Colonels  John 
(ireaton,  I'r.uicis  Johnson.  Rufus  I'utuam,  Mordecai  Gist,  William 
Russell,  William  Gr.iyson,  Walter  Stewart,  and  R.  J,  Meigs,  with 
John  Lawrens  as  Judge  Advocate  ;  antl  found  "  that  Major-general 
Philip  Schuyler  was  not  guilty  of  neglect  of  duty,  and  is  actpiitted 
with  the  highest  honor." 

The  fall  of  Ticonderoga  was  peculiarly  aggravating  to  this  officer, 
as  he  hati  sent  slooi)s  to  Pcekskill  for  the  troops  which,  as  before 
noticed,  l\ad  been  orderetl  by  Washington  to  his  aid,  ami  on  the  fifth 
lie  wrote  to  Congress,  "  If  they  do  not  arrive  by  to-morrow,  I  shall  go 
on  without  them,  and  do  t.j  best  I  can  with  the  militia."  He 
marched  on  the  seventh  with  all  the  militia  he  could  assemble,  but 
the  activity  of  Burgoync  had  anticipatetl  the  movement,  and  the 
lintish  troops  wire  again  in  possession  of  all  posts  on  Lake  Champlain. 


'i    r 


If  :i  .. 


fUlVX- 


r: _ ^■^"('fh  ■:9\^:,      'S'Av^ 

V^'j^^....  ;^<^,>f-:-   -v-.-t^v^ 


1     \''ifiw-fAi/fM,J 


11  NllIWlWStOK 

'/■  vn/ers  ii/(,'u/'.  Slurh.hio  /jfV///. 


Mohawk  Rivcr 

Albany- 


<'o/np//of/  ffm/  JJniu-/fl)i/('o/y'mTiii[i/on, 


i: , 

{  \  ■    W' 
id     ■  t'..  i 


m 


Jr.'*', 


'1  ^^nw 

u      i 

'  i   mSSSt 

8  J  ii  - 

'■  I  i  3h||Ie 

#> '  ^^BHfcTjBii 

\  ;,'fl      '^flH^Klnfi 

■1  Y- 

WBm 

III 

o 


CIIAPTI'LR    XLIV. 

FROM   TICOXOKROCA    TO   FORT    IIDWARD.     1777. 

N  he  mornincj  of  July  fifth,  1777,  tliu  Ihitish  occupation  of 
Sii!4ar  Loaf  Hill  Ljave  warnirifj  to  the  garrison  of  Ticonclcrof»a 
liiat  it  lay  ,it  tlu;  nicicy  of  the  enein\'.  Previous  to  that  occupation, 
tlu'  ihitish  had  been  drawn  closely  about  the  fort,  and  the  c^arrison 
looked  forward  to  an  assault,  with  real  courage  and  hope.  It  was  very 
evident,  however,  on  the  fifth,  that  the  [lost  must  fall  without  the 
credit  of  real  resistance.  .\  council  of  war  fully  consideretl  the  con- 
dition of  aff  lirs,  and  resr)lvcd  that  "  retreat  ouyht  to  be  undertaken  as 
soon  ,is  possible,  and  that  we  shall  be  fortunate  to  effect  it."  The 
possiViility  of  niaintainin^i  the  post  on  Mount  Independence  was  more 
than  counterbalanced  bv  the  certainty  that  the  liritis.i  wouli!  control 
South  river,  antl  cut  off  all  supjilies  from  New  Encjland  and  New 
York.  General  Ricdesel  liad  already  swung  his  left  wing  to  the  rear, 
and  eastward  of  the  latter  post,  and  the  south  face  of  Mount  Inde- 
pendence alone  remained  open  to  .American  forces. 

It  was  not  initil  after  dark  that  the  army  was  notilieil  of  the  deter- 
mination of  its  officers.  The  invalids,  ammunition,  and  a  l.irge  quan- 
tity of  commissary  stores  were  placeil  upon  two  hundred  and  twenty 
bateaux,  then  lying  in  .South  river  below  the  bridge,  and  these  were 
started  for  Skenesborough  under  Colonel  Long,  then  post  commander 
of  Ticondcroga. 

Lights  were  extinguished  at  the  usual  hour,  and  occasional  firing 
.  xs  maintained  from  the  summit  of  Mount  Independence,  upon  the 
new  works  upon  .Sugar  Loaf  1  lill,  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of  the 
usual  garrison  habits  and  activities,  and  to  indicate  a  purpose  to  con- 
test the  supremacy  of  the  so-called  Fort  Defiance. 

The  retreat  began  at  three  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  July  sixth, 
and  the  arrangements  for  its    execution  were  eminently  judicious. 


.-jii...*..- 


i 


''i   . 


314 


I'koM    'riCONI^KROOA    Td    FORT    KDWAKD. 


[1777. 


The  hoavy  L;iins  liad  been  si)ikcil,  but  the  truiini(Mis  were  not  IsUocked 
off,  lest  the  oHck  of  the  sleilLjes  should  !)e  borne  uu  the  ni^ht  air  to 
the  watchful  eneinw  and  Ljive  waniini;'  of  the  attempt  to  escape.  The 
ni^ht  was  still,  and  a  partial  moon  diniK' liL;litetl  the  mountain  sum- 
mits, wliile  the  shadows  deepened  under  .Mount  Independence,  just 
where  thebrith^e  was  waitini^  to  perform  its  last  office  for  its  builders. 
The  liritish  j^unsmade  no  res[)onse  to  the  firin;j;  of  the  Americans,  and 
as  soon  ,is  Colonel  Lonj^'s  command,  w  ith  the  American  llotilla,  had 
started  on  its  wa\-,  (ieneral  St.  Cl.iir  took  up  his  march  for  Castleton. 
No  other  e\-ideace  is  required  to  show  the  skill  with  which  these 
troops  began  their  disheartenin;^'  retreat,  than  the  sini^le  fact  that  the 
entire  L;'arrison  safely  crossed  the  bridge.  At  tlu>  most  critical 
moment,  when  tin;  last  detachment  was  clear  of  the  fort,  and  the 
troo[)s  on  Mount  Independence  had  desccntleil  its  southern  slope,  the 
house  which  had  been  occupied  b\'  (jeneral  f)e  l'"ermoy  (signed  De 
Rochefermov)  was  fire'.'  in  contravention  of  orders,  ami  the  whole 
scene  was  illuminated  f)r  the  inf)rination  of  the  besiegers. 

The  most  acli\e  measures  were  at  once  taken  in  pursuit.  Day- 
light w.is  ju>t  coming  on.  General  I'hilli})s  pushed  General  Fraser 
with  a  tl>"ing  column  after  the  retiring  Americans,  left  the  Sixty-second 
British  regiment  as  a  garrison,  and  embarked  his  own  division  upon 
ships  to  accompany  Bm'go}-ne  in  pursuit  of  the  .Vmerican  shipping, 
(ieneral  Riedesel  placed  the  Bruns>.vick  regiment  of  Prince  Frederick 
in  garrison  on  Mount  Independence,  and  followed  General  I'raser 
with  three  battalions  to  give  him  supjjort  in  the  pursuit.  Commodore 
Lutwidge.  with  .1  party  of  seamen,  soon  cut  a  [)assage  through  the 
bridge,  and  IhirgoN'ue,  with  the  Inllexible  and  Ro\-al  ("rcorge  frigates 
and  the  swiftest  of  the  gun-bo^its,  was  moving  up  South  river  before 
nine  o'clock.  This  lloating  column,  constituting  the  right  wing  of  the 
British  army,  reached  Skenesborough  only  two  hours  later  than  tlie 
Americans,  and  at  once  begcUi  the  attack.  A  brief  resistance  was 
made  near  the  falls  where  Wood  creek  enters  into  South  river.  The 
British  destro\-ed  all  that  the  Americans  did  not  burn,  including  all 
the  supplies  which  had  been  saved  with  so  much  cue.  Tile  Ninth, 
Twi  ntieth,  and  Twenty-fu'st  iiriii-,h  regiments  were  landed,  ascended 
the  mountains,  and  made  a  iletour  to  turn  a  small  fort  which  had  been 
built  to  command  the  passage  at  Wood  creek,  but  it  was  abandoned 
by  the  Americans  without  resistance.  Mills,  storehouses,  and  other 
valuable  property  which  had  been  accumulated  at  this  station  were 
soon  destroyed. 


«777.] 


FROM    riC()Nl)l:K()(;A   TO   ¥(^RT  EDWARD. 


315 


By  reference  to  the  map,  "  Ikirijoyi'.e's  Sarato^ja  Campaign,"  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  ri<;ht  wiiiL^  of  the  Jiritish  army  had  thus  L^ained 
an  advance  upon  General  St.  Clair,  as  Ca>tIeton  was  nearly  thirty 
miles  south-east  from  ricontleroL^a,  and  nearly  twelve  miles  north-east 
from  Skenesborouyh,  so  that  General  Hur_L;(i\'ne  folloucd  the  base  of 
the  trianj^le  of  which  Castleton  w.is  the  apex,  and  made  a  ijuick  trip 
by  water,  while  St.  Clair  maile  a  tedious  march  over  land,  throu<;h  an 
almost  pathless  wilderness. 

Colonel  Lon^  landed  his  battalion  abmit  three  o'clocl<:  in  the  after- 
noon, antl  upon  the  appro,lch  of  the  British  ships,  m.irched  directly  to 
Fort  Anil,  a  ilistance  of  eleven  miles  to  the  south.  Lieutenant  Colo- 
nel Hill  and  Major  l'\)rbes,  of  the  IJritish  Ninth  reL,dmcnt,  followed  and 
sjjiint  the  ni;4lit  bivouacked  in  the  woods  within  three  miles  of  that 
post.  General  .Sciuiyler  was  then  at  I*"ort  lldw.ird,  about  thirteen 
n\iles  further  to  the  south,  on  the  lludst)n  river. 

Me  promptly  sent  a  reinforcement  to  l''ort  Ann,  and  early  in  the 
morning;  of  the  seventh  Colonel  Lon;^  advanced  to  a  ravine  three  miles 
north  of  the  fort,  where  Colonel  Hill  had  spent  tiie  night,  and  attacked 
his  command.  Major  Forbjs  thus  tlescribes  the  attack,  in  evidence 
laid  before  the  House  of  Commons,  page  61  of  official  documents, 
relating  to  IJurgojne's  e.vpedition. 

"  y\t  half  past  ten  in  the  morning,  they  attacked  us  in  front  wit 
a  heavy  and  well  directed  fire.  A  large  body  of  them  passed  u\->  the 
creek  to  our  left  and  fired  from  a  thick  wood  across  the  creek  on  the 
ieft  llaid-:  of  the  regiment;  then  they  began  to  recross  the  creek  and 
attack  us  in  the  rear.  We  then  founil  it  necessarj-  to  change  our 
ground  to  prevent  the  regiment  being  surrounded.  We  took  post  on 
the  top  of  a  high  hill  to  our  right.  As  soon  as  we  h.iJ  taken  post, 
the  enem^  .iiade  a  very  vigorous  attack  and  they  certainly  would  have 
forced  us,  had  it  not  been  for  some  Indians  that  arrived  and  gave  the 
Indian  whoop." 

General  Powell  had  been  dispatched  by  Gener.d  Burgoyne  with 
two  regiments,  .is  well  as  the  Indian  au.xiliaries,  to  the  support  of 
Lieutenant  Cole  nel  Hill,  and  the  American  troops  retreated  under 
the  pressure  of  superior  numbers,  burned  Fort  Ann,  and  then  retired 
to  F'ort   F  ... .wd. 

General  Phillips,  who  had  accompanied  the  British  right  wing  as 
far  as  Skenesborough,  returned  to  Ticondcrog.i  and  commenced  the 
removal  of  artillery,  ammunition  and  provisions  to  Fort  George,  with 
all  other  heavy  baggage  which  could  be  more  readily  moved  by  water 


.1  '     , 


316 


IKOM    riCoNDKROC.A  TO  FORT   r:i)\VAKn. 


[I777. 


transportation  ;  wliile  runcral  l?ur;.;oyne  cstabli.^licd  liis  liuachjuartcrs 
at  Skcncsborou!j;h  to  await  tiic  iiiDvenicnts  of  the  left  win;^,  to  rest 
his  troops  and  organize  for  a  further  atlvancc. 

The  Biitish  left  win;^  followed  the  American  line  of  retreat.  Colo- 
nel Francis,  commantling  the  American  rear-i^iiard,  left  Mount  Inde- 
pendetice  about  four  o'clock  on  the  mornint:;  of  the  sixth.  St.  Clair 
moved  thrmij^h  the  forests  with  such  e.\pedition  tiiat  his  advance 
reaciietl  llubbardton  quite  early  in  the  afternoon.  Leaving;  Colonel 
Warner  with  one  hundreil  and  fifty  nun,  to  collect  straj^'^lers  and 
await  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Francis,  he  hastened  forw.ird  and  reacheil 
Castleton,  six  miles  further  south,  the  same  niL;!".t. 

General  Fraser  marcheil  seventeen  miles  on  the  sixth  and  halted, 
General  Riedesel  being  at  that  time  only  three  miles  in  his  rear.  "  At 
the  earliest  d.i\'-li;_jht,  or  a  little  before,"  he  promptly  renewed  the 
pursuit.  Colonel  l'"rancis  had  joined  Colonel  Warner  on  tlie  previous 
evening;  and  their  entiie  force',  totjcthcr  with  the  regiment  of  Colonel 
Hale,  which  also  came  up  from  the  rear,  amounted  to  nearly  thirteen 
hundred  men.  They  resolved  to  await  (general  Fraser's  approach 
and  i^ive  battle.  The  American  troops  occupied  a  plateau  between 
Castleton  creek  and  one  of  its  dependent  forks  which  offered  an  eligible 
site  for  defense.  General  Fraser's  command  descemled  a  long  slo[ie 
to  the  creek  and  were  compelled  to  ascend  directly  ujion  the  plateau, 
in  order  to  meet  the  .Vmericans  on  ecpial  terms.  The  latter  did  not 
await  the  attack,  but  ujion  the  alarm  of  the  pickets  met  them  promptly 
and  with  vigor.  A  sharj)  skirmish  ensued.  Colonel  Hale,  himself  an 
invalid,  (subsetpiently  acquitted  of  the  charge  of  cowardice)  with  his 
poorly  disciplined  regiment,  abandoned  the  fielil  [)recipitately,  and 
iled  in  the  direction  of  Castleton;  so  that  the  whole  burden  of  the 
fight  dev<ilved  upon  Colonels  Francis  ami  Warner,  who  were  left  with 
a  force  of  not  more  than  nine  hundred  men.  The  command  of  Gen- 
eral l-'raser  is  officially  reported  at  eight  hundred  and  fifty-eight.  The 
Americans,  ho^ly  pressed  as  they  were,  took  prompt  atlvantage  of 
Jailing  tiiTiDcr  and  all  other  obstructions  which  gave  effect  to  individual 
skill  with  the  rifle,  and  Stedman  thus  compliments  their  good  conduct : 
"  The  Americans  maintained  their  post  with  great  resolution  and 
bravery.  The  reinforcements  (Ricdesel's),  did  not  arrive  so  soon  as 
expected,  and  victory  was  for  a  long  time  doubtful." 

The  advance  of  Fraser  was  as  spirited  as  the  unexpected  resist- 
ance was  obstinate.  He  entered  the  action  with  the  confidence  that 
his  supports  were  close  at   hand,  and  very  nearly  paid  the  penalty 


I777-] 


FROM   TICONDEROGA   TO    FORT    HDWAKI). 


iW 


wliich  subsc(iuciitly  fell  upon  M.iuin  at  I^ciiniiv^ton.  The  l'..iil  Bal- 
carras,  who  was  sli.L;lUly  woundcil  (Uiriiii;  the  civ^af^cmont,  was  ad- 
v.iiiccii  on  the  iiij;ht  lo  occuj))-  t!u;  Castlcton  road  and  cut  n\(  the 
retreat.  The  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Americans  e\])osed  liis 
detachment  to  be  cut  off.  wlien  at  the  critical  moment,  tienera!  Rie- 
desel  moved  over  the  hill  and  came  on  ra[)idly  with  three  battalions, 
music  i)Iayint^,  and  amid  loud  cheers  of  his  men.  This  new  force  pro- 
lont^eil  itself  upon  l-'rascr's  left,  .iscended  the  plateau  with  fi.xed  bay- 
onets, turned  the  American  ri;4ht,  and  compelled  its  immeiliate 
retreat.  Some  tied  to  Rutland,  others  over  the  mountains  to  Pitt.s- 
ford,  and  about  two  hundred  were'  taken  prisoners.  C(jlopel  Francis 
was  killeil.  Colonel  Warner  retired  to  Rutland  with  a  remnant  of  his 
force,  and  joined  General  St.  Clair  two  days  after  with  ei_L;hty  men. 
The  latter  officer  heard  the  firin;^  and  jiromptly  sent  orders  to  two 
militia  rej^iments  whicli  were  between  Castleton  and  Ilubb.irdton  to 
return  to  that  place  to  support  Col.mel  Warner,  but  instead  of  obedi- 
ence to  the  order,  they  only  ipiickened  their  march  to  Castleton.  St. 
Clair  had  previously  sent  an  order  to  Colonel  \^'arner.  that  "  if  he 
fouiKJ  the  enem>'  pursuini;'  him  too  hotly  and  in  force,  he  must  join 
him  .it  Rutland."  This  place  was  selected  as  the  rendezvous,  having; 
just  heard  of  15ur;4oyne's  occupation  of  SkencsborouL^h,  '•  because 
Rutland  was  at  nearly  ecpi.d  distances  from  both  places,"  This  onler 
did  Mot  re. ich  Colonel  Warner,  The  defection  of  ll.de  h.ul  forced  him 
to  so  close  .1  fiLjlit  th.it  it  enii.nl  onl\-  in  the  dis[)ersion  of  his  conmiand. 
The  only  .iltern.itive  w.is  its  c.ipture. 

The  British  casualties  aniounteil  to  one  hundred  and  eighty-three 
in  killed  and  wounded,  includiiv^  .M.ijor  (ir.mt,  who  led  the  first 
attack.  The  IJrunswickers  lost  but  twent\-two  men,  as  the  action  w.is 
closed  almost  as  soon  as  they  -gained  the  American  ri_ij;ht,  and  their 
prompt  advance  carried  with  it  the  impression  that  .i  still  lar;.;er  force 
was  eni^a;^red  in  the  pursuit  of  the  .\merican  army.  Tiie  .\mericaus 
lost  in  killeil  fort)'  ofricers  and  men,  .md  tlie  tot.il  c.isu.ilties  inchuliiiL;; 
wounded  .md  prisoners  was  about  three  hundred  and  si.xty.  The 
entire  dispersion  of  the  commantl  s^ave  currency  to  cxai^gerated  esti- 
mates of  the  numbers  enya;^'ed  and  of  the  losses  incurretl ;  but  the 
capture  of  Colonel  Hale's  regiment  iluring  its  retreat,  swelled  the 
number  of  prisoners,  so  that  the  report  of  General  Burgoyne  is  recon- 
cilable with  the  facts,  when  the  entire  skirmish  near  Ilubbardton  is 
taken  into  the  account.  This  fact  also  reconciles  all  conflicts  which 
have  entered  into  previous  reports  of  the  battle. 


Hi 

t  r 


■*tiu 


3iS 


i-k<nr  tu(>ni)|-;k(i(;\  to  fort  kuwakd. 


['777. 


(  )n  the  tenth  '>f  July,  (^'lural  ISiiri^oyiie  issiuil  a  l^ciicimI  order, 
bc'L.;innin;:,f  as  follow  •^;  "  Thr  rcluls  evacuated  Ticondcio^a  on  the 
sixth,  havin^^'  btcii  forced  into  tlu'  measure  !))•  the  ])re^Mlre  <)f  mir 
army.  (Jii  one  side  of  the  lake  the)'  ran  as  far  as  Skenesl)oroii;_;h  ; 
on  the  other  side  as  far  as  llubbardton.  I'hey  left  behind  all  their 
■irtillery.  provisions,  and  ba;_;'j;a;4e."  (BurL;oyne's  report  of  thi'  stores 
cajjtuied  at  Ticonderoi^a  includ.ed  349,760  pounds  of  Hour,  and 
143,830  pniiiids  of  s.ilt  i)i(n'isions.)  lie  also  summoned  the  people 
of  cert. nil  desi^n.ited  townships  to  return  to  their  alleL^iance,  makin;^ 
'■  Colonel  Skene  "  the  representative-  of  the  (,a-o\vn  in  their  beh, df,  fix- 
iW'^  the  fiftee-nth  of  the  month  as  tin-  d,iy  for  such  sul)mi.-->ion, 
"  umler  pain  of  milit.iry  execution  on  tailure  lo  pay  obetlience  to  such 
order." 

On  the  thirteenth,  (jeneral  Schuyler,  then  .it  l''ort  IMward,  issued 
;i  counter  jirockimition,  declarin;j^  "  .ill  to  be  tr.iitdrs  who  should  in 
.in_\'  \v.i\-  assist,  ;^ive  comfort  to,  or  hold  correspondence  with,  or  t.ike 
protection  from  the  enem\- ;  comm mded  .i!I  officers,  civil  .luA  military, 
to  apprehend  nv  c.iuse  to  be  .apprehended  such  offenders,  ,iiid  closed 
with  the  demand,  th.it  the  militia  of  tlie  townships  to  which  General 
]SurLjo\-nc'scircu!.ir  w.is  addressed,  who  had  not  marched,  should  do  so 
without  del.ij-.  and  join  his  army  or  some  det.achmcnt  thereof." 

On  the  tenth.  General  .Schiixder  bej^an  a  systematic  eifort  to  obt.iin 
control  of  all  live  >tock  and  ,ind  ■^ta[)Ie  sui)plies  which  belon_L,'ed  to  the 
country  thre.itened  b)  15ar;4oyne,  and  .itte'mpted  to  make  the  entire 
route  from  Skenesborou;^]!  to  l'"ort  Mil w. ml  .is  nearly  impassable  >is 
human  skill  could  do  it.  Lar^a;  trees  were  felled  .ilon;^  all  trails  or 
natur.il  road.^.  creeks  were  choked  with  timber  and  branches,  so  ;is  to 
m.ike  them  overllow  and  deej)en  the  marshes,  all  britJL^es  were 
destroyed,  some  sm.iU  streams  were  div'erted  in  their  course  so  as  to 
imp.iir  tr.ivel  ;  and  such  w.is  the  success  of  this  l.iborious  undertaking; 
that  (jener.il  Huri;oyne  fjund  himself  compelled  to  buiid  forty  new 
brid^^es,  besides  the  re[)air  of  oi^l  cros-,in;^s,  and  in  one  in-it.mce  to  lay 
a  timber  c.iusew.iv  of  two  miles  before  he  c<juld  move  his  column. 


11 


le   correspondence 


f  Schuyler    with    Washington  during;  thi.' 


period  was  full  of  hope,  and  the  confidence  was  mutual  .md  un.ibated, 
notwithstanding  the  retreat  from  'l"iconderoi,M  w.is  a  re.d  dis.ister,  and 
full  of  discourai^eirK-'iit  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence.  .Subseipieiitly 
a  Court  of  IiKiuiry  and  Congress  itself  affirmed  the  i)ropriety  of  th.it 
retreat. 

A  single  fact  is  mentioned  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  which  deserves 


'777j 


FROM    1  l(i)NlJi:K()(iA    TO    KOK  P    KDWAKI). 


3'9 


a  place  ill  this  connection,  inasmuch  as  all  kinds  of  political  ami  social 
yossip  about  tin-  (ionL-rals  of  tlu-  war  of  1776-1781,  iiavc  been  made 
pivot  points  fir  judi^ment  of  military  conduct.  Marshall  thus  rcconis 
the  fact  referred  to.  "  In  this  l;Iooui\'  state'  of  thin;^^s  it  is  iin[)ossible 
that  an\-  officer  eouUl  have  used  more  diJiLjence  (jr  jud_L^nient  lii  ui  was 
displayed  by  .Scliu>ler." 

Chief  Justice  Kent  antl  Daniel  Webster  have  also  left  on  record 
the  most  po>iti\'e  tril)ute  t(j  the  unselfish  patriotism,  wonderful  eiier'^y 
and  (jxecutive  ability  of  this  officer  ;  the  latter  usiii;^'  tiie  followiiiLj 
somewhat  enthusiastic  l.uv^ni  i;4e :  "  I  wa-^  brouLjht  up  with  New 
I'^UL^land  prejudices  a;_;ainst  him;  but  I  consider  him  ,is  secoiul  only 
to  W'ashiiv^noii  ill  the  services  he  renilered  to  the  countr)-  in  the  war 
of  the  Revolution."  These  services,  however,  embraced  his  wise 
management  as  su[)eriiitendent  of  the  Indian  affiirs  of  the  north,  as 
well  as  the  more  limited  sphere  of  his  militar}- duty,  which  are  to  be 
judi^ed  by  their  own  merits." 

Washiui^ton  seemed  almost  to  anticipate  the  .iffair  ;it  Hennin;^ton, 
while  all  others  were  disheartened.  (  )n  the  twent\'-second  of  Jul}', 
he  wrote  to  Scliuvler  :  ••  Thoui^h  our  .iff.iirs  have  for  sonic  days  past 
worn  ,1  dark  and  ;_jloomv  aspect,  I  yet  look  forward  to  a  fortunate  and 
h.ippy  change.  I  trust  General  BurL^oyne's  army  will  meet  s<>oner  or 
Liter  an  imjxirtant  check,  and  as  I  have  sugL^ested  before  (letter  of 
July  I5tli)  that  the  succe>s  he  has  had  will  precipitate  his  ruin.  l'"roin 
your  accounts  he  apjiears  to  be  pursuiiii^  that  line  of  conduct  which 
of  all  others  I?,  most  favorable  to  us:  I  mean  actin;^  in  detachments. 
This  conduct  u  ill  certain!)'  L^ive  room  for  enterprise  on  our  part  and 
e.\pose  his  ])arties  to  [^reat  hazard.  Could  we  be  so  happy  as  to  cut 
one  of  them  off,  thoir^h  it  shouUl  not  exceed  four,  five  or  ^i.\  hundreil 
men,  it  wouUl  inspirit  the  people  and  do  away  much  of  this  present 
anxiety.  In  such  an  event  they  would  lose  si|.,dit  of  past  misfortunes  ; 
and,  lU'L^ed  at  the  same  time  b\'  <i  res^ard  for  their  own  security,  they 
would  tl\'  to  arms  and  affonl  ever}-  aid  in  their  power." 

( )n  the  thirtieth  of  Jul}-,  l)ur;^M))'ne  reached  I'"ort  Hdward.  General 
Schuyler  had  withdrawn  the  j^.irrison  from  I-'ort  Geori^e,  after  destro)-- 
ing  the  fort  ;  and  having  first  retired  to  Saratoga,  afterw.irds  established 
his  camp  at  .Stillwater,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mohawk  river.  Colon  i 
Warner  was  at  Manchester  recruiting  his  command  and  watching  for 
an  opportunity  to  ass.iil  Buigo\-iie"s  re.ir.  Glover  and  Ni.xon  had 
joined  with  less  than  a  thousand  men.  Two  thousand  militia  from 
Massachusetts,  sent  to  supply  the  places  of   others  whose  term  of 


'i 


'    I-. 


I' 


FROM    TIC(^N'I)I;R0G.\    'If)    KORT    KDWARO. 


H  J? 


i: 


\' 


M 


^1>'    ^3 


I1777 


siTvico  hiul  nearly  expired,  rctuniocl  homo  in  a  botly,  and  the  liarvest 
season  was  so  ex.ictin;^  in  its  demands  tli.it  it  seemed  as  if  no  larye 
force  could  be  perni.mently  maintained.  Upon  Svluiyler's  urgent 
request  that  an  active  gener.U  officer  be  sent  to  cooperate  in  raising 
troops,  Arnold  was  selected  ;  but  the  critical  condition  of  the  main 
army,  growinc;  out  of  the  uncertainty  of  (leneral  Howe's  movements, 
rendered  it  impossible  for  Washinijton  to  spare  any  considerable  force 
for  the  nnrthcrn  departmi'iit. 

Burgoyne  himself  had  been  [greatly  embarrassed  during  the  last 
two  weeks  <if  July  b)- the  increasing  bmxlens  under  which  his  small 
army  labored,  lie  urged  upon  General  Carleton  that  a  portion  of 
the  three  thousand  regular  troops  still  in  Canada  should  be  detailed 
as  garrison  for  Ticonderoga,  but  th.it  officer  had  no  latitude  in  his 
instructions  from  the  crown,  and  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  accetle  to 
the  re(]uest.  Gener.il  Kiedesel,  who  had  m.ule  some  demonstrations 
into  the  New  1  Iamp.shire  ( Ir.ints,  lA'ermont),  conceived  the  impression 
that  the  people  were  (piite  friendly  to  the  British  cause,  and  initiated 
.1  plan  to  i)r()eure  horses  and  mount  his  dragoons,  who  were  still  doing 
inf.mtry  duty. 

C)n  the  twenty-ninth  of  Jul\'.  General  Phillips  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing l'"ort  George  with  the  first  consignment  of  milit.iry  stores,  and  the 
practic.il  difficulties  of  the  great  separation  of  the  army  from  its  b.ise 
began  to  unfold  their  lesions. 

The  small  garrison  at  Castlcton  and  Skenesborough  had  been 
withdrawn  when  General  Riedesei  joined  15urgo\-ne,  so  th.it  the  onlv 
rem.iining  communication  with  Ticonderoga  w.is  through  Lake 
George  ;  and  the  g.irrisuii  of  the  former  place  was  less  than  the  strength 
of  a  full  b.ittaiion.  The  expedition  of  ."-^t.  Leg^r  h  ul  reached  Oswego, 
but  no  definite  information  had  been  received  as  to  its  progress  or 
prospects. 

Tlu>  detention  of  General  Riedesei  at  Castlcton  had  been  pro- 
tracted on  account  of  the  wounded  men  who  could  not  be  reinoved 
from  Bennington  to  Ticonderoga  after  the  battle  at  the  fi)rmer  pi. ice. 

All  efforts  "o  org.inize  a  New  England  battalion  of  Royalists 
dragged  slowly,  and  the  Indi.in  auxiliaries  began  to  become  un- 
manageable, so  that  at  the  end  of  one  month  after  the  occupation  of 
Ticonderoga,  the  Ihatish  army  was  but  entering  upon  the  serious 
duties  of  the  campaign,  and  the  American  army  u-as  in  no  suitable 
condition  to  resist  its  progress.  The  practical  success  thus  far  realized, 
had  however  inured  to  the  benefit  of  the  royal  troops.     15oth  armies 


'777] 


FROM    ■|'IC()Nni;KO(;A    I'o    roRT    KDWARI). 


321 


watclied  with  solicitude  the  movcncnts  of  General  Howe.  General 
Sciiuxler  took  advantage  of  the  reduced  garrison  at  Ticonderos^fa  to 
disp.itch  General  I,incf)ln  into  New  F.iv^dand  for  the  purpose  of  rais- 
ing troops  to  make  an  attem()t  to  regain  that  post  and  cut  off  Bur- 
goyne's  conuiiunicatit)ns  with  Canaiki,  and  tiien  once  more  re- 
organized his  camp,  upon  the  islands  a  little  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Mohawk  river,  and  continued  his  impcjrtunate  re<iuisitions  for  rein- 
forcements. Such,  substantially,  was  the  condition  of  the  northern 
campaign  on  the  first  of  August,  \~~~. 

r.Knisii  Ij-KicnvK  l-\)U(i:. 
NoiK.     rmin  "  Origiiuil  ri'tui;i^  in  tlu-  Mrili-li  Rt'cunl  OlTicc'."     Date,  June  3d,  1777. 


Jkk^i  V. 

]'>iili>li  Arlilli'iy 385 

"         (  avaliy 711) 

"         Iiif;iiitry S361 

Ik's-;!;!!!       "      330J 

An>]iacli      "      1043 


Nl  w    ViiKK. 

lirili^h    Inf;iiilry 

Artillery 

llci.>iaii  Infantry      


I3.7'W 
Si.\ii:n  Tsr.ANn. 

r)riti>li   Int'.intry 515 

Arlilkry II 

Waldfck  Infantry 330 

I'Afl.fS  H<iOK. 

British  Infantry 360 


1513 
20 

177S 

3.311 


RlldUK    INLAND. 

lirilisli  Inf.'.iitry 1064 

IIc»iaii       "       14<)(J 

Uritish  Artillery 71 

2631 
Total  of  the  army 2o,<)57 


]M>Kr.;GN  Tkiioi's  in  Amkkica. 


IJt'ssian. . 

Anspach. 

Waldeck. 


12.777 
1.293 


Total I4.74« 

21 


f>,. 


r^\- 


CIIAPTIvR    XLV. 


FORT    sent  \  1.1, K,    ^)|<|SK\\^•    AM)    |;|  A  M  N( ;  |(  )\.      1777. 


,«')'! 


:ifim 


ff, 


I^ill'".  iiiiiiitli  (il  Aip^iist,  1777,  (1cvc1m|)i'1  and  tuiu  liulfd  tin;  cKpc- 
(lilniii  of  (■oiiiiicl  St.  Lr;.;('r  to  tlu'  v.illcv  .>!'  the  MulMuk  rivi.T, 
,111(1  wit  li  ri|ii,il  i\,Ktiii--s  tiiinin.itc'd  t  lie  ope  lat  iuiis  nl  I!m  ;;i)\  nr  dii 
tlu-  c.islrll!   l),lllk  III"  the    IIikIsiim. 

St.  I. (•;.;(■!•  asciiuinl  the  ki\i-r  St.  l.awiciuc  ,iiul  l.akc  Dntario, 
ascriulc'd  tlu;  (  )sUc;_;ii  .lud  (  liuida  lucrs  to  <  )ncida  lake,  ^■|•(l-^s^■d  that 
Like,  aiul  fiiimd  liiiiiM-ll  <iii  l'"ish  ciick,  within  ,1  l\w  inilc^  i4  I'"i)rt 
Stanwi.x,  (.SiiniyU'ri  near  t  he  pn -^mt  citynl  Umiu-,  mii  the  Ajnhauk 
ri\tT,  It  i-^  to  1)1'  luitii'rd  that  with  tlu-  rxtcpt  inn  of  thr  ^ihnt  jioit- 
as^c  Ixtwci'ii  !'"i-.h  cicck  and  tlu:  .Mnhawk,  thcit'  was  w.itcr  lonmunii- 
ratinn  Inr  li;-dit  h^ats  and  l),itcan\  lioin  <  )-.Wf:_;ii  to  .\11)  ni_\'.  I'lie 
intiMAcnini;'  strrain--  wii\'  all  suhjiHt  to  the  iliu.tnation->  oi'  wet  and  dry 
seasons,  hnl  tlu'  hindm  of  niihlai)'  t lanTjJoitation  w.is  L;rcatl_\-  liL^ht- 
I'lU'd  1))-  th''  fharai'ter  oi  tlu;  mnti;  adopted  toj-  the  inwi'^ion  of  New 
\'ork  h'oni  the  west. 

'The  ehaiaeter  ot  the  settlers  in  that  rc;Ljioii.  particnkirly  in  'I  yon 
county,  had  lo>teriil  loy;il  sentinunts,  and  tlu;  diveiNitie^  ol  interest 
.iinon;^  the  various  Indi.m  trihe^  invoked  .1  constant  uneeitainl)'  as  to 
the  inte^rit)- ot  their  eondiul,  no  niatli;r  wh.it  nii;_;ht  he  the  terms  of  ,1 
contract  into  which  they  could  he  cntici;d  1)\'  hi;^h  soundiii;,;  pionii^cs 
.iiul  presents. 

Notw  i!hitaiulin;j^  tlu;  protracted  neL,^otiat ions  and  re[ieated  inter- 
views of  (ieneral  .Schnyler  with  the  Six  .Nations,  the  (Jneidas  ahjne 
remained  nentuil  in  the  cam[)aiL;n  un<ler  notice. 

l'\)rt  Schuyler,  at  the  bend  of  the  Mohawk  river  from  ,1  southerly 
to  an  ciisterh'  courst',  was  cominaiidetl  \)y  Colonel  I'eler  Ci.uiseAoort, 
as  early  as  i\pril,  1777.  He  found  that  it  was  actually  untenable 
apainst  any  enemy   whatever.      .\lthou''h   in  doubt   whether  to  i)ro- 


vide  foi  resistance  to   artiller)-,  he  went   to  work   with    aich   iiulustry. 


^, 


■4 .,.' <:;■ 


9  "». - 


''•'■''    /  '*,  \a  \ 


"(^iViit 

\\ 

n,;^. 

.11 
'    Ulllt 

■ 

Miut., 

.Irn,:..,n 
■  /t/i/.-,//. 


,'     v 


<^    '?<>' 


'J. 


'  •     .        •■:','/.      .A    :\     r 


r\v, :r.v    „  ^   \  :.  ly  I  \>'?  v.  V    ''ll;;■' 


(. 


aI;4;: 


'  "-i  ^-  r  . 


■All ,.  •■      ;•^        f 


■M'. 


■'  /-IpM'*'''  i-(  .  ^  '    ;vr       :     )..   ,v  \  ;■>  'J 


'>    > 


.\..i.ir,„u;.n: it:.„'j:.,:.;. 

u  liiiliuiis  (il/iii/,r</ill //icf',,/. 
Vi..Uftuii'l .  /nir'-irtin.'i  /'i  lu/ttitt.. 

i' .l'r>ili,,ti,t„l.,n  /;  Jnr , ,.^f  i  '/';. 
in  ,/, /:',:!  II,,, '/./,:  r,--.r./,l//, I  J. 

I).  /;„/,■/ /l„/,„n;is,/,  /,„■/„,/./„ 
<;-r,  i-l!i,)hl  ll!„,i  ,,l'lh-,l,:l,.  l,„n 

v..  I'll,,'  I!,  1,1,^,1  „-,lh  l;„l,l,u,,;lfy 

.  >iii„-^-i,;i'Af'/n/.\,'trf/f'.i,Mi/t/>t'f//,i'/ 

l.,i(H)ii,i 

,r.  I  Iiliriii;i/i  i)ii!.ili,,i;,,ilh  riiiyiiii/ 
f'l  /ltii/,-.st-/. 

{•.Jii //,;,/  ;>/'.  /'ii,iir,iii-i. 

1 1.  Ihili.fli iu:.:li,iii,  iilhr  //,,■, I,,'.;., 


I 

±  4..   '?  -- 


<■'"/'■■ 


"I,/  /'■,;„•,  /.,    (,'■/  I. ..■,.■„. J..  ,,. 


J 


'1     I 


^'Wt'^'^'' 


%■» 


LM?;- 


vp 


fip 


'    ..   ^ 


'"Hi 


1777- 


lOKI'   .S(IIUVI,i;U,    'iKISKAW     AM)    I'.liN  >  I  \( .  1  ( i\. 


tl\.it  when  tlic  test  was  made,  it  i)ri)vecl  fully  a(le([ii.ite  Id  witiist.iiKl 
llie  fire  of  the  lis^ht  ordnance  which  accompanied  the  column  of  St. 
Lcgc"  in  Aui^uist  of  that  year. 

On  the  twenty-ninth  of  May,  ("olonel  Marinus  Willett  was  ordered 
to  report  with  his  re_L;inu;nt  lor  duty  at  the  s.inie  post,  and  to  aid  in 
piittin<j  till-  fo't  in  a  thoroULjhly  defensive  condition.  He  reached 
I'ort  Sciui\  ler  in  .Ful)'.  On  the  second  of  Au;.nist  five  l)ateau>c  .arrived 
with  snffieient  stores  t(j  increase  tlu'  rations  and  small-arm  ammuni- 
tion to  a  .->upply  for  six  weeks.  riu;  i^v.urison  then  numbered  seven 
hundred  ,uul  th'ty  men.  Lieutenant  Mi'lloii,  of  Colonel  Wesson's 
Massachuse'lts  rcLiiment,  with  two  hundrid  men,  accomi)anied  the 
bateaux  as  their  e'-corl,  and  joined  the  j^arrison.  ( )n  the  same  d.iy, 
.md  within  an  Imur  .dU'r  the  landiuLj  of  this  timely  invoice  of  sup- 
plies, Lieutenant  iiird  of  the  Ihiti-^h  I'aLjhth  rej^iment  approached  the 
fort,  and  est.d)lished  .i  position  for  St.  Leber's  advanced  ijuard  ;  and 
on  the  third  of  .Vuj^ust  his  ami)-  be^^an  the  investment. 

Till'  acKance  of  .St.  Le^jer  w,is  conspicuous  for  its  excellent  adjust- 
ments. 'I'his  was  lap.rcly  c'ue  to  the  [)resence  of  tho^e  ,' Iio  had  skill 
in  Irontier  Indian  w.nf ire.  The  entire  force  w. is  so  disposed  by  sin;.;le 
files  and  the  wise  distribution  of  tin:  Lidian  .luxiliaries,  as  to  make  a 
surprise  impossible,  and  afford  llie  best  possible  opportunit)'  for  their 
peculiar  style  of  skirmishing  warfare,  in  ca.^e  of  an  .iltack.  Stone's 
Life  of  Hr.mt  very  cle.irly  represents  this  movement,  and  Lossin;^^  rei)ro- 
duces  it  with  full  details  uf  the  antecedent  Indian  operations  in 
central  New  York. 

Colonel  Daniel  Clark,  son-in-Iav.-  of  Sir  William  Johnson  ;  Colonel 
John  Butler,  at'terward  con.spicuous  at  the  massacre  of  Wx-ominir ; 
Joseph  Brant,  a  full  blooded  .Mohawk,  son  of  dw  Onondai^a  chief;  and 
Sir  John  Johnscjii,  a  son  of  Sir  Willkim  Johnson,  who  succeeiled  to 
the  title  in  1774,  were  associated  with  .St.  Leger  in  command  of  this 
composite  army  of  rei;ulars,  I  lessi.m-chasseurs,  Royal-greens,  (Can- 
adians, axe-nun,  ;ind  non-e(,>mbatants.  who,  as  well  as  the  Indians, 
proved  an  ultimate  incumbrance  and  curse  to  the  expedition.  The 
investment  was  immediate.  A  proclamation  of  St.  Leger,  was  fol- 
loweil  by  an  api)eal  from  (jeneial  Nicholas  Herkimer  to  the  militia 
of  Tryon  county,  and  on  the  sixth  he  p.issed  three  scouts  into  the 
foit,  with  notice  liiat  he  was  at  (Jrisk.my,  near  the  present  vill.ige  of 
VVhitesboroii<:h,  with  ei''ht  hundred  men  .ulvancin'j;  to  its  relief.  He 
also  requested  that  three  guns  might  be  fireii  to  give  notice  of  the 
safe  arri\al  of  liis  couriers.     Colonel  Willett,  as  had  been  suggested  by 


Ij 


■,^: 


:.i,:l. 


i  -  >  ■ 


3>'4 


lt)Rl    t>CllUVI.i:K,   (iRISKANV   AND   IIKNNIM.  i<  >.\. 


1'777. 


General  llcrkinur,  promptly  sallied  forth  with  t\.n  luiiulred  and  fifty 
men,  portions  of  (i.msevoort's,  anil  of  Wesson's  regiments,  and  one 
iron  three  pounder,  to  make  a  diversion  in  fa/or  of  the  advanein;^ 
militia.  St.  Lej^'er  ii.ul  been  advised  of  this  movement  of  the  militia. 
;ind  was  so  eiii^a^etl  in  pre|)ari'.tioi\  to  attack  it  in  the  woods,  antl  iiail 
so  lar^e  .i  f.iti;4ue  detail  at  work  upon  the  intrenchmeiits,  ;is  to  have 
entirely  i;^nored  the  possibility  of  offensive  action  on  tiie  part  of  the 
garrison.  TIil'  sortie  w.i-.  therefore  successful  in  the  c.iplure  of  much 
camp  plunder,  such  as  blankets,  arm^,  fliii;s,  aiul  chjthin^',  .i  few  [)ris- 
oners,  St.  Lei^er'sdesk  .iiul  p.i|)ers,  and  the  (K.struction  of  two  sections 
of  the  intrenchnients;  but  failnl  to  unite  with  (ieneral  Herkimer. 
That  officer,  overborne  in  his  jud;j;inent  by  the  im[)etiiosity  of  younyer 
officers,  who  mistook  liis  caution  in  .ippriMcliiiiL;  the  Indian  camp  tor 
cowardice,  allowed  his  march  to  i)e  crowded  loo  rapidlv,  .ind  while 
crossin;4  a  ravine  near  Oriskan)' creek,  he  fell  into  an  .unlnisc.ule  which 
involvetl  j^reat  sl.uiyhter.  Gener.d  llerkimer  himself  w.is  severely 
wounded,  and  the  total  Aincricaii  casualties  were  not  less  than  one 
hundreil  antl  sixl)'  killeii,  besitles  more  than  two  hundred  wounded, 
,irul  some  prisoners.  I'he  Indian  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
ne.irly  eiL;fit\-,  iiKUulin.n  several  valuable  warriors,  aiul  the  field  was 
abaiidonetl  b)'  the  ass.iilants.  Colonel  St.  Le^ermaile  noofilcial  report 
of  his  loss,  except  that  of  his  Imlian  allies.  The  fiujlit  continued  for 
scver.d  '  irs,  only  suspended  for  a  short  time  by  a  thunder  storm, 
and  stands  on  record  as  one  of  the  most  fiercely  coiitestetl  conllicts 
of  the  war. 

Un  the  afternoon  of  the  seventh,  St.  Le_L;er  tlemanded  the  surieiv 
der  of  the  post,  under  threat  of  L;ivin^  ocer  it>  L;.irrison  to  th  ;  \en- 
geance  of  the  Indians.     A  bold  defiance  was  the  sole  response',      lie 


also  wrote  to  ikn'!. 


;o)n 


e  on   1.he   eleventh,  that  "  he  was  secure  of  the 


fort  and  woukl  soon  join  him  at  Albaii)'."  On  the  tenth  Colonel 
W'illett,  afterwards  active  at  Momnouth  .ind  in  subseipieiit  Indian  wars, 
and  Lieutenant  Stockwell,  snuiL;gle(.l  themselves  through  the  lines, 
and  reached  I'orl  Dayton  (now  I  lerkimer)  safely,  to  arouse  the  militia 
to  fresh  efforts  in  behalf  of  the  post.  (General  Schuyler  hatl  alreatiy 
ordered  General  Learned's  Massachusetts  brij^ade  on  this  duty,  desijj;- 
natiuL,"  Fort  Dayton  as  the  rendezvous  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Schuy  er. 
Colonel   W  illctt  went  directly  to  Albany,  and   returned   in  company 

while  the  troops 


with  Arnold  and  the  first  New  York  regiment 


but 


were  yet  forty  miles  distant  from  Fort  Dayton,  St.  Leger,  alarmed  by 
reports  of  Arnold's  march  and  rumors  of  a  disaster  to  liurgoyne's  army, 


"77; 


F(»ur  S(iii\  i,i;u,  okisK.wv  and  hi;nni\(;h)\. 


.3-^5 


prccipitatily  iibaiulonctl  his  iiitreMichniiMits  ami  llrd  to  (Jswl'j^o,  leav- 
ing a  portion  of  his  artillery,  bat,'^a^L'  ami  camp  L(|iiip,ij^c  on  the  field. 
In  his  official  report,  tlaleil  at  ( )s\vey(),  Auj^ust  tuciitj'-seventh,  St. 
Le^'er  e.xplained  his  retreat  by  chartjes  of  treachery  ami  exa;4^erated 
rei).  's  of  Arnold's  force,  closint^  with  the  su^'^u'stive  statement  that 
his  own  men  "arc  in  a  most  deplorable  situation  from  the  plunder  of 
the  savages." 

Thus  ended  the  Ihitish  advance  up(jii  Albaii}-,  by  liie  Mohawk- 
valley.  The  moral  effect  of  its  filhire  was  as  encouraj^iii;^-  to  the 
American  arm)-,  as  the  tidinj^'s  of  its  advent,  coupled  with  the  suc- 
cesses of  ]?tir;^())'ne,  had  been  ilepressinj^  ;  and  the  .minialioii  i>f  the 
army  was  fully  shared  by  the  people. 

(iener.d  \\'ashin_i;ton  wrote  as  fol!(Jws  to  General  Sehiisler,  on  the 
twentj-first  of  AiiLjust,  when  advised  of  the  battle  of  (  )ri>.kaiiy  ami  (jf 
his  detail  of  (ieneral  Arnold  to  the  relief  of  I'drl  Scluivler :  "  1  ,un 
pleased  with  the  account  you  transmit  of  the  situ.ilion  of  matters 
upon  the  Moh.iwk  river.  If  the  militia  keip  up  their  spirits  .il'ter  the 
late  severe  sk'rmish,  I  am  confident  they  will,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  reinforcements  under  (ieneral  Arnold,  be  enableil  to  raise  the 
siej^e  of  l''ort  Schuyler,  whicii  will  be  a  most  imi)ortant  m.itter  just  at 
this  time." 

At  tlu'  time  when  St.  Lei^er  established  his  camp  before  fort 
.Sehuyler,  (ieneral  liui'Ljoyne  bei,;an  to  realize  the  difficulties  which 
attended  the  sup[)ly  of  his  army,  lie  had  received  altotjcthcr,  a  re- 
inforcement of  nearly  a  thous.uitl  Indians,  but  the  murder  of  Miss 
Jane  McCrea  and  repeatetl  violations  of  the  usages  of  civili/ed  war- 
faro,  as  well  as  the  adilitional  mouths  to  feed,  increased  the  discom- 
fort and  embarrassment  of  his  po-  tioii.  The  reports  of  (ierman  offi- 
cers to  their  sovereigns,  abound  ;.i  descri[)tions  of  the  horrors  of  this 
warfare.  One  wrote,  that  "  to  prevent  desertions  it  was  aunounced 
in  orders  that  the  savages  would  scalp  runawaj's."  Schloozcr  states, 
that  "  on  the  third  of  Aut^ust,  they,  the  Indians,  brout^ht  in  twenty 
scalps  and  as  many  captives."  It  is  clear  that  there  was  no  respon- 
sibility on  the  part  of  Burgoync  for  the  murder  of  Miss  McCren,  or 
other  personal  violence,  and  a  careful  sifting  of  all  accessible  reports  as 
clearly  shows  that  most  of  the  outrages  reported  at  the  time  were 
exaggerations  of  a  style  of  warfare  which  was  under  as  good  control 
as  jiossible  under  any  commander.  The  Indians  could  not  be  civil- 
ized iustantly,  nor  be  readily  made  to  acquiesce  in  the  limit  of  rations 
which  was  assigned  to  regular  troops,  and  all  their  demands  were    of 


w^'^:i 


M 


m 
•J  fi't 


i '«. 


3-6 


lORi"  srin  ■^  IKK,  c>kisK.\NV  and  iif.nmnctox. 


I'777. 


^^ji^i 


%>hi  M 


\w 


6        IK' 


\fS,l 


the  most  inipcnitivc  kiiul.  IJunj^oyiic  thus  states  his  own  views  upon 
tliis  sul)ject,  "  I  had  been  tauLjlit  to  look  upon  tlie  remote  tribes  wiiich 
joined  nie  at  Sheneshoroui^h,  as  more  warlike  :-  -but,  with  equal 
clcpra\ity  in  i;ener.il  priiuiples,  their  on!\-  preeminence  consisted  in 
I'erocit)-."  lie  also  ('xi)ericnectl  difl'iculty  in  '.iianaLjin;^  Indian  (ri^i'iifs, 
.md  lluis  expresses  a  sentiment  which  will  be  appreciated  by  all  of- 
ficers who  have  en;^au;ed  in  frv)nlier  Indian  service,  where  interpreters 
and  intermediate  civil  ai^ejits  are  emplo\-ed.  "  The  inter[)reters,  from 
the  first,  rej^ardeil  with  a  jealous  eye  a  sj-stem  which  took  out  of  their 
hands  the  tlistribution  of  Indian  necessaries  aral  presents;  hut  when 
the)'  lound  the  plunder  of  the  countr\',  as  well  as  that  of  the  i^oxern- 
ment,  \,as  (('///;■( '/Av/.  the  prolligacy  of  many  was  emplo}'etl  to  promote 
dissension,  revolt  and  desertion.  AlthouL;h  I  diflered  totally  with  .St. 
Luc,  "  tluMi  in  i;em-ral  charge  of  the  Indian  auxiliaries,"  in  opinion 
upon  the  efliciency  of  these  allies,  I  invariably  took  his  advice  in  the 
manas^a'ment  of  them.  e\en  to  an  induh^encc  of  their  most  capricious 
fancies,  when  the\- did  not  involve  the  dishonor  of  the  Kinc^'s  cause 
and  the  disL^race  of  humanity."  "  He  certainly  knew  that  the  In- 
dians pined  after  a  rf  newal  of  their  accustomed  horrors  and  that 
they  were  become  as  impatient  of ///.v  control  as  of  aii}'  other  :  though 
the  pride  and  interest  of  authoriiy  and  the  affection  he  bore  his  old 
associates  induced  him  to  cover  the  real  causes,  under  various  pre- 
Lenses  of  discontent  with  which  I  was  daily  tormented." 

At  a  council  held  AuL^ust  fourth,  it  ai)pe:ued  that  the  tribes  with 
which  St.  Luc  was  immediate!}-  connected  and  fir  which  he  inter- 
preted, were  determined  to  _l;'o  home.  HurLjoxaie  thus  writes  to  Lord 
(lermame.  "  I  was  conxinced  that  a  cordial  reconcili.ilion  with  the 
Indians  was  only  to  be  effected  b\'  a  renunciation  ol  all  n'ly  former 
prohibitions  and  indul;_;ence  in  bKiod  >ind  r.ipine."  Man)'  of  the 
Indian^^  ditl  in  fact  Irave  the  next  da)-,  and  man)'  others  before  the 
ecpedition  to  15ennini;ton  was  planned,  so  that  the  loss  of  valuable 
scouts  ;ind  skirmishers  was  L;reatl)'  felt  durin^^  operations  in  the  forests 
on  the  line  of  that  march.  An  additional  statement  oi  (ieneral  Bur- 
go)'ne  is  properl)' recorded  to  his  pcrmanetit  credit. 

"  1  lu'  Indian  princi"le  of  war  is  at  once  odious  and  unavailint^, 
and  if  encouraged,  I  will  venture  to  pronounce,  its  conse(|uences  will 
be  severely  repented  by  the  present  at^e,  and  universally  abhorred  by 
posterit)^" 

This  statement  was  made  before  the  House  of  Commons,  but  that 
it  was  not  an  after-thout^ht,  is  clearly  seen    from  the  statement  made 


I777-] 


FORT   S(TII;VI,1:K,    OIUSKANV    and    liKN'MNGTOX. 


327 


by  Bui\L;()\nc  to  St.  Luc,  in  the  presence  of  the  Ivirl  of  Ihurington  : 
"  I  woulil  r.ither  lose  every  Indian,  than  connive  at  their  enormities." 
St.  Luc  was  ani^ry  because  IkirLjoyne  insisted  tliat  a  British  officer 
should  accompany  all  Lidian  forays,  and  take  account  of  their  pro- 
ceedings and  tlieir  plunder;  and  .several  parties  were  brought  into  his 
camp  as  prisoners,  who  affirmed  that  they  had  been  treated  with 
])ropcr  clemency.  It  was  not  until  this  rule  was  enforced  that  St. 
Luc  stirred  up  the  Indians  to  deserti(jn  and  outrage.  He  is  not  a 
competent  witness  in  the  case. 

The  following  entry  api^ears  upon  Burgoyne's  record,  "  August 
fifth.  Victualling  of  the  army  out  this  day,  and  from  difficulties  of 
the  roads  and  transports,  no  provisions  came  in  this  night.  Sixth 
August.  .\t  ten  o'clock  this  morning,  not  quite  enough  provisions 
for  the  consumption  of  two  da\-s." 

In  thi,;  emergency  advantage  was  taken  of  the  statement  of  Philip 
Skene,  whose  cooperation  himight  mischief  only  to  the  expedition, 
and  of  others  supported  by  scouts  sent  out  by  General  Riedesel,  that 
a  large  depot  of  commissary  supplies  had  been  accumulated  at  Ben- 
nington for  the  American  army,  and  an.  expedition  was  organized  for 
the  threefold  purpose  of  securing  these  supplies,  procuring  thirteen 
hundred  lu.rses  {ox  mounting  Riedesel's  dragoons  and  Peter's  corps, 
and  two  hundred  for  general  army  use,  and  of  making  a  demonstra- 
tion m  the  Connecticut  river  valley.  On  the  ninth,  carefully  written 
instructions  were  prepared  for  Lieutenant-colonel  Baume,  who  was 
intrusted  with  the  command  of  the  expedition,  and  these  were  .so 
judiciously  framed  as  to  anticipate  all  p(jssible  contingencies  of  the 
march.  They  took  into  view  the  fact  that  Colonel  Warner  was  still  at 
Manchester,  and  the  possibility  that  Arnold's  main  army,  at  that  time 
sugi-^ested  for  a  proposed  movement  to  IJurgin'iie's  re.ir,  might  attempt 
to  interce[it  his  return  march.  In  view  of  the  exceptions  taken  to  the 
assignment  of  German  troops  to  this  expedition,  it  is  in  evidence 
that  even  General  Fraser,  who  considered  the  Germans  as  shnv,  de- 
clined to  suggest  to  General  Pnrgoyne  the  substitution  of  other  troops, 
although  asked  to  do  so  by  Adjutant-general  Kingston,  "  if  he  thought 
other  troops  should  be  cutailed,"  remarking  "  the  Germans  are  not  a 
very  active  people,  but  it  may  do."     This  matter  was  especially  sub- 


mi^ 


:d 


LO   Genera 


1    I' 


rascr, 


oec.uise 


th 


e    scouts  anc 


lid 


es    were 


.■iied  to  his,  the  advanced  corjis,  anci  it  was  thought  that  he  might 
kiiow  more  of  the  nature  of  the  country."  There  was  no  declared 
difference  of  opinion  among  the  general  officers  as  to   the  value  and 


'ill 


.Hi 


"1  u 


.[;# 


32i^ 


KURT   Si  IIUVLKR,    OKISKANV    ANU    IU;.N;;iN'(iTON. 


['777 


■mi 


wisdom  of  the  expedition  itself.  It  was  to  coniprehciul  Arlinj^ton, 
lyinj^  between  M.mciiester  and  Hennington,  and  as  wide  a  scope  of 
country  as  would  .ifford  opportunity  to  overawe  the  people"  and  secure 
su])plies,  and  was  allowed  a  margin  of  two  weeks  time,  with  adccjuatc 
instructions  in  case  the  main  army  should  advance  towards  Albany 
befori;  its  return. 

Burgo\-ne  thus  states  the  case  :  "  It  was  soon  found  tliat  in  the 
situation  of  tlic  transpoi't-service  at  that  time,  the  army  could  barely 
be  victualed  from  day  to  day,  and  that  there  was  no  prospect  of 
cstublishiiiL^  a  maL^a/.ine  in  due  time  ft)r  pursuin;,'  present  advantai^^es. 
The  idea  of  the  expedition  to  Bennini^ton  originated  upon  this  diffi- 
culty, combined  with  the  intelliL^ence  reported  by  General  Ricdesel, 
and  with  all  I  had  otherwise  received,  I  knew  that  lie  inline;  ton  was 
the  i;reat  deposit  of  corn,  tlour,  antl  store  cattle,  that  it  was  only 
guarded  by  militia,  and  every  day's  account  tended  to  confirm  tlic 
persuasion  of  the  l(.)}-.ilty  of  one  descrijjtion  of  inhabitants  and  the 
panic  of  the  other.  Those  who  knew  the  country  best  were  the  most 
sanguine  ii".  this  persuasion.  Tiie  German  troops  employed  were  of 
the  best  I  had  of  tlKit  nation.  The  nuniber  of  ]5ritish  was  small,  but 
it  was  the  select  litdit  corps  of  the  ami)',  composed  of  chosen  men 
from  all  the  rcLjiments,  and  commanded  by  Captain  Fraser,  one  of  the 
most  distinguished  officers  in  his  line  of  service  that  I  ever  met  with.'' 

An  additional  .statement  is  necessary  at  this  stage  of  the  narra- 
tive, to  show  exactly  the  status  of  the  British  army,  in  the  matter  of 
Logistics. 

Fort  I'klward  was  sixteen  miles  from  Fort  George.  Only  one  I'.aul 
could  be  made  each  day.  .Six  miles  below  Fort  Fdward  were  :apids 
which  required  a  transter  of  all  stores  to  boats  beU^v;  and  the  un- 
loaded boats  had  to  be  hauled  back  against  a  strong  current.  The 
horses  from  Canada  came  by  land  from  St.  John's  to  Ticonderoga, 
through  a  country  then  hardly  less  than  a  desert,  and  the  whole 
number  of  carts  and  horses  at  that  time  received,  was  barely  enough 
to  keep  the  army  in  supplies. 

As  early  as  ]\Iay  thirtieth,  while  at  Montreal,  an  order  was  issued 
that  blanket-coats,  leggings,  and  all  clothing  but  summer  wear  should 
be  left  behind,  and  before  leaving  Skenesborough  the  officers  were 
ordered  to  send  all  their  personal  baggage  to  Ticonderoga,  except  a 
soldier's  common  tent  and  a  cloak-bag. 

The  roads,  bridges,  quagmires,  and  rocks  were  constant  causes 
of  delay  in  hauling  stores.     Heavy  rains  set  in.     Ten  and  twelve  oxen 


lOKi"  sciiuvi,i:r,  okiskany  ani>  iu;N'.\i\(;rii\. 


529 


were  often  recjuired  to  haul  a  siiif^le  bateaux,  and  only  fifty  hc.ul  had 
been  pmeured  for  the  entire  army  use.  Tlure  was  no  remedy  but 
patience,  no  honorable  retreat,  no  alternative  but  to  make  the  mo^t 
of  tile  present,  and  press  toward  Albany  and  the  anticipated  uiiioj 
with  (leneral  Howe  and  St.  Leger. 

On  the  fourteenth  of  Au^^ust,  a  brid^^c  of  rafts  was  thrown  across 
the  river  at  Sarato;^a,  where  the  van^^uard  of  tlie  British  army  had 
been  established,  to  be  in  position  for  an  advance  upon  Albany  as 
soon  as  the  supplies  should  be  realized  from  the  expedition  then  on 
the  move.  Lieutenant-ct)Ionel  Breyman's  corps  was  posted  at  Batten- 
kill,  to  be  in  readiness  to  render  support  to  that  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Baume  if  it  became  necc  ss:n\-. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Baume  himself  marched,  on  the  eleventh,  with 
two  hundred  dismounted  drai^oons  of  the  re^^iment  of  Riedesel,  Cap- 
tain l"'raser's  marksmen,  Peter's  Provincials,  the  Canadian  volunteers, 
and  somethini^  over  one  hundred  Indians,  makinj^,  as  stated  by  Ihxr- 
goync,  a  total  strcn;4th  of  about  five  hundred  men. 

lie  halted  at  Batten-kill  to  await  ord  ts,  where  General  Burgoyne 
inspected  the  command  ;  and  he  expressed  himself  satisfied  with  the 
force  placed  at  his  disposal.  In  a  note  from  his  camj\  he  adds  this 
postscript:  "The  rciiiforccmcut  of  fifty  chasseurs  which  )'our  ex- 
cellency was  pleased  to  order,  joined  me  last  .light  at  eleven 
o'clock." 

Aftc:r  marching  sixteen  miles,  he  reached  Camb'-idge  at  four  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  thirtcentli,  and  reported  a  skirmish  with  forty 
or  fifty  rebels  who  were  guarding  cattle  ;  and  stated  that  the  enemy 
were  reported  to  be  eighteen  hundred  strong  at  Bennington.  He  also 
stated  that  "  tlie  savages  would  destroy  or  drive  away  all  horses  for 
which  he  did  not  pa)-  tlie  money,"  and  asked  authority  to  purchase 
the  horses  thus  taken  by  the  savages,  "  otherwise  they  will  ruin  all 
they  meet  with,  and  neither  officers  nor  interpreters  can  control  them." 
This  express  started  from  Cambridge  at  four  o'clock  of  the  morning 
of  the  fourteenth.  The  letter  closed,  "  Your  excellency  may  depend 
on  hearing  how  I  proceed  at  Bennington,  and  of  my  success  there. 
I  will  be  particularly  careful  on  my  approach  to  that  place  to  be  full)' 
informed  of  their  strength  and  position,  and  take  the  [)recautions 
necessary  to  fulfill  both  the  orders  and  instructions  of  your  e.xcellency." 
Burgoyne  replied,  August  fourteenth  at  seven  at  night,  instructing 
fully  as  to  tlie  items  of  the  dispatch  received,  adding,  "  should  you  find 
t.he  enemy  ton  strongly  posted  at  Bennington,  1  wish  you   to  take   a 


I 


%% 


\ 


"\1 


1     0 


330 


roRI'   SCIIUYLKU,    (lUISKA.W   AND    l!i;\N  I  .\( ;  ION. 


[1777 


ni  '1 


rJ  *' 


jiost  wluTc  N'oii  cm  maintain  your-ieir  till  _\-ou  receive  an  an'^wer  from 
me,  and  I  will  either  support  yon  in  force,  or  u  itiidraw  you." 

On  tile  loiirteentli  at  nine  o'clock,  he  reported  from  Sancoick  (Van 
Schaick's  Mills)  of  a  skirmisli,  the  capture  of  tlour.  s.ilt,  etc.,  that  "  five 
prisoniTs  aL;rie  th.it  from  fifteen  to  ei;-;hteen  hundred  men  are  at  Hen- 
nitifjton.  hut  ,u\:  supposed  to  leave  on  our  approach."  addiiv^,  "  1  will 
proceed  sd  f,ir  to-d.iy  as  tn  fdl  on  the  I'licni)'  to-morrow  early,  and 
make  such  dispositicMi  ,is  I  think  tu'ce-sar)-  fiom  the  intellijTence  I 
receive.  I'eople  are  ilockiiv,;  in  hi>url\-,  hut  w.int  to  he  armed  ;  the 
savages  can  not  be  ctintmljed.  They  ruin  and  t.ike  eveiAthiiiLj  they 
please."  Pos/Siri/^/.  '•  IVl;  \-our  excellency  to  p.irdon  the  hurry 
of  this  letter,  as  it  is  wrote  on  the  he. id  of  a  h.irrt.'l."' 

This  w. IS  the  last  dispatch  from  iiaume.  and  noreinforcements  were 
called  for,  neither  was  tliere  intimation  tb.at  they  would  he  recpiired. 
Careful  examination  fails  to  find  liie  data  upon  which  many  historians 
make  the  statement.  The  record  of  this  message  made  at  heatl- 
cjuarters  is  as  follows;  "  15th  .\ugust,  express  arrived  from  Sancoick 
at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.      Corps  (fr  ri'srr^'L-  ordered  to  inarch." 

General  Burgoyne  promptly  and  wisely  started  Iheyman's  force 
of  five  hundred  men  to  the  support  of  l^aunie  as  soon  as  advised  that 
tlie  "  secret  expedition  "  had  been  discovered  liy  tlie  enemy,  and 
that  the  American  force  was  piobably  greater  than  he  IkuI  before 
anticipated." 

Colonel  Ih'cyman  recei\-ed  his  orders  at  eight  o'clock  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  fifteenth,  and  marched  at  nine,  with  on;;  battalion  of  chas- 
seurs, one  of  greiii.diers,  one  rifle  company  and  two  pieces  of  cannon. 
"  Each  soklier  carried  forty  rounds  of  annnunition  in  liis  pouch,  antl 
on  acciMint  of  the  scaicit\' of  transportation,  two  boxes  ofammun  tion 
were  placed  upon  the  aitillery  carts."  This  command  met  with  con- 
.stant  disaster.  A  heavv  rain  continued  during  the  dav,  so  that  the 
troops  made  but  a  li.ilf  English  mile  an  hour  :  tlic  gun.s  had  t  >  be 
hauled  u])  hills,  alternatel}-  ;  one  artillery  crirt  was  ovei'turned  ;  a  lim- 
brel  was  broken  up  iiiil  its  ammunition  wasted  ;  the  guide  lost  his  w.'v, 
;iml  at  niglit  the  detaclinient  was  still  seven  miles  from  Cambridge. 
Lieutenant  llanneman  was  sent  forward  to  inform  Lieutenant-colonel 
Haume  of  theapproaeh  of  reinforcements. 

Breyman  reached  Van  Seliaick's  mill  at  half  past  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon,  wlierc  lie  met  Colonel  Skene,  who  notifietl  him  that 
Baume  u.istwo  miles  in  advance.  Hi-  pushed  on  to  his  support  with 
no  Mitimation  that  any  engagement  had  taken  place.     "  At  the  bridge. 


1/77] 


FORT   SCIIUVI.I:R,    OIUSKANV    and   Isr.N'MNGTON. 


33» 


u  force  of  men  \v;i.s  met,  some  in  jackets  and  some  in  shirts,  whom 
Skene  tleckired  to  be  roy.ilists,  but  the)- proved  to  be  rebels,  "ittempt- 
hii^  to  Ljain  hii;h  yrouiul  to  his  left."  "  A  vigorous  attack  was  made, 
with  var)in^  success  and  kislini;  until  nearly  ciLjht  o'cK^ck.  The  am- 
munition was  expendeti,  the  horses  had  been  killed,  Lieutenant 
Spantjenburg  and  many  others  were  wounded,  and  the  American 
forces  were  constantly  ailding  to  their  numbers.  The  L,"uns  were 
abandonetl.  The  troo[)s  reacheil  Cambridge  at  twelve  o'clock  and 
regained  camp  on  the  moniin;j;'  of  the  seventeenth."  Such  is  the 
melancholy  summary  of  Breyman's  rej)ort,  closing,  "could  I  have 
saved  my  cannon  I  \v(julil  with  pleasure  have  sacrificed  my  life  to 
have  cffec^ed   it." 

General  Stark  had  returned  to  New  Hampshire  some  time  after 
the  b.ittle  of  Trenton,  on  a  recruiting  expedition,  and  resigned  his 
commission  upon  hearing  that  Congress  ha.d  promoted  junior  (jfficers 
over  his  head.  The  appeal  of  his  native  State  was  not  to  be  resisted 
when  the  invasion  of  Hurgoyne  took  p'ace  ;  and  he  accepted  a  com- 
mand, upon  condition  that  he  should  not  be  compelled  to  join  the 
main  army. 

General  Lincoln  visited  Mancliester,  where  recruits  were  assem- 
bling, with  an  order  frc^m  (ieneral  Schuyler  for  Stark  to  reporl  for 
duty  ;  but  could  not  induce  him  to  swerve  Irom  his  purpose.  He  was 
at  Bennington  on  the  night  of  the  thirtieth,  when  advisetl  that  .i  body 
of  Indians  had  reached  Cambridge.  Colonel  tjregg  was  at  once  sent 
with  two  hundred  men  to  oppose  their  advance.  During  the  night 
an  express  messenger  brought  word  that  a  large  force  of  British  troo|:)s 
was  on  the  march,  of  which  the  Lnlians  constituted  onl\'  the  van- 
guard. He  immediately  sent  to  Ccjlonel  Warner,  then  at  Manchester, 
an  ap[)eal  for  aid,  aroused  the  militia,  and  made  preparati(Mis  to  meet 
the  enemy. 

On  the  fourteenth  Lieutenant-colonel  Baume  advanced  to  within 
four  nuK  s  of  Bennington.  The  AnK^ricans,  unprepared  for  battle, 
retired  before  his  advance,  auil  encamped  on  the  liennington  road, 
(see  map).  General  Burgoxiie  in  his  report  states  that  "  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Baume  sacriticed  his  command  by  violation  of  orders,  in  con- 
tinuing his  advance  when  met  by  superior  numbers,  and  by  too  widely 
scattering  his  force.  Thcembarrasi^ment  of  Baume  wastwofold.  His 
force  was  not  homogeneous  ;  and  his  adversary  was  loo  strong.  He 
followed  orders  quite  literally  in  holding  his  dragoons  tog-ther  and 
using  the  Provincials  and   other  irregular  troops  as  pickets,  but  the 


I 


n 


ij.^^ff 


/ ' 


!'■ 


^-!'.i 


'f''iiK 


332 


I'll.T   ^(  IK   N-l.l.H,    (jKISKANV    AM*    Iil-..\MN(iT' iN. 


[1777 


m-> 


Si  p 


iitf  ^ 


latt'T  wurr.  ;i  mill.-  fiijiii  ln\  own   p'j-iti'Jii  and  there  was  no  p(j-)->ibility 
ofcoiiccrt  (>(  .K.ti'/n   in   dufen^''. 

lie  occu|)i'fl  a  coniinandin;.;  liill  fiuiti.' thickly  wooded  at  a  h'lidof 
the  \\  .illooni-^coiel;,  and  at  onci-  intrenclied  Ids  iKjsition.  On  the 
rifte<ntii,  the  rain  which  retarded  tiie  march  of  Hreyman  susi)ended 
I'lCtivc' (^ijjeration-..  except  skirini-.iiin'j  ;  but  C^'Aoncl  Warner  made  the 
march  hvjm  Manclie-.t<M',  and  L'mI'iik;]  S\'moiids  arrived  at  lieiHiin",ti)n 
witl'  a  ditai  hment  of  I'erk-ihire  riiihtia,  so  that  on  the  niornin;.;  oi  the 
sixteenth  tlie  force  ol  General  Stark  amounted  to  nearly  or  (juite  two 
thousand  ni'.n.  Colonel  Warner'.i  re;_n'ment  halt(jd  at  I'ii-nnin»fton  to 
re^t  from  their  march  and  dry  th'ir  arm-,  and  cfjuijjments,  while  Stark 
so  distritjuted  the  rt  ;.;iment--,  of  hii  own  bri;,;a<le  and  the*  militia,  as  to 
be  rcadv  in  the  morniu'f  for  the  a^^aidt,  which,  after  conference   with 


Ins  ollicer-i 


nao 


d.      1 


ready  arran;4'-d.      Kiedesel  s  ilra;.;oo!is  with  a  part 


o  ;   wnile  oru; 


of  the-   ran^^e-rs   (occupied   the-   smmnit  already  refern.-d   t 

co'moanN-  advanced  down  the'  tIoiji;,  to  covr  tlr,;  chasseurs,  who  were 


lear  the  f  ;ol  of  the  hill  wliere  a  small  creek  enter--  the- 


\V 


() 


necompa 


n\-  ' 


if 


renadicr^,  with  a  portion  ot  the  ran;H.-rs,  occupie-d  a 


•omscoict 
(1 


jjfisition  b'-hind  thi-  brid;_;c,  on  the  road  to  I'Mimin'^^ton,  and  the  ('ana- 


dians  v.  ith   a  de-tacliment  of  Ko\-alist   A 


m>ri(  ans, 


took 


p'i-,-,ci-)ion  o 


f 


houses  -oiitli  o 


f  11 


le  i)ri(l''(; 


aiK 


1   a    sli'^dit    elevation  hover  down,  ne-ar 


the 


ford. 


here  a    tri-nca  'A-a-i  hasti.y  dir^   (,j,-   ],;irtial   ]jroteclion 


A 


-'■cond  delachmeiit  of  !:^renadie-r^  .-uid  royali-it-.  occu[jii-cl  the  extreme 
I^'itish  ri;_jht,  in  open  ;.;round  t"  the-  northwe-it,  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
le  ar  tlie  Sarato;^;a  road.      A    portion  of  the    Indian    scout t  took  po^i- 

but    thev 


tion  fjii  the-  oppo-^ite   side  of  the  road,  on  their 
fl 


ed  i<n 


rir,-.t  arrival 
the  fourteenth,  as  soon  as  the  Americans  weri 


(' 


on  III 


to  I 


)e  in 


forc(.'.      The  remaimle^  \s  hn  eiuani[)i;d,    in    tin-  woods    to  the    rear  of 


H: 


uime.  l)roke  awav  between   tlie  advanci 


)lumns  of  Nicl 


and 


Herrick  a^  -ofip  aitle-  b;ittle  bcLjan  on   the  sixteenth. 

General  Stark  reserved  for  himself  the  direct  attack  up  the  stejpcst 
part  of  the  hill,  and  held  hi-,  men  in  hand  until  the  other  troops  took 


th 


eir  as-,is.;ned   posi 


tions.     Nicliols  struck    the    H-ritidi   left.      Ilerrick 


took  their  e-xtre-me   ric;ht,  in    the  rear.      Stickiiey  cut  off  tlie  detach- 


in  e- 


spirit 


S   ai.    Mie 


jittacl 


ijrid"e  from  union  with  Haumi;and  Hubbard  with  caual 


iC     pO;-,ltlOnS 

(le 


liehJ  in  adv.mce   of  the   bridge.     These 

th( 


ittacks   were   made   with    Ljreat    promptness   and   the    utmost    vigor 


Hubbard  drove  the   .American   volunteers  and  Canad 


lans    acrf>ss 


thi 


ri 


vcr  at   the   first   chari 


wliere   thev   W( 


re   met    by  .Stickne;,-.     'I'he 


Rangers  alone  retired  in  good  order;  but  Herrick  and  Nichols  having 


177 


lO 


s(:iii;vi,i-,K,  muitkanv  anu  i;i.nm.\</ion. 


333 


coniplctcd  their  fl.iiik  movin'Mil  ;uid  driven  in  all  oppo-,in;4  dcl.icli- 
incnt^,  nnitcd  ,it  tin,-  Tiiiiiinil  and  participated  witli  Stark  in  bt'^rni- 
in;.j  tl)'-  IjT' a  .Iv.ork-,  wliur-j  liaumc  made  a  persistent  stand  and  or(t;rcd 
real  ri;.dit.  '1  li'-  ijattli;.  uIulIi  bi;.;,in  about  three-  '/clock,  wa-i  soon 
over,  and  rn.in)'  of  the  militia  were  en;^a;.jed  in  collectin;.^  the  tr<jpliies 
of  the  action,  ulien  Lie-utenant-colonel  lireyman's  command  readied 
the  bridj^e  and  attempted  to  re;.;ain  the  ln;i;^dits.  His  L^un-,  o[jencd 
fire  npon  the  scattered  AmericaiiT,  and  this  was  tlie  first  intimation 
that  tliey  rec '  iverl  that  the  vict'jry  was  still  to  be  v.  vn.  The  ojjpor- 
tune  arrival  of  ('olonel  \\'ariH:r's  re;.;iment,  fresli  and  in  ;.;ood  order, 
cliecked  the  .idvancm;.;  column,  and  a  vi'.jorous  action  was  maintained 
until  the  ammunition  of  the  I'ailish  artiilery  j^ave  out,  and  the  day 
closed. 

The   American    trriphies   included   four   brass   fiel<i    pie-ces,  twelve 
brass  drums,  two  hundred  and  fifty  dra;^oo;i   sworrls  and   several  hun 
drcd  stand  of  arms. 

The  Jlritidi  casualties  are  variously  stated,  liawson  in  hii  "  l')attles 
(;f  the  Uniterl  States  b)'  .Sea  and  Land,"  win'eh  i-  coin]jiled  with  remark- 
able- f  lit  hfidnc--.  a.nd  jud'.;meiit,  adojjts  (jordoii'-^  statement  and  ])lacei 
the  number  of  killed  at  two  hundred  and  seve-n,  ,a!id  tin-  ]jrisone-j-s  at 
seven  hundred.  Jrvin^  states  the  jjri^oners  at  fwc  hundre-d  and  fifty- 
four  ;  I5ancrf<ft  at  si.x  hundred  and  ninety-two,  and  Lossin:^  at  niin; 
hundred  and  thirty-four,  includin<(  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  one 
hundred  and  fift)'  toriei.  Tin'-,  la-.t  eleme-nt  must  be  fully  con-,idere-d, 
in  view  of  General  l')ur;j,o)ne's  fjfficial  riport  that"  man}- armed  royal- 
ists joined  the  command  (jn  the  march.  '  it  i^  the  only  wa\'  by  whicii 
to  reconcile  the  disproportion  of  casualties  to  the  actual  15riti-,li  f(;rce 
which  was  detailed  to  Lieutenant-colonel   liaume's  command. 

The  Americans  lost  about  forty  killed  and  as  many  wounded. 
The  killed  of  the  J<riti-,h  force  must  lia\e  been  mainly  from  the 
Canadians  and  royali->ts  who  fled  and  were  -liot  down  b\'  c:i.'j^v.r  pur- 
suers, as  nearly  four  hundred  He-,-,ian.-)  were  ainon  ^  the  [)rivjners  cap- 
tured. Reports  of  the  ca[)ture  of  arms,  lar;^n.l)-  in  acce-,^  of  the-  liritish 
f(jrce,  are  [)rcdicatcd  upon  the  idea  that  the->e  arms  v/ere  taken  with  the 
expedition  for  distributicm  to  royalists.  The  secret  nature  of  the  ex- 
pedition at  the  start,  and  the  fact  that  it  was  with  ^'reat  difficulty  that 
arms  were  obtained  for  si.\  hundred  of  the^e  recrut-,  the  maximum 
ever  secured  by  tlie  amy,  renders  such  re-pcjrts  unti  u^tworthy. 

Thus  this  battle  added  its  trophies  to  the  yallant  fiyat  of  Oriskany 
and  the    successful    defense   of    I''ort  Schuyler.     (General  Stark  wa.s 


r  (i 


"*j 


-!^ 


;* 


'i?^^  ia 


.5  54 


"I:  I    S(  |(i;\  M.i:,    ( jl.l    i.a  N  V    AM)    lil.N  M  Nf/I  <  .N.  (1777. 


pi"iii|illy  )iii,ii|,,|,  ,|  \,y  (■(,n;Mc;.,.  'I  lir.c  cviiit',  <  ri,\,i\  \,,  |j,  the 
iijx:  hull  .,1  \V,i  Jiiii;'|.,ii' ,  i)i.,|ih.li(:  (oi'i  .1  ,t.  I  )](•  iiiililM  1,.  y.iii  ,il 
""<-'■  '"  li'i  I'll  I"  tin-  (,iiiij)  I.I  S.  Iiiiyld.  '1  h.il  olliicr  h.i.l  1)1  .11 
sup' I  s(  ,1,  ,|  |jyf,ui<r.il  (..il.  ,,  unci,  r  lli-'  <lir.cli.,n  <.t  I  li  ■  Awi'  1  k  .in 
'  "ii.".i''  '■  I'll'  'li''  l.iMiT  did  ii'-t  .iiii'.'c-  |i,  a,.u)n<'  1 '»inni.ind  unt  il 
Au;;u  .1  niiiricciilii,  ju  I  ill  liiii.-  1,,  -.itln-r  l.iun  1  ,  alPMdy  ni.ituiiii:;  Imi- 
.my  di  ucct  c  Minn  1,1  nd'  r  i,\  tin-  k  vivin;;  ,iiiny  <>(  tl,(  NmiIIi.  (.ciicimI 
.Sdiiiylii'  i,i..iv<:d  linn  uilh  c/uitr  ,y,  ],ciniii  |,,|  tp)  ni-d  I  iI'k  .il  ion  .il 
"i"'  ''I'I'l' 11  i'iii""-'i!  from  (  i.niin.iiid  M.  1  lull  hi  .  cntlm  1,1  ,!  n  ,ii|,|,.;rt 
•I'l''  '  ■!■ 'I'  '  ' '"/ivr.iti'ui  in  ■■(  III  in;;  inni  .md  upplic  ,  lor  I  h'-  pioic- 
'  "''"II  "'  'II''  '.  imp.ii'Mi  ,  ,md  .ill  lion; d I  ii.,l  invited  hy  hi  ,  .u;  <  •  ,  .or  to 
•I  (  "II  III  il  (,|  ■,v.ir  w  ill.  1 1  '.v,!  ,  (  on  vind  t  o  <i(t  1  rniiir-  I  In;  <  xai  t  1  nndilimi 
"'  "i'-  'I' I'.iiliii!  lit,  ,(jid  111':  n'(<.,.iry  iii'.-.i  ,uii;  .  \slii(li  il  ,  ml  <  ri;  ^t '- 
(Ic  iii.imh  d,  \v,i,  a  ,  loyal  t.o  iJic  dc;iu.ind  ,  iij.on  hi  ,  honor  and  hi,  /..d 
•'"^  ''  h<-  h.^d  1)1  '  II  uj.'icnn-  in  comin.md,  ,iiid  w.i-.  about,  lo  [iul  on  .j 
crovii  o|  vu  lory. 


■4"' 


'i    I 


1;? 


A    /,',l//l.\r/.<  /)/H'/''0//.\.\'t  /ii//if/ir.\- 

' '  . ///// / II 11/ 1  lif/iu//i •/■/;>,  /'///■'  f< '///Wf/w/infl 

|)  tui/imii  f,'/i//iff////:f  \;  f'//i/.s.\iW.t' 

V J/illuA  ,iii///i/ii///V  //•////f/o///.\ 

•  '.  .Illii'ltiiili  /■i>fri:\: 


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r.ATri.i;  ok  fkkemans  iakm. 

GI'.NF.RAL  GATES  took  command  of  tlic  Nortlurn  Depart- 
ment Aucjust  ninct'HMitl),  1777.  Congress  clothed  liini  with 
Iar;4e  powers,  and  conceded  to  his  ilemand  all  for  which  (icneral 
Schuyler  had  in  vain  made  requisitions,  llis  communications  W(,re 
also  made  direct  to  Confjress,  over  the  head  of  the  comni.uuler-in- 
chief;  and  to  such  an  extent  ^\■as  this  practiced,  that  his  ultimate 
report  of  the  surrender  of  General  liurjfoyne  entirely  ii^imrcd  the 
position  of  Washinfjton,  as  if  Gates  already  occupied  his  place.  It  is 
not  prt)poscd  in  this  connection  or  elsewhere,  to  enter  into  the  details 
jf  llis  systematic  efforts  to  .ittain  the  t^eneral  command  ;  but,  as  in  the 
case  of  General  I^ee  ami  other  officers,  to  notice  occasional  military 
facts  and  docunients  which  tletermine  the  cpialificalions  of  officers  in 
respect  of  subonlination,  discii)line  anil  mililarv  c  induct. 

His  accession  to  command  was  siijnali/.ed  by  an  extraordinary 
letter  addressetl  to  General  Burijjoyne,  c<Mitaininy  the  following  para- 
t^ra[)h  :  "  The  miserable  fate  of  Miss  McCrea  was  peculiarly  at^yravatetl 
by  her  being  dressed  to  receive  her  promisetl  husbami,  but  met  lier 
murderer  ('/////('j'tv/ /M'J■''/^"  "  Upw.ud  of  one  hundreil  men,  women, 
and  cliililren  have  perished  by  the  luuuls  of  ruffians  to  wlumi  it  is 
asserted  j'oi/  liavc  paiii  the  price  of  bloody 

Buryo)nc  replied,  •'  I  would  not  be  conscious  of  the  acts  you  pre- 
sume to  impute  to  me  for  the  whole  continent  of  Americi ;  though 
the  wealth  of  worlds  was  in  its  bowels,  and  a  paradise  upcjn  its  sur- 
face." The  letter  of  Gates  received  passing  applause.  The  reply  of 
Burgoyne  still  honors  his  name. 

The  army  daily  increased  in  numbers.  Congress  directed  that 
Morgan's  riflemen,  then  thoroughly  organized,  should  be  sent  to  the 
Northern  Department,  and  after  nearly  three  weeks  of  delay.  Gates 
advanced  his  command  from  Schuyler's  old  camp  on  the  islands  of  the 


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33<J 


BATTLE   OF  FREEMAN'S   FARM. 


[1777- 


Mohawk,  to  a  position  about  four  miles  north  of  Stillwater,  and  twenty- 
four  fron^  Albany,  on  the  west  or  right  bank  of  the  Hudson  river. 

A  narrow  meadow  ski-ted  the  river  at  the  point  which  Kosciusko, 
then  an  engineci  in  the  American  service,  had  selected  for  the  camp. 
The  headquarters  were  established  on  the  first  hill  west  from  the 
river.  The  breastworks  proper  took  the  i^cneral  form  of  a  half  circle 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  extent,  projected  towards  the  north.  Sev- 
eral redoubts  were  established  to  command  the  front  and  the  river 
meadows  ;  and  the  old  Neilson  barn,  built  of  heavy  logs,  was  fortified 
at  the  nearest  approach  of  the  enemy.  Light  earthworks  also  rested 
upon  the  meadow  itself,  covering  both  the  old  road  and  the  bridge  of 
boats  which  established  communication  with  the  opposite  shore  of 
the  Hudson.  Still  farther  to  the  left  on  the  adjoining  hill  eastward, 
additional  earthworks  were  commenced  but  they  were  never  entirely 
completed.  The  position  itself  was  well  protected  by  its  elevation  and 
steep  face.  Bemis'  Heights  was  to  the  north  and  west.  Freeman's 
farm-house  occupied  a  cultivated  tract  of  limited  extent  nearly  north 
of  the  American  left,  and  between  the  middle  and  south  ravine, 
vhich  here  cut  through  from  the  hills  to  the  river.  Mill  creek  and 
■)ts  branches  swept  through  the  forests  lying  betM  een  the  .Vmerican 
position  and  that  which  the  British  army  occupied  on  the  seventeenth 
day  of  Augut.  The  south  ravine  was  behind  and  south  of  the 
American  camp,  and  the  north  ravine,  which  was  the  deepest,  was 
nearly  in  front  and  south  of  the  British  position.  The  middle  ravine 
was  between  the  American  camp  and  Freeman's  farm,  Reference  is 
made  to  the  maps,  "  Battle  of  Freeman's  Farm,"  "  Battle  of  Bemis' 
Heights,"  for  a  general  review  of  the  respective  positions  of  the  two 
armies.  The  two  maps  alike  reproduce  the  portion  of  country  which 
was  common  to  the  military  movements  from  September  seventeenth 
to  the  eighth  of  October. 

General  Poor's  brigade,  consisting  of  the  New  Hampshire  regi- 
ments of  Cilley,  Scammel,  and  Hale  ;  Van  Cortland's  and  Henry  Liv- 
ingston's New  York  regiments;  Cook's  and  Latimer's  Connecticut 
militia ;  Morgan's  rifle  corps,  and  Major  Dearborn's  light  infantry 
composed  the  left  wing  under  Arnold,  resting  on  the  heights  nearly  a 
mile  from  the  river.  Geiicral  Learned's  brigade,  Bailey's,  Wesson's, 
and  Jackson's  Massachusetts  regiments,  and  James  Livingston's  New 
York  regiments  occupied  the  adjoining  fortified  plateau  to  the  left 
near  the  Neilson  barn.  The  main  body  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  General  Gates,  and  composed  chiefly  of  Nixon's,  Patterson's 


I777.J 


BATTLE  OF   FREEMAN  S   FARM. 


337 


and  Glover's  brigades,  formed  the  right  wing  upon  the  bluff,  reaching 
across  the  low  ground  to  the  river.  General  Stark  joined  with  his 
brigade  of  militia,  but  they  did  not  remain  long  after  their  short  time 
of  service  expired.  Whipple's,  Patterson's,  Warner's,  Fellows',  Bailey's 
Wolcott's,  Brickell's,  and  Ten  Brocck's  brigades  also  joined  the 
army.  The  works  were  all  well  advanced  by  the  fifteenth  of  Sep- 
tember. 

On  the  twentieth  of  August,  Burgoyne  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine, 
that  Fort  Stanwix  held  out  stubbornly  in  spite  of  St.  Loger's  victory 
(over  Herkimer), — that  he  had  accumidated  but  about  four  hundred 
loyalists,  not  half  of  them  armed,  the  rest  trimmers  merely  actuated 
by  interest — that  he  was  afraid  the  expectations  of  Sir  John  Johnson 
as  to  the  rising  of  the  country  would  fail, — that  the  great  bulk  of  the 
people  is  undoubtedly  with  the  Congress  in  principle  and  in  zeal,  and 
that  "  their  measures  are  executed  with  a  secrecy  and  dispatch  that 
are  not  to  be  equaled  ;  "  adding,  "  wherever  the  king's  forces  point, 
militia  to  the  amount  of  three  or  four  thousand  assemble  in  twenty- 
four  houts,  and  bring  their  subsistence  with  them,  and  the  alarm  over, 
they  return  to  their  farms."  "The  Hampshire  Grants,  in  particular, 
a  country  unpeopled  and  almost  unknown  in  the  last  war,  now  abounds 
in  the  most  active  and  rebellious  men  of  the  continent,  and  hangs 
like  a  gathering  storm  on  my  left." 

Of  his  correspondence  with  Sir  William  Howe  he  reports  that  he 
"  knew  that  two  of  his  messengers  had  been  hanged,  while  only  one 
letter  had  been  received  ;  "  that  "  Sir  William  Howe  informed  him  that 
his  intention  was  for  Pennsylvania,  that  Washington  had  dispatched 
twenty-five  hundred  men  to  Albany,  that  Putnam  was  in  the  High- 
lands with  four  thousand  men,  but  that  Sir  Henrj'  Clinton  remained 
in  the  neighborhood  of  New  York  and  would  act  as  circumstances 
might  direct."  Almost  immediately  after  this  dispatch  was  sent,  he 
received  the  news  of  the  retreat  of  St.  Leger  and  that  the  American 
army  wp<^  relieved  from  that  pressure  upon  its  left  flank  and  rear. 

The  utmost  effort  was  made  to  secure  supplies  ;  and  by  the  twelfth 
of  September,  provisions  had  been  procured  for  thirty  days'  issue. 
The  bridge  of  rafts  had  drifted  away  by  a  rise  of  the  Hudson  ;  a  new 
bridge  of  boats  had  been  built,  and  on  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
of  September  the  entire  army  crossed  the  Hudson  and  encamped  on 
the  plain  of  Saratoga.  It  is  proper  to  state  in  this  connection  that 
his  crossing  of  the  Hudson  river,  was  not  only  in  the  direct  line  of 
general  instructions,  but  it  had  the  concunence  of  his  officers,  and  was 

23 


f*,'d 


I,) 


338 


RATTLK   OF  FREEMAN'S   FARM. 


[1777. 


ll 


I   I 

i 


regarded  as  tlie  only  method  of  meeting;  tlie  respoiisibility  which 
devolved  upon  the  army. 

On  the  fifteenth  the  army  moved  to  Dovej^at  (now  Coveville)  ; 
on  the  sixteenth  repaired  bridges,  reconnoitered  the  country  and 
made  a  still  further  atlvance,  and  on  the  seventeenth  encamped  upon 
advantaj^eous  ground  within  four  miles  of  the  American  army,  near 
Snoods'  Mouse,  as  indicated  on  the  map  entitled  "  Hattle  of  Free- 
man's Farm."  On  the  ei;^hteenth  skirmishing  was  active  between 
the  two  armies.  On  the  nineteenth,  after  careful  reconnoitcrin;^  of 
the  great  ravine  and  other  ave^iues  of  approach  to  the  .\merican  lines, 
the  British  army  advanced  .0  the  attack.  An  approximate  idea  of 
the  succeeding  movements  can  be  secured. 

Major-general  the  Marquis  de  Chastellux  who  served  under  the 
Count  de  Rochambeau,  revisited  America  in  1780-81,  and  82,  and  after 
an  entertainment  at  General  Schuyler's  mansion,  "visited  the  groun(J 
where  the  actions  of  the  nineteenth  of  .September  and  of  the  seventh 
of  October  happened."  He  sa\-s,  "  I  avoiil  the  wovd  Jirh/ 0/  biittli\ 
for  these  engagements  were  in  the  woods,  and  on  ground  so  intersected 
and  covered,  that  it  is  impossible  either  to  conceive  or  discover  the 
smallest  resemblance  between  it  and  the  plans  given  to  the  public  by 
General  Burgoyne." 

Whether  "  the  depth  of  the  snow  through  which  he  waded,"  or 
his  "  upset  in  a  great  heap  of  snow  while  tra\'cli!ig  in  a  sledge,"  had 
any  thing  to  do  with  the  difficulty  in  tracing  the  route  of  Bin\goync 
or  not,  the  genial  traveler  does  not  indicate.  These  maps  however 
do  set  forth  with  substantial  distinctness  the  general  positions  of  the 
two  arniies;  and  with  some  modifications  and  enlargement  of  detail, 
are  the  best  guides  from  which  to  obtain  a  fair  conception  of  the 
engagements  referred  to.  It  is  not  unseldom  the  case  that  a  single 
error  in  the  starting  point,  will  even  confuse  one  who  participated 
actively  in  field  operations,  if  it  be  only  through  a[)proaching  the 
position  from  a  contrary  direction  ;  and  in  reports  of  nearly  all  battles, 
the  movements  made  by  different  cor[)s  must  be  examined,  in  order 
to  understand  the  actual  relations  of  the  principal  parties  engaged. 

The  advance  of  General  Burgoyne  will  be  taken  from  his  own 
initiative,  sustained  b)'  the  evidence  of  officers  of  his  staff  and  his  divis- 
ion commanders  ;  antl  these  will  be  combined  with  the  rei)nrt  of 
Adjutant-general  Wilkinson,  of  General  Gates'  staff,  and  other  Ameri- 
can officers,  so  as  to  gain  as  accurate  an  estimate  of  the  battle  referred 
to  as  may  be  gained  by  such  analysis. 


•777.1 


BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN  S   FARM. 


339 


Six  companies  of  the  Forty-scvcntli  British  regiment  guarded  the 
bateaux  wliicli  were  at  the  river  bank,  in  the  rear  of  the  camp.  Two 
companies  of  tliis  regiment  remained  behind  on  Diamond  Island,  Lake 
George.  When  the  army  left  Fort  Edward,  "  General  Eraser's  corps, 
sustained  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman's  made  a  circuit,  in  order  to 
pass  the  ravine  commodiously  without  quitting  the  heights  ;  and  after- 
wards to  cover  the  march  of  the  line  to  the  right. 

The  Canadians  were  in  advance  and  were  speedily  L.'nvcn  back, 
but  rallied  upon  Eraser's  approach.  The  American  volunteers  and 
Indians  were  also  emplo}  ed  on  tlie  flanks,  and  to  the  front.  The 
British  and  German  grenadiers  and  the  Twenty-fourth  regiment  moved 
steadily  along  the  height,  until  they  were  required  to  change  direc- 
tion to  the  left,  which  brought  them  directly  in  contact  with  the 
American  troops,  who  having  been  repulsed  by  General  Eraser,  shortly 
after  engaged  the  British  centre.  General  Burgoyne  says  of  this  par- 
ticular movement  :  "  In  the  meantime  the  enemy,  not  acquainted  with 
the  combination  of  the  march,  had  moved  in  great  force  out  of  their 
intrenchments,  with  a  view  of  turning  the  line  upon  our  right,  and 
being  clucked  b}-  tlie  disposition  of  Brigadier-general  Er.iser,  countcr- 
inaixlud,  in  order  to  direct  their  great  effort  to  the  left  of  the  British." 
"  From  the  nature  of  the  country,  efforts  of  this  sort,  however  near, 
may  be  effected  without  possibility  of  their  being  discovered." 

The  centre  column,  led  by  Burgoyne  in  person,  '•  passed  the  ravine 
in  a  direct  line  south,  and  formed  in  line  of  battle  as  soon  as  they 
gained  the  summit  (out  of  the  ravine)  at  the  first  opening  of  the  wood 
to  the  right,  to  give  time  to  Eraser's  corps  to  make  the  desired  circuit, 
and  to  enable  the  left  wing  and  artillery,  which,  under  the  command 
of  Major-generals  Phillips  and  Riedesel,  kept  the  great  road  and 
meadows  near  the  river,  and  had  bridges  to  repair,  to  be  equally 
reatly  to  proceed."  The  latter  corps,  upon  reaching  the  position, 
changed  direction  and  marched  nearly  due  west,  to  connect  with  the 
left  of  the  Iiritish  centre,  which  had  engagetl  the  enemy  before  their 
arrival.  "  All  colunuis  moved  at  signal  guns,  a  little  after  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon.  A  few  cannon  shot  soon  dislodged  the  Americans 
from  a  house  where  the  Canadians  had  been  attacked, "  and  "  Brigadier- 
general  Eraser's  corps  arrived  with  such  precision  in  point  of  time,  as 
to  be  found  upon  a  very  advantageous  height  on  the  right  of  the 
British  centre  as  soon  as  the  action  began."  This  position  has  been 
already  adverted  to.  The  American  troops  made  their  first  advance 
upon  General  Eraser's  corps  ;  but  by  three  o'clock,  or  soon  after,  the 


M 


r" 


340 


BATTLE  OF   FREEMAN'S   FARM. 


ri777. 


whole  action  concentrated  near  Freeman's  Farm,  from  whicli  position 
tlic  Hritish  army  ir..nle  a  determined  advance  for  tlie  purpose  of  turn-i 
iiiLj  tiie  Americiii  left.  The  Twentieth,  Si.xty-second,  and  Twenty- 
first  regiments  advanced  directly  from  their  original  place  of  formation, 
leaving  the  Ninth  in  reser  ;e.  The  IJritish  grenadiers  and  the  Twenty- 
lourth  were  brought  to  thei.'  support  after  this  advance  to  Freeman's 
Farm  ;  and  the  light  infantry  which  had  been  on  Burgoyne's  right,  also 
came  into  action  on  the  left  of  the  grenadiers,  thus  connecting  with 
the  Ninth  regiment  when  it  subsequently  advanced.  Major  Forbes  of 
the  Ninth,  who  commantled  the  pickets,  states  that  "  he  was  attacked 
with  great  vigor  from  behind  rail  fences  and  a  house,  by  a  body  of 
riflemen  and  light  infantry"  ;  th.it  "  the  Americans  attempted  to  turn 
the  left  of  the  Sixty-second,  when  the  Twentieth  was  advanced  to  its 
support."  The  Americans  pressed  forward  al--,o  upon  the  right  of  the 
British  column,  until  the  advance  of  the  British  light  infantry,  and  the 
movement  of  the  grenadiers  of  Fraser's  commanc.  .o  the  left,  com- 
pelled them  .  )  fall  back  and  take  their  tinal  position  on  good  ground, 
between  Freeman's  Farm  and  Chatfield's  house.  Earl  Balcarras,  in 
his  evidence  upon  this  part  of  the  battle,  says,  "  The  enemy  behaved 
with  great  obstinacy  and  courage."  The  Farl  of  Harrington  says 
that  "  the  British  line  was  formed  with  the  utmost  regularity,  that 
different  attempts  were  made  by  the  General's  carders  to  charge  the 
enemy  witli  bayonets,  and  all  failed  but  the  last,  when  the  ]'ritish 
troops  finally  drove  them  from  the  field,  and  that  the  action  was  dis- 
puted very  obstinately  by  the  enemy."  During  this  time  the  rifle- 
men and  other  parts  of  Breyman's  corps  were  left  on  the  heights  to 
protect  the  extreme  right  from  being  turned. 

Major-general  Phillips  and  Major  Humphreys,  with  four  pieces  of 
artillery,  arrived  from  tlie  extreme  left  in  advance  of  General  Riedesel, 
and  led  the  Twentieth  again  to  the  front,  "  restorir.g  the  action,"  (says 
Burgoyne)  "  in  a  point  which  was  critically  pressed  by  a  great  superi- 
ority of  fire."  General  Riedesel  brought  up  the  Jagers,  Specht's  com- 
mand, and  his  Ih'unswickers,  only  in  time  to  engage  in  the  final  charge, 
which  was  just  as  night  came  on,  and  both  armies  gave  up  the  contest. 
The  Farl  Balcarras  occupied  Freeman's  Farm  with  the  light  infantry 
and  fortified  the  position.  Colonel  Breyman  threw  up  works  to  the 
right  and  rear,  to  protect  the  right  wing,  and  the  remainder  of  the  army 
was  prolonged  to  the  river,  behind  Mill  creek,  Manau's  corps  occupy- 
ing the  meadow  near  the  river  bank.  The  whole  line  was  at  once 
fortified,  and  five  redoubts  were  established  on  detached  hills  having 


!i     ( 


1777-1 


BATTLE  OF  FREEMAN  S  FARM. 


341 


commanding  positions.  The  British  regiments  of  the  centre  which 
had  been  held  under  fire  for  the  entire  afternoon,  went  into  action 
with  eleven  hundred  men,  and  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  more  than 
half  their  force. 

The  Twentieth  and  Sixty-second  were  almost  destroyed.  Colonel 
Anstruther  and  Major  Ilamage,  and  many  other  officers,  were  either 
killed  or  wounded,  and  Adjutant-general  Kingston  states,  that  "the 
su*"vivors  did  not  probably  exceed  fifty,  besides  four  or  five  officers." 
Captain  Jones,  commanding  four  guns,  had  thirty-six  men  killed  or 
wounded,  out  of  a  total  of  forty-eight.  The  fight  over  these  guns 
was  desperate. 

Such  is  the  summary  of  the  British  reports  of  this  action  ;  and 
they  clearly  vindicate  the  excellence  of  the  order  of  battle  which 
Burgoyne  atlopted  and  the  skill  with  which  his  force  was  handled  in 
the  midst  of  woods  and  where  there  were  few  tracts  of  open  ground 
for  manoeuveriiig  troops.  Early  in  tlie  day,  upon  the  advice  of  Arnold, 
Gates  had  directed  him  to  send  Morgan's  riflemen  and  Dearborn's 
light  infantry  to  oppose  the  advance  of  the  British  right.  This  was 
the  force  encountered  by  Major  Forbes  and  afterwards  by  Earl  Bal- 
carras.  Its  temporary  success  \vas  turned  into  a  repulse  by  the  sup- 
port which  Major  Forbes  received,  and  Morgan  fell  back  ('•  counter- 
marched," says  Burgoyne)  with  the  loss  of  Captain  Swearigen  and 
twenty  men  and  with  his  corps  so  greatly  disorganized  that  he  thought 
it  was  "  ruined."'  The  regiments  of  .Scammel  and  Cillcy  were  ordered 
to  Morgan's  support,  and  Arnold  pushed  a  strong  column  to  the  attack, 
from  his  division.  The  firm  resistance  of  General  I'^raser  required 
additional  troops.  Arnold  finally  pushed  his  entire  division  to  the 
front  and  then  it  was  that  the  attack  shifted  and  fell  upon  the  centre, 
commanded  by  Burgoyne  in  person. 

Sergeant  Lamb  says,  in  his  Journ  ',  "  Here  the  conflict  was  dread- 
ful ;  for  four  hours  a  constant  blaze  of  fire  was  kept  up,  and  both 
armies  seemed  to  be  determined  on  death  or  victory."  Arnold 
finally  brought  his  whole  division  into  action  and  other  reinforce- 
ments came  up  until  at  least  three  thousand  American  troops  were 
engaged. 

The  American  casualties  were  sixty-five  killed,  two  hundred  and 
eighteen  wounded  and  thirty-eight  missing.  The  British  army  was 
imable  to  resume  the  fight;  and  the  American  army  awaited  the 
arrival  of  ammunition  before  venturing  to  advance  again  upon  the 
enemy.     General  Gates  reported  this  action  to  Congress  in  brief  terms 


i 


I 


in 
s  IS 

I 


3-!^ 


BATTLE   OF   FREEMAN  S   FARM. 


[1777 


declining  '  to  discriminate  in  praise  of  the  officers,  as  they  all  deserve 
the  honor  and  applause  of  Con;j[ress."  The  names  of  Lieutenant- 
colonels  Colburn  and  Adams,  who  were  killed,  are  however  specifically 
mentioned. 

To  what  extent  General  Arnold  accompanied  the  successive  por- 
tions of  his  tlivision  which  bore  the  brunt  of  this  day's  fight,  is  not 
clearly  or  uniformly  defined  by  historians.  That  contemporaneous 
histjry  gave  his  division  credit,  is  nowhe"c  fjuestioned  :  and  that  he 
was  a  listless  observer  or  remaineil  in  camp  regardless  of  the  fact  that 
he  was  responsible  for  the  entire  left  wing,  which  was  then  assailed,  is 
perfectly  inconsistent  with  his  nature  anii  the  position  he  occupied. 
Wilkinson,  Adjutant-general  of  Gates,  and  by  virtue  thereof  "//-////^ 
facie''  good  authority  as  to  the  acts  of  Gates,  makes  the  remarkable 
statement,  that  "  not  a  single  gener.d  officer  was  on  the  field  of  battle, 
the  nineteenth  of  September  until  evening,"  and  states  the  execution 
of  this  wonderful  military  exploit,  that  "  the  battle  was  fought  by  the 
general  concert  and  zealous  cooperation  of  the  corps  engaged,  and 
sustained  more  by  individual  cour.igc  than  military  discipline." 
Bancroft  states  that  "  Arnold  was  not  on  the  field,"  and  adds  '•  so 
witnesses  Wilkinson,  whom  Marshall  knew  personally  and  believed." 
And  Marshall  says,  "  Reinforcements  were  continually  brought  up, 
and,  about  four  o'clock,  Arnold,  with  nine  Continental  regiments  and 
Morgan's  corps,  was  completely  engaged  with  the  whole  right  wing  of 
the  British  army.  The  conflict  v.as  extremely  severe  and  only  ter- 
minated with  the  da)-.""'" 

Gordon  sa\-s,  "  .XmoKl's  division  was  out  in  the  action,  but  he 
himself  did  not  le.ul  them  ;  he  remained  in  the  camp  the  whole  time." 
This  statement  is  not  inco  sistcntwith  the  fact  that  Arnold  regulated 
the  resistance  before  his  lines,  although  a  curious  intimation  concern- 
ing a  man  like  Arnold.  There  was  little  disposition  on  the  part  of  his- 
torians who  wrote  just  after  the  war,  to  do  Arnold  justice  for  real 
merit ;  but  St(;dman,  equally  good  authority  with  Gordon  in  most 
respects,  says,  "  The  enemy  were  led  to  the  battle  by  General  Arnold, 
alio  distitiguished  himself  in  an  extraoidinary  manner."  Dawson,  who 
has  few  superiors  in  the  careful  exa.nination  of  American  history,  and 
Lossing,  who  has  devoted  his  life  to  this  class  of  specialties,  and 
Tomes,  assume  his  presence ;  while  Colonel  Varick,  writing  imme- 
diately from  the  camp,  and  Neilson,  and  Hall  and  many  other  writers, 
give  to  Arnold  not  merely  the  credit  of  superintending  the  field  opera- 
tions of  his  division,  but  of  leading  them  in  person.     It  is  difficul.  to 

*  See  note  on  page  344. 


1777 


li.MTLE   OF  FREEMAN'S   F.M<M. 


343 


understand  how   the   withdrawal  of  troops  from  Fraser's  fror.t,  and 
their  transfer  to  the  British  eeiitt-e,  with  the  consetjuent  movements 
described  by  General   Huri;()\ne,  wliich  required  such  rapid  and  ex- 
liaustive  employment  of  the  whole  force  wnich  he  biou^Ljht  into  action, 
could  have  taken  place  undirected,  and  with  no  stronj^^  will  to  hold  the 
troops  to  the  attack  and  defense.     It  is  material  that  other  facts  be 
considered  in  order  to  appreciate  the  value  of  Wilkinson's  statement. 
He  was  a  yountj  inaii  about  twenty  years  of  age,  restless,  mij^ratoryin 
the  camp,  and  like  a   boy  in    his  eagerness  to  see  everything  every- 
where,    lie  exercised  his  functions  as  assistant  Adjutant-general,  as 
if  he  were  the  duplicate  of  his  chief,  and  repeatedly  gave  orders  as  if 
the  tivo /^crsoiis  m;ide  the  general  commanding.     The   unprofessional 
reader  of  history  wouhl   take    the  statement    that   "  General  Gates 
nnlered  out  Morgan's  corps   on  the  morning  of  the  nineteenth,"  to 
meanyV/i/  f/iat.     But  when  it  is  understood,  as  api^ears  from  Arnold's 
report,  that  Giitcral  Gates  ordered  Arnold  to  send  out  J/orj^uu's  corps, 
there   is  involved  a   negation  of  the  absence  of  Arnold  during  the 
attack  upon  his  lines.     Arnold  also,  in   his  objections  to  the  transfer 
of  Morgan  from  his  command,  and  neither  Gates  nor  Wilkinson  dis- 
sent from  his  statement,  thus  addresses  General  Gates  :  "  On  the  19th 
inst.,  when  advice  wa.-i  received   that  the   enemy  were   approaching,  I 
took  the  libcrt}'  to  give  it  as  my  opinion,  that  we  ought  to  marcii  out 
and  att.ick  them.     You  desired  vie  to  send  Colonel  .Morgan  and  the 
light  infantry,  and  support  them.     I  obeyed  your  orders,  and   before 
the  action  was  over,  I  found  it  necessary  to  send  out  the  whole  of  my 
division  to  support  the  attack." 

General  Arnold  was  complaining  that  "  he  had  been  iniormcd  that 
in  the  returns  transmitted  to  Congress  of  the  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  action,  the  troops  were  mentioned  as  a  detachment  from  the  army." 
He  also  says:  "I  observe  it  is  mentioned  in  the  orders  of  the  day, 
that  Colonel  Morgan's  corps,  not  being  in  any  brigade  or  division  of 
this  army,"  (just  then  withdrawn)  "  are  to  make  returns  and  reports 
only  to  headquarters,  from  whence  they  are  alone  to  receive  orders  ; 
although  it  is  notorious  to  the  whole  army,  they  have  been  in  and 
done  duty  with  my  division  for  some  time  past."  "  I  have  ever  sup- 
posed that  a  Major-general's  command  of  four  thousand  me.,  vas  a 
proper  division,  and  no  detachincni,  when  composed  of  w'^oie  brigades, 
forming  one  wing  of  the  army  ;  and  that  the  general  and  troops,  if 
guilty  of  misconduct  or  cowardly  behavior  in  time  of  action,  were 
justly  chargeable  as  a  division."     "  Mad  my  division  behaved  ill,  the 


|;/|| 


n 


344 


BArri.E  OF   FUKEMAX  S   lAKM. 


[1777. 


m 


other  divisions  (>r  the  army  would  liave  thouglit  it  extremely  hard  to 
have  been  amenable  for  their  conduct." 

Wilkinson  also  says,  "  T/i/s  battle  ivas  f^crfcctly  (icriiiriital"  (see 
BurL;o\'ne's  carefully  conceived  advance.^l  that  neither  of  the  'j^encral-i 
niedit.ited  an  attack  at  the  tinv.,  and  but  for  Lieutenant-colonel  Col- 
burn's  report  it  would  not  have  taken  place."  lie  states  that  thiii 
officer  was  "sent  acros>  the  ilutls'jn  river  to  observe  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  by  climbintj;  forest  trees  or  <ither  practicable 
means."  that  on  "his  makini,'  his  communications  to  the  (iencal, 
that  the  enemy  had  taken  up  their  camp,  he  immeiliately  ordered 
Colonel  Mop^^m,"  wis  if  it  were  .i  direct  personal  (jrder)  "to  advance 
with  his  corps."  When  the  firin^^  bej^an.  and  Major  Wilkinson 
wanted  to  see  what  was  L;oin;j;  on.  ,ind  (lenenU  Gates  answered, 
"  It  is  wnir  iiut\'.  sir,  to  .iwait  (irtler-^."  he  "  maele  an  excuse  to  visit 
the  picket  on  the  left  f  >r  intelliL;ence,  put  spurs  to  his  horse,  and, 
directed  by  the  sound,  entered  the  woods."  It  would  be  idle  to  fol- 
low his  extraonlinary  personal  experiences  thrcniL^h  the  woods,  as 
related  in  his  memoirs.  The  most  eventful  elements  of  his  early 
career  are  embodied  in  data,  gathered  b\'  him  on  such  unofficial, 
voluntary  excursions. 

It  is  a  fact  that  General  Gates  did.  not  pass  under  fire,  neitlier  was 
it  necessary  for  him  to  tlo  so  ;  but  the  whole  coiuluct  of  that  officer,  and 
of  his  Adiutant-L;eneral,  savors  of  tlie  disgust  with  which  in  an  earlier 
war,  King  Saul  heard  the  shouts  that  "  Saul  had  slain  his  thonsands. 
but  David  his  tens  of  thousands."  .\rnold  must  .stand  credited  with 
personal  valor  and  a  gallant  defense  of  the  left  wing  of  the  American 
arni\'  on  the  nineteenth  day  of  September,  1777. 

There  is  no  method  of  determining  the  details  of  his  conduct,  and 
the  student  of  history  must  unite  with  Sparks  and  Irving  and  Mar- 
shall in  the  general  sentiment  that  Morgan  only,  of  .\merican  officers, 
can  compete  with  Arnold  for  tlie  brightest  laurels  of  the  Saratoga 
campaign. 

NOTK  to  p.  342.  Marshall  (Kd.  iS,w)  closes,  "and  about  four  in  the  afternoon  upwards  of 
three  thousand  American  troops  were  closely  enj^aped  with,"  etc.,  adding;  in  foot-nf)te,  Wilkinson's 
sLitement,  cited  paj^e  ,^2.  Mr.  Bancroft  kindly  furnishes  this  fragnienl  from  (MS.)  li'tter  <  f 
R.  R.  Livin^jston  to  \Va-hinf:^ton,  January  12,  1778,  but  has  no  data  to  relate  the  personal  pronoun. 
"  I  take  the  literty  to  enclose  your  Kxcellency,  an  extmct  written  to  him,  under  General  .Xrnold's 
directi(jn  by  a  tjentlem.in  of  hi-  faniil>,  he  Ix'inj;  unable  to  hold  a  |>on  himself.  .Vfler  a  warm 
commendation  of  his  j:;;ood  conduct  both  in  tlie  camp  and  field,  and  j;i\iii,^  him  and  his  re};inient  a 
full  share  of  the  honors  of  the  battle  of  the  19th,  in  which  General  .\rnold,  not  being  present, 
speaks  only  from  the  reports  of  those  who  were."  This  fraij;meut  does  not  prove  that  Arnold 
did  not  superintend  movement  of  the  troops.     See  text.     (Sec  note,  page  354.) 


— ^  d1  =^ 


'  '/.•/f/'Av/f//u//^rr/ii///'i  //•/////: 


■ '''' 

31-1* 


.{ft. 


^ii 


H' 


'  i!i 


m    ■:.].: 


^^Vf^tklm 


CHAPTl^R  XLVII. 


BKMIS'  MKICIITS.     lU'RCOYNK'S   SURRKNUKR,   1777. 


ON  tlu:  twenty-first  of  September,  a  letter  from  '••  Henry  Clin- 
ton, written  in  cypher  on  the  twelfth,  adviseu  General  Hnr- 
!^^<>yne  of  his  intention  to  attack  the  lludson  river  posts  in  about  ten 
da\s.  No  other  niessai^e  was  received  from  New  York  durinij  the 
month;  and  on  the  thirtl  of  October  the  ration-issue  was  largely 
reduced.  On  the  seventh,  the  condition  of  the  army  was  such  as  to 
compel  enerLjetic  measures  for  its  delivrance.  The  paramount 
object  of  the  cainpai;^n  was  kept  in  view,  for  it  was  evident  that  a 
sudden  retreat  would  set  free  the  rapidl\-  increasing  American  army 
for  operations  a.^ainst  ("linton.  There  was  no  ilifference  of  opinion 
among  the  British  generals  as  to  the  duty  of  immediate  action,  and 
two  alternatives  were  consideud  ;  either  to  make  a  bold  offensive 
movement  and  force  a  passage  through,  or  past,  (Jiates'  army;  or,  to 
so  dislodge  iuid  cripple  him,  as  !:o  make  a  secure  retreat  practicable. 
To  rest  in  camp  was  to  starve,  or  perish  by  the  sword.  The  troops 
selected  for  the  proposed  movement  consisted  of  fifteen  hundred 
regulars,  to  bccomm.inded  by  Burgoyne  in  person,  accompanied  by 
Generals  Phillips,  Riedescl  and  Fraser.  Generals  Hamilton  and  Specht 
were  ordered  to  hold  the  intrenchments  and  redoubts;  and  the 
defense  of  the  river  meadow,  with  the  magazine  and  hospital,  was 
intrusted  to  General  De  Gall.  Two  howitzers,  two  twelve,  and  six 
six-pounder  guns  were  attached  to  the  command. 

The  column  was  formed  and  deployed  within  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  of  the  American  left,  upon  high  and  cjuitc  open  ground,  sur- 
rounded by  woods;  and  Ca[)tain  Eraser's  rangers,  the  Indians  and 
Provincials,  were  ordered  to  make  their  way  through  by  paths  of  the 
forest,  to  attempt  a  demonstration  to  the  rear  of  the  American  army. 
These   h'ght    troops  had    hardly  started,  when  a  sudden  and    rapid 


4'J 


II 


34^ 


HKMIS*    IIF.ICIITS.— P.URGOYNK*S   SURRENDER, 


[1777. 


attack  was  made  upon  tlie  left  of  the  line,  already  formed  for  imme- 
diate advance.  The  British  grenadiers  under  Major  Acklaiid  met  tlie 
attack  with  great  resohition  ;  but  tlic  increasing  numbers  of  tlie  enemy 
gradually  bore  ihem  I),ick.  'before  any  portion  of  the  German  troops 
on  the  riglit  and  to  the  centre,  could  be  withdrawn  to  support  the 
yieldii.g  grenadiers  the  centre  was  assailed,  and  then  the  right;  so 
that  the  entire  line  was  actively  i:-.;aged  almost  as  soon  as  the  action 
commenced. 

The  fragments  of  the  Twentieth  and  tiie  Sixty-second,  with  a  small 
body  of  light  infantry,  were  all  that  could  be  brought  forw.ird,  until 
Earl  Balcarras  was  withdrawn  'om  the  extreme  right,  and  General 
Fraser  took  a  position  to  cover  the  im[)ending  retreat  of  tlie  whole 
force.  While  thus  engaged  in  strengthening  tlie  left  and  securing 
some  steadiness  to  th(^  yielding  centre,  that  officer  was  mortally 
wounded.  A  general  retre.it  was  ordered.  Sir  Francis  Clarke,  who 
bore  the  message,  was  also  fatally  wounded.  Six  guns  were  at  once 
abandoned  the  horses  and  most  of  the  men  having  been  killed  ;  and 
as  the  troops  entered  their  o]d  lines,  "the  works  were  stormetl  with 
great  fury  by  the  Americans,  who  rushed  on,  under  a  severe  fire  of 
grape  shot  and  small  arms."  The  intrenchments  occupied  the  night 
before  and  regained  by  Ear!  Balcarras,  successfully  resisted  assault ; 
but  the  attacking  force  swept  by  them  and  successudly  stormed  those 
which  Lieutenant-colonel  Breyman  occupied.  He  was  killed,  and  his 
troops  broke  in  confusion  to  the  rear.  Such  is  the  British  history  of 
the  action. 

General  Gates  had  detailed  Colonel  Brooks  with  three  hundred 
men  to  move  around  the  Ikitish  right  and  annoy  their  outposts. 
Morgan  had  already  skirmished  with  a  small  Canadian  force  which 
threatened  the  American  pickets  on  the  comparatively  clear  groimd 
between  the  middle  and  north  ravine,  ami  an  officer  w;is  sent  to  deter- 
mine the  strength  and  disposition  of  the  British  forces  which  had  been 
reported  as  in  line  of  battle  threatening  the  left  wing  of  the  American 
army.  Wlien  the  aid-de-camp  reached  the  hill,  near  Chatfield's  house, 
he  found  that  the  ridge  was  alreadv  held  bv  an  advanced  detachment 
from  the  l^ritish  column,  and  that  Mungen's  house  was  occupied  by 
officers  who  had  been  sent  forward  to  reconnoiter  the  country  near 
the  American  lines. 

A^t  this  time  the  .-\mcrican  army  occupied  substantiall)-  the  same 
position  as  on  the  nineteenth  of  September.  Ar,  altercation  between 
Arnold  and  Gates,  owing  to  the  removal  of*  a  portion  of  the  division 


I777-J 


DKMIS     lIKKillTS. — BliTiGOYNE  S    SUKKKNDKR. 


347 


of  the  former  without  K'\''"rt  '''•"''  notice,  and  other  vexatious  questions 
which  had  their  prime  root  in  the  unabated  confidence  of  Arnold  in 
SchuN'ler,  had  driven  him,  in  one  of  his  passionate  outbursts,  to  ask  leave 
to  goto  headquarters  and  join  Washington.  Gates  readil\'  granted  this 
request,  and  General  Lincoln,  who  arrived  on  the  twenty-ninth,  was  at 
once  placet!  in  command  of  Arnold's  division.  Arnold,  however, 
quickly  repeuiied  his  passionate  outburst  and  lingered  with  the  army, 
liaving  the  general  sympathy  of  the  ofificers,  but  still  venting  his  anger 
in  daily  imi)rudence.  On  the  seventh  of  Octob(}r  as  the  battle  came 
on,  he  was  like  a  war-horse  gnawing  his  curb  and  panting  for  the  fray. 

Gates  sent  Morgan  to  the  left  to  gain  high  ground  on  the  British 
right.  Poor's  brigade,  matle  up  of  Scammel's,  Hale's,  and  Cilley's 
New  Hampshire  regiments,  was  ordered  to  cross  the  hill  by  Chatfield's 
house  ami  attack  the  Hritish  left. 

Major  Dearborn  was  placed  in  readiness  to  advance  to  Morgan's 
right,  and  the  Connecticut  regiments  of  Cook  and  Latimer,  and  Van 
Courtland's  and  Henry  Livingston's  New  York,  were  to  support  Poor. 
Learned's  brigade,  recently  under  Arnold's  command,  was  also  placed 
in  readiness  to  follow  immediately;  and  (iencral  Tenbrouck  was  held 
in  reserve  to  give  support  as  needed.  The  formation  was  made  under 
cover  of  the  woods,  and  as  already  intlicated  by  the  British  report  of 
the  action,  the  counter  assault  was  a  practical  surprise  to  the  troop3 
assailed.  The  composition  and  positions  of  the  British  corps  are  cor- 
rectly indicated  on  the  map,  "  Battle  of  Bemis'  Heights."  The  brig- 
ades of  Poor  and  Learned  crossed  Mill  creek,  reserved  their  fire,  and 
moved  up  the  slope  with  steadiness  and  in  good  order.  The  first  fire 
delivered  by  the  British  troops  was  aimed  too  high  and  did  little  mis- 
chief.    The  Americans  without  hesitation  rushed  upon  the  guns. 

Again  and  again  these  pieces  were  alternately  controlled  by  the 
opposing  forces,  until  at  last  the  British  left  wing,  overwhelmed  by 
numbers,  gave  way.  Major  Ackland  was  wounded,  and  Major  Williams 
was  taken  prisoner.  Morgan  had  already  gained  the  right  flank,  and 
was  actively  engaged.  Dearborn  was  in  front,  and  the  Connecticut 
regiments  filled  the  interval  still  further  to  the  right.  The  whole  line 
was  under  the  pressure  of  a  wildly  impetuous  assault,  fhe  German 
trooj)s  in  the  centre  broke.  The  Royal  artillery,  losing  their  horses 
and  half  their  men,  abandoned  their  guns,  and  the  Earl  B.ilcarras  with 
his  light  infantry  became  the  chief  dependence  of  General  Frascr,  who 
was  trying  to  rally  the  grenadiers  and  establish  behind  the  left  wing 
a  second  line,  as  cover  for  the  general  retreat  then  ordered. 


.^^ 


i:?f 


i  y 


M 


34H 


1!i;mis    iii;ic;iirs.  -i!i;r(;i)\ni;  s  sukrkndkr. 


[1777- 


At  this  si.i'^c  of  tin;  I.Mt'i'u-,  Arnold,  no  lotv^cr  uiuKt  silf-cotitrol, 
burst  from  tlic  cimj),  .uul  like  a  nu.k'or  rodi-  to  tlif  front  of  LiMnu.'d's 
briij.Klc,  wliich  h.nl  been  so  muMilly  uiidi.'r  his  coinMi.ind,  and  dasht-d 
into  the  fiLjht.  lie  was  clu.cred  as  he  rode  ])ast,  and  like  a  wiiirlwiiid 
the  re^jimenls  went  with  him  ii[)on  the  l)roken  Ihitish  lines.  l'"raser 
fell  mortally  wounded  in  this  assault,  and  swiftly  belniul  the  half  crazy 
Volunteer  came  'I'enbroeck,  with  a  force;  neaii)'  double  that  of  the 
whole  Jb'itish  line.  That  line  was  now  in  full  re-tre.it.  l'hilli[)S  and 
Rietlesel,  as  well  as  15uri;oyne,  who  took  command  in  person,  ex- 
hibited marvellous  couraL;e  in  an  hour  so  iH'rilous,  aiul  withdrew  the 
troops  with  cretlitable  self-j)ossession  and  skill,  but  noihini;  could  .-.lop 
Arnold.  Wherever  iie  found  troojis  he  assumed  command;  and  by 
the  maj^netism  of  his  will  and  passion,  he  became  supreme  in  daring 
entle.ivor.  With  a  put  of  the  briL,^ules  of  Patterson  and  (ilover,  he 
assaulted  the  intrenchmeiUs  of  I'Larl  IVilcarras,  but  was  repulsed.  To 
the  rii^ht  of  th';  I'.arl  lialcarras,  the  Canadians  and  Royalists  were 
posted  under  cover  of  two  stock.ule  redoubts.  Ariuild  here  ajjain  met 
Learned's  brigade,  took  the  li'ati,  and  with  a  sinL;le  chaii^e  cleared 
these  works,  Icavini^  the  left  of  iire\'m.m's  position  entirely  exposed. 
Without  waitin<^  for  the  result  of  the  furtlu'r  attack  at  this  i)oint,  he 
rode  directly  in  front  of  Hrevinan's  intrenchnunts,  under  fire,  and 
meetinLj  the  rey;im  'Uts  of  Wesson  ami  Livini^ston  and  Morj^an's  ritle 
corps,  which  had  made  the  entire  compass  of  the  Hritish  rii^ht,  he 
ordered  them  forward,  and  then  ridiivj;  on  with  a  portion  of  lirooks' 
reL;inKnt  which  joined  at  that  moment,  he  turned  the  intrenchments 
of  Hreyman,  entered  the  sally  port  and  was  sh<jt,  with  his  horse,  astlie 
victory  was  achieved. 

"  It  is  a  curious  fact,  that  an  officer  who  really  had  no  commaiul  in 
the  .nin>'  was  the  leader  of  one  of  the  most  spirited  anil  important 
battles  of  the  Ivevolulion."  'I'hus  writes  .Si)arks,  adding;,  "  His  mad- 
ness or  rashness,  wiiatever  it  may  be  called,  resulteil  most  fortunately 
for  himself.  The  wound  he  received  at  the  mojnent  of  rushin;^^  into 
the  arms  of  dant^er  and  of  death,  added  fresh  lustre  to  his  military 
glory,  and  was  a  claim  to  public  favor  and  apijlause." 

Arnold  was  promptly  promoted  by  Congress  for  his  gallant  con- 
duct. Wilkinson  says,  "  he  would  not  do  injustice  even  to  a  traitor  " 
and  after  describing  his  erratic  course,  substantially  as  stated,  declar- 
ing that  he  was  in  the  field  exercising  commaiul,  but  not  by  order  or 
permission  of  General  Gates,  makes  these  statements  which  belong  to 
history,  and  must  go  to  the  credibility  of  his  other  testimony, "'  The 


1777.] 


i;i;mis    iii:i(;iits.  — iuikcovm-;  s  siJKki.Ni)i;K 


349 


Cieiu:r;il  (Aiiiokl)  parted  (jffto  anollicr  part  of  tlic  iu'lil,  soon  aricr  this 
incicK-nt,  (nrfLTiiiiij  to  liis  striking;  an  offici  i)  ;  riiKliii;^  liimsrlf  on  <nir 
riglit,  111'  il.islicd  ti)  tlu-  left  tlirou;.,'li  the  fire  ol  tin-  liiic~.  and  L'sca[)C(l 
unliiirt  ;  lie  tlicii  tiiriu:d   to  tlu'  ii;.dil  of  tlu'  i.Micniy,  just  as  tiny  j^ave 


\va\-,  when    liis    \v'j   was 


hroki 


and   his  horse  killed   midir  him 


but 


whetlu-r  hy  our  fire,  or  that  ol'  the  enemy,  as  they  (led  from  ns,  has 
never  i)een  ascertained."  (?)  "  It  is  certain  that  he  neitlurr  rendered 
service  nor  deserved  credit  on  that  day  ;  and  the  wound  alone  saved 
liim  from  beini^  overwhelmed  hy  the  torrent  of  (icnerai  (iate's'  i.jood 
fortune  and  popularit\."  1  he  author  i^ives  tiiese  extracts,  because 
of  their  connix'tion  with  other  (piotations  from  this  offucr's  memoirs, 
and  to  vindicate  history  ;  without  cl.iiminL^  the  ability  to  determine, 
by  the  accei)ted  rules  of  evidence  at  common  I.iw,  just  where  the 
iiHinoirs  of  Wilkinson  divide  between  history  and  romanci-.  Inas- 
much as  many  writers  state  that  duriii;^  this  battle  Major  Wilkinson 
overtook  Arnolil,  and  ordered  him  to  return  to  cimp,  it  is  proper  to 
i^ive  the  iiuidcnl  its  proi)er  pl.ue  as  stated  by  him.  "  Winn  Colonel 
on  the  (.■venin;^  of  the  Kjth  of  SeptrmbLi',  reported  tlu;  in- 


M. 


.eu'is, 


\v 


lecisive  proLjress 
ill 


)f  the   action,  Arnold   exclaimed,  with   a 


n    o 


ith,  •  I 


ill  soon  put  an  cml  to  it,   clappnij^  sj 


)urs  to  his  lion 


UKI 


dl 


UK) 


pec 


off  at  full  speed. 


I'his  action  seems  to  imply  a  sense  of  responsibilit\-  for  the  move- 


ment of  his  division,  at  the  close  of  its  da\''s  work 


Colonel  Lewi"' 


)bserved  to  (ieiicral  Gates,  vou  had  belter  oixler  him  l)ack,  the  action 


IS  ;.;oin;^  well,  he  may  !))•  some  rash  act  do  niisc 


hief"     "  1  was  instantly 
led   Arnold    to 


and    remaiu 


dispatched,"  says  Wilkinson,  "  overtool 
camp."  Up  to  this  time  Arnold'sopen  difference  witli(jeneral  (iates 
had  not  taken  place  and  lie  was  in  full  command  of  the  I'xposcd  win<; 
of  the  army;  aiul  on  the  j)revious  day  he  had  been  es[)ecially  detailed 
by  Cieneral  (iates  to  ^o  with  fifteen  hundred  men  and  watch  the  ap- 
proach of  the  cneiii)-.  What  should  induce  a  deputy  (Juartermasler- 
L;ener.il  to  interfere,  when  the  officer  second  in  command  jjjoes 
promptly  to  his  division,  about  which  there  is  such  a  report  as  he 
i,MVe,  is  not  explained. 

The  battle  was  over.  The  Hritish  troops  liad  been  ovi'rwheiined 
as  by  a  torrent,  by  a  force  at  least  three  times  their  number.  Mesides 
lireyman  'illed,  and  Fraser  mortally  wounded,  .Sir  Francis  Clarke 
had  fallen.  lie  was  borne  to  (iates'  headcpiarlers  and  died  that 
nif^ht.  He  was  the  nominal  ^uest  of  (ieneral  (iates;  althou^di  his 
death-bed  scene  involves  a  painful  altercation  with  that  officer.     Major 


n 


-J., 


1  ^  n" 


350 


I'.I.MIS     IlKIGH  TS.— liUKGOYNE  S   SUKRKN'DI'R. 


['777- 


U  I 


Ackl.iiid  was  also  woiiiulctl  and  a  prisoiu-r  of  war,  aiul  wivh  Major 
Wiiliams  lie  shared  the  same  hospil.ility. 

I'rascr  was  curici!  to  the-  lunisc  ol  John  Taylor  iicar  Wilbur's  basin, 
and  died  the  next  lUDniin,,'.  TIk-  Amcriean  loss  did  not  exceed  one 
hundred  .ind  fifty.  Tlie  liriliMh  easu.dties  equaled  nearly  half  the 
conunand  cn;,ML;ed. 

Cieneral  histories  have  room  for  the  solemn  funeral  orgies  of  Gen- 
eral I'"raser,  at  sunset  of  the  eiLjhth,  within  raiv^'e  of  the  American  fire  ; 
the  devtJtion  of  Madaines  Ackland  and  Riedesel,  and  the  number- 
less minor  events  which  L^ive  jjeculiar  i^ravity  and  character  to  the 
termination  of  this  Cvim[),u;4n,  ami  intensify  its  trayic   experiences. 

At  night  Gener.d  Lincoln's  division  relieved  the  well-worn  troops 
and  advanceii  to  the  upper  fork  i.f  the  north  ravine. 

On  the  eiLjhth,  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  evenini^.  General  liurt^oyner 
abandoned  his  ht)si)ital  and  needless  b.iL;L^age  and  retreated,  amid 
heavy  rain,  toward  .Saratip^ja  (Scluiylersville)  across  the  Fishkill  river, 
and  compactly  intrenched  his  camji. 

As  he  approaehed  Sarato;_;.i  he  found  an  American  force  en|^ai:jcd 
in  throwin[^  up  intrenchments,  but  they  retired  upon  iiis  .ulvance. 
The  bateaux  which  contained  the  mt.'ai^re  amount  of  remaining;  sup- 
plies were  under  constant  fire  hum  the  opposite  shore,  where  General 
Fellows  was  stationed  with  a  large  force,  and  the  Fishkill  was  not 
crossed  until  the  morning  of  the  tenth.  Ca[)tain  Fraser's  marksmen, 
the  Forty-seventh  regiment  and  Mackey's  Provincials,  were  then 
ordered  to  escort  a  part)'  of  artificers  to  repair  bridges  and  o[)en  a  road 
up  the  west  side  of  the  river  toward  I'ort  Mdward  ;  but  "the  provin- 
cials Mil  awa)- ;  the  American  army  occupietl  the  luights  in  force,  and 
the  detail  was  withdrawn." 

A  battery  of  five  guns  hail  also  been  established  at  the  bridge- 
head, where  the  British  army  had  first  crossed  the  river,  and  this  was 
amply  supported  by  American  inf.mtry.  Morgan  and  Dearborn 
hovered  about  the  skirts  of  the  camp,  cutting  off  foraging  parties  and 
all  communications  with  Fort  Cieorge,  and  all  avenues  of  retreat  were 
controlled  by  the  American  troops.  The  American  army  already 
exceeded  thirteen  thousand  effective  men,  amply  supiilied  with 
artillery,  which  had  been  received  from  France.  This  force  patiently 
and  without  risk  was  pressing  more  and  more  closely  upon  the  wast- 
ing and  scantily-fed  forces  of  Lieutenant-general  Burgo'  ne. 

October  eleventh  it  became  necessary  to  land  the  supplies  which 
remained  in  the  bateau.x,  and  to  carry  them  up  the  hill,  as  a  constant 


('ivi/iili-il  mill  Dniwii  k  CoiCiirniuitoii 
♦  t  Arnold  Mviimliil 
if  Trazcr  ivoiiiniej 


i-  •    'J 


•Iv 


rf, ' 


r; 


aoo* 


i 


It 


17771 


BKMIS     HEIGHTS.— BURGOYNF/S   SUKRKNDER 


35» 


fire  was  opened  upon  any  approach  to  the  river.  Scouts  sent  across 
the  Hudson  at  its  bond  to  the  westward,  reported  that  the  fords  were 
tjuardcd  ;  a  camp  had  been  established  between  Fort  luhvard  and  Fort 
Georj^e,  and  Colonel  Cochran  was  in  jiossession  of  F'ort  I'.dward  itself. 

Tlie  Anieric;.  IS  occupied  cominandinL^  positions  throu.L,'h  three- 
fourths  of  a  circle,  so  that  no  attack  upon  any  sinj^le  position  would 
afford  hope  for  escape  of  tiie  British  army.  Canadians,  l'ro\incials,  and 
Intlians  had  disaijpeared.  Thirty-four  hundred  men  only,  remained 
fit  for  duty.  Rations  were  reduced  to  a  sui)ply  for  three  days.  No 
message  came  from  Clinton.  "  Iiy  day  and  night  grape  shot  and  rifle 
shot  reached  the  lines."  There  had  been  no  cessation  of  danger,  and 
"  the  men  had  become  so  worn  out,  and  at  the  same  time  S(j  accus- 
tomed to  the  incessant  firing,  that  a  part  slept  while  others  watched," 
and  the  army  had  no  interval  of  real  rest.  There  had  been  just  one 
half  hour''^  interval  of  hope. 

On  the  afternoon  of  tlie  tenth,  the  American  vanguard  readied 
th.e  ridge  between  Saratoga  church  and  the  creek,  and  General  Cates 
established  his  own  headcjuarters  a  mile  to  the  rear.  The  aihance  had 
been  made  slowly,  on  account  of  the  heavy  rain,  and  under  the  im- 
pression that  the  British  army  w.is  still  at  Saratoga.  On  the  morning 
of  the  eleventh,  during  a  dense  fog.  and  while  the  British  army  was 
fully  prepared  for  an  attack,  (jeneral  Gates  ordered  an  immediate 
advance  across  Fishkill  creek  to  be  made.  Without  any  reconnoissancc 
whatever,  he  sununonetl  his  general  officers,  and  in!'ornied  thein  that 
he  hatl  receiveil  reliable  intelligence  that  Ikirgoyne  had  started  for 
F'ort  luhvard,  leaving  only  a  rear-guard  in  cam[).  Morgan  was  pusiied 
over  the  creek.  Nixon's  brigade  followed.  Glover's  brigade,  suc- 
ceeded by  those  of  Patterson  and  Learned,  were  moving  down  the 
bank,  when  a  British  deserter  fell  int;j  Nixon's  hands.  lie  gave  the 
information  that  the  entire  .u-my  was  in  battle  array  immediately  on 
the  hill.  The  (jrder  was  disobeyed,  and  then  countermanded,  and 
Ni.xon  retired,  but  not  without  some  loss  to  his  own  command  as  well 
as  to  Morgan's  from  the  British  artillery,  which  opened  fire  as  soon  as 
the  retrograde  march  commencetl.  The  American  army  had  been 
placed  in  imminent  peril. 

On  the  twelfth,  a  council  of  war  proposed  a  retreat  ;  but  tlie  facts 
already  citetl  and  obtained  from  scouts,  terminated  the  discussion. 
Information  was  also  received  that  General  Lincoln,  before  his  union 
with  Gates,  had  made  a  successful  expedition  in  the  vicinity  of  Ticon- 
deroga,  had  captured  its  outposts,  several  gunboats,  nearly  four  com- 


''*»'•:! 


I 


352 


HKMIS     IIKlCinS.  — HLKCIOVNK  S   SUkRENDKK. 


fi777- 


panics  of  the  Mfty-thinl  rc^Mincnt,  and  had  otherwise  impaircil  every 
faciUty  for  retreat  which  depended  upon  the  British  control  of  Lake 
(jeori^e  and  Lake  Champlain. 

On  tin-  thirteentii  a  lla^  was  sent  to  General  Gates,  and  by  the  six- 
teenth, the  terms  of  capitulation  had  been  adjusted,  and  the  followin;^ 
day  was  assii^ned  for  their  execution.  During'  that  ni;^ht,  Captain 
Campbell  of  the  British  army  reached  camp  with  dispatches  from  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  announcing  the  capture  of  Forts  Clinton  and  Mont- 
gomery, and  that  Generals  V'aughan  and  Wallace  liad  started  up  the 
river  upon  an  expedition  as  far  as  Esopus  (Kin^^ston).  It  was  too 
late  to  recede  from  the  contract  solemnly  undertaken,  and  the  sur- 
render took  place,  under  circumstances  of  honor  and  courtesy,  such  as 
were  due  to  the  valor  and  persistency  of  the  precedin;^  struLj;^le. 

The  terms  are  briefly  stated. — "  The  troops  to  march  out  with  all 
the  honors  of  war  ;  to  have  free  passa;^e  to  (ireat  Britain,  upon  con- 
dition of  not  a;4ain  servini^  during;  the  war ;  subject  of  course  to  a 
cartel  of  exchange  ;  that  the  army  should  march  to  Boston,  be  sub- 
sisted reirularly,  and  not  be  delayed  when  tr.uisporls  should  arrive  for 
them  ;  officers  to  retain  their  baggage  ;  Canadians  to  be  returned 
liome.  and  all  corps  of  any  kind  to  be  placed  on  the  same  footing." 
Minor  items  are  embraced  in  the  details,  and  for  several  days  there 
was  a  critical  difference  between  (lates  and  liurgoyne,  the  latter  assert- 
ing that  he  would  resort  to  the  most  desperate  resistance  rather  than 
accept  the  degrading  terms  first  offered.  The  final  terms  were  reason- 
able and  generous. 

On  the  eighth.  General  Putnam  had  written  to  General  Gates,  giv- 
ing him  a  statement  as  to  his  trouble  in  retaining  militia  and  stating 
the  presence  of  Clinton's  army  and  Sir  James  Wallace's  fleet  mar  by, 
saying,  "  I  ran  not  flatter  you  or  myself  with  the  hope  of  preventing 
the  enemy's  advancing ;  tJicrcforc  prcptxrc  for  the  worst."  "  The 
enemy  can  take  a  fair  wind,  and  with  their  flat-bottomed  boats  which 
have  sails,  can  go  to  Albany,  or  Ilalf-moon,"  (only  sixteen  miles  below 
Gates' camp)  "  wi'J.i  great  expedition,  and  I  believe  without  any  oppo- 
sition."  This  letter  without  doubt  had  its  effect  on  the  settlement  of 
the  terms  of  Burgoyne's  surrender;  as  it  seemed  as  if  the  original 
plan  of  the  Ikitish  campaign  was  at  last  to  be  consummated,  and 
Gates  could  not  afford  to  wait  until  a  fresh  enemy  should  assail  his 
rear. 

The  total  force  surrendered  was  five  thousand  seven  hundred  and 
sixty-three.     Philip  Skene  who  had  been  a  burden  to  the  army  from 


«777.] 


BKMIS*   IIHIf;H  IS. — nURCOYNK'S   SURRKMJl.K. 


353 


his  first  affcctatidii  of  inlliuMice  in  New  Eiv^Iand,  wlio  had  hei-ti  licu- 
tciiaiit-i^nvcrnor  of  Ticoiuloroi^a,  and  major,  i)lac(.'d  his  name  on  the 
ori;^inal  [)arolc,  for  the  ncord  of  history,  as  if  to  escape  un<hie  notice 
.md  responsihihty,  as  "  IMiiUj)  Skene,  a  poor  follower  of  the  British 
army."  'riie  ])eopIe  chanL^ed  the  name  of  his  old  home  to  Whitehall  ; 
and  he  left  America  never  to  return. 

The  American  force  at  the  time  of  the  siirrentler,  numbered  nine 
thousatul  and  ninety-three  continental  troops,  and  General  (iatcs' 
return  of  ()ctol)er  sixteentii  made  tiie  total  force,  including  militia, 
thirteen  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixteen  men  present  fit  for 
duty. 

The  sick  numbered  six  hundred  and  twenty-two  present,  and 
seven  hundred  and  thirty-one  absent.  The  detached  commands 
numbered  three  thousand  eiijjht  hundred  and  seventy-five,  and  on 
furloujjjh,  (Mie  hundred  ami  eitjhty,  making  the  total  strength  of  his 
command,  eighteen  thousand  six  hundred  and  twenty-four, 

(ieneral  Burgoyne  returned  to  I-lngland,  and  completely  vindicated 
his  conduct  of  the  campaign  before  the  House  of  Commons.  He 
entered  parliament,  opposed  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war,  and 
upon  failure  to  obtain  a  military  trial  or  assignment  to  duty,  resigned 
his  commission  in  the  army. 

The  prisoners  were  transferred  from  Cambridge  and  Rutland  to 
Charlotteville,  Virginia,  and  made  the  march  of  seven  hundred  miles 
during  the  winter  of  1778.  Baroness  Riedesel  accompanied  her  hus- 
band, and  her  narrative  is  full  of  touching  experiences. 

After  frequent  changes  of  location,  the  larger  portion  ultimately 
became  settlers,  and  remained  in  the  country  after  the  war  closed. 
There  is  no  occasion  to  discuss  the  ilifferences  between  the  Ameri 
can  and  English  authorities  which  pr.ictically  reversed  the  terms  of 
ca[;itulation  and  prevented  the  return  of  the  troops  to  Europe,  as  the 
consideration  of  the  campaign  is  the  only  legitimate  object  of  this 
narrative. 

General  Burgoyne's  campaign  was  characterized  by  a  brave,  skillful 
and  persistent  effort  to  execute  his  orders  and  reach  the  objective 
designated  by  his  superiors. 

The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  the  idea  of  failure  on  the  part  of 
General  Howe  to  support  him  from  New  York  was  never  entertained 
by  himself  or  his  officers. 

Rein  orcements  were  due  in  New  York,  during  September,  and 
althougl  they  did  not  arrive  until  early  in  October,  and  after  a  voyage 


I' 


354 


iiKMis'  iii;u;ins.— iiuia.oVM.'s  sikki.M>i;k. 


I1777. 


of  llirc'c  iiioiitlis'  (UiiMtioii,  lu'  li.id  no  oi.\Msion  ti>  (l(iiil)l  tlnir  prompt 
arrival  ami  proper  ilispos.il,  uiulcr  the  ori^rinal  jilau  i>t'  the  (.ampaij,'!). 
His  maxim  was  illustrati'ii  in  his  career.  "  lie  who  obeys  at  the 
expense  of  fcjrtiine,  comfort,  health  and  life,  is  a  soldier!  he  who 
obej's  at  t'le  expense  of  honor  is  .1  slave."  11  is  independence  of 
opinion  in  matters  purel)-  antler  tlu:  rule  of  his  own  eonscienci'  cnst 
hin)  his  commi^^sion.  He  certainly  obeyed  ortlers  with  an  unselfish 
con-^ecration  of  e\er\-  ener^^y  to  his  work.  The  disaster  .it  Hennin^^ton 
was  .1  serious  check  to  his  expedition,  but  the  arri\al  of  .Stark  at  Hen- 
ninL;lon,  just  at  that  crisis,  was  thorouj^hU-  uni)remeditatetl  anil  pr(ni- 
ileiitial  for  the  Americans,  so  that  the  memory  of  liuri^oyne  unjustly 
suffered   b)'  the  tlisaster. 

lie  certain!)'  followed  St.  Clair  promptly  and  b\-  the  shortest 
route;  and  from  l'"ort  Edward  to  Saratoi^a  and  in  every  leadini;  move- 
ment for  which  he  was  abused,  he  was  cK'arly  riLjht.  Such  is  the 
juilLjment  of  impartial  history.  Hur,m)yne  says,  with  ver)'  natural 
emphasis,  I  reasoned  thus,  "The  expedition  I  commanded,  w.is 
evidently  meant,  at  first,  to  be  hazarded.  Circumstances  mij^ht 
require  that  it  should  be  devoted.  A  critical  junction  of  Mr.  (iates 
with  Mr.  Washint^ton  might  possibly  decide  the  fite  of  the  war.  The 
([uestion  of  m\' junclicni  with  .Sir  llenr)-  Clinton,  or  the  loss  of  my 
retreat  to  Canada  coukl  onl\-  be  ;i  partial   misfortune-." 

liuri^oyne's  Sarato^^a  CampaiL;n,  which  was  so  redolent  of  inspira- 
tion for  the  New  Republic,  must  stand  to  his  individual  credit  as  a 
SoLDIEk. 


NniK.  Geiicr.'il  W'ashinjjlon  tninsmitted  a  M.ijor-goner.il's  coininission  to  Henoditf 
Arni)lil  on  llio  2oili  of  Jami.iiy,  177'^,  usini;  the  followinj;  wonls.  "  It  is  my  tMrno^t  (kv^iic 
to  liave  yoiir  services  the  eiisiiiiii;  eniii|i.iii,'ii.  I  liavc  set  you  down  in  an  airani;cnunt,  ami 
for  a  coniuianil,  wliicli  I  tliink  \\  ill  lie  aj;reeal)le  to  yourself,  ami  of  ^reat  advantaije  to  the 
public."  On  the  same  dat<v  in  wrilinj;  to  (ieneral  Lincoln  who  had  also  iieen  wounded,  he 
thus  refers  to  Arnold.  "  (ieneral  .Vrnolil  is  restored  to  a  violated  right,  and  the  restitution. 
I  hope,  will  be  considered  by  any  gentleman,  as  an  act  of  justice." 

Nori;.  (I'on)th  f'.dilion.  Stippkinentiil  to  iio/i'  on  pai;c  344.)  In  the  .Majjazine  of 
American  History  for  M.irch,  1880,  Vol.  IV,  p.  186,  John  Austin  Stevens,  Esq.,  Kd.,  the 
entire  not';  is  jjiven,  clusint;:  as  foliov.'s:  "On  the  7tii  of  October,  the  cor  luct  of  your 
corps  (that  of  .Major  Henry  M.  Livingston),  fell  more  immediately  under  the  ins|)ection 
of  General  Arnold  ;  he  thinks  it  but  justice  to  you  and  them  to  observe  that  great  pan 
of  our  success  on  that  day  was  owing  to  the  gallant  part  they  acted  in  storming  the 
enemy's  works,  and  the  alertness  and  gooil  order  they  observed  in  the  dispute." 
Mr.  Stevens  sustains  the  position  of  Mr  Mancroft.  That  of  Gordon,  cited  on  p.ige  342, 
with  context,  harmonizes  the  chief  conllict  of  authority. 


of 
khc 
Inir 
Ion 

;ut 

+2, 


; ! 


i '  u 


t 


1  1; 


' 


CHATTIER    XLVIII. 

CLINTON'S    EXPKDITION    UP    IIIK   HUDSON.    CAPTURE  OF    FORTS 
CLINTON   AND   MONTGOMERY.     1777- 


''T^IIIC  o[)cr.iti<)iis  of  Sir  Henry  Cliiitoti  in  the  Hij^liKuuls  of  tlu- 
_|_  Ihidson,  are  atiion;^  the  concurrent  events  which  properly  fill 
rp  the  outline  of  Biiri^oyiu's  .Saratoi^a  campai;^n. 

I'orts  Clinton  and  Mont^jomery  crowned  hi;4lj  points  of  the  Hiyh- 
'.mds  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson  river,  ami  were  s(;parated  by  a 
narrow  depression,  throuj^ii  which  I'oplopen's  creek  found  its  way  from 
the  mountains  to  the  river.  Both  were  above  the  rant^e  of  fire  from 
'hips^of  war  and  bomb-ketches;  while  their  lieiLjiit  and  isolation 
.ilTorded  peculiar  facilities  torbein^  made  capable  of  protracted  resist- 
ance to  any  ordin.iry  force.  Fort  .Mont;4omery  was  a  lar^e  work,  then 
unfinishetl,  and  at  the  tlate  of  its  capture  the  _tjarrison  consisted  of  one 
lonipany  of  artillery,  a  few  regulars,  and  some  half-armed  militia, 
hastily  assembled  from  the  adjoininj^  counties.  A  boom  and  heavy 
iron  chain  extended  from  the  foot  of  the  river-cliff  to  "Anthoii\''s 
Nose,"  a  sharp  promontory  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Huilson. 
(.'nloncl  John  Lamb  commaiuled  the  post. 

I'ort  Clinton  was  on  the  south  side  of  the  creek,  and  more  com- 
pactly and  thoroughly  built,  but  much  smaller  in  extent.  Its  garrison 
consisted  of  a  few  regulars  and  raw  militia,  under  the  command  of 
Hrigadier-general  James  Clinton.  The  surrounding  country  was 
inountainous,  almost  pathless,  and  here  and  there  slashed  by  deep 
and  impassable  defiles. 

On  the  east  side  of  the  river,  northward  nearly  seven  miles,  and 
opposite  West  Point,  was  Fort  Constitution. 

Twelve  miles  southward,  and  five  miles  below  Fort  Clinton  was 
Fort  Independence.  General  Israel  Putnam  was  in  general  command 
of  the  Ilghl.md  range  of  defenses,  with  his  headquarters  near  Peeks- 


35^> 


CLiNTOxV  .s  Exri:DrnoN  up  tiik  iu'dsox. 


i'777- 


'1   ."^'t'.y 

0'm 


kill,  where  a  depot  of  supplies  had  been  established.  This  post  was 
also  the  t;eneral  rende/vous  for  the  inter-transit  of  troops  between 
New  iMv^land  and  the  Middle  States. 

The  detachment  sent  from  liis  command  to  that  of  Schuyler,  after- 
wards Gates's,  had  so  reduced  his  force  that  his  chief  dependence  was 
on  the  militia  of  the  immediate  vicinity  antl  of  Connecticut. 

Advices  had  been  received  that  an  expedition  had  been  orijanizctl 
in  New  York  for  a  demonstration  up  the  Hudson,  (iovernor  Clinton 
prompt!}'  ordered  a  considerable  militia  force  to  report  to  General 
I'utnam,  but  that  officer  furloUL;hed  the  men  durini;  fall  harvest  and 
seed  time,  because  the  New  York  garrison  seemed  to  rest  (juietly  in 
their  quarters.  Governor  Clinton  promptly  chans^ed  the  pro<;ramme, 
allowini^  one-half  of  the  militia,  however,  to  spend  a  moiUh  on  their 
farms,  while  the  remainder  were  ordered  to  assemble  at  the  mouth  of 
Poplopen's  creek  and  I'eekskill.  IJefore  this  modified  orcU.-r,  however, 
could  take  effect,  and  wh  le  the  entire  force  which  had  assembled  for 
the  defense  o\'  I""orts  Clinton  and  -Montgomery  was  less  than  six  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men,  the  expedition  from  New  York  was  in  full  activ- 
ity, Stedman  says,  that  "  tli<-' enterprise  was  entirel)-  spontaneous  on 
the  part  of  Sir  I  lenry  CliiUon,  was  conducted  with  more  energy 
than  most  of  the  miiittry  operations  that  t;)ok  place  in  .\merica," 
,ind  that  *'  the  ulterior  view  in  the  measure  (after  taking  possession  of 
the  forts  which  lorbade  the  passage  of  our  vessels  up  t(j  Albany)  w.is 
not  so  much  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  General  Burgoyne, 
the  necessit)'of  wliich  was  not  suspected,  as  to  open  a  communication 
which  might  have  been  important  when  that  commander  should  have 
fixed  himself  at  Alban)-."  This  statement,  while  substantially  true,  is 
put  too  unequivocally,  in  view  of  the  whole  history  of  operations 
from  Canada  as  a  base,  as  it  invo'  es  the  su[)position  that  Hurgoyne's 
conmiand  was  considereil  fully  equal  to  its  [)roposed  mission,  without 
any  aid  from  New  York.  The  text  of  Hurgoyne's  instructions  cer- 
tainly must  be  held  to  mean  that  his  union  with  General  Howe  con- 
templated a  union  with  whoever  cominanded  at  New  York;  and 
although  General  Ilowe  felt  confidence  in  the  ability  of  Burgoyne  to 
complete  his  campaign  after  the  capture  of  Ticonderoga,  he  did  not, 
in  fact,  lose  sight  of  the  northern  army.  His  "  Narrative,"  states 
that  he  regarded  the  operations  against  Philadelphia  and  the  occu[)a- 
tion  of  Washington's  army  to  the  fullest  extent,  as  a  very  substantial 
diversion  in  favor  of  Burgoyne;  and  on  the  thirtieth  of  July,  when 
"off  the  Delaware,"  he  wrote  as  follows  to  General  Clinton,  then  at 


i77;J 


CLINTONS   EXrKDITION   UP  TiiF-:    HUDSON. 


357 


Ncw  York,  "and  liaviiiLj  under  liis  command  a  force  of  ciijlit  thousand 
five  hundred  men  fit  for  duty.  If  you  can  make  any  diversion  in  favor 
of  Gener.d  Burgoyne';.  ap[)roacliinj^  Albany  with  security  to  King's 
liridge,"  (whieii  was  occasionally  threatened  by  General  Putnam),  "  I 
need  not  point  out  the  utility  of  such  a  measure."  The  following 
dispatch  of  Lord  Germaine,  dated  the  eighteenth  of  May,  1777,  gives 
the  view  taken  by  the  British  cabinet,  although  it  was  not  received 
by  General  Howe  until  the  sixteenth  of  August :  "  Trusting,  however, 
that  whatever  you  may  meditate,  it  will  be  executed  in  time  for  you 
to  coiipirate  with  the  army  ordered  to  proceed  from  Canada,  and  put 
itself  under  your  command."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  movement  of 
G'Mierai  Howe  so  cri[)pled  General  Washington,  that  he  could  not 
auequately  support  General  Gates,  and  the  opportune  success  of  the 
Americans  at  Bennington  and  Fort  Schu\'ler  proved  to  be  the  best 
ally  of  the  American  army  of  the  north.  It  is  not  to  be  overlooked, 
.is  intimated  in  a  prelimdnary  chapter,  that  much  of  the  needless  re- 
crimination that  passed  between  Howe,  Clinton,  and  other  British 
officers,  had  their  foundation  in  the  difficulties  of  prompt  communica- 
tion and  real  concert  of  action,  in  the  gre.it  distance  whicli  separated 
their  armies,  and  above  all,  in  the  numerical  inailecpi.icy  of  forces  sent 
to  the  execution  of  their  trust.  Without  further  notice  of  the  inten- 
tions of  the  parties  who  sharetl  the  responsibility  of  the  Saratoga 
campaign,  the  expedition  will  be  followed  to  its  end. 

( )n  the  third  of  October,  eleven  hundred  British  troops  were 
transported  from  New  York  to  S|)uyten  Duyvel  creek,  thence  to 
Tarrytown,  where  they  landed  early  on  the  morning  of  the  fourth.  A 
second  division,  which  Commodore  llotham  reports  at  about  the  same 
number,  marched  from  King's  Bridge  to  'J'arrytown  by  land,  reaching 
that  place  the  same  day.  The  third  division  took  transports  from 
New  York  on  the  fourth  under  convoy  of  the  Preston  frigate,  the 
Mcrcurv  and  the  Tartar,  and  in  the  course  of  the  same  tide  arrived 
off  Tarrytown."  On  the  same  night,  the  wind  favoring,  and  by  the  use 
of  a  large  number  of  flat  boats  previously  collected,  the  entire  com- 
mand was  advanced  10  Verplanck's  Point,  where  it  landed  at  or  about 
the  fifth.  The  exi)edition  was  managed  with  signal  skill.  General 
Putnam's  report  shows  that  he  was  entirely  deceived  by  the  manceu- 
vcrs  of  .Sir  Henry  Clinton. 

His  own  force  he  states  at  twelve  hundred  continental  troops,  and 
three  hundred  militia.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  fifth,  a  detachment 
from  the  British  army  embarked  on  forty  flat  boats,  besides  ships  and 


vi''^^  m 


I 

i 


.'I 


U'! 


m 


35^ 


CI.INI'ON's    KXl'KIilTION    Ul'   Till':   IHJDSOV. 


[1777. 


galleys,  under  convoy  of  the  vessels  of  Sir  James  Wallace,  ami  ••  made 
every  appearance  of  their  intentii  HI  lolaiiil.  both  at  I'^ort  Iiule[)endence 
and  I'eekskill."  Gowrnor  Clinton  was  keenl_\-  watchful  of  every 
movement.  He  adjourned  the  lei^islature,  then  at  KinL,'ston,  and 
hastened  to  Fort  M(int;^(Mnery  to  ^^ive  his  personal  support  to  the 
garrison,  and  to  watch  the  approaches  by  the  llaverstraw  road  wliich 
passed  throui^h  the  mountains,  aiul  with  which  he  was  familiar. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  transferretl  his  army  from  VerplancU's  I'oint  to 
Ston\-  I'oint.  earl_\'  on  the  mornin;^  of  the  sixth.  The  ilenionstration 
of  .Sir  James  W.illace  up  the  river  com[)letely  maskeil  the  main  move- 
ment b)-  Kinc^'s  I'erry,  .and  a  heavy  fojr  so  obscured  the  view  that 
(ieneral  Putnam,  who  discovered  a  lar;.;e  fire  at  the  ferr\'  on  the  west 
side,  supposed  that  a  party  had  landed  fur  the  soh;  purpose  of  destroy- 
ing the  storehouses  at  th.it  point. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps  "  Attack  on  I""orls  Clinton  and  Mont- 
gomery," and  '•  Hudson  River  lli^^hl  iiuls." 

Five  hundred  regulars,  consisting  of  the  Fifty-second  and  Twenty- 
seventh  regiments,  and  Fmerick's  chasseurs,  with  four  hundred  Pro- 
vincials commantled  by  Lieutenant-colonel  C.unpbell,  and  Colonel 
Robinsc^n  of  the  Provincials,  secoml  in  command,  marched  to  occupy 
the  p.iss  of  Dunderberg  (Thunder  Hill).  This  tletachment  was 
ordereil  "to  make  the  tietour  of  se\-en  miles  round  this  hill  and 
Hear  Hill,  to  the  rear  of  I'ort  Mont'jomerN-."     (icneral  V 


(icneral  Vaugh an,  with 
twcKe  hundred  men,  consisting  of  grenadiers,  light  infmtry,  the 
Twenty-si.\th  and  .Sixty-third  regiments,  one  company  of  the  .'-'eventy- 
tirst,  and  one  troop  of  dismounted  dragoons,  and  the  He-sian  chas- 
seurs. coveriiiLj  the  corps  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Campbell  until  it  should 
pass  Dunderberg,  w,is  to  halt  at  the  point  where  that  corps  to  >k  its 
course  around  Hear  Hill  to  the  left,  and  upon  its  appro.ich  to  i-'ort 
Mont'_:omer\-  was  to  move  bv  the  ri'^ht  to  storm  i'ort  Clinton  from 


th 


c  sout 


h. 


General  Try 


,'on  wi 


th  the  Seventh  regiment,  and  the  Hi 


sian  regiment  of  Trumbach,  while  cooperating  with  (ieneral  Vauijhan, 
was  to  occupy  the  pass  and  preserve  communication  with  the  fleet  ; 
and  ultimately  that  officer  joined  tieneral  Vaughan  and  participated 


m 


the  t 


mat  assai 


lit  upon  F'ort  Clint( 


)ii. 


The  iipproach  to  Fort  Clinton  was  steep  anil  difficult.  Hesides  an 
advanced  redoubt,  large  trees  had  been  felled  and  distributed  as 
abatis  down  the  slope,  antl  a  heavy  stone  w.ill  crossed  the  foot  of  the 
hill  below  the  timber,  extending  from  the  Hudson  to  Sissipink  pond 
or  lake 


IT77-] 


CLINTON  S    F.XrKDITION   UP   TIIK    HUDSON. 


359 


On  the  evening  of  the  fifth.  Sunday,  Governor  Clinton  "  sent 
Major  Logan,  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  ground,  through  the 
mountains  to  reconnoitcr.  He  returned  at  nine  o'clock  on  Monday, 
with  the  information  that  a  considerable  force  was  between  King's 
F'erry  and  Dunderberg ;  but  tlie  numbers  could  not  be  discovered  on 
account  of  the  fog."  Lieutenant  Jackson  marched  out  two  miles  on 
the  Haverstraw  road  with  a  small  party,  but  was  compelled  to  retire. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Bruyn  with  fifty  continental  troops,  and  as  many 
militia  umler  Lieutenant-colonel  McLaughry,  were  sent  to  support 
Lieutenant  Jackson,  but  they  were  too  late  to  seize  the  pass,  and  fell 
back  slowly,  in  good  order,  "  disputing  the  ground  inch  by  inch." 
Governor  Clinton  was  the  life  of  the  defense  of  both  posts.  A  dis- 
patch was  sent  to  General  Putnam  asking  for  reinforcements,  and 
Lieutenant-colonel  Lamb  was  tlirected  to  send  a  six-pounder,  the  only 
field-piece  at  Fort  Montgomery,  with  sixty  men  and  a  supporting 
party  of  the  same  strength  to  check  the  advance  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Campbell,  who  was  approaching  that  fort.  This  detachment  fought 
with  great  spirit,  but  was  compelled  to  retire,  abandoning  the  gun 
after  spiking  it.  A  second  detachment  was  hurried  to  their  support, 
and  a  twelve-pountler  was  advanced  to  cover  their  retreat,  which  was 
accomplished  with  some  loss,  including  captain  Fenno.  taken  prisoner. 
This  was  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  as  stated  in  the  official 
report  of  Governor  Clinton.  The  attack  upon  the  fort  was  maintained 
iiiilil  five  o'clock,  when  a  flag  was  sent,  demanding  a  surrender.  This 
was  refused,  and  the  fight  continued  until  dusk,  when  the  works  were 
stormed  on  all  sides,  and  the  garrison  made  their  best  efforts  to 
escape. 

In  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  report  he  st:ites  that  "  after  the  advanced 
parties  before  Fort  Clinton  were  driven  into  the  works,  Trumbacli's 
regiment  was  posted  ,it  the  stone  w.iU  to  cover  our  retreat  in  case  of 
misfortune,"  and  "  the  works  were  stormed  at  the  point  of  the  bay- 
onet, without  a  shot  being  fired." 

He  reports  his  "  loss  as  not  very  considerable,  excepting  in  some 
respectable  officers  who  were  killed  in  the  attack."  Lieutenant-colo- 
nel Campbell  was  killed  in  the  assault  upon  I'ort  Montgomery. 
Count  Grabowski,  aid-de-camp  of  Clinton,  Majors  Sill  .rid  Grant,  and 
Captain  Stewart,  were  among  the  killed.  Com';iodore  Hotham  in  his 
official  report,  states  the  British  loss  at  about  forty  killed,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty  wounded.  The  American  loss  was  not  far  from 
three  hundred  killed,  uxjundcd,  and  missing.     A  list  of  two  hundred 


I 


360 


CLINTONS   EXTKOrilON   UP  THK   HUDSON. 


[1775 


and  thirty-seven  who  were  taken  prisoners  is  s^iven  by  M.ij^er  in 
his  History  of  Orani^e  county,  New  York,  (jeneral  J.mies  Chntou 
received  a  bayonet  wound,  but  escaped  to  tlie  mountains,  as  did  tiie 
.Uirfjcr  part  of  tlie  tj.irrison  ;  and  (ioveriior  Clinton  safely  crossed  the 
Hudson  in  a  skiff  and  joined  (jeneral  Tutiiain.  That  officer,  only  the 
dav  before  the  att.ick  upon  the  forts,  had  withdrawn  Colonel  Mal- 
colm's rej^iment  from  the  pass  of  Sydhani's  bridge,  had  tletailed  Major 
Moffatt  with  two  hundred  men  from  the  ijarrison  to  supply  Ids  place, 
aiul  transferred  sixty  more  to  Anthony's  Xose.  Hut  fortius  ill-timed 
action  ihe  American  position  would   h,ue  been  [greatly  strenj^tliened. 

One  hundreil  cannon,  including  sixty-seven  in  the  forts  and  others 
on  vessels,  and  very  consitlerable  ([uantities  of  powder,  cartridges  and 
shot  were  trophies  of  the  assault.  The  boom,  chain  and  cluvaiix  dc 
/rise,  whicli  they  protected,  were  displaced,  and  the  frit^ates  Mont- 
gomery and  Contjress,  which  had  been  ordered  down  the  river  by 
(jeneral  I'utr.an  for  ilefe'i  e  of  the  boom,  were  burnetl.  The  former 
was  at;ainst  the  c'.iain,  without  anchor  or  wind,  and  couKl  not  be 
moved.  The  l.itter  hatl  been  ordered  up  the  river  by  Governor  Clin- 
ton on  the  previous  tlay  :  but  beiiij:;  j)oorly  manned,  <^rounded  upon 
the  flats.     Both  were  burned,  to  forestall  ca[)ture. 

General  I'utnam  as  already  seen,  was  led  to  expect  an  attack  upon 
his  own  immediate  i)ost.  He  retired  to  the  heights  behind  I'eekskill, 
and  after  consultation  with  General  Parsons,  "  thouijht  it  impracticable 
to  quit  that  position  to  attack  the  enemy."  A  reconnoissance  wa^'. 
then  made  southward.  It  was  just  two  days  too  late.  His  (official 
report  states,  that  on  his  return  with  Cieneral  l'ar>ons,  "  we  were 
alarmed  with  a  very  heavy  and  hot  firing,  both  of  small  arms  and 
cannon  at  Fort  Montgomery."  "  Upon  which  1  immediately  de- 
tached five  hundred  men  to  reinforce  the  garrison  ;  but  before  they 
could  possibly  cross  to  their  assistance,  the  enemy,  superior  in  num- 
bers, had  possessed  themselves  of  the  fort." 

As  the  result  of  the  occupation  of  these  forts,  Teekskill  was  aban- 
doned, then  Forts  Independence  and  Constitution  ;  and  General  Put- 
nam retreated  to  Fislikill.  Tlie  expedition  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was 
a  success.  Continental  village,  three  miles  above  Peekskill,  was  burned 
by  the  British  troops,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  public  stores  were 
taken  or  destroyed. 

General  Vaughan,  under  escort  of  Sir  James  Wallace,  went  up  the 
river  as  far  as  Fsopus  (Kingston)  and  burned  the  village.  On  their 
return,  F'orts  Clinton  and   Montgomery  were  thoroughly  ruined  and 


I 


f777l 


CLINTONS   FA'PF.DITION    UP   THE   HUDSON. 


361 


Sir  Ilenr)'  Cliiiton  retired  to  New  York.  General  I'utnarn,  rein- 
forced by  militia  from  Connecticut,  New  Jersey  and  New  York,  soon 
re-occupied  Peekskill  ;  and  after  the  surrender  of  Hurj^oyne,  additional 
Continental  troops  were  sent  from  the  northern  army.  It  is  only  neces- 
sary to  add  that  the  presence  of  an  intelligent  commanding  officer  of 
reasonable  military  skill,  or  the  absolute  control  of  the  posts  by  Gover- 
nor Clinton,  would  have  prevented  the  loss  of  Forts  Clinton  and 
Montgomery  The  patriotism  and  industry  of  General  Putnam  did 
not  sup[)ly  the  elements  which  the  importance  of  the  posts  required 
for  their  protection  ;  and  the  limited  demonstrations  northward  which 
attended  their  capture,  to  that  e.\tent  confirms  the  statement  f)f  Sted- 
nian  that  the  relief  of  Burgoyne  was  not  a  part  of  the  plan  of  Sir 
Henry  Clinton.  The  reasons  why  full  harmony  should  have  been 
secured  between  the  IJritish  commanders  in  this  military  movement 
have  been  sufficiently  indicated. 

General  Howe  himself  was  now  asking  for  reinforcements,  and  the 
third  feature  of  the  main  operations  of  1777,  that  which  made  the 
occupation  of  Philadelphia  its  objective,  now  demands  attention. 


M 


t  W 


!   i* 


III ' 


l{ 


iiii 


CHAPTER    XLIX. 

MOVEMENT  ON  rillLADI-.I.rdlA.     FROM  NEW  YORK  TO  THE 

BRANDY  WINE,    1777. 

DURING  the  period  dccupiod  by  tlic  march  of  Burgoyne  from 
Ticondcroga  to  the  place  of  liis  surrender,  there  liad  been 
other  operations  in  progress  which  had  equal  significance  in  deter- 
mining the  general  result  of  the  war. 

These  movements  were  so  co-related,  while  independent  in  fact, 
that  those  which  are  material  to  our  appreciation  of  the  campaign  of 
General  Ilcjwe  for  the  acquisition  of  Philadelphia,  must  pass  under 
review.  The  uncertainty  of  thai  officer's  design  was  a  determining 
element  in  the  jjlans  of  General  Washington.  The  following  letter  in 
the  handwriting  of  General  Howe,  signed  by  him  and  directed  to 
General  Burgoyne,  came  into  Washington's  hands  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  of  July. 

"  Ni:w  YoKK,   7«/r  20,  1777. 
"  Dear  Sir — I   received  your  letter  uf  the   I4tli  of  M.iy  from  Quebec,  and  shall 

fully  obser\e  its  contents.     The  expedition  to  B n  (Boston)  will  t.ike  the  place 

of  that  u|)  the  North  rher.     If,  arccjidin;;-  to  my  ex|)ectalioiis,  we  may  succeed  rapidly 

in  tlie  possession  of  B ,  the  enemy  ha\iny  no  force  of  conseciuences  there,  I  shall, 

without  loss  of  time,  proceed  to  coiiperate  with  you  in  thi?  det'eat  of  the  rebel  armv 
ojjposed  to  you.  Clinton  is  siiflkiently  strt)n,Lf  to  amuse  W'.ishiiiLjion  and  I'utn.im. 
I  an)  now  makiuLj  a  demonstration  southward,  which  1  think  will  have  the  full  effect 
in  c.irr\i;it;'  our  ])lan  into  execution.     .Success  attend  you. 

\V.  Howe." 

The  British  fleet  had  alread\-  sailed  from  Sandv  Hook,  destination 
unknown,  when  the  above  letter  reached  Washington  for  whom  it 
was  intended.  It  was  a  transi).ircnt  device  which  did  not  deceive 
the  Ainerican  Commander-in-chief.  General  Howe,  however  slow  to 
improve  opportuin'ties.  rarcl}'  misconceived  the  general  scope  of  a 
campaign,  and  his  field  operations  were  carefully  planned  and  scien- 


•   .  ^l*?J-^f'*V  /'Ml// 


'  a^^^     (^    fJm\snly(of  ft  /n/i^/on 


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•777-] 


MOVEMENT  ON    rilH.ADlil.l'IIIA. 


36i 


tifically  execute  1.  Ilis  movement  toward  Philadclpliia.by  sea,  was 
subjected  to  tlie  strain  wliich  attends  all  maritime  expeditions,  and 
tlie  elianije  nf  its  destination  from  the  Delaware  river  to  the  Chesa- 
peake Hay  was  an  incident  clearly  beyond  his  control.  He  was  ex- 
pected to  end  the  war  very  summarily  ;  and  as  with  Ikirgoyne,  after 
the  disaster  at  HeniiinL;tt)n,  anil  with  all  officers  who  fail  to  tlo  im- 
possibilities with  inferior  resources,  he  was  to  be  made  the  scape<^oat 
for  the  failure  of  any  enterprise  which  was,  theoretically,  within  his 
power.  lie  did  not  overlook  New  I".n;4kuul  ;  but  claimed  tliat  *' his 
movement  in  that  direction  would  draw  Waslii niton's  army  thither, 
where  the  population  was  dense,  and  the  spirit  of  resistance  was  ani- 
mated." "  In  Connecticut,  there  was  no  object  for  which  he  could  be 
tempted  to  risk  a  t^eneral  action,  and  only  two  or  three  places  upon 
tlie  coast  of  the  Sountl  could  be  kept  in  the  winter."  "  If  his  rein- 
forcements had  been  forthcomiuL;,  New  luigland  would  have  had  a 
share  in  the  j^eneral  operations  cif  the  campai;4n,  while  the  main  army 
acted  to  the  soiithward,"  To  have  moved  up  the  I  ludson  river,  in 
force,  would  have  imperiled  New  York,  or  "  sacrificed  all  other  opera- 
tions to  a  union  v.itli  HuvLjoyne  ;  who  was  expected  to  force  his  own 
way  to  Albany."  To  enter  l'enns\Ivania,  was  not  only  to  assail  tiie 
c.ipital  (reference  is  made  to  page  53  as  to  making  a  capital  the 
objective  of  a  campaign)  but  it  attempted  ''the  surest  ro.nl  to  i)eace, 
the  defeat  of  the  regular  rebel  army."  Such  was  the  reasoning  of 
General  Howe,  stated  in  his  own  words. 

The  embarkation  beg.m  early  in  July,  (jeneral  ("linton  having 
arrived  at  New  York  on  the  fifth  ;  and  on  th'e  fifteenth  an  express 
from  (icner.d  liurgoyne  informed  General  Howe  of  the  success  of  that 
officer  at  Tieoiulert)ga, — "  that  his  army  was  in  gootl  health  ;  and 
thcit  Ticonderoga  would  be  garrisoned  fnjm  Canada,  which  would 
leave  his  force  complete  for  further  operations  "  It  has  been  seen 
that  Carleton's  instructions,  construed  strict!)-,  disappointed  the  natu- 
ral expectations  of  Hurgoyne. 

The  exiJCtlition  southward  sailed  from  New  York  July  fifth, 
from  Sandy  Hook  the  twiiity-third,  and  arrived  olf  the  Dcl.iware  on 
the  thirtieth.  It  was  soon  fountl  that  the  Delaware  River  had  bec-n  so 
obstructed  that  uo  landing  coukl  be  effected  abo\  e  the  confluence  of 
the  Delaware  and  Christiana  Creek. 

On  the  sixteenth  of  August  tiie  squadron  and  transports  entered 
Chesapeake  Ikiy.  It  was  at  this  time  that  General  Howe  received 
^he  official  letter  referred  to  in  another  connection,  which  anticipated, 


''""  V 


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I 


MOVEMKNT   (1M    riin.ADKI  I'lIIA. 


[1777. 


that  "  whatever  he  mif^ht  meditate,  woiikl  be  executed  in  time  for 
huTi  to  coiiperate  with  the  nortliern  army." 

General  Howe  states  the  chief  difficulties  which  he  encountered, 
in  a  single  sentence.  •'  Almost  every  movement  of  the  w.ir  in  North 
America  was  an  act  of  enterprise,  clo^;^ed  with  innumerable  difficulties. 
A  knowledge  of  the  country,  intersected  as  it  everywhere  is  by  woods, 
mountains,  water  or  morasses,  can  not  be  obtained  with  any  det:jr.ee 
of  precision,  necessary  to  foresee  and  j^uard  atjainst  the  obstructions 
that  may  occur." 

The  fleet  which  appeared  off  the  Delaware  was  Ljiven  by  Sir 
Andrew  Snope  Hammond,  in  his  examination  before  a  committee  of 
the  House  of  ("ommons,  as  numberin;^  two  hundred  and  fifty  sail. 

"  The  naviLjation  was  intricate  and  hazardous,  and  large  snips  could 
pass  certain  places,  onl)'  at  particular  times  of  the  tide."  In  the  de- 
termination of  the  ultimate  course  ado()ted  by  General  Howe,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  this  testimony,  just  as  the  facts  impressed  his 
mind  at  the  time  and  affected  his  action. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  July,  Sir  Andrew  Hammond  reported  that 
"  Washington  had  crossed  the  Delaware,  and  was  marching  down  to 
Wilmington  from  Philadelphia."  This  officer  had  been  on  duty  upon 
the  coast  of  Delaware  and  X'irginia,  commanding  a  detached  scjuadron 
for  a  year  and  a  half,  slu)rt  intervals  excepted.  His  report  was  there- 
fore derived  from  personal  experience,  and  is  thus  ci>ndensed  :  "The 
coast  of  Delaware  from  Cape  Henlopen  to  Ready  Island,  is  of  marshy 
low  lands,  very  full  of  creeks  ;  from  Ready  Island  to  Chester,  the 
channel  is  so  narrow  as  to  require  four  miles  of  anchorage  for  the 
fleet,  and  the  vessels  must  lie  within  cannon  shot  of  the  shore,  and 
in  many  places  within  musket  shot,  with  a  tidal  current  of  between 
three  and  four  miles  an  hour  to  stem  ;  that  the  water-guard  of 
the  Americans  consisted  of  the  Province  ship,  the  Delaware  frigate, 
two  xebecks,  one  brig,  two  floating  batteries,  besides  two  frigates, 
one  partly  manned,"  and  added  to  this  protection,  there  was  the  "  fort 
on  Mud  Island,  and  numerous  channel  obstructions  "  ;  while  the  ves- 
sels of  the  fleet,  the  "  Cornwallis  galley  excepted,"  were  illy  adapted 
to  force  a  passage  against  the  American  light  craft,  and  the  interposed 
obstructions  and  defenses."  A  rigid  cross-examination  of  this  officer 
only  elicited  the  fact  ihat  there  was  depth  of  water  at  Newcastle,  and 
for  a  short  distance,  a  channel  two  miles  wide  ;  but  that  the  naval  force 
of  three  frigates  and  two  gun-ships  furnished  as  convoy,  was  not  ade- 
quate to  meet  all  the  contingencies  which  the  landing  would  involve  ; 


•777.1 


MOVKMKN'T  ON    i'lIII.ADia.l'l  IIA. 


S'-'S 


and  lli.it  the  niovoiiu'iit  up  tin;  Chesapeake  w.i-;  a  wise  ami  proper 
nuMsiire.  Tliis  opinion  contrcjUeil  the  action  ofCleiu'ral  Howe,  whose 
diit>'  involved  no  responsibility  for  the  niana<^ement  of  liie  fleet. 

It  was  a  {^rave  question,  inasmucii  as  Newcastle  w.is  but  about 
seventeen  miles  frtJni  the  luad  of  IClk  river,  by  l.uul,  while  the  distance 
froni  Cape  llenlopen  to  the  head  of  the  IClk  by  sea,  was  nearly  three 
hundred  and  fifty  miles.  It  is,  however,  certain  that  the  op[)ortu- 
nities  of  \\  .ishinylon  for  resistiivj;  a  laiulini;,  aiul  his  careful  recon- 
noissance  of  the  coast,  fully  justified  the  liritisii  military  and  naval 
commanders  in  declining;  to  imperil  the  army  by  forcing;  a  landin;.; 
where  every  advanta<^e  was  in  favor  of  the  Anieric.ui  forces.  The 
error  lay  in  failure  to  provitle  the  necessary  vessels  of  IiL;ht  drauLjht 
before  leaving;  New  York,  and  in  neL;lect  to  obtain  accurate  knowledi^e 
of  the  diflicultie.i  to  be  encountered  before  entering;  the  Delaware 
river. 

The  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  fleet  from  the  Delaware,  and  its 
long  voyage,  greatly  protracted  by  contrary  winds,  completely  foiled 
the  calculations  of  Washington  as  to  its  ultimate  ilestination. 

On  the  twenty-first  of  August,  Washington  submitted  the  con- 
dition of  affairs  to  a  council  of  war,  which  rendered  the  unanimous 
opinion  that  General  Howe  had  most  probably  sailed  for  Charlestcjn. 
On  the  twenty-second,  at  h.ilf  i)ast  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Presi- 
dent Hancock  sent  the  following  dis[).itch  to  Washington:  "This 
moment  an  express  arrived  from  Maryland,  with  an  account  of  near 
two  hundred  sail  of  General  Howe's  fleet  being  at  anchor  in  the 
Chesapeake  Bay." 

The  army  of  Washington  had  been  promptly  marched  to  Philadel- 
phia as  soon  as  he  became  satisfied  that  the  British  fleet  departed 
southward  from  Sandy  Hook.  The  most  active  measures  possible 
were  resorted  to  for  gathering  the  militia,  and  so  to  ()ccu[)y  the  coun- 
try adjoining  the  Delaware  as  to  anticipate  any  attempt  to  effect  a 
landing.  Upon  the  disappear.mce  of  the  fleet,  his  army  was  removed 
to  Coryell's  l'\-rry,  to  be  ready  for  a  march  northward,  in  case  the  fleet 
should  return  to  New  York,  either  for  the  purpose  of  ascending  the 
North  river,  or  of  making  a  descent  upon  New  England  or  New  Jersey. 
Upon  notice  of  Howe's  arrival  in  the  Chesapeake,  the  army  marched 
through  Philadelphia,  decorated  with  evergreens,  and  with  all  po::.^ible 
display  ;  thence  to  Derby,  Chester,  and  Wilmington.  General  SuUiv  m 
also  joined  the  command,  having  been  detained  in  New  Jersey.  On 
the  twenty-second  of  August  he  had  made  an  unsuccessful  attempt 


^ 


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1  I 


•ton. 


iOfi 


MovEMKNT  ON  riiii.Amci.riiiA. 


[«777. 


jpoii  the  Hriti^h  posts  of  Statcii  InI.iiuI,  uitli  .i  piirtiuii  of  Sin.illwootrs 
.iiul  Dcborrc's  brii^adL's,  incurring  some  loss  ami  Ljainiivj^  no  credit, 
i'lu'  nominal  strcni^th  of  the  American  army  which  marched  to  meet 
the  .irmyofGener.il  Howe  w.is  fourteen  thousand  men,  but  the  effect- 
ive force  did  not  exceed  eleven  thousand. 

On  the  third  of  September  General  Maxwell,  witli  a  li<;ht  infantry 
cor()s  compo-ied  of  one  hundred  men  from  each  brij^.ide,  which  hail 
been  orLj.mized  after  Mor^.m's  rillemen  liad  been  sent  to  the  Northern 
Department,  approached  VAk  riverto  remove  pulilic  stores;  but  Annul 
tlie  enemy  had  anticipated  their  arrival,  and  after  active  skirmish- 
in;^  he  retreateil  to  White  Clay  creek,  and  then  towartl  the  main 
army. 

On  the  seventh  the  entire  army  adv.inced  to  Newport  and  took 
a  pcjsition  alon;^  the  east  bank  of  Red  Clay  creek.  On  the  same  day 
General  Howe  placed  his  vanj^uard  witiiin  eit^ht  miles  of  Red  Cl.iy, 
and  occupied  Iron  llill.  Maxwell  acj.iin  retreated,  after  another  sharp 
skirmish  with  a  body  of  Cierm.m  Vaijcrs  at  the  hill,  The  landing;  had 
been  effected  on  the  twenty-fifth  ;  the  total  force  approximatiivj 
eij^^hteen  thousand  men. 

On  the  twenty-ei;^hth  the  m.'iin  body  reached  the  head  of  Elk 
Creek  (Klkton)  fifty-four  miles  from  Philadelphia,  leaving  General 
Kn\[)hausen  with  three  brigailes  at  the  landing  place, — one  brigade 
to  keep  open  communication,  ;ind  a  detachment  to  destroy  such  ves- 
sels and  stores  is  could  not  be  removed.  General  Howe  reports, 
th.it  "  on  the  tliid  the  Hessian  and  Anspach  chasseurs  and  theSeconc 
battalion  of  li,-,'.t  intantry  who  were  at  the  head  of  Lord  Cornw.illis' 
column,  fell  in  with  a  chosen  corps  of  one  thousand  inen  (Maxwell's.) 
advantageously  posted,  which  they  defeated  with  the  loss  of  only  two 
officers  wouniied,  three  men  killed  and  nineteen  wounded." 

On  the  sixth  Geneial  Grant  joined  the  ami)',  and  on  the  eighth 
the  whole  m.irched,  at  evening,  77'r?  Newark,  and  encamped  at  Hokes- 
som,  upon  the  road  leading  from  Newport  ♦'o  Lancaster,  at  which  [)lace 
Washington  had  taken  post,  having  his  left  to  Christiana  creek  and 
his  front  covered  by  Red  Clay  creek." 

The  British  at  once  made  a  demonstration  as  if  to  turn  Washing- 
ton's right,  crowd  him  upon  the  I.)el.iware  and  thus  cut  off  his  com- 
munication with  Philadelphia.  Ri^ference  is  made  to  map  "  Opera- 
tions near  Philadelphia."  A  council  of  American  officers  was  sum- 
moned .md  by  their  unanimous  advice  the  army  marched  at  half  past 
two  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  ninth,  for  the  Brandywine,  and  at 


17771 


MOVKMKNT   ON   I'liri.ADKIPIIIA. 


367 


ten  o'clock  took  a  tiuw  position,  solcctcil  by  Gcmial  Ciret-'no,  upon 
the  cast  bank,  on  hi.ujh  i;rounil  just  bcliim.!  ChtuKl'.s  l'"urd  upon  the 
Chester  and  IMiiladelphia  road. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  Lieutenant-general  Knypliau- 
scn  niarclu'd  to  New  Garden  and  Kennett  Scjuare,  seven  niiles  in 
front  of  Ciiadd's  Kord,  where  Cornwallis  joined  liini  with  the  riylit 
wing,  on  the  mo-ning  of  the  tenth.  The  right  wing  was  tiirown  to 
the  left  .md  rear,  in  the  direction  of  the  Lancaster  roail,  while 
KnyphausLii  was  slightly  advanced,  preparatory  to  a  direct  attack 
upon  the  American  lines.  This  division  was  not  entirely  coni[)()setl 
of  Messian.sand  ether  Luropean  continental  troo[)s,  but  includeil  such 
regiments  as  the  Fourth,  Fifth,  Twenty-third,  Twenty-eighth,  l-'ortieth, 
l-'orty-fourth,  l''orty-ninth  and  I'ifty-fifth,  witli  I'erguson's  rilles,  the 
Queen's  rangers  and  two  scpiadrons  of  dragoons.  Generals  Cornwal- 
lis, (jra\',  Matthews  and  Agnew  were  accompaniiHl  by  General  ilowe, 
although  Cornwallis  was  the  immediate  commander  of  the  column. 
It  is  a  fact,  to  be  noted,  that  Gener.il  Howe  rarely  kept  out  of  action 
when  his  army  h.ul  fighting  to  do  ;  but  placed  himself  where  the 
exam])le  of  the  (ieneral-in-chief  would  most  ins[Mre  his  troops. 

The  Hrandywinc  which  is  formed  by  the  uni(jn  of  two  inconsitlera- 
blc  creeks,  called  the  North  Branch  and  the  West  Hranch,  flows 
twenty-two  miles  southeasterly  from  their  fork,  joins  Christiana  creek 
near  Wil  nington,  and  empties  into  the  iJelaware  about  twenty-five 
miles  below  Philadelphi.i.  Its  banks,  then  steep,  uneven  and  bordered 
by  forests,  were  cut  through  at  such  places  as  furnished  convenient 
fords  for  pu'olic  or  local  travel. 

These  crossings  were  quite  frequent  between  Brandywinc  village 
and  the  forks  of  the  river.  Pyle's  Ford  was  two  miles  below  Chadd's 
Ford,  and  Hrinton's  was  one  mile  above  it.  Then  followed  Jones',  at 
a  distance  of  two  miles  ;  and  Wistar's  (.Skunks)  a  mile  further  up  the 
river.  On  the  north  branch  was  Huffington's,  (now  Hrinton's),  then 
Jeffries',  six  miles  above  Chadd's  Ford,  and  Taylor's,  still  higher  up,  at 
the  crossing  of  the  old  Lancaster  road.  On  the  west  branch  was 
Trimble's  I'ord,  more  than  half  a  inile  west  from  the  fork  of  the  river, 
and  five  miles  or  a  little  more  above  Welsh  Tavern,  near  which  the 
British  army  encamped. 

Reference  is  had  to  the  map  '•  Battle  of  i?randywine."  The 
centre  of  the  American  army  lay  near  Chadd's  l'"ord.  and  embraced 
the  brigades  of  Wayne,  Weedon  and  Muhlenberg,  with  Maxwell's 
light  infantry.  Major-general  Greene  commanding  the  division.     Light 


^j■.  1  J  » 


'mi 


i^ 


•III 


368 


MOVEMENT   ON   nilLADELPHIA. 


[1777. 


earthworks  and  a  redoubt  were  at  once  laid  out,  and  Captain  Procter 
was  in  command  of  the  artillery  thus  put  in  position. 

The  Pennsylvania  militia  upder  General  Armstrong  constituted 
the  left  wing,  and  extended  through  rough  ground  to  Pyle's  P'ord 
below.  The  portion  of  the  country  was  very  rugged  and  little  appre- 
hension was  entertained  that  a  crossing  would  be  effected  in  that 
direction. 

In  the  formation  of  the  right  wing,  composed  of  six  brigades,  in 
three  divisions,  the  division  of  Sullivan  was  on  the  left,  that  of  Ster- 
ling on  the  right,  and  that  of  Stephen  in  the  centre.  This  was 
exactly  right,  inasmuch  as  Sullivan  acted  in  the  light  of  a  modern 
corps  commander  and  v>'as  theoretically  detached  from  his  division,  so 
that  Stirling,the  next  senior  Major-general, was  entitled  to  the  right. 
The  official  reports  of  Sullivan,  however,  make  no  mention  of  a  con- 
flict as  to  position,  but  give  an  adequate  cause  for  his  tardy  partici- 
pation in  the  battle. 

If  his  consultation  with  the  other  general  officers,  hereafter 
noticed,  involved  a  question  as  to  where  he  should  be  relatively 
stationed,  in  the  line,  he  omits  to  state  it ;  neither  is  it  material  as  he 
could  not  bring  his  division,  as  such,  into  any  position  whatever  in 
good  fighting  order  on  that  occasion.  The  discussion  of  questions 
of  that  character,  in  the  absence  of  sufficient  facts  to  cover  the  whole 
battle  record,  only  confuses  the  narrative,  and  might  drop  out  of 
history  without  loss  to  history.  The  American  pickets  extended 
beyond  Sullivan's  grand  division  well  up  the  river.  Colonel  Bland 
crossed  at  Jones'  Ford,  and  Major  Spear  was  thrown  as  far  to  the 
right  as  Buffington's  Ford.* 

Such  were  the  relative  positions  of  the  two  armies  on  the  night 
preceding  the  battle  of  Brandywine. 

*  It  IS  somewhat  doubtful  whether  the  ford  known  as  Buffington's  in  1777,  was  not 
bclou^  the  forks  of  the  Brandywine  ;  but  it  does  not  change  responsibility  for  proper  recon- 
noissance  toward  Jeffries'  and  Taylor's  Fords. 


-  ,,  ,   ^      , 


CHAPTER   L. 


BATTLE  OF   BRANDYWINE. 

A  CAREFUL  survey  of  the  positions  first  taken  by  the  oppos- 
iii_f^  armies,  as  indicated  by  tlie  map,  will  aid  in  tlie  appreciation 
of  their  subsequent  movements. 

It  will  be  found  that  the  brigades  of  Muhlenberg  and  Wccdon 
were  withdrawn  from  Chadd's  Ford  to  form  a  reserve,  while  Wayne's 
brigade  deployed  to  the  left,  in  their  place,  and  that  a  portion  of  the 
right  wing  actually  crossed  the  nvcr  at  Hrinton's  Ford,  before  the  gen- 
eral action  was  precipitated  by  the  flanking  movement  of  General 
Howe.  The  American  army  did  not  rest  on  the  passive  defensive. 
General  Maxwell  crossed  at  Chadd's  Ford  early  on  the  eleventh,  and 
advanced  to  Kennett  Meeting  House,  where  by  resort  to  trees,  fences, 
and  all  available  obstructions,  he  maintained  an  efficient  skirmish  with 
the  vanguard  of  Knyphausen,  and  sustained  himself  skillfully,  until 
forced  back  to  high  ground  near  the  ford,  and  ultimately  to  the  ford 
itself  by  the  pressure  of  greatly  superior  numbers.  Having  been 
reinforced,  he  regained  the  heights,  and  at  the  same  time  Porterfield 
and  Waggoner  crossed  and  moved  to  his  left,  vigorously  attacking 
Ferguson's  rifles,  who  were  engaged,  with  a  portion  of  the  Twenty- 
eighth  British  regiment,  in  throwing  up  light  field-works  to  put  two 
guns  in  position  on  their  right.  These  detachments  passed  up  a  nar- 
row, well  wooded  valley,  and  compelled  a  company  of  British  troops 
supported  by  one  hundred  men  from  General  Slirn's  Hessian  brigade, 
to  take  cover  behind  a  stone  house  for  protection  until  additional 
troops  came  to  their  aid.  This  movement  and  the  pertinacity  of 
Maxwell's  attack  compelled  Knyphausen  to  bring  two  brigades  and 
artillery  to  the  front ;  and  a  strong  column  was  also  sent  toward 
Brinton's  Ford,  outflanking  Maxwell,  and  compelling  him  to  fall  behind 
the  river.     At  the  same  time  the  Queen's  Rangers,  led  by  Captain 

24. 


■■lil 


m 


370 


liAi  ri.i:   OK    I!RAM)V\VINi;. 


f>:77- 


w 


*':    I 


ik 


Wt;m\"^,  of  tin;  British  I'ortietli  ic;^inunt,  swept  the  narrow  valley  on 
the  ri;^lit,  and  forced  I'ortcrricKl  an<l  \Va;^';4oi)cr  to  retreat,  and  rccross 
the  rivt'r.  Lieutenant  S.  W.  Werner,  f)f  the  Hessian  .irliller}-,  whose 
tliacn-ani,  taken  on  the  field,  affords  llu-  best  data  for  a  riidit  jud;^nient 
as  to  tiiose  ino\-(inents,  was  actively  enL;a;4ed  in  these  skirmishes  nn 
the  west  hank.  The  American  casualties  duriii;^  the->e  minor  move- 
ments (lid  not  exceed  sixty,  and  those  of  the  I  lessians  and  Ikitish 
troops  wiMi'  about  one  hundred  and  thirty. 

Upon  the  retreat  of  General  Maxwell,  tiie  hi;^di  ;_;round  thus 
vacated  was  ()ccu]>ied  by  Knyphausen  in  force,  anil  j;uns  were  placed 
in  position  to  command  the  crossinijs. 

Proctor's  artillery  responded  ;  but  little  dama;4e  was  inflicted  on 
jith'-r  siile.  'i'lie  demonstrations  were  simply  such  as  <-n^a;^ed  the 
iltentiou  of  tin-  American  troops,  but  no  attempt-,  were  made  to  force 
a  pass,iL;(.'. 

Information  reached  ( ieneral  \\'asIiin'_;ton,  that  v  ■irnwalli-^  had 
i'no\cd  nortliw.Lid  iV'im  i\enne'tt  Sijuare,  as  if  to  seek'  some  hi;j1icr  and 
un[)roti-cted  cros-,in;^^  ami  attemiit  a  movement  a;.;ainst  liisri;;lit  ll.iid;. 
Knouin;,;  that  Major  S|)ear  had  been  advanced  ,i-^  fir  \[\\  tile  river  as 
l'iuffnv.;ton's  l^'ord,  .ind  dcpiiidiu;;  on  i  ieneral  Sullivan  lor  due  notice 
of  ,in\-  such  movement  a;^.iin-.l  liis  riL;lit  Hank,  he  re-^olved  to  strike 
Iviiyphansiui  v.'hile  tiius  sei)aratiMl  from  ("ornwallis.  and  make  ui)  lor 
inferior  numbers  by  overwhelmiiv^  the  liriti-^h  divisions  in  detail.  It 
was  also  known  that  Kiiypliau-.en's  column  did  not  make  its  advance 
until  about  nine  o'clock.  I  here  was  ;4ood  re.ison  to  believe  that  there 
w'juid  be-  ami)le'  time  for  tiiis  offensive  movement,  since  Cornw  illis 
could  not  double  the  forks  unless  by  about  twelve  mile-,  of  m,irchin,c;, 
ev<.n  if  he-  should  cross  near  Ihifdni^ton's,  where  .Major  .Spear  was  on 
duty. 

Duriu'.;  the  moruin;^r  ;i  f,,.^  spread  over  the  creek  and  tluou;.di  the 
woods;  ,ind  wliil''  this  operated  in  fivor  of  Maxwell's  skirmisliini^ 
party,  it  contributed  its  share  to  confuse  the  scouts  at  the  uijjjer  fords, 
in  their  estimate  of  the  streni;th  of  the  Ihitisii  column  which  nun'ed 
in  that  direction. 


It 


was 


bet 


ween  uu 


le  and  ten   o'clock  in  the  morninLT  that  Colonel 


Hlaiid  crossed  at  Jones'  Ford  with  a  few  li;.',ht  horse,  and  observed  the 
movement  of  Cornwallis,  who  w.is  then  approaching;  'IrimbK/s  i'ord 
on  the  west  fork.  He  inunedi.itel)'  notified  (jeneral  SuMivan.  .\ 
report  similar  in  substance  was  made  b)' Colonel  llazen.  The  follow- 
ing dispatch,  whicli  is  a  model  for  clearness  in  all  details  then  neetled, 


'777] 


liA'ITI.I'.    OF    I!RA\I)S-\VIM:. 


37  > 


was  sent  by  Licutcnrint-coloncl  Ross,  ami  was  forwarded  hy  fluneral 
Sullivan  to  the  (^omniaiuk'r-in  chief. 


"(iKKAr  Vai.i.i.v  Rdak,  I'.i.kvf.m  o'clock  a.  M. 
"  Dkak  rii'.NKH  \I-.  -A  lat),^!!  Iiii.ly  of  tin:  (jiiciiiy,  I'loiii  cviiy  ai  (  uiiiit  livr  tli')ii'.,iiul, 
with  sixti-iMi  or  ciLilit''!'!!  liild-piiTcs.  in.ircluv!  aloii;^  lliis  i'd.uI  just  now.  'I'Ins  road 
leads  to 'lav  lur's  l-'cny  and  Jctlrirs'  IVny  on  tlir  liiandyw  im,  anil  to  tlnMiriMt 
Valli-y,  at  ilicSij^ni  of  tin'  ship,  on  ihr  I,an<asi<-r  fnad  to  l'liilad''l|)hia.  Thrn;  is  also 
a  road  from  the  llrandywini-  to  (^hi-strr,  liy  DiKvorthtown.  Wc  arc  close  in  tlicir 
rear,  with  ahoiil  si.V(;nty  men.  Ca|)lain  .Siin|)son  lay  in  amhnsh  with  tweiitv  men 
and  'ij;:ivi:  iliem  three  r<)unds  within  a  small  distance,  in  wliieli  two  of  his  men  werf 
woiukIimI  ;  one  mortally.  1  believe  (general  Howe  is  with  this  pirlv,  a-  [ose|)h  ( ial- 
loway  is  here  known  hy  the  inhabitants  with  whom  hespok',  and  told  them  that 
(ieneral  Howe  was  with  them.  \'<iurs, 

"JaMI-.s   Koss,  l.ii  iiloiant-mloncl." 

Washiiv^ton  at  oiici;  ordiMc-d  .Sullivan  toiross  the  15iMnd3wiiu.'  .md 
attack  this  division  of  the  Uritisii  .irmy,  which  it  w.is  sii|)i)osc(l  would 
attempt  a  crossiii;^  ;it  some  ])oiiU  below  the  fork;  while  the  main  army 
was  to  cioss  at  Chadil's  i''ord,  and  make  a  direct  onset  ii])i)n  Kiiyp- 
hauseii's  division.  (ieneral  (iniine  w.is  ordered  to  cross  .above 
(!h.i(Id'-i  I'"ord,  ill  order  to  strike  the  left  llaiik  i>f  the  ne~.si,in  ;_;eiier,il. 
This  trans[)ired  before  twelve  (j'clock,  and  the  advance  ;^iiar(l  of  (ien- 
eral Greene  was  already  across  when  the  followino  note  re.icluxl 
Washington  : 

"I'.KICNION  I'ljkl),  Sifti-mlnr  \\, 
"  Df.AK  (ll  Nl  i;ai.  -Sime  I  si  iit  \iiu  the  messa;.;e  by  .M.ijor  Moore,  I  s.iw  Major 
.S|)e,ir  ot  the  niiliiia,  who  came  this  niormnL;'  lium  a  tavern  called  .NLirtln's,  ,it  the  loik 
ol  the  ilr.iiidywine.  I  h-  canie  Irom  thence  to  Welsh's  Tiivein,  .and  lieaid  iiolhiiiL;-  of 
the  enemy  about  tin  lork  of  the  lir.indywine,  and  is  contident  tliiy  are  not  in  Ih.it 
(|iiaili  r  ;  so  thai  (jiloinl  Ila/en's  inlormation  must  h"  wronj^r.  l  have  sent  to  tli.it 
(|uarli  I"  to  know  wln-ther  there  i-.  any  rouiiiiation  tor  the  report,  and  shall  i;ivc  \our 
exceilency  the  earliest  in'ormatiou.  1  am,  iXii  ., 

"Jon.N    -Si  1,1,1  VAN." 

General  Sullivan  hastily  reached  conclusions  not  warranted  by  his 
niformant's  statements  ;  since  the  route  referred  to  in  tin;  dispatch  of 
Licutenant-culonel  Ross,  led  to  Taylor's  and  Jeffries'  l-'erry,  as  stated, 
and  was  nearly  a  mile  west  of  the  fork,  so  th.it  the  truth  (jf  M.ijor 
Spear's  statement  was  no  proof  that  those  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Ross 
and  Coloiu  1  ll.izen  were  not  also  true.  Oni;  ;,^r.ive  fict  enters  into 
history,  tli.it  the  (juestion  as  to  where"  the  l.irge  bod}- of  the  enemy," 
seen  by  Lieut -iLint-colonel    Ross,  were,  was  not  .solveti,  nor  was  the 


'^1 


V  (1 


f   \. 


i72 


HAI  rr.K   OF    liliANNVWINK. 


[>777 


solution   adiiiu.itcly  attempted    by    M.ijor;.;riicial    Sullivan,    until    Ik. 
was  conipi'lUd  to  faci:  tlirm  liui  rii'dly  in  Ijattlc. 

Serjeant  Tucker  is  said  to  have  made  a  similar  report  to  that  of 
Major  S])<Mr;  l)u!  the  fact  is  immaterial.  The  ord<rs  issued  for  cross- 
iti'.;  the  river  were  suspended  upon  recei|)t  of  fieneral  Sullivan's  note, 
and  (ieneral  (ireiiie's  advanced  detadmient  was  withdrawn.  '1  he 
tenor  of  the  di-,pat(  h  would  indicate  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy 
was  within  supiiortin;;  distance  of  Knyphausen.  \V'a^hinL;ton  advanced 
Colonel  Hland  to  the  (xtreme  ri;;ht.  Another  dispatch  came  from 
( iem  ral  Sullivan,  includini^  one  fr<jm  ('olonel  IMainl.  '1  hey  read  as 
follows : 

"  'I'WM   (I'ri  iiCK.    v.    M. 

"I.>i:\K  C.l  NMMI,,  Coloiirl  Hl.iml  h;is  tliis  ni'mii-iil  sc'iil  im-  wipid  that  tin- 
eiicfiiy  arf,'  in  ilic  ri-ar  nl  tiiy  ri;;lil,  <  oiiiin^' 'Iia'.  n.  Tlnir  an,  In-  sa\s,  .iliniit  two 
i..*i)5'a(lcs()f  iIm  III.     I  Ir  also  s,i\s  he  saw  a  ilusi,  Ijai  k  iiM  he  i  oiiiilry,  lur  aliovi;  an  hour. 

I  am,  \c., 


"  Jons  .Si;i.i,iv AN." 


'Ihe  enclosure  is  as  follows: 


"  .\   (.a  AH  1 1,1;    PA- 1    (  »M.   "'■  l-oi  K. 

"Sn<      I  have  rlis(  ovt-n-il  a  pai'lv  of  the  ciimvi  on  Ihr   h(i.:;his.  ju  si    on    tin-  ri.^lil 

f>l  tlic  two  widow  D.ivis's,  Csi-c  iii,i[);  who  liyi-  >  losi'  1o;,'illiir  on    ihc  road  callid  the 

Fork  road    ationt  half   a  mile  to  tin- rij,dit  of  Ihc   .Miiiin^j  lloiisc  ( llurniinf^diain;. 

'i  lure  is  .1  lii^h'T  liill  in  their  lioni. 

"  I  ni:oiioKi;  Jii..\Mj.' 


I    i 


i  !  ii 


III: 


The  coliiinii  of  ('ornw.illis  which  had  been  seen  on  the  Lancaster 
road  W.I-,  at  l.ist  found.  In  order  rightly  to  estimate  tiie  succeeding 
battle  events,  some  additional  fait-s  are  to  be  noticed  in  connection 
with  this  defective   reconnoissance. 

In  a  lett(.T  to  \Vasi)inj.,'ton  dated  October  twenty-fourth,  (Ieneral 
Sullivan  saj's  :  "  lJ])on  my  askin^f  whether  there  were  no  fords  higher 
u[)  Cthan  Hufrnv.^'ton's)  I  was  informed  in  ])resence  of  \i)ur  e.xcellency, 
that  then;  was  none  within  twelve  mih.'s  ;  to  cross  at  which  the  (.'nemy 
mu-t  make  a  lon^  circuit  throuoh  a  very  b.id  road,  and  that  all  the  li;4lit 
horse  in  the  army  were  ordered  to  the  ri<;ht,  to  watch  the  enemy's 
motions  in  that  ipiarter.  I  had  no  or(h.'isto  take  any  care  above  Muff- 
inoton's  I-'ord,  nor  had  I  li;.;ht  horse,  or  lij^ht  troops  for  tiie  purpose. 
I  found  four  with  Major  T.iylor  wlu)m  I  sent  to  Bretiton's  Ford,  two 
of  wiiom  I  s(.'nt  off  with  ("olonel  Ilazen  to  Jones'  l""ord  ;  nor  did  I  sec 
an>-  till  Major  Jameson  came  to  me  the  day  of  the  battle  at  nine 
o'clock.  On  the  day  I  cime  to  the  ford  I  detached  the  Delaware 
regiment  to   liuffmyt(;n's  :  and  as  soon  as    I    saw  Major  Jameson,  1 


•777. 


HATIl.K    <)!•■    ItKANDVWINK 


373 


advised  liim   to  scud    .iii  officL-r   ovir   to    llii:    L.incistcr  ro.id,  who 
returned  and  said  llial  no  cm  iny  liad   passed   that  way.      Major  Jainc 
son   said   lie  emu;  fiotu  llic   ri;.;lil  of  tlic  army,  and    I  mi;;iit  depend, 
till  re   was  no   cncniy   llicre." 

It   is  evident,  if  Major  Jameson's  visit  to  tlie    Lancaster  road  was 
not  snade  (jiiite   early  in    tiie    forenoon,  due   allowance   w.is   not  mad(; 


examination  o 


ft! 


lor  the  early  marcli  of  ( ^ornwallis  ;  and  no  careful 
road  could  have  liecii  made,  <jr  he  would  have  confirined  the  statement 
of  Lieutenant-colonel  Koss,  which  was  substantially  (.'xact.  When 
the  fincilion  afterwards  arose  as  to  the  responsibility  for  the  uiiex- 
pe(  ted  .ippearaiice  of  the    British  army   in    force,  npun   the   American 


nt'h 


t   II 


ml 


U' 


hiii;;ton,    ^;enerously   avoidiir.;   to   n 


licet 


upon 


Sulli 


v.ui,  who  w.i-)  both  patriotic   and    brave;,  used   the-   followiii;.;   laie.;ua;4e 
in  re])ly  to  a   l<:tter  from   that   officer  who  was   then  oljtainin;.;  C(;rlifi- 


c.itc's  to   li 


>v{> 


re  Con' 'res- 


Witl 


rcTiJci 


t    to   your  other  (|uery, 


whether  your  bein;^  ])Ostt;d  on  the  ri;.dit  was  to  ;.;u.ird  that  llanl;,  and 
if  )ou  had  ne;_d(;cted  it,  I  can  only  observe,  that  tin:  obvious,  ii  not 
the  detlaieij  |)ur|)osL'  of  your  bein;'_  there,  implied  ev(;ry  necessary 
])re(aution  for  tin;  s(;curity  of  that    llanls.      Hut    it  is  at  the  same  time 


{  )  bi    remarked,  that  all  the  lord-,  above  Cliadi 


Iroi 


n  w  iiK  h  W(;  were 


tau|^ht  to  a]jprehend  d.inj.jer,  were  ijuarded  by  delachnu;nts  Irom  your 


clivision 


and 


that 


wc;    wen; 


led    to  believe,  Iiy  those   whom  wt 


had 


reasiiH  to  think  well  aciiuainted  with  the  c<juntry,  that  no  lord 
above  our  pickets  C(juld  be  j)assed,  witluMit  makin^^  a  vi;ry  circuitous 
march."  \V'asliin;^ton's  informatiijii,  however,  was  (jblaincd  through 
.Sullivan. 

It   will  appear  that   the  m  .vemeiit  of(}eneral  Howe   was  as   bril- 
liantly executed  as  it   was  eminently   scientific,   and    peculiar  to   his 


ift 


ions,  alterwards 


inilitary  habit.  l'"rom  General  .Sullivan's  lommnnicati 
made  l<>  (^dii^ress,  in  which  he  claims  that  tin-  miwemeiit  was  just 
wii.it  he- anticipated,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  his  ne;_;l(;ct  toexli.iust 
reconnoiss.mci;  and  determine  for  himself,  whether  there  w.is  no  lord 


nearc 


•rtl 


lan  twelve  miles,  and  if  not,  whetli(;r ///<//  ford  was  not  availabl 


t:)  an  earnest  adven 


iry 


nil 


le-.s  it    be   borne   in    mind    th.it   after  the 


battle  ol  Lonij  Island,  when  he  had  the  mi, fortune  to  fall  under  cen- 
siin;  fur  similar  neglect  of  reconnoissance,  he  anticipated  the  move- 
ments of  an  enemy  in  a  similar  manner,  without  the  ])ower  to  stop  it. 
Another  document  has  value,  in  connection  with  the  proposed  advance 
of  Washington  a;_;.iinst  Knyphausen.  It  is  clearly  seen  tiiat  such  a 
movement  was  in  the  spirit  of  a  true  soldier  ;  and   its  success,  on  the 


v"4 


nATII.t;  OF   BRANDVWINE. 


li777- 


basis  of  a  supposed  wiilo  separation  of  the  two  British  armies,  would 
have  been  briUi.mt. 

It  stimulated  the  enthusiasm  of  raw  troops  by  offensive  action, 
where  terrors  hke  those  of  a  stoh'd  defense  arc  unknown,  and  carried 
with  it  tile  courai^e  wliich  a  sharp  offensive  return  ahiiost  inv<iriably 
inspires.  It  was  one  of  those  rare  instances  in  which  Washington 
assumeil  L,neat  risks,  and  tiie  sudden  suspension  of  the  movement 
saved  the  army. 

Adiiitional  extracts  are  j^iven  from  the  document  ah'caily  referred 
to,  with  tile  remark  that  Washiiv^toti  understood  tiiat  the  cohmin  of 
Cornwallis  was  still  on  the  west  bank,  and  as  a  matter  of  course,  he 
would  lint  havo  attacked  Kn\'pliausen  if  he  susjjccted  that  two-thirds 
of  tile  Ihitisli  ,irni_\ ,  fully  e(]ual  to  his  own  entire  ct)mmand,  was 
already  bearintj  down  upon  his  rii;lit  and  rear. 


EXTRACrs    FROM    (^i  F.NKUAI.    .SlI  1,1,1  VAN's   S  I'A  I'KM  FN'T. 

"  It  was  ever  my  opinion  that  the  enemy  would  come  round  on 
our  right  Hank.  This  opinion  I  often  i^jave  to  the  General.  I  wrote 
to  him  that  niorniuL;-  that  it  was  clearly  my  opinion.  1  sent  him  two 
messages  to  the  s.ime  purpose  in  the  forenoon,  and  tiie  first  intelli- 
gence I  received  that  they  were  actually  coming  that  way,  I  inst.int.ly 
communicated  to  him;  after  which  the  Gener.d  sent  me  word  to  cross 
the  Brandywinc  and  attack  the  enemy's  left,"  (obviously  meaning 
Cornwallis,  /'.  c.  the  real  British  left,  not  the  left  of  the  army  imme- 
uiatel}- opposite,)  "  while  the  army  crossed  below  me  to  attack  the 
right.  This  1  was  preparing  to  do,  when  Major  Spear  came  to  mc 
aiul  infirmed  me  that  he  was  from  the  upper  countr_\-;  that  hi;  had 
come  in  the  road  where  the  enemy  niusl  have  p.issed  to  attack  our 
right,  and  that  there  was  not  the  least  appearance  of  them  in  that 
quarter  ;  and  that  (ieneral  Washington  had  sent  him  out  for  the  pur- 
pose of  discovering  wliether  the  enemy  were  in  that  quarter.  The 
account  was  confirmed  by  Sergeant  Tucker  of  the  light-horse,  sent  by 
me  on  purpose  to  make  discoveries,  and  who  had  passed,  as  he  said, 
to  the  Lancaster  road." 

"  This  intelligence  r//</  />y  no  means  alter  viy  opinion^  which  was 
founded,  not  upon  any  knowledge  I  had  of  the  facts,  but  ujjon  an 
apprehension  that  General  Howe  would  take  that  advantage  which 
any  good  officer  in  his  situation  would  have  done.  I  considered, 
however,  that  if  my  opinion,  or  the  intelligence  I  had  sent  the  General, 
should  bring  him  into  a  i)lan  of  attacking  the  enemy  on  the  advan- 


'777-1 


ItAiri.l',    Ol'    UKANDYWINK 


375 


ta^coiis  liuiLjlits  of  whicli  tlicy  were  possessed,  and  a  defeat  should 
tlience  follow,  I  should  hv  justl)-  CL'nsured  for  withljoldiii;,;  from  hiui 
|)art  of  the  intLlli;^cncc  I  had  received,  and  thereby  hrouLjht  defeat  on 
iur  army.  I  therefore  sat  tlowii  and  wrote  .Major  Spear's  account 
from  his  own  mouth,  and  forwarded  to  his  excellenc\-  b^-  a  li|^lit 
Horseman,  .md  ordered  the  Major  to  follow  himsidf.  /  //('n-r  tnade  a 
ioininciit  cr  i^ai'i' any  opinion  in  t/ic  iiidftfr.  .  .  .  I  beL,^  Coni.M"ess  to 
see  vlutlier  I  could  have  been  excused  for  wilhholdinj;  tliat  opinion, 
merely  because  my  ojjinion  did  not  coincide  with  the  decl.iration." 

(Tlu-  opinion  of  General  Sullivan  as  to  the  reliability  of  informa- 
tion received  from  iiis  scouts,  was  just  what  the  Commander-in-chief 
was  entitled  to.)  Colonel  Harrison,  General  WashinLjton's  secretary, 
wrote  to  President  Hancock  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  from 
Chaild's  l-'ord.  that  "Sullivan,  litirlin;^,  and  Ste[)hen  with  iheir  divis- 
ions had  j^one  in  pursuit  of  a  detachment  of  the  Uritisli  arm},  two  or 
three  thousand,  or  more,  whicii  ^\\cd  off  tVom  their  lei't  about  eleven 
o'clock,  .'.nd  were  sup[)osed  to  have  crosscil  the  Hrand\-wine  at  Jones' 
I'"ord,"  antl  adds,  that  "  at  half  past  four  the  enemy  attacked  .Sullivan 
at  the  ford  .djove,  that  the  action  was  very  violent,  and  a  ver_\-  severe 
cannonadin;^  had  be^un  here  (at  Chadd's  I'onlj  also."  This  letter 
confuses  the  movement  ordered,  upon  the  receipt  of  the  messat^je  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  Ross,  witii  the  general  action  whicli  was  in  pro- 
gress when  the  letter  was  dispatched. 

The  atlvance  of  (ieneral  Ilovve  bes^an  at  daylireak,  according  to 
his  report,  and  the  entire  column,  after  a  march  of  seventeen  miles 
from  Kennett  .Scpiare,  crossed  Jeffries'  Ford  by  two  o'clock,  its  van- 
l^u.ird  havins^  [)reviously  reached  the  vicinity  of  Osborne's  Hill,  near 
.Sullivan's  rii^ht. 

Its  battle  formation  was  tleliberately  made  in  three  lines,  and  was 
so  complete  and  adequate  that  the  third  line  was  not  called  into  action 
at  all.  That  formation  was  as  follows  :  The  guards  were  upon  the 
ri;4ht,  and  the  iMrst  British  grenadiers  to  their  left  near  the  centre, 
supported  by  the  Hessian  grenadiers  in  a  second  line.  To  the  left  of 
the  Second  grenadiers  who  held  the  centre,  were  two  battalions  of 
light  infantry  with  the  Hessian  and  Auspach  ch.isseurs,  su[)ported  b)- 
tile  Fourth  brigade  for  a  second  line.  The  composition  of  this  brigade 
is  indicated  on  the  map.     The  Third  brigaile  was  heki  in  reserve. 

A  brief  summary  of  General  Howe's  report  will  prepare  the  way 
for  a  better  understanding  of  the  movements  of  tiie  American  army. 
The  American  position,  when  the  British  troops  began  the  attack,  was 


%\ 


1'^ 


1 

1 

ti 

qRI 

f^l 

■ 

i    1 

Wj  \ 

[I 

W 

- 

3/6 


HATTLI-:  OF   BKANDVWIN'i:. 


'777. 


on  cinum.indir.i;  ^'roiiiul  in;ir  Hirmiii;4liain  McctiiiLj  house,  ncirly 
parallel  with  (  )sl)()rnc's  Hill,  behind  whiih  tin-  Ihitisli  .iiniy  so  tlelii)- 
cratcly  pii-paiiu  tluir  aiixMUce  movi'iiuiit .  "  Uotii  llaiik-;  were  coveri'd 
by  very  ihii-'k  woods,  and  the  arlillei)-  was  advant.iL;eiiu-^l)'  disposed. 
The  liL;hl  infantry  and  chasseurs  be;4an  the  .iltack,  the  L,ni  irtls  ami 
grcnaiiiers  instantly  advanced  front  the  rp^ht,  tiie  whole  under  a  iieavy 
train  (of  fire)  of  artillery  and  musketry;  but  they  pushed  on  with  an 
impetuosity  not  to  be  sustained  bv  tin.-  enemy,  who  fallin;^  b.ick  into 
the  woods  in  tlu'ir  rear,  the  kin;4's  troup-,  entered  with  them  and  [jur- 
sued  close!)-  for  ne.irl)-  two  mile-i.  liie  Americans  were  di^K)d;^ed 
hom  the  ^ec(jiul  position,  within  hall  a  mih;  ot  Dilworth,  and  just  at 
dark  the  iidantry,  Second  i^renadiers,  and  l'"ourth  l)ri;;ade  had  a  briet 
action  bej'ond  Dilworth,  between  the  two  ri)atls  which  run  Irom  l)il- 
worth  to  Chester."  "The  duarils,  First  lirilish  i;renadiirs  and  Hes- 
sian j^'renadiers  who  attacked  the  .Vmericaii  li.-ft,  having;  in  tin;  pursuit 
•lot  entangled  in  very  thick  woods,  were  no  further  eu'siijed  liurini' 
tlic  da)'." 

"  I.ieutenaiit-L^ener.d  Kn)'i)lMusen,  as  had  been  previous!)-  con- 
certetl,  kept  the  eneiii)'  amused  tlurini;'  tlie  da)'  with  cannon,  and  the 
appearance-  of  forcing;  the  ford  without  intending  to  p.iss  it,  until  the 
attack  upon  tiie  enem)-'s  rii^ht  shoukl  lake  place."  "  When  the  Ljen- 
eral  action  bei^an,  the  crossing;  w.is  SLiccessfully  matle  uiuler  the  lead 
uf  Major-General  (jrant,  and  the  American  left  ma^le  a  r.ipid  retreat." 

As  siion  as  \\'ashiiii;ton  learned  ot  tlie  approach  o!  tlie  Ihitish 
column,  ( ieiural  Sullivan  was  ordered  to  briiiL;- the  entire  ri^lit  winij 
to  bear  upon  its  advance.  The  position  ,it  (di.uid's  l'"ord  w.is  entrusted 
to  Wayne,  (jriene  was  placed  in  comm.md  of  Muhlenl)erL;'s  and 
Wcedon's  briL;ades  as  a  reserve,  and  this  force  w.is  posted  between 
the  extremes  of  attack.  The  American  formation  was  ijuite  compact, 
except  on  the  left  where  Sullix.m  ilropped  his  own  division,  w-hich  w.is 
in  t^re.it  di-^orik.T,  and  thus  "  made  an  intt,'r\al  in  the  American  line 
of  half  a  mile."  until  he  "  rode  on  to  consult  willi  the  other  L^ener.il 
officers  and  settle  upon  the  loc.itioti  of  the  troops."  He  st.ites  in 
his  report,  that  it  was  "  tlieir  unanimous  opinion  that  his  division 
should  be  brought  on  to  join  the  others,  and  that  the  wiiole  sliould 
incline  further  to  the  right,  to  prevent  our  being  outflanked  ;  "  that 
"  while  his  tlivision  was  marching  on,  and  belore  it  was  possible  lor 
them  to  form  to  advant.igc,  the  enemy  pressed  on  with  rapidity  and 
attacked  them,  which  threw  them  into  some  kind  of  confusion." 
"  He  took  his  own  position  in  the  centre,  with  tiie  artillery,  and  ordered 


17771 


nATTi.r.    ']■  ni;.\Ni)V\vi\K. 


377 


it  to  pl.iy  l)riskl_\',  Id  stop  tlu-  ])iiv_jivss  of  the  ciUMuy  .ind  i^ivc  tlir 
broki'ii  tioojjs  tiiiU'  to  r.illy  .iiul  fonn  in  tin-  rr.ir." 

"llr  si'iil  four  iiil-ilc-i.Mini)^  for  this  purposr  .md  \V(Mit  himself, 
but  all  in  vain  ;  tlicn  li'ft  ihi  ni  to  he  r.illii:il  by  tlu'ir  owii  uflKLTs  .ind 
tlu' aiils,  and  rctinnrd  to  tlic  .ntilU'ry  and  ccntrr."  "  Sonu.'  r.illicd 
and  othrrs  coidil  \\'>i  \)y  tlicir  offiicrs  be  brouL;lit  to  do  anythin;,;  but 
i]\ ."  'VUv  roi^tancr  of  Stirlin;^  an<l  Stc|)ln.'ii  w.issuili  .is  repeatedly 
to  ripulsellu'  IJiilish  attaek.  ( "on\\  ay's  briLjadc  distin;4uislie(i  itself  by 
il>  valor.  1 1  a /en's,  I  )ay  ton's  ami  (  );^'tlen's  re;_;iments  alone  niaiiitaiiied 
a  resolute  position  on  the  left,  (leneral  I  leborn-,  a  I''ri'iu  li  officer  of 
thirt)-fi\  I' >ears' experience,  connn.mded  liu-  ri;_;iit  brii;a<le  of  tlic  entire 
line,  but  it  L;ave  way  earl\'  in  the  action  and  the  ciiief  resistance  was 
niaile  at  the  centre,  (riiis  offieer  .dniost  ininiedi.itelv  resigned,  so  that 
lie  wa-.  not  dealt  with  b\' a  niilitar\' court.)  I'll, it  the  retreat  of  the 
tuo  divisions  of  .Stirlin;^  and  Stephen,  (e.\ei'|)t  Deborre's  briL^ade^  was 
effeeti'd  with  some  ste.idiiiess  ,ind  repe.ited  returns  of  the  <ifft'nsive,  is 
shown  by  the  laet  that  they  took  both  .irtiller)-  ,ind  i).i:-,'L;.iL;e  witli 
thcni  ;  and  there  is  abund.uit  evidence  that  ( ieiieral  .Sullivan  e.\hil)iti(l 
a  person. il  cour.r^e  which  ^ne,itl\'  oversli.ulowid  his  ileficiencies  as 
conim.iiulinc^  oificer  of  a  j^r.md  di\'ision.  Ihere  aw  circuinstaiici-s 
associ.ited  with  the  battle  which  indicate  more  cle,ui\'  tli.ni  the  b.ittle 
itself  the  difficulties  of  the  da_\\  .mil  inaki-  more  wonderlul  the  ri'scue 
ol  the  /vmeric.in  arm)"  from  entire  (Ustniction. 

It  woiiM  be  ])resL!med  h'oiii  the  oidi-r  issued  to  (leiier.il  Sulli\'.ui 
ami  the  position  occupieti  by  the  .Xnuricin  troops,  th.it  the  three 
divisions  moved,  uiuler  (lener.il  .Sullivan's  directions,  directly  to  the 
b.ittle-field    from   their   c.imp  on  the  river    l)luff;   ami    he    h.is    been 


. litem. ilely  pr.iised  ami  aljusei; 


for  tl 


le  1)0 


sition  idl 


en. 


he  tollowiiu 


is  an  extract  from  (leneral  .Sulliv.m's  person, il   conimunic.itioii  to  tlu 
American  (.!on''iess  : 


I 


wish  Coir^ress  to  consider  the  many  disadvantages   I    Libored 


iiiidcM'  in  th,it  d.iy 


It 


is  necessai)'  in  every  .iction 


that  the  coiiimand- 


incj  officer  should  have  a  perfect  knowledi;e  of  the  number  and  situa- 
tion of  the  enem_\',  the  route  the)'  an-  |)ursiiiiit.^,  tiie  t;round  he  is  to 
diMW  ui)  !iis  troo])s  on.  as  well  as  th.it  where  th  enemy  an.'  to  be 
formed,  and  that  he  iiave  sufficient  time  to  view  and  examine  tlie 
positions  of  the  enem)'  and  to  dr.iw  up  his  troops  in  such  a  manner  ,is 


to  counteract  their 


des 


!'jn, 


all   of  whiih  were  wantintr. 


General  /[o:k.u-  did  not  intend  to  i^rant  iltesc  favors  ;  and  tills  excel- 
lent programme  for  a  sham  battle,  in  experimental  practice  is  not  ac- 


!l 


rs 


i 


I' 


37« 


H\  in  I'    n|.-    |!i;  \\|i\\V!\F, 


:i777 


c<|)t,il)If  to  tho-^i'  \vhi>  scc-k-  liiLjh  attainirnMit  in  the  art  of  war.  Tlic 
p.iprr  loutiniif-^,  "  W'c  Ii.id  iiiti,'lli;j;fiici'  of  tWD  hn';^.i(lrs  foiiiiiv^  ai^.iin-t 
us;  wliLMi  it  UMs  ill  f.u't  tlx'  wIidIc  stroiv^th  of  the  Ih'iti^li  army,  com- 
manded by  Gciu'ral  Ilouij  and  I.ord  Coriiwanis.  Tlu-y  met  us  une\- 
prctedly.  and  attacked  us  before  \vr  had  time  to  form,  .and  iiixMi 
jjround  we  had  ne\er  before  seen.  Under  tliest-  disadv.uitai^es,  ,ind 
Hijainst  those  unequal  number-;,  we  m.iiiUained  our  i;round  .m  hour  and 
fort)'  minutes ;  .'ind  i)y  LjiviuL;  fresh  oijposition  on  every  i;round  that 
would  .'ultiiit.  we  kejjt  them  at  b.i\-  from  three  o'clock  until  after 
sunset." 

These  statements  are  to  be  considered  in  connection  with  tiiose  on 
pai^e  ;,"4  where  (lener.d  Sullivan  claims  to  have  cxjiected  ("leneral 
Howe's  ap|)roach  from  that  direction,  and  necessarily  over  the  !:rround 
where  the  battle  was  fou;_;ht.  The  occ.ision  was  one  which  ncpiired 
exhaustive  reconnoi-is.mce  and  thorou.;])  anticipatiou  of  the  contin- 
;^encies  of  such  an  attack.      Hoth  were  nc'/lected. 

It  is  nowhere  recorded  in  official  documents,  exactly  how  the 
.Xniericm  troops  |:;ained  the  b.ittlei^round.  The  report  of  (iener.il 
Sullivan  t;ive-;  his  views  ;  but  neither  those  of  l.a  l-'ayelte.  a  volunteer 
on  this  occasion,  nor  Stirlin:^.  explain  this  matter. 

(ieiu:ral  .Sullivan,  in  fact,  waited  for  further  orders  from  W'.ishington, 
after  sending  him  notice  that  the  enemy  w.is  closr  ,it  hand,  as  if  ]),ir. 
alyzeu,  and  the  divisions  of  Stirlini^  anil  Stephen  moveil  promptly 
without  liim,  to  the  nearest  tjood  position  from  which  tluy  could 
resist  the  advancin;.^  Ihitish  columns. 

The  author  knows  full  well  that  this  st.itement,  predic.ited  upon 
examination  of  documents,  reg.ardless  in  the  first  in-^t.mce  of  ,dl  other 
opinions,  does  not  conform  to  some  narratives,  neither  has  this  (.:x  im- 
ination  from  the  first  acce[)ted  any  opinion  which  was  not  in  ii.irmony 
with  a  strictly  military  review  of  conditions  and  data.  It  is  therefore 
material  that  adilitionaltlocumentary  matter  should  receive  attention. 
Mr.  Sp.irks,  in  his  Appendix  to  Vol.  V..  pa<:;e  462.  states,  that  "when 
Gener.il  Sullivan  c.ime  up  with  three  divisions  of  th  .•  army,  his  own, 
Stephen's  and  .Stirlinf^'s,  and  be^Mii  to  form  tlieni  into  a  line  about 
half  a  mile  in  front  of  the  enemy,  Coniwallis  commenced  the  attack 
before  this  maiKeuver  could  be  completed,  and  threw  Sullivan's  troops 
into  confusion,  etc." 

\Vasliin;j[ton,  writin;;  to  General  Sullivan  under  date  of  October 
twenty-fourth,  1777, says,  "  what  happened  on  your  march  to  the  field 
of  battle, — your  disposition  there  and  behavior  during  the  action,  I 


i 


I-  ;.l 


HATTLI';  or  1!u.\\i)ywink. 


379 


can  s.iy  iiothini;  about;  no  p.irt  till  tin-  n; treat  coininciicud  having 
conic  under  my  imnicdiati.'  observation.  I  ca.n  oniy  add,  tliereture, 
tliat  the  whole  tenor  of  your  coaduct  as  far  .is  I  h.ive  liad  opportu- 
nities of  jud;4inji;  has  been  spirited  and  active."  Tliis  letter  also  con- 
tains tile  folIowin|4  allusion  to  the  information  sent  b\'  Major  S[)ear, 
"  wit  hout  conunt'nt  or  opinion."  "It  was  not  your  t.iult  lli.it  the 
intelli;4ence  was  eventu.illy  found  to  be  erroneou.-.."  .l//</ jif  tvkcn 
that  (/isf>(itih  icuis  sent,  (icnrrdl  Sullivan  Ih-licvcd  it  to  hr  trroncous.  In 
writin<^  from  "  C.ini])  on  I'erkiomy,  September  twent>-seventh,  I  777, 
to  I'residi'ut  1  l.mcock,  (ieneral  .Sulli\  an  thus  shows  how  he  reached 
the  battle-field.     (\'\\v.  It.ilics  .ire  not  so  marked  in  liie  oriyin.il.) 

"  I  nevi-r  yet  jiretended  tliat  my  disposition  in  the  late  l)attle  was 
perfect.  I  kiu'w  it  w.is  very  f.ir  from  it  ;  but  this  I  will  venture  to  affirm, 
that  it  was  the  best  that  time  would  allow  me  to  ni.ike.  At  half-past 
two  I  received  orders  to  march  with  my  division  to  join  with  .ind  take 
commaml  of  that  and  two  others,  to  oppose  the  enemy  who  were 
cominj^dowii  on  the  ri;4ht  i1aid<  of  our  army.  I luitlur  kueiv  -u'hcrc  the 
enctity  were,  uor  :c>hiit  routr  the  other  t:i'o  divisions  turrr  to  tahe,  and  of 
course  could  not  determine  x^'here  [should  Jorin  a  Junction  'oith  them." 
"  I  bei^an  my  march  in  a  few  minutes  after  I  received  my  orders,  and 
had  not  marched  a  mile  when  I  met  Colonrl  Hazen  with  his  re.i,nment 
which  had  been  sto  led  at  a  ford  three  miles  above  me,  who  in- 
formed me  that  I  nii;4hi  depend  that  the  principal  p.irt  of  the  Hritish 
r:iin\'  w.is  there  ;  althou;^!!  \  knew  tlu-  report  sent  to  headquarters 
made  them  but  two  bri;^'a(les.  As  1  knew  Colonel  li.i/.en  to  be  an  old 
officer  and  .1  i;[ooil  judcje  of  numbers,  I  t^.ive  credence  to  his  report  in 
preference  to  the  intellii^encc  before  received.  While  I  was  conversin<^ 
with  Colonel  Uazen,  and  our  troops  still  on  the  march,  the  enemy 
headed  us  in  the  road,  (sec  positions  of  tjuards  and  Hessians  on  the 
map  '  H.ittle  of  Brandywine,')  about  forty  roils  from  our  ailvance 
guard.  1  then  found  it  necess.ir\' to  turn  off  to  tfie  ri;_jht  to  form,  .ind 
so  got  ne.irer  to  the  other  divisions,  tc/r/V//  /(//  that  moment  discovered, 
both  in  the  rear  and  to  the  right  of  the  place  /  was  then  at.  I  ordered 
(volonel  Hazcn's  regiment  to  pass  a  hollow  way,  file  off  to  the  right, 
and  face,  to  cover  the  artillery.  The  enemy  seeing  this,  did  not  press 
on,  but  gave  me  time  to  form  my  division  on  an  advantageous  height, 
in  a  line  with  the  other  divisions,  about  almost  half  a  mile  to  the  left." 

It  thus  appears  that  Major-general  Sullivan,  to  whom  the  command 
of  the  entire  right  wing  of  the  American  army  from  its  first  establish- 
ment on  the  east  bank  of  the  Brandywine  had  been  intrusted,  arrived 


t 


j8o 


HAiri.i:  or  nuANnvwiNi:, 


11777 


i 


> 


t   ^      I 


onl_\'  just  ill  time  to  take  part  in  tlu'  artimi,  aiul  that  Iiis  personal  valor, 
and  tliat  ot  thm-  ri';^iiiuin-;,  w.is  the  sole  contributioi)  of  his  division 
to  tlu-  rflkiciicy  of  till'  Ann'ricaii  resistance.  If,  as  appears  frorii 
.some  authorities,  (iener.il  Uehorre  was  in  .Stirliiv^^'s  division,  he  ams 
in  his  proper  position  on  tlic  rit;ht,  and  the  entaiiijled  controversy 
whether  there  was  a  disi)iite  between  that  officer  and  General  .Sullivan 
as  to  the  conim.md  of  the  extrenu;  ri;4ht,  is  settled  1)\-  the  ilocunients 
aire. id)-  cited,  independently  of  ihe  f.ict  that  there  was  no  occasion  for 
a  C(jnllict  upon  such  a  question,  between  a  general  of  bri;.;aile  and  the 
conuiiander-in-ch'  'f  of  tiie  entire  rii^ht  wing.  (General  .Sullivan's  time 
w.is  spi'ut  in  fiiuling  the  .army  first,  and  then  in  finding  a  place  where 
he  could  reniler  service  in  person,  and  with  such  of  iiis  own  division 
as  he  could  rescue  from  p.inic  and  flight. 

Wasliington  h.istened  with  Greene's  ilivision  to  the  support  of  the 
right  wing;  hut  not  in  time  to  save  it  in  position.  It  h.ul  n(j  retreat 
hut  tow  aril  Diluorth.  as  the  l^ritish  right  wing  out  fl.mked  it  to  the 
left  and  intervened  between  it  and  Chadd's  Konl.  Hy  a  direct  march 
nearly  to  Dilworth  of  four  miles,  effected  in  fifty  minutes,  and  a  wheel 
to  the  left  for  half  a  mile,  he  w.is  enabled  to  occupy  a  defile  and  sub- 
st.uitial  ground  from  which  to  open  a  pass.ige  for  the  retreating  bat- 
talions and  inter])osc  a  vigorous  resistance.  This  was  tempor.u)-,  and 
the  retre.it  was  then  m.ide  under  cover  of  Greene's  division.  In  an 
orchard  beyonil  Dilworth,  three  regiments  made  another  vigorous 
st.uul,  and  night  separated  the  confiicting  armies. 

The  militia  brigade  of  General  Armstrong,  on  the  extreme  left, 
near  Pyle's   Ford,  was  r  cd    into  action,  but  rapidly  moved  in 

the  direction  of  (."he-^  Generals  Wayne  and   Maxwell,  after  a 

vigorous  resislanc  .<k  the  same  direction,  losing  the  guns  which 

were  at  the  ford,  a,        ^me  others. 

The  American  army  gained  Chester,  so  that  Washington's  dispatch 
from  that  point  io  President  Hancock  was  dated  at  twelve  o'clock  at 
night,  September  nth,  1777,  and  the  British  army  remained  on  the 
field.  There  are  a  few  minor  items  which  belong  to  this  record.  At 
the  commencement  of  the  action  a  vigorous  skirmish  took  place  in 
the  orchard  north  of  tlv;  Birmingham  Meeting-house.  Special  credit 
is  also  due  to  the  corps  of  General  Maxwell. 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who  had  been  appointed  Major-gen- 
eral by  way  of  compliment,  as  claimed,  but  not  so  understood  by 
Washington,  served  as  his  voluntary  aid-de-camp,  distinguished 
himself  by  his  valor,  vva.s  wounded  in  an  attempt  to   rally  troops,  and 


1777- 


HAI'I  ll')   oi'   liKANUVWINK. 


381 


joined  W'.isliiiiotoM  at  Chcstur.  Captain  Louis  dc  Floury  fou;^dU  with 
such  },Mliaiitry  that  Coiv^icss  picsciitcd  hiui  witli  a  horse  in  place  of 
hi-,  own  killi'd  in  llu;  battle.  The  baron  St.  Ovary,  who  aided  La 
Kajc  ttc  in  rallying  fu^'itivcs,  was  taken  prisoner.  The  skill  of  General 
Howe  as  a  scientific  soldier,  even  amitlst  W(jo(1s  and  thickets,  was 
again  demonstrated  ;  and  the  winuU^rful  jjresence  of  nund,  ajjtitude 
for  emergencies,  and  e\traurdinar\'  cap.icity  for  making  the  most 
of  raw  troops,  was  inner  more  thorougiily  evinced  by  Washington  in 
ills  public  career.  With  all  its  mistakes,  and  the  final  retreat  of  tiio 
American  troops,  there  was  mu' '-  of  real  success  and  real  hope  as  the 
fruit  of  the  Battle  of  iJrandywine. 


CHAPTF.lv    LI. 


OFERATIONS  N\:AR  PHILADF.LI'IHA.     BATTLE   OF  GERMANTOWN 


GENERAL  WASHINGTON  iiLuchcd  from  Chester  directly  to 
Philadelphia  to  refit  his  army,  secure  ammunition  and  provis- 
ions, antl  tluncc  to  Gcrmantown  for  one  day  of  rest. 

Wiiik.'  Congress  was  makin;jj  an  effort  to  collect  detached  Conti- 
nental trooi)s,  and  rally  the  militia,  the  Commander-in-chief  was  in 
motion. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  September,  orders  were  sent  to  Monsiei^-  de 
(."oudray  to  com])lete  the  defensive  works  on  the  Delaware  as  rapidly 
as  possible ;  to  General  rutnam  to  send  him  fifteen  hundred  Conti- 
nental troops  f  )rthwith  ;  and  to  (icneral  Armstrong  to  occuj^y  the 
line  of  the  Schuylkill  river,  and  throw  up  occasional  redoubts  near  the 
fords,  to  be  occupied  if  necessary  in  crossini^  that  river. 

The  left  wing  of  the  British  army  had  moved  from  Diiwortli 
tow-ard  Goshen,  demonstrating  toward  Reading,  as  well  as  toward  the 
Schu\lkill  and  Philadelphia.  The  right  win;;  under  (ienerals  Grant 
and  Cornwallis  reached  Ashtown  on  the  twelfth,  and  Chester  on  the 
thirteenth.  The  failure  of  General  Howe  to  move  diagonally  toward 
Crum  creek,  or  Derby,  thereby  to  make  a  direct  route  to  Philadelphia, 
-horter  than  that  of  Washington's  retreat,  received  severe  criticism 
from  his  enemies  ;  but  important  considerations  controlled  his  actions. 
The  v.'ounded  of  both  armies  were  on  his  hands,  so  that  he  was  com- 
pelled to  procure  surgeons  from  General  Washington  to  assist  in  their 
care;  and  he  states  that  one  reason  of  his  occupation  of  Wilmington, 
where  he  captured  the  Governor  and  considerable  coin,  was  to  provide 
better  for  their  comfort.  Inasmuch  as  Grant  and  Cornwallis  were  in 
the  rear  of  Washington's  army,  a  march  to  Philadelphia  via  German- 
town  aflbrded  a  fair  opportunity  to  cut   off  its  retreat,  while  at   the 


Jiri/ish 
American. 


I    , 


'' '  -t  -V 


•I 


i   ' 


Mb 


^ 


mi 


11 


^.«« 


'7771 


OPKRATIONS    NKAR    rilll  ADKLIMIIA. 


3^i 


^;ime  time  thrcateninrr  tlie  city.  On  tiic  fiftcciitli,  W'.isiiington  was 
•ij^ain  on  the  west  side  of  tlie  Sclui)ikill,  li.iviiv^  crossed  .it  Swede's 
Van],  SO  that  the  halt  of  Gener,xl  Howe  for  a  sinL,de  d,iv  on  the  battle 
field,  rendered  it  useless  for  him  to  m.iki;  forced  m.irches  for  that  city 
direct. 

Washiiv^ton  moved  out  on  the  Lancaster  road  as  far  as  the  Warren 
Taver.i.  General  Howe,  watchful  of  these  movements,  advanced  bc- 
\-ond  Westchester,  and  both  armies  prejjared  for  battle,  (.ieiier.il 
Howi;  matle  a  p. irtiall}' successful  atteni[)tto  turn  the  American  rii,dit 
•A'iii!^,  in  order  to  throw  it  back  up')!!  the  .Sciuiylkill  ;  but  a  heavy 
storm  completely  ruined  the  ammunition  of  the  American  arm)',  and 
was  "  directK-  in  the  fices  i.f  the  British  troops."  Washin^^ton  left 
Wayne,  with  fit'teen  hundred  men,  in  a  peculiarl\-  retired  and  well 
chosen  position  near  I'aoli,  to  be  ready  to  fall  upon  the  rear  of  (ien- 
eral  Howe,  and  then  nioxcd  to  Yellow  .Sprin^^s,  thence  t(j  Warwick, 
on  I'"rench  creek;  and  after  lu:  found  that  (ieneral  Howe  did  not 
intend  a  movement  toward  Readin;^,  crossetl  the  river  by  Parker's 
Ford  and  encami)ed  on  the  Perkiomy,  September  seventeenth. 

On  the  twentieth  General  Wayne  was  surprised,  through  the 
treachery  of  the  people  of  the  country,  (ieneral  Grey  adv.uiced  frouA 
his  camp  near  Trudruffyn  at  night,  using  onl\'  the  bayonet,  and 
intlicted  a  loss  of  three  hundretl  in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners, 
with  a  mere  handful  of  casualties  to  his  own  troops.  Wayne  saved 
his  artillery  and  most  of  his  baggage.  John  Adams  thus  criticised  the 
crossing  of  the  Schus'lkiil  ;  and  the  criticism  does  more  credit  to  his 
interest  in  the  war,  than  to  his  judgment  of  military  conduct.  "  It  is 
a  very  injudicious  movement.  If  he  had  sent  (jne  brigade  of  his 
regular  troops  to  have  headed  the  militi.i,  he  might  have  cut  to  pieces 
Howe's  army  in  ,ittem[)ting  to  cross  an\-  of  the  fords.  Howe  will  not 
attempt  it."  //i-  did  attintpt  it!  "He  will  wait  for  his  fleet  in 
Delaware  river.  O!  Heaven!  grant  us  one  great  soul  I  (/>ne  lead- 
ing mind  would  extricate  the  best  cause  from  that  ruin  which  seems 
to  await  it!"  But  Howe  tlid  not ivait  for  Itis Jhct.  And  when  Wash- 
ington crossed  the  Schuylkill,  he  knew  that  (irant  and  Cornwallis 
were  detached  to  Chester,  so  that  the  movement  against  one  wing  of 
the  British  army,  interrupted  by  the  storm,  was  soKlierly  ;  and  the 
retreat  via  Parker's  Ford,  was  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  ([uickest 
possible  offensive  and  to  cover  the  fords.  The  disaster  of  Wayne 
alone  impaired  the  value  of  that  action.  The  brigade  of  Smallwood, 
which  had  been    left  as  a  support  to  Wayne,  failed  to   be  on  time  to 


m:v 


r    N. 


ffff^-t 


«Ji^ 


3^4 


(>ri:K.\rioN-s  ni:ar  i'iiii.adelpiiia. 


[1777 


m 


render  sucli  supiiort.  altlimi;^!)  only  about  a  mile  from  Paoli,  and  liis 
misfortune  drove  them  to  a  retreat  in  partial  disorder.  The  suceeed- 
iuLj  mameuvers  of  the  armies  were  respectively  alTeeted  by  the  affair 
at  PaoH.  Tlie  pressure  was  takm  off  tlie  rear  of  Howe's  arm}',  and 
he  moved  on.  Washinj^ton  says:  "  The\-  liad  ;_;i)t  so  far  the  start 
before  I  received  cert.iin  inteili;4encc  that  any  considerable  lunnber 
hat!  crossed,  that  I  found  it  in  \-,iin  to  think  of  ovi'rtakiiv,;  their  rear 
witli  tr-jops  iiar.issed  as  ours  had  been  with  con-tant  marciiin;^  since 
the  battle  ot  lirandywine." 

'•  t3ne  tiiousand  of  his  army  were  bare-footed."  and  Colonel  Hamil- 
ton was  sent  to  Phihulelphia  to  force  a  contribution  of  shoes  from  the 
inhabitants.  A  small  portion  of  the  liritish  left  cros>ed  at  Ciordon's 
l'"ord  on  the  twenty-second,  ;nul  the  main  body  at  I'latland  .I'ord,  near 
Valley  ForL;e.  on  the  twent\--thirtl,  reachini;  (iermantown  on  the 
twenty-tlfth.  <  )n  the  twent\--seventh  Cornwallis  entered  Philadelidiia. 
Colonel  Sterlin;^,  of  the  British  armw  was  moved  across  the  Delaw.ire 
to  operate  aj^ainst  its  defenses,  includinf^  the  works  at  Mud  Island 
anil  Red  Rank,  and  the  fleet  of  Admind  Howe  was  alreatly  en  route 
for  the  same  destination. 

There  was  no  rest  for  either  army  ;  and  the  occupation  of  I'hila- 
deli)hia  was  attended  b_\-  immediate  results  which  showed  that  the 
war  was  nearer  its  close,  through  that  occupation. 

Congress  adjourned  to  Lancaster,  and  subsecjuently  to  York. 
The  powers  of  \\'ashin;4ton  were  somewhat  enlars^ed,  and  a  [)cremptory 
ortler  was  sent  to  I'utnam,  ulio  was  .dl  the  time  attemptiiiL;'  ill-con- 
sidered attempts  upon  the  liritish  ou.'posts  near  New  York,  to  send 
twi'nty-five  hundred  troops  without  delay,  to  reinforce  Washington's 
army,  and  that  he  must  "so  use  mil.  ia,  that  the  posts  in  the  High- 
lands might  be  perfectly  safe,"  Applicatir)n  was  also  made  to  General 
Gates  for  tlie  return  of  Morgan's  corps  ;  but  they  were  not  sent  to  the 
lieadquarters  of  the  army  until  after  the  close  of  the  Northern  Cam- 
paign. 

General  Howe  had  been  one  month  in  marching  fifty-four  miles, 
from  the  head  of  the  I'dk  to  Philadelphia.  His  headcjuarters  were  at 
Germantown. 

This  village,  six  miles  from  Philadelphia,  was  built  upon  a  single 
street,  the  old  Skippach  road,  nearly  or  quite  two  miles  in  length, 
bearing  slightly  west  of  north,  as  indicated  on  the  map  "  Battle  of  Ger- 
mantown." This  map,  so  far  as  the  positions  of  the  British  troops  are 
indicated,  is  compiled  from  that  of  Lieutenant  Hill,  assisting  engineer, 


'7771 


OPEIJAriOVS    N'KAR    Tl  I  II.AnFI.l'I  r  I  A. 


385 


of  tlic  British  rwciity-third  n'i;iiiicnt,  and  whiU' iiniic.itiiv^  tlicir  moiij. 
fu'd  pii^itioiis  shortly  after  tlic  actiim  hci^an,  is  accepted  a-^  tlic  best. 
Tile  additiDiis  ma'le  .'tfird  a  fair  estimate  (if  the  successive  stages  of 
the   liattle. 

l  he  street  is  nut  strai;4ht  ;  so  that  tliere  is  at  no  sin;^de  point  a 
complete  ran^^e  for  fire  tliroui^liout  its  entire  extmit.  Neither  is  it  on 
a  uniform  or  continuous  tirade  so  tliat  ;4uns  stationed  at  Mount  Airy, 
or  near  the-  Street  K.iilway  station  (>is  occui)i''d  in  J.inuary,  1876.)  and 
trained  down  thi-  !ii!!,  could  have  a  clear  sweep  unohstructetl  b\'  crown- 
incj 'ground.  In  other  uortls,  troops  wr.uld  bi'  at  least  twice  undercover 
in  movini(  throus^h  the  town,  l-'roii)  the  (  )ld  .Scho<ii-iioii:-,e  lane  there 
is  another  j;radual  rise  on  the  road  leaiiin;^  to  I'hiladeljihi.i.  Beyond 
Mount  Airy,  northward,  is  an  >t  c  r  decli  "i^;^  slope,  soon  t.d<en  up  by 
the  ascent  of  Chestnut  Hill  ■  1  further  on.  A  few  small  alleys,  or 
o[)enin!4s,  projecte'd  east  and  v,  .  u  for  .1  few  rods  from  the  main  street, 
anil  si'veral  of  the  okl  buil(lin;^'s  of  the  era  under  notice,  were  in  very 
well  preserved  condition  at  the  beyinnintj;  of  1S76,  tlic  Centennial  year 
of  American  Independence.  In  addition  to  the  Skipp.ich  n-ad,  the 
tc)wn  was  approached  from  the  northeast  b}-  the  Lime-kiln  road 
which  entereil  the  villa'jje  by  the  IMarket  House,  and  In-  the  old  York 
road  w  hich  entered  the  Philadelphia  road  some  distance  below.  A 
fourth  road,  c.ilied  the  Manatawne)'  or  Richie;  ro.uj,  came  from  the 
upper  Schuvlkill  country,  and  wa-  located  between  that  river  and  Wis- 
sahickon  creek. 

The  British  c.unp  crossed  the  town  on  the  ijeneral  line  of  School- 
hou.sc  latie  and  the  Lime-kiln  road,  jiassint;  the   Market-house. 

The  left  was  commanded  by  Lieut enant-i^tmcral  Knyphausen,  anil 
the  troops  in  his  camj).  uucil  the  action  cune  on,  consistixl  of  seven 
British  and  three  IIes>ian  battalions,  and  the  mounted  and  dis- 
mounted chasseurs,  (ienerals  .Stirn,  (jrey  and  Ai^iiew  were  in  this 
command,  although  Gener.d  .Slim  seems  to  have  been  subsequently 
transferred  to  the  right  of  the  road.  This  force  had  General  Grant  on 
the  right,  where  the  guards.  si.\  battalions  of  British  troops  ami  two 
squadrons  of  dragoons  were  encamped  ;  there  being  no  distinct  centre, 
other  than  the  location  of  the  street  crossings,  to  the  south  of  which, 
within  half  a  mile,  General  Howe  had  his  headquarters  and  personal 
guaril. 

The  chasseurs  rested  on  the  Schuylkill,  a  little  advanced,  as  a 
picket  guard  ;  and  on  the  first  alarm  the  two  battalions  of  Minnigerode 
were  detailed  to  their  support.  The  first  battalion  of  light  infantry 
35 


^:;h 


>*  ?;• 


^  . ,  1 


i 


f 

r 

i 

1 

If 

i  ■  1  ^ 

i 

■  ? 

r      f  1 

'        '1 
i 

r  t      1 

;             It 

J   i' 

: 
I 

38<> 


OI'KRATIONS    NKAU    I'l  1 1 1.AI 'I  1  I'l  I  lA. 


[1777. 


wasslii;Iu1y  advaiucd  frotn  the  cxtrcino  rij^lit.  am!  the  (Jiuth's  ranchers 
were  lluDwii  bcvDiui  the  Okl  Vurk  road  ft)  aiUicii)aU'  an  aitcinpt  to 
turn  the  rii^ht. 

The  I'orty-niiith  liritish  reL^Mineiit  was  puslicd  up  I^raiikford  creek 
after  the  action  bc;^aii.  ,ind  some  sliarp  skirmishinij  ensued  ne.ir 
Lucan"s  Mill.  ui:)(>n  (ireene's  ;idv:uice.  At  the  head  of  the  street,  a 
mile  from  the  Market-house,  the  Second  battalion  of  li!j;ht  infantr\- 
was  posted  with  advanced  pickets,  supported  by  the  Fortieth  re;^iinent 
which  was  on  the  slopi'  westward,  out  "f  thr  main  streit,  where  it 
coinm.mded  a  clear  vii'w  of  the  countr\-  up  Wi-'S.ihickon  creek.  As 
the  narrative  will  disclose  th<"  tact  th.it  the  extreme,  or  rather,  the 
dctaclieci  wint;^  of  the  American  army  f.iiled  to  touch,  or  even  to 
appro.ich,  the  corresijoudiniijj  win;j[s  of  the  liritish  .irm\',  it  is  proper  to 
notice,  in  this  connection,  the  fact  that  the  Hriti^h  reinforcements  sent 
to  the  let't  wiiv^  fwlu're  the  cliassi-urs  were  advanced)  were  withdrawn 
when  the  actit>n  became  j^^eneral,  hut  did  not  participate  in  the 
battle;  ami  the  Hessian  grenadiers  did  not  accomp.my  (ieneral  Grey 
v;hen  he  made  his  subseciuent  .idv.mce  movement  into  tlie  villa^je 
itself.  Tl'..'  Third  and  Fourth  bri^jades  marched  obliipu'ly  forw.ird  to 
therijjjht,  crossin;^  before  the  rei^iments  of  Du  Corps  .md  i  )onop,  which 
h.ul  been  desi;j;nateil  to  support  the  I'ourth  l)ri;^Mdf  :  but  these  rej^i- 
ments.  Vjeneral  Howe  states,  tlid  not   p.irticipate  in  the  action. 

(ieneral  Cornwallis,  early  apprised  of  the  .\merican  attack  b\'  the 
artillery  firing  near  the  Chew  house,  brought  up  two  i'ritish  b.itt.ilions, 
one  of  Hessian  grenadi-rs  "on  the  run,"  and  i>ne  squ.idron  of  dra- 
goons, and  joineil  (ieneral  Grey  in  pursuit  of  the  column  of  Gener.il 
Greene  after  the  general  .action  was  over. 

General  Howe  on  the  right,  with  Cieiierals  Grant  and  Knyphau- 
scn  to  his  left,  made  their  adv.mce  in  a  couc.ive  order,  almost  envelop- 
ing Generals  Sulliv.in  ami  tireeue,  who  had  converged  toward  the 
Market-house  when  the  tide  of  battle  turned  in  Ihitish  favor. 

General  Howe  states  in  his  Narrative  that  "  he  was  not  surprised  :" 
— that,  "  the  enemy's  approach  was  discovered  by  our  patrols  and  I 
had  early  notice  of  it.  'I  he  line  was  presently  under  arms,  and 
although  it  must  be  atlmitted  that  the  outposts  and  light  infantry  in 
one  quarter,  were  driven  back,  it  must  be  equally  admitted  that  they 
were  soon  effectually  supported,  and  the  enem\'  was  repulsed  at  the 
only  place  where  the  stnallest  impression  was  made." 

Sir  George  Osborne,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  states,  that  he  "  received   from  General    Howe, 


■  777.] 


orKRATIDNS    NEAR    PIH;.  MMliril  [A. 


38; 


wlio  was  nccoinpanicd  l)y  his  aid-de-c  uiip,  oiil)-  tin-  iii'^ht  before,  tht 
ordorto  move  on  with  llic  <^n-ciuidicrs  aiul  Ii;4lu  inlaiitry  of  tlu'  j^uards 
to  Major  Siincoc's  post,  about  half  a  mili'  in  front  of  the  hue  of  infantry, 
as  I  niiijlit  expect  tile  eneni)' at  daybrealv  next  nioniinjr."  Tin's  offi- 
ct  r  acUls,  "  The  t"irini:j  of  the  enemy  on  tiie  moriiin;^  of  the  attack  be_iran 
exactl)-,  or  near  the  time  that  Sir  WiHiam  Howe  acquainted  me  the 
ni;^ht   before,  it  would  do." 

Washin;4ton'->  camp  was  near  I'ennebeck'  Mill,  twenty  miles  from 
Philadelphia.  Twti-lhirds  of  his  army  participated  in  the  movement 
upon  (jermantown,  llis  plan  w.is  to  occujjv  the  tour  roads  wliich 
more  or  less  directly  a"i)roacheil  (ieneral  Howe's  position,  and  to  make 
the  match  in  time,  Mr^^t  to  brin;^  all  the  divisions  into  approximate 
positions,  then  to  _L;i\'e  them  rest,  and  make  a  combined  attack  at 
daybreak. 

The  troops  left  camp  at  seven  o'clock  on  tlu:  evenin,;  of  the  third, 
passed  Metuclun  Hill  about  nine  o'clock,  and  all  the  divisions  which 
accompanied  \V,e<liin;j[ton  reached  their  haltin;^  [ilaces,  obtained  their 
rest,  and  made  the  attack  on  tmie. 

Sullivan  and  \\'a\ne,  with  Conwa}'  in  advance  acting  as  ,1  flanking 
corps,  were  to  move  directlj-  over  Clieslnut  Mill  and  entei  the  town. 

Maxwell  and  N.i-h,  under  Major-ijencral  Sliriini^,  were  to  follow 
this  column  in  re^>erve. 

(jeneral  Armslrot):^^  with  V'ne  ?v:\insylvanivi.  militia  was  sent  down 
the  Manatawny  ro.id  to  cross  the  W'issahickon  creek,  and  tall  upon 
the  JJritish  left  wiivj  and  re.ir. 

Greene  and  Stepheti.  led  and  flanked  by  McUouyjall's  bri<^ade, 
were  to  tiio\c  b)'  the  lime-kiln  roatl.  enter  the  villai^e  at  the   Market- 


louse,  and 


attacic  tlu 


Hrit 


ish  n''!it  win::. 


(ienerals   Smallwood   aiul    Forman    with    the    .Mar\land  aiul  New 
liti;i   were   to   follow   the   ( )kl  York  road  iititil  a  convenient 


erse\'   mi 


md 


rear 


o[)portumty  shouul  brm^^  tliem  upon  tlu;  extreme  ri^^lit  tian 
of  the  enemy. 

Washington  accompanied  .Sullivan's  division,  A  simplification  of 
tlie  subsequent  movements,  by  parts,  will  aid  iti  reconciling^  conflictini^ 
statements.     No   attempt  to   reconcile  reports  exactly  would  aid   in 


the  matter  ;  as  m 


all 


liutnan   exnenen 


ce  a  diversitv  of  statement,  ac- 


cordinj;  to  the  st.itulpoint  of  observation,  is   invariable,  aiul    truth   is 
fouiul  in  the  m.iin  features  of  the  coiiibined  reports. 

Genera/  Conivay  led  the  way  into  the  town,  ami  attacked  the  British 
pickets  who  were  stationed  north,  and  not  very  far  from  the  AlU;n 


■:  h  -1 


''SNi 


I'i 


#s 


388 


orKRATIONS    M-\U    I'l  II I  AI  >!  I  I'll  I  A. 


[1777. 


House.      riiis  adv.iiKC   picket  i^iuucl  w.is  proinptl)'  supported   by  the 
Britisli  IiL,dit  infanlrw 

(rciural  Siil/iraii  l)ri)u;;lit  up  liis  tiivi^ioii  next,  and  crowded  tlio 
t-Micniy  besond  the  Allen  House. 

T/ic  I'ortitt/i  Ihltish  ;•<;:,' ////,■;//,  Colonel  Mus;^rra\e,  ino\ed  up  to  the 
.support  of  tile  lij^hl  infantrv  ,is  indicated  on  the  map;  and  acconliny 
to  liis  report,  fiiutiii;.^  that  the  po-^itioii  was  alread)' occupied  by  .Xnieri- 
can  troops  in  force,  he  n-tired  down  the  main  street  fi^jhtinL;.  and  took 
iii-^  st.md  e.ist  of  the  >treet  at  the  C'lunv  Mouse,  a  stoiu;  buildin;^  of 
considend)le  stren_L,^th  on  a  crownin;^"  site.  I'p  to  this  tinu;  nothin;^ 
had  been  heartl  from  the  corps  of  Armstron^r  oilirrene;  and  the  dis- 
position t)f  the  centre  had  to  i)e  ni.ule  independently  of  their  coopera- 
tion, antl  was  modi  tied  to  suit  the  state  of  faets. 

Coni^uiywA^  thrown  t)ut  to  the  riLjht,  on  the  slopi'  west  of  tlie  town, 
to  i)rotect  that  llank  while  Sulliv.m  and  Xa->h  could  sweep  on  in  a  line, 
also  west  of  the  street,  tow.irds  the  M,irket-house.  Tile  extreme 
athance  of  Sullivan  is  noted  on  thi:  map,  to  be  consiiiered  irrespective- 
of  interveiiiu;^^  incidents  in  point  of  time,  >o  as  to  tii--po.-.e  of  the  firce 
division  by  divi>ion.  and  a\>)id  confusion. 

l]'(JVi  as  ordered  by  Sulliv.m  to  take  the  slope  (.is  (ireene  did 
not  occup,  :)is  desij^nated  positicjn  there)  east  from  the  m.uii  street, 
and  his  e.xtjeme  advance  is  also  noted  ;  althoui^h  he  w.is  f  )r  .1  time 
lecalle.l  di:rin;j;  the  firiiv^  at  the  Chew  ilouse.  One  regiment  from 
Wayne's  bri^'.ide,  and  one  'Vom  SuIIiv.ui'silivision,  howi;ver,  were  also 
placvvl  wivU  Con\va\' to  protect'  the  rii^ht  flank,  a^the  p;otr,icted  delay 
of  .Armstrong-  enchuv^ered  the  advance.  The  whole  movement 
throuL;h  a  narrow  town  was  one  of  [jeculi.ir  ex[)osure.  The  troojjs  of 
Sullivan  and  Wayne  passetl  on  "  abreast,"  accordinij  to  the  report  of 
tlic  former  officer.  Meanwhile,  Mirsgrave  on  liis  retreat,  had  thrown 
six  companies  of  the  Fortieth  re;^iment  into  the  Chew  House,  had 
barricaded  the  window,  refused  to  surrender  on  dem.ind,  and  kept  up 
a  vi,L;orous  fire  u[)on  the  American  troops  near  b\' ;  while  Sulliv.in 
says  that  "  his  own  adv.ince.  which  had  swept  pa>t  the  Chow  I  louse, 
was  resisted  constantly  at  every  fence,  wall,  ditch,  and  hedge."  Ad- 
ditional delay  occurred  from  tearing  up  fences  for  the  passage  of 
horses  and  artillery. 

Maxi^'cll  was  next  brought  forw.ird  with  Colonel  Knox,  and  two 
guns,  to  attempt  the  rcLluction  of  the  Chew  House.  Musgravc  suc- 
cessfully resisted  this  attack,  and  kept  them  from  advance  to  suppoit 
the  other  troops  for  a  full  hour  or  more. 


"777  J 


OI'Kk.Vl  IDNS    NKAk    I'llll.ADKI.rill  \. 


^■^9 


Upon  tlic  arrivdl of  M,ix:^'cll,  W.iym-,  temporarily  recalled  as  before 
stated,  a;4.iiii  moved  to  the  fro.it,  makin;_j(V/  tlic  /(/'/a common  advanci- 
with  that  of  Sullivan  which  was  on  the  /•/>///  of  the  town. 

More  than  ai.  luMir  certainly  had  passed;  the  division  commanders 
dirferiiiL^,  as  their  minds  were  differently  impressed,  when  Greene  xvas 
luiirti  froiii. 

His  division  shared  the  misai)prehension  which  attended  the  ilis 
chart^e  of  artillery  at  the  C'hew  House,  as  the  deepeniivj;  fo.;'  already 
confused  siL;lu  and  confounded  sound,  (ieneral  Stephens  division 
moved  out  of  column,  beiiiLj  (jii  the  west  side  of  the  Lime-kiln  road, 
without  waitinj^  fjr  orders  frcjm  (ieiier.d  (ireene,  followed  the  noise  of 
battle,  and  api)ron.'hed  the  vilhiL^e  ju-^t  south  of  the  Chew  House. 
I  fere,  unforlun  itel)',  he  struck  the  rear  ot  Wayne's  bri;^ade,  and  mulu  d 
l(.)ss  w.is  incurred  bv  each  mi^takin;j[  the  other  ftr  an  enemy;  and 
tluir  part  in  the  action  was  ])raclieally  terminated.  .V-;  G'eene  ad 
vanced  on  ilu-  east  side  of  the  l.ime-kiln  road,  and  bore  tow.ird  the 
Market-hou>e,  he  was  obli;4ed  to  counterm.irch  and  take  ground  to 
the  ri;_jht,  westward,  to  avoiil  the  extension  of  the  British  ri;_;ht  wiiiLj, 
which  w.is  alreail)'  adxMiiciiv^  to  en\'elo[)  the  .\nierican  troop-..  He 
cleared  his  division,  passed  inside  of  the  enemy,  iind  with  .Scott's  and 
Muhlenber'^'s  brigades  approached  the  Market-house.  C'olonel  Mat- 
thews, of  N'irginia.  who  led  the  .ulvance.  had  skirmished  all  the  way 
from  Lucan's  Mill,  and  hail  taken  a  det.ichment  of  light  infantry 
prisoners.  It  will  be  seen  by  another  reference  to  the  map.  that 
Washington,  .Sullivan,  and  Greene,  wcxc  now  converging  upon  the 
supposed  British  centre,  and  that  their  action  was  in  accordance  with 
the  original  plan  of  attack,  cripjjled  in  its  e.Kccution  b_v  the  absence  of 


the  columns  which    shoul 


lia\e  been  at  worl 


ipon  the  Brili>h  flanks 
and  rear,  and  embarrassed  by  variou.s  mcidents  which  had  placed  the 


CO  mm 


iiuls  of  Maxwell,  Stephen, 


an 


d  W 


lyne  out  of  close  ctjinmuni 


cation,  ami  also  b\-  the  dense  fog  which   left  the  reserve  in  utter  con- 


fu 


sion  as  to  tlu'  positions  of  the  troops  i 


n  ad 


vance. 


It  wa< 


nowever, 


unitetl  m  the  resistance,  when 


W^ 


ishiULjton  oiLiered  the  retreat 


Sul- 


i\an's  division  reall>'  had  extra  assignment  of  duty  ;  expended  all  its 
unniunition,  and  began  to  teel  the  ])ressure  of  the  British  left  as  it 
swept  along  their  flank,  while  also  attacking  their  front.     His  twoaids- 


le-camp, 


M. 


jors  -Sherbourue  and  White  weie  killed,  as  well  as  Gei 


eral  Nash,  and  the  column  gave  back,  not  a  little  disturbed  in  its  f  )r- 
mation  by  exaggerated  rumors  of  losses  elsewhere.  Colonel  Matthews 
also  was  soon  enveloped  ;  a  portion  of  his  men  were  captured  and  his 


■  ,''»i 


'VW 


t?*;. 


ll) 


300 


(•I'lKA  iiDN's  ni;ak  mil  \i»i:i  nil  \. 


1777 


pri-<()iK?rs  WL'iv  ri"^ciicil.      rijcretre.it  brcainc  <,^.'iut.i1.  .iml  thr  aitivily 
ol  a  powerful  ,iiul  .iliiiD^t  invisible  enemy  (|uickeiU'(l  that  retreat. 

Till-  arlilliMy  was  hrmiLjlit  off  s.ifely  .iiid  the  troops  of  W.iyne  .md 
(ireeiie  covered  tin-  forces  as  they  retired  lliroii;^h  town  antl  In-  the 
•1  .inie-kiln  r",i(l. 

'l"hc  conduct  of  deni-'  .1  .Stephen  was  submitted  to  a  militarj' 
Court  .111(1  he  w.is  dismissed  on  the  charije  of  intoxication.  The  col- 
lision of  his  division  with  tin-  brij^Mde  of  Wayne  does  not  nectss.irily 
involve  his  cinsure,  as  \\'.i\-ne  w.is  in  an  un,inticii).ited  position  by 
reason  of  tln'  delay  in  the  .uriv.il  of  the  left  u  in;^. 

(iener.d  (ireene's  tardiness  w.is  incident  ti>  tin-  loii-er  route  taken, 
the  check  .it  1  .ucm's  Mill,  ,ind  the  n.it  lue  of  the  country  :  .md  ])i)-;silily 
by  the  sudden  action  of  Stephen  in  .ibrupt  ly  le.iviui;  his  cuniin.ind. 
( leneral  McDoie^.dl  shared  the  retre.it.  but  L;aiued  no  l.iurels.  (ieii- 
eral  .\rmstron;j;  st.ite.s  in  liis  letters  to  (jener.il  (i.itesaud  others,  th.it 
•'  we  were  c.muon.idinLj  from  the  hcii^jhts  on  e.ich  side  of  the  \\'i-.-.,i- 
hickon."  "  w.is  cilled  to  join  the  (iener.il  "  "  wc  proceeded  some  three 
miles,  directed  by  .1  si'  >\v  tire  ot  ciniinn,  until  wi'  tell  in  u  ith  a  siipirior 
bod\'  (if  the  enemy,  with  whom  we  eiv^.e^ed  .ibout  tlree-(pi,irters  of 
an  hour,  but  thrir  ;-;r.ipe  shot  .md  ball  soon  intimid.itetl  .uid  obli;^eil  us 
to  retre.U.  or  r.ither  file  ot'l',"  "  loss  not  (piite  twenty." 

The  .affair  .it  the  Chew  House  w.is.i  m.iteri.il  issue  in  the  b.ittle. 
onl\'  .IS  it  kept  troops  to  the  rear;  ,ind  .1  prompt  concert  of  .action  on 
the  p.irt  of  .ill  the  trmips  on  duty,  .iccordiiij^  to  the  ori;_;iu.il  order  ot 
the  d.iy,  wouUl  probably  liave  re.ilized  success,  without  tlu:  .aid  of  Ma.\- 
NvcH's  eomm.ind.  It  w.is  a  di\ '.rsiDn.  v.hieh  h.ul  its  chie(  import. mce 
throUL;h  tiie  erroneous  impressions  it  Lj.ive  of  tlie  positions  of  the  con- 
tendiii;.;  armies. 

It  is  not  a  correct  stateinent  that  the  wliole  army  lialtcd,  to  its 
prejudice.  "  r.ither  than  leave  a  fort  in  its  rear." 

Colonel  Knox  reported  that  "  the  action  lasted  two  hours  and 
forty  minutes,  bv  his  watch;"  and  this  estimate  is  confirmed  by 
other  authority. 

The  British  .army  without  doubt  was  seriously  cmb.urassetl,  if  not 
p.irtially  tiisordered  by  the  sudilennessand  persistency  of  the  advance, 
and  was  satisfied  with  the  result. 

Washini^ton  rei;  lined  Metiichen  Hill  ;  and  Gener.d  Howe  returned 
to  Philadelphia. 

The  British  casu.diies  were  reporteil  ,it  five  hundred  and  thirty- 
hve,  inclutlini;  Ciener.il  A<3qiew  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Bird. 


I777-I 


iiiM;K.\rit»N,s  N'FAii  i'iiii,\iii;i,i'iii A. 


39  > 


The  Amvric.iM  c.i-^iialtii's  were  six  Inindri'd  imd  ^cviMUy-tlircc, 
hi'^iili's  prisoners,  t-stiniatcd  at  four  hundred,  and  iiiaiu'  iiiissiii<^,  some 
of  whom  afterwards  retrained  camj). 

Wasliiii^ton's  officers  had  been  divided  in  opiniim  as  to  the 
|)rudenc-e  of  this  attack  until  .uKlilioiial  troops  could  be  procured  ; 
but  there  are  few  operations  of  tin:  war  that  show  ijreater  skill  in 
dcsii^n,  and  the  ease  with  wliieli  a  victory  almost  achieved  is  more 
readily  lost,  than  the  li.ittle  of  (icrni.intown. 

Noli:,  {/'c'ui/'i  liiiti.'ii.)  Dr.  Alfred  «'  I.niiilnliii,  cil  l'liil.i(l(l|ilii,i,  i-^irtlully 
iU'>(  1  :lii''l  ilu'  H.iillc  111  (ifiniaiitou  II  in  .1  1  'i.iiii'iiiLi.il  .uMicss,  since  inililislicd,  Xul.  I, 
I'eim.  Ilisl  M.I.U.,  |i|).  3(>S-4oj,  ;iMil  to  lliis  1'  I),  Sidik',  tXi|.,  Ijluuinn  of  the  I'tiin. 
llisi.  Sue.,  :ils()  resiileiil  of  tierni;iiUou  11  :nul  l.iliiiliai  \\'\\\\  llic  (nunln,  li:i'.  ^iilded 
v.ilii.dile  notes  The  Aiillioi  ,it'eoin|i.iniril  Mi.  Sione  to  the  eliii  I  loe.dilii  s  k  h  1  h  i|  lo 
in  the  ni.n.. 

rile  te\t,  on  \y.\\H'  .T-S,  wonid  nioie  nndei  si  oidinyly  ii'ad  .is  lo!h;v..s:  •'  \\'.i\ne  vv;is 
oidi-recl  liy  Snlliv.m  lo  l;ike  the  slope  last  tioin  the  in.iiii  stieet,  uliieh  wonId  \r,\\  iiim 
in  line  Milli  ilie  li.nlit  of  (jieeni's  .idv.iiicc."  I'liietieMJly,  the  nioMineuis  ol  (iieene  mikI 
.\nnsiioiit;  well.'  indelu  iideni  ;  liee.uise  the  connliy  w.is  so  ioui;li  ih.il  lliey  c  onld  not 
unite  01  iidvance  with  the  ecnler  eohinin  as  a  coin|iarl  li.ittle-liont  It  \vas  enoimh  if 
lliey  enifaj^ed  and  liehl  the  allention  of  the  opposiiiif  Miitish  coiiinianijs  i'lie  liulit  ot 
(iieene  and  the  left  of  Aiinstrontf  woidd  thiicby  ^ivc  lo  the  eenler  (cihinni  all  the 
support  of  real  assoi  i.ition  in  line  ol  battle  ;  that  is,  the  wliole  illeinv  woidd  he  eiii;ai;i:il 
on  the  origin. d  b.itlle  plan.  A inistron,!.;  seems  to  ha\e  .ilvanied  as  rapidly  as 
expected,  but '.lid  not  cross  the  Wissahieken,  neither  did  hepie\-ent  the  Hiitish  lill 
w'iWii,  Iroin  "turnin.i;  Iront  to  the  vill.it;e."  lleiKc,  the  reijiiiienl  tioin  Waviie's  brigade 
and  one  fiuni  Sidliv.m's  division  y\t.  38S1,  vvhich  were  plaied  \viih('iunva\  on  tlie 
ri.uhl  II. mk  ii>  the  advance,  were  iiidi.spensable  lo  the  security  of  tli.il  llaiik.  as  it  met 
increasinii;  resistanee  from  the  Hritish  line.  The  convciuence  ol  llie  Aniei  ic  an  forces 
toward  the  .Market  Ik)nse,  brought  Cireene  and  Wayne  into  (lose  i  oneert  of  action, 
anil  AnnslroiiH  made  due  ellort  lo  reach  the  actual  final  field  of  ik''isi\e  action. 
Sullivan,  .'\rnistron,i;,  Nash  and  ("onwav  wore  therelore  ne.ir  School  House  l.ane  iii)on 
the  (vest  of  town,  while  (Jreene  was  enterinu;  on  the  east.  'I'lie  brief  halt  of  Wayne 
at  the  lirinjr  before  the  ("hew  House  \vas  probablv  common  to  all  troops  be\(ind  it, 
until  its  occupation  aud  the  lirin.u  were  found  to  be  immaterial  faclois  in  the  rial 
issue,  (jteene's  delay  was  because  lie  met  the  enemv  before  he  reached  laicans  .Mill, 
tile  objective  of  his  proposed  advance;  the  Hritish  troops  haviiiu:  advanced  diiiim;  the 
niKht.  (Jeiieral  (Irey,  followed  by  General  .\i{new,  iindonbledly  moved  by  the  right 
liiiik  into  the  main  street,  and  thus  followed  up  the  retre.il  of  Siillivaii.  (.General 
A,t(new  was  shot  while  ridin.ij  at  the  liead  of  his  column  in  this  street. 


^V.^ 


'K. 


'ml 


NiilE.  \Fotnth  /■'.Jitioii.)  Dr.  Lambdin  notes  the  fact  that  the  thirteen  colonies 
were  related  to  this  action.  "New  Hampshire  ijave  Sullivan:  Massachusetts,  Knox  : 
Rhoile  Island,  Oreene;  New  York,  McDoii.iiall  ;  New  jersey.  Stiiiini;  and  Wither 
jipoon  ;  Pennsylvania,  Wayne;  Maryland,  Smallwood  ;  \'iri,'inia,  .Midilenbeij^  and 
Matllicws  ;  .North  Carolina,  Nash ;  South  Cirolina,  John  I. aureus  and  Ciiarles  Coles- 
worth  Pinckney  ;  Georgia,  Mcintosh  ;  Delaware  and  Connecticut,  each  a  regiment." 


Wm^' 


I 

I 


ii  ! 


CHAI'TI-.R  LII. 

OFERATIONS   NEAR  rilll.AI  )i:i,l'l  II  A.     MINOR  MKNTION.     CLOSE    OF 

CA.M1'A1(;N,    1777. 

Till",  li.ittic  of  (iciin.mt()"ii  uhicli  (K'lii.mstratt'd  the  tireless 
activil}'  ami  luive  uf  Wasliin^ton,  incited  foolish  expectations 
that  ho  wmiUl  soon  rescue  Pliiladelphia  from  British  control.  When- 
ever the  promise  of  success  enlivened  the  public  s[)irits,  there  was  an 
instant  temlency  to  over-estiinatc  the  value  of  mere  courage  as  aijainst 
thorougli  discipline.  Nothing  seemed  too  ex.icting  at  such  times  ; 
and  Congress  li.id  so  much  sympathy  w  ith  clamorous  aspirants  for 
office,  that  the  life  of  Washington  is  more  memorable  for  his  calm 
faitii  in  ultimate  results  and  the  dignitj'  of  his  contempt  for  jealousy 
and  intrii^ue,  from  whatever  source  it  eman.ited,  than  for  almost  any 
other  qualit)'. 

The  consciousness  of  unselfish  devotion  to  duty  bore  him  up, 
when  the  spirit  of  mere  ambition  would  have  driven  many  leaders 
toward  a  dict.itors))ip,  or  tre.i.son.  'Die  tidings  of  the  surrender  uf 
Burgoyne  reached  him  on  the  eighteenth  of  October,  and  no  one  in 
Am;:rica  more  cordially  congratulated  General  Gates  and  the  North- 
ern army,  upon  the  result.  The  secondary  fruits  of  the  personal 
lionors  bestowed  upon  that  officer  were  however  prejudicial  to  army 
discipline  ;  for  they  put  the  impressive  result  of  that  campaign  in  con- 
trast with  the  slow,  so-called  "  Fabian  policy,"  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief.  This  spirit  of  e.xacting  criticism,  and  laudation  of  conspicuous 
deeds,  which  became  so  earnest  during  the  winter  of  1777-8  began  to 
declare  its  temper  as  soon  as  it  was  understood  that  Washington 
only  ahnost  defeated  llowe  at  Gcrmantoun.  The  thanks  for  that 
which  was  skillfully  devised,  soon  cooled  because  the  plan  failed  of 
complete  fruition. 

That  battle,  however,  satisfied  the  British  garrison  of  Philadelphia 


m 

'■\  m 

*| 

^i 

iS;? 


<  I  ' 


I  I 


: 


s 


•  1 


17771 


OPERATIONS   NEAR   rillLADRLPIIIA. 


393 


with  immediato  field  service.  The  next  matter  of  importance  was  to 
obtain  control  of  the  navigable  river  which  ran  past  the  post.  Its 
channel  was  obstructed  ;  and  the  American  autiioritics  regarded  those 
obstructions  as  substantially  complete. 

In  a  necessary  notice  of  the  closin;^r  events  of  1777,  the  reduction 
of  those  posts,  and  the  movements  of  the  army  until  it  went  into 
winter  quarters  at  Valley  Forge,  follow  in  natural  order. 

At  Rillingsport  in  New  Jersey  (By'Ii'iS^i*-"^  Point)  chciaux  de  frisc 
obstructed  the  channel  of  the  Delaware.  Just  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Schujlkill,  ami  within  cannon  range,  was  Mud  Island,  upon  which 
Fort  Mifflin  had  been  built.  Its  defenses  were  chiefly  directed 
toward  the  approach  from  the  Delaware  below  ;  and  the  rear  was 
;)rovi(led  with  only  a  stockade  and  ditch,  with  two  block  houses  of 
comparatively  little  strength. 

On  the  opposite  shore,  known  as  Red  Bank,  Fort  Mercer  was 
located  ;  and  this  also  was  mainly  designed  for  ri\er  defense.  The 
southern  portion  was  separated  from  the  northern  section  by  stout 
palisades,  a  ditch,  and  a  rampart,  so  as  to  have  considerable  strength  , 
but  the  activity  of  Monseur  Uuplessis.  engineer  in  charge,  had  been 
unequal  to  the  complete  protection  of  the  larger  area,  at  the  time 
when  the  British  demonstration  was  made  for  its  capture.  Chevaux 
de  frise  had  also  been  placed  in  the  channel  between  Red  bank  and 
Mud  Island;  and  several  galle\'s  and  floating  batteries,  under  the 
direction  of  Commander  llazlewood,  were  located  in  the  stream  for 
cooperation  in  defense. 

The  acquisition  of  these  posts,  and  the  removal  of  all  obstruction/i 
to  the  navigation  of  the  river,  had  been  resolved  upon  by  General 
Ilowe  ;  and  the  arrival  of  Adiniral  Lord  Howe's  fleet  off  New  Castle, 
about  the  sixth  of  October,  incr^  'sed  the  urgency  of  a  movement  to 
secure  free  communication  between  that  fleet  and  the  city. 

Washington  was  as  decided  in  his  purpose  to  maintain  these  posts. 
His  position  in  tlv  country  exercised  a  marked  restraint  upon  su[)plies 
for  the  garrison  of  Phikulelphia,  and  his  control  of  the  river  kept  up 
easy  communication  with  New  Jersey. 

Colonel  Chi  istopher  Greene,  already  noticed  for  courage  at  Bunker 
Hill  and  in  Arnold's  expediti(in  to  bee.  was  assigned  to  the  defense 

of  Fort  Mercer,  with  a  detachment  of  troo[)s  from  Rhode  Island,  his 
native  State.  Lieutenant- colonel  Smith  of  Baltimore,  with  ]\Iaryland 
troops,  was  stationed  at  P'ort  Mifflin.  These  garrisons  were  feeble  in 
numbers,  and  well  worn  by  extra   duty  ;  but  Washington  reinforced 


«"    A 


m 


•HI 

■•  ill 


394 


(irKKATioxs  m;ar  r'liii.AnF.i.riiiA. 


['777 


ii     I 


ll'i^i 


^, 


them  with  Contini-'ital  troops,  so  th.it  each  had  a  complement  of  four 
hundred  men.  A  detail  from  Aivjji-H's  Rliodc  Island  roj:;iment  was 
sent  to  Foit  Mercer,  and  a  portion  of  Greene's  Virginia  regiment 
joined  the  garrison  of  Fort  Mifflin. 

The  land  at  the  moutli  of  the  Sciuiylkill  was  marshy,  leaving  but 
two  points  sufficiently  solid  fir  batteries  ;  and  these  General  Howe 
occupied.  Two  light  redoubts  were  then  thrown  up  on  the  northern 
part  of  Mud  Island,  which  was  low  and  grown  with  reeds,  as  an  offset 
to  these  batteries. 

The  first  demonstration  in  force  was  made  against  Fort  Mercer, 
rhe  grenadier  regiments  of  Dono]),  Minnigerode,  and  Linsing,  Win- 
bach's  regiment  of  the  line,  antl  the  infantry  chasseurs,  all  Hessian, 
having  their  own  guns.  ;■/:.  eight  three  pounders  and  two  British 
howitzers,  were  detailed  to  this  attack  ;  while  the  naval  f  )rces  of 
.•\dniiral  Howe  were  relied  upon  to  act  in  concert  with  new  batteries 
then  being  erected  on  Province  Island,  opposit'.-  I'\)rt  Mifflin,  on  the 
Pennsylvania  shore. 

On  the  first  of  Octt>ber,  Colonel  Sterling  crossetl  the  river,  and 
without  serious  opposition  occupied  Hillingsport  ;  antl  the  Roebuck 
frigate  broke  through  the  i/h':vii/.v  dc  /rise  at  that  point,  making  a 
()assage  wide  enougli  ti>  admit  larger  ships. 

Colonel  Donop  crossed  Cooper's  I'^erry,  at  Philadelphia,  on  the 
twenty-first  of  October,  was  interrupted  by  skirmishing  parties  at 
Timber  creek,  but  earh'  on  the  foUowinii  morninLT  suddcnlv  emertied 
from  the  woods  and  demanded  of  the  garrison  the  immediate  sur- 
render of  the  post. 

U[ion  recei\'ing  an  uneijuivocal  defiance,  he  organized  two  assaulting 
columns  f>r  simultaneous  advance  .against  the  north  and  south  faces 
of  the  fort.  The  garrison  being  too  few  in  numbers  to  oppose  his 
whole  force,  in  the  unfinished  state  of  the  exterior  works,  retired  to 
the  interior  defenses  :  occupying  also  a  curtain  of  the  old  works,  which 
affoided  an  enfilading  fire  upon  any  storming  ]iarty  who  should  attempt 
th-.:;  stock. ule.  The  w  ithdrrtwal  of  the  garrison  w.is  mistaken  for  want 
of  confidence  in  resistance  ;  and  the  assault  w.is  made  with  spirit  and 
a  brilliant  dash,  as  if  success  were  alread\'  as>ured. 

That  resistance  was  overwhelming,  incessant,  and  deadly.  Colo- 
nel Donop  fell  mortally  woundetl,  ami  nc.ir  him  Lieuten.mt-colonel 
Minnigerotle.  The  c.isualties  of  the  assailants  exceeded  four  hundred. 
being  one-third  of  their  number.  Tiie  l.ist  attempt  was  made  at  the 
escarpment  near  the  river,  which  exposed  the  column  to  fire  from  the 


1777] 


OPERA  IKtS'S    NKAR    rilll.ADII.l'1 1 1.\. 


395 


galleys;  and  in  less  than   an   hour  from  the  first  attack,  the  Hessiaiie 
were  in  retreat. 

The   British  ships   accomplished   nothing.     The  Augusta  64,  and 
the  Merlin,  frigate,  grounded  ;  and  the  following  day  the  former  took 
fire  from  a  hot  shot  and   blew  up  before  her  whole  crew  could  escape 
while  the  Merlin  was  burnt  to  prevent  her  capture. 

The  American  casualties  were  fourteen  killed  and  twenty-one 
wounded. 

Colonel  Donop  was  carefully  attended  by  Major  Fleury,  a  I'rcnch 
engineer  in  the  American  service,  and  his  burial  place  at  the  south 
end  of  the  old  works  is  ever  an  object  of  interest  to  visitors. 

Colonel  Greene,  Lieutenant-colonel  Smith,  ami  Commodore  Hazle- 
wood  received  testimonials  from  Congress  for  "  gallant  conduct." 

During  the  action,  the  batteries  at  the  mmith  of  the  Schuylkill 
directed  their  fire  u[)on  Fort  Mifflin  ;   but  with  slight  result. 

On  the  tenth  of  November,  a  deliberate  attempt  upon  that  fort 
resulted  in  its  capture.  I'our  thirty-two  pounder  guns  were  withdrawn 
from  the  .Somerset  ;  six  twent\'-four  pounders  from  the  Kagle,  and 
these,  with  one  tiiirteen  inch  mortar,  were  added  to  the  works  which 
had  been  erected  on  Province  Island,  to  bring  a  more  direct  fire  upon 
the  fort  than  ct>uld  be  secured  from  the  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the 
.Schuylkill.  The  following  ships,  some  of  which  are  familiar  fvom  their 
services  at  Boston,  Quebec,  and  New  York,  took  part  in  the  action. 
T7'r..  the  Somerset,  68,  the  Isis,  50,  the  Roebuck,  44,  the  Pearl,  •;:;,  the 
Liverpool,  frigate,  the  Cornwallis.  galley,  and  several  smaller  vessels. 
The  Vigilant,  16,  ami  a  hulk  of  light  draft,  carrying  three  eighteen 
pounders,  took  a  position  in  the  channel  between  Province  Island  and 
the  fort,  and   sharp-shooters   from  their  tops  picked  off  the  gunners 


wi 


th 


;reat   precision. 


Commodore  Hazlewood   was   urged   to  assail 


them,  hut  so  utterly  failed  to  cooperate  with  the  garrison,  as  to  more 
than  balance  his  good  conduct  before  Red  Hank.  Lieutenant-colonel 
Smith,  wounded  early  in  the  action,  was  removed  to  Fort  Mercer. 
Major  Thayer  succeeded  to  the  command.  Major  Fleury,  the  en- 
gineer who  planned  the  works,  was  also  wounded  ;  and  after  a  loss  of 
two  hundred  and  fift\-  men,  the  remnant  of  the  garrison,  on  the  night 
of  the  fifteenth,  retired  to  I-"ort  .Mercer. 

The  Britis'-  loss  was  thirt(,'en  killed  and  twenty-four  wounded. 
At  dawn  of  the  sixteenth,  the  grenadiers  of  the  Royal  Guards  occu- 
pied the  island. 

During  the  movements  preparatory  to  this  attack,  General  Wash- 


fi 


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J»,j 


^.^/^-*!^* 


^^ 


^^ 


n 


:<:i^i 


9 


i 


OI'I.KAI  I'INS    NKAK    I'l  II  I.AI'I.I  .I'l  1 1  A. 


1777 


|||"I'>11    ilK  ii|( 


(  ii'lii'i.il    V  .11  liuill 


111. II 


K.  ,1   15. 111.  ;    ,111.1  (i.  ii'i.il 


l)ii;,ii|.-  to  f.ik-  |)'),t  .it  \Vf<'.(ll)iiry, 
Ko   (lii'i  ti-il  ti)  colli.cl  :i  1 


nl  III. HI    'AM  >    .1 


Ill.lllN'    111    t  III 


.\i\V   JiT'.iy 


llllllt  I.I    .1       I 


)'  I  ,  .lllli      I'l 


r  tin:    .mil-  |jiir|)i)Sc 


>iil 


l|l>   .it  I  'lllpl      VV.l  >     IllIM 
sllol  I    . 


1)V    till'    I'l  I'll'    '  "    lili'l    iil'i'll 


till-    .\i  w  J"-i  .(  y 


III  W.i  .liiir'tiin'-,    11  j)' tit   <»l    till  .  .u  til  111    111  (  ''(ii:;ri'  .  .,  In-  s.iy 


111 


•  Irfi 


(liti  use    Ulll     .1 


l\\.i\'  ■,    ii'llii  I    til'-    lii:.;li<.'st    1 


luiinr   iiijuii    1  111-   uIIk  ir  .  aiii 


iiiiii    111    till-   ".ini  iKii. 


i'hr    wniki   wric  iiitinly   1)1. il    ilo'.vii  ;   <;v<:ry 
li  iiiDiiiit  1(1,  aiiil   DIP'  111    tin-  iiii-m\''-^    .lii|' •  < '"'ii' 
tli.it     ,1|.-    tlni'A    ■M-ii  nil- ,  mill  til'-    toll    .mil  l;iil' (1    iiii'ii  Uji'in 


mick:  1)1    (   iiiiinii   w  A  ■■  I 


-ii  I    IK     II 


ihi-  pi  itlmiii-,,  liKiii  lit  T  t>)|)s,  IxIdK'  till  >•  ijnitti  il  ill-  I 


<  (11 


tl),-    ,  rilitriiitli,  <  II  iiir.il  (iDiinv.ilii-.    l.tmliil    ,it    Uilliii;',  ijiDit.    m 


1)111  .iltli'.ii"li  ( I. 


(  l<l|i|,ll    W.l  lillll'lull 


:lll   <  ji-111'..ll  '  in-rlii-  In  t.iki: 


(  iiiiitii.i'iii    111 


till-       llUMl),      III 


.\iu'    hi  iiy  ,tiiil 


I  iii-cK    II 


i  1   1)1  u'.iri  -.  >,  tilt: 


(|i|l||  illst  l.ll  lull      w.l'      ■'' 

w'orU'i  on  liH  .i|)])ri  i.n  li 


|.iiiniil.il)k-    tli.il    tllr    '.Miri.iiil    .ih.iinloiliil    the 


Tllf    /\!lli|'UMII  .,    llll,ll)|i-    t  o     S.lVC 

,  vrt_  fill-  to  t  In  111  111. 11  I  iloiu  i-iln 


t  lirir  :.',.illfy  ,  .iiiil  lit  lii:r  .iniifil  vi:i- 
I'ljiiit  ;  .iinl  the  Hiiliili  lori.;t:s  li.ul 


at  1,1  it  riiiiovi 


ij  the  ol)  ,t  nit  1  ioii  1  ol  I  III-   I  Jil.r.v.m 


criiici:  I)   III. 1(1 


ki  I 


)|)i  r,ilioii  .  oil  till-  I  >i  l.iv.'.ii-i 


1,-   I1,  till-   111,11)"  I'liil.uli-lplii.i  .ukI  Vii.iuity,"  .1111 


I  )iiiiii:.;    tliii  iiiiiv<:iii.  lit,  III'-  Miii|iiii  tl. 
Iiv  (jrt.-tMur,  uitli  ,1  tlit.K  liiiii  lit  ol  tioo])-,  ( 


I., I  i',iyi  ttf  WA-,  intrusted 
iiisi  >tiii'.'  t,r  tl  11  li'.'lit  liorsi;, 


oiu;  liitndrfil  .111(1  lil't>'  iilli-iiit  II  ,iiii!  .1  \<-\\   unlit  1,1, 

(]oloiul-.  AriiLiml    ami  I  ..luiimy  .iiid    ill':   (^lifV.i'n 


(-r    Diipli  V.I  ,  ,'iiii 


'  xillMt    \Vi|(-   .ll  -.')    W  It  il  lllMl. 

ri-,ir  of  the  ,11  my  oi  <  ]oriu\.illis,  he  h  11  111  a  i 
'y  111(11    h.iviii;;    ,ii  lili(-i)',  ,i! 


While  oil  ,1   uoul  towanl  Kid  I5,iiik  111  lln; 
t  li  ,1  I  il   ,  .i.iii  Ion  1:  ol  t  liree 


iiiiiiin-ti   ,111(1    III 


ii|    drove 


t  III  Ml    I), It  I.  n|t 


th.-ir   aippoit    .      .\ltir   -,(-V(-i.il  11. mow    (•■.t.ipcT  he  eludi-d  pui-iuil,  ,mii 

/  i  {.iddoiiHeld,  Willi  .1  lov,  ol    t>iily  oik;    hi, ill 


J' 


<  /i-lliT.ll    (  i|-.i-|li-    ,7 


,illc(|  .md  tIX    wouik 


h,i.      ()ii  the    lii-.l  ol    l)oct:i!ll)ei-  he    w.i-,  ,1 


-,i|._||ie-(l 


the    toiiiiii.nK 


1    oi     the    divi-^ioii     lell    v.ie.uil     by    the     dihiili  v-,.il    ol 


St(-|ili(-ii. 


At  the  s.iiiie  time  lt)ur  .ri-iii-r.il  oCficers  ol'  W,idiin|4toirs  army, 
a'jaiiist  i;levei),  voted  to  t,ike  adv,int.i;4e  of  tin-  alt^eiicx-  ol  Geiier.d 
Cornwallis  from  I'liil.ideipiiia  to  attack  Cieiier.d  Howe. 

'J//r  Aiiirriiiin  army  h.id  remained  iie,ir  I'erkioiny  creek  until  kite 
in  ()(  toiler,  when  it  advaiict^tl  to  White  .M.irhh.  <ii-iit:r,il  V.iinum's 
khode-  Isl.iiid  hri;.',ade  twelve  hundrfd  slron;.;,  .iiid  about  a  tlious,ind 
additioii.il    troops    from    I'eiiiisylv.iiii.i,   M.iryl.ind,   ,ind    Vii;.iim.i   li.uJ 


m 


"0' 

•3 

VSi' 

?/S^ 

-: 

'  1 '  o 

»^ 

IS) 

>^  y 

^ 


t .  ;;.3^ 


I?-  :.. 


;i!)(; 


' 


I    •  ; 


I  I 


i    I 


■J 


1777-1  filM.lvAl  IONS   .\i:.\l<    I'llll   NDI.I.IIII  \.  397 

arrived.  ricncr.iK  (l.itrs  ;iii(I  I'litn.ini  un.ulvi^cdl}'  rclaiiicd  tr<iiii)s  foi 
their  scini-in(lL'i)(;iidrnt.  oiniiiaiid  . ;  and  tin;  r.iriiirr  only  ^'■fud;_;ini,dy 
scut  such  as  were  pert  inptorily  ordered,  lie  li.id  already  t,d-:eii  active 
pari  ii)  ninveineiits  wliiili  relli.'Cled  iip'iii  \V.i-iliin;^floii  as  (!oiiiiii.iiider- 
iii-cliief,  and  it  rei|iiired  llu:  pcr-^on.d  visit  of  Colond  i  [.unilton,  before 
hi;  \\oiild   di-^])atcl\  tin;  troops  \vliic;li  \M;re   aiisolntely  iiidispeii-,al)l;;  at 

lio'if  l/t  II 'irf  i*t-^      -Mwl     -1-       1 1  i.:i  1I M  t  i>l  v^      il^cli'^^      if      \lli:in\7  I  il(»     I\l.,trir\7     of 


pell  -,al)l;;  at 

■"• '■"•••■"-V     •• ■   ""  3 /    ■'■ 

I-.  omitted  ;   i)Ut   tlie  ;.;ener,il  f.ict  i-.  noteworthy 


•'■'-    ^■■■'1' •-•   •>■' -■/   1--  ' 

lieaihpi.irters,  and   a-,   .disohitely    useless  ,it  Alb, my.      'I'he   hi-^tory  of 
t  he  '*(  'oil  wa\'  ^  '.d>  i'  "'*'''*"'''**"''  '    ' "  ■  *    f  1 1 . .  <  1 .  .i».  .t-i  1  r  ■  *'(   l^  n.  .f .  .,i.,  .ft  1^  t . 


tlu;  "Conway  (.iljil  1-.  omitted  ;  hut  the  ;.;ener,il  l.ict  1-.  noteworthy, 
as  it  finnislu;d  to  tlu;  Hriti^h  eoniin.iiidei  an  eleini;nl  of  str(;n;.;tli,  in 
proportion  as  it  wi;,ikeiii;d  the  arni)'  .ind  influc-nce  of  \\'a^liin;.;ton. 

'  )ii  tile  foiirtii  of  1  )(■(  (Miiher  ( iener.il  1 1  owe,  with  a  iorce  of  fourte'eii 
thousand  men  and  .ici  c)m]):inieil  |jy  I  j\;iiteii,mt-:.;eneraU  ("oniw.illis 
.md  Knyphau^eii  advaiice'd  to  (Iheslnnt  Ilill.  \\itliin  llin-e'  iiiijes  of  the 
riLjht  of  the  Aineriean  ami}',  and  on  the-  filth  .idv.ince'd  tin;  S(;coiid 
hatt.dioii  .md  p.irt  of  the  I'iist  lij^iit  iiifinl  ly  h.ittilioii,  under  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Al)(;rcruinhie,  to  fe(l  the  po-,ition.  A  sharp  skiniiidi 
ensued,  to  tlii;  di~.adv.int.e4(;  ol  tin;  Aniericms,  re^ultin;_;  in  the  c.iplurc 
of  (jeiu;r,il  James  Ir\ini;,  ,iiid  ,1  small  loss  to  both  parties. 

')n  the  seventh,  tin-  Ihiti-^h  .iiiii)  left  (Jli(;>lnut  llill  .md  took  a 
position  on  VaVik:  Hill,  iu;.ir  llu;  American  left,  deiier.il  Moil^mii, 
only  just  arrived  from  the  Northern  departnu;nt,  v.ith  hi-,  toip-,,  and 
the  Maryland  militia  under  C'donel  .Mordecui  (ii^t,  h.ul  "  ,i  shar[)  con- 
llict  with  the  l'"ir.-;t  battalion  oflif^ht  infantry,  .md  i'liirtj-third  r<;.;iiiieiit 
under  (jener.il  Cornw.illi--,  resultini^  in  ,1  loss  to  the  .Xmericuis  of  forty- 
four,  .md  .it  le.ist   .in  e(jual  lo^s  to  the   liritish  troops.      M.iji.'r-v.ener.d 


four,  and  .it  le.ist  .in  e(jual  lo^s  to  the  Jintisb  troops.  M.iji.'r-v.eiier.il 
(irey  and  theOucen'.-,  R.iiiLiers,  tlie  llessi.m  ch.i^^eur-.  and  one  bric(,idc 
of  ihitish  rej^ulars  made  some  impres.sion  upon  the  left  wm;^,  inflict- 
ing a  loss  of  .about  fifty  men  :  and  both  armies  prep.ired  for  ,1  ;j,en(  r.il 
action,  the  Hriti^h  pickets  having  been  adv.mced  within  h.df  .1  mile  of 
the  American  lines, 

(ieiier.il  1  lowe  sa\'s.  in  his  re'port  of  iJecember  thirteenth,  "  L'pon 
the  iiresumptioii  th.il  a  forw.ird  movement  niii^iit  tempt  the  enemy, 
.after  receiviiv.;  such  a  reinforcement  1  reported  ,ifterw,ir(U  of  four  thou- 
sand men)  to  ^dvc  battle  for  the  rec(jvery  of  this  |)1, ice  1  Philadelphia) 
or  that  a  vulner.ible  part  mi;_,dit  be  fouiul  to  admit  of  an  att.ack  upon 
their  cimj),  the  .irniy  m.ircheil  out  on  the  ni^ht  of  the  fourth  inst." 


(jeiieral   W.ishington   s.iys,  "  I    sincerely  wish  th.it  they  li.i 


<t  made 


the  attack,  ,is  tin;  issue,  in  all  probabilit}',  from  the  (!is[)ositioii  (jf  our 
troops  and  the  strong  position  of  our  cam|>,  would  have  been  fortunate 
and  liapp)-.     At  the  same  time  I  must  add,  th.it  reason,  i)rudence  and 


<  *i. 


ifj 


^pt^A 


f.H 


«  n 


%   il' 


sit 


f^'ll 


!  ■ 


I 

w 

I  li 


3CS 


oi'i.kA  I  in.\>  Ni:.\u  i'iiii,\iji-:i,i'iii.\. 


[1777 


cvfiy  piiiK'iplc  of  policy,  forb.itlc  us  (juittiiv^  inir  post   to  iiftack  them 
Notliiiii;  hut  success  would  have  justilicU  the  measure  ;   .ind  tliis  could 
not  l)c  expected  li')m  their  position." 

On  the  eiLjluh  (jeiieral  Howe  .ihandoned  his  camp  antl  returned 
to   Philadelphia. 

The  arni}-  of  W'ashiiv^'ton.  nominally  eleven    thousand  stron;4,  '\s 
stated   h\-  Haron    I  )e   Kalb  to  ha\e  had  at   that  time  but  seven  thou 
sand    eftective  men    present    re)r   dut>' ;   so  i^reneral   w.is  the   sickness, 
owiny  to  the  e.vtreiiie  cold  and  the  want  of  suitable  clothing  and  other 
necessaries  of  a  campaip;n. 

'I'here  were  not  wantiii;^'  officers,  as  well  as  leadini,'  civilians,  who 
persistently  pressed  an  immediate  attempt  to  reca[)ture  I'hiladel[)hia. 

Of  the  officers  most  f)fficiously  antai^oni^tic  to  \Vashin;_;ton,  several 
were  placed  in  hii^h  positions  by  Con<jress. 

On  the  sixth  of  No\-ember  Wilkinson,  aid-de-camp   of  Cjates,  had 
been  maile  l>riL;adier-;4eneral  ;  .ind  on    the   twenty-seventh  Gates  was 
made    President    of  the    Pioard  of   War.      Miftlin,  withdrawn  from  his 
duties  as  Ouartermaster-L;eneial,  !)ut  leLainin;^  his  rank  as  Major-gen 
eral,  was  also  placed  on  the  Hoard. 

On  the  tw(.iity-ei;_;luh  of  December,  Conj^ress  appointed  Conwa)' 
Insi-,ector-;4eneral  and  Major-General,  and  placed  him  in  communication 
with  tlie  Board  of  War,  to  act  iiidi'peiulently  of  the  Comm.mder-in  ■ 
chief.  Lee,  then  a  [jrisoner  at  New  Vork,  throut^h  letters,  united  with 
Gates,  Mifflin,  \Va\ne  and  Conway,  to  oppose  Washington's  policy  and 
dictate  his  aeticm  ;  and  nujre  than  that,  there  was  a  strong  influence 
thereb}'  exerted  to  compel  his  resi;;nation  or  removal. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  December  Washin;4ton  went  into  winter 
quarters  at  Valley  l'\ji\L;e,  twenty-one  miles  from  Philadelphia.  On 
the  same  daj",  a  detachment  under  General  .Smallwood  was  sent  to 
Wilmington  to  occupy  the  country  south  of  Philadelphia  to  control 
supplies  for  that  cit\',  and  to  be  LjeneralK-  useful  in  that  quarter. 
McDougall  was  at  Peekskill,  and  Putnam  was  on  the  shore  of  Long 
Lsland  Sound  near  New  York  until  nearl\'  the  middle  of  December, 
when  he  was  ordered  back  to  the  Highlands. 

The  absence  of  Mifllin  from  the  army  and  his  neglect  of  his  duties 
as  Quartermaster-general,  caused  the  "  want  of  two  days'  supply  of  pro- 
visions ;  and  thereby  cost."  said  Washington,  "an  opportunity  scarce- 
ly ever  offered  of  taking  an  advantage  of  the  enemy."  Washington 
reported,  December  twent>-third,  that  "two  thousand  eight  huntlreC 
and.  ninety-eight  men  were  unfit  for  duty,  because  barefoot  and  othei 


ii'M* 


K^ 


i<,  f« 


^ 


i  n 
1 1 


I?:?! 


OPKRATIONS    NKVR   PIIILADKI-rniA. 


399 


wise  iKikrd."  "  Tho  numbers  had  decreased  two  tlious.uul.  from 
hardships  and  cx[)i)sure  in  tliree  weeks,"  (from  the  fourth  of  Decem- 
ber.) "Only  ei;^dit  thous.md  two  luindred  men  wen;  pn'sent  fit  for 
duty,"  adding;,  "  w(.'  li.ive  not  more  tlian  three  months  in  wliicli  to 
prepare  a  great  deal  of  business,  If  we  let  them  sHp,  or  waste,  wc 
shall  be  laborin;^  under  the  same  difficulties  all  next  canipai^^n  as  we 
have  be^'U  this,  to  rectify  mistakes  and  brinij  thinj^s  to  order.  Mili 
tary  arrangements  and  movements,  in  consecjuenee,  like  the  median 
ism  of  a  clock,  will  be  imperfect  and  disordered  by  the  Wiint  of  a 
part." 

To  the  remonstrances  of  the  .\ssembly  of  Pennsylvania  and  others 
against  his  going  into  winter  cpaarters,  he  says,  "  Gentlenien  reprobate 
the  going  into  winter  cjuartersas  much  a.s  if  they  thought  the  soldiers 
were  made  of  sticks,  or  stones.  1  can  assure  those  gentlemen  that  it 
is  a  much  easier  and  less  distressing  thing  to  draw  remonstrances  in  a 
ct)mfortable  rot)m,  than  to  occupy  a  cold  bleak  hill,  anil  sleep  under 
frost  and  snow,  without  clothes  or  blankets.  However,  aUhough  they 
seem  to  have  litt'e  feeling  for  the  naked  and  distressed  soldiers,  I  feel 
superabundantly  for  them,  and  from  my  soul  I  pit}'  their  miseries 
which  it  is  neither  in  my  power  to  relieve  or  prevent." 

On  the  twenty-si.xth  of  December,  General  Sullivan,  who  appa- 
rently kept  aloof  from  active  participation  in  the  movements  of 
intriguing  officers,  urged  Washington  to  make  an  attempt  upon  Phila- 
delphia,  and   '  risk  every  conseijuence  in  an  action." 

Nothing  moveil  Washington  to  tlepart  from  his  matured  plans, 
and  on  the  thirty-first  of  December,  1777,  his  army  was  still  building 
huts  and  struggling  for  life  at  Valley  Forge. 

De  Kalb  had  been  made  Inspector-general  the  day  before,  vice 
Conway  resigned. 

During  tiie  year  thus  closed,  the  American  privateers  and  vessels 
had  made  nearly  four  hundred  captures,  and  Commodore  Nicholas 
Biddle  had  gaincil  great  credit  in  handling  the  Randolph  frigate  in  its 
disastrous  collision  with  the  Yarmouth  64.  A  brief  rcsuind  of  the 
disposition  of  the  .American  ships  of  war  built  during  the  struggle,  will 
be  found  at  the  close  of  the  campaign  of  1781. 

The  two  events  of  the  campaign  of  1777,  which  made  the  pro- 
foundest  impression  upon  European  States,  were  the  surrender  of 
Burgoyne  and  the  battle  of  Germantown.  News  of  the  former  occur- 
rence reached  London  on  the  second  of  December.  The  lansjuacre  of 
Fox   was  eminently  wise  :  "  If  no  better  terms  can  be  had,  I  would 


V  . 

t 


.'.('.' 


Jt  t,),' 


s-c? 


t  nil. 


400 


OIM'.RATIONS   NEAU   PIIII.AUKLI'II  I  A. 


l»777 


m 


jl: 


treat  witli  them  as  allies  ;  nor  do  I  fear  the  consequence  of  their  irule- 
j)iiKience."  With,  sarcastic  wit,  he  .ille^eil  that  '•  the  ministry  liad 
mistaken  the  extent  of  the  colonies,  anil  considered  Massachusetts  as 
includin;4  the  wliole." 

It  was  evident  that  the  seed  sown  by  the  emploj'ment  of  Euro- 
pean mercenaries,  as  predicted  1)\'  the  Duke  of  UichnKjnd  (pai^^e  IJ2). 
would  bear  unexpecteil  fruit,  ami  tii.it  America  ^»'oiild  find  in  l'"rance 
abundant  aid.  1  lie  pieviou-.  purchase  of  arms  had  not  been  kept 
secret,  and  it  was  eviilent  that  only  an  occasion  w,i-  \\antin;4  for  an 
open  tlecl.iralion  t)f  sympathy  with  the  United  States. 

The  Duke  of  Richmond  aijain  advocated  peace,  and  on  the  terms 
of"  Independence,  and  such  an  alliance  or  federal  union  as  would  be 
for  the  p.utu.d  interests  of  both  e(nintries."  Lord  North,  already 
worn  out  in  his  countr\''s  service,  and  Burke,  were  solemnly  impressed 
with  the  con\ictiun  that  "peace  upon  an)' honorable  terms  was  in 
justice  ilue  to  both  nations." 

The  kin<;  unwisely  adjourned  Parliament  to  the  twentieth  of 
Januar)'. 

A  ship  from  lioston  matle  a  i[uick  passa;4e  to  France,  and  the 
news  fi(jm  America  made  a  profound  sensation  at  I'aris.  At  an  inter- 
\iew  (jf  the  American  Commissioners  wi'di  Count  tie  Vergennes,  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  uii  the  twelfth  of  December,  that  gentleman 
in  speaking;  of  the  report  of  the  ba,  ■  of  tjermantown,  just  received, 
said,  "  Nothing  has  struck  me  so  nmch  astjenertd  Washington  attack- 
ing and  giving  battle  to  General  Howe's  .irmy.  To  bring  troops, 
raised  within  the  year,  to  do  this,  promises  everything."  Couriers 
Were  sent  to  Spain  to  solicit  her  cooperation,  as  already,  without  real 
sympathy  witii  America,  she  liad  discriminated  in  favor  of  American 
privateers  which  tuuk  prizes  to  her  ports.  Without  waiting  for  reply, 
on  the  seventeentii  of  December,  just  when  Washingtt)n  was  about 
conducting  his  weary  and  well  worn  army  to  their  winter  huts,  for 
partial  shelter  and  rest;  while  his  own  spirit  was  pained  by  the  small 
jealousies  which  impaired  the  value  of  his  services,  and  threatened  the 
harmoii}-  ot  his  command,  there  was  warming  uj)  across  the  ocean  a 
new  ally  and  friend,  and  the  power  and  prestige  of  France  vvere 
about  to  drop  into  the  scales  for  the  vindication  and  accomplishment 
of  American  liberty.  On  that  day  Gerard,  one  of  the  secretaries  of 
Count  de  Vergennes,  inform:'d  Franklin  and  Dean  by  the  king's  order, 
that  "  the  king  in  council  had  determined,  not  only  to  acknowledge,  /juI 
to  support  American  Independence." 


CHAPTl'R    LIII. 


OPERATIONS  NEAR  PHILADELI'IIIA  FROM  JANUARY  TO  JUNE.  1778. 
VALLEY   FORGE.     DARREN   IIILL. 


ii^ 


TlII"^   American   army  wintered    at    Valley    Forijc,  and    ilid    not 
material!)-  cliange  its  [)ositloii  luitil  the  evacuation  of  Philadel- 
phia in  June  cnsuint:^. 

The  months  were  full  of  self-sacrifice  and  real  suffering  on  the  part 
of  the  troops;  while  the  Hritish  army  enjoyed  a  considerable  share 
of  cit)'  couifort  and  social  entertainment.  One  army  lived  in  huts, 
and  depended  upon  forced  contributions  from  the  country  people  for 
their  scanty  food,  until  WashiiiLjton  shrank  from  so  arbitrary  an  exer- 
cise of  necessary  authority;  while  the  other  army  had  s^ood  (juarters, 
abundant  clothing,  and  such  food  and  fuel  as  money  could  purchase 
in  a  restricted  market.  One  army  was  drilling  daily  under  Haron 
Steuben,  to  learn  the  rudiments  of  military  service,  so  far  as  shoes 
and  clothing  could  be  provided  ;  while  their  comrades  sat  or  lay  down 
by  burning  stumps  and  logs  to  escape  freezing  to  death.  The  other 
arin\-,  according  to  Stetlman  and  contemporaneous  historiins,  enli- 
vened the  dull  times  with  the  dance-house,  the  theatre  and  "  he  game 
of  faro. 

One  of  General  Howe's  inactive  intervals  had  arrived.  Philadel- 
I'hia,  resting  1)11  a  sufficient  lleet,  was  not  treated  d^s  2,  base  of  opera- 
tions, but  as  snug  and  agreeable  winter  quarters.  The  chief  activities 
of  war  were  suspended.  The  license  which  an  idle  garrison  life  invari- 
ably evokes,  began  to  arouse  jiopular  hatred  ;  and  the  conduct  of 
many  commissioned  officers  was  as  blameworthy  as  that  of  the  troops. 

The  occupation  of  the  city,  insteadof  a  camp  in  the  field,  actually 
restricted  all  valuable  field  service  ;  because  a  sufficient  garrison  had 
to  be  retained  to  ward  off  attack.  The  scouting  parties  from  Wash- 
ington's camp,  even  at  midwinter,  gave  warning  that  he  was  alive  and 

watchful;  while  their  continual  success   in  cutting  off  supplies  from 
26 


%- 

^im 


N.., 


:■  :x 


f^f^A 


mvH 


i!,;i,l 


:yf<i'' 


■■■::l,i\t'  j;\  i 


'& 


402 


OPERATIONS   NEAR    rilll.ADKl.rillA. 


[1773. 


the  country  as  clcarl)-  indicated  tiiat  the  military  occupation  was 
simply  within  its  picket  lines. 

General  Howe  stated,  that  he  "did  not  attack  the  intrenclicd  sit- 
uation at  Valley  Forj4e,  a  strijnL,^  point  durinj^  the  severe  season, 
although  everythinjf  was  [jrcpart'd  with  that  intention,  judging  it 
imprudent  until  the  season  shoukl  afford  a  prospect  of  reaping  the 
advantages  that  ought  to  have  resulted  from  success  in  that  measure, 
but  having  good  information  in  the  spring  that  the  enemy  had  strength- 
ened the  camp  by  additional  works,  and  being  certain  of  moving  him 
from  thence,  when  the  campaign  should  open,  he  dropped  thoughts 
of  an  attack." 

Reference  is  made  to  map  "  Encampment  at  Valley  Forge,"  copied 
substantially  from  that  of  Sparks,  for  an  outline  of  the  defensive 
position  of  Washington. 

After  the  camp  was  occupied,  it  seemed  as  if  the  t^uasi  antagonism 
to  the  Commander-in-chief  began  to  fade  out,  month  by  month.  It 
drew  no  breath  from  popular  sympatliy,  and  in  spite  of  sickness,  death, 
wretchedness  and  desertion,  the  soldiers  were  kept  to  duty  and  ac- 
quired toughness  and  spirit  for  future  eiiujavor.  A  calm  reliance 
upon  tiic  future,  a  strong  will,  and  a  straightforward  method  of  deal- 
ing with  men  and  measures,  vindicated  Washington's  fitness  for  the 
supreme  command. 

During  this  period  a  diversion  into  Canada  was  proposed  with 
General  La  Fayette  in  chief  conmiand.  That  officer  accompanied  by 
General  the  Baron  DeKalb,  and  about  twenty  French  officers,  went  as 
far  as  Alban\-,  to  inspect  the  preparations  said  to  have  been  made  for 
the  expedition. 

The  army  of  General  Gates  had  been  previously  withdrawn,  and 
these  officers  found  that  less  than  a  thousand  effective  men  had  been 
concentrated,  and  that  neither  clothing,  provisions,  nor  transportation 
had  been  fu'"nished.  Generals  Conway  and  Stark  were  also  assigned 
on  this  duty.  To  the  latter  was  intrusted  the  destruction  of  the 
British  vessels  at  St.  John's,  aiul  thr^e  thousand  troops  had  b(;en 
pledged  for  La  Fayette's  advance,  and  reptjrtetl  by  General  Gates  as 
disposable.  Stark  could  only  send  back  the  inquir}-,  "  What  am  I  to 
do  ?'  "  And  what  ..roops  am  I  expected  to  raise  ?  "  lie  had  nothing 
to  do  with,  and  thii  winter  enterprise,  initiated  by  the  Board  of  War 
and  approved  by  Congress,  culminated  in  failure  even  to  organize. 

La  Fayette  was  not  yet  twenty-one  years  of  age,  antl  at  first  felt 
some  enthusiasm  in  an  attempt  to  make  the  conquest  of  Canada,  the 


with 


Ic  for 


)1"  War 


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(77«. 


oiM'.kArioNs  ni;ak  I'Hii.adi.i.I'Iiia. 


403 


fi)rm(.T  possi.-ssioii  of  l''r,iiii  i- ;  hut  iixlcixiidiiilly  of  the  suiiini.iry 
scvfiMiuc  of  Ill's  cniiiicc  lion  uilli  \V,isliiii;;ti)ii,  uliicli  was  inadt;  with- 
out toiisiilt  in;;  thi;  (JomiiMiKhrr-in-chicf,  Ik;  soon  di  ,c(jvirf(l  ihi-  lolly 
of  the  ciitcrprist;. 

Duriii;.;  J.iiiu.ny  a  conimillrc  from  ('oiv^rcss  visit(Ml  Washin;ftoii  at 
Valley  I'^or;.;!',  and  ohtaincd  some  idra  of  his  coinlitioii  and  necessities. 
( )n  their  ritiiiii  they  iceoiiiiiiende'd  th<-  adoption  ol  his  sii;.;;.;<;st ions 
for  the  tli')rou;.di  reopranization  of  the  army,  both  miiiti.i  and  re^niiar, 
Ml  r-'spect  of  .dl  elenieji's  of  enli-.t:inent,  out  fit,  and  sii|)|)ly.  Skirniisli- 
in'^f  w.is  fo-cpiiMit  as  well  as  forays  in  pursuit  of  lior>es;  and  yet  the 
men  them  .dves  did  the  ;;ri:ater  pait  of  liaulin;.;  lo^^'s  foi-  huts  and  fuel, 
and  they  were-  se-verely  taske-d  to  maint.iin  life  and  love  of  life. 

The  arrival  of  H.non  Steuhe-n  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  Ivrhruary 
was  .1  new  element  entirely,  and  it  put  the  men  at  such  work  as  st  imu- 
lated  their  /.eal  and  enhani:c-d  their  confidence-  in  their  c.ipai:ity  to 
b(-come  soldiers.  Officers  and  men  alike  were  placed  iindc-r  the  ii;^i(l 
trainiir.j  of  this  veteran  innr/iiii/.  He  w.i-,  the  man  for  the  hour; 
and  the-  efficts  of  his  st(-rn  discipiim:  and  exai  tiie.;  drill  we-re  (jf  per- 
maiieiM  viliK-.  Altlioiedi  he  volunteered  his  servic(-s,  he  soon  receiv(-d 
an  .ippointmeiit  a-,  Major  ;M-neial,  with  this  extraordinary  bonus 
ad<led,  that  it   wa-.  ;.Mven  "  without  dissent  or  murmur." 

Ill  ,\|)ril  (!onway  resi'.nied,  and  went  to  I'rance. 

On  the  fourth,  (loir^rt-ss  authorized  VVashin;.flon  to  rail  upon 
Pennsylvania.  Maryland,  and  .Mew  Ji:rsey,  lor  five-  thousand  militia. 

On  th(;  ninth,  (ieneral  I  [owe  n-ceiv(;d  his  recall  to  Mii;_;land,  and 
h(,-^an  to  air,m;M;  for  his  de[)artiire. 

On  the  t(-iith,  I, a  I'ayelte-  was  a;',aiii  in  camp. 

On  the  t  hirleeiith,  ( ieneral  Mcl)oU'_;all,  assisted  hy  Ko.sciusko,  was 
busy  at  VV'e-st  I'oiut,  to  make-  it  tin-  point  of  resistance  to  any  further 
movements  up  the  lludson.  (ieneral  (jates  was  placed  in  command 
at  Fislikill  on  tin-  fifteenth.  On  th<-  foiirte(Mith,  iiishuui  of  reinforce- 
ii/cnts  (f  /roops.  Lord  North's  (Joiniliatory  Piills  reached  Ni-w  York,  and 
were  publi.shed  by  (Governor  'I'lyon  the  tu-xt  da)-.  They  maddened 
the  liritish  troops,  incited  mutiny,  conciliated  nobody  and  failed  to 
modify  the  war. 

Oflici-is  of  th<;  American  army  bei^an  to  mak(;  plans  for  the  ensu- 
ing cami)ai;ni.  Various  obje-ctives  were  presented,  and  opinions 
l^reatly  differed.  It  is  proper  to  pl.ice  them  on  record,  so  that  other 
differences  with  the  Commander-in-chief  may  Ije  more  re.idily  left  to 
their  individual  merits. 


m 


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t 


404 


0|'1;K.\I K'NS    Ni:.\K    I'liri.ADKM'KIA. 


1778 


W'.ivnc,  I'.ittrrsoii  and  Maxwell  ncommciKUMl  l'liila(l(l|)hia  ; 
Knox,  Pool',  Wiriiuni  and  Midilcuhi  r;^  advisi'd  Nt'w  N'oik  ;  (ircciic 
ailvi'H'd  .111  attack  ui)i)ii  Nt-w  York  with  imir  t  iKui'-aiid  iCL;ulai"s  and 
the  I-asliMii  militia,  undtT  \\',ishin;^t()n  in  person,  Kavin;(  \a:v.  to  coin- 
niand  in  IV'nnsykani.i,  uiiih'  the  main  army  sliould  rcm.iin  at  Valley 
l-Or^e;  .Stirling'  I)1-o])om(1  operations  atjainst  both  cities;  while'  I  .a 
l'"ayettc,  StcuhcM  .iiid  Uii])ortail  iiad  doubt-;  as  to  m/r  attack  until 
the  army  sliould  hi:  stren[^tlieue<l,  or  the  liritisli  army  indicate  its 
l>lans.     'This  op'iiion  was  aUo  that  ofCieneral  \\'a->hin;_;ton. 

On  the  seventh  of  M.i\'  tin:  liritish  ascended  the  Delaware  and 
destro)'ed  ])ui)!ic  stores  at    liordeiitown. 

(jciieral  Maxwell  had  been  sent  to  their  nrotection  as  soon  as  the 
expedition  was  under  wa\',  but  his  movements  were  retarded  by 
iieavy  rains,  and  he  (aileil  to  bi'  in  tiiiu' to  ])revent  the  damai^e.  A 
lorix;  un(u:r  (ieiural  Dickinson  had  been  in  that  vicinity  also,  but  it 
w.is  too  small  to  o|)po-e  the  l^ritish  troops.  Several  fVii^ates  and 
fort\'-four  \'essels,  alto!.M:ther,  shared  the  late  of  the  stores. 

77/c  Sii'ditli  (iiiv  i>jM(i]\  177.S,  was  not  entirc:ly  a  day  of  t;loom  for 
the  American  army,  the-n  encamped  at  Valley  For;^e.  The  breath  of 
spring  (]uickened  nature,  and  the  forest  bei;an  to  stir  and  bud  for  its 
next  campai;_;n. 

.So  tin:  breath  of  Heaven  bore  a  i'rench  fri;j;ate.  La  .Sensible,  36 
guns,  to  I'almoutli  Harbor  (Portiandj  Maine,  amj  there  l.inded  from 
lier  tleck  a  her.ild  of  I'rance,  and  h':  ])roclaimed  an  armed  alliance 
between  his  ctnmtry  and   the    United  .States. 

On  the  seventh  of  May,  at  nine  o'clock,  A.  M.,  the  American  army 
was  on  parade.  Drums  bi  at  and  cannon  were  fired,  as  if  for  some 
victory.  It  was  a  day  of  jubilee,  a  ran;  occurrence  for  the  times  and 
place. 

The  brigades  were  steady,  but  not  brilliant  in  their  formation. 
Uniforms  were  scarce.  Many  feet  were  i)are.  Maii\'  had  no  coats. 
Some  wore  coats  made  of  the  remnants  of  their  winter  blaukt:ts. 
The  pomp  and  circumstance  of  war  was  wanting.  Strongly  marked 
faces,  good  muscle,  and  vigorous  action  were  to  be  discovered  ;  but 
there  was  no  such  surpassing  display  of  extrinsic  splendor  as  enlivened 
riiiladel[)!iia,  onl\'  eleven  days  Liter. 

There  was  no  review  l)y  genera!  oQlcers,  with  a  well  appointed 
staff.  l""ew  matrons  and  few  nKiitlens  looked  on.  There  stoi'd  before 
eacli  brigade  its  chaplain.  God's  ambassailor  was  made  the  voice  to 
explain  this  occasion  of  their  expenditure  of  greatly  needed  powder 


i-x. 


oi'KRA  iioNs  .\i;ak  I'IIii  .\i)i:i.ii;i a. 


405 


Tlic    Treaty  of  Alliance  was  read,  and  in  solemn  silence  the  American 

army  al  Valley  For<;e  uniliMl  in    I'hanks^'iviiv^f  to  Almi|^hty  Go<l  that 

he  had  [_;iven  them  one friciut on  idif/i. 

One   theme    was   universal  :  and    il   lliilters   yet  in   the  breasts  of 

millions : 

"  Praise  Goil  fr)!n  wlinm  all  lilrssinijs  Mow." 

Huzzas  for  the  kint;  of  I-^-ance,  for  W.iTliinj^ton  and  the  R(;|)uljlic, 
with  cai)s  tossed  hi;,;h  in  air,  antl  a  rattlin;.^  fu-e  throu'^h  the  whole 
line,  terminated  the  humble  paj.a'ant. 

With  the  openiiv^r  sprini^  Geiieral  llowe  found  himself  constrained 
to  send  detachments  for  supplies  and  fora^^t;,  which  became;  scarce 
in  ])roportioi'  as  \Vashin;.;ton's  army  infested  the  country.  (Jolonel 
Mawliood  and  Major  Simcoe  en;.ra<^r((l  ,1  niilitia  force  under  Oiloiul 
llolmes,  at  (juinton's  IhidL'.e  near  .Salem,  New  Jersey,  on  the 
ei;diteenth  of  March,  with  litlK:  credit  and  little  plunder.  On 
the  tweiity-fu'st  ol  March  another  e.\-))edition,  under  .Majcsr  Simcnj, 
accompanied  by  (Jolont.l  Mawhood,  enL;av_ed  the  militia  at  Han- 
cock's l^ridj^e,  five  miles  south  of  .Salem,  and  the  iiiciditits,  as 
n.'corded  in  .Sinn  oe's  own  Journal,  are  not  to  his  credit.  On  the  first 
of  M.iy  Lieutenant-colonel  Abercrombie,  with  Major  .Simcoe,  en;.;aLje(i 
militia  under  (ieneral  1, ace)-,  at  the  (rooked  liillet,  in  .\b)nt;_;(jmery, 
I'ennsylvania,  inllictin;.^'  some  loss,  but  L;atherin;^  neither  iood  iiur 
foraj^e. 

To  cut  off  and  restrict  these  detachments,  WashiuL^tou,  on  the 
ei<^liteenth  of  Ma)',  advancetl  Cieneral  La  I'ayelti:,  with  tui!nt)--one 
humhed  chose'ii  troops  and  five  pieces  of  artillery  to  15arren  Hill,  about 
hall  the  distance  towartl  I'hiladeipliia.  His  onlers  L;ave  him  ( om- 
m.Lud  over  ,ill  outposts  and  skirmishinL,^  detachments,  contemplated  the 
C(jntin,L;ency  of  an  early  evacuation  of  l'hil.i<iel[)hia  by  the  British  arnjy, 
and  with  cauti<Mi  as  to  prudence  in  takini;  his  positions  ami  riskinj^ 
doubtful  movements,  conferred  lari^e  .uitliority  ami  ilisi  retion  in  the 
execution   of  his   instructions. 

It  was  |)rai:tically  a  corps  (;f  observ.itioii,  ami  it  wa-.  the  first  re, ill)' 
ind(  pendent  command  ot  La  Layette,  a;-,  a  Major-general.  The 
execution  of  his  trust  iilustr.itc-s  those  peculiar  traits  of  his  ciiaracter 
which  had  early  .ittracted  the  favfir  of  Washington,  won  iiis  respect, 
and  gradually  deepened  into  an  attachment  almoil  paternal  in  its 
depth  .md  ciuluranco.  The  /Vmeiican  (  onimander-in-chief,  however 
reticent  of  his  opinions,  rarely  filled  to  read  men.  He  read  La  I'ay- 
cttc.      With  .-.mgular  enthusiasm,  great   purity  of  cii  iracter  and  pur- 


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orKKAIlONS    NKAK    I'lII  I,AI)i:i,l'1 1 1  A. 


I '773. 


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il 


pose,  iins\v(-rvliii.j  fidelity  to  nblif^.itinn,  aiiii  lliMioii;.;!!  contcm])t  for 
the  mean  or  dishonorable,  tliis  yoiint;  I'icnch  Ljentleman,  now  Major- 
general,  combined  a(]ni(k  sat;aeit\',  sound  jii(l;^ment  and  (|uici<  execu- 
tion. 

Kefercnce  is  made  to  mi|)  "  I.a  I'ayette  at  I'arrcii  Mill."  'I  he 
site  liir  his  cam|)  was  well  sc|fcte<l.  A  steep,  rock)'  led;^e  was  on  ilii- 
ric^ht  toward  the  Sclni\'ii<ill  as  well  as  to  tiie  tVunt  where  his  i^miiis  were 
pl.ucd.  ('.ipt.iiii  .Mil. can's  li;_;ht  troops  and  tlfly  Indi.m  scouts  were 
just  hehiw,  niir  the  Rid^n;  ro.id,  and  |):ckels  were  still  lurlher  utlvancctl 
on  ihe  road  and  in  tin;  woods.  To  tlie  h-ft  was  a  dens(>  forest,  and 
just  on  its  v(\in-  there  were  several  stoni,'  houses  well  c.ip.d)le  of  defense. 
Six  hun(ir(;d  renns\ivania  militia  under  (leneral  i'orter  wen;  posted 
on  the  W  hitemarsh  ro.id.  'liie  sudden  retie.ildf  this  boily  without 
notice  or  r([)ortinL',  their  action,  ver_\'  neail)'  iiivnU'ed  ins  tduimand  in 
a  conflict  with  niori'  than  double  its  fuice.  ,\t  the  forks  of  the  two 
roads  there  w.is  i  stone  cliurch  in  a  ijuryin;^  ;_;round  wiiieh  was 
inclosed  1)\'  a  stone  fence;  and  La  I'ayetti:  established  liis  heaihjuar- 
ters  I  lose  \)y. 

(jener.d  ("linton  had  alread)'  relieved  (iener.d  llowe  from  the 
comm.ind  ,it  riiiladelphia.  l"'ive  thousand  I'lilish  troops  were  ordered 
losmpiise-  the  American  c.imp  at  llirre'U  ilill.  and  <  lener.ds  (irant 
.ind  ICrskine  were  associated  in  the  atti'mjit.  1  his  command  marclied 
early  on  the  mornin;^  of  May  nineteenlli  l)y  the  I,itiie-kiln  and  old 
York  ro.uls,  and  ver}'  early  the  next  morniny;  ])assed  W'hitemarsh,  when- 
it  chan;.;ed  direition  to  t  lie  left  toward  i5arren  J  lill,  w  ilh  the  desiL;n 
of  cnttiii;.;  off  I  „ I  I'.iyt^tte's  retre.it  by  Swede's  l""ord.  (jeneral  (jrey 
with  two  thous.md  men  crossed  the  ,Schu\lkill  and  marched  alonj.^  its 
west  bank  to  a  point  about  three  miles  below  Jiaiicn  11  ill  to  f)e  in 
reailiness  to  act  in  concert  with  the  other  detachments,  (iem  ral 
Clinton  with  a  thirti  division  marched  by  Ciieslnut  I  Idl,  and  u|)  the 
Manatawny  rtiad  to  make  enclosure  of  La  Fayette's  cou'.m.ind  witiiin 
their  enveioi)int;  forct;s  the  more  secure.  The  pl.m  was  skillfully 
conceived.  Whih;  (General  La  I'ayette,  as  he  states,  was  conversing- 
with  a  youn_!4  '■"'>'  tl'en  on  iier  w,iy  to  I'lnkideli-'hia,  (ostensibly  to 
visit  friends,  l)ut  really  to  obtain  inlormalion)  lie  was  notified  that 
red  uniforms  had  i)een  seen  in  the  wooils,  near  the  road  Irom  While- 
marsh  to  Swede's  l'"ord,  in  his  rear.  One  iuindrcd  (haijouns  had  been 
ordered  to  join  liim.  They  had  scarlet  uniforms  .and  ids  first  impres- 
sion was  that  they  were  close  at  hand.  To  assure  himself,  he  imme- 
diately sent  scouts  into  the   woods  and   learned  the  real   (acts.      He 


II  r 


1773.1 


()i'i;i;.\  iKiN's  m:\u  riiii,\i)i,i,i'i;i a. 


407 


cIi.iivmmI  liuiit  imnici!i;itcl)',  (K-cii])ii{l  llic  tlimili,  Imiyin";  "r'umd  .iiul 
;il!  stroll'';  points,  .111(1  thru  "  m.uli-  .1  ili^pl.iy  of  fal  ^.c  In  mi  Is  ol  col  11  inns," 
,is  if  ])rc|).irin;;  to  ,uK-aiu:c  |)iom])tly  npoii  the  riirmy.  (ii'iicr.il  (iraiit 
li.iltcd  his  ailvancc  ;Mi.'a(l  to  aw, n't  tlic  arri\al  of  llic  wliolc  division, 
hfforc  fii;.j,i;.;iiv^  with  the  ,\nicric,in  t loop  ,.  '|  he  IJiiti^li  tolnmii  then 
on  tiii-  Kid^.fi.'  road,  al-o  halti'd,  and  waited  loi  as-,iiraii((-  that  the 
ri'^dit  had  nall\'  n  ;u  hcd  I  ,a  I'aycttc's  rear  ;  .md  this  w.i  .  lo  hr  diter- 
miiicd  hy  ,111   act  u.il   .iltai  k. 

A  country  road  ran  iVoin  tin-  ihurcli  directly  under  liarreii  Ilil!  to 
Malson's  l'"oid,  which  was  very  litlh-  iiirther  from  V.diey  I'"or;4(;  than 
Swede's  l'"oid.  I'liis  ro.id  was  entirely  hidden  from  \  iew  I))'  the  hill. 
The  lirilish  ri  'hi  nsled  at  the  crossiiu';  of  the  tw;  principal  roads  to 
both  folds:  and  as  will  ap|)iMr  from  the  map,  tlie\'  were  ne.irer  to 
Malson\  l'"ord  than  l„a  h'.iyette  was;  but  supposed  that  the)-  con- 
trolled ,ill  approaches. 

(iener.d  I'oor  w.as  onlered  to  K.'.id  the  retre.it,  .and  I  .a  i'.iyeltc 
broueht  up  the  rear,  'i'lu;  troops  retired  in  order  .and  so  pioinptly 
th;it  the  main  body  cro-^sid  the  ford  .iiid  oc(  iipied  hi'di  .ind  coin- 
in.andiii;;  ;.'roimd  .is  liie  ISritish  v.in;.Mi,n-d  le.iinedof  the  movement, 
.md  pri--;sed  mi  in  pursuit.  .\s  the  List  troops  cro-.sed,  ,1  bri  .1;  skirmish 
ensued  over  the  ;;un^,  which  were  tlu;  la^t  to  follow  ;  but  tli<-  retre.it 
,v,is  perfecti'il  and  llu;  ;.iuns  wen;  s,iv(.'d. 

I'ieiier.il  \V,ishiii;;ton  hail  a  distinct  view  nf  the  I'ritish  movement 
as  it  advanced,  .and  lired  ,il,irm  ;nins  to  warn  I  ,,i  l'",iyette  ;  but  the  wis- 
dom, coolness,  and  promptness  of  th.it  officer  saved  his  cominand. 
The  American  loss  was  nine,  and  that  of  the  British  was  reported  as 
three. 

L;i  l<",i}'ette  relates  the  fact,  that  "  fifty  Indi.m  scouts  were  sud- 
den!)^ conliouted  by  ,111  e([u,il  number  of  lh■iti-^ll  dr.ii.i^oons,"  ,uid  that 
■'  the  mutu.al  surprise  u,is  so  ere.it  tli.it  Ix.jtli  iled,  with  e(|u,il  speed." 

The  c(Mi;^rratuI;itions  of  \V^lshiu 'Ion  were  as  cordi.a!  on  the  return 
of  L.i  l'",i)'ett<;  as  the  ereetine;  of  tiie  Hritish  troops  on  their  ri:turn 
w,is  cool  ,ind  imp.issioned.  \c)  tiouht  h.id  been  entert. lined  that  the 
I'"reiu  h  Mar({uis  would  become  the  ;;uest  of  the  earrisoii  tint  eveiiinc;, 
,inil  this  w,is  one  of  the  minor  dis.ii)[)ointmeiil  i  of  this  fruitless 
expedition. 

General  lIoweclosedhisoffici.il  connection  with  the  British  service 
on  the  eleventli  of  May,  but  rem.iined  in  Pliiladc!])hi.i  until  after  the 
march  to  Barren  i  I  ill. 

Extraordinary  fetes,  parades,  salutes,  and   scenic  displays,  formed 


i    1 


'XI'  I' 


1,1  i 


11 


A    It''' 


in' 


I     i' 


)    I 


if  i 


408 


oi'i'.kA  rioNs  Ni:.\i<  niii mh.i.I'Ika. 


1 1 778. 


part  of  .1  (k'lnoii-^liMlion  in  hi-,  honor  hiTorc  hii  ilcp.irt  iifc.  A  riL^att.i 
on  the  1  )il.iu  .irc,  a  toiinKUUiut  on  land,  triuni[)h,il  archc-^,  (K'cor.ited 
pavilion-i,  niounlt'cl  inaidriiN  in  Tnrl^ish  co-^tiuncs,  -slaves  in  fancy  habits, 
knight-;,  cscinirfs,  licr.ilil^,  am!  rvcry  l)iiliiant  device,  made  the  ei:^ii- 
Iccnth  da}'  of  May  n">enioia!;le,  from  dajbrcak  mitil  dark.  IS.dl.-., 
ilhnTiinatioiis,  fire-works,  wax  h;,;hls,  llowers  and  fantastic  drapery 
cheered  the  iii^ht  hours,  exhil^itinj^,  a-^  described  b\'  Major  Andre,  "  ii 
Ci>///>  t/r  (/v/,  l)e\-ond  description,  ina;.;nificent."  "  Amon;.;'  the  l.drest; 
of  tin:  ladier^  \va^  Mi---  Siiippen,  I  hi;  snh^eipicnt  second  wife  oi  Arnold." 
At  lour  o'clock  on  tlie  mor'nii!.;  of  the  nineteenth,  the  twent)'-tour 
hours  of  hilarit)',  adulation  and  e\tra\a;_;ance  closed,  and  the  ami)' 
hastened  to  I'jarren  Hill  to  capture  I, a  l'"ayette. 

On  the  nineteenth,  ( jeneral  .Mifllin  re[)(jrted  at  V.dlcy  For;.^c  for 
duty. 

In  a  Icttei'  to  ( iou\  i-riieur  .Morris,  d.ited  May  eii^hteenth,  General 
\VashinL;ton  e'\[)ressrs  his  "  surprise  to  fmd  a  certain  ^.^entleman,  wlx.) 
.some  lime  a;4o,  when  .1  hea\_\'  cloud  ol  liarkness  hun;^  over  us  and  oiw 
affairs  looked  Ljlooniy,  wa-^  de^^irous  of  re.->iL^lin;^^  to  be  now  stepping; 
forward  in  the  line  of  the  ,ir!n\',"  additi;;,  "  If  he  can  reconcile  such 
comluct  t<_i  hi-^  own  feelin;.;s  a-^  an  olficer,  and  a  man  of  lionor,  and 
ConLjres^  h.ive  no  objection  ti^  hi-i  le.iviuL;'  his  seat  in  another  di'part- 
nient,  I  ha\e  notliin;^  personall)'  to  oppose  to  it.  Vet  I  must  thiidc 
that  i;entlemau's  steppini;  in  and  out,  as  the  sun  happens  to  beam 
forth  or  become  obscure,  is  noi  i/u//c-  the  thini^',  nor  tj/ii/c  just,  with 
resiject  to  those  officers  who  take  the  bitter  witli  the  sweet." 

WashiuLjton  was  .ilready  advised  that  the  British  army  was  about 
to  evacuate  Philadel|)hia.  R(;peated  discussions  occurred  as  to  the 
future  action  of  the  two  armies.  The  .American  army  bei^an  to  feel 
the  throb  of  ho[)e  as  they  realized  that  the  pressure  of  a  superior 
force  w.is  to  be  withdrawn  ;  and  the  toil,  selt--,acrifice  and  aUL'.ui.ih  of 
a  wretched  winter  was  relieved  a  little  b\'  the  prospect  of  entering  the 
capital,  as  they  entered  it  in  the  autumn  (.if  1777. 

On  the  following;  day  a  council  of  war  w,is  held,  at  which  Major- 
generals  Gates,  Greene,  .Stirling,  .Mifllin,  La  k'ayette,  De  Kalb,  Ann- 
strong  and  .Steuben,  and  Hri;^adier-general  Knox  were  present,  to  hear 
a  statement  of  the  CfHidition  of  the  two  .irniies. 

Washington  under-estimated  the  Hriti^h  forces,  as  will  be  .seen  by 
No/e.  Me  estimated  the  British  effective  force  at  Philadelphia  as  ten 
thousand  ;  that  at  New  York  as  four  thousand  ;  that  at  Newport  as 
two  thousand. 


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OI'I.KA  TIDXS    NI:AI;    I'IIII,AI)I,I.I'III.\. 


409 


'I'lic  ("Diitin  ■iit,(l  (nvci-  at  Villry  I'lir^M-,  inrluiliiv;  tlir  sick  and 
those  oil  comm.iml  -.iihjc*  t  \n  1  .ill  on  .•inrr;.;riiry,  lie  icpnilcd  as  i'Kjvuii 
tlioiisarul  ciijjit  lumdiiil  ;  it  \V'ilmiii:.;toii,  foiirlct.-ii  luiiidri'il  ;  and  on 
tin-  Iludson,  at  (■i'.ditcrii  luindnd. 


Ill-   iipiiiioii    was   iiiianiiiious  til  if    the  army 


,li<)iili 


rem  nil  on  tli' 


ficfciisivi',  and  .iwait  liir  ;,(  t  ion  ol  t  li.-  I  Ji  iliMi  1  ummand 


cr. 


(  h\  the    tvM'Mlh  til    (>(    Ma\',  fioiirral  (!liarl(;s  Lee  JDi'iicd    tin;  cain]), 

t  w'l'nt  v-i"n'-.t  of  April  (or  M.iJdi- "cni'iMl 


avitu'  lii;c;n  (•x(iMn''fi|  011  tin 


1' 


n.'SCott,   ulio   iiad    hccii    vriy   .hIk  jit  ly  i  apt  in  rd    at 


In   idi|iiarti-ri 


rt,  Uln.d.-    Inland,  on  tl 


1"  ni  "111  o(   1  111-  t w'riiti- 


fwc.  miles  al)ovc  Ni wpui 

i:lli    of    Jnl\-,     1777.    !)>■    I  .icntriiant  ( i)|iin.'i     liaiton    uf    l'iii\'iil(iicc. 

("icMcral  Li-c  had  l)c"ri  |)ln:(;d  on  piri»h,-  a^  i-arly  as  tin-  lu'i-iity-fiH  h  ot" 


M 


in  h,  and    visited  i'hil 


.Mehlllia. 


II 


IS    panih- 


was   cNten 


ded   so  that 


le     tilth 


,1    ,\i 


d    Y 


till,    ami     YMrk-,    wni-re 


lie  visited    Valley     l'"(ir';e     on     t! 
(!on;.jress  wa^  in  si-,aiiii,  on  tin-  ninth. 

It  is  also  to  he-  notiec-d  that  r)n  tin-  fifl' i-ntli  of  June-,  while  at   Val- 
l(-y    I'"i)r;^(;,  wlie-ii    there    was  still  ,1    douht  a^  to  the  iiltimati-   plans  of 


iclieral    (Jintiiii 


alter    the   e\-a(n 


it  inn    of    l'liilade!|)hia,  <  ii m-ial    1  ,e 


a< 


hire 


sscd    a    nutc-    Id   (leinr, 


\Va,l 


nii'.Moii   I'uni'/   m 


oniion    th.it 


tin-  enemy  unnld  eitln-r  'ui  |o  .\( 
out  and  Irdit  it   to  advanta' 


■weastle,  in  c 


Iraw  the  Ameiiean  .uiiiv 


or  "I) 


to  M 


iiA'l  iinl  or 


)(-l,iware  or  sunn 


islini'.'tDn  could   not  have 


other  indepind'jnt    fnld    where  tli(;y  CDiild   (nntrol   water    coinninnica- 
liun-.,  and  .n  t  in  harmoii)'  witli  (mntier  Indian  a;.;;_;re-.^i<in^.  " 

A  ship  nf  war  naclied  i'liiladil|iliia  on  the-  se\-entli  with  t:i>mmis- 
sioners  to  icpre.-.eiit  J.urd  NdiIIi'-,  ' 'oneiliatory  i5ills,  and  this  delayed 
(  linlon's  iii()\-(,-iin-nl  ;  hut  i,ee's  h-tterto  W 
been  more  skillfully  desi;,;ned  to  mi^e.ul,  if  In-  li.id  at  lieait  tin-  execu- 
tion by  (jciural  ilowi:  of  the  plan  he  iiad  liimsilf  h)-potht-lic.diy  sn^;- 
gestcd  while  a  prisoner  of  w.ir  at  \ew  Yurk. 

His  letter  to  Washiin'lon  -vvas  in  h  iinnm)-  with  his  advice-  to  (jen- 
er.il  ih)We;  hnt  tin-  will  known  i'riiu  h  alliance  which  ripeiiid  in 
Jannary,  177.S,  made  that  ninvem'-nt  inii)()ssil)le  of  execnlion  by  the 
liritisli  troops,  and  I.ee  soiii^hl  by  all  means  in  his  powi:r  to  prevent 
a  pnrsnit  o(  their  lelirin'.j  army. 

A  brief  retrospect  will  e-xpl,iiii  Lee's  position. 

Durin<^  the  month  of  l"'ebni.iry,  1777,  he  obt.iined  pernii-.sion  from 
General  Howe  to  send  letters  to  Cioii'.oess  ui'.;in;.;  that  conimissiDiKMS 
be  sent  "  to  confer  with  him  ,il)ont  confidentia!  matters  of  v.ist  interest 
to  tile  nation. il  cause."  On  the  twenty  hrst  of  I'elirn.iry  of  the  same 
year,  Congress  declined    to  send    snch   cominis-,ioiiers  "  us  aito'^ether 


;iH<  i 


]  V^«;1 


I? 


J 


lii'II 

iiItJ 


i  M 

,  in'h 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


^ 


// 


U.s 


4a 


1.0 


I.I 


11.25  i  1.4 


2,5 
22 

2.0 


1.6 


V] 


/^^ 


/: 


.^  ;v 


^'  >'V 


/; 


7 


-^ 


^ 


^Z*}- 


^ 


;V 


i  » 


410 


OPERATIONS   XFAR    rilll.ADELPlIIA. 


I '778 


k '  'i  fcit' 

11  iliji 

''  11 M 

1 

i  m  fii 

I 

;  mm 

1 

[■  Wff 

i 

improper,"  and  "  they  could  not  perceive  liow  a  compliance  with  hi;- 
request  would  tend  to  his  advantage  or  the  interest  of  the  public." 
On  the  nineteenth  of  March,  Lee  wrote  ai^ain.  This  letter  was  re- 
ceived on  the  twenty-eighth  ;  and  on  the  following  day  Congress 
again  decliiied  the  proposition. 

On  the  fifth  of  April,  1777,  Lee  wrote  to  Washington,  "  It  is  a 
most  unfortunate  circumstance  for  myself,  and  I  think  not  less  so  for 
the  public,  that  the  Congress  have  not  thought  proper  to  comply  with 
my  request.  It  could  not  possibly  have  been  attended  with  any  ill 
consequences,  and  might  have  been  with  good  ones.  At  least  it  was 
an  indulgence  which  1  thought  my  situation  entitled  me  to.  But  I 
am  unfortunate  in  everything,  and  this  stroke  is  the  severest  I  have 
ever  experienced.     God  send  you  a  different  fate." 

There  were  nt)t  wanting  officers  at  that  time,  (ieneral  Greene 
included,  who  supposed  that  the  visit  of  commissioners  could  do  no 
harm,  but  the  ])eonle  at  l.irge  approved  the  action  of  Congress.  The 
time  had  passed  for  compromise. 

On  the  twenty-ninth,  the  day  that  Lee's  second  application  was 
acted  upon  by  Congress,  that  officer  submitted  a  paper  to  the  British 
commissioners  which  indicated  his  opinions,  wishes  and  purpose.  The 
original  document  was  brought  to  light  by  George  H.  Moore,  an  emi- 
nent historical  scholar,  and  librarian  of  the  New  York  Historical  Soci- 
ety, in  connection  with  an  address  before  that  Society  in  1870,  and 
was  officially  endorsed  by  the  British  commission  as  "  J/r.  Lrc's  pla)i, 
2Qih  March,  1777." 

A  few  paragraphs  are  cited  in  this  connection  :  "  It  appears  to  me 
that  by  the  continuanct^  of  the  war,  America  has  no  chance  of  obtain 
ing  its  ends."  "As  I  am  not  only  persuatled  from  the  high  opinion 
I  have  of  the  humanity  and  good  sense  of  Lord  and  General  Howe, 
that  the  terms  of  accommodation  will  be  as  moderate  as  their  powers- 
will  admit  ;  but  that  their  powers  are  more  ample  than  their  succes- 
sor would  be  tasked  with,  I  think  myself  not  only  justifiable,  but 
bound  in  conscience  in  furnishing  all  the  light  I  can,  to  enable  'cm  to 
bring  matters  to  a  conclusion  in  the  most  con'modious  manner." 

'■  I  know  the  most  generous  use  will  be  made  of  it  in  all  respects  ; 
their  humanit}-  will  encline  'cm  to  have  consideration  for  individuals 
who  have  acted  from  principle."  Then  followed  hypothetical  data  aa 
to  the  number  of  troops  required,  and  these  sentences:  "If  the 
Province  of  Maryland,  or  the  greater  part  of  it,  is  reduced  or  submits, 
and  the  people  of  Virginia  are  prevented  or  intimidated  from  march- 


1778.] 


OPERATIONS   NEAR    I'llII.ADKI.liFIA. 


411 


ini^  aid  to  the  PiMinsylvania  army,  the  whole  machine  is  divided,  and  a 
period  put  to  the  war  ;  and  if  it  is  adopted  in  full,"  ("  Lee's  plan,")  "  I 
am  so  confident  of  success  that  I  would  stake  my  life  on  the  issue." 
"Apprehensions  from  General  Carleton's  army  will,  I  am  confident, 
keep  the  New  Englanders  at  home,  or  at  least  confine  "em  to  the  east 
side  of  the  river.  I  would  advise  that  four  thousand  men  be  imme- 
diately embarked  in  transports,  one-half  of  which  should  proceed  up 
the  Potomac,  and  take  post  at  Alexandria,  the  other  half  up  Chesa- 
peake Bay,  and  possess  themselves  of  Annapolis."  The  relations  of 
various  posts  to  the  proposed  movement, — the  character  of  the  "  Ger- 
man population  who  woLild  be  a])prchensive  of  injury  to  their  fine 
farms,"  were  also  uri^'ed  in  favor  of  "  //is  plan  "  for  terminating  the 
war  on  terms  "of  moderate  accommodation." 

Wa?.hinL(ton  answered  the  letter  of  General  Lee,  on  the  day  it  was 
received,  written  only  three  days  before  the  evacuation  of  Philadel- 
phia :  and  its  contents  indicate  that  he  fully  appreciated  the  manner 
in  vhich  that  officer  attempted  to  influence  other  officers  in  the  regu- 
lation of  aimy  movements, 

"  1  have  received  your  letter  of  this  date  and  thank  you,  as  I  shall 
any  officer  over  whom  I  shall  have  the  honor  to  be  placed,  for  their 
opinions  and  advice  in  matters  of  im[)ortance,  especially  when  they 
[)roceed  from  the  fountain  of  candor,  and  not  from  a  captious  spirit, 
or  an  itch  for  criticism,  .  .  .  and  here  let  me  a;j;ain  assure  you 
that  I  shall  be  always  happy  in  a  free  communication  of  your  senti- 
ments upon  any  important  subject  relative  to  the  service,  and  only 
betj  that  they  ma)- come  directly  to  myself.  The  custom  which  many 
officers  have  of  spcakini^  freely  of  things,  and  reprobating  measures, 
which  upon  investigation  may  be  found  li  be  unavoidable,  is  never 
productive  of  good,  but  often  of  very  mischie/ous  consequences." 

The  encampment  at  \'alley  P'orge  was  about  to  be  deserted. 
Washington  aiid  Lee  were  ready  for  the  march  to  Monmouth. 


S1L-' 


1     tv 


Pritisii  Efff.ciivk  Force. 

NoTF,. — From  "  Original  Returns  in  llie  I?ritisli  Record  Office."     Date,  March  26th, 
1778. 

Pnn.ADKi.i'iiiA  Xkw  York  Rhode  Island 

liritish 13078  34S6  1610 

(Jerman f,202   3680  21 16 

Provinci.il 1250 32S1   44 


Total 


19.530 


10,456 


3.770 


e 


I: 


(    i 


r : 


!i 


CHAPTER    I, IV. 

FROM  rillLAUELPIIIA  TO  MONMOUTH.     MONMOUTH  AND  VICINITY. 

1778- 

'^T^IIIC  al)and<:)nmeiit  of  Pliiladelpliia  by  the  British  army  had 
JL  become  a  miUtarj'  necessity,  because  too  remote  from  the  sea 
coast,  unless  the  Army  of  Occupatior  could  be  so  reinforced  a?  to  be 
independent  of  support  from  New  York.  The  detail  of  troops  required 
by  General  Howe  had  not  been  made.  The  recommendation  of  Gen- 
eral Amherst,  military  adviser  of  the  kinL,^  "that  foity  thousand  men 
be  sent  to  America  immediately,"  had  been  disapproved. 

It  was  of  vital  importance  under  such  circumstances,  that  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  should  reach  New  York  with  the  least  delay  and  the 
least  possible  embarrassment  from  fightinj^  on  the  march. 

The  moral  effect  of  the  proposed  evacuation  was  in  Washini^ton  s 
fivor.  The  purpose  of  the  English  Cabinet  to  transfer  all  active  opera- 
tions to  the  .Southern  States  had  not  been  made  public  ;  and  when 
the  British  army  took  its  departure  with  twelve  miles  of  baggage 
train,  thoroughly  cumulative  of  all  army  supplies  that  could  be  loaded 
on  wagons,  it  made  a  deep  impression  upon  the  people. 

It  indicated  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  was  no  temporary 
diversion,  in  order  to  entice  Washington  from  iiis  stronghold  to  a 
combat  in  the  field  ;  but  it  was  a  surrender  of  the  field  itself  to  his 
control.  It  announced  that  the  royalists  would  be  left  to  their  own 
resources,  and  that  the  British  army  had  not  the  strength  to  meet  the 
contingencies  of  active  operations,  either  in  Pennsylvania  or  New 
Jersey.  The  embarkation  of  nearly  three  thousand  citizens,  with 
their  merchandise  and  personal  effects,  to  accompany  the  naval  squad- 
rons, was  equally  suggestive. 

The  cooperation  of  France  in  the  resistance  of  the  Colonies  to 
British  authority  had  been  publicly  announced  by  Congress,  and  the 
impending  arri  al  of  a  French  fleet  hastened  the  movement.     As  a 


1773.1 


FROM    rillT.ADEl.PIIIA   TO    MONMOUl'Il. 


413 


matter  of  fact,  that  fleet  .iMpcaieti  at  tlic  entrance  of  Delaware  Bay 
almost  immediately  aftei  Adniir.il  Howe  turned  Cape  May,  for  New 
York. 

The  evacuation  of  IMiiladelphia  began  at  three  o'clock'  in  tlieinorn- 
infj;,  June  eii^hteenth,  and  the  entire  army  was  on  the  New  Jersey 
shore  by  ten  o'clock. 

This  movement  had  not  been  made  so  secr^  tl>'  that  General  Wash- 
ington had  nei^lected  to  anticipate  its  execution,  (/cnerai  Ma.xwell's 
brij^jade  and  the  New  Jersey  militia  had  been  ordered  to  destroy 
bridges,  to  fell  trees  across  the  roads,  and  to  so  interrupt  the  march  as 
to  give  time  for  his  own  army  to  place  itself  in  a  favorable  position 
for  offensive  action.  A  detachment  under  (jeneral  .\rnold,  whose 
wound  still  detained  him  from  held  service,  entered  Philadelphia  just 
as  the  liritish  rear-guard   left. 

Reference  is  made  to  maps,  •' Oper.itioiis  in  New  Jersey "  and 
"Operations  near  Philadelphia." 

(icneral  Clinton  advanced  to  llatldonfielil  the  same  day.  At  this 
point  the  militia  under  (icneral  Maxwell  made  a  short  resistance  and 
retired  to  Mount  IIoll\-  Pass.  'This  place  was  also  abandoned  as  the 
strong  British  vangu.u'd  arrived  ;  but  tht>  destruction  of  bridges  and 
other  obstructions,  co.iibined  with  the  excessive  summer  heat,  made 
the  march  of  the  l?ritish  army  peculiarly  painhil  and  exhausting. 
Clinton,  witii  his  usual  pr(nnptness,  crowded  so  closely  upon  tne 
^Vmericans  that  the)-  did  not  comi)lete  the  destruction  of  the  bridge 
at  Crosswicks,  and  the  British  army  passed  the  creek  on  the  morning 
ot  the  twenty-fovuth. 

The  column  of  Lieutenant-general  Kn\'phausen.  with  the  provis- 
ion train  and  heav>-  artillerj-,  went  into  camp  at  Imlays'  Town,  while 
that  of  Cornwallis  occupied  Allentown,  and  thereby  co\ered  the 
other  di\-ision  from  surprise  from  the  north. 

According  to  (ieneral  Clinton's  re})ort,  datetl  at  New  York,  July 
5th,  1778,  "the  cf)Iumn  of  General  Kn_\i)hausen  consisted  of  the 
Seventeenth    light    dragoons;    Second    battalion    of  light    infantry; 


Hessian  Yacrers  ;  First  and  Second  British  bri'jades;  St 


nil 


and  Loo's 


brigades  of  Hessians  ;   Pennsylvania   Lowdists  ;   West   Jersey   Volun- 
teers and  Maryland    L())-alists.     The  second   division  consisted  of  the 


Sixteenth    li'dit  dragoons ;    First  anc 


1    S 


ecoud 


jjattalions  of  British 


grenadiers,  the  Guards,  and  Third,  Fourth,  and  l-'ifth  British  brigades." 

Upon  receiving  advices  that  Washington  had  already  crossed  the 

Delaware  and  that  General  Gates  with  the  northern  armv  was  ex- 


?•  ii' 


m 


•n 


^l 


it' 


'■'■4 


H    ' 


414 


FROM    l'IIII..\|)i;i.l'llIA    TO    MONMiiflll, 


I' 778. 


!il' 


!    11 


pccted  to  unite  with  \Vasliiii;_(ton.  tluis  rendering  a  direct  ni.iicii  to 
New  \'ork  nioie  haxiirdous,  dcneral  Clinton  threw  all  his  bci;^ga<^e 
under  tlie  escort  of  Gcniral  KuNpliausLii,  placed  it  in  atlvance,  and 
occupied  the  rear  w  ilh  the  second  di\i^ii;n,  in  light  niarchin;^^  order, 
under  his  own  inmiediate  conmiand  ;  and  took  the  Monmouth  route 
to  the  sea. 

V\'ashini;ton  was  notified  of  the  movement  and  took  definite  action. 
in  pursuit.  He  had  crossed  the  Delaware,  at  Coryell's  Ferry,  nearly 
forty  miles  abcjve  Philadelphia,  without  assurance  of  the  re.d  purpose 
of  his  ad\ersar\'.  Ilavin;,;  detached  Colonel  Morgan  with  a  select 
corps  of  six  lumtlrcd  men  to  reinforce  Maxwell,  he  marched  to  Prince- 
ton with  the  main  ami)-,  and  thence  to  lioi)ewell  township,  five  miles 
distant,  where  he  remained  until  the  morning-  of  the  twenty-fifth. 
<.)n  the  pre\ious  da)-,  however,  he  had  sent  a  second  detachment  of 
fifteen  hundreti  chosen  troops  under  Hrii^adier-general  Scott,  to  rein- 
force those  ahead}'  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  and  m.ore  effeefually 
hnnoy  aiul  ret.ird   their  march. 

On  the  twenty-sixth  the  army  moved  to  Kingston  ;  and  having 
intelligtMice  tliat  the  enem\'  had  been  seen  moving  toward  Monmouth 
Court-I  louse,  Washington  dispatched  a  third  detachment  of  one 
ihousand  men  under  General  Wayne,  together  with  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  who  was  assigned  to  take  command  of  the  entire 
advanced  corps,  including  Maxwell's  brigade  and  Morgan's  light  in- 
fantry. Orders  were  given  to  La  Fayette,  to  "  take  the  first  fair 
opportunity  to  attack  the  rear  of  the  enemy." 

That  officer  wrote  from  "  Robin's  Tavern,  half  past  four,  June  26th," 
"  I  have  consulted  the  general  officers  of  the  detachment  ;  and  the 
general  opini(jn  seems  to  be  that  I  should  march  in  the  night  near 
them,  so  as  to  attack  the  rear-guard  on  the  uMrch.  Your  excellency 
knows  that  b\-  the  direct  road  \'ou  are  only  three  miles  further  from 
Monmouth  than  we  are  in  this  place.  Some  prisoners  have  been 
made,  an  I  deserters  come  in  amazing  fast,"  "  I  believe  a  happy 
blow  would  have  the  happiest  effect."  ^Igaiii.  "At  five  o'clock," 
"General  l*'orman  is  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  we  may  overtake  the 
enemy,  it  is  highlj-  pleasant  to  be  followed  and  countenanced  by 
the  army  ;  that,  if  we  stop  the  eneni)',  and  meet  with  some  advan- 
tage, they  may  push  it  with  vigor.  I  liave  no  doubt  but  if  we  over- 
take them  we  possess  a  very  happy  chance." 

Again:  "  Ice  Town,  2Cth  June,  1778,  at  a  quarter  after  seven." 
"  When  I  got  there,  "  referring  to  previously  expressed  purpose  to  go 


'i    r 


1778.] 


FROM  rHii,Ani:r,rHiA  T(j  MoxMourir. 


415 


to  Ice  Town  for  provisions,  "I  was  sorry  to  licar  that  Mr.  Hamil- 
ton, who  liad  bcLMi  riilini,'  all  the  ni;_;ht,  had  not  been  able  to  find  any- 
bc>dy  wlio  could  give  him  certain  intelligence  ;  but  b>'  a  party  who 
came  back,  I  hear  the  enemy  are  in  motion,  and  their  rear  about 
one  mile  off  tiie  place  they  had  occupied  last  night,  which  is  seven  or 
eight  miles  from  here.  I  immediately  put  Generals  .Ma.xweH's  and 
Wayne's  brigades  in  motion,  and  I  will  fall  lower  down  with  (ieneral 
Scott's  and  Jackson's  regiment,  and  some  militia.  I  sIkhiUI  be  very 
happy  if  we  could  attack  them  before  the>-  halt."  •'  If  I  can  not  over- 
take them,  we  could  lay  at  some  distance  and  attack  them  to-Morro\v 
morning.  .  .  .  If  we  are  at  a  convenient  distance  from  you,  I  liave 
nothing  to  fear  in  striking  a  blow,  if  opportunity  is  offered."  "  If  yen 
believe  it,  or  if  it  is  believed  iieeessary  or  useful  to  the  e^ooil  of  the  serviee 
and  the  honor  of  Gem  ral  Lee,  to  send  him  down  ivith  a  couple  of  thou- 
sand men,  or  any  ^^reater  force,  I  loill  cheerfully  obey  a)id  serve  him.  )iot 
only  out  of  duty,  but  ouf  of  ivhat  I oive  to  that  i^entleinan's  character." 
The  ItaHcs  are  not  so  indicated  in  the  original. 

The  following  appeal  had  been  made  to  General  La  Fayette  by 
General  Lee,  when  he  found  that  the  army  was  earnestly  pressing 
upon  the  enemy:  "It  is  my  fortune  and  my  honor  that  I  place  in 
)'our  hands  :  you  are  too  generous  to  cause  the  loss  of  either."  La 
Fayette  sa\-s  in  his  memoirs,  "  This  tone  succeeiled  better,"  referring 
to  Lee's  change  of  opinion,  and  claim  to  the  coinm.ind  ;  and  the  let- 
ter, above  cited,  contains  the  generous  response. 

At  evening  of  the  twenty-sixth  the  whole  army  advanced  from 
Kingston,  leaving  their  baggage  so  as  to  be  able  to  su[)port  the 
atlViince  corps  with  promptness,  and  reached  Cranbury  early  in  the 
morning.  On  the  twent)--seventli  a  heavy  rain  and  intense  heat  sus- 
pendeil  the  march  for  a  (cw  hours.  Finding  that  the  advance  corps 
was  bearing  too  far  to  the  right  io  be  assured  of  promi)t  support  from 
the  main  body,  orders  were  sent  to  La  Fayette  to  take  ground  to  the 
left,  toward  Englishtown.  This  movement  was  also  executed  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventli. 

The  advance  corps  was  at  once  strengthened  by  two  additional 
brfgadcs,  as  suggested  by  General  La  Fayette,  and  General  Lee  took 
command.  The  whole  force  thus  detailed  was  about  five  thousand 
men. 

The  main  army  advanced  to  within  three  miles  of  Englishtown, 
and  within  five  miles  of  the  British  army.  The  official  reports  of 
General  Washington   show  that  General  Lee  positively  declined  the 


■-".i 


f    '1 


416 


FROM    Pilir.ADF.I.rillA    TO    M()NMnL'r[r. 


I '77''. 


^1    i' 


comniand  of  tliis  advance  i'ot]is,  until  its  larL^t"  increase  rendered  it 
certain  tliat  it  held  the  post  of  honor,  and  woulil  he  pushed  ni)on  the 
iMiemy.  La  l""ayette  was  first  assii^ncd  to  the  command  after  a  liot 
(K  l)ate  in  council  as  to  tin;  proprietj-  of  attacking-  Clinton's  army  at 
all  ;  and  (jeneral  Lee  used  the  followin.i,'  lan!.nia_L;e  when  that  assit^n- 
meiit  was  made  with  his  concurrence  ;  that  he  "  was  well  pleased  to 
he  freed  from  all  rc.s[)onsibility  for  a  plan  wliich  he  was  sure  woukl 
fail."      This  statement  is  made  important  by  subse([uent  events. 

MorL:;an's  command  was  now  on  the  British  rij^ht  flank,  and  Gen- 
eral Dickinson  with  between  seven  and  ei;;ht  hundred  men,  threat- 
ened their  left.  Durin;^  the  subse(iueiit  action,  Mor;4an  lay  with  his 
corps  three  miles  south  of  Monmouth  at  Richmond's  Mills  (Shum  'n's) 
awaitinc^  orders;  only  kept  '"rom  particip:'.tion  in  the-  battle  by  failure 
to  receive  tnnely  instructions  as  to  his  duty  in  view  of  the  general 
movement  of  the  army  to  the  front.  It  will  be  seen  that  he  sent  for 
instructions  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  souik'  ofliattle. 

This  battle  of  Monmouth  has  less  cle.uness  of  definition  than  any 
other  action  of  the  Revolution.  The  countr\-  had  not  been  re:on- 
noitered,  and  very  loose  reports  were  made,  even  by  officers  who  were 
on  the  i^round,  and  who  afterwards  testified  before  the  general  court- 
martial  which  tried  (jeneral  1  ee. 

On  the  part  of  the  British  army  it  was  a  bold  and  successf  '  tcturii 
of  the  offensive,  at  the  very  moment  when  any  other  policy  would 
have  threatened  it  with  ruin.  The  pursuit  of  Clinton  by  Washington 
was  fully  equal  to  the  opportunity.  The  limitation  of  its  success  was 
largely  due  to  the  conduct  of  General  Charles  Lee.  Washington  as  a 
matter  of  fact  made  no  rash  venture,  as  if  in  chase  of  a  disappointed 
atlversary. 

lie  neither  underrated  nor  ilesi^ised  his  enemy;  but  giving  credit 
for  courage  and  wisdom  equal  to  his  own,  measured  the  forces  that 
were  to  meet  in  conflict,  and  as  usual,  struck,  or  struck  back  as  best 
lie  could. 

The  American  army  was  fully  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy  in  num- 
bers ;  and  although  fresh  from  Valley  Forge,  was  not  wanting  in 
energy  and  nerve.  The  sujiph'  of  provisions  was  scant)-,  but  the  army 
was  eager  in  the  pursuit.  It  felt  the  onw.ird  spur,  when  the  force 
which  had  so  long  kept  it  on  the  defensive,  crossed  the  Delaware,  in 
full  retreat  from  the  old  theater  of  conflict. 

The  military  issue  between  Clinton  and  Washington  was  in  some 
elements  quite  unequal.     Clinton  must  regain  New  York.    -He  had 


I77S.1 


VROM    IMIII.ADI'.r.PIIIA    TO    M(iNMO|:ill. 


4«7 


noiliin;^  tn  hope  from  a  hatlK-,  mote  tlianaclcir  i)ith  to  Sandy  Ilook. 
His  heavy  ba;4;^a!j;c  tr.iin  restricted  his  operations  to  the  repulse  of 
an  attack,  and  rendered  .in_\'  ])rotracted  pursuit,  even  of  hrokeii  cohimn.s, 
a  fruitless  strain  upon  his  conunand. 

Hut  for  \V.ishin;4ton  to  have  shrunk  I^aek  from  that  rctreatin;^ 
army,  which  he  iiad  been  ])rompt  to  meet  upon  reasoiiabU;  terms, 
woultl  have  accredited  the  British  army  with  tliat  invincibility  which 
Lee  affirnK-d  of  it  ;  would  have  sacrificed  the  imjietus  which  the 
offensive  imparted  to  his  command,  and  would  have  made  eveiy  sub- 
se(|ueiit  issue  of  the  war  more  hopeless  or  uncertain.  It  would  nave 
canceled  tlu;  memory  of  Trenton.  It  would  h.ive  stultified  the  move- 
ment which  made  (iermantowii  a  pledj^^e  that  the  American  Com- 
mandei-in-chief  was  ready  at  all  times  to  seize  opportunit)-  .md  do 
real  hi^htiiv^.  l'",ver)-  attemjjted  vindication  of  the  conduct  of  (jen- 
eral  Charles  F^ee  has  one-  fital  defect.  He  knew  that  he  coiiM  impair 
the  standiuLj  of  Washington  only  by  such  a  limitation  of  his  success  as 
would  place  himself  in  the  foreground  as  a  wise  counselor  and  com- 
mander. He  had  only  to  act  upon  his  avowed  opinion  that  American 
troops  could  not  cope  with  15;ilis'i  troops,  and  withdraw  the  former 
from  a  test  of  their  mettle.  La  i'ayette  tlisseiited  from  this  assump- 
tion ;  but  Lee  was  in  command. 

While  all  narr.itives  agree  that  the  advance  of  subordinate  com- 
manders w.is  prompt  anil  orderly,  however  blindly  conducted,  ami  in  .i 
direction  favorable  to  success,  it  is  ecpially  clear  that  Cieneral  Lee 
made  no  adequate  effort  to  concentrate  his  divisions,  promulged  no 
definite  orders: — and  in  the  conduct  of  his  own  movements  and  the 
precipitate  retreat,  absolutely  failed  to  control  iiis  .irmy  and  keep  it 
in  hand.  His  presence  inspired  none,  discouraged  in.in\',  and  abso- 
lutely left  the  divisions  to  work  their  own  way  out  of  confusi(jn,  as  if 
there  were  no  cfficer  in  general  command. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  facts  seems  to  exclude  the  idea  that 
Lee  was  guilty  of  ;;iy  overt  act  of  treason;  while  it  is  equally  true, 
that  upon  the  b.isis  of  his  antecedent  opinion,  and  his  expectation  of 
failure,  he  did  not  make  the  proper  effort  to  render  that  failure  the  least 
disastrous  possible,  and  thus  fulfill  the  obligations  of  high  command. 

The  division  which  General  Lee  commaiuled  on  the  twenty-eighth 
of  June,  1778,  according  to  the  evidence  of  Generd  Wayne,  consisted 


)fth 


01 


lowing  troops,  besides  the   flanking  detachments  of  Dickin- 


son and  Morgan. 


In  front,  Colonel  Butler  with  two  hundred  men 


Colonel  Jackson  with  an  equal  number ;  Scott's  own  brigade  with  a 


^1 


j  ;;iU| 


27 


418 


FROM    l'im,.M>I'.I,l'lII.\    Vi)   MONMoUTir. 


I1778 


ii.(:! 


■|« 


■  i'i 


H! 


I 


!i 


ilU 

jiart  of  Woodford's,  six  hundred,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  ;  General 
Varnuni  appeared,  about  the  same  number,  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery  :  M\-  own  detachment  was  about  one  thousand,  with  two 
pieces  of  artillerj' ;  (leneral  Scott's  detachmiMit  fourteen  hundred 
with  two  pieces  of  artillery  ;  Gener.il  Maxwell's  was  one  thousand  and 
two  pieces  of  artillery,  in  all  five  thousand,  with  twelve  [lieces  of 
artillery,  exclusive  of  the  militi.i."  General  Lee  claimed  that  this 
force,  so  K)()sel)'  stated  b)  (ieneral  Wayin;,  ditl  not  exceed  four  thou- 
sand one  hundred  men  ;  but  the  force  which  Grayson  took  to  the 
fron  was  nearly  ep^ht  hundred  men,  and  althout^h  temporarily 
detached  from  Scott's  and  Varnum's  briijadi's,  it  must  enter  the 
agt;reLjate  and  be  counted  as  if  not  detached.  The  entire  force  which 
Lee  had  at  /lis  i/isposnl  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-seventh,  con- 
siderably exceeded  five  thousand  men,  altlu)Ut;h  he  took  no  steps  to 
communicate  with  Mor_L;an  and  Dickinson  until  especially  aroused  by 
Washins^ton  to  action.  General  La  Fayette  accom[)anied  General 
Lee,  with  his  consent,  as  a  volunteer. 

Position  of  tJic  Annies.  On  the  evenini:^  of  June  twenty-seventh, 
177S,  the  liritish  army  encamped  in  a  strong  jjosition,  with  their 
"  right  extentlini;-  about  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  the  Monmouth 
Court  House,  in  the  parting  of  the  roads  leading;  to  .Shrewsbury  and 
Middletown,  and  their  left  alon^  the  road  fnjm  Allentown  to  Mon- 
mouth, about  three  miles  west  of  the  Court  House."  This  position, 
well  protected  on  the  right  and  left,  and  partially  in  front,  by  marshy 
ground  and  woods,  was  regarded  by  Washington  as  "  too  strong  to  be 
assailed  with  any  [)rospect  of  success." 

The  gener.d  direction  of  the  Hritish  line  while  thus  encamped  and 
when  its  march  commenced,  was  south-easterly,  exposing  their  left 
and  centre  to  an  attack  from  the  American  troo])s,  whose  offensive 
advance  was  from  the  north-west.  It  thciefore  became  important  for 
General  Clinton  to  change  his  position  and  gain  the  Middletown  road 
to  the  sea  as  cjuickly  as  possible,  especially  as  a  march  of  only  ten  or 
twelve  miles  would  place  him  upon  strong  defensive  ground  beyond 
danger  of  successful  pursuit.  Lie  itenant-gcneral  Knyphausen  was 
under  orders  to  move  at  daylignt  of  the  following  day.  The  single 
road  which  was  available  for  the  proposed  march,  passed  almost  im- 
mediately into  a  series  of  bluffs  wh.ere  the  baggage  train  would  be 
greatly  exposed  to  attack  from  skirmishing  parties,  and  General  Clin 
ton  undertook  the  protecvion  of  its  rear  by  his  own  division  of 
selected  troops. 


I778-1 


TROM    PlIH.ADKI.rillA    TO   MONMoUlir. 


419 


The  American  army  was  nearly  three  miles  heliinJ  ICncjlishtown, 
and  only  five  miles  from  the  British  camp  ;  while  the  skirmishiiv^  ile- 
tachments  of  Mori^an  and  Dickinson  were  already  on  the  alert  for 
.strokes  at  tile  British  Hanks,  as  tlic  army  should  break  camj). 

Moniiiouih  and  Viciiiify.  The  re[)orts  of  (lenerals  WashinLjton, 
Clinton,  and  of  many  other  officers  who  enijac^ed  in  the  battle  of  Mon- 
mouth, arc  so  defective  as  to  localities,  that  some  ex[)Ianation  is  neces- 
sary to  an  appreciation  of  the  narr.itive.  The  di^>tinctinns  of  "  ri_Ljht  " 
and  "  left  "  are  greatly  confused,  through  the  changing  positions  of  the 
troops  ;  especially  .is  the  right  and  left  of  Clinton  were  reversed  when 
he  returned  the  (>ffensi\e  ;  antl  the  statement  of  officers  that  "  Morgan 
was  on  the  left  "  ilid  ncjt  become  true  until  they  commenced  their 
retreat.  Thus,  although  Dickinson  threatened  the  British  left  (link 
or.  the  morning  of  the  twenty-seventh,  his  demonstr.ition  w.is  upon 
their  right  during  their  .tdvance,  later  in  the  forenoon. 

The  Raviiu's.  The  terms  "  ravine,"  "  morass,"  "  first  stand,"  anil 
"last  stand,"  "behind  the  morass,"  and  "before  the  morass,"  ,irc 
jiainfuUy  disheartening  to  one  who  t.ikes  up  this  battle  record,  and 
they  will  receive  notice.  Three  r.ivines.  or  morasses,  as  they  are 
indiscriminately  named,  are  mentioned  by  American  officers.  Clinton 
mentions  onI_\'  the  two  which  intervened  between  his  .advance  from  the 
Court  I  loLise  aiul  Washington's  main  army.  The  ravine  (jr  mor.iss 
behind  which  Washington  formed  the  divisions  of  Greene  and  Stirling 
to  cover  the  retre.it  of  the  fugitive  brig.ides,  is  about  h.alf  a  mile  south- 
easter!) from  the  old  Meeting  Mouse,  and  about  two  and  a  half  miles 
from  Englifjhtown. 

The  early  skirmish  which  led  Gener.il  Dickinson  to  believe  diat  the 
British  army  had  not  left  Monmouth,  but  was  adv.uicing  in  force 
toward  the  hill,  was  on  high  grouml  just  east  of  this  morass,  this  zihst 
ravine,  and  was  simply  the  demonstration  of  light  troops  to  throw  off 
the  American  militia,  and  conceal  the  withdraw.il  of  their  main  army. 
It  was  on  this  hill  that  the  hedge-fence,  the  parsonage,  and  the 
orchard,  near  which  the  chief  fight  took  pl.ice,  were  located.  A  sec- 
ond ravine  or  morass,  which  will  be  c.illed  the  middle  ra\  ine,  crossed 
the  road  not  quite  a  mile  to  the  east  ;  and  on  the  east  side  of  tliis,  the 
British  camp  rested  for  a  few  hours  after  the  battle.  This  high 
ground  extended  still  farther  eastward,  and  blended  with  the  so-called 
"  heights  of  Monmouth,"  and  then  dipped  toward  the  low  plain,  one 
mile  wide,  and  about  three  miles  long,  just  east  of  the  Amboy  road, 
which   ran   from  the  Court  House  nearly  due   north.     This  narrow 


w 

11 

'  i     ^\    '^■. 

1 

)'•' 

''h 

1 1;' 

'■n 

^    ■         ■     V ; 

A 

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.'■n 

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■A 

t  %l 


;iT'1 


w 


420 


FROM    PllILADEI.PIIIA   TO   MONMOUTH. 


I1778. 


k    ' 


1 1  il^ 


!    I' 


III 

1  ■  ■) 

u  1 

t  .s 

ili 

''11'' 

1  w 

li 

plain  or  valley  where  Clinton  formed  his  line  of  attack  was  also  marshy 
near  a  small  pond,  and  aIiw^  :\  small  creek;  the  latter  extending,'  from 
near  the  Court  House  north-easterl)',  past  Briar  Mill;  and  this  cast 
ravine  is  that  which  Wayne,  V.'.i-num,  Jackson,  Scott,  Grayson,  and 
Oswald's  artillery  crossed  and  .'crossed,  and  behind  which  the)' 
retired  when  the  British  line  .idvanceil  in  force.  Just  west  of  the 
Ambo\'  road,  and  nearly  parallel  with  it,  "  so  as  to  cover  both  roads," 
is  the  lii;4h  wooded  ground  where  Lee  proposed  to  re-form  his  line, 
and  from  which,  in  fact,  the  divisions  l^ad  advanced  into  the  plain 
without  definite  orders,  or  due  reLjard  to  their  mutual  dei)endence  and 
relations. 

IVd/iT  C(>i//Sis.  Wenrock  Brook,  as  indicated  upon  the  State  Geo- 
logical Sur\'e)-  of  Xew  Jerse)',  and  recent  township  surveys,  has  been 
erroneously  located  by  most  authors.  It  unites  with  Geblard's  Branch 
just  beyond  Englishtow  11  ;ts  indicateil  on  map  "  Operations  in  New 
Jersey,"  and  map  "  B.itlle  of  Monmouth."  and  flows  in  the  opposite 
course  of  th.it  indicated  b_\-  Irving,  Sparks,  and  some  others.  At  the 
head  of  the  Manisquan,  ne.ir  Monmouth  L'ourt  House,  there  was 
formerl}'  marshy  ground,  where  its  small  tril)utaries  gathered  their 
waters  ;  and  on  the  north  side  of  Monmouth,  Geblard's  BriUich  was 
bordered  by  marshy  ground.  The  small  stre.im,  or  drainage,  west  of 
Briar  Hill,  sometimes  called  Briar  Creek,  is  not,  as  sometimes  indicated, 
a  branch  of  Ciiarles  Ri\er,  emptying  in  to  R.iritan  Ba\-,  but  local,  and 
was  crossed  at  thii  time  of  the  battle  by  a  causeway  or  bridge.  A 
small  fjrk  of  the  Man.dapan  brook  (lowed  north-easterly  from  the 
Allentown  road,  and  furnished  the  swampy  grouml  which  protected 
the  left  of  the  British  camp  on  the  night  of  the  twenty-seventh. 

General  Fcaturts.  The  low  plain  below  the  slope  from  the  Court 
House  and  the  Amboy  road,  was  quite  open  for  at  least  a  quarter  of 
a  mile,  with  woods  well  distributed  beyond  this  narrow  belt  as  far  north 
as  Briar  Hill,  to  the  Middletown  road,  on  the  edge  of  which  Colonel 
Grayson  halted  his  command,  nearly  parallel  with  the  road  upon 
which  the  British  "  column  was  marching."  The  summit  between  the 
Amboy  road  and  the  middle  ravine  was  mostly  in  woods,  with  open 
ground  near  and  just  north-west  of  the  Court  House,  where  Butler 
drove  back  the  Queen's  Rangers.  To  the  left  of  the  British  line,  after 
it  faced  west  to  return  the  offensive,  was  another  piece  of  woods  out 
of  which  the  dragoons  advanced  and  from  which  a  strong  column 
emerged  for  an  advance  toward  the  Court  House,  to  turn  the  Ameri- 
can right  and  cut  off  Grayson,  Scott,  Jackson,  Maxwell,  and  Oswald, 


1778.] 


FROM    IIIII.ADI.I.I'IHA    lO    MONMOUTH. 


421 


when  they  retired  beliiiid  the  east  ravine  and  reai-Iu'.I  the  summit. 
Ihe  i;uise\\a\"  and  liridLjcs  arc  iiulicated  uii  tlie  map;  .uui  as  late  as 
Janii.ir)',  1S76,  the  niiddltj  ra\ine  was  still  charact'ri/cii  by  taii;^Ied 
iintUrhiush  and  briar^,  as  reported  b\-  uHicers  after  tiie  battle.  I'lie 
present  road  from  En^lislitown  runs  considerabl\-  north  of  the  old  road, 
antl  tliere  i^  no  trace  of  two  old  paths  rcferrL'd  to  b\'  witiu.>SL's  on  the 
trial.  The  f.ict  that  all  the  eoniinamlers  refer  to  the  lOi'sf  ravine, 
clearly  indie. ites  thai  llu.')-  ni.ide  eoniinoii  erossing  at  its  bridi^e  :  and 
althoLi;^h  one  division  niarehed  to  the  left  from  the  Meelintj  House, 
while  other  troops  took  the  sharp  turn  to  the  rij^ht  at  the  forks,  the  two 
divisions  finally  took  two  routes,  fur  the  double  purpose  of  extending 
their  hcnu  to  pre\ent  flank  attacks  in  a  ^^enei'al  advance,  and  to  gain 
room  for  the  movement. 

There  wa-.  difficulty  in  obtaining"  guides,  and  repeatc:d  halts  ensued 
on  that  account,  (jcneral  Maxwell  says  that  he  i.dvaiiced  aloii;^"  a 
morass  from  the  Meetin;^  House,  but  crossed  the  hill  finally  occupied 
by  Cieneral  .Stirlinti'.  The  small  creek  emptyinij  luto  Lules  pond 
fulfills  the  coiidiiinis  of  his  statement.  He  was  informed  that  there 
was  a  second  road  to  the  north  leatlin;^  to  I'jv^lishtown  b\-  Craiy's 
Mill,  iuid  fears  were  expressed  that  the  Hritish  troops  would  seek 
thereb)'  to  gain  the  American  rear,  but  it  was  not  attempted,  and  the 
entire  retreat  was  finally  mad';  over  the  causeways  at  the  middle  and 
west  ravines. 


,,:(1 


Wi^f^A 


'■N  fl 


^^y-'M 


dd. 


CHAPTER    LV. 


VK1".I'.\KATI()NS   F()R'1-|II-.    I',,\-ni.l'    oK  M()\M(  )UTI[,  [778. 


I 


I 


GI:\I:R.\I,  \\ASI1I.\(.I()\,  Ihc  Anuiican  Commaiulcr-in. 
iliii'l  was  in  canii'vt  pursuit  of  tlu-  Hrilisli  anr.y  iiiuh  |-  I.iciULcii- 
aiit-;,;ciiiTal  Cliiiloii,  as  it  iiiaiili'd  Iroiii  I'liilailclpliia,  r//  route  for 
N\'\v  ^  (Ilk,  'llu'  cliai'acttT  of  tlir  Anuricau  |)t'M[)K'  ami  their  reluc- 
tance til  accept  the  restiaiuts  of  strict  authorit)-  had  theii-  effect  ii])on 
the  liNuh'T  (il  thi'ii"  armies  ;  ami  Ills  orders  were  sometimes  so  cour- 
teous, in  form,  that  the  eiemeiit  "do  ////s,"  ww^  almost  meri.n'(l  iu  a 
courteous  riUjiiost . 

Iiul  (harlc's  I  ,ee  was  a  jjrofessional  soldier,  and  knew  what  W'asli- 
ni;:;ton  m(\int.  1  le  ]<new  W'ashiuj^ton  hettei',  when  he  took  his  final 
orders,  on  tiie  L,"enty-ti;.dith  d,i\-  oi  June,  1770,  on  the  hill  by  Wen- 
rock  ("reek,  about  two  mik's  east  of  Alonmouth  Court  I  louse.  lie 
hatl  bien  in  command  of  nearly  one-half  of  the  Anurican  army  diiriiii;- 
that  da\-,  and  lor  the  thirty-six  Iiours  precech'ni^r.  It  was  liis  first  active 
command  after  his  exchani^'e  as  a  prisoiu'r  of  w.u';  and  both  at  Valley 
l'"or!4i;  and  at  Kiiu;ston  he  had  opportunit}-  to  le.un  the  tem|)er  and 
purposes  of  his  commandin;^'  officer.  ile  was  not  lelt  without  more 
tlefmite  instructions  afti'r  he  soliciteil  the  command  which  closed  iiis 
militai)'  career. 

]\'(t s // i II i^/ oil's  liisliiictioiis.  'Ihe  foUowinij  is  a  statement  of  his 
instructions,  as  understood  !))'  those,  (other  titan  (leiieral  I. eel,  who 
were  ch.ar^ed  wiih  their  e'.xecution,  and  it  is  taken  from  the  record 
of  "  l'roceedinL;s  of  a  general  (^ourt  Martial  which  conx'ened  at 
lirunswick,  Jul)'  fouith,  177S,  for  tlie  trial  of  Major-iuiur.il  Lie." 
Soon  after  noon,  on  tha-  twenty-seventh  of  June,  177S,  Washini^ton 
assenibled  tlie  senior  i;eneral  officers  who  beloni^ed  to  the  column, 
then  under  marchin;^  orders. 

GenI'.k.M.  Sco'l  T  "  heartl  General  VVii-sliington  say,  in  the  presence 


1  Ri:r.\i-;\iii>Ns  I'-or  nil'  i!\iii.i',  i>k  MDWiorni 


.y2  '■ 


nj  ( Iciii'f.il  f  ,cc,  t  he  M.ir(|iiis  (Ic  I  ,,i  I'".i)cltc.  ( icncr.il  M.i\\\  (  II  .ind  liini- 
'^rit,  t  li.il  lu'  intciiiKd  t.i  li,i\c-  the  cncm)'  attacked,  tlir  ncNl  iiiDrii" 
ill',;',  or  wurds  I  (I  t  li.it  cIKi,  I  ;  .iiul  W'.t  diiii;.M(m  di-iifil  ( ii'iin  .il  Lccln 
I'all  liis '.'cnciMl  iiHicrrs  tu^MiluT  that  altcniuun,  tn  I'niu ci  t  some  inmlr 
<if  attaik.  (inural  I.cc  appninlrd  the  tiim-.at  liall  pa-4,  fiM' ;  hut 
l)i:r()ic  tlu'  Mllicd",-,  met .  <  iriUTal  I.cc  li.id  lode  diit  :  Kil  in  \\-itli  (icii- 
ci'al  I.cc  that  (A'cniii;,;  .tiid  tnld  liiiii,  tliat  J  //ii</  .\v///<v/ . v/  //////.  iind 
(ts/cii/  /::///  ii  //(■  liitii  iiiiv  orders."  "  lie  -aid  he  had  nuiu-;  l)iil  uc 
should  not  lie  dispii  till;;  ,d)i'ut  rank ,  111  w  hat  pa  it  ol  the  hue  wi'  sIimiKl 
inari  li  in."  "  (  h/  iri'ss  <  .\'<////!//ii//i'//,"  "  \u\i\cv-.\i\n(\  that  I.cc  \\a>  to 
proceed  on,  and  \shcncv'cr  lie  nict  llu'  ciiciiiy,  to  take  the  t;arhesl 
op|)oi  tiinit y  to  atlai  k   tlum." 

(iiih'rir/  lf'rM//(' sa)'s  ;  -  "  (Tcncral  \\'a-hin;;ton  called  upon  (  icncial 
Scott,  ( iciicial  Maxwell  and  ni\-.eir.  1  he  t  wi'iity-^evcntli  o|  Juir',  to 
come  ioru-.ird  to  1  he  place  he  and  ( icneial  Lee  were  talkiii;;,  and  t  h>  re 
recoinniended  \is  to  fall  upon  some  proper  mode  o|  attackiii;;  the 
eiicnu',  next  morniii;.;," — "did  not  hear  <  ieiicral  Wasiiiiv'ton  ,i\a- an\' 
particular  orders  lor  tlie  attack;  !)ul  he  ri'c  iminenth'd  that  there 
should  he  no  disjiule  in  re;;;ard  to  rank',  in  case  of  an  attatk;  ihat  ,ts 
(ieneial  \ki\well  was  the  oldest,  he  of  ri;dit  -hould  ha\'e  the  p  eer- 
eiice  ;  l)utasthe  troop-,  th.it  were  under  his  command  \v'eie  nio-^tly 
new  K'vies,  and  therctori-  not  the  troo])-,  to  hiiiv;  on  the  .itt.ick,  lie 
tlierel'ore  wished  thai  the  .ittack  iiiidil  he  conimeiiced  hy  one  ol  the 
]iicked  corps,  as  it  would  prohahU  f^iN'e  ;i  \'er_\  liapp\'  iiiipressio"." 
"(ieneral  I.cc  appointed  tlu;  i^enerals,  w'  o  were  there,  to  meet  at  his 
ijuartiTs  .ihoiit  five  o'clock  in  the  attenioon.  which  I  undi  r^lood  was 
lor  the  purpo-c  oi  tia-min;^  a  plan  of  .alt.ick:  on  the  I'lieni)',  .laei-ahle 
to  the  n  (.cmimeiukition  of  (leiieral  \\'ashiiv.;toii."  ''At  the  hoi  r 
appointed  met  with  the  Marcpiis  de  I.i  I-"ayette  and  (ieneial  M,i\- 
wi'll  at  (leiieral  I  .ei'"s  (piarters,"  "  1  h;  -,iid  he  had  iiothiiej,  liullu'r  to 
leconmieiul,  than  that  there  should  he  no  dispute  with  reijard  to 
r,ink,  in  case  of  an  attack,  lor  he  mii^ht  order  on.  cither  the  ri;^ht  or 
the  left  uint;-,  and  In-  expectt'd  tlu_\-  woiiM  ohe)',  ,ind  if  the\-  i  unsid- 
t'red  tliems(dves  a;.;i^rievecl,  to  complain  atti'rwards  ;  th.it  he  had 
nothing;  more  to  say  on  tlu;  suhject,  hut  that  the  iroop^wfie  to  he 
u'kl  in  readiness  to  nu)ve  .it  .i  niomeiit's  wainiii;;."  <  h/  iross- 
f.\ui/iiii>tioii  :  "  I,ee  said  the  position  of  tlu'  army  niiL;ht  render  .in\- 
previous  pkm  invalid,  or  words  to  tli.it  eflc'ct."'  "  I  nn.'.erstood  that 
W(.  were  to  attack  the  enemy  on  tluir  march,  at  all  events  ;  .md  th.it 
G'oncral  VV'.isliini^'ton    would  be    near  us  to  support  us  with  the  main 


'%' 


;'^. 


:""V.„ 


mm 


'  <s. 


'm 


1 


A'" 


424 


n<i-,i'.\KAri(iNs  iMK   riiF,  ijaii'lk  i>f  MoNMourii. 


['773. 


•«. 

ll 

anil)' :— u  liicli,  i;i  its  consc'iniciicc,  must,  if  wc  wltc  i)ushcil,  incvi- 
tabl)-  haw  lirciM^lit  uii  .i  ;.';i.'ncral   action." 

Giihiiil  M(t.v:oii7,  "  uuclrrsiiH),!  l)y  what  Genera!  Washini;toii 
sail!  to  ("uiicral  Lee.  that  (iciural  Let:  was  to  .itt.ick  the  rc.ir  ot  the 
I)riti>h  .iiiiiy  as  soon  as  hr  had  inlorniation  tliat  the  "  front  was  in 
motion,  or  marched  olV,"  ami  he  fiutlu-r  mentioned  th.it  sometiiin;^ 
mi!4lit  be  (U)ne  by  ;-;ivinL;  them  a  ver\-  briik  char;_;e,  by  some  of  tlir 
best  troops.  "  (ieneral  \\',ishin;;ton  mentioned  somethin;j;  .ibont  my 
troops  -that  some  of  tliem  were  wcw.  and  in  want  ol  cartouch-boxes, 
and  seemed  to  intimate  that  there  were  some  troops  titter  to  make  a 
charj^c  tlian  tiiem."  "  lie  further  recommended  tliat  we  sliould  go 
to  General  Lee's  ([uarter.s,  at  six  o'clock."  "  The  orders  I  got  there, 
were  to  keep  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  warning  in  case  the 
enemy  should  march  off,"  "  that  tliere  should  be  no  differences  respect- 
ing rank,  or  which  shoidil  be  called  In  the  front,  right  or  left." 

Luiural  Iai\  in  his  defense  says,  "General  Wasiiington  recom- 
mended to  me  I  conference  wi^'  those  gentlemen,  relative  to  any 
1)1, m  of  operations  to  adopt  ;  buL  as  he  only  rccoiUDioidcd  the  con- 
terence,  I  oi  course  thnugiit  m\-self  at  full  libert)'  on  this  head."  It 
is  to  be  noticed  in  tlii^  comiectinii  th.it  (iener.d  Lee  knew  the  bold 
purj)OMe  of  La  l-"a\-ette.  andth.it  \V,iyne,  1  )iiportail  and  others  h.ul 
^trongl)'  urged  the  offensive,  before  the  council  of  w.ir  nekl  at  Kings- 
ton. In  hi>  defense  he  tloes  not  st.ite  that  he  was  under  an}'  obliga- 
tion to  adopt  the  plans  of  (jeneral  La  Layette,  or  prosecute  his  policy; 
nor  does  he  refer  to  Washington's  instructions  of  the  twenty-sixth. 

In  Washington's  innnedi.ite  answer  to  the  letter  written  b)-  La 
Layette  trom  Lelown.  he  sa\s,  "  (ieneral  Lee's  uneasiness  (ju  accoimt 
of  )e>terda\''s  Lran->action,  rather  increasing  th.in  ab.iting,  and  your 
l)oliteness  in  wishing  to  e.ise  him  ol  it,  have  induceii  me  to  det.ich 
him  from  this  army,  with  a  p.irt  of  it.  to  reinforce  or  at  Unit  cover 
the  Si'curd/  dctaclunoits  at  pnsciit  under  your  command.  At  the 
same  time  that  I  feel  for  General  Lee's  distress  oj  mind,  I  have  an  eye 
to  your  loishes  and  the  delicacy  of  your  situation;  and  have  therefore 
obtained  a  promise  front,  him,  that  when  he  i:;ives  you  notice  of  his 
approach  and  command,  he  ivill  request  you  to  prosecute  any  pla)i  you 
may  have  already  concerted  for  the  purpose  of  attaekingor  other:oise 
annoyini;  the  enemy ;  this  is  the  only  e.ipedient  I  could  think  of  to 
anszccr  the  views  of  both.  General  Lee  seemed  satisfied  witii  the 
measure."  Washington  wrote  to  the  President  of  Congres.s  on  the 
inorning  of  the  twenty-eighth  :  "  I   am   hero  (^Lnglishtown)  pressinjj 


t77S  I        rRi'i'AKATKA's  mii  i!!i-  nArri,!':  OK  MoxMouTH.  425 

hard  to  conic  up  with  tin:  (MU'iny.  \Vc  liuve  .1  strong;  >inil  select 
detachment  more  forwanl.  under  coininaiul  ><{'  M,ijiir-c;cneral  Lee,  lai/// 
oriirrs  t,i  attaik  their  iwir  if  possible .'' 

I"he  cjueslion  involved  is  this  :  Did  (ieneral  Lee  have  )io  knowl- 
c'ch^e  of  the  purpose  of  Washinj^ton  in  seiuliivjj  more  than  five  thousand 
men  to  tile  front,  with  the  entire  army  in  li,L;ht  marclunt;  order,  under 
pledge  to  supi)ort  the  advance? 

Doctor  (iriffiths  st.ited  upon  the  trial  of  General  Lee.  that  "  about 
one  hour  and  ,1  h.ilf  .dter  tiie  acli'in  IjCLjan."  (ieneral  Lee  stated,  that 
all  was  goin;4  as  he  exi^ected  :  that  his  ailvice  had  ever  been  contrary 
to  a  t^ener.il  action  ;  that  it  ii.id  been  determined  upon  in  a  council  ot 
officers  not  to  risk  anythiuL;  by  an  attack,  lu'tivitlistaiuiiiv:;  tliat  he  had 
that  morniiii:;  received  positive  orders  from  Washington  to  attack. 

Sniiiniarv  of  livoits.  General  Lee  atlvanced  to  EnLjlishtown,  but 
remained  inactive  until  Washini^tun  i)ressed  him  forward. 

General  La  I'a\'ette  called  duriiv.;  the  eveniuL,^  nf  the  twenty- 
seventh  to  know  if  an>'  disposition  of  the  troo[)s  had.  been  madi;  for 
the  next  da\'.  "  Lee  tliou;4ht  it  Would  be  better  to  act  accordin;^  to 
circumstances,  aiul  had  no  plans."  "  Between  one  and  two  o'clock," 
as  .stated  by  Gener.d  Lie's  aids,  "  \Vashin<;ton  sent  an  order  direcl- 
ini;  that  six  ox  eii^ht  lumdred  men  from  .Scott's  and  Y.irnuni's  dnn- 
m.inds  should  be  at  once  sent  forw.ird  to  lie  ver}'  near  the  enemy  as  ,1 
part)' of  observation,  in  case  of  their  movin;^  off,  to  '^ive  the  e.irhest 
intellii;ence  of  it  ;  to  skirmish  with  tlieni,  so  as  to  produce  delay  and 
[;i\e  time  for  the  rest  of  the  troops  to  come  up  ;  and  directiiii^  him  to 
write  to  Mon^an  to  make  a  similar  att  .ck."  This  order  was  received 
as  stated,  before  two  o'clock  A.  \\.  Dickinson  received  his  notice, 
and  (ieneral  Lee's  aid  de-camp  st.ites  that  he  sen.t  a  messenj^er  to 
Mor<fan,  but  that  officerditl  not  actually  receive  any  instructions  until 
those  given  by  Wayne  tluring  the  battle  to  a  messenger  sent  for 
orders. 

"At  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-eighth,"  says  La 
Fayette,  "  I  went  to  Lee's  (piarters  to  know  if  there  was  anything 
new  ;  the  answer  I  received  was  that  one  brigad.e  was  already  march- 
ing. As  i  considerei.1  myself  a  vt)lunteer,  I  asked  (ieneral  Lee  what 
part  of  the  troops  I  was  to  be  with  ;  (ieneral  Lee  said,  if  it  w.is  con- 
venient for  me,  to  be  with  the  selecteii  troops.  I  put  myself  with 
them,  in  full  expectation  that  these  troops  would  act  .uui  be  opposed 
to  the  British  grenadiers." 

At  five  o'clock,  Dickinson  reported  to  Generals  Lee  and  Washing- 


r, 


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NT  1 1:  I* 


■  'Mr: 


l»*^l^^t,. 


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I'. 


426 


I'Kl.l'AK  \  1  KINS    FOR     llli:    llMII.i:    nV    MONMOl    ril. 


['773. 


h 


n> 


ton  that  tlu' i.Mi.':iiy  h.id  t-oinmciiccd  tiu-ir  ni,ir'.h.  \V,ishln;_;fon  iniine- 
(iiati'l)-  sent  orders  to  General  Lee  to  "  move  forwartl  and  attaek  tlie 
enemy,  unless  vi'ry  iiowerful  reasons  ])revented,"  and  athised  (ieneral 
l.ec  that  "  the  entire  army  !i  id  tlirown  aside  their  paeks  and  was 
ad\' incin;4  to  his  sn[)i)ort." 

The  follow  i',';4  remarkable  statement  taken  from  I.ee's  defense,  is 
eiteil  in  this  connection  withont  comment.  "  I  had  no  ide.i  that  his 
excellenc}-  was  to  mo\-e  from  I'jv^lishtown,  where  1  w.is  informe(l  he 
was  posted  ;  and  that  situaiion  appe-ared  to  me  the  best  calculated  to 
support  my  corps,  of  .my  I  knewofin  th, it  country."  In  anothc-r  con- 
nection, ho  s.iys,  that  on  the  m.irch  he  noticed  th.e  hill  where  the  tlnal 
st.uiil  w.is  m.ide  to  be  an  "xcellent  position.  'I'he  movement  of  the 
troops  was  \-er\'  l(Misely  m.ide  :  w  is  simply  puttin;;  them  on  the  march, 
and  (jcneral  Lei-  did  not  in  person  superintend  that  movenn;nt. 

t(i/iv;<7  oVvn.fiw '•  rerci\  1(1  orders  aliout  iIui'l'  o'<li)rk,  tn  put  Scott's  .uul  \'ar- 
nuiii's  l)ri^a(!cs  in  rtMilini'ss  to  march  and  to  t;i\a' noini' w  Inn  tlu-y  were  rrady." 
•  I'poii  n'luirtiiin;  te,  r.oncr.d  I. re  ;il  I'aij^lishtcnvii  ;  -was  ordcrrd  to  adv.uirc  and 
halt  tlirt'f  niili's  from  the  launn.  .iiid  send  rejieited  inlelli;.;('i'fe  i>t"  llieir  movements. 
.•\t  tin- sime  time  i!  written  p. HUM"  iVom  ( li'nei.d  \\',ishin;.;ton  to  CieneiM.l  I.ee  w.is 
pi. iced  in  his  liaiids  dire(tin'4  (iener.il  la'C  to  send  ont  si\  or  eiv...  hundred  men  a-> 
a  lorps  ol  ohser\ation,  to  >^i\v  iVecjuenl  int'orm.ition  ol'  the  enemy's  movements  .iiul 
fo  ij//(7c/^'  thrill  iiit'iisc  t/uy  A  v.///  t/n/r  nuUi/i." 

"  At  ,1  disi.inee  ot'two  .md',;  h.dl  miles  troin  F.nL;lishto\vn.  \v,is  ordi  red  ti)  m.ireh 
slow  ;  shortly  after,  to  advance."  This  iiroii^dit  Ciraysoii  to  the  hrich^e  over  the  west 
ravine;  wlieic  the /f;\7  .v/^v'/'wA//.  liereafter  mentioned,  took  pl:ue. 

(Jf/iritj/  S\i>//  "  had  ordeis  .ihout  live  o'c  lock  to  follow  M.iNwell's  hiij^'.iile  ;  — 
p.issed  I-'.nLjIislitown  ;  was  ordend  to  h.alt  ;  receivi'd  .in  ordei'  Irom  one  ol  ( leneral 
l.e(;'s  aids  to  maich  in  the  rear  of  ("iei\er.il  W'.ivne's  delachmen'.  .\!ioul  thi.s  time 
tlicre  w.is  . I  h. lit  of  an  hour;  iii.in  lied  to  the  .Meeiinj^-house,  w  lure  there  w.is.i 
second  h.ill  ;  ad\'.inced  .1  mile  .iiid  then  halted,  when  sevi-ial  pii'ces  of  c.innon  were 
tired,  and  some  sm.ill  arms,  in  front  oftlie  colunin. 

This  !iioUL;ht  Si,'//  to  the  west  r.ivine  :  I  le  coiiiinues, — "  Soon  .liter  I  w.'is  ordered 
on,.ind  soon  look  a  ro.id  to  the  1.  ft  .md  ilirii  .in  old  road  to  the  riL;ht  which  hroiiijjiu 
Us  into  a  field  to  the  let't  of  some  ol  our  ti(io|is  that  were  formed  where  theii-  w.is  a 
pretty  iirisk  lirini;  of  e.einon  on  both  sides."  This  w.is  the  location  of  the /////,./ 
ikiiDinh  here.ifier  mee.ioned. 

i'itii,r,il  M ii.wii! \  "received  orders  alier  fn''  o'clock,  to  put  mv  hiii^.idc  in 
(radiness  to  m.irch  imiiiedi.iiely.  Ordered  '.lie  hriu;  ide  to  he  ready  to  m.iii  h  ;  went 
and  waited  on  <"ienerai  '.,ee.  I  le  seemed  suipiised  I  w.is  not  marciied,  .md  that  I 
imist  st,iy  until  the  last,  and  I. ill  in  the  re.ir.  I  ordered  uv  hriii^.-idc  to  the  ijroimd  I 
understood  I  w.as  to  march  by,  ,ind  found  nuself  to  he  hi  fore  (leiur.il  W'.ivne  .and 
General  Scolt.  and  h.dted  m\  hrij^ade  to  fill  in  the  '-.'ar." 

(A  temporar}'  diversion  made  by  this  briL;adc  under  General  Lee's 


L 


it:?.1 


I'UKI'AliAridNN    ll)K     Mil:    I'.Al'ILK    oj     M    i.\M   ).    111. 


4-^7 


ordrr,  uiuler  apprehension  that  the  ciicin\'  wrrc  advancin;^  1\\-  Craii^'s 
Mills,  far  to  tiic  north,  was  coiintcrniandrd  I)\-  our  nf  \\'ashin;.aMn's 
aids.) 

"Came  hack  to  my  former  position,  waited  a  coiisiderahK"  time  before  General 
\V;i\ne  and  (nner.il  Scoti  jjot  jiast  nie  ;  linn  1  lu.irelicd  in 'lie  rear.  'J'liere  wcrr 
thri'f  jiretly  Luj^^i:  li.dls  ht  fore  1  ^ol  up  within  .i  mile  of  i!ie  (."ourt  House.  Tlie 
M.ir(|uis  (ie  I..i  l\i\(tli'  inlnrnicd  inc!  lli.it  it  w.is  (lenir.il  l.n's  wisli  tli.it  we  slimild 
kee[i  to  tiie  woods  as  ii'  ucli  as  |iossil)le  ;  tiiat  as  1  had  a  sni.dl  party  of  niiluia  liorse 
he  desireil  I  siiould  keep  these  horse  |)retty  well  out  u|)(in  niy  ri.i.;hl."  This  liirlii 
hcirse,  I. a  F.iyette  h.indled,  ,is  here.itU  r  .i[ipears.  "  It  was  thereabouts  that  1  iuard 
some  lirin<;;'  ol' e.mnon  and  sni.ill  arms." 

Tlus  rtlers  to  the  third  thiniiisli. 

"  The  m.ircli  w.is  pretty  r.ipid  from  that  ]>l,u-e,  and  1  fillowed  u])  Ciencral  Scott 
u:itil  I  n'lit  the  Iront  of  tny  hri.^.idi'  in  the  clear  (ground,  (.ciirral  Scott  w.is  about 
(lie  hundred  wirds  in  my  front."  |Si-e  map.)  "  I  did  csprct  th.il  (ieneral  ScoU  \\ciuld 
have  moved  to  the  riLjht,  .as  there  w.is  .i  v.ic.inev  between  him  .and  the  other  ti'onps. 
hut  while  I  was  i  idinj;  up  to  him,  I  saw  his  troops  turn  about,  and  foi  ni  in  column,  .md 
(icnei'.il  Scott  cominLj  to  nt'ct  me.  He  told  mc  our  tnxijis  were  retreatinj.;  un  the 
ri,i.jht  and  we  must  i;et  out  of  th.al  place  ;  liiat  he  desired  his  cannon  to  go  along 
w'th  me  as  there  w.is  onlv  one  pl.ice  to  get  (ner  that  mor.iss  (th('  east  morass)  and 
he  Would  get  out  of  th.U  if  he  could.     I  oidcred  my  brig.ide  to  r.iarch  hack." 

(.u/irict/  ll',n;!,- :  "  rccei\ed  orders  to  ])iep.ire  and  march.  Hiving  m.iri  hed 
about  a  mile  with  a  detachment,  there  was  .a  halt  made  in  Iront.  Half  .an  hour  .after 
received  a  nu'ssage  bv  one  of  licner.d  Lee's  aids,  to  le.ive  mv  detachment  .and  comi 
to  the  front  and  take  comm.ind  of  the  troops  m  front,  th.it  it  w.is  .a  post  of  honor. 
When  1  .iirivefj  there  1  found  about  six  hundred  rank  .oid  liie.  with  two  pieces  ol 
aiiiileiy  from  Scott's  .ind  Woodford's  brig.ides,  .md  (iener.d  V'.irnum's  brigade  dr.iwn 
U|)."  "  S(  ott's  .advanced  up  a  morass,  the  oth.ei-  in  rear  of  it."  This  w.is  just  at  the 
close  of  the  //>v/  skiniiiih  at  the  «'.  .^/  rai'i'itc. 

"  Upon  notice  th.it  the  enemy  were  advancing  from  the  Court  House.  General 
Lee  (hrecieil  that  tin;  troops  might  he  formed  so  as  to  cover  two  ro.ids  that  were  ie. 
the  wood.s  where  the  troops  h.ad  achanced  and  formed." 

"  Colonel  liutler  witli  his  dct;ichment.  .and  Colonel  J.ickson  with  his  detachment. 
were  ordered  to  the  front.  Colonel  liutler  Ibrmeil  the  adv.mce  guard  and  m.irohed 
on.  The  troops  took  up  again  the  line  of  march  .and  t'ollowed  him.  When  we 
arri  "d  ne.ir  the  edge  of  some  open  ground  in  \iew  oi  the  Couit  I  louse,  we  observed 
a  body  of  the  enem\'s  horse  dr.uvn  up  on  the  north-west  side,  between  us  .and  the 
Court  House.  Gener.d  Lee  ordered  the  troops  to  h.dt.  and  by  wdieeling  them  'o  the 
right  they  were  reduced  to  a  pioper  front  to  the  enemy's  horse,  though  th.en  under 
cover  o*  the  woods,  (ieneral  Lee  .md  nnself  were  advancing  to  reconnoitf:r  the 
enemy.  In  advancing  a  piece  lorwarii,  ( iener.il  Lee  received  some  message  which 
Uoiiped  him.  I  went  on  to  a  pl.ice  where  I  h.id  a  fiir  pros|iecl  from  my  glass  of  the 
-Mieiny.  Their  horse  seemed  so  much  .adv. meed  from  the  loot  that  I  could  hardly 
percc-ive  the  movement  of  the  foot,  which  induced  me  to  send  for  Colonel  lint ler's 
detachment,  an<l  Colonel  J.ickson's  detachment,  in   order   to  tlrive  their  liorse  b.ick. 


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177S. 


This 


I  till  n  (|i'iM'h'-i|  I't.irt  (if  I'.iillcr'^  jicdplc  wlm  r!ii)\c  the  lidrsc  into  the  vill.r.;i 
w:is  the  Si-t  Olid  ■i/:iri)iish  hfrcit'tcr  miliiid. 

••  I  ('(iulil  |)i  irrivc  the  cDi'Miv  wiir  ininiiii;-  t'n)rn  lis  in  vcrv  i;rc,it  (lisunlcr  and 
(•onriisiun.  In  .ilimt  icn  or  lilicrii  miiiuli's  ihi'  en  mv  ni.ulr  .1  halt,  :\w\  ;\|i|)(Mrc(l  to 
lir  t.ii  nun:;'  ill  .-Tiiiic  urdci-.  'I'his  iiilt  niL;<'ni  c  I  sciil  hy  one  of  mv  voliuitt'tT  aiils  to 
("ill  ( i.il  I.ti-,  .mil  ni|iiisifil  ti)  il  ilic  lumps  iiiiniil  be  jjiisiicd  on.  It  was  Cnni-ial 
l.i('\  orders  tlial  1  sliouid  advamc  wilii  I'oionrl  riutlcr's  (Ictat:!,  aciit  and  CJiloiul 
laiksnn'i  liflaihiiirnl.  I'pon  adv  iiu  inj,'.  tiic  ciicim-  took  up  thrir  lint,'  of  niarrli  and 
hi'L;an  lo  iiiovr  on.  I  crosscil  ihi'  (i-asli  mioimss.  ahout  tiii('c-(|Marlcrs  ot  a  iiiilr  cast 
of  tiic  Court  House,  ( north-e.ist)  near  to  the  ed;^e  of  ,1  road  ieadinL,^  to  Middletown, 
near  tiie  foa<l  whfiv  thi   enemy  were  marchin'^r  n])on. 

'•Tile  wiiole  of  the  eneiii)'  llien  in  \iew  iiaited.  I  advaneed  a  piece  'a  siiort  dis- 
laiiee)  in  tront  ol  tiie  troo|is,  upon  a  little  eminence,  to  have  a  view  of  tlie  position 
.ind  ot  their  movements.  (>ur  troops  were  adv.uicin^^  and  li.ad  a, rived, it  the  edj^e 
lit  1  morass  r.ither  east  ol  the  t'ourt  House.  The  enemy  then  adv.inced  their  liorsi-, 
ahnnl  ihi-ee  hundred,  and  .diout  t\\i)  Imndred  toot  to  cover  them.  The  horse  tiien 
m.ide  .1  full  rh.ir'.,fe  on  Colonel  liutler's  del.ichmi-nt,  :\ni\  seemed  delermineil  upon 
^.uniiii,''  their  rii;ht  ll.mk,  in  order  lo  throw  theiiiselves  in  between  us  .and  our  iii.iin 
liody  which  had  hailed  .U  the  nioiMss.  He  broke  their  horse  bv  a  wi  11  directed  lire, 
whiih  r.ui  "  the  hoi.-.e"  .imon;;  iheir  foot,  hi'oke  them  and  curied  thi-m  off  likewise. 
(I  las  w.is  the  t/i/tif  skirmish.)  W'v  h.id  not  advanced  .above  two  Inmdred  \,irds, 
before  tliev  bei^'.ui  to  open  three  or  four  pieces  of  .irtillerv  upon  us,  'I'hev  inclined 
liisl  to  oiir  ri^ht,  in  order  to  ,L,^,iin  a  piece  of  hit^h  ;.;round  to  the  ri^ht  of  where  I  fiy, 
ne.iiK'  in  Iront  of  the  Court  House.  1  sent  off  .M.ijoi-  ISiles  to  desire  our  troops  that 
Were  in  \  lew  .and  in  front  ot  the  morass  to  adv.ince.  ( )ur  .iitillery  beef.an  to  .answer 
theirs  from  about  .1  h.ilf  ,1  mile  in  the  re.ir  of  liutler's  deiachment,  when  M.aior  Biles 
reUirned,  and  informeil  me  thai  the  troops  wen;  ordered  to  rep.iss  the  moiass,  ,ind 
tiie\-  were  then  retiiin;^  awv  it.  I  L;,illiiped  up  to  the  Marquis  de  I-.a  l'"a\i-tte,  who 
was  in  the  rear  of  I,i\ini(ston's  or  Stew.irt's  reL;iment,  who  said  he  was  ordered  to 
recross  the  mor.iss,  .and  form  ne.ir  the  (."ourt  House.  Irom  th.it  to  ihe  woods.  I  aj^.iin 
sent  to  (icneral  lee,  askini,''  th.it  troops  mii^ht  be  broiinht  up.  M.ijor  lilies  or  M.iior 
I'ishbourne  returned,  .and  infoi-med  me  th.at  the  lroo|)s  h,id  been  ordered  to  retire 
from  iIk;  Court  House,  ,ind  that  they  were  then  relirinj,'.  About  the  same  time  one 
of  (leneral  Lee's  aids  tolfl  me  th.al  it  was  not  (iener.il  Lee's  intention  to  att.ick  them 
in  front,  but  he  intended  to  /dkr  tlirm,  and  was  iirep.uini;  a  det.ii  hment  to  throw 
Upon  their  left.  I  then  crossed  tlit!  r.iviiie  myself,  .and  went  with  Gener.il  .Scott  to 
the  Court  House,"  but  "  after  viewini;;  the  irround  about  the  Court  House,  sent  off  one 
of  my  aids  to  (General  Lee  to  reciuest  him  th.at  the  trooiis  mi^lit  aj;,iin  be  returned  to 
the  pi. ice  they  h.id  left.  At  this  time  the  enemy  did  not  appear  to  be  .abo\e  two 
thousand,  .about  a  mile  dist.mt  in  front,  movinj,^  on  to  jj.iin  the  hill  before  mentioned. 
A  tire  was  kept  up  of  cannon  between  us  .and  the  enemy  at  this  time.  Major  Kish- 
bourne  returned  and  informed  nu'  that  the  troops  were  still  retreatinjr,  and  that 
Gener.al  Le<'  would  see  me  himself.  Allerw.irds  I  perceived  the  enemy  be;;iii  to 
move  rapidly  in  a  column  toward  the  Court  House.  I  aL;.iin  sent  .M.ijor  Leiio.\  .and 
Major  Fishbourne  to  deneral  Lee,  re(|uestini;  him  at  least  to  halt  thetroojis  to  cover 
General  Scott,  and  that  the  enemy  were  adv.ancinj;',  and  also  sent  to  order  Colonel 
liutler  to  f.ill'back,  as  he  was  in  dan!j:er  of  lu'inLf  surroundc'd  and  taken." 


!   »> 


1778.1 


I'kl'.rAKA  1  in\s   FOR     IIIK    lIAI'lir.    OK    MONMnrin. 


429 


"  (iciuT.il  Ia'ciIu!  lint  .r;  liii  ;_;<it()  tlur  I'lont,  hut  fell  back  with  the 
rctrc.itin^f  troops,  then  ,1  iniK-  in  the  irar." 

Colonil  '"fiiih'son  "  n'('i'is'<'il  mdci-,  limn  C'nlnnrl  I'lioiik-.,  .KtiiiL;  Ailjut  iiit-[,n-ni;nil 
of  I.cr's  Dn  isidii,  111  l.ill  in  ilic  rr.ir  ul  M.ixwfU's  l)ii.L;.iilr.  Thric  was  sdiii'' nii->- 
iindi-ist  iniliii^'  lu'twi-cn  ("u'urral  Si  (iit\  ilri.irliincin  ,1111 1  ( 'i(  lur.il  M.i\\scH\  hrii^adc, 
fiy  tmlli  I'liinin;^  iiilii  till'  ni.id  al  llu-  s.iiiic  liini,  anil  I  Irll  nillir  irar  nf  (Iciinal 
Scott's  ill  lai  luiitnt.  W  liilr  I  was  ilinr  I  rcrcivcil  .irilrr-,  in  juin  the  ailvanrc  ;^nai(l 
iiniiir  the  riiMimaiul  ul  (.'iilnnrl  I'lUllrr.  \Vc  iiianlicd  tuur  or  li\r  nnlri  "  ( li  oni 
l''aij;lisluii\\  n  t  "  when  \\i-  (lisciArn-d  Uic  liicniy  I'sMoiiiinnilli  Coiiii  I  lousr,  a  ;  aii\  ol' 
luiiscand  a  |iailv  ol  inlaiiliy.  Colonel  IJullcr  was  ofdcit/d  oil',  and  I  inia;,rjnc  (i:o|-- 
ri'itly  I  I') /all  in  l)iiwi.-cn  iImI  |iai!\al  ihr  l_  onil  Ijon-M'  .id  linn"  main  body.  .\t 
this  lime  tlir  iliMsion  nndrr  ( Inin.il  I.n'  li.illril.  'rliiii  lanic  onln  ■>  iVmn  ( irniT.d 
\\'a\ni,-,  (of  my  (Itlaihnirnt  to  nnnii  diairly  join  l.'olom  I  lliiilri.  I'liloirthat  1  had 
ofdi'rs  from  (icncral  Lit  to  suppoia  t'olond  ()sw.ild  with  his  aiiill'i\.  L'pon  thesi' 
iirdris  coniinji  lioni  (irm-ial  \\'a\  nr,  ( 'irnri.d  I. ci' 01  dried  nic  oil  innnrdiali-Jv  to 
join  Coloml  iliiilrr."  Colonel  J.irkson  lin.dlv  ;;.iined  a  position  upon  the  li  II  (sne 
map)  ,ntd  tlpis  deseiihes  it.  "1  did  not  like  my  position  .U  all,  .is  there  w.is  a  morass 
111  my  rear,  .-ind  .i  luii^ht  tli.il  romm.inded  the  morass.  I  ask;'d  Lienlen.iiil-roloiud 
Smith  if  he  >}.'i\  not  think  it  lust  for  iiie  to  rross  tlie  morass  and  jiosl  iiuself  on  tli-j 
lieii^lit  that  crowiU"!  it.  lie  asked  il  I  had  , my  orders,  1  .inswered  no.  lie  m.idi' 
replv,  "  for  (lod's  s.ike,  don't  move  wilhonl  \ou  have  orders.  I  desired  him,  or  he 
offered,  to  l;o,  ,ind  see  if  there  w.is  ,m\'  person  to  L;ive  me'  orders  ;  returned  in  ,-i  few 
tniiuitcs  and  'old  me  there  w.is  no  [lerson  there.  I  lold  him,  I'll  risk  it  .ami  cross  the 
inor.iss." 

deiuniil  /'tiiiiiiJii,  "lode  forward  to  discover  the  number  ,md  situation  of  the 
enemy,  siioilly  .ifter  the  <'iieinv's  horse  h.id  ch.irLji'd  Colonel  liutler's  det.ich- 
ment  ;  then  roile  in  ijuest  of  (iener.il  Lee,  ,ind  oiiend  to  t.ike  a  dct.'ichment, 
and  li\  t.ikiiii;  .i  ro.id  upon  our  K-li,  to  double  their  ri.L;lit  llank.  Coneral  Lee's 
answt'r  \v,is,  1  know  my  business.  A  few  minutes  .ifierw.irds  I  s.-iw  the  M.irqiiis 
de  La  F.iyette  direct  tloloiiel  Liviiii.;ston's  ,ind  Colonel  Stew.irl's  rej^iments  to  m.irch 
tow.ird  ilie  enemy's  letf,  and  I  was  inlorined  by  the  M.miuis,  that  he  was  directed  by 
General  Lee  to  j^'.iin  the  ('iiemy's  left  Ikmk.  In  this  time  there  w.is  ,a  cinnonadiiijf 
(rom  both  parties,  but  principalU  on  the  p.irt  of  the  enemy.  I'lie  \i.irqnis  did  not 
i;.iiii  the  enemy's  left  tiank  :  as  I  suiiposed,  it  w.is  cii-cisioni  d  by  .a  retre.it  th.u  li.id 
been  ordered  to  the  vill.ii^e,  I  presimie  l)\  (Iener.il  Lee,  as  he  was  ]M'esent  .md  did 
not  contr.idict   'l." 

Tlii.s  inovcmciil,  which  tlclaclied  llu;  ri'oiiiiciUs  ol"  Stewart  ami 
Livincrston  from  Wayiic'.s  brii^ade  was  tliat  wliich  is  hereafter  referred 
to,  under  notice  q{  third  skirmisli,  uhicli  induced  the  retreat  of  the 
entire  American  left. 

Lieulciiaiit-colonel  Os7vahi,  "joined  Scott's  and  Vainuin's  brii^Mdes  with  four 
pieces  of  artillery,  June  sixteenth  ;  ath.ilfan  hour  .ilier  one  in  the  mornini^  of  the 
twenty-eiehth,  we  were  assembled  in  ih'.'  rear  of  Kn).;lisliio\Mi,  marcluHi  into 
Englishtown  where  we  were  detained  for  a  jfuide.     The  two  l)ri;^acles  under   the 


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430  ri<i:i'AkArinNs  i-ou   riii'  hai'I'M'.  oI'  M(  inmoi' i  h.        \[--f. 

lunmi.uiilor  (.'(iliincl  ( '.r.i\  ^oi),  ,ii|.Mn(('(l  tow.inl  .Muiiin'Miih  ('i.nri  II.it)-,c.  When 
we  ic.n  hdl  till'  liist  inniass.  just  in  \\"<\\  df  il\c  pusiiinii  .ilicrw  .ird  -  t.iki  11  1)V  l.nid 
"■ilirliiij^f,  wr  llicii  III  ri\  I'll  intrlli'^iiii''  ill  It  tin-  riiciin  wnc  viT\  mar  us.  C'niiinci 
(Ir.ivHoii  anil  iiu'-i'lt  rmlc  up  m  Imni  u|iiiii  \\\v  hill  wlicic  we  t'luitid  (icnc-ral  |)Hkln- 
siiri  with  a  l\-\v  inililia.  (olnnrl  ( '"laysDU  llu'ii  aiK.iinKl  with  his  iij^inn'iit  where 
thf  militia  w  elf  cMLiaL,'''!!  anil  I  JnllnvMil  w  iili  one  |ii(\c  nf  artilli-iy.  \\  liiii  ur  l;iiI 
ill  limit  ol  ilic  hi  ili;r-iii\v  "  lalii  |-,' aiils  a  pnint  n\  m  si-,tani  ri  "  wr  saw  im  ciiiiny, 
<]cn(  lal  l.cc.  ( '.( lU'ial  W.uiir  and  sunii'  ntliir-.  rmic  uM  Id  iiinnnuiiir  ihr  cnriiiv. 
I  i('iia\(il  n!i!(ts,  as  I  siip|ii/sr(l  tinm  ( 'unrral  l,i  r,  tn  jniii  Srnit  ami  Wuiniin's 
hri^ailis  U|)i'n  ihr  hill.  At  ihi-,  Inid'^r.  (ihr  wcsl  ra\infi  wr  liad  iin^^cd  ^iiid  ic- 
iTusscd  twi)  iir  ihnr  timis,  in  iiinsr(|uiiiri'  nl  thr  ink  llii;ciue  \\c  had  rcicivcfl 
bcini;  \a;^iir  and  iim  rrtain.  (.'ulnnrls  liallci's  atiil  jaiksnn's  ics^iniL'iits  (aiiir  ii|) 
and  were  ad\  ancci,!  ni  mw  tmni,  in  thr  rnad,  Srott's  md  \'a  in  inn's  brigades  t'oUuwini; 
ihi  111." 

'I'lir  siil)-i(|iunt    iiiii\riiunt>   1)1    l'iihiiii.1    (  )>\\,il(l   arc  ciuiiiKiird  in 
tliv   (uilliiic  n|  the  lliiiil  skifmish.  altrf  lie  (.To-.scd  tlic;  cist  inoi.iss. 

I  .iiiiliiiiinl-ii'linul  Urooki.   .11  tin;,'   ,\iliiilant-;4incr.d,  "  in  ii\  cd   llu-  mdrr  I'lniu 
CieiuT.il  W.ishinu;!''!!  tn  111. ikc  ihr  driail."  .dir.idy  nntnid,  "  .dimit  one  o'l  Im  k  ir  the 
morniiiL,':  tiny   Iul;  in    thru-   iimI'  h    ;di'int    six;  .ihoiit   si.ACii,   W'.iviu-'s    and    Smll's 
(Iftachnu-nts,  .M.ixwrH's  hri^-adr  .md  jai  k^uii's  '.mps  lnllowrd.     I   niik'  fni'w.ud  ami 
tiiiind  Ciiiui.il   Lrr  ,it   ihr  .Mcciin;;    ll.iusc  i/t'  l''rcfhulii.     lntilli.L;i.-iici.'  ot'  ilv   iiiusi 
ci)iitr.idii.'tiiiy   li.itnic  w.is  inunuiitly    lirmi-ht  (.rmr.il   l.ei-.     This  occasiiinud   \'ai- 
nu Ill's  hii^.idc  and  a  p.irt  uf  Sintt  's  in  pa-^-.  ,11 11 1   ii|i.iss  the  li/idi^'c  "  (west  \:\\  inn 
s<\('i.il  tiiiHs.     (ii  nn.il  I.cr  llDW  -^aid  hi'  woiilil  p.unn  f.iithir  ri'^.ini  to  intt'lli'.;inrr. 
Imt  wiuild   niaiih   tin-   wlinlt'  iiiiiiiii.ind   .md  rmU'.ix  ur  "n  lind  thr  cnciiiw  and   kiinw 
their  ciinditiDii  fur  himsrll'.     I'm    tii:>   piiipnsi'   Jarkson's  detichmeiit   was  orde  nl 
truiii  the  rear  to  iuin  the  ad\  ,inrr  1  i>i  ps,  the  11  nn  in  and  ot  whirli  was  ahuul  this  tinu- 
^i\eii  Id  I'leiiei.il  W.ivnr.     W'lihiii  \irw  ul  Mdinnnutli  Ciiiii  t  I  Inline,  thr  re  w.as  .1  h,dl 
lor  .III  hmir,  111  whiili  intrrv.d  <  irner.d   \.v\-  rrcoimoiirrrd  the  eiieiii',,  wlio  put  on 
the  aiipr.iraiK'c  of  retiring;  honi  the  Court  1  louse  somexs  h.it  prei  ipit.itely ,  .mil  m  di^- 
ord(  r.     When  they  ii. id  retre.iled  .ihout  .1  n.ilr.on  the  Midilletowii  road,  tiiey  iialled 
,111(1  loiim  d   on   hii^ll   rrduml.      ('.enn.il    !,ee   olisr'.-ved,  that  il  ijii.'    lioiU    now  in  view 
\\  <  re  all.  or  near  .ill.  lliat  \\i  le  hit  lo  i  (i\er  the   retre.it  o|   the  iii.iin  liod\ .  instead  ol' 
p.ushiiii.;'  till  ir  rear,  he  would  h.ive  them  .ill  iirisdneis  ;  lie  iii.irched  his  main  hoilv  ii> 
^aiii  the  eiieiin 's  le.ir.  lea\in,i.j  (iener.il  \\  i\  iie  with  two  nr  ihree  pieees    ol   aitillerv 
to  .iiiuise  the  eiirmy  ill  front,  hut   not  to   push  thrill,  lest  his  projei  t  siiduld  he  liiis- 
traled.     ,\tter  eoaiiiiL;'  into  the  pi. liil,  about  ,1  mile  Ijelow  the  Court  House,  I  observed 
the  lie.id  of  ( leiier.d  I.ee's  roUimii   lllinif  to  the  ri,!.,flii,  tow.ird  the'  I'oiirt   lldu-.e.     .\ 
caimoiiadin;;  had  now  taken  pl.iee  between  us  .md  llii^  enemy.     When    1   e.une   in 
tiie  re.ii  of  Si  oil's  del.icliiueiit  1  perceived  a  ver\  ,L;re.it  inler\al  between  tli.it  ,iiul  the 
front  of  Maxwell's  bri^.ide.    I'pon  C.em'r.d  .M,ixw<-ll  seeinj^  iiie  he  .asked  if  I  h.ul  any 
orders  from  Ceiier.d  I.ee.     I  told  him  Iliad  not.     .     .     (ieiier.il  Si  oil  came"  up  about 
this  time  and  obser\ed  tli.it  our  troops  were  ^oini(  off  the  tield   tow.ird  the  Court 
lliiiise.    I  le  .isked  me  wlutlu  r  It  w.is  the  case.    1  told  him  I  knew  nothiii}';' of  it,  il  it 
was  so.     liurini;  this  time   all  the   lolnmns  exi cpt  M.ixwcll's  were  moviiiL^   toliie 


'        Al''' 


177S.] 


I'KKrAKAiKtNs  I'Ok   iiii':  i!\rri,i'.  ^i'   \ins\ii  ui  ni. 


1  'I 


ri);hl.  AlIi  r  liavinu;  seen  scvcr.il  l),itl  I'liniis  p.is-i  "  I  frp.iss)  "  llii-  i  nine  I  niiinuil  t.i 
l!iL'  point  wiiric  (irncr.il  M.iwvdl  w.is  .ind  tdimd  (Iriifi-.iK  Scdit  and  Miwvll 
Staiulinj;  lii^iilu-r.  llincr.il  M.iwmII  a^.ini  askid  nir  it  1  lia<l  any  oidns.  1  I'lld  him 
I  had  not,"  "  1  rude  inwaid  ihc  ra\  inc  to  liiid  (icnrral  l,ir,  but  llndiii}^  the  (muidv 
were  |iushini(  ihat  \sa\,  thoiiujlit  Ix'-^t  to  ii'tuiii  and  came;  round  the  ravine  and  t'oiind 

(ieneial    1,'C   a  1)1  nil   a  i)U  llle|-  of  a  mile  tlli~.  ilde  "  UVest )  "  ol'  the  Court    1  T  ni^"'.       He 

said,  ymi  see  our  situation  ;  luit  I  am  deterunnrd  to  nial<e  the  hest  ol  a  bad  b  ir;^ain. 
The  troop~,,  III  a  very  (-'asy,  itio(.,  rale  and  ici^oilar  \va\  i  oniinued  their  miirji  until 
ihe\  iiad  passed  the  ravine."  (niiildie  iavine|"in  iVoiit  of  Can's  House.  Cpon 
askm;,'' se\eral  ollii  els  who  appeared  to  (  oinm  ind  the  b.iltalions  whv  the\  lelt  tlie 
j;roiind,  the\   s.iid  it  was  hyCieneral  Le(   s  and  tin    M  iKiiiis  de  I, a  l'"ayettc's  orders." 

ImiiKiliately  .illcr,  lln:    batllf  dT   MoiiiiMulh    took  pliicc  ;   ('n.'iin.il 
Washiiiotoii  ill  [icrsmi  i  unim.mdiiv^. 

(_'if/^/.////  S'/,',-,',///,  of  till,'  artillery.  "  was  on  eouiin.uid  with  the  M.iniuis  de  La 
l''a>file.  (Iiiihe  lo.id  to  the  lelt  of  Moiuii'iuih  Court  House,  about  a  mile,  and  about 
hall  .liter  ten  tj'eloi  k  in  the  day,  1  heard  ihe  diseh.irL^e'  of  several  pieces  of  eanuoii 
.ind  some  iiuiskelr\  m  Iront.  1  iniinediaiel\  uulimbeied  my  pieees.  .  .  .  lieii- 
ei,il  Lee  e.ime  up  and  ordereil  me  to  liml)r  r,  and  !>(■  ready  to  march  on  immedi.iiely 
tow.ird  the  ciiem)',  low.aicl  .Monmouth  lamrt  House;  at  the  ^iine  lime,  (ieneral  \''ar- 
num's  briLj.itlc  .mil  the  Marfpiis's  di't.iehmeiu  obliipied  lo  ihe  ri'^lit.  Icaviii:.;'  ( leneral 
.Scott's  bri;^,lile  .uul  Cohiiiel   j.iekson's  colp-,  more  on  tlie  li  It." 

Colonel  Slewarl  ol  W.iyne's  biinade  .lsi^ed  i  lener.il  j.ec  "where  he  should  t.ikf 
his  men,"  alter  the  retreat  bet^.m.  .uid  he  .mswcitd.  •  I. ike  them  to  any  place  to  save 
their  lives,  pointin.i;'  to  an  oich.inl  in  front." 

iiifi/(U')i  .l/cr<  rv  ,  .lid-de-c.imp  of  (Imei.il  I.ee,  s.iys,  "  I  w.is  sent  by  ( ieiiei.il  Lee 
with  .111  order  to  ( iener.il  I  )i.'kinson,  to  inform  him  lii.ii  he  intended  to  .ittai  k  the 
enemy  ,is  soon  .is  he  w.is  ceil.iin  of  their  march  lor  Miihlletowu.  About  one  o'clock 
in  the  mornin,i^  we  were  w.iked  up  b\  .i  ieiter  from  (iener.il  W.ishiiiL^'ton.  si;.;ned  by 
Colonel  H.iniilton."  .  .  .  "  After  Colonel  Cir.iyson  h.id  m  uched,  1  w.is  orilered 
by  (KMier.il  Lee  to  write  to  the  M  arciuis  de  L.i  l''.iyette  th.it  he  mi,;^iil  imiiudi.Uely  jiut 
himself.it  the  lie. id  of  W. unci's  and  Scott's  dtt.ichnii  iiis.  I  don't  coiu:ei\e  th.it  the 
troops  Were  r(.id\  befn.'  ei^ht  o'clock  ol    lall'-past  ei'^hi,  .it  whicli  time  i  ••'lu-ral  Lee 


set  out  from  his  (|u,iiters. 


Sul 


)se(|Uin!lv,"  .is    s 


it.ited    ill  report  of  t/i/'i  d 


sldimi^li,  '•  the  three  rej^iinenls  in  Geiier.il  Wayne's  detachment,  Colonel  Wesson's, 
Stewart's  and  Li\ii!;4sions  were  ordered  to  the  rii^lit."  "The  enemy  were  then 
III archinsj  b.u  k  .ii^.iin  to  the  t'ourt  House.  t'Hiier.il  Lee  s.iid  he  believed  he  was  mis- 
i.ikeii  in  their  slreii;.;tli,  but  .as  ihev  were  returninu;"  to  the  Court  House,  there  would 
be  iiu  uec.isioii  to  push  th.u  column  further  to  the  let't,  .is  they  were;  in  the  re.ir 
alre.idy."  At  this  point,  the  retreat  of  Cii.iyson,  Scott,  and  Jackson  h.ui  become  .i 
iic'cessity.     "  He'  then  ordered  me  to  Scott,  with  orders  for  him  to  h.ilt  hi-,  column  in 

ders.      I  .isked  him  where  I  should  lind 


liie  wtiod,  and  continue  there  until  further 


Cieneral  Scott,  as  I  had  not  been  there  when  the  front  of  the  troops  filed  off.  He 
jioiiited  to  the  wood  over  the  r.ivine,  and  told  me  I  should  find  them  tin-re."  I  made 
what  speed  I  could  to  the  r.ivine,  but  my  horse  bein;.;  V(  ry  tired  I  w.is  some  time  .i 
Koiiiy.     1  touiui  yre.it  diiiiculty  in  p.ibsinj,^  it  as  it  w.is  vers  deep  and  miry.     When  I 


,•  r 


;-f;||f 


•c    .A 

f  ■;::..-| 


•3    i  ! 


M 


*iU 


ifr- 


\ 


flit 


m 


432 


rkKPAKAlIONS   I'OK    TIIK    HAITI. !■;   <t|.    MiiWKH    111. 


imi. 


goi  iiviM  lo  the  (iiluT  sidi',  I  iDimil  CdIoiicI  Jiickson's  rcj^'iincnl  ntiiin^'  ovrr  llii; 
i;ivmc  an.iiii.  I  look  ;i  transient  I'nlil.idc  view  of  tlif  (?n<:rny  ;  the  p.irly  ncari'sl  lis 
srcined  to  I),  a  liiivfuii;  of  ailillci  y  ;  :i  lolumn  of  llii'  I'lwiny  appealed  at  a  >;rt'at  dis- 
laiicf,  man'hin;j  toward  the  C'oiirl  House  on  llie  ii^;lil.  1  supposed  they  ini;^dit  iir 
aliniil,  iiul  i|Milr,  lliiic  ||i(jus,iiid  iiii  11  ;   tli(  il'  lioise,  \ ery  consideiahle,  in  my  idea." 

Tills  officer's  tcstimoiu'  is  iiiiniatcrial  tNicjd  as  il  slmw^  tlic  want 
of  system  witii  wliieli  tin-  aiiny  was  liandKd.  'I'lie  ti  >t  iiiioii)'  of  1  .a 
l'"a\'(tte,  Kii'ix,  and  tuiiity-seveii  onieers  not  eited,  sim])ly  iiidiiate'- 
one  fact  ;  tlial  t  lie  division  was  luver  coiicentr.it(.'d,  fei'eived  no  deft 
nite  orders,  and //(^//r/Av/  itself.  The  apolo^'y  for  tlics(;  facts  will  be 
found  ill  the  fL'C(-)r(l  of  thi;  liatlle. 


\    *' 


M^ 


CIIAI'IKR    LVI. 


THK  HAITI.I.  n|-  MONMolI  ril,  1778. 

1 1 1'.  Rattle  of  Monii'.oiith  was  foiij^lit  cluriiii;  the  afternoon  of 
Jiiiic  twi-nty-fi^fluli  177H,  at  Wetirock  ("reek  in  Monmouth 
('<iiint>-,  New  JiTscy  ;  (leneral  VVas!iin;^ton  ami  (iciunal  Sir  llcnry 
C'linlini  in  pi  rson  rLS[)i,-ctively  coininandin;^^  the  American  and  Rritish 


T 


arinii: 


r 


ic    ori'-nial  purpn^c  o 


t  tile  Anirrican  ( ominaiuh.-r-in-ciiief 


lias  jjccn  airead)-  slatrd.  I'lic  division  of  (General  1  ah;  advanced  too 
late  in  the  niornin;^  to  realize'  that  jjinpose,  nd  the  niismanaj^ement 
of  the  troo[)s  after  the}'  marched,  as  certainly  inqxMiled  the  whole 
armj'. 

Tin;  criticisms  of  the  battle  of  Monmouth  do  not  ajjprcciati;  that 
rel.uiiiii   of  the  two  cohunns  which  ''avi-  to  five   thousand   ^American 


ru\uu 


just 


where  (jenera 


W 


isn- 


uuon    the    ilaiik,  or  re.ir  of  a 


troo[)s  an  immense  adv,uilaL;e,  by  st 
iiv^ton  expected  the  blow  to  fall,  ; 
marchin;.j  column,  covering'  at  least  four  miles  of  heavy  road. 

The  prelinn'nary  movements  alre.idy  adverted  to  in  the  evidence 
cited,  will  be  a;^ain  nijliced  for  a  more  definite  appreciation  of  the 
battle  itself. 

T/h-  Jiisf  skiniiis//,  Wd<,  that  of  Dickinson's  reconnoiterin^   party, 


on   the   hi! 


J 


usl 


.1st    of  the  west    ravim 


bet 


ween   seven    and    eui 


ht 


o'clock    in   the  mor 


select  detachnu-n 


t,  b( 


nint^.      Colonel   (irayson   had   advanci'd   with    his 
yond  the   l''reehold  Meetini;  House,  half  a  mile. 


General   Dickinson  sent  a  messei 


I'j-er 


to   Washington  and    Lee  with 


notice  of  the  British  retreat,  as  carlv  as  five  o'clock  in  the  mornii 


Wl 


ten  Colonel  Grayson  ai)[)roached  the  first  ravine,  he  "  saw  firi 


11'' 


and  a  party  of  militi.i  ri'trealiiiLj  from  tlu-  enemy." 

General  Dickinson  was  then  cn^a^ed  with  a  small  flankinj;  party 

which  had   been  detached  from   the  liritish   left  wing,  and  which   he 

erroneously  supposed  to  be  the  advance  cjuard  of  their  returnini^  army. 

He  .sent  for  aid.     Colonel  Gniyson  crossed   the  bridge  with  one  regi- 

r8 


li 


! 


■.'■J 


!  'U 


m 


i '.   i 


''W  n  T 


f   ■    J  ,■ 


!  ^  I  It 


■\'\ 


III     l!\  I  I  I  !•:    <>!•    M(.S\|i  il    I  II. 


rr* 


nu'iit  ,iiiil  iiiic  nf  < )  ,\smI(|' ,  ;;uns.  ,niil  just  ,i  v  lir  .i-.i  riijrd  ihc  lull,  llic 
Hrit  isli  n!  ii(  (I.  (i'lKi.iI  I  ,i  c  .n  i  iviil  sn.iii  ,ill>i.  At  tlii.  t  iiiir  t  lure 
was  thniiMi"li  (iinlii  .i.iii  m|  .■|imi(  hi  ^  as  to  tin-  |ii.-.iti(iii  and  iinu'ciin  iit  - 
i<r  til'  >  iH'iin  .  (iiiKi.il  |)uUin.iiii  ( laituc'd  that  lli>'  l'>iili<!i  wtrr 
ret  111  iiiii ;;  Il  iiiii  th(  (  cull  t  I  T  m  ,r.  (  )t  Ikt  iiifi'i  iiiaiil  .  statril  t  hat  t  In  ■ 
were  iitK  atin;;  tnw.ml  M  ulillil  1 1\\  ii.  I  h'  !<•  was  soiiir  hmsu.,  I'm  the 
jtci  sisl(  111)'  With  wliiih  larh,  "  wiili  mic  ii-'it  "  pic-.'.cij  ilicir  viiws, 
as  till  ic  had  liciii  III  I  i<  t  Minii  li  ,„iiu  ■,  in  t'ou-c.  ( iciui.d  lac,  lii)\M'\'<r, 
iiisiaccj  that   till-   I'litih  .iiiiu'  //././  n  tnatcd. 

(iciKial  (liiitiiii  elates  til, it  "  I  iiiiti  iiaiit  'Mil'  lal  Kiiyph  aiis-'ii 
in.iii.liid  ,it  dayh;dit  :  ..;id  that  in'  dr  riiidi-d  into  tlir  plain  .it  it  .,t 
o'rJDik."       Thr  Litciiunls  th.il  tlir  Hiitidi  had  lrri,,iiii|  that  tln-s'  h.id 

lint     li-ll,     WTIi'     inir-iaillt     with      tllf     l,ut,    .1-     l.lliiWIl      tn     till'    dlHil'flll 

iiii'ssi'ii;.;rrs,  siiicr  ( ii  in  i.il  I  )i'  kiii-,i  m  n-lri  1 1  d  tu  t  hr  lai  l\-  iin  "Viimait  ; 
and  t  111-  [lie  SI  I  U'l'  1)1  (  hut  1  ill's  di\i  ai  111  in  mi  t  iii-  (  i  mi  i  lie  m  ,i'  .uul  i  a 
thr  ll.inki  1-.  with  ulmni  In  i  iiya;'/ d.  iinliu  id  tin-  inist.ikcn  'i|iiiiiiin 
th.il  till'  .limy  itself  li.id  rctnniril  li>  t.ikr  tin-  nlliaisivi'.  .\s  the  rrsiilt 
i)i  liiis  iiintiisii)ii,  t  In  l)ii;;.idis  i.l  ."^intt  ,iiid  \'.iiniiin  .ind  ('dIhiicI 
|)iu;.;i;l''s  :i'L;iiii(iit  *iii,-^cd  .iiid  KainsMil  the  wrst  i.iviiif  sc^timI 
ti!!i>  .,  ,is  st.itid  li\    tliiisi'  (ilTurr^. 

riir  p)  iWiihc  oj  some  toiiliiilliity^  mini/  u'ii.\  r.iiliil :  Irmips  wcii- 
i.i|iid  ly  I  iMu  I  lit  r.it  ill ;'  and  haltiii;;,  iint  il  ,it  l.i-^t  ( irinaMl  I  ,(c  pnslnd 
(  fill  iinls  I'liit  111' .iiid  j.uk.iiii  |i  a  \\  .nd,  cull  with  Iwm  himdiid  iinai, 
.111(1  tin  n  w  I  lit  in  pir.nn,  tn  n  iiiniiuiti  i'  the  pn-iiimi  As  siiun  ,is  ( irn 
cr.il  1..1  iMycttc  .iiiivid,  till'  wlnilr  dixiami  rnis,'  d  tin-  r,i\iiii'  .md 
.uU.iiK  111  ti  iw  .11(1  ihct'iMiit  lliiusi.  It  had  hriii  ili>( '  i\  I'll  .1,  liy  t  his 
liiiic,  .illi  1' nine  n'cli  11  k.  t  h.it  tin  I'liitidileU  w  iip;  h.id  (  lit  iiely  hit  the 
;\lieiitiiwn  1(1, id  ,ind  w.is  ni.iuhiii';  ti  iw  .in!  .Muldletnw-ii.  I  he  nppm 
tuiiit)'  I'nr  strikiii;;  it  dii  the  Kit  tl.ink,  uiiiU  ^n  !M(.itl\-  i-\t(n(i( d,  liiut 
Ihilt  lust. 

I  lie  second  skirmish  y  ww"^  with  a  siii.dl  rcir  imi.ikI,  iidrth-wcst  <>f 
the  I'oiirt  Il'iiisc,  wiieii  !?nti(i',  tlnn  in  adv.iiuc,  .utiin,;  under  the 
orders  (it  ( iem  imI  \\'.i)iie  (1iii\  <■  li.uk  tin.' < 'inen's  r.iinu'is.  l,u  {'.lyetle 
with  .1  lew  h;.du  hoisc  tioiii  .M.ixw  ell's  liiif'ade,  p.issed  lieyuiid  the  ( '(unt 
llonse  into  the  al.iiii,  tu  retoiiiniiti  i ,  ,md  there.ir  tMiaid  ol  the  Ihitish 
arm)'  was  tin  ii  ".i  mile  in  .kKmiuc."  \V'.i\  ne  h.nl  t.iken  a  pnsitinii  mi 
the  left  of  tli(j  road  ica(iiii<;  tn  tlu;  C'diiiI  I  lousi;  "  h.iviiiL;  been  .issi;;iu:(l 
to  the;  po.st  of  lioilor,"  as  stated  by  (ieiier.d  I.ee,  with  orders  to  pr(.-ss 
li_i,ditly  u])on  the  British  rear  t^iiard,  and  to  hold  it  until  a  movement 
could  be  made  to  cut  it  off  from  the  main  column.     As  soon  as  the 


.7:^1 


'I  in:  r. \i  ii  r.  <ii    \io\\iui'  ni. 


r>^ 


niH'cn's  r.m;;(rs  wen-  diiviii  t  lim'.i'Ji  IIh'  \illr;'',  <iiiiii,il  \V',i)'iif 
li.i  .tfiicd  (  "mImik'I  MutK  t  .  fii-i-,  tl\i'  <MSI  r.u'i 111-,  anil  ]>l.n  id  In  ■  ilrt.u  li- 
mi'iit,  with  I  w'u  ;',iiii-.,  u|iiiii   .i    -mmII   riuinrni  r  jn  tln'   |i|,im,  u'liilf  the 

titlicr    111  i;;,|ilcs   uric    tolliiw  ill-;    tln'    ",rll(l,ll    Ic.nl    n|     t  llusc   ill   .11  Iv.llHr, 

until  tiicy  I'll  iiircl  .111  in(';Mil,ir  line  ,1-,  t.ir  .1.  liii.ii    llill. 

Ilic  third  skiniiisli  tui)k'   pi. ire   jm->I    .iliri   jiullii  n-.n  lnil   tlu.'posi- 

t  i.ill    I.I    t    ft  ■t'TP'd  111,  .111.1    wllilf  t  lie  t  lcii)|i  ,  we  IT  !!l'»\in;'.  1 1  Mill  t  Ik'   U'DO'is 

111, II  till'  .\!iil)ii\'  III, III,  III  the  |)l.iin  l)i\iiiiil  till-  ci-^t  i,i\ini',  uiiilri  the 
j.M'iirr,il  (111  III  imi  III  (iiiiiT.il  \\',i\iii'.  Ill''  Miiti^li  li;;lil  i|i.i;',miiiis 
III, nil'  ,1  (  li,ii  ;i'  upmi  ('iiliiiii|  Miitirr  w'liii  h  w,is  since  v^fnily  rcpiiKfil. 
( "1  ill  mil  ( ii.iysiiii  w.is  in  .idvaiu  r  w  il  li  .111  mi  1 1,111'  to  In  .  Nil  ;  jn  k  .mi 
•  ilnMit  ,1   hiiiidrcil    y.mls    in    Ills  ir.ir ;   tliiii  "^intl    ^  iincwli.it    dit.uliiil, 

.mil    M.l.WScll   nil    the   i(l;'i'   iil't'ic   lll'ilMs-..       (iLiysull    w.ls    i  11  |i  il  I  lln  I    |)\',i 

iiU'sscn"iT  Imiu  (iiiu  i.il  W'.unc,  tli.il  lie  nui -t  Imld  lii^ ''nniiid,  .is  tln' 


■iii'iiu'  w.is    iTtnin'f, 


i.illiiiiiil    In    l.uk-ii 


11    til    niiiii'  .iiiiI    f'iriii 


ill)' III    till'    lull,  I 


Hii.ir  llilli  npiiii    liis   li'li,"       I'liis  iiiiivi'iiunt 


W  ,IS   I  illC 


wliiiii  I  111!  itriii  d   Knyiili.iuscn'-i  luliiiiin,  jn-.l   ulun  it  w.i  ;  Imiiid  in  ,i 


oil'.'  di'l"i!i',  ,ini|  ( 'lintnii    \v,i    .it 


I  IIIlT 


iri  iiHiil  til    .111  ivit  \'  to    s,i\'c    t  he 


'''':',;;■':  V  '  I'li"    whii  li    lie  suiiposi'd  t  lie  ,\mrrii  ,ins  wtif   ,it  I  I'll  I  pi  in;.;  to 

.itl.U'k.        ('iijolli'l     I.ul.soll    (lis|-("i,lli|i'il    till-    rciplcst    ot'  ( 'i  ilolli'l  (  il.lN'-MiIl, 


.iiisc  ill'    li.id  no    .iililJi'iA'.      Scott   wMs   tlic'ii  .1  littli     to  tl 


ir    li'.ir  .III 


1 


ii'dit  o|      .icksoii. 


M 


l\UT 


■xpi'c'tcd    .Sc'ot  t     to   lllo'.c-    to   tile    II   "111,   to 


11  illl    I  111 


\v 


l\'lli',  do-,!'     t  Mr    ".ip,   ,1111 


t     llllll     into    till'     line 


\V 


IVM' 


li-,llUvllili;  lli'ld   till-   I''.'imcMlts  ot   Wesson.   .Stew, ell  .  ,illd    I  ,i\in' 'stoil     .) 


Illl-.l 


llii'  li-i't  of  V.inuini,  tl 


II 


ii  r  into   tilt;  plain,  am 


ivcT  Hilt  In-  with 
alsi I   to   CI ivcr  (  )- 
V 


wlloiu    In: 


.idv.iiuc'd  still  fur- 


art  1  lie  ly,  wlii 


■Il    1 


C'll      II. Ill 


r.iw  II  I  wo  ai'ditioii.ii  '.miih  Ii'i  nn   v  .11  iiiiiii  s  In  1 '.Mile,  .md  w.h  cm  li,m 


ill';  shots  with  the  .irtiljeiy  o|    the   enemy 
;  St. ill"  told  ( Ir.u'soii  th.it  his  pl.i 


M.ijor  Meii cr  of  ( iei 


lel.il 


I  ,c'e  s  st.lll  told  ( ir.iysdii  tll.lt  Ins  ])l,li  e  w.is  111  I  lie  re,  11  ol  \\  ,i)-lle,  who 
li.id  no  ri;,.;ht  to  order  him  to  the  |)ositioii  he  held  on  the  k-ft.  (ieii- 
cr.il  Lee  states  th.it  "  he  sent  M.ijor  Mercer,  ind  then  .1  second  officer, 
with  express  orders  to  (ic.'iier.il  .Scott  to  hold  his  |)osition."  As  ;i 
ni.itter  oj' fact,  (irayson  had  part  of  Scott'.s  comm.ind.  .md  hotli  were 
so  .issociated  willi  W.iyne.  t  h,il  when  \\v  moved  tow.ird  the  Court 
Mouse,  ;is  subse(pienl  1\'  ordeicd,  the\'  followed  his  movements,  and 
received  110  intim.ition  th  it  thc:y  should  h.ive  dmie  otherwise  until  tlu; 
inoveineiit  was  actu.illy  made,  and  the  while  ariirc  w.is  velre.itiir^,  oy 
det.ichnnciUs,  before  the  advance  of  t he  I^ritish  ;irm\'.  The  .\meric.ifi 
troops  h.id  deployed  (]uite  ,it  their  own  discrc;tion.  <  )sw.ild  m;iin- 
tained  his  L;iins  in    position  until   his  amnumitioii  was  exhausted,  and 


|«!'':l 

■In 


lT  ^i 


m 


^! 


U' 


)M 


j''/i. 


in  I 


1^ 


,1  \. 


ik\ 


M- 


•l.'l! 


II 


a 


43^' 


'IIIK    1!A1  ri.K   OF    MOXMOJ  lir. 


['778. 


t'.icn  retired  behind  the  inorass.  Tliere  he  met  Gen<T,d  Lee,  \vh() 
ordered  lii'.n,  upon  obtainin;^  ammunition,  to  continue  tnin;^f,  anil  tiiis 
was  done  over  thi'  heads  of  liutler's  adv.mce  det.ichment,  ;ind  with 
i;reat  d.mger,  accordin;^  to  the  evidence,  ofdoini^  injmy  to  those  troops. 
At  this  stat;e  of  tlie  contlict,  Gener.d  Lee  siuit  orders  to  Gciier.il 
\Va>-ne  to  move  toward  the  riijjlU,  ne.irer  the  Court  House,  where  tin- 
enem\'  were  threalenin;,,^  a  mos-cinent.  The  reLjiments  of  laviiii^^tou 
anel  Stewart  Ije^.m  thi'  mo\-eiiu'nt.  This,  for  want  of  mdrrs  to  tlu; 
coiitr.iry,  was  considered  b\'(irayson  and  Scott  , is  ,i  L;i'ni-r,d  retreat, 
and  that  o[)iiiion  w.is  conhnned  by  tlie  evident  pressure  of  tiie  Hritisii 
left  toward  tlie  C'ourt  Housi'.  while  their  ciuitre  imd  ri^jht  emer;^fe(l 
from  the  woods  into  the  plain,  thu^  thre.itenitv.;  to  sever  the  American 
line,  alre.ul)'  weakened  in  the  centre,  and  cut  olf  the  re;.Mments  which 
were  on  the  lefttowaiii  Hii.ir  Hill.  ihe  .ir,  ;iery  had  not  returned, 
and  w.is  [jl.iyiiv,;  from  time  to  time  in  the  rear  of  tlu;  mor.iss.  Gra\-- 
son,  Scott,  J,ickson,and  V^irnum  recrossed  the  morass,  ,ind  with  M.ix- 
well  entered  the  wood  u[)on  the  hill  west  of  the  Amboy  road.  It  was 
not  until  then,  that  the  messen^^ers  from  Geiieial  I^ee  intimated  to 
General  Scott  that  he  \\,is  to  rem.iin  steail)'  on  the  left.  TIun'  coni- 
inunic.iled  carders  to  re-form  the  line  in  the  woods  on  the  hij^ii  !.;roun(l, 
the  ri;4ht  restini^  on  the  vilkr^e.  General  Lee  st.ites  that  In-  supposed 
the  houses  were  of  stone,  but  when  he  found  that  tlie  villai;e  w,is 
open,  and  the  houses  were  of  wootl,  he  fell  back  before  tlu'  liritish 
adv. nice.  General  Lee  says  "  the  retre.it  in  the  first  instance  was  con- 
trary to  my  intentions,  contrary  to  my  orders,  contrary  to  m_\'  wishes." 

l^ut  the  entire  division  w.is  in  f.ict  retre.ltinL.,^  tpiickened  ,'it  this 
time  1))'  his  orders  ;  .md  the  left  wiiiLj  only  saved  its  connection  with 
the  main  body  by  .i  m.uch  throu;.^h  the  woods,  leaviuL;^  their  j^uns  to 
the  chart^e  of  Colonel  d-^w.dd,  who,  with  his  few  ukmi,  brouL;ht  olf  ten 
pieces,  after  takiiiLj  but  two  into  action  .it  first.  It  was  at  this  period 
that  .1  messenj^er  from  Gener.il  Morj^.in,  "  havinij  in  v.iin  soUL^lit  for 
General  Lee,"  ap]jlied  to  Gener.il  Wayne  for  instructions,  and  w,is 
informed  that  "  he  could  see  the  condition  of  things  fur  himself,  and 
report  the  ficts  to  (iener.il  Morgan." 

Thus,  before  eleven  o'clock  or  half-[)ast  eleven,  the  British  column, 
which  h.id  been  retreating  by  the  A[iddlett)wn  road,  had  forined  an 
olilique  front  .to  the  rear,  extending,  .according  to  the  evidence  of 
General  Knox  and  Colonel  H.imilton,  who  saw  *'  no  signs  of  any  plan 
for  tlie  cooperation  of  tlic  different  Ameriean  brigades  in  resistance  to 
the  Diovementr  from  Briar  Hill  to  the  marsh  cast  of  and  near  llic  Court 


,::l 


'77' 


nil',    IIATI'LIC   OF    MiiWlor  I  II. 


437 


Mouse.  Tlic  Britisli  tnj<)])S  ;ippc;irc(l  in  tlic  ccl;.^t;  of  tlic  woods,  hardly 
a  mile  dist.mt,  ami  wcm'c  variously  c^tiinaU-d  at  troin  fifteen  luiiidred 
to  twenty-five  hundred  men.  The  toree  ot  Lee  then  dis[)osabK'  for 
attack  or  resistance,  if  propeil}-  in  h.ui  1,  was  not  less  than  three  timu- 
sand  mt-n,  l)esidrs  Grayson's  detachnunt.  Wayne,  durin;_j  the  hour 
and  a  half  while  he  w.is  in  tlu;  jjlaiii,  M.nt  thit:e  times  to  ur^^e  (jcner.d 
Lee  to  advance  with  tlu'  tro(i])s,  ,iiid  as  he  states,  refrained  from 
pressing  the  attack  too  stronu;')'  under  iiistruLtions,  and  constantly 
expecting  th.it  (ieneral  Lee  would  carr\-  the  l<ft  wing  .iround  the 
right  of  the  British  line  to  cut  it  off  from  tlu;  main  body. 

(icneral  Lee's  ])urpose.  as  understood  by  (jeiieral  \\'a\-ne.  .md  as 
stated  b)'  Lee  himsi'lf  raas  to  so  swing  his  left  .iboiit  the  Brilidi  right 
as  to  A//(-  /i'h//i,  and  he  also  states  that  wluii  lir  notified  (jeiieral 
Washington,  who  sent  to  learn  the  i)rogress  of  the  .irin_\-,  that  he  was 
confiilent  of  success,  he  supjiosed  the  iiritish  rear-guard  not  to  exceed 
fifteen  lumdred  men.  His  estimate  was  eoiri'ct,  at  the  time,  .is  his 
whole  division  w.is  then  pressing  to  the  from,  eager  to  engage  the 
enemy;  but  , it  noon  the  British  army  ii, id  reah/.ed  the  we.ikness  of 
the  ])ursuit,  and  g.iined  time  to  turn  it  into  .i  fiihire.  (ieiie-r.il  Lee. 
in  his  (U'fense,  ridicules  the  .ipplic.ition  ol  (jeiur.il  W.iyne  for  support  ; 
but  ///'/  in  connection  with  his  st.ilenient  that  he  placed  him  ,it  the 
post  of  honor,  ne.irest  the  enemy,  and  with  the  l.irgest  control  which 
any  subt)rdin,ite  officer  h.id  over  the  movements  of  the  picked  troops 
then  in  front,  (ieneral  Lee  .admits  lh.it  he  sent  ikj  messenger  to 
Washington  to  advise  him  of  the  retre.it,  and  in  his  .ippeal  to  the 
Court  Martial,  st.ites  th.it  lie  could  a])preci.ite  the  feelings  of  W.ish- 
ington  wdien  the  column  rolleil  back  u])on  him  without  |)re\ious  notice 
of  disaster;  but  th.it  when  he  met  Washington  and  exch.mged  wonls 
with  him.  he  did  not  know  that  the  men  had  thus  disorderly  fallen 
back  upt)n  the  main  body. 

77/r  retreat.  The  British  .irmy  emerged  from  the  woods,  ;ind 
l^ressed  tow.ird  the  Court  House.  (Jeiieral  La  Fayette  first  reported 
to  Gener.il  Lee  that  the  right  w.is  thre.itened,  iiaving  previousl\-  been 
checked  in  his  adv.mce  of  the  .\meric.m  ixlreme  right,  by  (ier,er.il 
Lee's  personal  direction.  General  La  I'ayctte  then  consulted  Gen- 
eral Wayne,  and  placet!  the  regiments  of  Livingston  and  Stewart  in 
position  to  resist  the  British  advance,  which  was  steady,  solid,  and  in 
good  order. 

The  details  of  the  retreat  of  different  brigades  and  regiments  .ire 
not  to  be  consiilercd.     An   entirely  erroneous  opinior;   prevails  as  to 


•■  HI 


\\\ 


\ 


<\i 


■rhi' 


ii 


.  •'. 


438 


I  III    i;\  iii.i:  'ii    \i()\M(  ,1111 


i77« 


f*    * 


(■       ! 


Ill'  If  IjiIi.u  iDf. 


It    1.    Irih-   Ih.i!    ihcr 


r  was    M)iML'  CMDlii  iMii,   t  liroii'/r 


want  ol  (line  aiil  limital  ivc  (lii<M  timi  nl  tlicir  iii'iviincut  ;  hut  it  is  to 
1)1-  ii'it  ic.il  thai  t  lidc  \va  nut  hi  u",  mI'  i  h'-  nat  iir<-  nf  a  iianir.  Nd  i  miii- 
iiiaii'h  |-  l<iii-\v\\li\'  hi-  ii't  ii-at.il.  only  that  sik  h  uci'-  iiixlrr  ,t  ooil  to  ])<■ 
ill''  oi'h  I    .  and  t  iiat  ol  li'-r  -  f-t  mmI  i-d,  aii'l  no  t  roo])-  conM  ii  a  v  ralli'    1 


Illoi  ' 


lir'anptly  tiian    tli'-ydiil,  uli'ii    th'v  hli   t!i'-  pri-s'-ii 


.f  W 


I  .  1  - 


ni;',t')n.      'i'II'ImI    I.'i-   'h'  •  iv-s   c f-dit    lor   • 
])iirj)i;  '■  to  liiiiv;  till-  111'  n  awav  in     al'ty,  v.  1 


l-P')ssc  ;  ,1.  j|)      ;ii|,|     ,1     ii-.il 


I'll    111'   I'Mlll'l    he  (  '  Jlild   n')t 


lianil 


t  111'  divi  a'di,      'III'     troop-,   hail    ni.inlicd   .anl   ('oiiiit' rnian  ii''il 


iindir  Mind    "iii'laiM'',  diiiiii"  .<    dav  of  i\lri-iiii'    hiat,  'A'-  i''  lallin"  1 


)\' 


the  way-'idi',  lainliii".    \vitli    thii    1,  and    worn  out,  with    no  ■  tiinulai  ')( 
lioiii-  to  liojil  t  h'  ;ii  Mil,  and    !  Iii-  riti'Mt   ol    Momiioiith  \sa  -  tin'  vii  tory 
ol  manhood  o\'i  r   i  \i  i\'  i)o   ahh-    ill  ,<  o'li  a^rnii  nt  that  coiild    l)r|all    an 


irni-^t  army  in  par  nit   ol    a  I'-l  ii  iiv;  ad 


\'i'r  -ais' 


l\i"iiii'  lit  alt'  r  ri"i- 


iin  n 


t ,  hri'Mi  |i'  all  ir  Ini'Md'-  lia~t  i 


III  il  to  cross  till'  west  ia\ini',  and,  i' 


Ills  (  It  dit,  I ,'  I  (  imi'  with  till-  la  t  I  olumn.  ,\t  tl;  i^  point  tin-  l)iol;i  n 
d('ta(  i  mi  I '11  Is  I  on  ml  tin'  main  arm  v.  Soni'-  w  <  iit  to  it-,  i'  ar  t'l  rfst  and 
rally  tor  a  Ire  h  advaiu  ■  in  tin'  'Wiimi".  Soiih'  tiirm'l  ahont  and 
(on; 'jit  ant  il  t  Inii  pni  ana  -,  I't  ii'  '1  li'  an  lip  liil'l.  '  'oloiiid  '  );;ili  n  s.i\  ., 
lie  lic'ii'd  (nan  ral  Max  \'  il  to  halt  lii<  f  Miii'iit  ami  lac'  tln'  <!ncmv, 
aii'l  li''  did'-o  without  iliiri(iilt\.  I  111'  divi  i'Mi  ol  (iiiiiial  la'cwas 
sa\'i 'I  li\'  1  li.-   'ill-i)o-scs-ion  ol    It-   oHi(  I  I -,  and  t  hi-    \sondiilni   i-iidni- 


y"//.'  (iniviil  of   ll'ii'//- 


atu'i-  ol  t  In-  rani:  .\]\'\  lih'. 

/'//(  iir,/' ii/  I'/  Willi  V  I'ni'yy  siirci/  ///«■  unm. 
iiiy^fmi  i'i\l(ii-,il  II . 

Ill,  lunirtli  V/'//-////'.//,  di'Vclopi  d  till'  li.\lll,i  ot  M' i\  \I' )l '  III.  It 
was  as  coii'-pKU' 111-  loi  tin  ■  prompt  111' -^  of  th''  A  mi'iu  an  t  loops  to  respond 
to  inti'lli;Mi)li,'  ordi'i-,  and  lor  i  i  ^idity  in  |io-it  ion  mnlir  tin-,  as  t  hrir  fir^t 
cxpo^nri'  to   t  iir  1  nciiu'  iiad    Ic'ii    nm  ova'rin  d  and    I'losil)'   prc^riilcd 

Till'   (.'aiinoiiadin'a    liilorf    noon    aroiis'-'l     \\'alim"toii    to    Iiis    full 


li;',lilin';  capaiilV'.       I  In'  ntnrn  'il    his  aid-d'>famp  with    tli'-  a-siiraiua 
tiiat  (iciK'r.iI  I,<'''    li.i'l    o\-i  rtaki'ii    the  |{ri'i-'h   arni\'.  ami    i  xpcctcd   t' 

d,  wa-,  rci.ii\'''d    as  a  vimln  ati'in  'il    lin  pn-vion- 


t'Ut  olf  their  rear-"nar 


jiid  'im  lit  and  a^  .in  < aiieii 


ol    smarts. 


Il''    t  roups   dropped    every    III 


I  iimliraiKc   ami    Ion  ed    the'   iiiarcii.      (iieeiie    to'ik-    the    ri;;ht   .it    thi 
,\!i  '  t  ill"  I  ioiiM',  .iiid  Slirlin'.i  led  the  left  direi  1 1\  tow.ird  the  hill  w  liei: 


he  siili-'iim-nt  1\' t '  lok  his  itroti"  'lo^itioii. 


Ill 


e  v.i.rMi ai'l  iiii'l'-r  W'.isli 


in;jti  III  .ippi'i 


.idled  the  hrid'"'  .il   t 


le  \V(  si  r.i\'imN  when  ri;pe,ite(.  inter- 


ruptions of  Ills  pri);4ress  be^an  to  w.irii  him  that  liie'   !)ittl<'  w.iited  for 
the  presi.iK  I-'  of  the  L"<Jinin.iiid(n'-iii-cliief. 


177^1 


I  III-.    liAII  I.I,    oj      NKAMdi;  I  II. 


■\yj 


I'ii  ,1,  ,1  inniinlcd  (  nmit  iaiii.iii,  tln-n  ;i  lii;;liti'nc(l  fii;;itivf  fifcr.  loM 
liis  story.  "  .\ltri  .1  fc\\-  |i.ir(  ,,  \\\n  uf  tliici-  iiMic  prrvui.  .liil,  lli;il 
till'  ('(iiitiiii-nt.il-.  wnc  ni  rr.it  m  ;,"  I'll''  wli'ili-  i  .H'-ir  mM  li.n  l^- ,  I  .l(• 
\\,l^  c|iii(  kly  liinir'lit  Ii)vi<"A'.  V,i;mi'- .iii'l  p.iiiiful  Ml  ,]ii<  i')ii  ,  ,iiii|  iiimic- 
p.milul  .i|i|)ii-li<'ii-.ii)ii ,  ,irMiis>il  W.i  iIiiii;MMii  tMiliity.  ilirii.Mii  .mil 
l''it/;^ii,il(l  wdr  rli  ,|).it(  li((|  I'lliml  out  \v  li.il  \\,{.  tin  iiiittii'.  'I'lii')' 
met  M.iioi  '  (•■liiii.  Ili,  r\-])|.iii.ii  iDii,  t  loiT'jy  (•.\|>litivi\  w'.is  'iiiniil), 
"  I  li<y  .in-  ll\  in;.;  Iiom  :i  -Ji.kIow."  <  XJu  ci  .liter  oCrKcr,  <l't  .k  liim  iit 
.illiT  (ii't;u  liimiit.  I  .imr  ii\rr  \]^l■  Ijiidyc,  ,ill  .ilil.i-  .iiiiMimioii  .  in  tli<'ir 
ri-jilic^,  or  I'Mior.iiil  of  the  ( .tn  .i-  of  tlnii  ri-tn-.it.  ('oloncK  .iini  ;',iii- 
(•r,il  ■.  { .11111-  \s  itli  hiokcii  ( 1)111111.111(1  .,  .ill  kno\s  ill"  |  li.il  tlu-y  wi-rr  ret  icit- 
in;;,  hill  U'l  Mile  ,il)!i-  td  s.iy  iiion-  til. Ill  til, it  iiic'li  w  yr  t  111- ordi  rs,  .uid 
til, it  "  tin-  wlioli-  r.iiti  ,li  .irmyuM,  jn  ,t  luliiinl."  \V,i  liiii;;t'Mi  li.i  .1  iiiiil 
lo'A'.iiil  tin-  liml'i-  .iinl  iinl  l<,iii)-.ry  .uni  Sti'.v.nt,  \\'.i_\  in-  .iinl  \'.iriiiim, 
<  )>\\,ilil  ,iinl  1  .iv  in;,;  -toll.  I  .^|)oii  t  iniii  In-  tlin-w  tin-  hni  di-ii  ol  nn  i-t  in;.; 
till-  I5i  i!  i  .li  1  m1  II  III  II-,,  .Iinl,  li  .111  111;;  tin-  u  ,i\'.  In-  plio  d  t  iniii  I'li  tin-  lull. 
On  tin-  lilt,  ill  I  111-  i;d;;i-  of  tln-wond-,  In-  r  ,t  .ihli  In- d  K.iin  .i-y  iinl 
Sli-w.iit  with  1  wo  ;;iiii ..  with  t  lie  snli  iiiii  .1.  .11  r.uicr  t  li.it  In-  ili-])i-iidc.'il 
upon  tlniii  to  -.luit  pill  lilt.  (  )m  till-  ri'hl,l).ul;  o|  .iii  ok  h.ird,  ,iiid 
ro\-(-icd  liy  .1  thick  lii-il;;i-  |i-iu:i-,  In-  i)l,iii-d  \V.i)in-  .iiid  V.niiiini,  .iiid 
l.i\  in;.;sloii  ;  .md  I\iniv  ,iiid  '>.\',,ild  (-it.ililisin-d  fmir  ;;uiis  tln-n.-. 
.M,i\w'i-ll  .iiid  otlnr  ;.;(  iirr.ils  .i,  tin  )•  .iiriv'i-d  vs'rii:  ordi-rid  to  tin-  ii.ir 
to  I  (--form  t  lii-ir  I  oluiiiii  ■.,  .md  1  ..i  l'',!_\  etii-  u.i ,  intru-^ti-d  with  tin-  form- 
itioii  iif  till'  M-cuinl  liiii-,  until  In-  <  oiild  ';i\i-  tin-  li.iUi  d  troup-,  ,i  pod- 
1  ioii  which  tin-)-  mi-;ht  hold  \vliili-  he  -  lioiild  liriin;  up  tin-  m.iiii  .irmy 
t'l  tlnir  'iippuil.  It  w.issuili.m  hour  ,is  ti-sts  i-jrcil  i.ipt.iiiis  .md 
pio\  (;s  s.  'Idii-r^. 

A  hi, id)-,  with  tin-  List  rctrciiin;;  i  oluiiiii,  ( ii  lu-r.il  I .(  i-  h  id  .ippi-.iml, 
md  findiin;  the  troops  in  liru:,  he  ,iildi(-.-((l  iiiiii  rlf  to  a  cli,iii;;i-  of 
tin  ir  poMtiuiis  and  siii  li  ,iii  .ii  i,iin;rmi-nt  ,i>  hr  diriiiid  hrst  iiiidir  tin- 
1  Mruiii  d,mri-s.  It  li.nl  ]»  i  ii  hi^  piirpo,'-^  ;, ,  Ji,,  ^t,itrs.  .iftrr  In-  p,is  rd 
( '.iir's  I  Imisi-  ,ind  ,iit  i-r  (  on  iilt  .itioii  w  ith  W'ii  kofi",  vsho  Km  \v  i  In-  c-niiii- 
try.  to  plai  .  .irtillcr)-  on  (  omh's  1 1  ill,  w  liirli  ,ittr,uti-d  iii-,  iittnit  i'.ii. 
Mr.  \\'i(  koff -^howrd  liim  th.it  In-  could  t.iki-  fnui-  r.iil^  .md  iii.ikc  ,i 
ir(,ssin;_;  o(  the  iiior.iss  .md  lli.it  tin-  i^rit  i  h  .iriiiy  coul.j  not.itt.uk  him 
wilhoiil  iii.ikiii;^  ,1  liniiit  of  three  or  lour  niihs  to  the  smith  ;  hut  lu' 
^aid  tiiere  was  no  time  for  th.it,  and  coiitiniiL-d  his  rein;. it.  Wdiile 
di  m.mdin;.;  the  ri-.isoii  for  t'.u.-  existiii;.^  di>|)osition  oi  t he  troo|)-  on 
tile  hill  ne.ir  the  west  r.uinc  lie  was  informed  tiial  W.i-diiii;.;ton  h.id 
located  the  troo])s   liimself.      Re^janiin;.;  this  as   virtu, ill)'  siiper^edin;.; 


«■;:!■■ 


•mi  5 1 


-i:[,,M 


I'r 


■li" 


I  III:    ll\  II  If    OK    M'  iWIdlVI'II, 


I':;*- 


< 


}~ 


i  :i 

t      4 


liiiii  in  I  niimi.iiiil,  lie  rc|>niti-.l  In  diui  r.il  W.i  liiii;;toii  fm  imici  ,  .nid 
vv.is  inci  Wy  t  111-  |K-iriii|)t()r\'  (liiii.iinl  !■  n  "  ,111  i-\|)l.in,it  inn  .  i|  t  In  rd  icit." 
'iiniiil    1.(1-    ■.(■(1111(1    td   li.ivc    l)(cii    1  i\(t\\  helmed   li\-    W'.i -liiii    ton's 

stel  linens  (i|  111, inner  .111(1  l(|)!i(  (I,  "  Sll  -  .il."  1']kii1  repel  itioll  d  lllc 
ilU|llir\-,  lie  '.l,lt(  (I  lll.ll  "llle  (  (lilt  l.idn  tdiy  |e|i.i|  t  ,  ,1s  to  (lie  el|(  ||i\''s 
IlKA'elliellts  l)liill;;lll  .iIkhiI  ,i  idlliu.ldil  lie  ((Ulld  llol  I'dnlKil,"  .Hid 
iciiiin(i(  (I  W'.iliiii'.Mdii  lli.it  "tli(  lliiii;',  w.i-.  ddiie  (dMti.ii\-  Id  lii- 
dpinidll,  tll.lt  lie  U.l-  ,l\'el-.e  to  all  .ltt.uk,  dr  'lellelMl  I  ll';.l"(|llellt,  .ind 
W.IS  .l';,lin  4  it  in  rdlllUll,  tll.lt  while  t  lie  ellelliy  W  eic  M»  sU])elidr  111 
C.tV.lliy  we  Cdllld  Ildt  (i|)])dM-  til'  111."  \','.lsliill;'tdll  ihel)  ICjllied  lll.lt 
lie  "  slldnld  Ildt  ll.l\'e  lllldel  I  .ll-.ell  it  llllh-,-,  )  )le]  i,n(  1 1  1"  i  .11  IV  it 
tlirdllldl,"  t  ll.lt  ,"  W  ll.i|e\(r  ll  is  d]iillidll  llli'dlt  ll.l\  C  l)e(  II.  lie  exp.  (  I  ed 
llis  dider,  would  ll.uc  Ik  en  dl)e\cd."  (i(iiei.il  I  .(  (  111  (  \  jiKinit  i.  Ill 
d|  this  intelAieW,  s,iy,,  "sdine  e\j)re  ■,idn.  lei  I. (11  liy  the  (l(||e|-,il, 
I'dlUcAed  tile  ide.l  lll.lt  he  ll.ld  ,l(|d]ited  siiiiK  new  sent  illlelll  .,  .Hid 
tll.lt  It  W.l^  hi.  wi-ll  td  lillll;.;  nil  a  ;;il|(  l.il  (  n;,;.i;'elllellt  .  i'hi,  iilci 
dr<\\'     Idltll     sdiiie     ■-elltelUCs  sih  h    .is     nl.lted     l»\'('d|dnel      1  ih  d  llil.lll 

,il)()\c  ipidti  il  •  "tli.il  wh(  II  he  sc't.  dill  ill  the  iiMi  iiiii'  it  W.I  wit  li 
the  idii\i(ti(in  tli.il    i:    \.i     ne\'(  r   his   iiitenii.in    t()  h.i,',,ir(l   d|-    i-.iiir!    ,i 

l.M'Ilel.ll  el|e.i;;eIIH  lit.  \\  ll.it  hi-  e.\i  eilelU"\'  llle, lilt  l)\-  s,i\ii|.i  tll.il 
I  sIldllM  Ildt  ll.U'e  lllldei  t.ll.(  n  Nsll.it  I  ll.ld  lid  inlelltidll  dt  'Miilpr 
tliriMi;'h  \\itll,  I  iiillle.s  I  did  lldl  llli  n,  ll(ir  (Id  i  till.  d.lV.  (  .Xll'.Mlst . 
I  77(Sj   nildelsl.iud.         1  he     .eVelMl    i  ( ill  lU  i  1  .  dl    W.lT    held  ,  (ill   t  lie   sill  iject 

dl  the  ipei.itjdns  in  the  Jersey,,  repi(i|).ited  llu:  ide.l  dl  riskiii;;  .1  ''.en- 
ei.il  I  II  ;;.i;  uiiient,  .is  ;i  iiicisuri.-  hi  dil)' .ihsiird  ill  t  lie ///(V/ i  ii  luiii  ■',  .inccs 
dl  .Aiiurie.i  ( lor  since  t  he  time  t  lidsc  i  diiiu  ils  \v  ere-  held,  1 1 1  (.■  1 1111st,  11  ucs 
are  llilK  h  .lltered  )'"  ,111(1  .idds,  "  I'.ilt  \\ll.ile\'er  Ill.iy  il.i\c  heell  the 
"^(1(1(1  sense  di  llldsc  I  diiiu  iN,  I  sll.ill  fe.idlK'  .illdW  t  h.it  the\'(ill;dlt  to 
ll.lV'e  little  dl'  lid  \\ci;;llt  Willi  .111  dl'fucr,  il  sill  )se(  |  iiellt  dl'dels  iVdlll  llu; 
(  (iniin.indi  rdii-(.hii  I,  dr  e\i  11  ;i  hint  i  diniiinnu  .it  1  d.  ii.id  been  of 
siiih  .1  n.itiiie  ,is  td  ;.',ive  iiMSdii  td  thinl-.  tli.il  the  idci  h.id  l)e(  n 
(lisiMi  1,  .111(1  lll.ll  the  (irner.il  Ii.kI  .iddpti.l  .1  pi. in  rejiii!.Mi.int  to 
tlldse  rdiiiu  iK."  "  Nd  Idler  I  reicived,  IKi  edlU(  r',;it  ion  I  rvei  held 
with  him,  indu  .ited  an  intcntidii,  df  wish,  to  idiiil  ,1  |,;ener,il  <'ii;', '!-;''- 
iiieiil  ;  if  he  ll.ld  I  indlest  solemnh'  tli.it  wh.itevei  I  nii;,dit  h.i\r 
thoiielit  dl  the  wisddin  of  tlu:  111. in,  I  shduld  li.ue  Inriied  111)'  thdii;difs 
solely  to  ils  c.xctnlion."  ( leiier.il  \V.isliiii;;ton  i  Idsed  llu:  interview  l)\.- 
asking  ("ifiicral  \ac  if  lie  Wdiild  t.ikc  idnmi.ind,  whih;  he  could  foiin 
tlu;  army  in  tlu:  rear.  !  .ee  .s.i)-.s,  "When  W.ishinjMdii  asked  me 
vvhetlier  I  would  rciiiaiii  in  front  and  retain  the  Cdmm.md  dr  he  should 


177^1 


I  iir;  i!\  11 1 1    III    M.iwii  ,1  I II. 


■11' 


take  it.  I  .III  ^\\l K  il.  til, it  I  uiiiliMililciIIy  wi'iiM.  md  llial  Ik  liuiild 
scctli.it  I  iny-cir  ^imiilii  lie  Idle  (.r  tlu'  l.ist  t^  Icuc  tin- licld.  ('(iImikI 
I  l.iiiiilti  111  111  MM  i  ,liiii ;;  In^  w  c  ml,  iiiiinc(li.itily  CM  l.iiiind,  "  I  li.it ' ,  i  i'dit, 
111)'  ili'.ir  (  iciicr.il.  ,111(1  I  will  'I,!)  ,1111 1  \vc  w  ill  ,il|  (lie  hcic,  m)  the  s|)()l." 
1  ,cc  s.iys  :      "  t  lie  I M  P',it  ii  111  \\  .IS  III  it    (iiic   ti)   li^l,    .iiiyl  liiirOiii  t  licr  t  li.iii 

the    t |),    wlinh    then    li.ilteij    1,11    It,"    .iii'l    ridieiile,    wli.il    he  style-, 

i'l'l'Uiel    ll,iiiiilt')n\   "  lliist  r.itcij    Ml, inner   .iini    |ilii  en/\-  nl    wilm,"  .iini 

,uliis  "  I  .IllsWcieil,  I  .1111  i  es||()|lsi|)Ie  1<i  tile  (ielli  r,||  ,ini|  to  tile  C'lllli- 
IK   lit  ,    |ii|-   the   1  I  IK  (|  IS    !    h.l\  e   lieell  elll  I  llsteil    with.        Wiun     |    li.i\e    t.lkell 

|iiiij)ei  inclines  t'l  ;;el  th'-  ni.iiii  IhhIv  in  .i  ;;iiiiil  )iM,itiMii,  I  will  die 
with  yiin,  ipii  the  spul,  il    \ipii  jiji  ,e,e."' 

It  is  UMithy  111  rcimd  tli.it  im  witness  mi  the  lii.il  nl'  (ieneril  l.ee 
puts  I  111  1 1,11  ic  words  in    \\',ishin"tMirs  iiii  mt  h.  neit  her  di  h-    ( jener,,!    1  ,.i 

iMVClte     ill     his    lliellinii   .,     Imt     .|1|     .HCiilinl^    iiilUlir.     tll.lt     his     |>ei    i.ii.d 

he.iiiip;,  III. inner  .md  tune  nl  \eii  c  \m  re  c.\|iressiv('  111  tli.it  suhliine 
\\r.ith  which  ImIJiumiI    his   ccMuiction  tli.it  the   CMuntry  .md    the   ,iriii\' 

were   willhliK'    illl|ielilei|    1)\-   the   disiihcdieiu  e   111   ('h, tries    l.ee. 

\\  .isliiip'tiin  |>l.iccd  his  .irniy  in  ]iiiiitioii;  fiieiiie  mi  the  livjit  ; 
Sliiliii''  (111  the  lilt,  while  .111  .idinir.ililc  dispi  isii  ii  in  ut  .irtillcry  pic- 
p.ired  him  to  v\itli,t.iiiil  the  iiiitidi  iMlnmn.  .md  1  .,i  I'.iyctte  \\-.is 
]p1.u  ed  in  I  I  iiimi.llld  I  i|  t  lie  seci  illd  line.  (  icncr.il  <  irecne  sent  live  ;miiis 
t(i  ( 'mulls'  I  I  ill,  will  1 1  they  wmild  li.i\  c  cntil.idiii;;  Ine  iipmi  the  I  ii  it  i  h 
(ohimils  ,i->  tlie\-  ,iiU-, lined  .e',.lillsl  \\'.i_\ne's  line,  .Illd  the  i),lt'.lc  ill" 
MiiimiiPiii  li  lieii.m. 

(iciiei.d  (iintmi  "  iikiicIk  d  ,it  ei;.dil  u'llipik  A.  \!.  .Sumi  .ilter, 
-lime  It  i  (Piiin  pit  el  in;',  p.ii  I  ic-,  .ippe.ircd  mi  t  In  lelt  ll.mk  '  (  I  >h  kiiisipn's 
sknniishi.  " 'i'lic  (hieen",  l\,m;.Mi-,  rcll  in  with,  ,ind  di -peised  some 
di  t,u  hmciits  ammi ;;  the  wipmU,  in  the  s.mie  ipi.irter  "  i  |5ut  lei  "s  skir- 
lllisll).  "The  le.ii  L;ii.ird  h.l\  in;.;  desremled  IVmil  the  hei;dit->  .lliipV-e 
l'l"eeliiild,  iiiti  1  pi.iill,  .llmnt  t  llTt  e  imji  -,  ill  len;;th  .Illd  .ilimit  mie  ill 
l)ie,lilth,  se\ei,il  iipliimils  iif  tile  t  iii  Illy  .ippe.iled  likewise  deseendlll:; 
mill  the  pl.im,  ,1111 1  .d)i  lilt  ten  uV  Im  k  t  hey  he; '.in  cum  mi  ad  in;.;  mir  le.ir. 
Intelli;;eiuc  w.is  ,il  thi-,  m-t.mt  hroii'Jit  me,  tli.it  the  enemy  were 
disii)\iied  111, in  hill;;  ill  Imie  mi  Imth  mil  ll.iiik^.  I  u  .is  emu  iiii  cd 
th,it  mir  l),i;4;;aL;e  was  their  iphject  :  Init  it  i)ein;;  .it  this  juiutuK 
(■n;4a;_;ed  in  defil' s,  whii  li  emit iiiiied  lor  smiie  miles,  no  miMiis  m  eiarcd 
of  i).irr\in;^  tlio  hluw,  hut  ,itt,ukin;;  the  imps  which  harassed  mir 
re.ir,  ,md  pii  Ssiii'^r  ii  so  h,ird  ,is  t  >  ohji;!- tin.'  iL'lachiilents  to  return 
lioiii   our    ll.iiiks    to    its    ,issist.ince.      I     h.ul    "ood    inforiii.itimi    lli  it 


■•  i\ii 


V  '!■■ 


'■A 


■mm 


■;yr  ■ 


^/%^,- 


w 


isliii|i;tmi  \\,is  up  with   his  whole  .iiiu)',  isliiii.ited   ,il  .ihout  lw■cllt^ 


m 


44: 


TIIK    r.ATTF.K    riF   MONMOUIII. 


[1T7S 


th 


oil  sand 


but  as  I  knew  tlicrc  were  two  defiles  l)etween  liim  ami  the 
corps  at  whieh  I  meant  to  strike,  I  jiulL^ed  tiiat  he  could  not  have 
passed  them  with  a  t^reater  force  than  what  Lord  C"orn\v,iIli.->'  division 


was  well  able  to  emjaL 


'r 


le  enemv  s  cavalr\-,  coniman 


ded  it  is  said 


it  possible  that  the  e\ent  miLjht  dr.iw  ti>  a  i^eneral  action.  I 


by  M.  La  F.iyette,  havint;  approachetl  within  our  reach,  they  were 
chari;ed  with  s^reat  spirit  by  the  Queen's  lii^ht  dniLji'oii;.  They  did 
not  wait  the  shock,  but  fell  back  in  confusion  upDii  their  own  infmtry. 
Thinkiii;, 

sent  for  ,1  briLjade  of  15ritish  and  tlu'  Seventeenth  lii^ht  tlraL;oons  from 
Licuten.uit-i^eiieral  Knxphausen's  division.  >ind  havini^  directed  them 
on  the  march,  to  take  a  position  effectually  covering  our  riL;ht  Hank, 
of  which  I  was  most  jealous,  I  made  a  disposition  of  att.ick  upon  the 
but  before   I   could  advance,  the  eneiTi\-  fell  b.ick  and  took  a 


pl.iin 

stroni;  jiosition   on  the  heii.dits  above  l""re 


hold  t 


our 


t  il 


ouse. 


The  British  "renadier.;.  with  their  left  to  the  \-ill,iL:e  of  l-"reehi 


OeuMn 


th 


e  attack  with  sumuch  spint  that  the  enem\-  Lrave  w,'i\-  immedi.iteh-. 


The  second    line   of  the   e 


nemv.  on 


the  h 


eas 


t   (if  the   west   ravine 


stood  the  attack  with  great  obstinac\'  but  were  likewise  completely 
routed.  They  then  took  a  third  position,  with  a  marshy  hollow  in 
front.    o\er    which    it    would    h:.    j    been    scared)-   possible    to    h.u'e 


attackeil  them. 


lowever, 


par 


rt  (f  the  secoiul  line  m.ule  a  movement 


to  tlie  front,  occupieil  some  ground  on  the  enemx's  left  tl 

Hv  tl 


ml 


,md  the 


lis  time  our 
press  the  .iffiir  no 


light  infmtry  and  Oueen's  rangers  turned  their lett. 

men  were  so  o\erpowered  b\-  fatigue  that    1   could 

f.irther,  especially  as  1  was  confident    the   tnd    was  gainetl   f )r  which 

th 

but 


le  attack  had  been  ni.ule.      I    ordered  the   light    infuitiA'  to  join  me; 
;i  strong  detachment  of  the  eneni_\"  !  Wayne)   "  h.iving  possessed 


themselves  of  ,i  jiost  which  wduld  ha\e  .imioyetl  tluin  in  their  retreat, 


the    Tliirt\-tliird 


w 


•iment    m.ule    a    movement    toward    the   eiienn", 


w  liicli  with  a  similar  t>ne   mac 


le  bv  t: 


le 


!■ 


irst 


'renaiher- 


immediatel 


dispersed  them.  I  took  the  position  trom  whence  the-  memy  hail 
been  first  driven  .itter  they  h.id  <]uitted  the  plain,  and  h.iving  reposcil 
the  troops  till  ten  at  night  to  avoid   the  cxcessi\e  lie.it  of  the  day,  I 


took  adwintaije 


.ft 


le  111(10  n, 


HiThtr  t( 


rej 


om 


aeutenant-'j:ener,d 


.nyp- 


haiiseii.  who  li.ui  adwiiiceil  to  Xut  swamp  ne.ir  Middlett)wn. 


The  attack  w  1 


iicn   wa- 


withstood  "  with  great  ob.itin.icv.  was  at 


the  heds:e-ro 


w   where  the  .S 


fered 


extremeh-.  losimj  their  ".illant  commaiu 


econd   battalion   oi 


Hrit 
der   L 


isli  "ren.uliers  su 


f- 


leuteiiant-colonel 


Monckton,  whose  bodv  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans.     Adol- 


No  'iioon,  add  ten  u'cUick 


I77S.' 


TiiK  r.Arri.K  ov  MosMoiMir. 


443 


phus  states  tli;it  "  relays  of  jjjrcnadiers  buried  lii-;  Ixidy,  takitv^  turns 
durinrr  the  battle,  and  usinfj  bayonets  for  shovels,  niini^lin;^  tear-^  with 
the  earth  they  cast  upon  his  body."  The  grenadiers  fell  b.ick  after 
the  third  assault  u'itJtont  rescuiiiL;  the  body  of  their  leader,  and  the 
Americans  withdrew'  behinil  the  ravine.  The  attempt  of  General 
Clinton  to  cross  in  force,  ami  turn  the  Americm  left  and  ri^ht,  in  turn, 
was  met  by  Generals  StirliiiLJ  and  Greene  with  prnm])tness ;  and 
General  \V,i)-ne's  roinniand,  \\hich  w.is  directly  in  front  of  the  bridj^c, 
niaintainetl  such  ,i  i;allinL,f  fire  that  the  re^^iments  referred  to  by 
(ieneral  Clinton  were  j)romptl\'  witiidrawn. 

Upon  the  retreat  of  the  Hritisli  army  behind  the  middle  ravine, 
messenj^ers  were  sent  to  Knt^lishtown  to  brinij;  a  portion  of  the  trooos 
which  had  been  sent  tlure  for  ri'-form,ition,  under  the  direction  of 
General  Steuben,  at  the  time  of  tiie  tlrst  retreat.  When  the  troops 
retired  from  the  hedtje-row,  (ieneral  I.ee  reported  to  General  Wash- 
intjton,  and  "  re(]uested  his  excellencj-'s  ple.isure.  how  he  should  dis- 
pose of  the  troops,  whether  to  form  in  front,  alonc^  with  the  main  body, 
or  draw  them  up  in  the  rear."  He  "  was  ortlereil  to  arranij^e  them  in 
the  rear  of  MiiLjlishtown  at  three  miles  ilistance."  General  .Steuben 
says,  "  I  joined  (ieneral  Lee  on  hor.seback  before  a  house,  who  said  he 
was  very  L,dad  of  my  havin;j^  taken  that  chari^e  upon  me,  fir  he  was 
tired  out."  "  (ieneral  Maxwell's  brii^atle,  a  part  of  General  Scott's 
detachment,  were  formed  behind  the  creek  at  lins^jlishtown  ;  then  three 
bri_q;adcs  of  the  line  which  arrived  with  (jeneral  Patterson,  antl  the 
second  brigade  of  Genend  Smallwootl.  The  cannon.ulint:^  continued 
more  or  less  briskly  until  i)ast  five  o'clock.  Half  an  hour  after  it 
ceased,  Colonel  (iimat  arrived  and  brou;j;ht  me  the  order  from  the 
Commander-in-chief,  that  the  enemy  were  retreatinij  in  confusion,  and 
that  I  shouKl  briiiLj  him  a  reinforcement.  I  ordered  General  Maxwell 
to  take  the  commaiul  of  the  troo[)s  I  had  placed  behind  the  creek,  and 

to  remain  there  till  further  order.s.  I  then  marcheil  off  with  the  three 
brigades  of  the  second  line.  As  I  passed  throuLjh  p'n^lishtown,  ) 
again  met  (jeneral  Lee,  who  asked  me  '  where  I  was  going  ;  '  1 
imparted  to  him  the  order  I  had  received  from  the  Cominantler-in- 
chief,  which  I  deliveretl  in  the  very  expressions  of  Colonel  (iimat, 
that  the  enemy  were  retreating  in  confusion.  Upon  that  word 
confusion,  he  took  me  up,  and  said  they  were  orly  resting  themselves  ; 
but  said  he  afterwards,  '  I  am  sure  there  is  some  misumlerstanding  in 
your  being  to  advance  with  these  troops.*  It  was  not  until  (ieneral 
Muhlenberg,  who  led  the  column,  halted,  and  the  precise  orders  of 


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II''    IlAiri.I'   OF   MONMOI'Tir. 


f>;7S 


General  Washiiv^ton  wciv  irpo.itrd,  that  ruMicr.il  Ia-ochuIiI  imilkTstaiul 
til  it  till'  (.Ts^.ition  of  firiiii^  um^  .ictually  oiwisimu'il  by  i!u-  rctriMt  of 
tlu'  r>M'ti-li  aiinv.  ami  nut  1)\-  the  drfcat  of  tlu' army  of  Washiiirrton. 
'  TIk'H,'  sail!  lu.  '  you  arc  to  march,'  and  (jciuTal  Stciilu'ii  marciicd 
with  the  troops." 

Duriiii^  the  evcniiiL;  General  W'oodfoitl's  brii^ade  was  ailv.uiced  on 
thj  riL,dit,  aiul  General  Poor's  on  the  left,  for  tlic  purpose  of  an  early 
attack  u])oii  the  British  army  the  followiiv.r  mornin;^',  General  Clinton 
haviuL^  re.dized  every  possible  benefit  from  his  return  of  the  offensive, 
skillfully  witiidrew  his  army,  and  tin.'  oppressive  hot  weatlu-r  iire- 
\ented  [lursuit. 

The  British  casualties  as  reported  by  General  Clinton  were  as  fol- 
lows :  Lieutenant-colonel  Monckton,  Captain  Gore,  Lieutenants 
VauLjhan  and  Kennedy,  four  sepj^eant-;,  and  t'ifty-seven  rank  and  file 
killed ;  three  serine. mts  and  tlft\'-si\  r.uik  and  t"ile  die<l  iVom  fitiijue  ; 
Colonel  Trelawney,  Lieutenant-colonel  .Simcoe,  Maior  Gardner,  Caj)- 
tains  Cathc.ut,  IJereton,  Willis,  Leii^hton,  Powell,  l?ellue  ami  nitm.is, 
and  Lieutenant'.  Kelley,  I'aumier,  Goriiff?;.  Uesborou;_yh  and  (jilchrist, 
seven  ser:^eants.  one  hundred  and  forty-eiLjlit  rank  and  file  '.^'oiindcd, 
and  si\t\--one  rank  and  tile  ii!issi)ii:;. 

General  \Vasliin;^fon  reporteil  the  American  ca:-ualties  as  follows: 
Lieuten.mt-colonel  lionner,  .\l.ijor  Dickinson,  three  captains,  ihrei; 
lieutenants,  one  serLjeant,  ei;.';ht  artillery  men.  and  rit"t\'-two  rank  and 
file  killed;  two  colonels,  nine  captains,  six  lieutenants,  one  ensi;4n, 
one  adjutant,  nine  serL^e.mts,  eleven  artillery  men,  and  one  hundreil 
ami  twenty-two  rank  ami  ^\\e- ivouudcd  \  tlvt*  sergeants,  one  artillery 
man,  and  one  hundred  ami  twenty-six  rank  and  file  niissiuj:^,  many 
of  whom  who  h  id  been  overcome  b\'  the  heat,  afterw.irds  came  up." 

The  two  reports  imlicate  nearly  equal  casualties  in  the  two  armies. 
General  \Vashin;^ton  states  that  four  liritish  officers,  and  forty 
privates  whose  wounds  were  too  dangerous  to  permit  their  removal, 
were  left  on  the  field  by  General  Clinton,  and  th.it  the  jxirties  havinj^ 
iii  charge  the  buri.il  of  the  dead,  reported  the  I-Vitish  dead  at  four 
officers,  including  Lieutenant-colonel  Monckton,  and  two  hundred 
and  forty-two  privates.  With  due  allowance  for  the  usual  i-rrors  in 
re])orts  of  burying  parties,  it  is  evident  that  the  detail  of  General  Clin- 
ton's report  is  defective,  as  it  leaves  many  men  unaccounted  for,  who 
were  dropped  from  his  subsequent  report  of  the  strength  of  his  army. 

Lord  Million  says,  "  On  the  whole  it  was  a  pitched  battle." 

Adolphus  says,  "  The  affair  ought  to  have  terminated  when  Lee 


1778 


llll.    ItAiri.K   or    MoNMoU  111. 


445 


n.is  fir>;l  compolK'd  {o    rrtiiL-.      There    w.is  no    Iiopc  of    inakinj^-  .m 
advantat^cous  assault  on  the  oiiciny  protected  1)\'  iKfiles  aiul  m.irslics." 

/■.(r////'  says,  "  Tlie  coiuhict  of  Wa-hiiv^'toii  wa-.  hi;4h!y  credital)Io  to 
his  military  skill." 

Sft'(!iii<vi  states  that  "  It  w.is  iini)ossible  tt»  attack  Washington's 
front  with  any  pr<isj)ect  ot'  success,  that  the  judicious  position  whicli 
he  took  probal)ly  s.ived  his  adv. meed  corps  from  tola!  ruin." 

Gordon  savs,  "  Washiiv'ton  .mimateil  his  forces  hv  iiis  i/all.mt 
c\-am[)lc,  ami  by  e.vposin;^  his  |)erson  to  every  datiijer  common  to  the 
meanest  soldier,"  and  that  "the  behavior  of  the  .\mcricaii  troops  in 
'general,  after  recoverinj^  from  the  first  surprise  occasioned  by  the 
retreat,  was  mentionetl  as  wh.it  could  not  be  surpassed." 

A  (ieneral  Court  Martial.  M ajor-;4eni'r.il  Stirlin;^  presidiiv;,  found 
General  Lee  "  i^uilty  of  disob^'dience  of  orders  in  not  attackin;^  the 
enemy  on  the  JSlh  of  June,  a;.;re''able  to  repeatc'd  instructions,  of 
misbehavior  before  the  enemy,  by  m.ikin;^  an  unnecessary,  and  in 
some  few  instances  a  disorderly  retreat  ;  .iiui  of  disrespect  to  the 
Commander-in-chief,  in  two  letters  dated  the  ist  of  July  (-9th  June), 
and  the  28th  of  June  I30tli  June),  and  sentenced  him  to  be  suspended 
from  command  for  the  term  of  t\\e!\-e  months." 

(The  error  in  the  d.ite  of  the  fust  letter  w.is  corrected  by  General 
Lee  on  the  30th,  when  he  matle  another  misdate,  as  al)ove  correcteci). 

The  findiiiLf  of  the  Court  Martial  was  sustained  by  Coni^ress,  by 
fifteen  affirminij  and  seven  dissentiiv^  votes.  Genend  Lee  was  not 
known  then  as  he  subsequently  made  himself  known,  ami  he  hat! 
strong  p.irtis.'U  advocates  of  his  cause.  If  he  IkuI  bei  n  in  symij.ithy 
with  \Vashin;_jton,  he  would  have  recei\-ed  no  censure.  If  he  h.id 
exercised  reasonable  self-control  at  the  close  of  the  action,  he  would 
have  saved  his  commission.  He  contemled  indeetl  with  many  diffi- 
culties. He  "  knew  few  of  the  officers,"  th':  country  was  unknown, 
the  L^uides  were  few,  and  his  staff  seem  to  have  been  inefficient,  even 
in  executing;  his  restricted  orders  ;  but  he  liud  earnesth-  solicited  the 
command,  and  thus  fr'.tally  closed  his  milit.iry  career  at  Mt)nmouth. 

His  subsequent  death  was  marked  In*  an  atrocious  contempt  of  his 
Maker,  and  of  relii^ion,  so  tliat  even  in  his  will  he  [)erpetuated  thut 
hatred  of  moral  responsibility  and  true  duty  which  rendered  his  suc- 
cess while  livin;^  absolutely  impossible.  It  is  but  justice  to  the  reader 
of  history,  that  this  element  of  Charles  Lee's  character  should  be  per- 
petuated ;  not  only  for  its  painful  lesson,  but  as  affonling  an  additional 
key  to  the  motives  and  conduct  of  his  restless  career 


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chaptI':r  lvii. 

FROM    MoN.Morill    K)    NIAV    NoRK.     SII'.CK   OF    NEWPORT. 

coNd'KKiiN  r  KVKN  rs. 

G1:\1-:RAL  sir  Ikmy  Clinton  reached  Now  York  the  last  of 
June  without  further  detention.  At  that  date  the  only  coii- 
siilerable  posts  in  the  Northern  States  wliicli  remainetl  under  his 
control,  were  those  of  New  York,  St.iten  Island,  anil  New[)ort.  Rhode 
Islantl.  Sir  Auj^ustine  I'revost  was  in  command  at  St.  AuLjListine, 
Floritla.  The  British  Cabinet  resolved  to  renew  operations  in  the 
Southern  States  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  that  General  Carleton 
should  aLjain  occupy  the  posts  on  Lake  Champlain.  This  was  con- 
sistent with  the  jilan  sui^j^ested  by  General  Lee,  who  expressetl  the 
opinion,  in  a  letter  to  General  Washini^ton,  immediately  after  the 
battle  of  Monnmuth,  claimini;  ininu.'iliate  trial  before  a  L;eneral  Court 
Martial,  that  "  the  canipaitjn  would  close  the  war." 

General  Clinton  was  hartUy  settled  in  his  headquarters,  when  the 
post  at  Xew[)ort  was  threatened  by  a  lar^^e  American  force,  actin;^  in 
concert  with  a  French  fleet.  General  Washington  marched  from 
Monmouth  to  Brunswick,  where  he  rested  his  troops ;  thence 
to  I'aramus  and  Ilaverstraw  Hay,  on  the  Hudson,  and  finally  re- 
established his  headquarters  at  White  Plains  on  the  twenty-second 
of  July. 

On  the  eiyhth  the  Count  D'Estaint;  made  the  Delaware  Capes  with 
the  following  squadron  of  twelve  ships,  anil  four  frigates,  viz.,  Lan- 
guedoc,  90 ;  Tonnant,  So;  Cesar,  74;  Guerriere,  74;  Protecteur,  74; 
Provence,  64;  Valliant,  64;  Saggitaire,  54;  Chiniere,  30;  L'En- 
geantc,  26  ;  L'Alemence,  26  ;  L'Arimable,  26.  The  Chiniere  was  sent 
to  Philadelphia  with  Silas  Deane,  one  of  the  American  commissioners 
just  returned  from  Paris,  and  Monsieur  Conrad  A.  Gerard,  the  first 
French  Ambassador  to  the  United  States. 


fe    -I    '!,r  h 


I 


Nl 


1778.1 


FROM    MONMoUrU    li)   Ni;\V    VOKK, 


447 


The  remainder  of  thcsqiiadrnn  liavinyncaiiy  four  thuusaiul  troops 
on  hoard,  sailiil  for  Sandy  Hook  as  soun  as  advisi.'d  of  tlu*  evacuation 
of  I'hiladelphia. 

The  l''rcnch  fleet  sailetl  from  T(Hdon  on  the  tliirtcmUi  of  April, 
but  on  account  of  contniry  winds,  did  not  pass  Gibraltar  until  tliu 
fifteenth  of  May. 

An  ordinary  voya,£;e  would  have  anticipated  the  departure  of 
Admiral  ilo\v<;  from  the  Delaw  •  and  have  imperiled  hoth  his  fleet 
and  the  army  of  (ieiieral  Clinton,  'ihe  Hritish  fled,  then  at  New 
York,  was  .i^n'eatly  inferior  to  thai  of  the  P'reiich  and  consisted  of  only 
six  sixty-fours,  three  fiftj's,  two  fort\'s  and  a  few  small  frifjates. 
Other  shii)s  were  hastil\-  armed,  and  extraordinarv  measures  were 
taken  for  extreme  re>istance  ;  but  the  drau'^dit  of  water  on  the  lower 
bar  would  not  allow  the  heaviest  of  the  l'"rench  ships  to  enter  the  har- 
bor, and  the  chief  benefits  from  the  priseiice  of  that  scpiadron 
were  deriveil  from  the  cajjtnre  of  vessels  which  approached  New  V'orU 
without  knowled^fe  of  their  arrival.  A  fact  in  this  connection  illu.,- 
trates  the  uncertaint)'  of  naval  movements. 

The  Ikitish  government  ordered  an  additional  s(|uadron  for 
America  as  soon  as  advisei!  that  hraiice  desiL;;ied  to  coiiperate  actively 
with  the  United  States  in  war  with  Ciieat  15rit>iin.  Tin.'  fleet  sailed 
from  Portsmoutli  on  the  twentieth  of  Ma\-,  but  ujjou  a  report  that 
the  fleet  of  Count  lyMstainLj  ivas  bound  for  the  West  Indies  th.e 
order  was  su^^pended  ;  so  that  Admiral  15yron,  who  was  sent  with 
twenty-two  shii)s  to  relieve  Lcjrd  Howe,  recalled  at  his  own  re(iuest, 
went  into  Plymouth  and  did  not  sail  ai^ain  until  the  fifth  of  June. 
This  fleet  w.is  c^'reatly  scattered  by  storms.  I'our  ships  reachesl 
Sandy  Hook,  separatel),  sc^on  after  the  dep.irture  of  Count  D'Kstainy, 
and  thereby  escaped  capture. 

The  Americans  criticised  the  failure  of  the  Count  l)'Kstain_!.^  to 
engage  the  British  fleet,  but  without  cause.  Even  Stedman  intimates 
that  he  "  did  not  seriously  intend  to  make  an  attempt  against  the 
harbor  of  New  York  !  "  A  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress  dated 
the  twenty-sixth  of  y\.ugust,  1778,  contains  the  following  conclusive 
statement. 

"  The  [)ilots  procured  by  Colonels  Laurens  and  Hamilton"  (of 
Washington's  staff)  "  destroyed  all  illusion." 

"  These  experienced  persons  unanimously  declared,  that  it  was 
impossible  to  carry  us  in.  I  offered,  in  vain,  a  reward  of  fifty  thou- 
sand crowns  to  any  one   who  would  promise  success.     All  refused. 


M 


■s . 


448 


FROM    MrjXMOUTII   TO   NEW    YORK. 


['778. 


i    i  ! 


and  the  particular  soundin<js,  which  I  caused  to  be  taken,  myself,  too 
well  demonstrated  that  they  were  right." 

Washington  determined  to  make  the  capture  of  Newport  the 
immediate  objective  of  the  campaign,  while  the  French  fleet  remained 
in  American  waters. 

The  condition  of  the  British  garrison  at  New  York  was  such  that 
on  the  twenty- ninth  of  July  General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine 
that  he  "  miidit  be  com|)elled  to  evacuate  the  cit_\-  and  relnrn  to 
Halifax."  On  that  da\-.  tiie  Count  D'l--^taing  anchored  near  Point 
Judith,  Long  Island  Sound,  within  five  miles  of  Newi^ort. 

Washington  directed  General  Sullivan,  then  stationeel  at  Provi- 
dence, to  call  in  the  New  England  militia  for  a  combined  movement 
against  New])(M't  and  its  tlefenses ;  assigned  Cienerals  Greene  and  La 
Fayette  to  command  divisions,  and  ordered  the  brigades  of  Varnum 
and  Glover  to  join  La  Fayette's  division.  These  officers  served  with 
Greene  before  Poston,  and  Varnum  was  in  the  original  company 
which  marched  with  Greene,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  pro- 
posed co{>peration  of  French  troops  made  the  assignment  of  La  Fa- 
yette ecjually  judicious. 

The  American  force  which  assembled  at  Proviilence  was  about 
ten   thousand  men.     Reference  is  made  to  map,  "  .Sit;ge  of  Newport." 

The  ]5ritish  garrison  consisted  of  six  thousand  men  under  Major- 
general  Pigott,  and  embraced  the  following  troops;  -the  Twenty- 
second,  P'orty-third,  I'ifty-fourth  and  Si.xtj'-third  British  regiments; 
P'anning's  and  Brown's  Provincials  ;  the  following  regiments  of 
Hessian  chasseurs,  .'v:  ,  Ihiyn,  Banau,  Ditforth,  Landgrave,  Seaboth 
and  Boit.  Two  He.-sian  regiments  and  Brown's  Provincials  were 
stationed  on  C(jnnanicut  Lsland  ;  but  were  withdrawn  to  a  strongly 
irijrenched  camp  in  from  of  Newport,  when  the  French  fleet 
entered  the  harbor.  On  the  fifth  of  August,  two  PTench  ships 
entered  the  Xarraganset  j)assage,  and  two  frigates  passed  in  through 
tl)e  eastern,  or  Seaconnet  Channel. 

The  British  frigates  which  had  secured  the  garrison  from  attack 
up  to  that  time,  were  destrojed,  to  prevent  thei  capture.  The 
Juno,  32  ;  Lark,  32  ;  Orpheus,  32  ;  Cerberus  32  ;  and  the  King-Fisher, 
16,  were  burned  ;  and  the  Plora,  32,  and  the  Falcon,  18,  were  sunk. 

It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  General  Sullivan  unwisely  detained 
the  P^rench  fleet  in  the  offing,  and  neglected  military  courtesies  which 
were  no  less  deserved  than  proper,  while  he  was  maturing  his  plans 
for  operations   by  land.     The  French    troops    had   been  nearly  five 


1778.] 


FROM    MONMOUTH   TO   NKW   YORK. 


449 


months  on  ship-board,  and  their  prompt  landing  would  have  averted 
subsequent  disaster. 

Tiie  tentli  of  August  was  designated  for  the  attack.  The  Ameri- 
can troops  were  to  cross  from  Tiverton  to  Rhode  Island  at  Howl.md's 
Ferry,  and  the  Frencli  troops  were  to  land  on  the  west  side,  nearly 
opposite  Hyer's  Island.  On  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth,  without 
giving  notice  to  the  French  commander,  Ge.'.eral  .Sullivan  crossed  from 
Tiverton,  and  occupied  the  north  end  of  Rhode  Isl.md.  The  French 
had  forced  the  middle  and  eastern  piss  igcs  on  the  eighth,  in  readi- 
ness to  land  on  the  tenth.  General  Sullivan  had  i)revii)usly  notilied 
Count  D'Estaing  that  he  coukl  not  move  earlier  than  the  '  T.th, 
because  of  the  non-arrival  of  militia  and  other  troops  dail_\'  expected 
in  camp.  Count  D'l^staing  was  a  Lieutenant-general  of  the  Fn  i 
army,  while  General  Sullivan  was  only  a  Major-general  ;  but  tu 
French  officer  gracefully  declined  a  command,  and  as  gracefully  pro- 
posed to  attach  the  French  troops  to  the  division  of  General  La 
Fayette.  The  precipitate  landing  of  the  .American  troops  discon- 
certed the  plan  of  attack,  but  did  not  engender  a  conflict  between 
the  American  and  I'rench  commanders,  as  so  often  stated  at  that 
period,  and  currently  believed. 

General  SuUiviin  notified  Count  D'Estaing  that  "  in  consequence 
of  the  abandonment  of  the  north  end  of  Rhode  Island  by  the  British 
troops,  when  the  French  ships  forced  a  [)assage  into  the  harbor,  he 
had  occupied  the  position,"  and  "  had  made  a  descent  upon  the  island 
without  waiting  for  the  day  appointed."'  Count  D'Estiing  •'  had  bi.-en 
assured  that  morning,  that  not  more  than  two  thousand  men  had 
landed,"  and  "  believing  that  his  (Sullivan's)  situation  retjuired  prompt 
succor,"  made  a  personal  visit  to  General  Sullivan.  His  own  state- 
ment of  the  matter  is  highly  honorable  to  his  judgment  and  candor. 
In  a  report  to  the  Presiilent  of  Congress,  he  sa\'s,  "  Knowing  that 
there  are  moments  which  must  be  eagerly  seized  in  war,  I  was  cautious 
of  blaming  any  overthrow  of  plans,  which  nevertheless  astonished  me, 
and  li'hicli  in  fact  merits  in  uiy  oivn  opinion  only  praise,  although  accu- 
mulated circumstances  might  have  rendered  the  consequences  very 
unfortunate." 

The  Count  D'Estaing  visited  General  Sullivan  without  information 
that  the  British  fleet  at  New  York  had  been  reinforced,  and  was  on 
its  way  to  Newport. 

On  the  eighth,  General  Washington  wrote,  that  he  "  had  received 
a  letter  from  General  Maxwell,  dated  at  nine  o'clock  the  previous 
29 


mm 


V^^ 


IH' 


.,  :ii- 


#11 


45^ 


mnriuii'.;,  iic 


inM    MoNMni;  I  11    TO    NKW    \()l;l<. 


f<778. 


ir  St.itcn  Island,  statiiv/ that    I.oul  Ilcui'  li.nl  sailed  from 


the   1  I'.dl.  with  hi,  lli-rl,"  addiii".  will 


■  iv  forecast  (il   thi-  fiit  ur( 


"iinhs-.  till-  l]i-et  111  ly  h.ive  reeeived  advic  ci  ol  a  riinluiic'iient  on  tlie 
coast,  ...  it  tan  only  he  actomiti  il  lot  on  tin-  ])rinci|)lc  of  des- 
pei.ition,  stimulated    1)\'  a  hope  of  fnidin;.',  V'oii    divided  in  your  opciM- 


tions  a'.Min-,l   Khode  Isla 


lUl 


riu    ('ount    I  )'I',-,tain"    \  i-itcil  ( "unerai 


Sullivan    uith  no  appieliension    tiiat    hi-,   licet  \\a,   in  dan;.;er.      "'I' 


if  the  l''fen(  h  shii 


I,    VMI'e     on 


t  ol    the-   jirut    in  tile  Sound;   two  other- 


were  ,il  the  noith  end  ol  the  west  channel  ;   three  lri"ates  weri-  in  tin 


cast   channel,  and    the   er.dit    shin^   u 


hi(  h    lorci  (1    tl 


le    nnn<lle    iias-ia'.'i 


/ere   hetueen   Kliode  I -ilaiid,  t  hicklv  set   \sith    hatterie  ,,  .md  ( 'oimani- 


cn 


t   1 


an! 


ir"e  nuniher  of   hi-,    s.iilors,  who    were   snlleiin'/  w  itji 


the   .1  Ml  vy  weje  oil  til  it  island  ;   .iml  wiien  he  vi  a 

I 


te,i    C 


nei  al  .Sullivan, 


le   jelt     ordeis     lol"    the    troo|)s   WMo    W<'r(.;   to    join     in    the   e\[»edlt|o|i    to 

'I"li<-  di^sip.ition  ol  the  inorniii'/  fo'/ discovered  I.oiil   ilowe's 


|l  illow, 


llei-t    .Ipploaehill'i    the    elltr.liue     to     the|)ort.        lie    "counted    loUlt 

vesseU  with  two  tieis  of  •'uiis,  and  in  in\'  li  i'.'ile^,  t  liiil\'  six  in  all." 


eell 


It 


ippear^   that    (ieiieral  i'i;,;ot    promptly   notitiid  <  ieiieial  (  lintoii 


ol  the  arrival  of  tlu'  i'^reiu  h  ^'pi adioii.  and  the  t;r,;ely  arri\'al  ol  a 
portion  ol  .\dniiial  Ityron' ,  lli  ct  e:ial)led  .\diniral  iiowe  to  |eav(-  .New 
\'oii;  on  the  sixth  ol  ,\u'.;nst  with  i-i;.;lit  liiK-  <il-l)  at  t  le  ships,  five  fiftys, 
two  jolty  fours,  several  li:.',ht  fii;.;ates,  tlir<e  fire  ship^.  two  hoinh',  and 
soiiu:  sni.iller  vt-ssels.      Uidavoiahle  \\inds  dela\cd  their  pas-„i''e. 


The  scattered    lleet  <,(  th.-  ( 


nt     I )  I'. Tt.iin;_;  w.is   in  [ 


n  iieiil  ol    i)eint' 


cut  off  l)v  detach  men  Is.     '1  he  wind  u.is  from  the  north  east,  insuriu'r  tu 


him  tile    we.itlier  iMU'/c; 


and    with   dm 


)romptiie-,s   lu 


'.Mtliered  his 


ships  , and  passed  tin-  channels  to  lie  n  ad)-  for  his  .id vers, ii)'.  I'or 
two  d.iy-,  the  wind  remained  in  tlie  ^ame  (piarter.  ,\s  he  I'l  t, lined  the 
weather  i^au;.;e.  Admii.il  llowc-  wisely  (let:liiie<I  to  ]iri -.-.  up  to  tlu; 
shore  .iL^.iiiist  such  ,ih  advanta'^e  in  f.ivor  of  the   I'lc-iuh  lie.  t. 

A  storm  of  iinu-n.il  se\'erit)'  sep.irated  ,iiid  dispiMsi'd  both  fleets, 
just  .IS  ,1  p.irti.il  ch.iiv^fo  of  wind  h.id  brou^^dit  them  upon  ne,irl\-  eipi.il 
terms  of  conllict.  .S'Av/z/ww  styles  th.it  storm  "  treirumdous."  (fi)/i/( 
.says,  "  .1  stroiiL,^  ;.;,ile  increased  to  :i  violent  teini)est."     A/tirs/ta//  s.iy. 


Ill 


"a  lurioiis  storm  ol  wind  .iiid  r.iiii  cime  up  honi  the  noit  li-e,ist,  which 
blew  down  .iiid  .ilniost  iire]),ir.ib!y  ruined  all  the  tents  ;  render((l  the 
arms  unfit  for  imniedi.ite  use,  .iiid  d.im;i;^ed  the  .immunition,  ol  which 
fifty  rounds  lia<l  jusl  been  issui d.  The  soldiers  siiffereil  extremely, 
and  several  perislieil  in  the  storm,  which  continued  for  three  d.iys." 
Bolli   fleets  were  seriously  dain.i^cd,  and   duriii^^   their  dispersion 


l'l;')M    MoNMdIMII     |(»    M.W    S'tRK. 


■t5' 


ovrv  (ifl\'  mill'  .  .111(1  more  of  ()( I'.iii,  there  were  rri:(|iiiiil  lulli^ioii ,  from 
the  iiicctiii;;  ')l  lust  sliips  ,111(1  (Icl.K  litiicnt^.  On  tiur  tliirti-ciit  ii,  the 
Kenoun.  v).  '^"'i' i^l' »  <  .ipt.iiii  I  ),iw^i)ii,  tell  in  with  tiie  K.in;.;ue(i')C, 
S.4,  (ll.i;.;  .lii|)i  <|iiite  (lisiii.tnll(;( I  ;  hiil  the  viciiiit)'  ol  -.ix  other  i'"rench 
shi])-!  prevented  ,itt.u;k.  Dnrin;.;'  the  same  eveiiin;.;,  the  Tonn.int,  So, 
lot  her  m.iinm.i  -t,  and  vv'ould  have  heen  at  la(  1-ed  \>y  the  Tn^lon,  50, 
(  cimmod'M.  Ilolhain,  hut  lot  the  |)i'eseni;e  ot  other  I'lcni  h  \'e-,iel,. 
<  )n  the  sixteeinh  tile  r.is,  ^o,  ( Ih'it  i  di  1  ("a]>!am  Kayn-r,  wa-.  maily 
.stri])i)ed,  ill  ai  t  ion  with  the  ( 'a-  ,ar,  7.},  imt  !  he  lat  ter  veTi(  1  was  severcdy 
handh '1  and  drew  olfto  n  111.  Admiral  1  lowe  him-,(df  ran  the  '.emnl- 
lel  ot  a  |)oition  ol  the  [•"rem  h  Ihct  .and  hirely  iiii'le  Xca  \'oil..  I  he 
Ihitish  >'|ii.idii;n    n  turned    to  tlnl    i  ily,  and    the  hremli  latniiied    to 

Ne\\  pol  t  . 

Ill''  ,\m'M\an  ,irni_\-,  meanwhile,  had  made  sucli  .I'lv.uuc-.  tow.ird 
Newpoit  .i  ■,  the  unpropitious  i  ir(  iiinst.uu c  >  i)ermitte(l.  I  he  niove- 
iiiciit  l)c;,;.in  on  the  I'llt'-enth.  ( 'oloiiel  lfenr\'  l'>.  I  ,i\in;',ston,  with  ;i 
det.iil  of  fifty  nii  n  (rom  call  liri'.j.ide,  .and  i(  it.iin  independent  (oni- 
panies  \\hi(h  had  reported  lor  dnt  \'  diiriii;;  ill''  .itliniol  to  I'-'Min 
khodi-  I-laiid.  lornied  the  aiK'.anee  eohinin.  ( ieiier.d  .SullivMii  tuol; 
])osition   ,il)ont    live    miles   in    aiKance   ol   the    town,  at   ( lihh's  harm  ; 


(  ielleial    (  n  eene    ,1 


R;lIl(iMl|,ir 


t     Middlet  own,  on    the    larni    .ilt(  rw  .ird-.    k 


no\\n   .as 


.and  (  eiier.i! 


l.,i    I'",i\(  tie    .at 


lie      I.Mller 


<iinl';ii.       loliii 


.iiuoi  I;,   o 


f    .M 


is-,.nlmsetts,    (  aiiie    lorw.ird    .is   .1   '''-ner.il    oIIhii"   aiii 


.omm.inded  the  s.coiiil  line,      ("olonel  \\'.-^t  commandeil  the  ii-^eiwc 


C^ein  l.il     l'i;,;otl     ll.id    i  lid  list  rjoiisly    perfec  ted  t  he  dch  i 


1  •  (       ( 


iinii"   liic 


(iel.iv  \v  liieli  occiii 


red  .after   the  first  .arrival  of  the  i'lcneh  lleet.       i  In 
netk  ol  land  linm  (  1  iddiir't'in's  ('dve  arrows  to  I'.a-ton's  Way  .and  tin 


iiid  jii-t  aho\c  It ,  \'. .1' 


proteiteil  by  interior  .uid   e\l(  rior  lines,  (.mi  h 


snit.il)])"  hroki  11  hy  redoiilils. 

'idle  interior  lim  ■,  eNleiided,  ,is  will  .i|)pe.ir  liy  r' lerenr(;  to  the 
m.ii),  .md  .Is  st.ited  in  (ieiier.il  .Siilli\-.in's  report,  liom  the  sea  to  the 
north  end  o|^  the   id.iiid,  lia\'in'.'  .i-tr'in'/   icdonht    at  the  head    of  the 


l)ass 


l.et 


\M-eii    r.a-.t'iii 


\>.[y    am 


'>n. 


1.      .\ 


S'(  olid     leMoilht     tW(.'nt\' 


rod 


north  of  t 


lelii-t,  had  a   ''ood    sweep  ot    lire  tM'A.ni!    tiie    hill  c.i  .t 


the  pom 


fii-t    line,  ,1  '[uartcr   ot    .1    mile  in  ,1  l\  ,iiii  ■■   o 
1;  .md 


f  thi^ 


.ilso  ])re-.ent  ed  a  stroll;.^  red  on  hi  e.istw.ird  ;  ,ind  li' >m  t  hat  dnci  t  ion  t  h 


Anieru  .111   .appro, nhe-.  were  m.ii 


\V 


.irr.iiiL'ed  .ii).ilis  crossed  the 


neck  Iroiii  Irish's  iedoiil)t,  i  omn'.indin;^  the  ioik  ot  the  e.ist  .and  west 
ro.'ul.s  which  cxt(Mule(l  from  th.il  iioint  to  tin  iioitii  end  of  the  island. 
1  lie   distance    lioni  Castle  iiill  iie.ir  the  ni.iin  inti.iiKe-   (A   the    h.iihor 


t    ".s-#* 


M 


i    ''I 


i 


u  * 


452 


I-KDM    MmNMoU  III    111    M  W    \()KI<. 


I  1  ,  /O. 


to  Hutt's  Hill,  where  the  AinericaiK  niaile  their  last  resistance,  was 
nearly  filtei'n  miles,  between  the  fifteenth  antl  tiie  twentieth  the 
Americans  liad  established  several  lotteries  and  the  Hritish  wore  com- 
l)e!led  to  strengthen  their  works  by  redoubts  in  the  manner  already 
stated.  On  the  lu  ent) -tiiirtl  the  American  army  was  reported  by 
General  Sullivan  in  a  published  circular  as  follows: 

"The  numbers  of  our  army  amount  toeiyht  thousand  (nie  hundred 
and  sevent}'-four,  rank  and  file,  i:xclusive  of  eiLjht  hundred  artillery- 
men, the  whole  e.\ceedinL;l\'  well  officered,  and  a  reinforcement  of 
three  thousand  men  will  probal)!)'  be  here  in  a  few  tlays." 

On  the  twentieth  the  Count  D'llstain;^  returned  to  port.  His 
fleet  was  badly  crip[)led  by  the  storm,  and  some  of  the  ships  were  cut 
up  1)\'  the  casualties  of  action,  (ienerals  (ireene  and  La  h"a_\'ette 
waitetl  upon  him  to  ur_L;e  the  resum|)tion  of  the  ori;4in,d  pi, in  df  attack 
upon  the  Brili>h  works  ;  but  he  h.ul  already  decitled  to  s.iil  for  Bos- 
ton, to  refit.  The  in.struclions  of  his  sovereii^n  were  explicit,  for  any 
ca-^e  {^C  sex'ere  iniur\'  by  te'uipe.-^t  or  in  action  ;  rv.r,,  to  make  the  port 
of  Boston.  rile  manifei.l  propriety  of  these  instruction^,  w,is  o\  er- 
looked  by  the  Aiiieric  in  officers.  He  was  upon  .1  dist.uit  firei;_,ni 
id  li.ible  ,it   .inv  tune  to  meet   ,1    liriti-^h   lleet.      It    w,is,i  vital 


:)ast 


m.itter  th,it  1: 


IS  snips  siiou 


d  l)e  kept  in  fi'  htintr  tri 


111. 


The  A 


mericiiiM 


■irL'eO 


SIC'l'  o 


pur]) 


til, It 
f  X 


ne  couUl  re 


e\\ 


ew 
H 


pt)rt 
is  o 


on  ni>  n.iiK 


fit  at  X 


Is,  N 


It  IS  I'videiit  til. it  with  the 


port, 
ewport  w,is  wholly  un^uileil  to  lh,it 


iTicer 


s   were   lu.uix'  or  ( 


luite   unanimous  in   fivor   of 


hter.d  compliance  with   his  instructions,  and   he   sailed  lor    Boston  on 


the  twentx'-second  of  Aui^ust,  just  a  month   from   his  de]),irt 
Sand\-  1  locik.      It   has   b 


lire  trom 


een    ci.iimed 


originated  from  jealousy 


if 


ins  assign 


til, it    the   action    of  his  officers 
nieiit   to   iKiv.il  C' imm.ind,  while 


:ener,u  ollicer  o 


ffK 


.f  tl 


le  .irnn', 


r 


lere  is  no  occ.ision  for  lh.it  criticism. 


The  I'reiich 


iiawil  ofhcers  were  tullv  .innreei.itive 


.f 


aii\"  i)rosi)e\ 


■t  of 


su 


cce>s    aL;,iinst   the    British    troops;   but   1 


10 


a^^uii. 


prosp 
d,  that    their 


vvhole  future  depended  upon  the  condition  of  tluir  si 


T 


le   Count    1  )'I-'-,tain''-,    in    a    'itter    to   (iener,il 


lips. 
.Sull 


ivan    on 


the 


morning  ot    hi-,  retuiii,  sa\-: 


I 


should    be   culpable    m    ni_\'  dut_\'to 


Ame 


ric.i    nerse 


If 


coll  III 


for   .1    moment  think   of  not    preservin;4  a 


squadron    i 


that  \ou   .^hou 


lestined  for  1 


ur   (letiMi.~c 


fc' 


I 


regretted  to  (.  olonc 


1  I- 


leurv, 


Id 


nave   hiiideii   o 


n  tl 


le   isl, 111(1 


'y 


before  the  time 


.i;4reed  upon   between  us,  ,ind 
that  you  are   in   dan;^er.     To   di 
II 


I    should   be  Lrrcatlv  afllicted  to  know 


■cide   upon   \'our  motives   is   .1  wroiv.^ 


u'liicii  I  have  not  committi. 


I  h,ive  refrained  from  censure 


an 


dtht 


I77S.] 


FROM    MONMOUTH     TO    Ni;\V    VO!;K. 


453 


twelve  thousand  men  now  iindcr  your  comm;uiil  will  prob.ihly  prove 
the  correctness  of  the  step,  l)y  a  success  wliicli    I   d 


i>ire 


as  a  cili/cn. 


aiid  as  an  admirer  of  your  bravery  and  talent 


A  protest    was   sent  to   him  Au;4ust   twenty-seventh,  after  he  had 


sailed,  si'niei 


1  l)y  1 


1)1111 


Si 


illiv.m, 


X.  ( 


I  re e III' 


ohii 


aneock, 


J,  CA 


over. 


E 


zek  (.'oriu 


I'it 


Will.  \\'lii|)plr,  Jolin    Tyler,  Solomon 

1  h 


,0\'f 


anc 


1  J 


ohn 


zconnci,  winch  overlook  .iiul  .imio\-eil   Inin.  bul  did  not  cliaULie  In 


)uri)ose  ;   altlioii'di  he  tr.ive  earnest  assurance  th.it  he  would  return  as 


soon  as  ne  cou 


Id 


do  so  in 


fi-ht 


iii'j  condition. 


(jeiier.il   Sullivan    issued  an   iiiteinperate  t/ciieral   order,  which   he 


modified  tuo  il.U's  afterward 


hut    the  followiiv':  sentence    liai 


'one 


)efore  the   peo[)l 


le  (leneiMl    yet   liopes   the  event   will   prove 


ill 


A 


nierica  able  to  procure  that  1)_\'  iier  own  arms,  winch  lier  alius 


refur- 


to  assist  in  oblaiiiiii<j. 


The  tle[)arture  of  the  fleet  depressed  the  American  army.     They 
droppetl   from   enthusiasm   to    its  o]i[)osite  extreme,  aiul  the  militia 

The  public   indignation  was  very 


returned    home  iii  lar'-e  numbers. 


bitl 


eriv  expressed 


.■\t    this   period   of  doubt  in  tin.'  Ann'rican  cami),  a  courier  arrived 


fr. 


in  (reiiera 


1  W, 


i-^liiiv'toii   with  tlu:   iiif  )nnation   that  Sir  Ilenrv  CI 


m- 


lOI 


1   had   left   \ew  York  with   four   tl 


f  X> 


irrisoii  ot  .Ne\v|)oi 


lou-and  troops  to  reinforce  the 
rt,  ami  stroii''lv  intim  iled   the  iinnort.uice  (jf  secur- 


iiiL*   a   timeh'   retrea 


t  fr 


om 


Rh 


oiie 


I- 


ind 


11 


e.id   winds 


cK'l.ived   the 


tran-'i)orts  so  that  General  Sullivan    had    liiiul\-  notice  of  the   move- 
me'.it.     On   t  he  twent\ -sixth,  the  In 


\-  1 


eavy  na;^^L;,e^e  aiul  sui)erlUious  (jrd- 


11 1 


nance  were    removed   in  safelv.     '  )ii    the  twenty-ei;^hlh.  ,i  council  of 
war  decided   th.it  the  arm\'  should   f.ul  i).ick  to  the  iiiu-th  end  of  the 
isl.md   and    I'ortify  the   position,   until   a  messeni^^er  could    be   sent   to 
Boston  to  learn  if  Count  1  )'l".>lain;_;  w.is  ready  to  return   to  Newport. 
Gener.il   La  I''a\'ette  maile  this  trip  with  remarkable  expedition,  but 


fa 


lied  to  move 


the  I" 


reiicli  (ieuer.il  to  expose  his  licet  until  it 


couli 


1  be 


tiiorouuh 


ly  ovi'rhauled.      It  i-.  cert.iin  tli  it  if  he  had  responded  to  the 


appe; 


lie  wou 


Id 


a.ive  e'licoui 


tered  a  superior  British  force  and  .ilmost 


Certain  tlestructiou. 


.\^ 


.f  t 


s  an   index  ot   the  spirit  m   which  he  receivec 


the  application,  it  is  oiils'  necessary  to  sa\',  that   he  offered  "  to   lead 
his  troops  in   person    to   New[)irt,  .iiul   place  himself  under  (jeneral 

I  w.is  anxious  to  demonstr,  "e,  that  my 


Sullivan's  orders. 


II 


e  savs, 


countrjaiieii  could  not   be  offeiuled  b\'  a  sudden  expres 


ion  o 


f  feel 


ins: 


and  that  he  who  had  the  honor  of  comm.indiu'r  t 


lom  III 


diierici,  was 


h-^ 


i 


':H 


i^ '!.    ■ 


■vn 


IK  J 


■'i 


'      S"!     ' 


w 


I 


111' 


m 


U:: 


.  f 


454 


1  ROM    MONMOUTH    TO    NI.W    VOk 


fi77S 


ami  WDuld  hi'  at   all  times,  one  of  the  most  iK'vuIlhI   and   /.calous  slm'- 
vantsnftlu-  l^iiitnl  States." 

Tt  must  he  the  jinli^meiit  of  history  that  he  did  his  duty  to  Franco, 


111(1 


menca.  and   luiiiselt  ;  and  under   the  exasperatnv^  cliar.icter 


.f  thi 


abuse  which  was   hea|)ed  upon  him.  he   vindicateil  the  contidence  of 
his  sovcrei'^n  in  his  capacit)"  and  wisdom. 


Hv  tl 


u'cc  o  eloe 


k  on  the  morninuof  tile  twentviiinth,  the  American 


armv   occupied 


(^ual> 


er 


[li 


am 


1   '!" 


uike\' 


Hi 


with    tlieu-    advance 


ard,  and  held  stroii'-'  intn  iichment->  across  the  north  vnd  of  i\hodi 


and 


,inil  a  c 


imniandini;"  position  on  Butt's  ili 


('iijoiu-l  IKiiry  n.  Liviiv^ston  was  jxisju'd  forward  i))-the  east  road, 


ami   I'oloiU'l    lohn  Laurens   1)\-   tli 


e    we 


-t   road,  to  meet  th 


le  advance. 


At  a  council  of  war  which  was  held  before   niornimr,  Gener.il  Greene 


ur; 


m   .ittack    in  force   u)>ou  the 


Hrit 


i>n, 


as  to  cut   their  detach- 


ment-; off  by  superior  numbers,  but    lii>  opinion  was  o\'erruled.      T 


liritish  >oou  drove  tin 


not  without  lo 

oral   PiLlott   states   tli.it    lu 


Americans  from 
A 


uike\-  .iiu 


1  O 


uaker 


ind  tile  Americans  retired  witliiii   their  lines. 


r  Hills,  hut 


Gen- 


mormmr.  when   he  ir,.uie  the    followin 


did    not  know   ot    the    retiwit   until   the 

lie 


er.ii 


're^cott    ,uid    a  \id\ 


t   of   i 


east  w. in 


anil  moved   up  the  east  shon 


eral  .Smith  inarched  tlie  rweiity-srcoin 
the  n.ink  couipanie^  o 
road.      .Maioi-''ener,i 


dis[)osition   of  troops  :   Gimi- 
irown's  cor[)s  occupied   the  old   works 
of  the  i-^laiid  ;    r>ri:^Mdier-L,'cn- 
ind  i'ortx-third  re'jriments.  and 


f  tin-  'riiirt>--eiL;litli  ,iiul  iMfty-f  mrth  by  the  ea-.t 
1  lv)sberL[  marcheii   with  the    lles-^ian   chasseurs. 


and   till 


A 


n>pacii  re;4im 


eiits   of   V'oit   and  Sciboth   1)\-  tin;  west  road. 


s  soon   as  (uMieral  ."-imith   re]iorted  the  Americans  to  be  m  force 


fn 


on 


Quaker  Hill,  the  i'"iftv-fourth  Hriti-li.  tlie  If 


essi.m  regime 


ntof  H 


ULTer, 


.and  the  r< 


( 


oloue 


-iilue  c  I 


aiiiun'. 


f  I^rown's  rro\'inci.il  corps  were   sent  to  his  support. 


^llppl)rt  ( 
Purkev  1 


leiier.il 


corps  o 
she 


f  l'ro\incials  were  sent  b\'  the  west;  road  to 


osberir.  who  encountered  ,i  stubborn   re:->istance  at 


At  Quaker  Hill  Gtiier.al  Glover  distiiiLmished  h 


imse 


If 


by  a  vali.int  defense,  , IS  (litl   (."olomls  Livinj^ston  and   Laurens.      The 
American  casu.ilties  were  thirt\-  killed,  one   hundretl  and   thirt\-scven 


wounded  ami   lor 


tv-f. 


)ur  missnu 


The  l»ritisli   casualties  were  thirt\'- 


citjht  killed,  two  hundred  and  ten  wounded.  ,ind  a  few  mi^siu.. 


!ust 


at  eve mi 


1-  ll 


le 


iiuericaiis  made  an  .ittempt  to  cut 


-.onie  iliasseurs 


who  were  advanciii'^   on   their   riiiht ;  but   General  riirott  states 


that 


"  tile  reL;inients  of  I'anniiig  and  Hus^er  were  ordered  up  to  their  sup- 
port, and  after  a  sm.irt  engaL^ement,  obliged  them  to  retreat  to  their 
main  btxlv  on  Wiiidmili  Hill." 


17-!^. J 


I'KoM   MoNMouni  K)  m:\v  Vokk. 


455 


The  Amcricins  pitched  .i  luimbcr  of  U'lUs  in  front  of  their  lines, 
and  appeared  to  l)e  dili_Ljently  at  work  upon  tlie  defenses.  A  retre.il 
by  both  Bristol  and  Howland  ferries  had  been  determined  upon.  The 
c\i)irience  and  ;^ood  jud.L^nient  of  General  Glover  was  conspicuous  on 
this  occasion,  as  durint;  the  retreat  from  Long  Isl.md  in  177^.  Geti- 
erai  La  I-'ayette  returned  from  Hoston  at  eleven  o'clock,  and  devoted 
himself,  as  at  ISraiuKuine,  Barren  Hill,  aiul  Mnnniouth,  to  the  care 
of  the  rear  ;^uard,  iind  "  befon;  twelve  o'clock,"  s.iys  t/ener.d  .Sullivan, 
"the  m.iiu  army  had  crossed  with  the  st(}res  .md  ba;4;4age.  La  I'.iy- 
ctte  broui^fjit  off  the  pickets  and  other  parties  which  covered  the 
retreat  in  excellent  order;  not  a  man  was  left  behind,  nor  the  smallest 
article  left.  " 

On  the  mornin;^of  the  thirtieth,  one  hundred  sail  of  British  vessels 
appeared  in  si^^ht,  brin^^ini;  General  Clinton's  arm)'  to  the  rescue  of 
the  garrison.  He  returned  proniptly  to  New  Vork,  however,  only 
deterred  from  a  ilescenl  upon  .\ew  London,  b)-  contrary  winils,  which 
prevented  the  Heet  from  entering;  the  harbor.  General  Grey  sailed 
from  Xewi)ort,  with  the  transports,  to  Acushnet  river;  landed  at 
evening;,  .uui  within  twi-nty-four  hours  destro)'ed  seventy  vessels. 
Bedfonl,  I'airhaven  and  Martha's  Vine}artl  were  also  visited.  These 
posts  were  f.uiKJUs  for  their  outfit  of  privateers,  and  six  armed  vessels 
of  from  fomteen  to  sixteen  L;uns,  besides  ^varehouses  and  public  stores, 
were  destroyed,  and  a  successful  levy  was  made  upon  the  inhabitant-. 
for  ten  thousand  sheep  and  three  hundred  o.xen.  Admiral  Howe 
sailed  for  Boston,  where  he  arrived  September  first ;  but  being  unable 
to  draw  the  Count  D'Estaing  into  an  engagement,  returned  to  New 
Vork. 

The  popular  clamor  against  the  French  general  had  not  subsided. 
On  the  fifteenth  of  .September,  the  Chevalier  de  Saint  Sauveur  was 
killed  at  Boston,  while  attempting  to  quiet  an  affray  between  the 
I'rench  and  disorderly  parties  at  the  French  bakery.  The  Massachu- 
setts (ieneral  Assembly,  on  the  day  following,  ordered  a  monument  to 
be  erected  to  his  memory,  and  the  judgment  of  good  citizens  was 
fully  alive  to  the  disgrace  which  such  disorder  and  recrimination 
inflicted  on  the  national  cause. 

The  Count  D'Estaing  remained  at  Boston  until  November  third, 
when  he  sailed  for  the  West  Indies.  On  the  first  of  November,  how- 
ever. Admiral  IJyron  appeared  off  the  harbor  with  a  large  naval  force, 
but  was  immediately  driven  off  by  a  severe  storm,  which  so  disabled 
his  fleet  that  he   was  compelled    to  go    to  Newport  to  refit.     This 


■m 


M;;t, 


¥y. 


ii'l'lH 


,1  I 


456 


1  KoM    MdWKil    III     10   M:\V    \(>kK. 


177S. 


oii'xiicv Joiii;/it  the  (.)n(iii  (luriiv.r  '""S.  I'lir  p.i^^a;'/'  of  hi-,  licit  iVdiii 
ICriL^land  u'.i-i  (li^astiuii-,  ;  |m|-  ,illir  tlic  ili^pcr^iiin  ol  liis  sliips  dii  t  li.it 
voya^f,  In- uM^  liiiiisiir,  iDinpLlU'tl  to  m.iki:  I  lalilax,  Uclmi;  lu;  icarlud 
New   \'«iik. 

'I'llc  fii^l  ailivc  coiipriat idii  of  the  I'"n'iu  li  nav\-  ill  support  of  tin* 
Unitrd  States  liad  rcsultid  in  110  \iitoiirs  ;  hut  it  pniipitatcd  the 
evacuation  of  IMiil,id(  Ipliia,  iisti  ieted  tlie  >.;airisoii  ol  New  ^'o^iv  to 
()])erations  u  itliin  reach  of  tlie  Hrifisli  iia\  y,  and  ua-.  a  ph  d^:  o'  pr.ic- 
tical  s_\nip,itliy  in  llie  strii;,;'^U'.  I'o  the  nations  of  I'aiio|)ij  it  w.is  tin- 
emphatic  declaration  tlial  Immiki'  was  re.idy  to  maintain,  as  well  ,is 
acknowledge,  American  Iiidcpi.iuleiice. 


m 


f,;,U 


^n. 


r'.    1. . 


ill! 


J.M 


M 


M 


]l 


M 


f!    t 


!i 


I 


il 


CIIAl'll'-k    I A  III. 


CAMI'AK'.N  <»r   i77,S.     }\\.\     In   I  )|:(  I  .MIlKR. 


A 


.  I',i>ctt<.' 


SiillivMU  r<~.iinif(l 


\i')  A  at 


lo\'|(I(.'lu:r 


ICIK  T.ll 


I  Hi  iiuiri 


I  r 


I  i-ii  I 


aiK 


1    ,.('t 


I  rw.iiM 


wiMkIicw    1)(  liirii 


W 


irnn,   on 


I    of 


ir.uli   ol    till-     I'lrili-,!!   slii|i]iiii'.',  and   'icikimI    ( iiciiic,    wlm    was  stiil 
(  hi.iitcmi,istcT-:.;>'iii  i.il,  went    to    I'^.tDii    1<i  ^ii])tM  intcinl   tlic  |)Uiclia-.c 


.r  >i 


innlics 


('(II  llic  !•  Kill  li  -.iiiiailimi. 


W 


i^liiii;.;tiiii  ntaiiiiil    liii   li(.Mil(|iiart('r- 


it   Wiiitc    I'laiii^,  until  tlic 


lattrr  part  of  S(;|)t(iHl)ir.      I'poii  liis  tlist  ritiini  to  this  pnst,  aftt.T  two 
\(Mrs'    ahsciKH',  lie    took   occasion    to  (diitra-^t    tin-   t  wo  periods,  thus 


writ  111''', 


The  hand  ol   rrovidmcc  ha-;  liccii  so  consiiicuoiis,  tliat  \\c 


nil 


1st  ]k-  worse  than  ,in  infidel  lliat  lack 


.iilh  ;   .iiuJ  mole  than  wicked 


lli.it   has  not  >rralitu(le  enou''h  to  ackiiowh-d^c  ins  ol)li^atioii. 


It 


Is 


ni 


ins 


it  'oo  much  to   say  of  tlie   American  (.  (jnimander-in-chii  I,  thai 
mderfnl    self-coiitrol    over    a    passionate    natural    teinpc-r,   and    his 


L'.pianiimty  under  exas])eratin!.j  ordeals,  owi 


much  of  their  strength  t< 


the  sentiment  just  (pioted,  so  that  h>;  could  devote  his  faculties 
entirely  to  duty,  unhamin  r<  <l  hy  such  i)ersonaI  issues  as  annoyid 
mail)'  of  his  associates. 
,ind    on    the    tenth    to    ]• 


l'"roin  White  Pl.iins  he  removed  to  I'ishkil 


reileiK  kslnir: 


Ol 


twentv-seventh    he 


aimoimce'ii 


till 


iispoation 


.f  t 


le  .irmy  lor  the  .ippro.ichiiv.j  peril 


xl  of 


wintcr-iiuarters. 


It  indicates  his  judj^ment  of  the    rel.itive   \Mlue   and   ex|)osurc  of 


different    localities  ,ind    posts. 


N 


me 


ri-jades  on   tin;  west  si( 


le  of 


the  Hudson  River,  exchi'^ive  of  the  ^.nrisoii  ,it  West  Point;  one  of 
which,  the  Morth  Carolina  brigade,  will  be  iie.ir  Smith's  Chn-c  for  the 
sccurit)'  of  that  pass,  and  as  a  reinforcement  to  West  Point  in  case  of 


lecessity  ;   .mother 


the   J 


erscy  bri|^ade,  will   Ije  at   Iili/,al)ethtown.  t( 


cover  the  lower  pari  of  New  Jersey;  and  tlie  (jther  seven,  consistii 


1-^-U 


45S 


(  AMTAICN.     iri,\    [>  >  III  1  I  \ir.i;K. 


[1778. 


f:    f 


mi 


of  tlic  \'ir;^ini.i,  M.ir)-laiul,  I  li'l.iw.iri.",  and  IV-iinsylvani.i  tr()(;ps,  will  \n'. 
at  Mitlillrl)n»()k  ;  six  l)ri;^M(K's  will  hr  K  ft  on  the  cast  side  of  the  rivi-r, 
anil  at  Wist  I'oinf  ;  tliier  of  uhiih  inf  the  Massachusetts  troopsi  will 
be  stalidiu-d  Inr  the  iiiiirudiate  del'en-e  of  the  lli;^hIan(U;  oiU'  at 
West  l'i>int,  ill  additiiui  tn  tlu'  i^aiiison  ahead)'  there  ;  and  the  other 
two  at  I'i-hkill  and  Coll  timiital  \  ill, e^e.  I  lu'  niiiainiii;.;  tliiei'  brii^ades, 
composed  ot  the  Xew  i  I.iin])sliire  and  Coiiiiecliiut  troops  and  I  la/en's 
regiment,  will  be  posted  in  the  vicinity  of  D.inburv,  for  the  |)rotec- 
tioii  of  the  counti)'  l\'in;4  aloiiLj  the  Sound,  to  co\ei-  our  iiiaL;a/.ines 
l_\'in;4  oil  ("onnccticut  river,  and  to  aid  llu;  1  li;_;hlands  011  any  serious 
inoveinent  of  the  enemy  that  way.  The  park  of  artillery  will  be 
.it  I'luckeiiiin  :  the  c.iv.ilry  will  be  disponed  of  thus  :  Aland's  reyimeiit 
•it  Winchester,  Virginia  ;  15a\-Iis  ,it  I'rede'ric,  or  iIa;^erstown,  M,uy- 
land  ;  and  ."Sheldon's  ,it  I  )urham,  (.ioiinecticut  ;  Lee's  corps  (Colonel 
Hart)'  l.ee)  will  be  with  that  p.irt  of  the  .n'lU)' vvhich  is  in  the  Jerseys, 
actin,L,f  on  the  adv.iiiced  posts." 

Ciener.d  i'utnam  was  assi^^ned  to  command  , it  l)anl)ur)';  (jeiieial 
Mchoip^all  in  the  I  !  i;_;lilands,  and  ;^eneral  lieadiiuarlers  were  to  be 
near  Middlebrook. 

77/(  r>ritislt  army.  No  extensive  field  oi^er.itions  took  place  in  the 
Northern  States  after  tile  battle  of  Monmouth.  The  time  was  ilraw- 
iiii,'  near  when  the  ciMiipar.itive  rest  which  the  .Southern  States  realized 
after  tin:  defense  of  I''ort  .'^ioultrie  was  to  be  re[)I.iced  b\- the  perxasivc 
activities  of  w>ir.  and  the  issues  of  pitched  battles.  The  .irmy  of  (ieti- 
er.il  Clinton  was  lar''el\'  (lei)leted  bv  order  of  the  British  Cabinet. 
I-"ive  thousaiul  men  were  orderetl  to  the  West  Iiulies,  and  three  thou- 
sand men  to  Florida.  Sir  1  lenry  Clinton  says  in  .1  letter  of  ( )ctober 
eighth,  addressed  to  Lord  Gennaine,  "  With  an  army  so  much  dimin- 
ished at  New  York,  nothing  important  can  be  done  ;  esjiecially  as  it 
is  also  weakened  by  sending  seven  hundred  men  to  Ilalifa.x,  and  three 
hundred  to  Bermuda." 

The  n:treat  from  .Monmouth  involved  nearly  eight  hundred  deser- 
tions, as  authentically  verified,  and  the  killed,  wounded,  and  miss- 
ing, and  the  contingent  casualties  of  all  kinds  from  the  time  the  evac- 
uation of  Philailelphia  began,  were  little  less  than  two  thousand  men. 
.Man>tlied  from  exposure  to  heat,  and  the  wa.ste  was  not  promptly 
replaced  from  England.  Several  restricted  incursions  were  made 
which  kept  the  American  Commander-in-chief  on  the  watch  for  the 
Highland  posts;  but  these  became  less  frecpient,  And  the  year  1778 
drew  near  its  close  with  a  material  loss  of  prestige  to  the  British  cause, 


.77.^ 


i\M1'.\1i;n.    -in.V    lo   DI  ri;\il;i;i; 


459 


(I   mtiih    of  ci»iit"i(U;iicc  on   the   part,  of  tlu;    LJiiitrd   St.itcs   in   fiiKil 


an 


success. 


On  the  tWLMity-SL'Vcntli  of  ScptcmljiT.  ("rincral  fircy  surprUcd 
Coloiu'l  H.iylor's  li;4lit  liorsL-  ,i'  T.ipp.m,  as  coinplctel)'  as  \\c  did  (n'li- 
(.Tal  W'.iync's  coinui.ind  at  I'aoli  ;  and  F^ii.'uli.'nant-coloncl  C.uni)bcll, 
acconipanird  by  Lioiitcnant-colouil  Sinicoc,  confirnKjd  tln'ir  ante- 
cedent custom  of  uMif.iie  \)y  foiM\s  which  l)'\)u;4ht  hlllc  phmdcr  and 
less  intiin>ii-  crcih't. 


General   (.'or 


nwaliis, 


with    l\w  tliousmd   men,  mad^'  an  incur-'i 


on 


into  New  Jersey,  Ijetween  the  llud-^on  ,ind  the  I  laikiMisack,  d\\i.\  (len- 
er.d  Knyphaiisen,  witli  three  thou>,iiul  men,  ojter.iletl  in  Westcliester 
count)-,  between  the  ifudson  ,ind  the  Hronx,  but  with  httle  acquisi- 
tion of  |)ro\isions  or  other  supphes. 

( )n  the  fifteenth  of  (  )etober.  Captain  i'\-r;^ni-ion  ol"  the  Seve-ntieth 
liritisli  re^^imtiit,  with  thne  tliou-<;ind  re;_;ui,irs  and  the  Third  Xew 
Jersey  VoUnUeers,  made  ,i  descent  upon  iattle  N'eck,  Xew  Jerse_\', 
where   man)'  priv.iteers   were  e(piii)[)ed,  surpris 


a   detacliment  ot 


Count  I'ul.iski's  brigade  at   iii''ht,  and   inllicted   a 


filty 


7to//r  :,v//////it/,"  iiuludiu'r  Ia\;utenant-colonel   the  ll.iron  de  15 


;nie(l 


and 


L 


leutenant  de  l,i  iior 


,K 


'erLTU^on   savs  m 


his  oflicial  repor'        It 


bein;4  ;i  night  attack,  Hitle   quarter  could  of  course  be  L,n'ven  ;  so  that 


tiiere  are  on!)-  Ii\e   [)risoners. 


Colonel  I'uKiski   vii;orousl)-   pursued 


the  p.irlv,  in 


tlict 


HI"  some  loss. 


lie  Indian   massacres  in   tlu 


W 


x'omiii'. 


\' 


ilie 


from  .liilv  first  to 


the  lourtli,  whicli  were  to  be  subsequent!)'  ax'eiiL^ed.  were  followe'd  \<y 
th.it  of  Cherry  Valley,  Noveml)er  eleventh.  These  were  frontier 
enterprise  ,  beyoiul  the  ran!_;e  of  the  Ljener.d  c.iinpai,;n  ;  but  they 
made  imp' .'s., ions  ui)oii  the  n.ition,  and  muUii)lied  the  embarrass- 
ments of  the  ]>ros(.'cution  of  the  war. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  November,  Commodore  llx'de  Parker 
con\'o)'ed  a  lleet  of  trans[)orts  to  Savannah,  which  carried  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Campbell,  the  Seventy-first  rei^imeiit,  two  battalions  of  Hes- 
sians, four  b.ittalions  of  J-'rovincial   trooi)s,  .iiul   a  iletachment  of  the 


Ro\'al   artillerv,   makiiiL;'  a  total   force  of 


!t     tl 


iree 


tl 


lousand   five 


lunnlred  men.  'The  troo[)s  landed  at  'T)'bee  Island,  about  filteeii 
miles  from  Savannah,  and  cai)tured  the  cit\'  on  the  tweiU)'-niiitii  of 
iJecember.  The  American  force,  under  command  of  Gener.d  Robert 
liowe,  consisted  of  abt)ut  ei;4ht  hundred  men,  and  with  militi.i  did 
not  exceed  twelve  hundred.  (Stedman  estimates  it  at  tlfteen  hundred  i. 
Colon  '  ' 'user's  and  Thompson's  South  Carolina  reLjiments,  Colonel 


«'S 


m 


-h 


'M 


„'«? 


I  I 

:  i 


I 


1  f- 

I  Hi 

U 

iW 

i       1 

H 

i    \ 

t 

1 

I  < 

H 

f'li 

mil 

;  !  . 


h 


.  u 


in 


I 

i 
I 

i.  i 


i 


i 


460 


CAMPAIGN. — JULY    TO    DKCI'.MI'.I-K. 


L'778. 


George  Walton's  Gcorf:^ia  rilkmcn.  one  hundred  men,  and  Colonel 
Elbrrt's  GcGr;_;ia  militia  i'ouj^ht  well  at  an  .ulv.mced  jxi-ition  near 
Tatnal's  ami  Wrij^ht's  plantations,  until  resistance  was  hopeless. 

I.ieuten.int-colonel  Campbell,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  he 
was  ;4uided  by  a  ne^jro,  tlu^jui^h  a  hidden  path  across  a  swamp,  upon 
the  .\meric.in  rif^ht.  This  movement  in  force,  while  only  demonstrat- 
ini;  in.  front,  insured  his  success.  Mis  rei)ort  states  tiie  cqiture  of 
thirty-eiL,dit  (ifricers.  four  hundred  and  fifteen  non-commissioned 
officers  ;uul  privatt.:s.  and  fort^'-eij^lit  j^ieces  of  cannon,  twenty-three 
mortars,  and  ninety-four  barrels  of  powder,  besides  the  shipping  in 
the  harbor,  and  ;i  large  cpi. unity  of  provisions.  His  loss  is  given  as 
one  officer  Captain  I'eter  Campbell,  of  Skinner's  li;,',hi:  inf.intry.  two 
priv.ates  killed,  and  one  sergeant,  and  nine  privates  wouiide<l,  and 
states  that  eight\-three  American  dead  and  eleven  woundetl  were 
found  on  the  field. 

Thus  the  Southern  campaign  of  1779  ''''''^''  inaugur.ited  with  the 
closing  days  of  1778. 

Notwithstanding  this,  the  condition  of  Genei'.U  Clinton  at  New 
York  had  become  critical.  The  position  of  tin;  Aineric.m  ,irm\' 
restricted  his  supi)lies,  and  compelled  him  to  depeiul  largely  u[)on 
England  ;  and  on  the  second  tl.iy  of  iJeceinber,  he  again  wrote 
despondently  to  the  ])riti>h  .^ecretai}  of  State  :  — "  I  do  not  complain, 
but,  my  lord,  do  not  let  any  thmg  be  expected  of  one  circumstanced 
as  I  am." 

7'/;r  XorlJicni  Front  it  r.  'I'he  l^ritish  garrison  at  Detroit  had 
taken  little  [jart  in  active  service  .after  its  detachment  retired  from 
"the  Cedars"  in  1776,  but  the  early  western  settlers  were  co:istantly 
exposed  to  Indian  incursions;  .iiui  the  defense  of  Jioonesborough, 
Harrodsburg,  and  Fort  Logan  were  cons[)icuous  lor  their  valor. 
Daniel  Ho(.)nt:  with  thirt)'-seven  men  li.id  been  captured  at  last  by 
Indians,  was  taken  to  Chillicothe.  ()hio,  and  thence  to  Detroit,  lie 
was  taken  back  to  Chillicothe  and  adopted  by  the  Shawnee  nation. 
On  the  sixteenth  of  June,  177S,  he  escaped  and  reached  Boones- 
borough,  one  hundretl  and  .-.ixty  miles,  as  he  states  in  his  nariative, 
on  the  twentieth.  Caplain  Duf|uesiie  ,  nd  eleven  othe'  I'reiich 
Canadi.ms  from  De'troit,  acting  in  the  ii.ime  of  Governor  Hamilton, 
and  four  hundred  and  fifty  Indians,  unexj)ectedly  attacked  the  fort  on 
the  twentieth  of  .\ugust  but  were  repulsed. 

A  small  British  garrison  had  been  [)Iacetl  at  K.iskaski.i  (Ivandolph 
county,  Illinois),  but  this  force  had   been   withdrawn  to   Detroit  upon 


;3.] 


cAMPA]G\.--jiLV  i(»  I)i:ci:mi!i;r 


41JI 


the  American  invasion  of  Canada  in  177^,  and  tlie  command  of  tli 

post   UM-^ 


intrusted  to  a  Ficnciiman  bv  tlic  name  of  Roclieblave 


Under  tile  |)atrona<^e  of  Tiiomas  JvlTerson.  Geor^^e  Mason  and 
Cieor;_je  Wytlie,  (jf  Virt^inia,  Colonel  Geor;.rc  Rof^ers  Clark  left  Williams- 
burt^,  VirL^inia,  on  the  fourth  of  Janiiai)-,  177S,  ,iiui  o!i  the  fourth  of 
July  captured  Kaskaski.i.  W'iiile  de^ci'ndin;^  the  Ohio  he  heard  of 
the  alliance  with  I''rance  and  from  l\..i--ka^kia  lie  moveil  tow.ird  the 
French  settlement  at  Vinceinies  (Knox  county,  Indiana)  .md  there 
established  him^elf,  with  the  ileclared  purpose  of  conquerinsj  the  north- 
west. Lieutenant  Governor  Hamilton  left  Detroit  on  the  seventh  of 
October  and  recovered  Vinceiines  on  the  seventeenth  of  December, 
post[joninL:f   operations    to   recover   Illinois    until    spring.      Thus    the 


extreme 


,s7  he'Mu  to  eniia^e  in  the  general  war. 


Miscil/itihoiis  /■.I'tiits.     The   French  alliance  had   been  an   i 


^lve   sien   o 


f  t 


mpres- 
le  .\meric.in  progress  toward  recognition  among  the 
nations.  All  efforts  to  compromise  still  failed,  and  the  military  opin- 
ions of  General  Amiierst  receivetl  no  attention. 

On  the  nineteenth  of  March   the  constitution   had  been  adopted, 
to  take  effect  the  twentv-ninth  of  November. 

Another  expeditit)n  to  con(pjer  Canada  was  [)r(jposed,  to  be  under 
the  command  of   La  l'"a\ette,  associated   with  the   Count   D'Kstaing. 


Detroit,  Xi.igara,  Oswego,    Montreal   and    II 


ini.i 


X    were    to    be   sei)a- 


r.ite  objectives    of  one  grand  movement  ;  but  the  wisdom  of  W'.ishing- 
ton  postponed,  and  afterwards  induced  Congress  to  reject  the  scheme. 


Tl 


le  ve 


sed  ;   but  the  Americm  Congress  hail  no  nVMiey, 
union  of  tlie  States  was  conslautK'   evoking  sectional 


ar  177S 


The    C 


ommaiic 


Kr-in-chief   declared    th.it 


the    States 


and  the  lo 

jealousies. 

separateK'  were  too  much  engaged  in  their  local  concern-,  when  the 

great   business  of  a  nation,    the    momentous   concerns  of  an  empire, 

were  at  stake." 


B.mcroft  thus  cinbodies  his  sentiment. 


I  le  who  in  the  begin 


nmi 


)f  th 


e   revolution  used   to   call   Vir''ini,i   his   counlrw 


rom   this  time 


never  ceased  ms  ehorts,  by  conversation  and  correspondence,  to  tram 
the  statesmen  of  America,  es[)eLially  of  his  beloved  native  common- 
wealth, to  the  work  of  consolidating  the  Union." 

Upon  visiting  Philadelphia  at  the  close  of  the  year,  he  adtlressed 
a  letter  to  Colonel  Harrison,  Speaker  of  the  Virginia  House  of  Dele- 
gates, which  solemn!}-  declared  his  apprehensions  for  the  future.  He 
urged  Virginia  to  "  send  the  best  and  ablest  of  her  men  to  Congress," 

ley  must  not  slumber  nor  sleep  at  home  in 


and  thus  continues 


Tl 


■  r 


U' 


H. 


1    I 


![!' 


IP '' 


II 


i    v\ 


4('> 


CWll'MCX.     Jll,\     TO   I»l  <l  .\!i;l,l-;. 


|I77« 


such  ,1  time  III  picssiii',^  (l.iii;;rr  ;  -rniitcnt  willi  tli'-  <njwymi'Ht  ot 
pl.ici--^  ot  Imiii  II  1,1  ]  III  I  fit  in  t  lirir  ow  ii  Si.ilc^  while  I  hi-  i  uiiiiiniii  iiiliT- 
csts  of  Aiiiiiir.i  ,nr  iiii iiililriiii;^  .md  -.inkiii'j  inlo  ini\'i(.il)li-  ruin." 
"  ll  I  WA-ic  til  ih.iw  .1  jiiitiirc  ot  thi-  tinii  T  .iml  nun,  imni 
uii.il  I  h,i\r  M  Lii,  hi, Mil,  ,niii  in  p.irt  know,  I  shiiuM  in  one  \voi<l  s;i)' 
t  h.it  iilli  ni-^>,  (!i-,-<i|i.it  ion  ami  i\t  r,i\'.i;.;,nu c  -^rr ni  to  ha\i  laiii  last  hoM 
ot  nio  t  ot  lin'iii  ;  that  ^ju-c  iilat  ion,  |)(;(  nl.ition  .iii'l  an  in-..it  i.iMc  tliir  t 
for  ri(  ill.  ■,  ^11  111  to  h.ivc  '.;ot  llir  l;(ltir  ol  fvciy  ot  her  ton  iih  latioii 
.iml  ,ihiio-t  of  ivii)-  older  ot  iinn  ;  th,it  paily  (li-^|iiites  ami  |iir^onal 
i|u,irrels  .ire  the  ;.;re,it  hiiaiie.,  of  tin-  il.iy  ;  .  .  .  while. i  v,ii:.it  ami 
.III  nniiil.it  In;;  deht,  rniiuil  linaiue-,  ile|irei  iati.'il  money,  .nul  \\',iiit  oj 
credit,  whiih  in  its  i  oiise-i[Uen(;e-^  i^  the  w.nit  ot  e\'ery  thin;;,  are  hut 
.seiomiaiA'  coiisider.it ion ^,  it  our  .iKairs  wore  the  nio  l  jiroiiiisin;; 
,i^|)i  ( t  ;  .  .  .  An  a--^eiii!)ly,  ,i  loiuiit.  ,i  dinner,  .i  sii|)iiir,  will  not 
only  take  imn  o(T  tiom  .iitni;;  in  thi.  husiiu'-s,  hut  even  iioiu  tiiink- 
iii'^  ol  it  ;  while  a  '.;reat  |iart  of  the  otfu  ers  of  oiir  .irniy,  from  ahsojute 
nee'e^sitv,  .ire  i|uittin;;  t  he  service,  ,iiid  the  more  virtuous  lew,  rather 
than  ilo  this,  ,iie  sinkin;.;   hy  sun- dc'j^i'ei-s  into  hi':-".;ary  .iml   w.int." 

I  I  is  loiu'ict  ions  Were  enihoiliiil  in  one  si'iiieme.  "  ( )ur  ,ij  fail's  ,ire 
in  .1  nion-  distressed,  ruinous  ,md  deplor.iMe  condition  than  they  h.ive 
hccii  since  the  conimenccinent  ot  tli'-  w.ir." 

r.riiisii   laii.'  iivi    Fold  r. 
N'mII.      t'luni  "  Orii'.iii.il  Ket'irioiii  lln;  liiiU,fi  Kcouil  <  ill'irr."     I  laic  Aiij;u  t  IJlii,  177H 
Nov  Vi.il; t=,r^(> 


SUiU-'H  l>l.ii 
l';uiliis  I  I'M) 


■»  =  '' 
iij,5^'j 


1  ..ii;;  lsl:il|.|.. 
Kiiii.l.'  I,l.inil. 


Willi  I.or.l  lliisviN  I  iicl. 


117 


51^ 


14.47 


ii.ii  :',\.'.(-\. 


'I'lli-  fi.riij  riMJiii.-cl  l.y  .IrtiicliiiiiMil ,  sent  lu  iIh-    W.    1    IimIh-s  ;iivI    ll.ilil:ix,  w.v,  t.ilioii  U| 


NdVUlllllLT,    I,    I77H,  III  fiilluws  ; 

New  \\>\\i i*-"''^ 

l..irig  Mail'! Sf>y> 

Sl.ilen  Island <J72 


I'^mllO    ll'ink      

I'l.jvi^U'iu  ■■  Is). Mid. 


1"') 


Kiiijilc  Inland 574'' 


16,170 


Total,  22,554- 


IS 

I 


CllAI'TI'K    IJX. 

JANUARY    TO  JUI.V,    177a     rosilloX    (i|     Till;    AkMM.S.     !\'(ll  )F.\-rs 
<M-     llll.    (.I.M.kAl,    (  .\\II',\I(;N. 

'^  I~^l  1 1,  )T,ir  I  779  optiiiMl  uilliDiit  orfciis:\-(:  aiiiDiis  liii  llic  |),iil(jf 
_|^  cithci'  <il  the  .iniiiis  in  tin-  Nuitlu m  Stati:-,.  'I'Ik;  ".irii-,Mii  oi 
New  \'i)ik  in.ulc  111)  (i'MiiDii  ,t  r.itiMii  111  iiiipnit.iiu c  in  any  (lircelinii  ; 
ami  \Va'iliiii;;t()ii  spciU  t  lie  ;;ri'atir  ])ail  ol  jaiuiaiy  in  iir'nn.;  (>)n;.M(!ss 
to  t.ikc  active  m<asiir(.'s  tn  ircniit  tin-  army.  Il  v\.ii  iidI  until  the 
ninth  ol  M.inli  thai  (■i;.',lit_\'  n-iilar  liattaliMn  ,  were  anlhoii/cil,  and  it 
was  foiiiKl  alniM^l  iiiijin^^ililr  to  uhtain  lunds,  hy  loan  or  taxation,  to 
maintain  the  tioo])s  ahr.Klv'  on  duty. 

'I'ln;  i;arri^oii  (.t  I 'hiladclpliia  u.m  ]).i-,-.in;';  thron^.^h  an  id!'-  cxpcii- 
encf,  similar  to  that  of  ihc  I'.iiti'-h  v.arriion  oi  tin:  pn^'ioiis  \'car. 
C"oni;rc>>s  it^idl  st.ciiicd  ciurvati'd  liy  the  tnnporary  suspm^ion  of 
,nti\'(;  hostilities.  While-  ( iemiMl  ('Imtoii  \va  ^  iiiai  ti^i-  at  .\'r\v  \'oil;, 
(leiieral  \\'asliiii;_4on  resolved  to  cinplo)-  a  poilion  ol  the  army  in 
|)nnishin;_;  the  indi.m-,  who  hid  <hvailate(l  Wyoiniii;,;  .md  ("lierr)- 
V.ille'ys  the'  |tic;vioii-^  ye'.ir.  New  Jersey  troop,  were  as^i;.Mied  to  this 
duty,  hut  refilled  to  mai\  h  until  pro\'i,ion  w.is  m.uh:  lor  the  support 
of  llie'ir  families,  llu:  .State  leLudature  |)rovided  moiiiy  lo  p.iy  the 
officers  and  nun.  and  order  was  re-.tor<;d.  ihc  iiniiMiliate  ileinents 
of  the;  Soutlnrn  cnnpainn  |)o,tpone-d  the  expedition  to  WNomiiiL; 
V'.illey  ;  but  (^iloiiij  .Sch.iiek-,  I  .ieuten.iiit -colonel  W'lllett ,  ami  Majoi 
Cochran,  surprised  the  towns  of  the  ( )nonda.;ai,  in  .\e\v  \'oik,  .md  on 
the  nineteenth  of  ,\pril  de-.troyed  the  whole  settK:nient  without  loss. 
1  he  (Confederate  inoUi  y  hoon  dej)ie'eiateil  -^o  as  to  he  worth  Init 
three  (jr  four  cents  on  tlie  dollar,  ,ind  \\",ishin;_;ton  was  con->tr.iineil 
to  offer  his  own  est.ite  lor  s.ile-  to  me'et  his  aetu.il  nece-.sitieT.  lielore 
f.ill  tile  i.ssuc  of  two  liundrcd  millions  of  [)ai)er  money  was  ,iutIiori/cd, 
and  measures  were  taken  to  obtain  a  loan  in  I'lurope. 

Majer-<rencral  Ikiijaniin  Lincoln  luul  arrived  at  Charleston  (Jii   the 


iii^  y^M 


.:i^  11. 


*■  r 


M 


m 


•  (■♦••^S 


I.  ll 


i: 


m 


t  I 


4'M 


first  of  n 


JAMAkV    lo    11  I.N- 


177'). 


iiLinhcr    nrcccdiii 


siipt 


rse'din'r    Hri-'atlicr-'U'iu  r>il    Ivohrrt 


H 


owe,  in  cmniiiimd  of  ilie   Aim  rio.in  troop- 


V) 


uriM'. 


j 


uiiiarv,  ( un- 


iT.iI    I'rcvost    c.iptuiril    Siinbmy,    ami    Coloiu  1     Campbell    occupiinl 
Auj^usta. 

(icncial  I-iiUMlii's  comniaml  consisted  of  one  thousand  oiU'  hiindied 
and  t\veiU_\--one  re;j;ul  ir  troops,  and  a  force  of  lau  militia  w  liieli  m.ide  the 
.ii;gK\t^atc  three  thousand  six  hundred  and  t  liirl)--iiine.  lie  advanced 
to  I'errx-sbur.;  on  the  east  h.ink  of  the  Saxannah  a  few  miles  north 
ofthateit)'  to  prevent  the  crossiiv^  into  South  t  ari'lina  of  (uMieral 
Prevost's  army,  then  on  the  opiKoite  bank,  and  tlu\e  thiiu-~and  strong;. 


l)e>iiles   (le 


oi-''ia  1  io\incial 


Neither   arni\-  was   inchued   to    t'orce    ,i 

the 


|)as-~aL;e.  but  two  couip.inies  of  tlu'  Sixtitlli.  and  one  coinpanx' 
Sixteenth  Hritidi  reL;iments  m.ule  ,i  diversion  toward  Beaufort,  for  the 
purpose  of  seeuriu;,;  a  t'oDtini;  ui)on  Port  l\..)}al,  a  lar;4e  island  seventx'- 
fiv'c  miles  south-ue-^t  of  Charleston. 

Coloin'l  William  .Moultrii-  was  si-nt  to  the  rescue.  He  crossed  to 
the  island  with  .i  force  of  three  hundred  militia,  one  smail  t^un,  and 
nine  re;4ul. us,  includiiv^'  Captain  He  TrexilN,  ,ind  .ifler  ,i  spirited 
skirmish  repulseil  the  attack. 


aiu 


Oi 
1  (• 


he 


fonrt 


eenth. ( 


oiu-1   .\ndr 


I  •  w 


1 


icKei 


IS,    of  .Soutli    (_" 


irolma, 


)|OIU 


n 


ookw, 


if  ( reor;4i  I,  with  thrt 


hund 


reil   men,  surpn- 


*^,o|one 


l>o\(l  s    1  ro\-niciaU  on    tlie    noi 


th    -^ide    of    Kettle    Creek 


m 


Wilkes  ciuint)',  (ieorL;i,i. 

( )n  the  tliiid  of  March,  ("reuer.il  iancoln  sent  (general  Williamson 
with  twelve  lumdretl  men  u[)  the  ri\'er  to  take  position  opposite 
Au'justa  ;   (jener.il  Rutherford  with   ne.irlv  eijht  hundred  men  to  the 


l^lac 
milit 


olma 


kh\\,imp:aud  deneral  .\she  with  hfteeii  linndn 

i,i  ,111(1  some  (ieoi;_;i,i  C'dntiiUMit.il  lioo])s,  w.is  --ent,  with  orders  to 


■d  North  C.ir 
Ih 


cross   the  river  .it  .\u'm--t,i  (which  the  l>iitish  had  .ibaiidoned),  ,rid  to 


mo\r  di)wn    the    w  e>t  sit 


the  river.       Tiii-.   det.ichment  went  into 


camp  Ml   the  aiu 


.f   1 


>riar   cree 


and    the  ^a\',mi 


lah,  tiiirteen   miles 


above  tlu 


Prit 


i->h   arm\-, 


e  .\ 


mericin   po-itioii  w.is  ver\'  stroiv.! 


by 

lit  llank  was 
left   entiielv  exposed,      tiener.il    Prevost's    report    to    Lord   Germaine 


nature,  ,is    l)iiai  cri 


w,is  (Ici'i 


)  aiii 


Proai 


but    the  ri. 


states  that    "  wlii 
Lincoln    in   checl 


ile    dis[)o>itions    were    m.ule    to   keep    .Mr.   ('General) 


M 


iior 


,\K 


ni:rsoii,  w  i 


Sevent)-tirst,  .iiul  some   irrc^ul.iis,  with  two 
to  adv. nice   tow.ird  Briar  creek  brid'' 


th   the   tust  battalion   of  the 


ted 


lelil  piece: 


P 


w.is  iiuec 


Willie  l>ieuten;int-co!oiiel  1  re 


vost  with  the  ;-,econd   battalion  of  the  Sevent>--tirst  regiment,  a  corps 
uf  liLjht  infantr)-  coinm.inded  bySir  J.ime-;  B  lird,  ami  three  companies 


<  779-1 


j.\:;u.\i;v   lo  in.v, 


463 


of  ;^rcii.iilicrs,  made  ,1  loiv^  circuit  of  fifty  miles,  surprised  the  Ameri- 
can ann\'  .iiul  loiitcd  it  tlv)i-i)u;..;hl)'." 

Seven  caiiiinn  and  a  tliousand  arms  were  captured,  as  well  as  Gen- 
eral I""dl)ert,  ("olmiel  Mcintosh,  sever.il  other  officers,  and  near!)-  two 
lunuired  men.  \earl)-  an  ecpial  number  were  >upposed  to  have  been 
lost  in  the  .letion,  or  in  tlii^ht  throu;4h  the  sw.imps  and  the  residue, 
with  the  exception  of  four  or  five  hundred  men,  retired  to  tiieir  homes, 
and  did  not  rejoin  (ji^neral  Lincoln  at  Charle-^ton.  (io\'eriior  Rut- 
ledge  h.ul  been  re-elected  L^overnor,  .md  the  people  assembled  at 
( )rangeburg,  \vith  a  s[)irit  similar  to  th.it  which  had  been  aroused 
durin;4  17~^>. 

On  the  twent_\'-third  of  April,  (ieiural  Lincoln  a^ain  cros-,t-d  the 
Savannah  rive'r,  but  after  truitless  marchiiiL;',  the  American  army 
aj^ain  retreated  to  C^harleston.  General  I'revost  [)roniptl}'  .idvanced 
and  demandeil  the  surriMuler  of  the  city.  General  I'ulaski  ;_;ained 
credit  in  skirmi^hini;  betore  the  town,  .md  the  vi^cU'ou-.  action  of 
Rutled;_;e,  Moultrie,  Laurens  and  others,  o\ercame  the  fe.irs  of  man\- 
litizens  who  were  ready  to  sid)mit. 

Dii  tile  thirteenth  the  British  wiliidrew  ;  and  on  the  twentieth  a 
\i;^orous  attack  was  made  upon  a  jjoit  retained  b\-  them  .it  Stono 
[•"erry,  whicii  failed  tor  want  of  lull  concert  in  the  att.ick,  and  piomi)t 
su[)port.  The  l)riti>ii  troops  retired  to  S.uannah,  .dter  establishing  a 
post  at  Tort  Royal. 

Congress  seemed  incapable  of  realizing  the  impending  desolation 
which  must  follow  a  strong  invasion  of  the  Southern  States,  and 
Washington  was  powerless  to  furnish  the  .lid  recpiired,  so  long  a-. 
(iener.il  Clinton  occLii)ied  New  \'ork. 

(ieiieral  (ireeih'  ,i-^ked  permission  to  go  to  the  Southern  .States, 
but  his  assignment  was  not  authorized  b_\- t''ingres-.  although  ajjproveil 
i)y  the  Comniaiuler-in-chieL  The  utmost  that  could  be  elone  w.is  to 
authorize  a  i)ortion  of  the  regular  tri)ops,  which  belonged  to  the 
Southern  Department,  to  return  to  that  section  for  service. 

L.i  l'*a\-elte,  Inidmg  th.it  active  dut\'  w.is  nt)t  coiitempl.ited,  s.iiled 


tor  Fr.iiice  in   the  American  frigate  Alii. nice,  with   the   best  wishes 


of 


the  people  he  h.id  served  hO  intelligently  .iiul  >o  wl 


.■11. 


At  tl 


le  extre-m 


e   wes 


t,  the 
)f  L 


A 


mericin  torces  .1 


to  .inticip.ite  the  tiue.it- 

still   at   Vincennes.  .md    had    an 


ieuten.int-go\'ernor 


t  K.isk.iski.i  resolved 
1  lamilton,  wh.o  w.is 


h 


'lUounced   nis    purpose 


to  r 


etluce 


the 


Illinois  country  to  submission.     Colonel  CI. irk,  after  gre.it  tri.ils  and 
an  extr.iordinary  march,  captured  Vincennes  on  the  t\vent)'-fourlh  of 
30 


Wh 


!j:  .  .K 


,1.4 


J«^ 


■:,'SU 


:l  ? 


466 


lANLAKV    'lO    IIIA', 


177') 


I'l-bruary  ;   .iml  sliorti)-  .iftLi".  si\t\-  n{  his  men  ascciulcd   the  W.dia^li 
livrr,  with  aiiiud  Ixiat-;,  .\\\d  c.iptunil  a  hirL;i;  supply  of  ^^oods  iii  roiiti' 


Iroin  I  )Ltr(iit. 


A  t 


in 


u-^anii  troops  were 


aised  1)\-  North  Caroh 


iia  and 


ip'niia  to   striMiLnhrii    the   troiiti'T, 


•  iinl  iiiulei-  the  wise  supi>orl  of 
'riionia--  JelUrson,  then  Governor  ot  Vir^^nnia,  that  re;4ion  was  [)lacecl 
in  a  coiiih'tion  for  iletense. 

rile  Middle  States   were    not    without    their    experience   in   that 


Class  o 


f  warfare  which  characterizei.l  the  greater  part  uf  tlie  canipa 


ILHl 


•f  17 


// 


<)• 


(ieneral  Matthews    lelt   New  York  with    two  thousaml    troo))s  and 


five    lunulied   ni arines, 


Mav 


at(. 


Ml 


Ai 


)rn 


Linelioretl  ni 


anii)ton    l-ioaos 


on  the  nuilh  ol 


,iid   waste  I'lirtsiiKJiith    and  Norl 


orl 


destrc 


T 


over  a  hundred  wssels,  and  returned  to  N 


ew  Vork  within  the  month, 
having  taken  seventeen  prizes,  ,uid  at  lea>t  three  thousand  hogsheads 
of  tobacco. 

The   fust  six   months  of   1779  wa--  a  severe    te'st  of  the   I'lulur.uice 


)f  tl 


le  l)ankrui)t   l\.ei)ul)lic,  and  ,in  e(]uail\' seve 


.■re  test  of  tl 


U:  patriotism 


of  the  Southern  Stati's,  which  began  to  leel  the  pressure  troin  rapitlly 
augmenting  hostile  forces,  while  the  gener.il  government  was  power- 


to  render  them  adeciuati.-  aid  for  defense 


T 


ui- 


ir  the  camp.iign 


havl    been    e\li.ui>li\'e.    without    nian_\-    critic.d    issues   to  .irouse    the 
jjcople  to  .1  pa^-^ionate  resistance. 

(^ne   single   demonstration    was   made    1)\' (n'lieral  Clinton,  u  liich 


seenud  to  ha\e  in  \iew  the  reduction  of  the  11 


I'jiil.ii 


id 


|>osts,  .iiul  this 


coiitirnu'i. 


1  tlu 


polic 


V  of  Wash 


m-. 


Ill   in   ret. lining  his  ;irm\-  m  such   .1 


jiosition    tli.it    lie    could    quic 


kh 


reac 


h    tl 


le 


lud 


on    river. 


On    tl 


thirt 
Cicn 


ecu  til 


,f  M 


:iy  (ieiier.d  Clinton  .isceiuleil  the  river,  accompanied  bv 


era 


1  \' 


lu^li.m.  undei  coiivo\-  of  the  fleet  of  .Sir  Cicorge  C 


oilier,  aiul 


took  possession 


.fV 


eriii.mc 


k's  1 


oiiit  .iiid  ."-iton  V  1  omt. 


1 


le  Litter  post 


was  lieiii'''  fortified,  but    b\'  .1  ver\' 


Mll.ll 


lor 


ce,  eiitireU'  inadetpiate  to 


resist  a  n.iv.il   .ittaci 


It 


re.ilK' 


11. ul 


little   tlelensut,'  v.uue 


but   the 


two  pt)sts  t.iken  together  formed  the  lower  p.issage  to  the  Highl  inds, 
and  their  occuijation  by  the  ihitish  troojis  would  be  a  st. Hiding  menace 
to  West  Point.  The  Seventeenth  Ihitish  regiment,  the  greii.idier 
companies  of  the  Sevent>'-first,  ,ind  artillery,  uiuler  Lieutenant-colonel 
Webster,  we're  pl.icetl  at  Ston\-  I'oint;  a  garrison  of  eipi.il  strength 
was  k'ft  .it  N'erplanck's.  each  co\ered  b\'  the  presence  of  se\'eral  small 
frigates  and  siooi).^  of  war,  and  Cieneral  Clinton  retired  with  the  m.iin 
body  to  Yonkers. 

The  American   armv  w.is  removed   from  Middlebrook  to  Smith's 


'779- 


JAM'ARY    'I'O   JULY, 


467 


Clove  carK' ill  the  month.     ( )n  the  twent\--thinl,  W.Hhiii'jton 


'■I'lnoveil 


his  lie.idi 
inami.     ( 


jiMi'ters 


to  New  Wiiulsor,  le.ivii)/   ( 


ifiieral 


iiiii  im  111  eoin- 


reiier 


,il  Heath  was  Drdeiei!  fioiii   Hn^tDii,  and  ( 


leiiera 


W; 


IV  no 


was  stationed  hetwi'eii  tile  Clove  and  l""ort  Mi)ntL,'oinery.  near  Dunder- 
her^f  mountain. 

Sucli  were  the  nioditled  pdsilions  of  the  two  armies  of  the  northern 
zone,  at  the  close  of  June,  1779. 


llkil  f>ii   ];rM-;cii\-|;   I'ou 


NdTi:.     1- 


u  "I  Tigiiial  kcluiii^  ill  the  lirili^h  K 


(:i„ 


d  Ulllce."    iJale,  Icl 


I. 


I> 


SUllL-U    U 

raulus  II 
KIkhIc  1m 


m.l 

V" 

?7 

aiul 

Kil 

i>oU    

.V 

laml 

Cbj 

>OV,l  >toll.i. 


15111.  1779- 

3011 

....   4330 


llunuuda 

I'luvidtiicc  l.ilaiui 2j 


22,462 


Total,  30,283. 


Sami:,  May  im,  17; 


Now  Vmk. . .  .  .  . , ()ij 


I. 


hl.iiul. 


'J  I 
(.056 


Statcn  Isl.mtl i 


344 


I'aulus  llouk 3ti 


Hobc 


264 


Khode  Island 5644 

33,814 


llaliki 


C 


WlM  I'loi ida   

Ueiiuuda  and  rrovidL-nce  I-slaiid. 


Total.  33.  458. 


7821 


3f'77 

4794 

J7"3 

47<- 


10,644 


M!M:1! 


!    t   I  .       i ,  M 


1'4  •    ' 


%  "1 


Am 


kS 


cii.\i'Ti:k  LX. 


H'l.Y  'lO  Dl  (  IMIU.K.   177.;.     HI  SDl.A  I  INC.    INCURSIONS.     MINOR 

Mi:\  rioN. 


I       1 


K'f 


'J  /H 


ij    r, 


A 


S  the  lirsl    of  July  j.i  rCccti'cl   lln'   liHl'Miunt    mI    liiiti,!)  Iiuops.if 
the  cull. lllic  til  till-    I  I  i"lll.in(ls  ;    soil     w  it  nr-.^cil    Ullc-w  nl   .k  t  iv 


It  \-  111  t  111  ■if  null  Ik  111  .iniu  ,  li\'  ilct.u  liiiuiils.      (  )ii  tli 


at    nr 


■lit,  1 


uiit  in.iiil  (.  (iiMncj  1 1, 1 11,1 -t  re    1 .11  Id  1  >ii.  ;i  >  mi  in-,  (■.iiiij 


1-    M-c.  iinl.  ,lt    clcVill 


on  the  ri\i  r  I'lunx,  ni.iili'  i(|)(irl  ul  Ins  ii|)cr,it  h  111-.  ihiiiii"  tlir  |ii(  a'iuus 
twinl)'-l(iur  limii-^.  Willi  M\cnt  )■  ul  the  Sc\'>'iilcriil  h  li  'jii  (lr.i;.;Mi)iis, 
a  pari  oj  tlic  I  .ci^icii  iiitaiiti  y  .iiid  i  a\  ah  \-,  I  Tai  li  li  m' .)  (  jiuth'-,  l\aii;. 


(■!■ 


^ians,  and    s'lmc    iii'iimtcil    ^'a;.'(■|s,  \\\(<   Inniilnd    nicii,  lie    jias^rd 


I    I  ilUIKl     Klil'.'i- 


North  (  astlf  Mcctiii;.;   Iloiisc,  and    ihioindi   Hrdl'Pidt. 

to  ^LUin  isr  (  iiloiirl  Sheldon,  \v  ho  (c  iMiiiianili-d  ,1  loiii   <  ij  about   iiiiH-t  \- 

ca\'.iir)-  al  that  |)oint.       I  In-    luitiih    lioii|)-,    |)ni'.iii(l  the  jiaitially  siii- 


pii-^cd   .Aincruaiis  marlv 


to   Salcni  ;    I 


iiiincil    till'    I'll 


d)\t 


I'l  lall 


MiTt. 


IIIL 


louse   allil 


ine   d\\elliii;.;s,  ea|)tnn'd    Slieldoii  s   loloi.-,  w  liii  h  had 


Ijcc'ii  aeeideiitallv  lilt  in  tlu-ii  i|uai  leis,      some  ba;. 


aiul   a   lew  arm- 


but    inllKled    and 


I'eeeiMd  small  loss. 


)i  t  lie  offKers, 
I  .iiiiteiiant  - 


colonel    iaile'toii  says,   "  I   ])ro|iosed  to  the  militia  leniis  ;    that  il  llie\- 

riiey   pel^i^ted    in 


wonli 


I   not   Iht;  liom  buildin"-.,  I    would  not   burn. 


tiriiiL;,  till    t  lu:  torch    stojip 


d    ll 


leir    pro'^ress. 


he    retreat   was    ti 


lowed    up    b\-    tin:    miliiia,   a\ailin'.'    llieni->el\-es    o|     leiu 


and    oilier 


obstiiu  t 


loll 


s  W.  hull  shortened  t  he   e.X] 


.xiiedition  .Hid  made  it  uiiprolit.ibl 


Un    tlu;   third    ot    |ul\-   (iiiierai    'l"r\()n    left    New    ^'ork   with    \\ 


tl 


lou.saml  six  Iiund 


red    men,  niider  eon 


\ov  of    the  fleet  ol    Sir  (ieoi'. 


("oilier,  to  invade  ( 'oiineelieut.  In  the  report  ol  the  latter  olluer  to 
Mr.  .Ste'pheiis,  Secretary  of  tiic  .\dmiialt\'  lie  st.iles,  tiiat  iu'  "  lirst 
.sunt  the  kemnvii,  rii.imes,  ()ller,  .ind  two  armed  \Hssels,  to  l)lock  ii]) 
Now  Loiulon   harbor   and    the   cast  eiilranci,'   to    tlu;  Soiiiid,  and  pru- 


cccclcti    troni    iNcw    \i>\ 


N( 


r/'ii    I  It  11    (i.itc,   with   his    Majcstys  ships 
Camilla,  Scorpion.  Ilalila.K   0"':-i'   •""■'    Hus.s.ir  (yalU'y)  toL^cthcr   will) 


177') 


|i  i,\    u  >  HI  I  I  \ir.i  k. 


\^"} 


till'  tiMi)'.|niits,  aiid   1)11  lli(    (il'lli    I.iiiilcil   till-  .iriiu',  ill  two  divisiiMis,  .it 
Ni'W  I  I.i\  in. 

(  )ii  Siiild.iy,  |iil\-  ,|lli,  llic  (l,i\  1)1  fill  ,•  (IciKi.il  liynii  l.iiidcd,  lie 
issiH'd  .1  jii'iK  1, mi.it  ii>n  wliuli  fnii  li.idnwcd  lii^  piii  |iii-,cs.  A  sjiij^lt; 
(•\ti.ut  is  ;m\(||.Im  il!u'-t  i.ttc  ils  I  li.ii.H  t<T  :  "  I  he  iiii;.;ciicri>iis  .iiid 
waiitiiii  iiisuiiiH  t  imi^  .p.iiii.l  the  s.  ivck  i;;iit  y  ut  (in, it  r.iit.iin,  into 
wliicli  ;lii'i"limy  li.id  Ixcn  diliidrd  l>)'tli<'  ,irt  ifiics  nl' di'-,i  ■niii;;  men, 
|i>r  |ili\Mtc  |iiir|i(  1  ^c-,  llli;;lll  well  jiislify  in  yi.u  c\iiy  Icir  which  luii- 
M'inu-^  ;Miilt  muld  hinn,  rcs|)'Cl  in;;  ilir  inttiit  ions  ol  tin-  |iri--.(iii  .iriii.i- 
iiiiiil.  I  lie  (xi-^i  ciuc  ol  ,1  siii"|c  li.iliil.it  ioii  on  \oiii  di  |i  11  .i-lcss  t'onsf 
oirdil  to  111-  ,1  sul)iii  t  ol  ^'on^t,llll  i(|iioo|  toyoiM  in;;r.it  It  iidc."  I  lu" 
|M-o|i|c  to  whom  tlii>  w.i-i  ,id(hi'>Ncd,  w  (  i  r  |ii  i|i,iiin'.;,  so  soon  .is  tlic 
S.d)h.itli  shoiiM  j).i.,,  to  hoiioi  thi'  d,iy  ujion  whiih  hi-  |iioi.  l.ini.it  ion 
w.i^  d.itfd.  ( iiiii  r.il  I'lyon  irjioii  ,,  1  h,il  "  tin  lii  .t  d;\'i  ion,  (  on-i  ,t  iii',; 
ol  the  (ill. lids  l''iiNi|((i  ■,,  I''ilty  loiiith  I  c;, 'inn  lit ,  ,md  a  di  t.ii  himnt  oj' 
\'a;;ris,  with  loni  fnld  ]iiir(-^.  imdii  Hi  i;;.i(hii-;.',iiirr,il  (i.iith,  laiidiil 
.ihoiit  luc  o'l  lock  i\  M.i.imiir  south  ol  W'c  ,t  I  l.i\  1  II,  .iiid  1)1-. sm 
t  Inir  n  1.1  oh,  m.ikin';  ,i  riii  nil  ol  npw.nd-^  of  ^i^'Mi  mil'- .,  to  he  .id  oil'  ,i 
cii'c'l,  on  thi-  wi'.h  rn  snlc  ol  iln-  town.      Iidoic  noon,  .iltti   ihr  Ktiiin 

ot    t  hi-   lio.it  ■,,  (  icnfl.ll     I  r\oii.    Ml     per  .1 '11,   di  Mini). II  Lis  1     with     tllc     llcs- 

si.m  ..  1  ..ind;M.i\'i-^  .md  "  l\  iii"/'       im  i  u  .m  "  ri'i'ini'  nt  .  .md  two  |)iii  cs 
of  iiniioii,  on  thf  (M^li-rn  side  o|   the  h.iilioi,  .md  in-l.iiitU'  l>(;;.m  the  -* 
ni.iit  h  ol  ihicc  nli^■-^,  to  lh<'  Iciiy  lioiii  .\rw   I  l.i\cii,  iM-,t  to  I'nciit  lind, 
"  (  HiMiiloid  I."       I  h;'    l^i'il.   liilti'iy  (l''oit    I  l.il(  1    w.i->   thiT.    Ol  I  npicd, 

.md     till'     .milcd     \csscls     entiled     tin      l),|\.       "  (  icIirlMl   (i.llt  h    "1)1    into 

tile  town,  not    williout    o|ipM -It  ioii,    |o>,   ,mil    l.il  i  on-,  .ind  1 1  ported  , it, 
li.dl-  p.ist  one,  ih.it  he  dimild  1)1   'in  t  he  loiill  r'l.il  loll  uhieh  he  t  hoipjlil 


il  w.int( 


111  the  nioiniiv'',  the  lir-t   di\i-.ion  einh.iikeij  ,it   tin-  -,ou 


th- 


(.M  >t  p. tit  ol  the  town,  eio-^scd  the  leiiy,  ,iiiil  |oined  ihe  other  on  llic 
l',.l--t  1  l,l\  en  side.  Ill  their  |)ro;.;ie,^  on  the  pi  eeeil  ill;. ;  da\'  In  Mil  We  si 
mdei  loiit  iiiii.il  file  ;  hnt  tile  ril)i:Is  were  e\ei\-  when; 


.(Veil  t  he\'  were  i 


iciniUed.       1  he  next  nioinin",  .i->  tluie  w.is   not  .i 


fired 


mole   t 


the    leticit,   (iener.il   (i.irth   cli.in'. 


ed    Ins    (lesi'.'Il    .mo    (lestlo\-eil     onl\- 


the  p;ii)lic  stores,  some  \i;-^-,els  .md  ordn.iiire,  e\(eplin;.;  --ix  lield- 
pieces  .md  ,m  , limed  |)ri\-.itiH:r  w  hu  h  were  i)ri)ii;.;ht  oil.  liic  troops 
recmh.irkcil  at  l\oik-l''oit  .md  .mchore.l  on  tin:  iiioinm;.;  ol  the 
ei'lilh  oil' the  viil.i'M'  of  l'",iirrield,  ' 


11 


le  kindiii''  ol  (iciu'imI  (i.iilli  w.i- 


it  S.i\in  Kork.      At  the-  "  West 


ll.Uell     (  ileeii,"  C'.lpt.lin     J. lines     II 


illliou^e,  w  ith  a    p.irty  ol    studcnt- 


ironi  N'.ile  (JolU'ie  .md  other  \ouii  ■  men  ol  the-  cit\',  m.idc  .i  cour,i''eou- 


.*t 


^.V    ^ 


if^; 


iff 


•t;!.».  ' 


'iB^ 


I' 


r     w 


f 


[  '  II'  •  If; 

4 


n. 


\l 


■  I' 


I  <,  'I 


im 


flfi 


470 


JULY   TO   nKi'KMMI'.K. 


f>7"') 


rcsi'^t.inco ;  tliiowiiv^  tin-  British  lii^ht  tronps  l)ack  upon  the  main 
body.  Tile  jilink  Iku!  Ix'i'H  taken  froiu  flu-  l)ri(l;^i'  wliiic  thr  Milfonl 
turnpike  (.■io-4-.i(l  \\\>t  Ki\(i',  ami  at  this  point  Adjutant  ('ainpl)L'll  of 
thi:  i^uanU  wa-^  kilk'd,  and  l\c\-.  Xajilitalic  Daj^tjctt,  aftirwards  I'rcsi- 
(U'lit  of  Vale  Colk'^c,  w.is  made  a  ])risont.T,  and  siirtcrcd  nuicli  per- 
son,d  violence.  The  l?ritish  troops  fell  h.ick,  passed  up  the  uestian 
bank  ot  tin-  ri\er,  crossed  at  rhoni])soirs  l)riik_;e  and  enti'red  the  town 
on  the  old  herb)-  road  l)\-  the  way  of  llotehkissville,  cniDint;  into 
Chapel  stieet  from  the  west,  .i  little  before  two  o'clock  in  the  ,ifter- 
noon.  (imer.d  Tiyon  kindid  ,it  l.i:.;ht  IIousc  I'oint.  After  ( "u-neial 
(iarth  joined  ("iener,d  Trvoii  in  the  cvenin;_,^  the  troops  found  that  it 
was  impossible  to  oi)t.iin  control  of  the  Ncck-brid;^e,  and  his  division 
remained  north  of  the  town  without  crossin;^  ;  while  (lencr.il  'rryon 
remained  on  the  I'^.ist  Jbucu  llii;_;hts.  'The  American  loss  is  stated 
in  th"  Connecticut  Journ.d  of  jul\-  17th,  1770,  >it  twenty-two  kilk'd, 
anil  seventeen  wounded,  (ieiural  !'r_\dn  states  his  own  loss  at  two 
officers  and  seven  men  killed;  three  officers  and  thirty-sjven  men 
wouiuied   and  twenty-five  niissin^. 

The  pecuni.iry  ckima^^e  was  stated  by  a  committee  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  Connecticut,  .ippointeil  in  October,  1779,  to  h.ive  been 
of  the  cash  v.Uue  of  twenty-four  thousanil  ci^^ht  hundred  .md  ninctr- 
three  pounds,  se\'en  shillinijs  and  six  pence,  besides  C"<intinent.d  money 
which  was  ilestroyed.  .Several  pnjminent  citizens  were  taken  away 
by  the  licet. 

On  the  eii^hth  and  ninth  of  July,  F.iirfielil  was  burned,  including 
two  mcetiiiL^-hoiises,  eighty-three  dwellint^  houses  and  shops,  two 
school-houses,  the  jail,  and  the  county  house  ;  of  "  the  total  estimated 
casii  v.due  of  ^34,559  5.s'.  and  6(/.  The  estimates  were  based  upon 
the  money  value  of  1774." 

The  ihitish  loss  is  reported  b)-  Gener.d  Tryon,  as  nine  killed,  thirty 
wounded,  .ind  five  missin;^.  (iener.il  Tryon  .sa)'s  in  his  report,  "  I 
regret  the  loss  of  two  places  of  public  worship  at  l''airfield,  which  took 
fire  unintention.illy  from  the  flakes  from  the  buildings,  .uul  I  g.ive 
strict  orders  for  the  [)reservation  of  that  of  Norwalk."  Lord  Ger- 
maiiie  wrote  to  General  Clinton,  November  fourth,  "  Vou  will  aciptaint 
General  Trvon  and  the  officers  that  were  under  his  cire  that  their 
conduct  h.is  met  with  his  majesty's  approbation;  but  I  can  not  help 
lamenting  with  you,  that  the  behavior  of  the  rebels  in  firing  from 
their  houses  upon  tlie  troops,  rendered  it  necessary  to  make  use  of 
severities  that  are  ever  painful  to  British  soldiers  to  inflict  ;  but  were 


(•      i! 


«77')] 


ni,Y  TO  nr.cKMiir.u. 


4/1 


such  .IS  arc  jii-.tirii'<l  l)y  the  general  practices  of  all  nations  iijion  such 
occasions." 

Lord  (Ti,TnMim.''s  slali'inciit  simply  indicates  how  uttcrl\'  incapable 
ho  was  of  apiircciatini^  the  character  of  tlu-  war,  and  of  distin;^ui:iliin;^ 
a  conti'St  hctwciii  annits,  fimn  niaraudin;^'  cxpt-ditions  at^ainsl  tin; 
lionies  of  a  civili/.i-d  pciple.  Ormi  I^'arni-^,  m.-ar  by.  suffered  the  loss 
i>f  the  inectin;4-house,  fourteen  dwellings,  thirteen  barns,  and  .i  store, 
"  valued  in  all  at  /,*,V)'H  T-^-" 

The  tlet.'t  crossed  the  Sound  to  I  Iiintin;4toii,  Lon;^  Island,  for  suj)- 
plies,  anil  on  the  t'leventh  returned  to  the  ("onneetieut  shore,  ,ind 
ancliorcd  five  miles  from  the  bay  of  Nnrw.dk.  A  landin;^  was  effeetc;d 
that  ni^.jht  1:»\' (liMieral  Fraser  at  the  Cow  Pasture.  '•  a  iieninsula  on  the 
cast  side  of  the  harbor,  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  brid;_;e  which 
formed  the  eommunication  between  the  east  and  west  parts  of  the  vil- 
Ia;4e,  ne.irly  e([ually  divided   by  .i  salt  creek." 

The  second  di\'ision  under  (lener.il  Garth  landeil  .it  the  "old  well," 
on  the  west  side  of  tile  harbor.  .Sir  ( Jeoi-'^i'  ('oUit-r  sums  up  the 
o])er,itions  brielly  :  "  l"or  the  tre.icherous  coiuluct  of  the  rebels  in 
munleiuiL;  the  tnn^ps  from  windows  of  lu)uses  .ifter  s;ife-!^u.irds  were 
sM-anted  them.  ihc.  t(jwn  of  Norw.dk  w.is  destroyed,  with  f\'e  lari^e 
vessels,  two  privateer  brisks  on  the  stocks,  two  saw  mills,  consider.ible 
siilt  works,  several  warehouses  of  stores,  merch.mdise.  etc.  The  sm.ill 
town  of  Greenfield  suffered  the  s.ime  chastisement." 

"  The  rebels  firinj^  frt)m  the  windows  and  the  tops  of  houses,  occa- 
sioned the  band  of  royal  re fuj^ci's  to  set  several  of  these  on  fire,  which 
communicating'  to  others,  burned  the  whole  town,  .mil  also  several 
whale  boats." 

Gener.il  Parsons  arrived  with  two  thousand  troops,  but  too  late  to 
prevent  the  destruction  of  the  town. 

On  the  thirteenth  the  expctlition  returned  to  New  York.  Cien- 
er.d  W.ishiiiL^ton  was  enj^a^ed  on  the  si.Kth  in  inspectini^  out-posts, 
and  on  the  seventh  first  learned  th.it  troojis  h.ul  been  sent  toward 
Connecticut.  An  express  w.is  sent  to  Governor  PrumbuU.  Cjlover's 
brii^aile,  then  at  Providence,  was  ordered  to  cooperate  with  the  militia, 
in  c.ise  the  enemy  should  m.ike  a  descent  ;  but  the  evjieditio!!  had 
.iccomplished  its  mission  before  the  orders  were  received. 

This  incursion  has  been  thus  referred  to,  in  order  to  illustrate  the 
character  of  th.it  w.irfare  which  only  incites  resistance,  embitters  the 
stru<,'gle,  and  uKikes  submission  possible,  only  through  extermination 
and  ruin. 


;;]i 


'A.:     ■> 


i-  \CII 


472 


I.V    lo    DLCIMIIIU. 


['779 


{   ; 


J! 


1^    f 


i    ■  '.i 

t 

i       ■ 

!     ;    * 

|i    J  ■' 

1  )« 

M:^ 

V     i  .., 

>  f  ; 

Tlic  Hiiti^h  .iniiy  um-^  imi  riiiiii>liL'('  with  ilic  necessary  rcinforco- 
nient^  to  cnnti-iul  in  tlir  tuM  ;  .iiid  its  activities  were  cxpeiulid  in 
forays  which  b.irljari/nl  thr  suMicrs  ami  made  suhst'iiueiit  small 
reinforcements  useless. 

Tlu-  discussions  enihraced  uiidrr  "  Statesnianship  in  War."  and 
"Civil  Wars."  afford  the  Vv\  to  ihi-  nindc  of  warfare.  'I'lic  atrocities 
committed  on  either  side,  orii^iiialed  almost  (.ntirely  iti  tlu:  emplox'- 
ment  i)f  lauDpe.ui  nurcenarie>,  I'rovinciaU,  Roy.d  refuj^ee's,  and 
Indi.iiis.  The  Ia";4ionary  tioo])s  .\\v\  .Xnierieai'.  partisan  corps  invari- 
ably took  larj^e  liberties,  reciproc.ited  personal  violence,  and  disre- 
garded those  principles  of  war  between  civili/iil  nations,  which  as  a 
f^encral  rule,  were  honorably  re;4arded  by  the  British  and  Americm 
regular  troops. 

The  in\Msion  of  Connecticut  w.is  iniini'diatil\-  followi-d  b_\-  a  strictly 
milit.iry  e\[)ctlitiiii'  of  ch.ir.icteristic  boldnc-^s  .iiul  distinguished  suc- 
cess. As  early  as  the  tenth,  \\'.ishinj;ton  organized  an  expedition 
against  ,Stony  Point,  the  execution  of  which  was  intrusted  to  (ieneral 
Wayne.  The  pl.uis  finally  adopted  were  subst.mtially  those  ot  the 
Comm.mder-in-chief.  The  details  l.iid  ilown  by  him  were  carefully 
executed  !))■  (iencr.d  W.u'ne. 

The  British  garrison  h.id  bien  supplied  with  luMvy  guns,  and 
strong  tlefeiiscs  h,id  been  well  advanced  duriiig  the  })receding  six 
weeks  of  British  occupation,  lireastworks  and  batteries  were  built  in 
advance  of  the  fort,  and  two  rows  of  ab.itis  crossed  the  slope  to  the 
rear,  l  he  American  right  consisted  of  Colonel  Febiger's  regiment  in 
front,  followed  by  Colonel  Webb's  (  Lieuteii.uit-colonel  Meigs  com- 
manding), and  .1  iKt.ichment  from  W^.st  i'o'nt  under  Major  Hull. 

Colonel  Butler's  regiment,  and  two  companies  of  North  Carolin.i 
troops  under  Major  Murphy,  formed  the  left  wing.  Colonel  Lee's 
li<jht  horse  formed  the  reserve,  and  the  brigade  of  General  Muhlen- 
berg,  three  hundred  strong,  which  had  been  so  m.intLu\  ered  as  not  to 
lead  vagrants  or  spies  to  anticipate  its  ultimate  destination,  formed  the 
covering  party,  and  took  post  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  sw.uii[). 

The  troops  left  Sandy  Beach  at  midnight  of  tiie  fifteenth  and 
marched  by  single  files,  over  mountains,  through  deep  moras:-  ■  and 
difficult  defiles.  At  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  sixte-enth, 
tlie  troops  were  within  a  mile  and  a  hal*"  of  the  fort;  and  the  columns 
of  attack  were  rapidly  formed,  as  previously  designated  in  orders.  A 
reconnoissance  was  made  by  Wayne,  in  person,  and  at  half-past  eleven 
the  advance  was  ordered.     One  hundred  and   fiftj    volunteers,  with 


'77'/ 


JUl.V    III    KKCKMUr.U 


47.5 


fixed  bayonets  and  iinlnadi'd  muskets,  und'-r  I.iciitcn.'int-colonul 
Flfury,  led  by  a  fDrlorn  1io])l-  of  twenty  nn'ii  under  Lieutenant  (lib- 
bon  of  the  Sixtli  IVimsylvania,  formed  the  i-xtreme  rii^ht  ;  and  one 
luHidnd  volunteers  under  Licuten.mt  Kncix  of  Ninth  iViiiisylvania, 
led  !)>•  a  similar  [)ait\'  of  twenty,  tnrnied  tin;  extrenii:  Kft. 


T 


o  a\()i' 


the    1 


)OSSl 


bilit\'  of  aiu'  deserter   'dvin''   warnin-f   to   tin 


tjarrison,  til'  previous   purpo-^i- of  the   expedition   wa-.  not  diselosed 
til  the   fnial  formation    for   the  .ittack.     The   fillcnvinif  order  h,id 


un 


been  ;.,dven,  "If  any  soldier  presume-  to  take  his  musket  from  his 
shoulder. — attempt  to  fire,  or  bej,'in  the  baltk'.  till  ortlered  by  his 
pro[)er  officer,  he  shall   be  instantly  put  to  death  1)\'  the  officer  next 


mm. 


The  full  tide  made  the  mora- 


more   di 


m. 


ult  of  passive,  and  tin 


M 


idvance  of    Major   Murph)'.    in    tin:   centre,  was    somewhat   dela) 


hat 


The  ri;4ht  column  fell  in  with  an  outjjost  which  i^ave  the  alar 


m. 


M, 


or 


M 


ur[)liy  s  c 


(jlumn 


.idvanced  imniedi.itel)',  as  if  it  were  the  only  attack- 


in;4    part)-,  .uul    received   a    heav)'  fire 


.f 


mu 


4:c'ti 


y  .and  j^'rape    shot. 


Each  olTicer  and  soldier,  at   the   su'r'^estion  of  W'.ishiu'^ton,  had  been 


directed  to  ti\   ,i  ])ii'Ci 


hite  i),ii)er  to   his  cap,  to  dislin,L;ui>h  him 


rom  an  eneuu',  and   a  watcliwori 


the  tort   IS  (jurs      h.id  been  ''iven 


for  each  detachment  to  s/ioiit  aloiiiL  as  they  Lj.iinid  the  positions  the)' 
were  ordered  to  attack  "  thus  to  prexeiit  confusion  and  Inist.d^es." 
The  troops  had  been  carefully  dr.iftetl    by  Washiiv^lon    himself.     .\ 


reward  of  five  huntlred  dollars  and  immediate  uromotion,  was  o 


Tereil 


■,un 


dred  dollars  to 


the  first  m. in    wIkj   entered    the   Works;  and   one 
each  of  ihe  fair,  r.ext  in  turn." 

(lenend  W'ax'ne.  in  pers(;n,  leil  I'\bi;4er's  solid  column,  half  platoon 
fr;int,  followed  b\' the   other   troo[).s  of  the    ri^^ht  wiiv^s   ^"d   Colonel 


lUitl 


er  acivanciK 


in   his  left,  with  the  second   division 


r 


le   a 


b.it 


H 


W 


ere  wrenched  away  by  the  [jioneer  corps.      Mvery  detachmiiit  moved 


on  its  course  as  if  crowded  by  some  resistle 

two  assaultin;^  columns  met   in   the  centre  of  the  worl 

same  moment. 


ss,  unseen  power,  and  the 
about   the 


tjeneral  W.iyne  fell,  while  passing  the  ab.itis,  wounded  in  the  head, 


but  not  d, 


uvjerou 


'ly,  by 


a  in  us 


ket  ball  :  and  the  total   Amer 


lean  loss 


^vas  only  tit'tt:en  killed  and  ei;^ht\'-three  wounded. 

The  Hritish  casu.dties  were  one  otTicer  and  nineteen  men  killed, 
six  officers  and  sixty-eiyht  men  wounded,  two  officers  and  hf:\--six 
men  missing  ;  twcntv-five  officers  and  four  hundred  and  fort\'-seven 


men  taken  orisoners.     The  st 


ores,  v 


alucd   at    i;8,6 


5J),040  uollars,    were 


I   < 


I 

1 

f 

u  i, 

if* 


i 


I 


k  f  II 


tl 


.   at      .2. 


H 


:f 

V 

;                   ..  <  ' 

474 


JUI,Y  TO   DKCEMRKR. 


[I77Q. 


liivitltd  among  tlio  troops,  in  proportion  to  the  pay  of  the  officers 
and  men. 

The  extraordinary  and  literal  success  of  this  movement,  as  planned, 
is  due  to  Washington's  mature  preparation,  and  tiie  no  less  remark- 
able faithfulness  and  skill  of  Wayne  and  his  entire  force.  It  was  dis- 
tinguished by  a  courtesy  to  prisoners  and  an  entire  absence  of  vio- 
lence, after  the  surrender,  which  received  high  praise  from  British 
officials. 

General  Clinton  moved  up  the  river  to  cover  Verplanck's  Point 
from  threatened  attack,  and  General  Sterling  was  detailed  to  attempt 
the  recapture  of  the  post ;  but  it  was  abandoned  by  the  Americans, 
as  untenable,  after  removal  of  the  stores,  and  the  British  troops 
resumed    possession. 

A  second  expedition,  undertaken  in  July,  without  the  sanction 
of  Washington,  was  less  fortunate.  General  McLean  (jf  the  British 
army  commanding  at  Halifax,  e.-,tablishetl  a  post  of  six  hundred  men, 
on  the  site  of  the  present  town  of  Castine,  Maine,  on  Penobscot  Bay. 
The  State  of  Massachusetts  organized  an  expedition  to  reduce  the 
post.  Nineteen  armed  vessels  carr\-ing  three  hundred  guns,  and 
twenty-four  transports  carrying  about  a  thousand  men,  entered  that 
bay  July  twenty-fifth,  and  Luuled  or.  the  twenty-eighth.  It  was  a 
failure  from  that  mi^inent.  The  troops  were  too  few  to  storm  the 
works;  the  armed  ships  were  too  ignorantly  handled  by  an  officer  of 
militia,  to  make  an  impression,  and  the  subsequent  arrival  of  .Sir  George 
Collier  with  a  sixty  four  gun  ship  and  five  frigates,  insured  the  disper- 
sion of  the  American  troops. 

Twenty-four  transports  and  the  following  armed  vessels  were 
burned.  Ihigs :  Active,  l6;  Defence,  l6;  Ilazanj,  l6;  Diligence, 
14; — The  Providence  (sloop)  14;  was  blown  u[).  Tiie  Nancy,  16; 
and  Rover,  10,  (sloops)  were  captured  ;  and  the  Spring-Bird,  10,  (sloop) 
was  burned. 

On  the  twenty  second  of  Jul\-,  Joseph  Brandt  led  a  party  of  Indians 
and  disguised  royalists  into  Orange  County,  New  York,  laying  waste 
and  destroying  as  they  went,  and  at  Minisink,  ten  nwles  west  of 
Goshen,  on  the  Neversink  river,  burned  the  church,  houses  and  other 
property.  Count  Pulaski  had  ([uartered  in  the  vicinity  during  the 
previous  winter;  but  when  he  was  ordered  south,  no  troops  were 
ortlere  1  to  take  his  place.  Application  was  made  to  Colonels  Ilathorn, 
T'jstcn,  and  Major  Meeker  of  the  militia  for  aid.  An  ill-managed 
pursuit,  an  ambuscade,  and   a  massacre   followed.     Forty-four  were 


'779v 


JUl.V    TO    I)i;CF,MI!KK 


475 


killed  in  the   field;  and  of  one  liurulred   and    forty-nine  who  cnLjaged 
in  the  enterprise,  only  thirty  returned  to  tell  their  story. 

In  contrast  with  this  expedition,  and  more  like  Wayne's  assault 
of  Stony  Point,  was  Major  Henry  Lee's  capture  of  Paulas  Hook, 
directly  opposite  New  York,  where  Jersey  City  now  stands.  The 
Hook,  so  called,  was  an  island  at  high  water,  and  here  the  British 
authorities  had  established  an  outpost  of  New  York.  A  detachment 
from  the  Sixty-fourth  Ihitish  rci,nment,  ami  a  few  Hessians  occu[)ied 
it.  The  Americans,  four  hundred  in  numher,  crossed  the  Hackensack. 
marched  down  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson,  and  storined  the  works, 
using  the  bayonet  only,  not  a  shot  havini^  been  fired.  The  assault 
was  made  at  half  past  two  o'clock  on  the  morniivj^  o(  Aui^ust  nine- 
teenth. The  American  loss  was  twent)-,  and  tiiat  of  the  British  fifty, 
and  one  hundred  and  fifty-eight  prisoners.  The  retreat  was  accom 
plished  with  difficulty,  but  safely  ;  the  march  having  been  at  least 
thirty  miles,  over  mountains,  through  morasses  and  defiles,  with  their 
rear  threatened  by  a  considerable  force. 

A  single  additional  expedition  is  mentioned,  that  of  General  Sul- 
livan against  the  Seneca  Indians.  The  command  was  tendered  to 
General  Gates  on  the  sixth  of  March,  when  the  expedition  was  first 
authorized  by  Congress.  An  enclosed  letter  tendered  the  command 
to  General  Sullivan,  if  General  Gates  declined  the  command,  in  which 
event  he  was  to  relieve  General  Sullivan,  then  at  Providence,  (ien- 
eral  Gates,  tlien  at  Boston,  wrote  under  date  of  March  i6th  :  "  Last 
night  I  had  the  honor  of  j'our  excellency's  letter.  The  man  who 
undertakes  the  Indian  service  should  enjoy  youth  and  strength, 
requisites  I  do  not  possess.  It  therefore  grieves  me,  that  your  excel- 
lency should  offer  me  command  to  which  I  am  entirely  unequal.  In 
obedience  to  your  command,  I  have  forwarded  your  letter  to  General 
Sullivan,  and  that  he  may  not  be  one  moment  detained,  I  have 
desiretl  him  to  leave  the  command  with  General  Glover,  until  I  arrive 
in  Providence.'' 

General  Sullivan  marched  from  Easton,  Pennsylvania,  to  Wyoming, 
reaching  the  valley  on  the  last  of  July,  and  Tioga  Point,  New  York, 
August  eighth.  General  James  Clinton  commanded  the  northern 
division,  and  joined  General  Sullivan  on  the  twenty  second  of  August. 
The  additional  brigades  of  Generals  Hand,  Poor,  and  Maxwell,  Major 
Pa'r's  rifle  corps,  and  Proctor's  artillery  were  attached  to  the  com- 
mand, making  a  total  force  of  five  thousand  men.  On  the  twenty- 
ninth,  the  battle  of  Chemung  was  fought,  near  the  present  site  of 


m 


-m 


i ,  ■'*. 


r 


■A/ 


\  mt 


1    i 


\ 


476 


ji'LY   TO  di;ckmiu:r 


['77<). 


I'-lniii\i.  Thr  American  loss  wds  seven  killed;  that  of  the  enemy, 
i.nknown.  The  towns  of  the  "  Six  Nations"  were  laid  waste.  Or- 
chards, gardens,  houses,  cabins,  clothini^,  provisiijns,  and  life,  suffered 
indiscriminately,  and  the  expedition,  which  returned  in  September, 
failed  to  put  an  end  to  Indian  ag;^ression,  and  equally  failed  to  recom- 
mend Christian  civilization  by  any  contrast  of  its  warfare  with  that  of 
the  enemies  it  was  sent  to  punish. 

The  numerous  minor  operations  of  the  year  1779,  thus  briefly 
outlined,  ii.ive  been  illustrative  of  the  war  which  centered  in  the 
movements  of  lan^e  armies;  and  as  they  fill  the  ij.ip  between  pitched 
battles,  are  used  to  illustrate  the  extent  of  the  war,  and  the  characters 
whose  military  record  is  made  up  of  the  minor,  as  well  as  more  prom- 
inent, events  of  the  campaii^ns. 

The  \'ear  did  not  close  however,  without  one  conspicuous  action, 
and  that  entailed  upon  the  Southern  .States  a  series  of  struggles  which 
lasted  until  the  close  of  the  war. 

Admiral  .Arbuthnot  arrived  at  New  York,  .Xuj^ust  twenty-fifth, 
with  reinforcements,  not  greatl}'  exceetling  three  thousand  men.  ami 
relieved  .Sir  (leorge  Collier.  .Sir  Andrew  Hammond  .arrived  with  an 
additional  force  of  fifteen  hi  ndred  men  from  Cork,  on  the  twenty- 
first  of  Septeinber.  The  French  squadron  of  Count  D'Estaing  having 
captured  St.  Vinceiits  and  tjninada,  suddenly  appeared  on  the  coast 
of  Georgia. 

Spain  had  joined  Frarce  in  war  against  Great  Britain,  and  the 
whole  line  of  l^ritish  posts,  from  Halifa.x  to  St.  Augustine,  was  exposed 
to  such  naval  attacks  as  these  two  powers  might  attempt,  to  divert 
attention  from  their  more  direct  operations  against  her  West  India 
possessions.  These  small  British  reinforcements  did  not  w.irrant  any 
attempt  upon  West  Point,  which  Washington  was  strengthening  with 
great  industry;  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  rightly  apprehended  an  attack 
upon  New  York  itself,  by  a  coiiperation  of  the  French  fleet  with  the 
American  army. 

General  Clinton  abandoned  Newport,  October  twenty-fifth,  then 
Stony  Point  and  Verplanck's  Point,  so  that  New  England  and  the 
Hudson  river  were  free  from  British  restraint. 

The  military  operations  for  the  season  terminated  with  the  siege 
of  Savannah  and  the  departure  of  .Sir  Henry  Clinton  from  New  York, 
to  again  attempt  the  capture  of  Charleston. 


CHAPTER   LXI. 

SIEGE   OF   SAVANNAH.     C.F.NKRAL  CLINTON   SAILS   FOR 
CHARLESTON.  1779. 

GOVERNOR  RUTLEr3GF-,  of  South  Tarolina,  ,uul  General 
Eincolii,  then  stationed  at  Charleston,  were  aHke  coininced 
that  the  recovery  of  Savannali  was  the  best  method  of  protecting 
South  Caroh'na  and  rescuin;^  tlie  State  of  Cieor^ia  from  British  con- 
trol. As  early  as  July  twentieth,  Ciovernor  Wright  had  returned 
from  England  and  resumed  office  at  once.  The  season  was  approach- 
ing when  the  West  India  harbors  were  liable  to  hurricanes  or  sudden 
tempest,  and  the  susjiension  of  nav.d  operations  in  those  waters,  after 
the  French  capture  if  Granada,  afforded  a  plausible  opportunity  for  an 
appeal  to  Count  D'Estaing  to  emi)loy  his  fleet  against  Savannah. 
iMonsieur  Plombard,  the  French  Consul  at  Charleston,  concurred  in 
the  feasibility  of  the  movement,  and  messengers  were  at  once  sent  to 
the  French  commander  to  urge  his  cooperation.  He  thoroughly 
approved  the  plan,  and  sailed  immediately  for  the  American  coast. 
A  division  of  two  ships  and  three  frigates  was  sent  to  Charleston  to 
perfect  the  details  of  operations,  iind  the  remainder  of  his  squadron, 
consisting  of  twenty  ships  of  the  line,  two  fiftys  and  eleven  frigates, 
with  six  thousand  troops,  appeared  off  T)bee  Island  near  Savannah, 
on  the  eighth  of  September,  ami  on  the  ninth,  anchored  off  the  bar. 
The  Expernnent,  50,  ( Hritishj  Sir  J.imes  Wallace  commanding,  and 
two  store  ships  were  captured  near  the  harbor  entrance,  and  the 
Ariel,  24,  which  had  been  cruijing  off  Charleston  bar,  shared  the 
same  fate. 

Reterence  is  made  to  map  "  Siege  of  Savannah  "  which  is  chiefly 
copied  from  the  survey  of  a  British  officer  of  the  garrison,  and  was 
engraved  for  Stcdman  in  1794. 

Several  of  the  ships  had  been  seen  off  the  coast  as  early  as  the 
fourth,  and  the  detachment  which  sailed  for  Charleston  had  given 


V  m 


ii  I .  \ 


n 


V  ■  ; 


r  ■   5  r, 


■^t,: 


I H 


.  Vi  !    , 


4; 


-II  (iK   CK   >\\.\NNA1I. 


l>: 


i    :i 


i    ;i 


still  cailicr  \varniii'_;,  SI  >  tli.it  .1  (lisi).iti:li-vi'sv,I  li.ul  been  ^c-iit  to  rn.iural 
("liiiton  ti  1  j^ivc  niiiic\:  of  tluir  prc^iinc  dd  tlu;  iimist.  It  ilors  imt 
a])|)c.ir,  iidiii  tlu'  npint  i>\  (iiiui.il  rrcvust,  tlun  in  coniniami  at 
Savannah,  that  hi  uas  conruhut  i>t  their  i>iiii):>si'  to  attack  S.ivannali, 
until  al)i>at  tin;  ii;^luh  ;  hut  tioiu  tin-  rii>t  iut  iin.ition  of  tin-  appcar- 
atici-  of  I'Viinh  >hii)s,  he  in(lu-.triously  ai)|ilii'il  hinisilf  to  sticn;,;tluii- 
in;4  liis  ck-fcnscs.  I'lic  sinallcr  aiiiud  vessels  tlun  in  [jort  Wfic  iiuiVfil 
u|i  tlu-  rivLT,  and  their  ;j,uns  ami  se.inu'ii  were  transferred  to  the  city. 
A  hor^L-shoe  battery  was  at  oiue  l)uilt  on  the  i:xtrenic  rij^dit  of  the 
town  and  entiu-^ted  to  tlu-  (.Mre  ot' -ailois.  'I'hc  l''ouey,  l-Jos;-,  Ki-ppci 
and  (11  iniaiiK-  were  kc|)t  in  serviee  and  were  so  stationed  as  to  dettiul 
the  harbor  pass.i-j^c  fioiu  a  landin;,;  1)\-  boats,  or  to  retire  up  the  rivi-r, 
as  nuL^ht  be  dicnied  nece-^^.uy.  ('a|)lain  Ilemy'-^  disp.itih  to  the  .\<1- 
niirall)-,  of  Xo\cniber  ei;4htli,  states  that  ever)-  exeilion  was  tlu-ii 
beiiii^  made  to  increase  the  iorlifKations  of  the  town.  I'he  bucn's 
were  renio\ed  from  the  harbor  entrance-,  a  larL^e  number  of  uet^rocs 
were  impressed  and  put  at  work  ;  ne'W  ndoubts  of  ])alnu'lto  logs, 
inter-illle'd  with  >aiu!,  were  erected  ;  a  .stron;^'  line  of  paiisadi-s  was 
completed,  and  an  inner  line  <A'  detached,  bat  nuiln.dl)'  supporting; 
eartli-work.s,  were  added  to  the  lines.  Kiliefs  of  trooj)s  aiul  neq;roes 
were  assiLJUi-d  to  dut\-.  so  that  the  labor  was  incessant,  !)}•  rn;;ht  as 
well  a.s  by  da_\-.  Captain  Monci  .ft",  a  distin;4uished  eiv^iueer,  liaci 
cliargc  of  the  i)rep,irations  ;  and  every  hour  of  protracted  del,i\-  in 
making  the  investment  was  earnestly  improveil  by  the  t^arrison  in 
prei)aration  to  resist  an  .itlaek. 

As  the-  purpose  of  the  enemy  unfolded,  the  L^uns  were  rem-i\ed 
from  the  "  Rose,"  already  unseaworth)',  and  it  was  sunken  with  the 
Sav.innah  and  other  vessels,  in  the  cliannel.  The  Germaine  retained 
her  armament  and  w.is  stationed  off  the  liorse-shoc  redoubt,  to  flank 
the  lines  un  the  ri^ht  of  the  town. 

Lieuteii.int-colonel  (ru-i-r  was  then  at  .Sunbury  with  a  small 
detachment,  .ind  Lie, -tenant-colonel  Maitland  was  at  Beautort  with  a 
force  of  eij^ht  luindred  excellent  troops.  15oth  officers  were  ortlered 
to  report  at  S.ivannah,  with  their  connnands. 

The  American  authorities  at  Charleston  tcjok  hold  of  the  enter 
I)rise  with  great  zeal,  and  sent  galleys  with  other  small  vessels  to  assist 
the  l''rencl'i  in  l.mding.  This  fleet  of  small  craft  [)rom[)tly  took  on 
board  three  thousand  five  hundred  and  twenty-four  Frencli  troops 
and  passed  up  0.s.sabaw  inlet  to  Bcaulicn,  about  twelve  miles  from 
Savannah,  where  tliey  were  landed  under  cover  of  four  armed  galleys. 


si 


177')] 


SIKGK   OF  SAVANNAH. 


479 


'111 


V.    coniin.iiKi   niairlicd    iniimdiatil}' 
ttcMitli  llu-   (dunl    1 )' I'.staiiii.:  siiiniiiuiiccl   tli 


l'>  tlu;  ;uiiis  1)1    llu 


.IIV''    o 


f    I< 


iMiu:c 


to   S.iv.miiali,  and    (ni   the  si\- 

ai  ri-.i>n  "to  mii  icndi-r 

(inu'ial    l'r.vo-,1  hid 


di'cliiK(l   an  unconditional    surrender   and  invited   tirnis. 


A  t 


IlK'e-  o 


t\vciit\ -four  hours  was  LManttd  bv  ("ouiil  1  )'l',siain'j  ;  and  du 


nil'. 


that 


period    Lieutenant  colonel     .M.iitlaiul    skillUilly   condueletl    his    eoiii- 


maiu 


son. 


1  tl 
T 


irou'jh   "Walls  Cut."  behind  th 


e'  I- 


ands.  and  joined  the  ijarri- 


le    surreiide'r   'am-^   then    i)erein|)t' inlv  declui 


ed.      Tl 


ic    o 


bjcct 


of  the-  truce  had  been  reali/.ed. 


At  c:i. 


irleston  all  was  active. 


he  k'!^islatiiie  ad|ourned 
1 


-uiilitia 


took  the  i)lace  of  the   reL;ulars  in   the   forts,  and  on   the  eij^htli,  after 
ur   d.i_\s'    notice    of   the  proposed   movement,   a  consider.ible   force 


fo 


in 


irched    for    S.iv.mnah.       ( 


lener.il 


ancoln    lelt     the     city 


on 


tht 


twelfth. 


(ii'iieral  I'rescott  hail  not  net,dectetl  the  l.iiid  approaches  to  Savaii- 


nan,    wlule    especially   wau 


lb 


UIU 


I  lie    river 


l)riil''(' 


and    otherwise'    obstructed   the   ro; 


III) 
als 


lit  ;   but   had    destro\-e(l 


lat  the  .'vineiicans 


dill  iMt  join  the'  I'reiich  army  until  the  sixteenth. 


A 


council  ot    war  was   held  ;  the   dem.iiul  made   upon 


the 


.UTison 


by  the  ('ount   I  )'I''.stain;4,  ])rior  to  the  arr 


1\MI 


of  <  Idler. 


1 


mcoMi,  was 


satisfactoriU'   exnlaiiu 


and    on    the   twenl\--lliirii    the   Ireiiche 


were 


commeiiceil 
haulin'4   tlu 


"he    diflicult\-    of    |)rociiriM''    animal 


dr,iu''lit    lor 


heavv  ''ims  a  distance  o 


f  I 


ue  mile-.,  occa-^i'Jiud   ,i  dela)' 


which  .still  lurtiier  enured  to  the  beiielil  of  th'.-  ISriti^h  troup^. 

On    the   tweiit_\--foui  th,  Major  ( irahani    made    ,i   sail}'  from   thein- 
trenchmeiit-.  without   valuai)le  results.      On   the    ni;^lu  of  the  Iweiily- 

bold  and  skillful  demoiistratioii 


uir  maile  sucU  a 


seventh,  Major  Mc.\rt 

toward  the  centre  ol    the  allied  forces  as  to  occasion  a  firiiv. 


bet 


ween 


the  I- 


rench  and  .Vmerican  cam[) 


On  llie  fifth  of  October,  at  an  eariv 


lour,  fire  was  opened  from  a  battery  of  nine  mortars,  an 


d  t! 


urtv-three 


piecesof  heavy  artillery,  from  the  land  side,  ami  sixteen  i;uns  Iromthe 
river,  and  w.is  maintained  without  interru[)tion  until  the  cii^hlh.  The 
treni^thened  and  advanced,  adilitioiial  L,fuiis  were  placed 


works  were   s 


in  position,  aiul   the  c 


ffect 


was  soon   visible   in 


the  1 


)urnimi  o 


f  h 


ouses 


anc 


reiieral  d.'.nur'e 


to  the  t 


own  o 


f  Savannah,  without   serious  injury 


to  the   defensive   worl 


On  the  ei')hth.  Major  LT'lnfinl,  with   live 


men  atlvanced  under  tire,  screened   themselves  behind  tlie  abatis,  aiu 


kindled    the    timber;    but  the    ^jieeii  wooi 
attem[)t,  liowever  darin;^,  was  a  failure. 


I    failed    to    burn,   and   the 


General  Prevost  sent  out  a  fl.i.Li'  reipiesting  permission  to  send  the 


i-^ 


■r 


^:'"    I 


■rU 


11 


'icrH'ii 


•r/l 


111! 


I- Hi 


n   ijf;|<i  .;'  4 


'\^ 


!):■     " 


4S0 


sii:<;i;  or'  s.wann.mi. 


|I77'> 


uoiiU'ii  and  iliildrcn  nut  of  the  iit\'.       Iliis  \v;"^  rcriiscd  I)\-  hotli  (itii- 
cral  LiiU'ihi  .md  ("nimt   I )' I'".sl.iiii;;,  and  llic  canniinadin;.;-  lontimird. 

'I'lic  I'Kiuli  llcrt  had  l)(('ii  more  than  a  i.mdiIi  uii  the  loist.  ( )n 
lii-.  ai  liv.d.  t  he  ( "uiiiit  1 )' I.  I, I  ill;,;  stated  that  li  is  time  u  as  vei\'  Hniited, 
and  tlie  oiiininii  ] nt'vaiK d  amnii;;  tin'  Anieriian  ulTi'/ers  tliat  liis  delay 
lie-li>re  .Sa\annali  would  not  necessarily  exeicd  lioni  ten  to  sixteen 
(ia\'s.  I'ljiii  this  undi'istandiin.;  lie  I.mded  his  t  ioe>|is.  'I'he  i' icin  h 
West  India  Islands  h.id  been  left  suddenly  wi'iiout  na\al  suppoit; 
and  the  lime  alread\-  wasted  had  heeii  suHieienl  lor  the  I'liitisli  lleet 
at  New  \'oi'k  to  lie  .nUised  of  the  sie^M-,  and  mal<e  the  vo\M'_;e  to 
relieve  the  ;',anison.  Many  scami'ii  .md  ;;unners  iVoni  the  !■  rem  h 
ships  weiH;  in  the  treiuhes.  and  the  lleet  itself  was  seriously  exposed. 
'I'Ik'sc  taets,  in  i:onnett  ion  with  the  lateiie^.  oj  the  seasiu!,  were  ur;.',eiil 
rc.isoiis  lor  niessiiv.;  tliesie;M'.  'I  he  I'lciu  h  eoinm.mder,  ,is  at  Xew- 
|)(Mt.  slnanL  lioui  no  lonlliet,  hut  held  th.it  his  lleet  was  liis  Ihst  care, 
<iiid  that  his  support  ol  Aniei  ica  must  lie  consistent  with  his  allei^iancc 
to  i'lance.  1  he  en;;ineeis  reported  that  it  would  reipiin;  ten  daj's 
more  to  comjilele  till-  trenches.  it  hid  therelore  lieeoine  impracti- 
cahle  foi'  him  to  await  the  slow  jiroci'ss  ol'  a  re;.ni!ai"  sie;.;e,  by  s)'slcm- 
alic  aiiproachcs,  and  a  council  ol  w.ir  resoU<(l  to  assault  the  iJritisli 
works  without  dela_\'.       I'he  only  allernat  i\e-  was  lo  raise  the  sie;,;c. 

'idle  torce  (let. iile(l  lor  t he  direct  .Is-., lu It  cousi^teil  ol  three  thou- 
sand Uvc  lumdicd  i'rench  troo])s,  si\  hundred  American  re;4ul.irs, 
inclutlin;.;  I'ul.iski's  cor|H,  ,ind  two  hundred  .nid  lilly  ( 'li,iiie-.to:i  militi.i, 
the  w hoi (•  force  di\  id ed  into  two  columns.  ( iener.il  I  )i lion,  of  the  Irish 
l)ri;j[.ule'  in  the  {''reiu  h  service,  w.is  to  [.ikc  tlu'  extreiiu:  left,  ;iiid  p.iss 
iinde'r  ;ind  p.isl  .Sprin;^  liill,  with  the  purpose  ol  .iltackiiiL;  the  l>ritish 
extreme  ri;.dil  near  the  horseshoe  or  s.iilois'  h.ittery. 

The  C"<iunt  iJ'lCstaiiv^  and  (iiMieral  Lincln  were  to  move  with  the 
second  division,  wdiich  w.is  t<i  .itl.uk  t  he  .Sj)!  iu;^  Mill  ndouht  itself 
and  its  llankin;,;  deleiises,  \\hile  the  t'ount  I'ul.iski  w.is  ordered  to 
storm  the  n-doul)t  still  farther  to  the  u  irth  on  their  lelt. 

General  I  lusher,  of  .South  C.uolin.i,  with  live  liundred  men  <if  the 
l'"irst  and  Second  hri^.ides  of  militia,  (iener.il  Willi.ims'  briLj.ulo,  and 
the  .Second  b.ittalion  of  militia,  were  to  m.ike  /(vW/  att.icks  upon  the 
soiit-h  .md  east  .ides  of  tin:  town,  with  orders  to  impro\'e  .my  f.iir 
opii(»rtunily  to  push  on  and  t.ike  the  e.iirisoii  in  the  re.ir  ;  anci  the 
trenches  and  b.itteries  w(;ie  to  be  (jccujiied  Ijy  Americ.m  militia,  as  it 
the  nsu.il  cannon. idiiiL;  w.is  to  bi;  continued. 

On  the  eveniiiL;  of  the  ei.L;hth,  (jcneral-LinCotrr  ordered  trix:-xf^*fips- 


177'). 


SIKfll",    OK   SAVANNAH. 


481 


.^'^i 


In  iil.ior  white  p.ip'T  nil  tlnir  li.it  ,  tor  ili-.tiiu'tii>n  Iidiii  tin;  enemy,  .itui 
to  he  ic  idy  t(»  iii.iki'  tile  assault  at  tour  m\  loelc  the  iie\t  inDniiii;;,  tin; 
niiitli.  uhuli  had  been  (le,i;;iiatril  loi   tin;  moveiU'  lit, 

I'he    iiianh    w,is   so    delaN'cd    that    it    was    da)li;dit    uheii    Ca)uilt 
I  )'l'lstaiii;.;,    .sui)i)ort<;d    l)\-    (ii'iuial    laiieolii,    (oloiiels    I, aureus    ami 


Meliito^h,  rc.iclied  tin 


t  111  Spiiii"   I  lill  ,ind  eoiiimviued  llu;  attael 


Under  a  wastiiv.;  tire  the  l*"iemh  lioojis  ai'.d  the  Anierie.in  li;_;hl 
iiiLtiilry  presst-d  on,  heedless  of  the  lal!  of  men  hy  the  si-ore  .it  every 
ste]).  The  |)u:ked  troops  of  tin.'  ;.;airi^on  had  lieeii  coiieentrated  \o 
meet  tlu'  .iss.iult.      (ieiicr.il  I)ilIon  ])rt'ssed  so 


ar  into    the  maisii,  be 


yond  the  main   eolumii,  as  to   lose   his  w,iy,  -^d  that    he  ua-;   not  discii- 
led  imlil  the  battle  was  over;   .md  the  rolunin  of  (ieiieral  IIiiltlt 


taiu 


which  waded    thioii'di    rice    fields  was    unable   to    m.ike   an)'   praclic.d 
advaiuc,  and  retired  ,1  Iter  a  loss  of  t weiitv-ei'dit  men.      The  .Ser'n'.uit- 


major  ol   till'  (    hallestoll  ^.Meliadier: 


had  deserted  duriii'  the  iii'dit,  alter 


the  order  had  been  proiiiul;;ated  to  the  troop--,  and  the  ;_',arri-.on  adapted 

their  defense  to  the    well  iiiulerslood  on-,et  which   they  wen:  to  resist. 

(a)Uiil  I'lil.iski   proiiijill)'  took  his  ]io-,ilion,  ,aiid  by  the   impetus  of 

his  attack    was   curied  into   llu;   fact;  ot    siijierior   numbers   where    he 

he.id 
r  Kill 


foiiiiht  without    \'ii'l(liii;',  until  lu   was  inort.d 


\'  wouilileil. 


tie 


of  tlu;  main   cohiimi    not  only   Ion 

ili.ad 


I  he  laitraiice   to  ihe  .-ipriii'. 


redoubt,  but    cimibed    t !ic  iiali-^.ide .,  and   at  one   monient  laeulenanls 


liusli   and    lloiiii's,   ol    the   Second   South   (' 


irolina,   iiad    pkmted   Ihe 


.South  t^.irolina  colors  by  the  sidi:  of  ihe  freiich  standard,  within  the 
redoubt.  ]5otli  ofl'uers  fell,  and  Lieutenant  (irey  r.iised  the  colors 
only  to  receive  a  iiioit.d  wound.  S(;r;;i' nil  Ja-^per  r.uSed  one  ol  them 
a  tilird  time,  but  received  liisdi;,illi  'ivouiid  also.  Me  lived  to  brin;.; 
aw.'i)'  the  loloi's  ill  s,ilet\'.  I'or  filty-livi;  minutes  the  ,issailiii;_j  column, 
crowded  within  a   narrow   space,  w,is  exposed  to  .1  constant  fire  from 


troops    wi'll    under   co\'er,  as   wel 


,is  iVoiii   the  Ihiti-ih   -'ninadiers  and 


Major  (lla/Jer's  marines  who  met  tlicm  m  hont. 

(icneial  Moultrie  say.^,  ''()ur  troops  wen;  so  crowded  in  the  ditch 
and  ui)on  tlu;  beam,  th.it  they  could  h.u'dly  raise  an  arm,  and  wliih; 
they  \\(;re  in  this  situation,  hudd.led  up  lo;.;etlii'r,  the  iiritish  loaded 
.iiid  fired  delil)i;ratel\',  without  .ui)'  daii;.;er  to  tliemst;lves. 

;\t  this  time  tlu;  ( iermaine  and  sever, il  ;.;alleys  maint.iiiu;d  a  d(;adly 
enfiladini;  fire  across  llu;  slope  of  the  hill,  until,  ov(;rwhcliiied  with  tlu: 
.severity  ol  the  storm,  the  troo[.'    witlulrcw  to  their  encampments. 

With   perhaps   the  e.xception  of  Hunker  Hill,  there  w.is   no  action 
of  the  war  where  so  great  a  loss  was  received  in  so  brief  a  period. 
31 


<Q' 


ISi 


llrh'    ■    t  I 


:   ' 


a  "'1  .fi 

lil/^"' 


4SJ 


sii'c;!'  oi-  s\v wvAir. 


|i77'i 


Tlu    I'liti^li    iMsunltif^  were  as  follows:   ("aptain    Tawcs,  who  (diu 
maiuKil  till-  Spiiiv'  lliil  ii'douht    with    ^Mcit  ;.,Mllaiilry,  Captain  Siiuji 
son,  I  .iciilctiant    M.  |'hci-.oii,  l",iisi;.Mi  rollaiil,  and  t  liirly-si\    iion-coiii- 
tnis>ioiU'( !  ii(Tuii-,  ,ii)ci  ])ii^Mtcs  \vff(:  IdlK-il.      riir  wouinlcd  ami  inis^iiu;, 
inclinliii'    two    captains  and    two    licutmant -,  nnnihcrcd    sixtv-lhicf, 
and  the  dr^i'itcis  and  niis-^in;.;  fitly-two. 

'ri>r  AnuTican  la-iialtit-s  includi'(l  ainon;^  tlic  kilK'd,  M.ijurs  Mott, 
Wise',  and  Jones,  t",ij)tains  Hciaud,  Slu'plu'iil,  and  l)onnoin,and  I.iru 
tenants  I  (nine.  l?nsli,  Wickliain,  and  Mailfv  ;  anion;,;  tlu;  woundrd  and 
mis-^iiv,;,  (icnrr.il  I'ula-^ki  (nioitailyl,  nine  r.ipt.iins  and  clcN'cn  lieuten- 
ants; mni-connni-.'-ioned  ofVuers,  .nd  privates  killed  and  'AdninU'il, 
acconlin;;  to  (ii'iuiai  IJntoln's  stati-nu'iit,  one  Imndicd  and  seventy, 
(leneral  Monltiie,  in  his  Memoirs,  puts  the  Anic  i  iean  casualties  at 
four  hundred  and  fifty-seven,  which  is  undoubtedly  the  correct 
luiinher. 

(  lener.d  D'l^sl.iinL;  was  twice  W(uinded,  and  the  I'"rencii  casualties 
amounted  to  tlfti'cn  officers  and  one  hundri-d  and  ^ixtv'-ei^^ht  sub- 
alterns and  soldiers  killed,  and  forlx-tiiiee  offuers  and  four  hundicd 
ami  eleviui  ^^ubalterns  and  soldiers  wounded. 

I  .ieuten.mt  Colonel  Maitland.  of  the  l)'iti--h  army.  Major  Moncrii'f, 
cliief  en;4ineer,  and  Captain  lleniv',  who  had  ciiar;.;e  of  the  iia\'al 
forces,  distin;_nn\lieil  theni^eK-e,;  and  ("olonel  I.aurt'us  was  eipiall)' 
conspicuous  for  'j,allanlry  at  the  head  of  the  American  lii^ht  int.mtry. 
'idle  I'rench  withdrew  tlu'ir  aitillery,  and  sailed  on  the  twenty  ninth, 
and  the  American  ainiy  retired  to  ("JiarK'ston. 

(iener.il  Moultrie  sa\'s  in  his  M<Miioirs,  "  There  can  not  be  any 
doubt,  but  if  the  l'"reiich  and  Ame  'cms  !iad  marched  into  Sawmnaii 
when  till)'  arrived  on  the  se\-enteenth,  the)-  would  liave  carried  the 
town  vei  \'  ea-^iU',  because'  at  that  time  tlu-v  had  onl\'  the  Surin/  bat- 
tcry  coini)leted,  .uid  no  abatis  round  the  town,"  and  then  adds,  "  after 
tliis  repulse  we  were  in  a  much  worse  situation  than  befoii'.  Tlu' 
Count  D'l'.st.iin;^  departed  ;  the  unfortunate  militia  of  (ieor;j,ia,  who 
JKul  taktn  the  Hritish  protection  could  not  _l;o  back  to  them  aj:;ain,  but 
were  oblii^ed  to  seek  shelter  in  n  straiiLje  country,  or  live  in  the  back 
woods  oi  their  own.  It  depressed  our  spirits,  wc  bcfjan  to  l)c  appre- 
hensive for  the  safety  of  these  two  Southern  States  ;  it  also  depre- 
ciated our  money  so  low  that  it  was  scarcely  worth  anythin;^'." 

The  result  of  the  sieije  of  Savannah  determined  the  movements  of 
both  the  nortiicrn armies.  The  I'rench  fleet  was  dispersed  by  a  storm 
soon  after  it  left  the  Aineric.m   coast,  and    four  frigates  fell  into  the 


m<)] 


SIKC.K   OF   SAVANNAH. 


4.S3 


li.mds  of  tlu;  UritiMi.  A  poitioii  of  tin-  iLit  n;t  iiruiMl  to  tlu;  West 
Inclii;s,  .111(1  til'-  ('ouiit   i  )'!•'- 4. liir;  n'tuiiird  to  I'VaiU'c. 

Oil  tin-  tui  nly-^ixth  of  I  )in'iiil)i:r,  Sir  Ilcni)'  (!liiUoii  left  \r\v 
York  to  tlu;  (.■oinm.inil  of  LiiMilrn,ml-;.;fiiiiMl  Kii>'i)li;uHL-n,  .iinl  cm- 
W.irki'il  with  scvrn  tlioii  iiul  Tim-  IiuikIitiI  iiicii  lor  (  liiiic^toii  im  irr 
convoy  of  Ikc  -liips  ol  \]\r  line  .ind  st;\(  r.il  fiij^ati'S,  Ailiiiiial  AiKutii- 
iiot  foiniii.m'liii;;  tin-  si|u.iilroii.  \\',i-.liin;.;toii  li.id  ,i-M'iiil)lfil  ,i  l.U;.^i! 
lorcc  o|  Ni  \\  ^'o|•l^  ,in<l  M,iss,iiiiu-,it t-i  militia  lor  the-  purpose  ol  in.ik- 
iii;4  ,m  att.ii  k  iipMii   New  \'oik,  Ixil  llirsc  wcic:  ,il  oiur  (li^l)aiiili;(l. 

LiMiiiiii;'  thai  Sir  III  iH)'  ("hiUoii  wa-^  ciiiharkin;.;  a  l,ir;.;i;  force 
upDii  t  raii-.pnrls,  ami  hi'liiA'iii;.;'  that  their  di -,t  inal  loii  was  cither 
(jcor;.;ia  or  South  CJaroliua,  he  or  li;ri;d  the  N'orth  (Carolina  l)ri;^ade  to 
march  l<i  (  harle->t(ai  m  No\-e'mlier,  the  \'ir;.M'iii.i  Imc  to  march  in 
iJecendjcr,  and  the  nniaiiuler  of  the  arms  was  placed  in  wniler 
ipiaiter-^. 

( )ne  division  under  (icner.il  Neath  was  stationed  in  the  Hi;^ddan(ls, 
tile  cavalrxunen  were  sent  to  (.'onneclicul,  and  \\'.ishin!;ton  with  tlu; 
main  army  established  his  hciuhpiarlcrs,  lor  the  second  time,  at 
Muiii.-^town,  New  Jer^ev. 

liRmsii  Ki  i-icrivi;  l''ni:ei:. 

NniK.     I'rom  "  Original   k(.'tunis  in  liie   iiiitish   l;ici)iil  OHicc."     Dale,   Dccciiilicr  1st, 

'779- 

(  lirilisli I3.^.tfi 

<  Ccnnan l",!^:!'> 

(  I'ldvincial 4.""- 


Ncvv  Vork  and  its  iJcpemlcncies. 


I  liilifax  and  Penobscot 3.  l'"' 

3.'):^' 


* "••"rt;i:» 3.')3" 

West  Florida 1.7''7 

Ueruuida  uiil  I'rovidiiite  Island 636 


Q.8n 


Total,  38,569. 


n\ 


■mm 


!'     ',» 


7       P"    •  I     'fH 


If  .  \  '^ 


f.  V, 


v,( , 


if   h^ 

i  1  i  ■ 

i:|    ^ 

f  i 

i 

CHAPTER    LXII. 


JANUARY    [O  JULY,   17S0.     CONDHION  OF  'IHE  ARMIES. 


T  ^  71 IILK  General  Clinton  was  once  more  on  the  ocean,  to  again 
V  V  attempt  the  capture  of  Charleston,  the  American  army  wa.-) 
m  iiiits,  surrounded  by  snow  to  the  even  deptli  of  two  feet,  badly 
iliifled  ill  all  defiles  and  unilerLjoinL^  a  physical  ordc  d  liardl)'  less  try- 
ing;' than  that  of  V^alle)'  l'"or;^'e.  In  order  to  induce  Coni;ress  to  make 
still  more  ur^^ent  efforts  to  brini;  the  army  up  to  a  fair  service-sta'ul- 
ard,  \\'a^liinL;ton  preparetl  a  statement  of  his  force  as  it  appeared  on 
the  muster  mils  of  the  army.  That  statement  included  the  total 
nominal  force,  (except  from  South  Carolina  and  Geori^na)  with  all 
independent  or;4anizalions  ;  and  upon  the  impossible  assumption  that 
(Very  m.iu  on  the  uriLjinal  roll.-,  w.is  still  liviiv^'  and  in  the  service,  the 
agi;re;4ate  was  onl)-  twent)'-seven  thousand  ,ind  niuet}'-nine  men  ;  this 
included   iuvah\ls,  drummers,  fifers,   in   tact,  the  entire  arm)-. 

1  w  o  thou>aiul  aiul  tifl)-  one  enlistments  were  to  exjjire  December 
thirt)-fir.-t.  Six  tlKHisand  foiu' lumdretl  aiul  twenty-six  would  expire 
March  thirty-first.  \W  the  last  of  April,  the  total  reduction  by  ex- 
piration of  term  of  sei  vice  would  reach  eiL;ht  thousand  one  liundreil 
and  eighty-one;  b\-  the  last  of  June,  ten  thousand  one  hundred  and 
fitty-ei_L;ht  ;  !)}■  the  last  of  September,  ten  thousand  seven  hundred 
and  nine,  and  during  the  year,  twelve  thousand  one  hundred  and 
fift)'-seven. 

Tile  total  force,  enlisted  for  the  war,  was  but  fourteen  thousand 
nine  huiulreil  aiul  ninety-eight  ;  and  from  the  numbers  already 
given,  there  was  to  be  m.ule  the  necessary  allowance  for  artificers, 
armorer-:,  wagoners,  tiuartermasters.  emi)loyees  and  all  the  suborclinate 
detai!>  which  lessen  the  fighting  force  of  an  army  ;  as  well  as  the 
casualties  since  the  original  muster.  The  several  States  furnished 
their  quota  for  different  periods  and  at  different  times,  so  that  there 
was  a  constant  addition  of  raw  levies,  and  the  army  Jiad  ni  opportu- 


V 


. 

{r  '• 

•^ 

U 

c: 

,  €n 

i 

53 

t, 

6 

=: 

'0t 

V   .,' 

-r^ 

/ 


■^ 


^^ 


r'' 


/    /. ,  .-•ir-ir-\nn  *    -       .Wnjst r-  ,,  ~"L  '^'\''. 


S^' 


1/  >  i  (iu'innnai 


^----:- 


(Mmirn'mi 


w_. 


>^T 


'^-' 


*;  i  1 


^ 

1    t    ■ 

('    ;■ 

■ii.    - 

■■■■)'' 

jJLi' 

rlMli' 

liiiif' 

I7S"' 


JANUAkV    It)   JII.V. 


4S; 


nity  t(i  bccomi-  aliki.'  cli^n'iiIiiKMl  and  tlrilK.d,  in  all  its  parts.  Such 
was  tht;  louilitinn  <>(  tli'  aiin>'  <>i  llu'  IJnitiil  Stales  wlu-ii  tiii,'  sui.onil 
caini)ai;,;n   in  tlu:   Suutlurii   Slalc-,  hr;^,in. 

At.  the  time  this  statmncnt  u.is  ni.uii',  siiortly  hrtoii'  (niuiai 
t'linton  saiK'd,  tin:  Hrilisli  force  at  Mew  Vurk  and  its  dependencies 
consisted  ol'  luenly-ei^^lu  lliuusand  seven  liumiied  and  tifty-^i\ 
effectives. 

Three  tlionsand  nine  hundred  and  fliirt)'  men  were  in  Geop^i.i : 
one  thi)usand  seven  hunth'e'd  and  ei;^hty--.eveu  in  h'lorida  ;  and  .it 
l'enol)scot,  Maine,  and  I  Ldifix,  sul»ject  to  call,  tliere  was  an  addi- 
tii>nal  Ihiti-^h  force  of  three  till  lusaml  four  hundred  and  sixty  men, 
making  a  total  force  of  nearl_\'  thirty-(M;4lit   thousand  men. 

( ieneral  t'linton  sailed  with  seven  thousand  tivi'  hundred  a\\<\  lilts- 
men  ;  thus  increa-'in;,',  the  Hritish  force  in  the  .Southern  l)e|)arlnient 
to  thirteen  thousand  two  hundred  and  sixty-seven  men,  anil  le.iviiu; 
twenty-one  thou^.md  and  >ix  in  and  near  Xew  York.  ICveti  this 
Ljarrison  was  not  uitiioul  aujirt'licn^icjus  of  an  attack  from  Washin^;'- 
ton's  .iini}-,  L^ipreceiliMited  cold  fro/e  the  bay  so  that  le,im>  and 
artilK'i)'  Could  cre^s  u[)on  the  ice. 

I'he  Ihili^li  aruiv  in  Xew  York  was  almost  in  a  starviiv-;  'ind  frozen 
condition.  l'r,nsi)nris  were  broken  up  lor  fuel  and  almost  all  cmmtry 
supplies  wuri..-  cut  off  b)- the  extremely  cold  weather  and  the  difficulty 
of  :;endinL;  out  e.xpetlitions  to  hunt  for  foot!  or  wood. 

Notwithstandincj;  the  severe  cold,  Lord  .Stirliirj  .ros-eil  to  Slalen 
Island  with  a  face  of  tweiily-fiw  hundred  men,  but  filled  to  sur- 
prise the  posts,  and  a  ch.innel,  which  openetl  (|uiie  sudilenlx'  thr(jUL,di 
the  ice,  put  the  L;arrison  in  sjieedy  communication  uitli  the  city. 

A  fe\''  prisoners  were  take'ii,  but  the  men  suffered  severel)-.  On 
the  tv.e  ty-tifth  of  the  same  morith,  Lieutenant-yeneral  Knyi)hau- 
sen  sent  a  small  command  across  the  ice,  at  I'aulus  Hook,  which  cap- 
turetl  a  comp.iii)-  at  Newark:  while  Lieutenant-colonel  Huskirk 
crossed  from  Staten  Iskmd  to  the  m.un  land  .uul  captured  the  picket 
guard  at  Elizabethtown,  with  two  majors.  lw(j  caiitains  aiul  foit_\-  two 
privates,  In  the  first  instance  the  academy  was  burned,  and  in  tlu' 
other,  the  town  house  and  the  church  of  Rev.  James  CcUdwell.  then 
Cha^)lain  in  Colonel  Elias  Dayton's  regiment. 

On  the  second  of  Febriuiry,  Lieutenant-colonel  Norton  with  four 
companies  of  guards,  two  of  Hessians  and  one  of  Yagers,  with  some 
cavalry,  .md  two  siviall  guns,  madi;  a  march,  using  sleighs  for  the  men. 
against  a  small  American    post  near    White   Flains,  in   Westchester 


nil 

iu        -l^ll 


■  '  !•■             ; 

,* 

;'!>? 

iiJHii 

i 

i 

u 


I    PF' 


486 


JANUARY   TO   Jl'I.Y. 


[1780. 


,ir  i 


i    ! 


■?^«.  i 


.    >   I 


I   .    ' 


J   * 


co'.mty  :  l>urin'<l  the  liousu  of  .1  inui  by  \.\\c  name  of  Vouiv,;,  wliicli 
was  the  ])i)st  hcuiquartcrs,  and  captured  niiut_\- prisoners,  iiuiirring  a 
loss  of  two  killed  and  twenty-three  woumled.  Sucli  random  incur- 
sions comprised  the  whole  active  operations  of  the  L^.irrison  of  New 
York  nntil  sprin;.';. 

Tlu'  American  arni}-  at  Morristown  fon;,'1it  eoltl,  nakedness  and  fam- 
ine. DuriiiL;  ;he  ",^'7(V/  />(-;v:7- "  of  January,  17S0,  tlie  suffering;  ln'Cime 
intense.  W.^diinqton  fumd  that  e\en  military  constraint  w.is  nnable 
to  collect  foot!  from  a  r(;,;ion  ,dmost  depleted  of  supplies,  I  lis  ti.ms 
portation  was  so  limiti'd  that  it  w.is  with  difficidty  that  fuel  couKl  he 
hauled  for  c;uri]i  fires,  and  the  Irc^ips  were  repeateiUy  without  meat 
for  two  or  three  days.  It  was  at  such  a  tinn!  that  the  people  of  New 
Jersey,  whose  soil  w.is  a  constant  h.ittle-field  fnun  the  heLjinnini;'  to 
the  t'lul  of  the  war.  exhibited  tlu'ir  confidence  in  W.i-liini^ton  and 
their  s_\'mpathy  with  his  troops.  The  patriotism  of  the  citizens  was 
of  t!ie  same  temper  as  that  of  the  people  of  Snuth  Ciro'in.i.  In  each 
State  the  royalist  element  was  bold  and  acti\e.  As  the  c.i[)ture  of 
Charleston  subsecpicntly  developed  that  ele;nent  and  ;j;a\e  it  ori^^ani- 
zation  and  boklness,  so  the  jiresence  of  (leneral  Clinton's  army  in 
New  ^'(lrk  encouraLjetl  the  beliei  that  Uriti^h  suprt'macy  Wduld  ulti- 
m.itely  be  restored.  The  Anu'ricm  ro\'alists  therefore  considered  the 
pro]:)erty  (jf  the  patriots  to  be  k'Ljitimate  phnider  ;  .and  the  AnK.'ric.in 
soldier  who  found  an  enem_\'  in  an  old  iieii^hbor,  and  reijarded  him,  at 
best,  as  only  a  spy,  was  (juickcned  to  acts  of  violence  which  he  woukl 
not  have  committed  .if^amst  a  British  re;j;ular. 

Quite  a  large  number  of  those  who  were  disaffected  to  the  new 
government  h,id  joined  the  British  Provincial  b.itt.dions,  .ami  with 
those  of  New  York  of  this  class,  there  was  carried  into  Ciener.d 
Clinton's  returns  for  December,  1 779,  a  force  of  four  thousand 
and  sixtv-four  men.  Thus  organized,  and  knowing  the  country 
thoroughly,  they  made  successful  irritating  forays,  and  the  State  \  ..s 
treated  as  a  free  granary  for  both  armies.  In  Washington's  hour  of 
trial,  the  self-s,icrifice  of  heads  of  families,  past  the  age  of  militar\'  ser- 
vice, and  of  the  women,  was  practically  extended  to  his  relief.  Im- 
pressive: instances  are  numerous,  and  they  illustrate  one  of  the  redeem- 
ing elements  of  a  war  of  revolution,  when  surpassing  trials  develop 
transcendent  virtues. 

The  Rev.  Dr.  Joseph  1".  Tuttle,  afterwards  President  of  Wabash 
College,  a  son  of  New  Jcrse)-,  and  for  a  long  time  a  resident  of  M  mIs 
.•ounty,  devoted  many  years  to  the  study  of  the  Revolution   ,     .lis- 


JANUARY    Ti;   JULY. 


487 


(Uikl 

new 

with 

iiicral 

iS.Ultl 

untry 
\  ,.s 
lur  of 
•\'  scr- 
Ini- 
,U-em- 
cvclop 


tnry  of  tliat  Statr,  ami  by  personal  visits  to  survivors  of  the  war,  at 
their  own  homes,  accumulated  a  ^torc  of  memorial  facts  which  _L;"reatly 
redountl  to  the  credit  of  that  people.  Hoth  Mr.  Irving  and  Mr.  P>.in- 
croft  have  acknowledged  their  indebtedness  to  his  valuable  manu- 
scrijits,  and  the  autlior  cites  a  few  facts  kindl)-  furnished,  to  illustrate 
the  condition  of  affiirs  at  Morristown,  tiie  s[)irit  of  the  people,  and 
the  state  of  the  army  at  the  beginning  of  i/So. 

The  CiViip.  ''  The  p.ilh  ;  at  the  camp  near  Morristown  were  marked 
with  blood  fntiii  the  bare-footed  sokliers." 

Its  iippnKic//fs.  "  Till'  i.'iir)ny  iicvcr  piisst'd  Sliort  llilh.  The  alarm 
gun,  the  beacon  fires,  the  express  riders,  were  cdwa)s  ready.  llie 
light  kindled  at  .Short  Ilill^,  could  be  seen  at  Pompton  and  Haskiug- 
ridge  ;  an  1  this  was  answered  from  Kimball  mountain,  Rockaway 
Heights,  ami  X'ernon,  in  .Sussex."  "  The  pass  throLigh  to  Chatham 
was  as  a  closed  gate  and  .secure." 

Divotion  of  ii.<oiiiiii.  "  Mrs.  Uzal  KitchcU,  daughter  of  Daniel 
luttle,  with  husbantl,  father,  .uid  four  brothers  in  the  service,  declined 
a  Hritish  protection,  saying,  "  Ii"  the  (jod  of  battles  will  not  protect 
us  we  will  fare  with  the  rest."  "  .\s  man)-  as  twelve  soUliers  at  a  time 
were  rei)eatedly  billeteil  .it  her  house,  and  as  with  many  others  of 
like  spirit,  the\-  contributed  from  slender  means  for  army  uses,  without 
asking  for  voucliers  for  the  .uticles  Oaruished." 

fliiiiiirr  trpprasi'd.  "  On  one  occasicm  her  sister,  Mrs.  Keturah 
I'Kitt,  filled  a  large  kettle  with  meat,  placed  it  over  the  fire,  and 
started  to  sift  some  meal  for  a  hungry  party.  'i'he\-  eagerly 
snatched  the  uncooked  food  in  her  absence,  antl  preferred  the  un- 
sifted me.d,  because  there  was  more  of  it,  and  it  was  good  enough 
as  it  was." 

ClotIu)ig.  "  Stockings,  mittens,  leggins,  blankets,  and  all  kinds  of 
iiomestic  fabric  emiiloyed  these  earnest  women." 

"The  Kitchells,  Smiths  and  Greens  of  Hanover;  the  Jacksons, 
Beeches  and  Winds  of  Rockawa>-  and  IV  :  ;inock  ;  the  Condits, 
Fords,  Johns,  and  Ilathaways  of  .Morristown;  the  Carters,  Pier- 
sons,  Sayers,  Millers,  Thompsons  and  ]?rowns  of  Chatham  ;  the 
Thompsons,  Drakes  antl  Carys  of  Windham,  were  only  a  few,  who 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  counted  all  things  a.s  loss  unless 
independence  was  won  ;  and  the  army  was  made  recipients  of  their 
bounty." 

All  this  \t'as  in  keeping  with  that  spirit  which  comforted  the  army 
about  Boston  in    1776,  which  saved  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas,  which 


,1:.! 


pa  I: 


^^■*). 


■^  :•  i: 


'■,'^^s    »  f  i; 

t>*  I  ij}' 


•   H: 


v 


!  i  J 


ill 


1^ 


4S8 


lAMAKV     lO    III.S' 


[1780. 


wcjik'cd  mi;^litily  l)y  firesides,  like  iinsceii  Iciveii,  to  niaiiit.iiii  llic 
striii^i^ii-  ivliicli  ("oiv^rcss  well  ni;^!!  dcs|);ui-ccl  of,  iind  the  iirmy  seemed 
too  f(.:eljle  to  sii^t.iiil. 

\V'.i.-.liiii;jlon  says  of  N'mv  Jersey  at   tint  pirioil,  tliat  "  liis  reqinsi- 

tioiis  were  piinc'tuall)' coiiiplii  li  willi,  and  in  iiia'iy  counties  exceeded," 

IrviiiL,^   sa\-s  :   "  Ivxliaiiited    as   tlie   State   wa-i  \)y  repeated   drains, 

y(,'t,  when  cK;ep  snuw^  cut  off  all  distant  supplie.-,,  \Vashin|^'ton's  army 

subsisted  by  it." 

Hancroft  says:  "  Ciencr.iHy  tlirou;.;hout  the  war,  the  WDineii  ot 
America  never  '^rvw  we'ary  of  \'ic:Idin;.^  up  article;  neces-iary  for  the 
comfort  of  the-ir  own  housi;hol(h,  to  ri-jieve'  the  distresses  of  the  soldiers. 
'file  women  of  Philadelphia  rallyin;.^'  round  the  amiable  i'".sther  Reed, 
wife  of  the'  I'roide'iit  of  Pemi-.ylv.uiia,  now  m.uU:  a  more  earnest  effort  ; 
they  brou,i4ht  to;_;ether  lar;_;e  donations  of  clothin;^^  and  invited  the 
ladies  of  otlur  States  to  adopt  a  like  plan.  They  thus  assisted  to  keep 
alive  tin-  spiiit  of  patriotism  in  tiie  ,uiny,  but  their  j^ifts  could  not 
meet  it-  ever-re'currin;4  wants." 

(  )n  the  eleventh  of  January,  Quarte'rmaster-^.jeneral  (ireen  wrote, 
■'  Such  weather  m.-ver  did  I  Icel.  l""or  six  ore-i;'.ht  days  it  has  iieen  so 
cold  that  there  has  been  no  livin;^  abroad  ;  tlu;  snow  is  also  very  deep, 
and  niuih  drifted.  Wedriveover  the  tops  offences.  We  luive  been 
dternalel)-  out  of  meat  and  l)read  for  ei;_,dit  or  nine  days  past,  and 
without  eitlier  fir  three  or  four." 

With  all  this  destitution  of  tile  army  and  local  w-aste  throujjh  New 
Jersey,  tlu:  New  I'liu^land  .Slates  and  i'ennsylv.mia  were  once  more 
without  I'riti.sh  L,^anis(Jns;  and  the  active  anxieties  of  impendin;^ 
dan^^er  i^ave  way  to  a  lethar<,'y  wiiich  seemed  .dmost  t(j  ignore  like 
danc^^Ts  which  hail  only  been  transferred  to  other  portions  of  one 
common  country.  There  was  scarcity  of  money.  Practically,  there 
was  no  money.  The  soldiers  had  iiot  been  paid  for  five  months  ; 
their  funilies  were  suffering;  recruiting  was  almost  sus[)ended  ;  aiul 
the  burden  of  the  war  seemed  to  rest  more  depressiiiLjly  on  the  North- 
ern States  which  had  resjiite  from  its  active  operations,  than  upon  the 
Southern  .States,  which,  left  mostly  to  their/selves,  were  called  t(j 
endure  afflictions  such  as  New  Jersey  had  experienced  durin.!^  previous 
campaigns.  The  comparative  independence  of  the  separate  States 
weakened  their  esseiiti.d  union,  and  the  jealousy  which  Con<,n-ess, 
reiiresentim^  the  States,  entertained  of  central  authority,  prevented 
that  prompi  confidence  in  the  counsels  of  the  Commandcr-in-cliief 
which  had  been  so  reliable  after  the  battle  of  Trenton,  and  which  wa.^ 


New 
more 
■ndins^ 
like 
)f  one 

t  lie  re 
)nlhs  ; 
1  :  ami 
Nortli- 
-,on  the 
lied    Ui 
rcvious 
J  States 
)ngres,s, 
cviMited 

n-cliief 

ich  was 


7«o.l 


JAM'Al.V     lO    JL'I.V. 


4.^9 


TI 


itulispeiisahle    to   [jetlera!    success. 

cxpresiiDiis  which  ilhi^tiMle  tin's  ciT^i-.  of  the  war. 


icse  ele-in'/nt.-i   iiad    im mora 


ble 


W 


isliin'.'lon  liuis  stales  llie  rn'-.t  difficult \ 


Ccr( 


am 


am,  unless 


ConL;ress  are   ve^lid  with   power-,  hy  the  separate  Stale  .,  competent 


to  th 


le  ;.;reat   purjxjscs  ol    war,  or  a-.-ume  tliem  as  a   matter  of  n;.;lit, 
and  llievand  the  Slates  act  with  more  cnerjAlh  m  th;;\'  h.ive  hilherlo 


(lone,  our   cause    1 


lo.t.      W 


e  can    no  loU'^cr  ( 


Iriid' 


•■e  alon.'  m  tlie  ohl 


w 


ay.      Hy  ill-limin;^   in   the   ailop! 


,f 


1)11   (jI    measures 


1)\-   del, 


I',-,   m 


tl 


le 


execution  ol 


llu-i 


n,  or  \)V  unw.irrau 


UhU 


jealousies,  \\i:  iiunr  ciiormcius 


ex[)enses   and    derive  no  be 


in 


fil    h'oin    tiiem.      (  )ne  slat 


e  will   i:umpl)- 


willi    a   reipiisilioii  (jf  Con;^ress ;  another   iie^decls   to    doit:   a    thin! 


executes  it    !))•  lialves 


and    all    dilfer   in   tlu'    manne'r,  lln:   matter, 


so  nuicli  in  point  of  t 


ime,  thai  we  are  always  worl.iir^  up  liil 


\ 


\  nil 


we 


sucli  a  s)sleni  ,is  the    present  one,  or   rather  w  ml  ol    one'  prevail 
sh.dl  ever  he  uiiahle  lo  appl_\'  our  streir^th  <ir  nvsources  to  any  athan- 


ta'/e.      ...      I 


see  one  army  1 
C(jn!jress  as  tin 


see    one  he-ad    ;4raduall\  clian;_;iii;^r    mlo  thirteen. 

f 


\ 


)raiichiii'.'  into   Ihirleeii,  winch  instcid  of   lookiii'''  up  to 


lUiiri.'ine  controlhn;,^  po,\i  r  o 


f  the-  I  'niled  SlaU 


are 


coiisitieriiiLj  ihemselves  a-    tle|jendeiil    upon   lluii    ropective    .Slat' 


t'oii-'re- 


lave'  already  scarcely  a 


power   lelt    hut 


sucli  as 


conceu'iis  f(jrei''n  Iraiisaciioii- 


f 


to  tile  army,  they  are  ,it    pre- 


i;nt 


little  more  than  tin;  medium  llirou;,di  which  it':  wants  are  coin-(,')-(d  to 


tin 


States.      'I'lii^    ho'dy 


nevi'r 


n.ul 


or    at    least   in  h;w  in-.liiices 


•ver 


■xercised  [)owers  adequate  U)  the  purj) 


.  c)|  war. 


n  a  wold 


th 


P 


owers  o 


f  ( 


on'j'ress  declinin 


LT  too  last    for   the    coiisideialioii 


ami  respect  which  are  due   to  tl 


lem  as    th 


e  '/rea 


.f  .\ 


merit, I,  atu 


1  I 


nil 


.ft) 


iilul  ol  t  ne  conse'<[uenc( 


Ui 


n:(|u,d  pay  .nid  bounties  continued  to  a;;;4i"avate  these  dilliculties 


t   represenlalive 


body 


mlil  W'.ishinvt 


A 


pr 


11,  so   t)lam 


on  wrote'  to  tin'  i'reside'iil  of  ('onj^ressoii  the  third  of 
1)'  ,111(1  une(juivocally  of  the  mutinous  s[)iril,  intense 
disi^nst  and  absolute  (les[)er.ilioii  of  his  sin. ill,  fimished  and  de'i)leted 
command,  that  a  committee  of  tiiree  was  appointed,  after  allot  debale, 
to    consult   with   him    .is  to  me.isures  <>(  reli- 


f.     !■: 


\'en   tills  advisory 


committee   \v;is    relncl.inlly  conceded.      M.  de    I  .a  \''er;^nc   wrote  on 
the    seveiiteenlh   of  April   lo  (Jouiit   Verc^enncs :   "It    was  s.iid    that 


this  ,ip[)oiiitmen 


t   of 


a  committee,  would  be'  puUiii;.;  too  much  jiower 


in  ,1  few  hands 


and 


csi)eci.illy  in  those  oi   ihe  ( ,omin,inder-iu-c 


hief ; 


lh.it  his  inlluencc  was  .already  too  threat  ;  that  even  his  virtues  .dlorded 
motives  for  alarm  ;  that  the  entiiusiasm  of  ihe  ,irmy,  joined  to  the 
kind  of  dictatorship  already  confided  to  him,  put  Conyress  and  the 


.i^'* 


m 


"'^•^•ii 


.1!* 


i\i 


■}'/* 


JAMAKN'     111    Jl   I.V 


[lyS. 


I' iiitcil  States  at  his  mercy  ;  tli.it  it  was  not  expedient  to  expose  a  man 
i>f  the  hi;.;he>t  virtues  to  siicli  temptations."  General  S(lm)ler,  then 
in   (  oni;ri^s,  Jolm  M.iUhiws  and  Natlianit  1    re.ilxid}' were  a])i)ointe(l 


Ih 


e  ((immittee. 


on 


In  .(letter  to  J.imes  i  )iiane,  (l.ited  M.i\' fourteenth,  \\'ashin;.;t 
s.i_\s  of  the  ajipnintme'nl  of  (ie'iier.il  Schuyler  upon  thi>  connnittc-', 
that  "no  ni.in  could  !)e  more  usi'iul,  (Vmn  his  jieiTect  knowlrdj^e  of 
tile  resources  of  the  (mintry,  t  he  ,ict  i\ity  of  hi-,  tem[)e'r,  his  fruit  fiil- 
iii'ss  of  exjiedieiits  and  his  ^nund  nniit.iry  sense." 

.As  a  I'csult  of  tlii>    coiilereiice  ,ind    the   i)ersintent   pre--uie  which 


the    C'lmni.inder-in-chief   broie.dit    to    lie.ir     upon    ( 'on;.',r'ss,    it 


was 


•tcrmiir  d  th.it  the  -oldiiis    p.iy  should    In'    e<piali/ed  :ind   more  s)'s- 


tem.itic  e'ffort^ 


ni.ide  to  recruit  and  m.unt.iin  the  ,n'm\' 


The  fu'st  six    months   of   1 1 


!'■    _\-e.u'   W'-re  jMtaiii.uly  tryin;4  hec.iib 


the    I'ii.iin   arm\'  w.is   unable   to   t.tke-  p.irt  in  tlu:  active-   operations  of 


the   Southern   cunuai'ii,  duriu'.;  the  occupation   f 


if  \eu-  ^■ 


ork    h\'  a 


superior  loice,  supported  h\'  ;ui  adeipi.ite  lleet.  'The  c.ipture  of 
( 'h.ii  lestoii,  and  another  invasion  of  \e\v  Jersey,  for  the  purpose.'  of 
cipturiuL;  the  Monistown  l.istness,  were  the  chie'f  milit.irv  events,  hut 
there  were  otliei    iiuidcnts  which  re'tiuire-  notice  hcjore    those    acli^Mis 


I 


"  '*'  S 


ilSLk, 


I    If 


hi ! 


I'     H 


t   4 


I  .'S   I     '-'A 


mi 


ree'el\e'  attention. 


(  )n   the  tw(  Ifth   of  I'^ehruary,  Conc^ress  .ifflrme'd   the   action    of  a 


lellef 


al  ( 'ourt  M.uti.il  \\] 


ncli   s'li 


li  !ued  Ar 


Hold,  then  commandiii'';  at 


I'hil.ideljihia,    to    he    reprimanded    for    iM\'iiu;    jmsscs    to  dis.'iffe'cted 

citi/e-ns  and  usin;,;  ])ul)lic  tr.msportation  lor   ])ii\  .ate  uses.  The  re])ri- 

ni.md  w.is   mildly   administeri'd,  but    ,\rno!d    w.is  ant;r\'.  Ili-'  life  of 
ostc  nt.itioiis  dis!)l,i\-,  wild  extr.iNM'j.i 


nce-  and  loose:  views  ot  nior.il  obli 


f: 


)bli 


t;;itioii  h.id  .irouscd  public  indi',ni.ation  ;   and  the  ch;ir;.;c's  which  would 
comp.iralivel)'   unnoticed    if  he-  had   observed    Republican 


;i\e'    heeii 


suiiplicit}',  wvvr   pressed  somewlial  stern!}',  because  of  suspicions  that 
lie  h.id  repeatedly  iiscd  his  official  posiiioii  fVir  piiv.ite  emolument. 

(ieiier.d  La  l'".i\'elte  returned  from  loMiice,  re.iched  Morristown 
on  the  twelfth  of  '.\l.i\',  was  received  w  itli  enthuH.ism,  and  broir^ht  the 
uelcoiiU-'  news  tli.it  ]''r,uu:e  had  detailed  the  Count  de  Ko(  hambeau 
with  a  l,irL;e  arin\-  to  ,iid  the  United  States,  and  the  first  division  was 
■  dready  oil  its  p,is-,,i;,;e.  Tlie  extraordinar\'  t.ict  of  this  officer,  cot  a 
little    aided    b\'  the   efforts   of  the    beautiful   and    eiithiisi.istic    .M.irie 


Antoinette,  h.t.d  achu  ved   tli 


IS  resu 


It 


and  with  wise  apnreci.ition  o 


the  difficult}'  of  real   harmony  between    I'rench  and   .\ni;lo-Americ,in 
troops,  lie  succeeded  in   seturins.j  such  instructions  from  l.ouis  XVI 


4: 


17^1. 


t li;it  .1  jar  of  iiUcrcst.  <>r 


JANUAkN'    I  I  1    |ri.\- 


(Illt\'  hit  Weill    t  he    alllc-i    si( 


49 1 


mcil  iini)r.i'i)ai)le. 


I  lie  tl'i  I'ips   \\  cl'c  t.<j    uhey   \\  ,isllin;,;t;)Il  :    tn  .lilmil   t  ln:   [)l  I'Ci'ilciU  C   ()| 


A 


Aiiiiiir.iii  ulliccrs  ot   ((lual  lain;  ;   mi 


f 


all  roiin.il 


ui  r.i^iMii'i  Id  \'n:iii  the 


n';.;iit  to  tin;  /Xnicn'iMii  ai'iii_\\  aiiil  Ii'mp  in  iniiiil  that  the  whujr  pur- 
pose uas  heailily  ami  clficuntl)'  to  ixcLiitc  tlu:  will  o|  tip'  Aiinrican 
(  oininaiulL'r-iii-e'hie'f."      'I'lif  only  diawback  \v,is  foiiiul    in  the  cntiicly 


ini|iicparci!  condition  of 


the    LJniteil    Slate,    I. 


f. 


)  nidviili'  lor  I  III  11    ,111)- 


nort,  and  to  larni^ii  an  ei|iii\'a 


K'lit 


ainu'  force,  so  as  to  m,d<e  tin;  piiiit 


operations  more  immedi.itely  elleetivi;. 

Lom;4  belore  their  airi\al  the  Aiii'  riean  arni_\'  had  lost  in  miinl)e-is 
even  more  tliaii  antic  i pat  ed  1))-  W'ashin;;!'  m,  in  his  report  ,drt;ady  cited. 
W'iiiU;  tile  call  from  South  I'.irolina  for  aid  heeame  more  and  more  ini- 
pc:rati\'(;  he  \\as  ciiinpc;llc'd  to  ;.;roan  in  spirit  ami  send  only  words  ol 
s}''ii])at  li_\',  instead  of  men  to  fe.dit.  '  )n  t  he  second  of  April  his  w  hoi i; 
force,  on  l)Mtli  side!-;  of  the  I  i  iid  on  live-r,  consisted  of  only  ten  llion  -and 
four  hundred  ranlc  and  li!c;  and  "I    the-c-    two  thousand  ei''ht   liundrc;cl 


liac 


1    hut  four  weeks  ti 


>  serve 


jicl  Uawdoii  took  two  thousand    fivi 


liimdrc;cl  ISri' i--li  and  llessians  to  reinforce  ( ieiier.d  (  iinton,  hut  nearly 
tweK'i;  thousand  rem;iiiiecl  heliind  ;  ind  whih:  this  wainin;.'  of  the 
piir[)osc;  of  the  I'ritish  c  <imni;i!idi;r  to  strike  will 
Charleston,  aroused  the  alarm  ol  Was  li  in '.'ton  for  the  file:  of  tlu;  Soutli- 


1    clecisi\'e   c;llort    at 


ern   campai;.Mi, 


lie  coiili 


1  not    lea\'c;  the   \ort! 


ic:rii  States  to  render  sid)- 


-taiitial   aid.       Tin;    .Mar\-l,md   divi-iou. 


howc;\'er,   the    I  )eki\\Mr(;   vc'i- 


nieiit    and   the    I''irst   .utilhuA',    \".itli    tln'    consent   of    (Joiv're 


S-,   wc;rc; 


dered  .South,   and  the  D.i'on    1  )c;    Kalh   was   instructed 


Id   leail  tnc 


troops  to  (  harlc-stou.      It  is   just   here  that  one  fact  in  the  stru'/'.de  fc 


meric.m    imiepenclence   slioiilcl    nave    s[)i;ci 


fic   notice;.      I""rom    1 77^'>. 


/  / "' 


Ijelore    I'xistoii,  and   tl.roii'.di   tin;   i  iitirc;    war.  the   st;ttes  cif  Marvland 


an 


d  Delaw.uc  were;  re  [ 


ireselltei  I   oil  near 


V  e\-er\-  hattle-fic;ld.     Altliomjh. 


or, 


their  t  loops  were  fewv   in   numhers  they  weic  distin^fuished   for  val 
so  that   th(;ir  failure  in  an   emer;^eiicy  w;is  a  sit.jn  of  ;_jrcat  peril,  or  of 
sonic;  over-mastering;"  sujieiiority,  or  panic. 

iiiit  it    w.is    not    oil    hatlle    fields,  north    or  south,  tliat    the  entire? 


interest  ol  the;  nciriod  com cntrate 


he;  southern  armv  was  iiuinc;ri- 


h 


call)'  u-e;,ik,  and  tlu;  northern  .irni}-  was  hi'n;;ry.  On  the;  twenty-lilt 
of  .M.iy  two  ( 'oiiiiecticMit  re;.;ime!its  mutinied,  declarin;,!;  that  tlic;y 
would  march  home,  "  or  at  least  ;^ain  sui^sistence  hy  tiie  [joint  cjf  the 
h,i)'onet."  Ilaiulhills  printed  in  New  \'ork  were  secrcti)'  circulated, 
urs^in-^  tlu;  soldiers  to  desert.  "  This  mutiny,"  sa\s  Wasliiiicjton, 
quite    imprcs.sivcly,    "  h.is    give  n    infinite    concern.     There    was     no 


.ii*'*-; 


u 


(4  •'(  f.  i  I 


!  :  •  ■  ;■ 

) 

V     1 

■     ^'•^' 

'■■1 

■i,  - 

' '  % 

it' 

■■■- , '    ■ 

.u  F-n- 


:»f 


492 


JAM  AUS'     Ml    JII.\- 


17S1) 


iiiDiicy  hut  (  nut  iiu'iit.il  papci-,  ami  adils,  "  //  /v  n'iiiiiitlv  iiii/<r(i<  liml'lr, 
Jrciiitlh  hniitiiisr  ijii,iii/i/ri/,>'('ti/i//i(/it!/i\/ii  /'ay  tliiiii  usinin/i  as 
7i'ottlif  HI, lie  nf'  lln  il,  1^1 1(  iittioi."  " 'I  liis  is  a  dci  isivc  iiioiiiciit ,  <>iic 
of  tlic  III!  1  t  ;    I   will    I'll    laitliir    ami    ^.,\y  ///r   him-, I     iin|j(  n  taut    Aiu<-iiia 

as    iiiadr   a   "loiiou^  flluit    tor  our 


lias  seen.       1  lie   t  (iiirl    ol'    l''raii( 


(!i'li\i  i.iiui',  and  it  w  f  di-.appoint  it  ■,  int(  ntiun  ,  1)\'  our  .-.upincnf  s,  vvc 
nuist  hciMiMf  c:ontrni|)t  ilijr  in  the  cn'c^  oj  all  uiaul.iiid  ;  nor  i  au  we 
aitir  \rntuic  to  inufidi.'  that  our  allic-.  will  |)ir-.i4  iu  au  ,ilt(ini)lt() 
fst;.l)li  ■\\  what,  it    will  appear,  we    w.iut    iucliiialiou  or  aiiility  lo  .issist 


tl 


KMU    Ml. 


(ii.'ucral    ( in-cuc,  then   <  Miartci  ula■^tl■r-</(•m■ral,   thu,  addressed   the 


oioMel     o 


f  the    Morristou  II    militia:   "   I  In  le   aii:    no   more    provisions 


lur  late  terrible  storm. 


C 

than  lo  serve  one  re'.'imeut  in  the  ma-ei/iiie 
the  de]ilh  oi  tile  suow,  and  till-  <liiil-,  in  ihe  roail  .  piiAcnt  the  litth,' 
■•tocl;  h'om  (.ouiiii;;  forward  wliii  h  i .  in  di  tant  ma;.',a/inei.  'Ihe  roads 
must  lie  l:ept  open  t)ythe  inhalii! ants,  or  the  aimycaii  not  lie  suh- 
si-t<'d.  I'nli-ss  tile  ;.;ood  people  lend  tluir  a.~-i-.lanee  to  forward  sup 
plies,  till  army  must  di  liaiid.  11  le  army  i.  strip]  jed  ualad  .  if  t(  am^ 
as  possible,  to  1(  -,sen  the  e<,u-aimpt  ion  of  fora;^e.      (  !all  to  your  aid  the 


d  eveiv    ot  1 


oversetMs   o|    lii;;liway^    .unl  eveiy   otiier   ordi  r  o!    men    wlio   i,\\\    ;.;ive 

dispateh  to  thi-i  hu-iuess." 

"  I'.  S.      ( i>\c  no  I  opies  of  this  for  fear  it  should  ;u;t  to  the  enemy." 
(ienei.il  <  iiei'iie    re-.i;.;)ied    liis   place    as   ( juartermasler-'Miieral,  hut 


er)Uti 


tinned   to   art    until  /\ii'.;ust. 


when    (j.louel  I'iclaniu'/    assume-i 


1  it^ 


duties.      lie  ile.ired  to  i.,in  the  soutlu.-ru  army. 

( )i1  tlie  thirteenth  ot  June,  ( 'oiv.u'ess,  without  consulting;  Wasliin;;- 
toil,  appointed  ( ii'Ueial  <  iates  to  the  command  of  the  Southern  I  )epart- 
ment.  lie  had  spent  tlie  winter  at  lii^  iiome  in  Vir;.nui;i,  luit  ca;.;erly 
aci'epted  this  iiis_di  commaml.  Ills  old  lonfldaiit  and  companion 
in  arm;,  Charles  Lee.  senteiitiously  forewained  iiim  on  his  departure; 


ak'c  care 


that 


vou  do  Dot   (^\•cll.ln'a■    noiUieni  laurel-    for  southern 


willows. 


'W 


hm*. 


'\^ 


it   trf 


*.^ 


1  ,ih 


iji  j' 


CIIM'II'.R    I, XIII. 


SOMTll    (  AIOM.INA    AM)    NI.W   JI.KSi:V    I  \  VAI  )i:i ). 


.(;!•;  OF 


I  II AKI.I.SIoN.    r, A  T  I  I.M  ni 


i\(;ni:i.i>.    ly';'^. 


c 


■.Xl.KAI.  (  I.!.\  i  (  ).\   led  New  V<>y\:  I  )>'Oiiil)' r  t  ■.vonly-.i\-t.li, 


I 


mliT    j.iir    iiiDiTii  .1',  he    ImiI  a  v<iy 


I'll.'    Ol      () 


Illy  ten  il.iy 


i,.  I 


iii'i;  Mini. 


Ill-   ell    iiid    llir   ice   of   the   liaihnr    uilll'Jilt    ililfuultN',   .111(1 


llic   \\-|li 


llrcl     •.<,!; 


IllKlcl     \\il\', 


a  li'W  (1.1>'S 


the  \'v(:atlli:r    provi' 


f.ivorabli; ;  tlii:  ailmiial  lr,\   liu-  van,  .iiid  kciil   in   .li'in-,  hut.  llii- 


if  fort  I 


line  was  not    >;ilii(;iiiil  Iv'  i)riinan(:nl  to  "ivc  a  lortiiiialc  Icniiiiia- 


t  ion  to  the  v()\  ,1' 


A 


■accession  ol   st  olllls  (li  ,])(M-cil   llu;   licet. 


'  t;  \v 


sliijis  arrived  at  '1  \l)cc,  in  (icor;oa,  Ik  fore  the  end  o|  January.      .Some 
v\('re  taken,  other-,  seii.iiated,  one  (n-dn.Liice  vi-ssi-1  loniidend,  most  ol 


tlu-  .irtilhr)',  ,ind  ii//  tin-  c.tv.dry  iiorsirs  ] 


pen  ilii-( 


coioiic- 


.ineion  s  hi u 


I  1 1-(  1)1(1  ol  the  vo)'.i:_ 


1.      .Sncli  i-,  1  .ieuleii.tnt- 
1 1  isLorv  of  lli( 


1  11    Ills 


Cinip.iij^ns  <»!'  17S0  .md  17.S1,"  in;  say: 


II 


f  ll 


le  riclinc^-i  ol  the  comitr\ 


its  vitinity    to    ( i(-oi-;_da,  ,ind    its    dist.iiice    Iroiii    (ieiicr.il  \V'.i^hin;;toii, 


pointed   out    the   .•idv.tnt.i 
would  hi;  .'in    ui!s|)e,ik,d)le 


,.Ms  .111(1    f.K  ility   of  its  (iiiKiiu-st.      W 
loss  to  the-  ,\i 


iicrK:;iiH,  the   i)ossession 


UJe     It 

,f  It 


Wol 


lid  t(;nd  to  s(;curc  to  the  crown  the  scjutherii  p.irt  of  the  (-ci!ini;nt 


which  stretclit-s  heyoiid  it. 


Ti 


u;  Ihitish    troops  1 


n.ide    i'vhec"  Isl.ind,  n(;;ir  Sa\ann.i 


h,  tl 


leir   Mrs 


rcndc/A'ous,  hut    W(;n:  iiii.i 


hie   t 


o  l(-,iv(- 


f()r    .S(juth    (Jarijlin.i   until    ll 


tL'iith   of   February,  l.uidiiv.r   on  .St.  John's  Isl.uid,  thirty    miles    hclow 
Charleston,  on  the  following;  d.i)-. 

ch  .iccomuanied  Gener.il  Clinton    con-^iited   of  th( 


Tlu;  tr 


roops    will 

followin<^  coininands,  .and  were  rt-ported  .'U.  the  time,  at  Condon,  to  he 
of  the  strength  now  indicat(;d.  'I'hc  st.itemeiit  is  L;iven  ;  hut  so  ni.'iny 
ruHiid  iminlhrs  iiidic;itc  error. 


(ht  Iiit'.iniry 800        Queen's  K.nn^-ci 


200 


( ir(;n;uii(:rs     ,     .     , 
Seventh  Keyiinent 


9110        (iiiidcs  . -111(1  I'iDiH-crs 150 

4uu         K.uuiiiig's  CJ>r|)s i(-)o 


i"  It 


|.i"*r 


f 


'%_ 


,  .its; 


maai 


4iy,|  S'H   III   i,\i;iii\\   AM'  \l.\v    ll.K^i  \    i\\  \hi  n.  I17H0. 


r'Ariily-lliii'l  K'  ;;iiiiciil 
Tliiiiy-lliinl 

|ul(\.-,Ci   1)11(1  " 

Si\i\-llunl 

.Sl\l\-l'MHlll 

lilill.sll  l,r''iiMi    .      .      .      . 


.y>> 


jij<. 


I  \r  --,1,111   (  III  ll.lilll  ts lOX) 

I'  I  I  '.Ml  .nil-,  (    .11  j)  ,  .        .        ,       , 

S'  1  'iIhI    I  |r-,  .l.lh    [<■  :;iiiii-lil    .       . 

\.K\'r 

Hull  ,li  Aiiilli-i  V 


>S(i<> 


■\'n\M 


75i'>- 


I,i(  iitcii.mt  lull  hkI    I'.iilctiiii    -,;,itcs    (li.it    tr.iii->|)'irt,itioii   w.is   prti- 

\iilril   I'M'  •■\'_'\\\    tlliill-^, 111(1    Uvr   liuinilrd    lll'll  ;    .IMil    til, it    i,  tlii:   nuiiilx.T 

iMiii  r.illy   It  |)Mrtf(!   .is  i  nmiccti  il   with    tli'-   ixpi'lili'iii    prior  to  rt.-in 
loucniciil^   Vi-(. civcil    fiDiii  s.iv.mii.ili  ;iiiil  .\cw  N'orJ,;. 

Adiiiir.il  Ailnit  hunt  1 111  iii  ^In-i  I  t  he  i '  iii\-i  p\ ,  1 1  )ii-,i  ^t  iir;  of  t  he  I'lii(i>|)c. 
>>.\;  Kii.^cl  ~.|  ;  KmIju  t'  ,  ;■.)  ;  I  )(ri,iiuc. '>.(  ;  l'I.,iiii»iial)lc,  64  ;  K'.nnwii. 
iC)  ;  koiiiuhi-,,  .14;  km  hiu  1;,  I  I  ;  Hlipiuli',  :;_'  ;  I'crseiis,  3.:  ;  ('.iinill.i, 
Jo;    K.ilci;_;h,  _'S  ;    k  u  hnii  HH  I,   ^^' :    \'ir;.Mni,i,  jS. 

The  Iiiitih  tiiiii|i.  \Mii-  ])riiiii|i',  ly  t  r,iii~.rcn'c(!  to  J.iini",  IsKiiid. 
then  I  h  I.-,!  (1  SluiH)  and  ,\-,hIc_\'  ii\'iTS,  .mil  timk  pn^itiini  .uioss  tin- 
ii.iriiiw  iic(  1,;  1)1  Iwccn  the  .\--hli)-  ,ind  ("i)i>]);r  rivcix,  wlicrc  they 
(.•slal)li-.iir(l  thv'm-.(;lvc>  on  tin-  twdUh  of  .M.U1.I1.  Il  will  he  itotiicd 
by  r<  Il  uiu  (-■  to  ni.ip.  "Si(:;.;c  ol  (  h.irlf^toii,"  tint  tin:  |)oss('siion  ot 
W'.ippOo  (I'crl-;  cn.ihlcd  the  l'.ii!i-,li  troops  to  ii-,c  -,nMll  ho.it^  I"! 
tr.in--lcnin;4  troop-,  to  the  .\ -hli  y  v\v>\\  without  eiiti;iin;;  the  h.irhoi 
from  the  siM.  .Mcuiw  liilc,  the  liriti-,!!  licet  had  been  ordered  to  silenci' 
I'ori  .Moultrie,  ,ind  loiie  .m  entranci'  t()  the  inner  h.i)'. 

'I  he'  narriioi)  of  the  i  it\'  did  not  exceed  t  wo  thoiis.md  two  hniidi  ed 
rc;,MiIars  and  one  thou^.iiid  militia,  when  (leiier.il  ('linton  ero^si  d  tin- 
Asliley  ;  hut  he  ih  i.i)'ed  hi>  adv.nu'e  upon  the  ril\'  for  two  week^,  so 
tliat  the  troop,  under  ( ii.ner.il  I'atter-ioii,  who  h.id  been  ordert'd  to 
join  iiini  hoin  .Sav'.mn.ih,  lonld  arri^'e  .iiid  inak'e  iii-,  loi'ce  equal  to  .my 
c<)iitiri;.;eiKy  of  .stubborn  re^ut  nice  1)}'  the  Aineric.in  troops,  (gov- 
ernor kulle-d;'e  ji.id  ii.u.lu  (i  (  ii.irlest oil,  haviii;.,^  dist:retion.ir_\'  .luthor- 
ity  from  the  .St.ite  to  act  accordiiv.;  to  hi-,  own  will  in  all  inalt(.'r.s  ol 
cs.seiuial  concern  ;  .ind  (jeii'iMl  Lincoln  w.is  in  lonim.md  of  tin;  [,;,ir 
rison.  It  .ippi:.irs,  Iroin  docimicnt.uy  d.it.i,  til. it  the  retention  of  the 
city  was  principally  owini;  to  the  tlcm.ind  of  the  inhabit. ints,  since  the 
nee;lcct  to  .intici|).itc  an  attack  from  liie  land  side  li.id  prevented  the 
completion  of  thoiou^^hly  defensive  works;  ,'uid  it  w.is  cle.irly  ,in  error 
to  ret.iin  tlie  town  with  inadeipi.ile  forces,  (.ionunodore  \\'hii)ple  of 
the  American  n.iv)-  lelt  stioiii^  confidence,  not  sh.ired  b_v  W'.ishiiv^ton. 
that  lie  could  prevent    the    15riti-,h   ships   fnjin  crossin;.;  the  b.ir  ;  and 


I7«"i  SDinil    CAlMil.lN A    AM)    M:\V    Jl'kSI-V    1N\M)I.I'. 


V)l 


1 1 K I  iiiui  li  ( (iiihdciicc  w.is  i'i|)i)  ,i:il  in    the  cij)  u  it  v  dI   i'urt    MmiiIi  rii-  to 
111. lint. till    it,    '.'i)i)il    ii'CDi'il,  .illlioii  'li    it    li.ul    l)c<'ii   ,ii!i)ucil  t')    !)!■(  Mine 


;ilniii-,t    wiitiilc V,    liDin    ncjlcit        I'lu:    lev    vi 


at  lii  .  I  \\'!iii)|)l 


\r  I  ii  I  iM|i>    nuniin.ii 


I\-  .|  |.  hut    IIP  Mini  111;;  (iiily 


Cumin. mil,  cnii-.i  ,t  fi\  i<\    t 

Jf)  iMiiii  ;    the  I'mvuliMK  !•    .iinl    l'>o,t  on,  c.uii     ^J  ;,;iiii^  ;    t  hr  <  Jnr.-n 

l''iMiuc,  .!.S  ;    l/.\vciilnrc  .iiitl     I 

(  Ti.lKT.ll     I  j'luohi,  cu  h 


iml     liuitc,   cull    jO'Min-,;    thr  k.iir-i  r  .md 


K)     'Mill  ,,    ,1111 


1    the    NlMtiv    I), 


mil-    1(1     I  1-    'Mill-.. 


Ui'^r  well-  II 


luiin-il  bi.'twi'cn  .Siilhv. Ill's  ULnul  .iinl  thr  ninlilli-  ;;riMmil, 
pn-viou-.l)'  iPiticnl  ( )n  tiir  t  \\'..'ntii:ti\  ul  M-iiiii  'in-  l'>iiti-,h  ^iinnlrmi 
safely  crnsM'd  the  h.ir,  ,mil  the  Ameiic.m  lleet  retiicil.  With  the 
e\eej>l.iipn  ul  t  lii-  iv.ii 
liivei,  hetu  cell    t  lie  lit  \-  aiii  1  Sliiiti'-.  I'dIIv;   ami    tin-   "iiii-,,  -.ti):r,  am 


i"<:r,  J' 


),  the  Ameiie.in  slii])->  \s  eTe-  .imlc  in  (Ji)ii[ier 


men     Here     tr.md'eiieil     tu      the    ut\'    iletell 


alliA".  were    lil.n  (  il    111   Mil 


ll 


ii     K.Lii'i  r   ,mil   t\\i» 


Id.iiH!  I  li.mnel  lu  keep  ni)  LDimmmKaliDiit 
with  'ill-  iMimtiy  math  of  (.'li.iile  .Idii. 

'  )ri  the  se\'e'iilli  1)1  April  (iem.T.il  W'Dinirurd  oro-;-,ed  ("noper  i\i\-er, 
and  joined  the  ;,eirii^<)ii  with  M.-veii  Imndred  \'ir  dni.i  truop-,,  li.uin;..j 
m.idc  a  ioree'd  man  h  dI  ne,iii_\-  fu'e  Imndred  miles  in  t  hiil) 


1\'  d.i\-..       1' 


:\ 


nieneaii-.  st 


till    let.mi  ■(!  ,1    pi)  A    ,lt    .MmiH-.'s  ( 


)iner  ;   ,md    1  lie   ■'.iiri  .1)11 


depended    wIidII)'    n  pi  ill    that   .sei  t  ion    i  if  the   St.lt  e    till'  ilipplli-.,   alt  el    the- 

Nei'lv  e.ime  into  the  po^-.e's',ioii  ol  llnte-li  Iroup-..  ( ii  ner.d  Clinton 
thoroiedil)'  nndeistood  ln\  po-,ition,  hut  still  auaited  the  arrival  ot 
(leiier.d   I'.ittei  ^oii. 


At 


oil''  o  I  |i  H  I;  I  ll 


1    tin;  ninth,  Admiral  Arhnthnut  wei'died   .iiuhor, 


leadiii'.'  with  thr  Koehui  k,  tolluwed  ill  older  hv  the   Kichmond,  Ron 


ulu-,  blonde,  vir.Mui.i,  k.dei'iji,  .s.mdwich,  arnie'd  '-nip,  .md  the  Ive- 
iiown,  .and  p.i-.M-d  i'oit  .Moultrie'  with  .i  lo^-,  of  oiiU' tua.-nt)' levni  urmi, 
\\illiout  stoppiii;;  I'll-  its  lire;,  .md  (.anie'  to  .iiichor  off  l'"ort  Join  oi 
which  ll. Ill  heeii  ,d).mdone'd.  "  The  Aretus  ordii, nice  ship  [.rrmmded 
and  w.is  hurned.      'V\\v  K ii  hiiioiid'h  fi)retoi)-mast  w.is  shot  ,iwa\' ;   souk; 


^  rt        .1 


daniaL;c    w,is  done    to  the  m.t-.ts  .imi    ri'^'iiii'^  ol    the  other  \ 
their  iiiills  Mil'fered  hut  sli'ditls'.' 


cssels,  iJLil 


General   Lincoln    had   toiifidv  " 


expected    that  the   |):o(.  l.imatioii 


of  (iener.al  Kut  led'^e,  .md  the;.;r  '.'mer;.;enc\'  which  threateiietl  tie 
city,  would  hriiir  ,i  lar;.;er  torce  ■  >  the  defense,  hut  he  was  tlii.ii)- 
Ijointed. 

Geiier.d  I'.ittersoii  marched  for  (^h.irlestoii  ahout  the  middle  of 
March  with  tw-lve  hundred  men.  He  was  joined  hy  1  .ieutt-nanl- 
coloiiel  Tarletoii  ne.ir  I'ort  l"i.o_\-al.  This  officer  h.ul  parti, dly  re- 
iiiumiled   Ills   (lra;^oons,  and  Major  Cochran    with    the   leyion   infantry 


* 


1 


m 


U  J' 


I  I 


II 


•liri 


I  t 


1  trr    -     i    I, 


i  !' 


.\0(i 


SltUril    (  .\K(>1,IN.\    AM>    Ms'A     |1,I<M;N-    I\\A1i|;I). 


[I7S0 


.111(1  M.iiiir  I'"ri;^u-^i)M's  rinciuiii,  Inrmcd  ,111  .ulililioiMl  toivi:,  to  in.ikt; 
till"  rciiil(ii\  cinriit  iinporl.int  lo  (Iciu  r,il  ('liiiton's  siicicss. 

Sovi'i.il  •.kinnisiu's  oiiiii  ird  as  tlu\-  a|)|)i  n.u  licil  (."li.irK'sldii,  in  oiif 
lit"  which  ('i)l()ntl  Willi. till  W'.isli  l',1<mi,  willi  I'ul.iski's  ci>i|)s,  niaiid's 
liLjht  lioisr,  ,111(1  .1  (l(.'ta(.liiiu-iit  of  i\  ;4iil.ir  c.ivaliy,  ;_;aiiu(l  diiidcdi  ifdit, 
tapt  uriiiL,'  Liciilcnaiit  (.  ol'Mii'l  ilamiltiui  o!  llic  Xortli  ('arohii,!  I'r  i- 
viiK'ial^  .111(1  s. line  dthcr  ])n-^()iu'rs.  i'ai  Ktmi  ^ays,  "  I  lu;  alTair  nidivl 
willi  C(|ual  Id-.s  to  l)otli  |iarliL'>."  (."oliuiil  \\'a-.iiiii;.;loii  \\,is  tiuii 
attaclu'd  to  (iiiui.il  lluya'i's  coiiim.uui,  uliii.li  Min-,i--lcd  of  tlu'  c.iv- 
.iliy  ahi'.id)-  ii.iiiuil  aiul  soiiic  iiiilili.i,  with  inaihiii.iildi  at  Monk's 
(.'oiiKT,  tliiilx'  iiiiKs  dist.int  iVoui  ihv  (.ity.  I  jcntLiiant-i.  ojoiui  \\'(1>- 
slcr  with  tuiiitv'cii  liiindri.(l  men,  (.•oiisistiti;.;  of  tlu'  Thirl)  lliiid  .md 
Si\l\'  fourth  I'liili-li  iutaiitr)-,  .H(.i  iniianicd  liy  I'arlclon's  and  r\r;^u- 
M)ir>  iiiountcd  iiu'ii,  inarched  on  the  lliirt(-'eiuli  ot  .Xpiil,  surprised 
the  post,  aiiil  eaptuied  one  iuindred  ofticers  and  men,  tour  hundre'd 
horses,  and  I'llty  \\aL;ons  lo.ided  with  anus,  clothiiiL;  .md   .mmumition. 

(  >ii  till.'  tvventy-ninlli,  Admiral  Arhiithnot  formed  a  hi  i;.;,ide  o*"  ;',vc 
hundred  seamen  .md  mariiU's  under  Captains  IhuUon,  Order  aiul 
(  iamhier,  wliii  li  I.ukK  d  at  dayhreak',  .it  Mount  I'leas.int.  This  com- 
pelled the  Americans  to  .ihatidon  lluir  position  at  L'l'aiipi  ics  roint, 
Willi  a  loss  of  ne.irl)-  a  hundred  mvn,  who  u  ere  capturetl  h)'  the  !.;u.ird- 
ho.tts  of  the  lleet.  while  retirin;4  to   C  harlestoii. 

t  )i)  liic  lonrth  of  May,  ('apl.iiiis  I  1  udsuii,  (lanihier  .ind  Kiiowk-s 
l.mded  l)efore  (layli;_;lil  upon  Sullivan's  Island,  with  two  luiiuhx'd 
seaineii  and  marines,  and  llie  Lfarrison  ot  l'"ort  Moultrie  surrendered. 

(iroimd  had  lieeii  broken  on  tiie  iii;;ht  of  the  lust  of  .\])ril,  at  .1 
distance  of  ei;^ht  hundred  j-.irds  from  the  Americ.ip  lines,  .md  011  the 
tenth  . I  summons  w. is  sent  to  (leiier.il  l.incoln,  demandinL'.  the  sur- 
render of  the  city.  This  was  promptly  refused,  ,ind  by  the  nineteenth 
the  secoiul  p.irallel  was  opeiu'd  at  a  distance  oi  only  lour  luiiulrcd 
and  fift}'  \-ards.  The  American  iletachmcnt  at  l>i|^;4iiis'  l.irid|^c,  over 
tlu't'ooiier  Ki\er  a  few  miles  above  (.'harlesto.i,  w. is  also  dispersed, 
and  upon  the  arri\al  ot  reinforcements  from  Ww  \'ork,  /\pril  the' 
ciiditeenth,  la'euten,int-L;ener.il  ("ornw.iUis  took  comm.ind  upon  the 
north  bank  of  tli.it  ri\-er  and  closed  all  communication  between  the 
city  ;uul  the  loimlr)-  ailjacent. 

On  the  sixth  of  May  ihv  third  par.illel  w.is  occupied  and  prepara- 
tions were  111. ule  for  an  .iss.iult. 

]{)■  reference  to  marj^inal  notes  upon  the  map,  the  relative  posi- 
tions of  the  American  batteries   will  be  uiuleistood.      Two  rows  of 


I7S. 


M    II[    f.M^Ol.INA    ANT)    \i:\\    JI'.kSl'A     IN\  \l)i:ii 


497 


ab.itis,  .1  cloubK:  picki.'tctl  (liU:li  .mil  mvi.'imI  H(li)iil)l  ^  iio^scd  Ix't'iiic  tlitr 
town,  coniU'Ctiiv^  thi--  sw.iini)s  tli.it  skirted  the  cil\'  on  l)nth  rivers,  .md 
a  cMii.il  was  still  tuitlnf  advaiucd  hrlorc  tiiesi',  inakiir^  a  wcl  <liu  li. 
'I'lic  tliiid  iliitisli  |Mialli  I  tappid  this  dilili  ami  it.  ua^  at  oiui;  cin\- 
vntcd  iiild  .1  siiii'  C'lvcT  I 
al)atis. 


or  pit-.sm;4  iiioix-  ijosrl)'  upon  tlic  liius   ( 


if 


'riicre  was  no  loti;^'cr  any  hope  of  siiccessfiil  resistance.     'The  ;.jitns 


w 


ire  disnionnled,  thi'  works  ui-re  in  rnins,  and  on  the  twelfth  of  M 


ly 


Major-|.M'neral    I-eslii;  took   [)i)ssession  til    tiie  eity,   undiM"  iioiiorahlc 
terms  of  Miirendcr. 

rile    Puili^h   ea^iialties,  as  repnited  liy  (iciieial  ("liiitoii,   M,i\'  thir- 
1ei;ntli,    wei'e    sc\'ent \'-siv    killed    and    one    luindi'ed   ,md   ci'dils'-niiu" 


WOIMK 


led.       The    A 


nuruan    casualtns    weir    neaiK'   the    same. 


11 


le 


•-elieduli-    of  prisoiurs    reporti-d    1)\-    heputy    Adjnlant-i^eiier.il    Johi 


\  l!i/li 


maile  an  aL"/re'.Mte  of  |'i\'i 


noi 


i>and   six  huiuln.'d  and  ei'dit 


een 


nun,   wliuh    m 


fiet 


meluded    ail    male    titi/.ens. 


the  ( 'ontini-ntal 


troops,  inelndiut;  five'  hundred    in    hn,pitai,  did  not  exeeed  two  thou- 


sand  men. 


I  he  citi/ens,  as  well  as  the  niiliti.i,  were  treated  a«  prisoners 
on  parole,  and  were  allowed  to  leturn  home,  wliili-  tlu:  ( "ont  ineiital 
troops  aiui  seamen  wv.w.  retained  as  prisoners  of  \\\i\\  iiuludin';  the 
Lieutenant  dovernor  and  five  of  the  couneil.      I'diir  liundied  and  five 


)ieees  of  ordn.uiee,  larL'e  and   small,  were  .imou"'  the  ae(|uisition->  ol 


the  e.iplnre, 


At  til  is   time  ('oloiud    lUiford    with  three  hundred  and  eie^lity  \'ir- 
t;inia  re:.Milars  and   two   field   (lieces  was  (■/i  rciffr    for  Ciiarli'stoii,  but 


npoi 


1    heariii"    of   its   eauluri'    lu-    fell    baek  towards    .\orth    ('.irolina. 


oineil   1)\'  ( 'olone 


W 


isliinLTton   and   the    few  of  his  eavalr\'  who  had 


I'seani'd    iio 


111   the   affair  at    Monk's    ( 


oiner. 


Imniediatelv   alti'r  tli 


-ui  reiuK-r,  (ieneral  Clinton   sent   Lieutenant  (aiiv^^jer  uj)  the  .S.ihida  to 


Ninet)'-six  (see  map  of  '•  (  )perations  in  Southern  .Statt 


)  and  Faeu- 


leiiant-eolon 


r.irlcton  with  one  h 


undri'd  and  se'Venty  dra|_;oons,  one 


ider  ;_;iin,  to  iiur-^ue  ( 


liundrcd  mounted  infantr\'  .and  a  tlirc:e   poii 

lie!    Knfoi'd.      In    a   forced    mareli    of   twenty-four  hours    he    icaelied 

Ku^M'ly's  Mills,  !)e\'ond  (."amdiMi,  and  by  three  o'eloek  of  the  afternoon 


)Vertook  the  .\nierica 


ns  on 


the  bank  of  the  W'axh.iw.      A  messeiiijer 


was  sent  in  advance,  exat^L^eratiiiL;  the   pursuini;  force,  an 


il  ilema 


luliiu 


a  surrender,  w 


hi-h 


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action,  threw   them   into   disorder  and  committed  great  havoc.      His 
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S(H:TH   CAROLINA    AM)   NKW   JKKSKV    INVADED. 


[1780 


report  gives  the  American  casualties  as  one  hundreii  and  thirteen  killed, 
one  hundred  ami  fift\-  wounded,  mtablc  to  travel,  and  fift\--three  piison- 
ers.  (ieneral  Clinton's  report  states  the  number  of  killed,  at  one 
hundred  and  seventy-two.  The  Hritish  casualties  were  two  officers 
and  three  privates  killed,  one  officer  and  fourteen  privates  wounded, 
eleven  horses  killed,  and  nineteen  wounded.  Colonel  Tarleton 
says,  "a  report  anion;^  the  cavalry  that  the\-  had  lost  their  command- 
xwz,  officer  (.when  his  horse  was  shoti  stimulated  the  soldiers  to  a  vin- 
dicti\'e  asperil)',  not  easily  restrained  ;  but  the  wounded  of  both 
parties  were  collected  with  all  possible  disp.itch,  were  treated  with 
equal  humanity,  were  placed  at  the  neii;hboring  plantations  and  a 
meetiny-house,  and  sur^^euns  were  sent  for  from  Charleston  and  Cam- 
den to  assist   them." 

The  inauL,airation  of  a  bitter  partisan  warfare  at  once  began  ;  and 
on  the  twentieth  of  June  at  Ramsour's  Mills,  in  Lincoln  County, 
North  I'arolina,  a  party  t)f  Whig^,  distinguished  by  white  paper  on 
their  hats,  and  a  part\'  of  Tories  wearing  twigs  of  pine,  had  a  decully 
encounter,  where  acquaintances  and  old  neighbors  fought  until  nearly 
three  hundretl  were  killed  or  wounded. 

On  the  third  of  June,  two  days  before  his  departure.  General 
Clinton  issued  a  proclamation,  "  requiring  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Province  of  South  Carolina,  including  prisoners  on  parole,  to  return 
to  their  allegiance,  or  be  treated  as  rebels  to  the  government 
of  the  king."  It  was  based  on  the  assumption  of  restored  suprem- 
ac\- ;  it  ignored  the  terms  of  honorable  surrender  ;  it  set  at  naught 
all  sound  military  policy,  and  quickened  the  energies  of  the 
people  to  fresh  assertion  of  independence.  Its  key  is  found  in  the 
hasty  and  enthusiastic  communication  of  (jeneral  Clinton  to  Lord 
Germaine,  which  saj's,  "  The  inhabitants  from  every  quarter  declare 
their  allegiance  to  the  king,  and  offer  their  services  in  arms.  There 
are  few  men  in  South  Carolina  who  are  not  either  our  prisoners,  or 
in  arms  with  u<." 

In  following  General  Clinton  to  New  York,  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  th<,'  mutinous  spirit  which  had  been  evoked  in  the  American 
army  through  actual  famine,  had  been  misinterpreted  by  the  Britisli 
officers  at  New  York,  and  th.it  on  the  sixth  of  June,  General  Knyp- 
hausen  with  Generals  Mathews,  Tryon,  and  .Sterling,  with  five  thou- 
sand troops,  crossed  from  Staten  Island  to  Elizabethtown  Point,  for 
the  purpose  of  cooperating  with  any  movement  which  might  favor 
the    restoration  of   British  si:premacv,  or  afford  a  prospect  of  a  suc« 


[I /So 


ip'^ 


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M*;i 


>li 


.ft'  li^ 


■f»,i 


t  1:  '■ill 


■  I 


4n'^'^ 


173.).] 


SOUTH   CAROLINA   AND   NKW   JKRSEV    IXVADF.n. 


499 


cessful  attack  upon  Morristown  itself.  General  Sterlincj  adx-anccd 
before  cla)'li;4ht  toward  Rlizabcthtown,  but  fcnind  that  the  militia 
were  on  the  alert.  An  American  sentry  fired  into  the  advancing  col- 
umn while  it  was  only  dimly  distinguishable  before  daylight,  and 
General  Sterling  received  the  shot  in  his  thigh,  which  ultimately 
proved  fatal.  He  was  carried  to  the  rear,  and  (ieneral  Knyphausen 
took  his  place  at  the  froiit.  Hy  this  time  the  sun  had  risen,  and 
the  r<;giment  of  Colonel  Rlias  Dayton  began  to  assemble,  falling 
back  slowly  however  bci  )re  the  advancing  Hritish  troops.  A  squad- 
ron of  Sinicoe's  Queen's  Rangers  followed,  leading  the  British 
and  Hessian  infantry.  As  by  magic,  the  militia  appearctl.  Fences, 
thickets,  orchards,  houses,  and  trees  were  made  available  for  single 
riflemen,  and  the  column  suffered  constant  loss.  Stedman  says, 
"  a  mutinous  spirit  had  certainly  discovered  itself  among  the 
soldiers  of  the  American  army,  but  arose  from  distress,  and  not 
from  disaffection.  The  British  commander  experienced  a  grievous 
disappointment.  Instead  of  being  received  in  the  Jerseys  as  friendly, 
the  militia  very  gallantly  turned  out  to  ojjpose  them.  During 
the  march  from  Elizabethtown  to  Connecticut  l-arms,  a  distance 
of  only  seven  miles,  they  were  annoyed  by  parties  of  militia  the  whole 
way.  When  the  British  troops  approached  Springfield,  a  detachment 
from  that  army  which  was  represented  to  be  mutinous,  was  seen 
drawn  up  in  force  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  to  dispute  their  pas- 
sage." As  Colonel  Dayton  fell  back,  lie  found  that  General  Max- 
well's brigade  was  ready  to  support  him,  and  a  vigorous  skirmish  was 
maintained  until  the  enemy  brought  artillery  to  the  front  as  well  as 
additional  troops.  The  village  of  Connecticut  Farms  was  burned, 
including  the  church  and  parsonage,  and  the  wife  of  Chaplain  Cald- 
well was  killed  by  a  bullet.  Irving  says,  "  The  tragical  fate  of  Mrs. 
Caklwell  produced  almost  as  much  excitement  throughout  the  country 
as  that  which  had  been  caused  in  a  preceding  year  by  the  massacre 
of  Miss  McCrea."  Like  that  event,  however  sad,  it  could  not  be 
charged  to  the  account  of  the  British  commander. 

General  Knyphausen  advanced  within  half  a  mile  of  Springfield, 
and  halted,  to  determine  the  wisest  plan  of  action.  The  whole  coun- 
try seemed  aror-sed.  General  Maxwell  was  on  the  bank  of  the  Rah- 
way.  On  the  short  hills  in  the  rear,  Washington  was  posted  in  force. 
The  smoke  of  beacon  fires  spread  the  progress  of  the  alarm  and 
throughout  the  country.  When  night  came  on,  dark  and  rainy  as  it 
was,  the  fire^  still  blazed  with  increasing  numbers,  and  the  deep  boom 


# 


I*  .?i' 


h 


W 


mn-  \' 


1  %  ^*» 


I 


:oo 


SOUTH    CAROLINA    AND    NIAV    THKSKV    INVADKD. 


[lyfio. 


,*:i 


m' 


of  the  alarm  i^nns  on  the  niouiitaiiis  warned  the  people  far  and  wide 
that  every  man  who  had  a  s;un  was  wanted  at  once.  Before  mornnig 
the  Hessian  taMieral  attempted  to  rei^ain  Staten  Island  ;  but  the  tide 
was  out,  and  the  whole  shore  was  covered  with  deep  mud,  which  the 
cavalry  could  not  cross.  Stcdman  sa\s,  that  "  It  was  determined  for 
the  credit  of  the  Hritish  arms  to  remain  some  days  lon^ijer  in  New 
Jerse\-,  lest  their  i)rccipitate  retreat  should  be  represented  as  a  fliL^ht." 
Such  considerations  could  hartlly  have  controlled  the  actions  of  a 
veteran  soldier  like  Lieutenant-i^eneral  Knyph.uisen.  As  early  as  the 
first  of  June  he  had  learned  of  the  capture  of  Charleston,  and  that 
General  Clinton  was  to  return  to  New  York,  which  was  a  |^ood  base 
for  an  advance  upon  Morristown.  He  therefore  strengthened  his 
position  and  awaited  the  arrival  of  his  superior  officer. 

Washington  wrote  on  the  tenth  that  "  their  movements  were 
mysterious,  and  the  d.^sign  of  the  movement  not  easily  penetrated." 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were  few  movements  during  the  war  which 
bore  so  directly  upon  the  safety  of  the  American  army  and  the  gen- 
eral cause,  as  the  operations  of  the  British  army  before  Springfield 
during  June,  1780 ;  and  the  conduct  of  both  sides  indicated  some  :ip- 
preciation  of  its  importance. 

.Sir  Henry  Clinton  reached  Staten  Island  on  the  seventeenth,  and 
a  plan  was  at  once  matured  to  strike  the  camp  and  magazines  of 
Washington  at  Morristown  Trooi)s  were  embarked  upon  transports, 
and  all  suitable  demonstrations  were  made  as  if  an  expedition  against 
West  Point  was  intended.  Washington  deliberately,  but  actively, 
put  his  army  in  motion,  and  advanced  eleven  miles  toward  Pompton, 
on  the  twenty-second,  r«  ro/i/r  to  the  Hudson,  when  he  discovered 
the  purpose  of  his  adversary. 

General  Greene  had  been  left  in  command  near  Springfield  on  the 
twenty-first  of  June,  with  Maxwell's  and  Stark's  brigades,  Lee's  cavalry 
corps,  and  the  militia. 

The  British  advance  was  made  in  two  columns,  at  five  o'clock  on 
Ihe  morning  of  June  twenty-third  ;  one  by  the  Vauxhall,  and  the  other 
by  the  Springfield  road,  the  whole  force  consisting  of  five  thousand 
infantry,  besides  cavalry  and  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery.  The  British 
pressure  was  quite  deliberate,  but  eartiest,  upon  the  left,  on  the  Spring- 
field road,  as  if  it  were  the  main  attack.  The  column  formed  near 
the  Matthews  house,  on  a  small  eminence  where  artillery  could  gain 
a  commanding  position,  because  just  at  the  left  of  the  bridge.  Colonel 
Angell's  Rhode  Island  regiment  with  one  gun,  was  holding  an  orchard 


I7S().] 


SOUTH   CAROI.IXA   AND   NHW   Jl-IRSEY    INVADKI). 


;of 


which  commanded  the  bridge  over  tlie  Rahway  and  afforded  some 
cover.  The  l^riti.sh  j^uns  were  aimed  too  hij^h  at  first,  and  did  httle 
execution  ;  but  by  fording  the  stream,  not  more  tli.m  twelve  yards 
wide,  the  command  turned  the  American  position,  and  crowded  Colonel 
Angel!  back  to  the  scciMid  bridge,  over  a  branch  of  the  Rahway,  where 
Colonel  Shreve  rc'sisted  with  equal  obstinacy.  Colonel  Angeli  lost  one- 
fourth  of  his  men  and  was  compelled  to  fall  back  with  Colonel  Shreve 
upon  the  brigades  of  Maxwell  and  Stark. 

Colon(;l  Dayton's  regiment  contributed  to  their  resistance,  and 
"none,"  says  Irving,  "  showed  more  ardor  in  the  fight  than  Caldwell 
the  chaplain,  who  distributed  Watts'  psalms  and  hymn  books  among 
the  soldiers  when  they  were  in  want  of  wadding,  with  the  shout 
'  put  Watts  into  them,  boys.'  " 

The  other  British  column  had  a  still  more  important  objective  in 
view,  being  no  other  than  to  gain  the  pass  leading  to  Chatham  and 
Morristown.  Major  Lee's  cavalry  and  a  picket  under  Captain  Walker 
were  posted  at  Little's  Bridge,  on  the  Vauxhall  road,  and  Colonel 
Ogden's  regiment  covered  them.  General  Greene  soon  found  that  he 
could  not  afford  to  hold  so  extended  a  front,  and  c<jncentrated  his 
force  at  other  positions  eminently  strong  and  cai)ablc  of  defense. 
Reference  h  made  to  map  "  l^attle  of  Springfield."  The  remainder 
of  General  Maxwell's  and  Stark's  brigades  took  high  ground  by  the 
mill,  with  the  militia  force  of  General  I-)ickinson  on  the  flanks.  The 
Vau.xhal!  bridge  was  contested  as  hotly  as  that  at  Springfield.  Cien- 
eral  Greene  ultimately  took  post  on  the  first  range  of  hills,  in  the  rear 
of  Byram's  tavern,  where  the  roads  were  brought  so  near  that  succor 
might  be  readily  given  from  one  to  the  other,  "and  he  was  thus 
enabled  to  detach  Colonel  Webb's  regiment.  Lieutenant-colonel 
Huntington  commanding,  and  Colonel  Jackson's  reginKuit  with  one 
piece  ^f  artillery,  which  entirely  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
on  the  American  left,  and  secured  that  pass."  Reference  is  also  made 
to  map — "  Operations  in  New  Jersey."  The  map  previously  referred 
to  designates  the  various  British  and  Hessian  corps  engaged  in  the 
action. 

General  Clinton's  army  withdrew,  after  burning  Springfield,  and 
at  midnight  crossed  to  Staten  Island,  removing  their  bridge  of  boats 
after  the  passage. 

The  American  casualties  were  one  officer  and  twelve  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  privates  killed.  Captain  Davis'  detachment  and 
the  militia  not   reporting,  five  officers  and  fifty-six  privates  wounded 


-:l 


P4 


I  :ti 


\>*i> 


1^1 


1,  • '! 


I  '■  I  i 


W   ■    I  ■' 


M 

4 


1 


m 


i  ki 


,  .n 


502 


SOinil    CAROLINA   AND    NKW   JKUSl-.V    IN\A!)F.IX 


[1780. 


and  nine  privates  niissiiiL;-.  The  British  loss  was  not  officially  stated 
but  was  estimated  by  contemporary  journalists  as  about  one  hundred 
and  fift)-.  (ieneral  Clinton  sa\'s,  "  1  could  not  think  of  keeping  the 
field  in  Xrw  Jersey,"  and  wishetl  "  to  laiul  the  troops  and  give  a  camp 
of  rest  to  an  army  of  which  many  corps  had  had  an  uninterrupted 
campaign  of  fourteen  months."  It  ai)pears  from  this  report  that 
General  Clinton  had  no  innncdiate  designs  upon  the  Hudson  River 
posts,  but  his  operations  were  so  conducted  as  to  kee[)  the  American 
arm}-  on  constant  duty. 

New  Jersey  had  been  a  scene  of  constant  warfare  for  five  years; 
and  it  was  at  last  relieved  from  the  pressure. 

Washington  was  still  imploring  the  States  to  fill  their  quota  under 
new  assignments,  and  the  first  six  months  of  1780  closed  their  battle 
record. 

Hritisii  ]-".i-Fi-.crivr.  Fokci:. 

NoiK. — l''r.>m  ''Original  Returns  in  the  liiitisli  Kt-coid  Oflu-c."     Date  May  IM,  1780. 
Niw  VoKK  S()t;Tii  Carolina  Xuva  Scoiia  Ea'^i'  I'I.okiua 

British 771 1    7041    221)8   536 

German 7451    3018   572 

rrovincials.  .    2162   278S   638 


1453 


17,324  12,847 

Wf.st  Florida  CIlorc.ia 

ISritis!', 590  .. 

Gorman 547   862  .. 

Provincials...   316   1016  .. 


1878 


3.508 

BKRML'DAS 


—    326  . .. 
Total,  38,002. 


rRovnncNCE  Island 


130 


i  •* 


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I, 


[1-30. 


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Ait  p 


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^)-1     I   :-    i 


CHAPTER    LXIV. 


rft 


FRENCH  AUXILIARIES. 


ARNOLD'S   TKI-.ASON. 
MISIIES,    1780. 


SOUTHERN  SKIR. 


'm. 


\;.,  t 


LII",UTENAN'r-gencr;il  tlic  Count  dc  Rochambcai;,  arrived  at 
Newport,  Rhode  Island,  jiiiy  tenth,  17.S0,  with  nearly  six  thou- 
saiul  l'"rench  troops,  constituting  the  first  division  of  a  cor])s  of  twelve 
thousand  men,  which  Louis  XVI.  had  desi_L;nated  as  aid  to  the  United 
States  in  their  war  for  national  independence.  Maj()r-_L;eneral  the 
Marquis  dc  Chastelhix,  a  relative  of  La  Fayette,  acconii)anied  the 
command.  The  Chevalier  de  Ternay  commanded  the  convoy,  which 
consisted  of  seven  hea\y  ships,  r7.~.,  two  80s,  one  74,  four  6^^,  two 
40s,  a  cutter,  20;  hospital  ship,  pierced  for  64  ijuns,  a  bomb  ship  and 
thirty-two  transports. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  \\'ashini;ton  to  make  the  capture  of  New 
York  Ills  immediate  objective  ;  an  J  a  plan  of  operations  was  submitted 
to  the  French  c.immander  soon  after  his  arrival  at  Newport ;  but  on 
the  thirteenth  of  July,  Admiral  (iraves  arrived  at  New  \'ork  with  si.\ 
ships  of  the  line,  which  gave  the  British  naval  forces  a  superiority  of 
ships  and  metal  ;  and  the  enterprise  was  postponed  until  the  French 
second  division  should  arrive. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  turn,  proposed  an  expedition  to  Rhode 
Island,  and  eight  thousand  troops  were  advanced  as  far  as  Hunting- 
ton, Long  Island,  but  a  prompt  movement  of  Washington  with  his 
army,  and  advices  of  the  strength  and  position  of  Rochambeau,  gave 
such  assurance  that  he  would  meet  a  superior  force,  that  the  project 
was  converted  into  a  simple  naval  demonstration,  with  the  double 
purpose  of  blockading  the  French  squadron  and  cutting  off  the  ex- 
pected second  French  division  when  it  should  enter  the  American 
waters. 

The  Count  de  Rochambeau,  with  a  soldier's  exactness,  at  jnce 
comprehended  the  situation,  and  in  his  dispatch  of  July  sixteenth. 


^1  fti;: 


''i 


ll'u'  i 


'Wm^^  ■ 


i 


\h 


504 


FRENCH   AUXILIAKIKS. 


[1780. 


to  Count  dc  Vergcniies,  thus  epitomizes  the  coiuh'tiDti  of  American 
affairs : 

"  Upon  our  arrival  liere,  tlic  country  was  in  consternation,  the 
paper  money  had  fallen  to  sixty  for  one.  .  .  I  spo'  •  to  the  [)rin- 
cipal  persons  of  the  place,  and  told  them,  as  I  write  to  General  Wash- 
ington, that  this  was  merely  the  advanced  guard  of  a  greater  force, 
and  that  the  king  was  determined  to  sui)port  them  with  his  whole 
power.  In  twenty-four  hours  their  spirits  rose,  and  last  night  all  ihe 
streets,  houses  and  steeples  were  illuminated,  in  the  midst  of  fire-works 


and  the  greatest  rejoicings. 


You  see,   sir,  how  important  it  is 


to  act  with  vigor.  .  .  Send  us  troops,  shijjs  and  money;  but  do  not 
depend  upon  these  people,  nor  upon  their  means ;  they  have  neither 
money  nor  credit ;  t'leir  means  of  resistance  are  only  momentary,  and 
called  forth  when  they  are  attacked  in  their  homes.  They  then 
assemble  fo-  the  moment  of  immediate  danger  and  defend  themselves. 
VVashingt  1  commands  sometimes  fifteen  thousand,  sometimes  three 
thousand  men." 

The  above  letter  would  fairly  represent  a  condensed  statement 
of  Washington's  experience  during  the  greater  part  of  the  entire  war. 
The  entire  campaign  of  1780,  is  interwoven  with  reports  of  deficiency 
in  men,  food,  clothing  and  money;  and  the  numerous  entreaties,  pro- 
tests and  demands,  heretofore  cited,  are  but  feeble  expressions  of  the 
patience  as  well  as  agony  of  spirit  which  ciiaracterized  both  the  official 
and  unofficial  correspondence  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief. 

The  last  six  months  of  1780  was  without  active  field  operations 
in  the  Northern  States.  The  French  fleet  was  blockaded  at  Newport 
by  a  superior  British  naval  force,  and  repeated  consultations  between 
General  Washington  and  the  Count  de  Rochambeau,  resulted  in  the 
postponement  of  a  proposed  attack  upon  New  York. 

A  proclamation  was  published  over  the  signature  of  La  Fayette, 
with  the  sanction  of  Washington,  announcing  to  the  Canadians  that 
the  French  troops  would  assist  in  expelling  the  British  from  Canada. 
The  object  of  this  paper  was  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  garrison  of 
New  York  from  the  proposed  attack  upon  that  city.  General  Clin- 
ton, under  date  of  August  thirty-first,  forwarded  a  copy  to  Lord  Ger- 
maine,  calling  his  attention  to  its  purport ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
expedition  was  never  seriously  proposed.  During  the  discussion  of 
the  project  to  attack  New  York,  General  Arnold  was  advised  by 
Washington  that  he  would  be  tendered  a  command.  Still  pleading 
his  old  wounds  as  an  excuse  from  active  service,  he  expressed  a  prefer- 


I780.1 


FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 


505 


encc  for  n. post-command,  aiid  after  repeated  solicitations  of  himself 
and  friends,  he  was  granted  his  choice,  and  on  tlie  tliird  of  August, 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  "  West  Point  and  its  licpcndcncks,  \w 
whicli  all  .xxc  included,  from  Fishkill  to  King's  I-'erry." 

A  protracted  clandestine  and  confidential  correspondence  liad  long 
been  carried  on  between  himself  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  through  Major 
Andre,  uiuler  the  assun^ed  names  of  Gustavus  and  John  Anderson, 
and  this  was  so  disguised  by  commercial  forms  as  to  be  intelligible 
only  to  the  parties  holding  the  secret.  By  this  means  General  Clin- 
ton was  frequently  advised  of  the  condition,  movements  and  resources 
of  the  American  army,  and  was  undoubtedly  greatly  restrained  in  his 
military  movements  by  the  possession  of  the  secret  and  a  correspond- 
ing dependence  upon  '  rnold  to  instruct  him  as  to  times  and  modes 
of  action.  Arnold's  pi  :ended  preference  for  post  duty  was  deliber- 
ately treasonable  and  base. 

On  tlie  twenty-fifth  of  yXugust,  General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord 
Germaine  officially  as  follow  i :  "  At  thi  ■.  ;it;"  epoch  of  the  war,  when  a 
foreign  force  has  already  landed,  and  an  addition  to  it  is  expected, 
I  owe  it  tc  my  country,  and  I  must  in  justice  say  to  my  own  fame,  to 
declare  to  your  lordship  that  I  become  everyday  more  sensible  of  the 
utter  impossibility  of  prosecuting  the  war  in  this  country  without 
reinforcements.  .  .  .  We  are,  by  some  thousands,  too  weak  to 
subdue  this  rebellion." 

Lord  George  Germaine  wrote  in  reply,  under  date  of  September 
twenty-seventh  :  "  Next  to  the  destruction  of  Washington's  army, 
the  gaining  over  officers  of  influence  and  reputation  among  the  troops 
would  be  the  speediest  means  of  subduing  the  rebellion  and  restoring 
the  tranquillity  of  America.  Your  commission  authorizes  you  to  avail 
yourself  of  such  opportunities,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the 
expenses  will  be  cheerfully  submitted  to." 

It  is  impossible  to  determine  how  far  Lord  Germaine's  confidence 
in  the  ability  of  Arnold  to  execute  his  plan  dissuaded  him  from  send- 
ing troops  to  the  United  States ;  and  yet  such  .vould  be  the  natural 
effect  of  substituting  the  use  of  gold  for  the  force  of  arms  in  the  pro- 
secution of  a  costly  and  protracted  war.  The  archives,  then  secret, 
show  that  he  was  kept  advised  of  the  entire  scheme. 

On  the  thirtieth  of  August,  Arnold  solicited  an  interview  ^vitli 
some  responsible  party  in  order  definitely  to  settle  upon  the  price  of  his 
honor.  On  the  eighteenth  of  September  he  wrote,  advising  that 
Andre  be  sent  up  the  river   to  the  Vulture,  sloop  of  war,  then  at 


1^ 


m 

Iff  '' 

. 

•*ii 


ihiP^ 


506 


FUKNCII   AUXILIARIES. 


[1780. 


anchor  in  Haverstniw  Bay,  promising  "  to  send  a  person  on  board  with 
a  boat  and  a  flag  of  truce.  General  Clinton  received  the  letter  the 
following  day ;  troops  were  embarked  under  the  pretense  of  an  expe- 
dition into  the  Chesapeake,  and  Andre  leachcd  the  Vulture  on  the 
twentieth. 

Cn  the  twenty-first,  about  midnight,  Andre  landed,  met  Arnold, 
and  accompanied  him  first  to  the  Clove,  and  then  to  the  house  of 
Joshua  Hclt  Smith,  see  map  "  Highlands  of  the  Hudson."  Subse- 
quent exammations  failed  to  convict  Smitli  of  any  knowledge  of  the 
details  of  the  conspiracy.  His  antecedents  were  favorable  to  sympa- 
thy with  the  British  army;  but  tlie  secret  was  too  valuable  to  be 
intrusted  to  a  convenient  tool.  The  terms  of  purchase  were  soon 
settled,  simply  "^o/if  and  a  brigadier-general's  commission." 

Andre  crossed  the  Hudson,  to  return  to  New  York  by  land,  was 
captured  on  the  twenty-third,  and  on  the  second  of  October  was 
executed  a^.  a  spy. 

America  grieved  over  this  painful  necessity,  but  there  was  no 
alternative  except  an  exchange  for  Arnold,  who  escaped  by  taking 
refuge  on  the  Vulture,  the  twenty-fourth,  and  this  exchange  was 
declined  by  General  Clinton. 

General  Clinton  wrote  to  Lord  Germaine,  "  Thus  ended  this  pro- 
posed plan,  from  which  I  had  co.v'eived  such  great  hopes  and 
imagined  such  great  consequences." 

General  Greene  was  at  once  assigned  to  the  command  made  vacant 
by  the  treason  of  Arnold.  The  garrison  was  changed  ;  the  vv'orks 
were  modified  and  strengLhened,  and  Washington  took  post  with  his 
main  army  at  Prakeness,  near  Passaic  Falls,  in  New  Jersey.  (See 
map,  "  Operations  in  New  Jersey.") 

During  these  months  of  uncertain  plans,  depreciated  credit,  and 
exposed  treason  at  the  north,  the  south  was  the  theatre  of  active  war. 
For  a  sliort  time  there  had  been  a  superficial  peace  in  South  Carolina 
and  Georgia,  and  Lord  Cornwallis,  then  at  Charleston,  undertook  to 
reduce  North  Carolina  to  submission.  Lord  Rawdon  was  placed  in 
command  at  Camden.  A  considerable  royalist  militia  force  was 
enrolled,  but  the  efi'orl  to  force  paroled  citizens  and  prisoners  to 
render  service  to  the  crown,  gradually  destroyed  all  confidence  in 
official  pledges,  and  developed  a  partisan  warfare  of  most  persistent 
daring  and  bitterness.  The  cane-brakes,  rice  swamps,  and  evergreen 
forests  were  hiding  places  and  natural  strongholds  which  an  army 
could  not  penetrate  without  guides,  and  to  which  small  detachments, 


1 780.] 


I'Rr'.NCH   AUXILIARIES. 


507 


unable  to  take  the  field  against  regular  troops,  could  retreat  when 
closely  pressed,  with  little  danger  from  pursuit. 

A  few  of  the  principal  skirmishes  are  briefly  stated,  in  order  to 
illustrate  the  style  of  warfare  which  the  .Southern  camp<u;_;n  evoked, 
and  which  properly  enter  into  the  minor  oper.itions  of  war. 

On  the  twelfth  of  July,  Captain  Christian  Ilouk,  who,  with 
thirty-five  dragoons,  twenty  New  York  volunteers,  and  sixty  royalist 
militia,  was  detached  from  the  garrison  at  Rocky  Mountain,  "  to  col- 
lect the  royal  militia  and  push  the  rebels  as  far  as  he  deemed  conve- 
nient," "  was  surpri  ;ed  and  destroyed,"  as  Colonel  Tarlcton  states, 
through  placing  his  party  carelessly,  without  pickets,  or  sending  out 
patrols  at  Williamson's  Plantation.  "This,"  says  Justice  Johnso?i, 
"was  the  first  check  the  British  regular  troops  had  received  from  the 
militia  since  the  fall  of  Charleston."  Among  the  Americans  who  par- 
ticipated were  the  brothers  Adair,  one  of  them  the  subsequently  well 
known  General  John  Adair.  This  expedition  first  went  to  the  house 
of  a  Mrs,  McCluri;,  found  her  sons  James  and  lidward  in  the  act  of 
converting  her  tea-pots  into  bullets,  and  took  them  off,  as  they  said,  to 
hang  them.  The  plantations  of  Colonel  IJratton  and  James  William- 
son, who  afterwards  took  part  in  the  skirmish,  were  ravaged.  Mrs. 
McClure  reported  the  facts  at  Sumter's  camp,  where  Colonel  Bratton, 
Captain  McClure  and  five  of  the  Williamsons  were  on  duty.  With 
seventy-five  men,  they  stole  upon  Houk's  party,  separated  them 
from  the  picketed  horses  and  then  punished  them.  Captain  Houk 
was  among  the  killed.  These  facts  illustrate  the  character  of  many 
skirmishes  which  the  passing  weeks  developed. 

On  the  thirteenth  of  July,  Sumter  made  an  unsuccessful  attack 
upon  the  British  post  at  Rocky  Mount,  on  the  west  side  of  the 
Catawba,  thirty  miles  northwest  from  Camden,  and  eleven  miles  from 
Hanging  Rock,  then  commanded  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Turnbull. 
This  post  consisted  of  two  log-houses,  perforated  for  small  arms,  and 
a  small  redoubt  surrounded  by  a  ditch  and  abatis.  Three  assaults 
were  made  and  repulsed.  The  American  casualties  included  Colonel 
Reed  and  thirteen  men  killed  or  wounded.  Tarleton  gives  the  British 
casualties  at  one  officer  killed,  one  wounded,  and  about  ten  men  killed 
or  wounded,  and  says  "  at  tiie  last  assault,  the  Americans  penetrated 
the  abatis,  but  were  finally  repulsed." 

On  the  first  of  August,  Colonel  Elijah  Clark,  of  Wilkes  County, 
Georgia,  was  followed  by  a  Mrs.  Dillard,  who  had  just  fed  his  com- 
mand, and  informed  that  Major  Ferguson  was  in  close  pursuit.     She 


m 


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Sifl 


i-l, 


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^'  I 


Est'  '■'  ■    : 


: 


! 


^J  ■■  i 


508 


FRENXII   AUXILIARIES. 


[178a 


was  just  in  time  to  prevent  a  surprise,  and  in  the  two  skirmishes  that 
followed  nearly  sixty  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  the  drat^oons  leav- 
ing twenty-eight  dead  on  the  field,  and  the  Americans  losing  Major 
Smith,  and  four  men  killed,  and  Colonels  Clark  and  Robinson,  Major 
Clark  and  twenty-three  others  wounded. 

The  character  of  the  warfare,  coupled  with  the  ill-advised  policy 
of  General  Clinton,  produced  absolute  disregard  of  the  formal  obliga- 
tions of  surrender  and  parole. 

On  the  sixth  of  August,  Colonel  Tarleton  reported  to  General 
Cornwallis,  "  that  Lieutenant-colonel  Lisle,  who  had  been  paroled,  and 
had  exchanged  his  parole  for  a  certificate  of  a  good  subject,  carried 
off  a  whole  battalion  of  men  which  he  raised  in  the  districts  of  the 
Ennoree  and  Tyger,  as  soon  as  they  received  arms  and  ammunition,  to 
join  Colonel  Sumter,"  adding  "  This  trcacJicry  mined  all  confidence 
between  the  regitlars  and  militia." 

"  This  reinforcement,"  says  Colonel  Tarleton,  "  added  to  his  former 
numbers,  inspired  Colonel  Sumter  with  a  desire  of  sil,  ;  Hzing  him- 
self by  attacking  son<e  of  the  British  posts  upon  the  frontier."  On 
the  sixth  of  August,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  he  approached 
the  flank  of  the  post  "  of  Hanging  Rock,"  which  was  entrusted  to 
the  North  Carolina  refugees,  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Bryan. 
They  fled.  "  The  legion  charged  twice  with  fixed  bayonets  to  save 
their  three  pounder."  "  Colonel  Sumter  still  persevered  in  his  attack, 
and  very  probably  would  have  succeeded,  if  a  stratagem  employed  by 
Captains  Stewart  and  McDonald  of  the  British  Legion  had  not  dis- 
concerted his  operations."  This  was  the  simple  detachment  of  a 
small  force  of  buglers  to  the  flanks,  who  gave  such  signals  as  to  indi- 
cate the  approach  of  additional  troops.  It  was  repeatedly  practiced 
during  the  war.  Colonel  Tarleton  omits  to  state  that  the  American 
success  at  one  time  was  so  promising,  that,  as  at  Bennington,  they 
allowed  themselves  to  fall  into  disorder  by  plunder  of  commissary  and 
other  supplies,  and  thus  greatly  imperiled  the  success  achieved  at 
the  first  onset.  The  conditions  of  the  battle,  for  it  was  more  than  a 
skirmish,  changed  repeatedly  during  nearly  four  hours  of  conflict. 
Gordon  says,  "  The  Prince  of  Wales  regiment  which  defended  the 
place  was  nearly  annihilated,  and  the  arms  and  ammunition  taken 
from  the  British  who  fell  in  the  beginning,  were  turned  against 
their  associates  ;  that  Colonel  Sumter's  party  had  not  more  than  ten 
bullets  to  a  man  when  the  action  commenced."  The  British  loss  was 
two   hundred  and  sixty-nine,  killed,  wounded  and  taken  prisoners. 


[i78a 


1780.] 


FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 


509 


The  American  loss  was  severe,  but  not  officially  reported.  Colonel 
Tarleton  states  that  "about  one  hundred  dead  and  wounded  Ameri- 
cans were  left  on  the  field  of  battle,  adding  significantly,  "  The  re- 
pulses he  (Colonel  Sumter)  received,  did  not  discourage  him,  or 
injure  his  cause.  The  loss  of  men  was  easily  supplied,  and  his  reputa- 
tion for  activity  and  courage  was  fully  sustained  by  his  late  enterpris- 
ing conduct."  Irving  says — "  among  the  partisans  who  were  present 
in  this  fight,  an  orphan  boy  of  Scotch-Irish  descent,  was  Andrew  Jack- 
son." That  boy  became  a  successor  of  Washington,  as  President  of 
the  United  States. 

During  those  desultory  operations,  of  which  a  lew  only  are  stated, 
the  condition  of  the  American  army  proper  is  to  be  noticed.  On  the 
sixth  of  July,  the  Baron  De  Kalb  was  at  Buffalo  Ford  and  Deep  River. 
He  left  Morristown,  New  Jersey,  on  the  sixteenth  of  April,  with  nearly 
fourteen  hundred  men,  embarked  at  the  head  of  Elk  river  on  the  third 
day  of  May,  reached  Petersburg  early  in  June,  entered  North  Carolina 
on  the  twentieth  of  June,  halted  at  Hillsborough  to  rest  his  troops 
and  secure  supplies,  and  then  advanced.  General  Gates  reached  De 
Kalb's  camp  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  July.  He  had  previously  written 
to  General  De  Kalb,  from  Hillsborough,  "  Enough  has  ah'eady  been 
lost  in  a  vain  defense  of  Charleston  ;  if  more  is  sacrificed,  the  Southern 
States  are  undone  ;  and  this  may  go  nearly  to  unilo  the  rest." 

General  Caswell's  North  Carolina  militia  had  already  crossed  the 
I'eedee  on  the  route  for  Camden  in  defiance  of  the  tvishes  and  orders 
of  General  De  Kalb.  There  was  some  jealousy  of  foreign  officers, 
and  General  Caswell  made  a  mistake  in  not  reporting  directly  to  Gen- 
eral De  Kalb.  That  officer  felt  the  slight,  and  wrote  on  the  seventh 
of  July  to  his  wife,  "  Officers  of  European  experience  alone,  do  not 
know  what  it  is  to  contend  against  difficulties  and  vexations.  My 
present  condition  makes  me  doubly  anxious  to  return  to  you."  It 
had  been  his  purpose  to  advance  by  Salisbury  and  Charlotte,  through 
a  fertile  country  where  supplies  would  be  ready  at  hand.  Adjutant- 
general  Williams  urged  the  movement  ;  but  General  Gates  decided 
differently,  upon  his  arrival,  and  to  the  amazement  of  his  officers 
ordered  the  troops  to  be  ready  to  start  at  a  moment's  warning,  and 
"on  the  twonty-seventh,"  says  Irving,  "put  what  he  called  the 
Grand  Army  on  its  march,  by  the  shortest  route  to  Camden,  through 
a  barren  country  which  could  offer  no  food  but  lean  cattle,  fruit  and 
unripe  maize."  Marion  was  detached  and  sent  to  the  interior  of  South 
Carolina  to  watch  the  British  troops  and  make  a  report. 


^'  !      '' 


^      I 


.*n 


i'   J- 


1 1 


\'-  M 


't    J 


510 


KKEN'CII   AUXILIARIES. 


[1780. 


MV 


On  tl',c  thisd  of  Aiit^ust,  the  army  crossed  ihc  Pccdcc  and  united 
with  the  commanil  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Poiterficld,  wlio  liad  been 
dispatclied  to  tlie  reUcf  of  Charleston,  but  who  with  superior  enter- 
prise and  judi:jment  had  operated  on  the  border,  after  hearinf:j  of  the 
capture  of  that  city.  Neitiie/  prisoner.-;  nor  medicines  could  be  had. 
The  ;uniy  ate  peaches  for  bread.  Dysentery  broke  out  in  the  camp; 
many  could  hardly  walk.  "  On  the  fourth  of  Aut;ust,  General  Gates 
issued  a  proclamation."  A  portion  is  copied  from  Colonel  Tarleton's 
official  reports,  with  Italics,  as  ejiven  by  that  officer,  "  inviting  the 
l>atriotic  citi-cns  of  Carolina  to  assemble  under  /lis  auspiees,  to  vindicate 
t  lie  rights  of  Anieriea  ;  holding  out  an  a  nun  sty  to  all  ivho  had  sub- 
scribed paroles  imposed  upon  thin:  by  the  rutfian  band  of  conquest  ; 
<ind  except  in  i^  only  those  mho  in  the  hour  cf  devastation,  had  exercised 
acts  of  barbarism  and  depredation  upon  the  persons  and  property  of  their 
felhnv  citi::ens." 

Colonel  Tarleton's  troubles  with  .\merican  militia  had  not  ended 
with  the  desertion  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Lisle.  As  General  Gates 
moved  toward  Camden,  Major  Mc.Arthur  collected  boats  on  the 
Pecdec,  upon  which  he  placed  one  hundred  sick,  many  of  whom  were 
from  the  Seventy-first  British  regulars,  which  had  suffered  <^reatly 
from  the  climate."  "  Colonel  Mills,  who  commanded  the  militia  of 
the  Cheraw  district,  thouijh  a  very  good  man,"  says  Tarleton,  in  his 
report  of  Au<;ust  sixth,  "  had  not  complied  with  my  instructions  in 
forming  his  cor|)s.  and  attended  more  to  oaths  and  professions,  and 
attended  less  to  the  former  conduct  of  those  whom  he  admitted. 
The  instant  that  the  militia  found  that  Major  Mc.\rtluir  had  left 
liis  post,  and  were  assured  that  Gates  would  come  there  the  next 
day,  they  seized  their  own  officers,  and  the  hundred  sick,  and 
carried  them  all  prisoners  into  North  Carolina."  Colonel  Mills 
escaped. 

On  the  seventh.  Gates  effected  a  union  with  Caswell's  North  Caro- 
lina militia,  and  the  h.ilf-famished  army  adv.iii..ed  to  Lynch's  Creek. 
The  Hiitish  withdrew  their  post  from  Cherav  s  Hill,  and  fell  b;  ck  to 
Camden.  If  the  American  column  had  marched  by  ♦•.he  route  sug- 
gested and  urged  by  Haron  De  Kalb,  it  would  1  avc  reacheil  Camden  in 
the  rear  of  Cheraw  Hill  before  Lord  Rav  do;i  could  have  gained  that 
post,  and  would  have  secured  ainple  supi)lies. 

Colonel  Tarleton  says,  "  The  American  commander  had  not  suffi- 
cient penetration  to  conceive  that  by  a  forced  march  up  the  creek,  he 
could   have    pushed    Lord    Rawdon's    flank,   and    reached  Camden ; 


i78o.] 


FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 


511 


which  would  have  been  an  easy  con(iu<j.st,  and  a  f.ital  blow  to  the 
IJritish."  This  was  a  fact  wliich  may  have  L,Mven  to  Coniwallis  more 
confidence  in  his  subsequent  attack  u|)i)n  Ciates  <it  Sander's  Creek. 
He  was  too  t;ood  a  sokUer  not  to  notice  such  mistakes  and  profit 
by  them. 

General  Gates  halted  two  days,  and  on  tiie  thirtec'iith  encamped 
at  Ruyei)''s  Mills,  twelve  miles  above  Camden.  On  the  fourteenth, 
General  Stevens  joined  the  army  with  seven  hundred  Virginia 
militia. 

"On  the  nii;ht between  tiie  thirteenth  and  fourteenth,"  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  reached  Camden,  havin;/  left  Charleston  on  the  tenth.  The 
Twenty-third,  Tiiirty-third,and  Seventy-first  British  regiments,  the  Vol- 
unteers of  Irelaiul,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  1  lamilton's  corps  had  also 
been  collected  at  that  post.  Four  companies  of  light  infantry  from 
Ninety-six  joined  the  same  da\'.  Colonel  I'arleton  himself  having  just 
recovered  from  a  fever,  crossed  tlie  Santee  River  on  the  sixth,  then 
lUack  River,  joined  Lord  Rawdon  on  the  tenth,  and  with  him,  fell  back 
to  Camden. 

Meanwhile  a  train  of  clothing,  ammunition,  and  other  supplies  had 
left  Charleston  for  the  use  of  the  British  troops.  Colonel  Sumter 
made  application  to  General  Gates  on  the  fourteenth  for  a  detachment 
of  four  hundred  regulars  and  volunteers  to  join  his  command  of  an 
equal  number,  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  that  train.  A  detail  was 
made  by  General  Gates  upon  hastily  formed  impressions  that  his  own 
force  was  seven  thousand  men,  and  consisted  of  one  hundred  Maryland 
regulars,  umier  Lieutenant-colonel  Woodford,  three  hundred  North 
Carolina  militia,  some  artillerymen,  and  two  brass  guns. 

Colonel  Sumter  met  the  train  as  it  slowly  traveled  up  tiie  west 
bank  of  the  Wateree,  and  was  about  to  cross  the  rivi;r  within  a  mile 
of  Camden.  The  surprise  v.'as  complete,  but  the  roar  oi'  cannon  soon 
advised  him  that  there  was  severe  fighting  on  the  other  side  of  the 
river.  During  the  next  day  he  was  informed  by  a  messenger  from 
Major  Davis  of  the  defeat  of  G.ites  at  Sander's  Creek,  and  at  once 
hastened  toward  Charlotte,  North  Canjlin.i,  as  ordered. 

On  the  night  of  the  seventeenth,  his  command,  oppressed  by  the 
heat,  worn  out  by  marching,  and  encumbered  by  more  tli.m  one 
hundred  prisoners,  went  into  canq)  on  the  north  side  of  Fishing  creek, 
about  two  miles  above  its  junction  with  the  Catawba. 

Colonel  Tarleton  had  already  crossed  the  Catawba  in  pursuit,  and 
was  resting  his  men   at  Fishing  creek.     On  the  morning  of  the  eigh- 


;1  !:■ 


(1     -r 


512 


FRENCH   AUXILIARIES. 


[1780, 


;  U' 


teenth,  he  dashed  in  upon  the  surprised  Americans,  cutting  thorn  off 
from  their  color  hnc  where  the  arms  were  stacked,  inflicted  a  loss  of 
one  hundred  in  killed  and  wounded,  captured  three  hundred  prisoners, 
besides  the  rescue  of  his  own  men,  and  the  train  they  had  lost,  took 
one  thousand  stand  of  arms  and  two  cannon,  and  dispersed  the  entire 
command  as  with  the  suddenness  and  success  of  a  whirlwind. 

Brmish  Effective  Fokcr. 
Note. — From  "Or!t;'m,il  Returns  in  the  British  Record  Office. "    Date,  August  1st,  1780. 

Run- 1. A K  Troops  Only. 


New  York 19. "  5 

Soutli  Cariilina 6,589 

Georj^ia iiTS^ 

East  Florida 453 

27.913 


West  Florida 1,261 

Nova  Scotia 3.524 

Bermuda 204 

rrovidence  Island   ii3 


5.107 


New  York ,  . 

On  an  ]",x|iedition 2274 

Souili  Carolina 73S4 

Gei.r.i;ia 968 

East  I'lorida. 453 


Tutal,  33,020. 

December,  1st  17S0. 

17,729  West  I'lorida 1,261 


Nova  Scotia 3,167 

Bermuda 387 

rrovidence   l--i.ind 143 


4.958 


28,8oS 

Total,  33,766. 
Provinei.il  forces  at  close  of  year 8,954 


ii 


I,2f)l 

3.524 
204 

nS 
5.107 


1,261 

3.167 

.     3S7 

.     143 

4.958 
8,954 


lwtt^«^Sfip' 


HIGHLANDS. 


Comjjilct/  i/m/ /Jn/ifM  />^  Co/.  ('a/r///jJ/o.>/ 


^«r'vr,-i 


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■'\y:m. 

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ill 

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^1^1  ! 


ijii*;! 


i'.   I 


CHAPTER   LXV. 


\[ 


> 


ifi 


BATTLE   OF   CAMDEN.     KING'S   MOUNTAIN.     POSITION  OF 
SOUTHERN   ARMIES. 

THE  battle  of  Camden,  or  Sander's  Creek,  was  one  of  the  most 
suggestive  of  the  war.  The  force  of  discipline,  exact  apprecia- 
tion of  the  adversary,  quick  seizure  of  opportunity,  and  the  delivery 
of  incessant  blows  upon  every  exposed  point  in  turn,  were  illustrated 
in  the  conduct  of  Lord  Cornwallis.  Webster,  Rawdon  and  Tarleton 
recognized  the  controlling  will  of  the  general  commanding,  and  obeyed 
orders  implicitly,  confidently,  and  at  all  hazards.  The  British  regulars 
only  did  their  duty  as  usual.  It  was  characteristic  of  their  general 
conduct  during  the  whole  war. 

Lord  Cornwallis  hesitated,  as  he  states,  whether  to  risk  an  action 
against  the  American  army,  or  to  retire  to  Charleston.  His  scouts 
were  constantly  on  the  alert,  and  he  formed  so  correct  an  estimate  of 
the  character  of  General  Gates,  and  the  composition  and  disposition 
of  the  American  army,  as  to  risk  an  attack,  although  he  knew  that  it 
was  superior  in  numbers  to  his  own,  and  occupying  a  go -d  position 
at  Rugely's  Mills.  General  Gates  was  thoroughly  "  sure  of  victory, 
and  of  the  dispersion  of  the  British  army."  It  has  been  seen  that  he 
participated  actively  in  no  part  of  the  operations  near  S.iratoga  until 
the  morning  of  August  eleventh,  1777.  Confiding  in  numbers,  and 
neglecting  reconnoissance,  he  then  imperiled  his  army  by  forcing 
several  brigades  across  Fishkill  creek,  while  remaining  in  the  rear 
himself. 

He  brought  his  worn-out,  sick  and  hungry  army  to  Rugely's  Mills 
despite  of  advice  and  prudence,  and  intended  at  once  to  attack  a 
strong  post  and  veteran  troops,  as  if  the  prestige  of  the  Burgoyne 
campaign  was  a  formidable  part  of  his  aggressive  force,  instead  of  an 
element  to  incite  Cornwallis  to  a  more  determined  resistance.  Pie 
33 


';h,  1; 


f..':n 


1  *!ilil . 


5'4 


HAITI  I".   OK   CAMIKA'. 


11780. 


liail  al)i)iit  fourteen  luiiulrcd  <;()oil  troops  well  ()f(kereil.  The  re- 
mainder were  r:iw  militia  just  coUetti^il,  many  of  whom  h.ul  \iever 
been  in  aetion,  and  had  onl_\'  just  received  bayonets,  witlioiit  instruc- 
tion in  their  use.  I'hey  liad  no  idci  of  tactical  formations  and  move- 
ments, and  no  |)r<ivision  was  made  fur  a  rali_\in.L;  ponit  in  case  of  dis- 
aster, (ieueral  (jates  seems  to  have  been  limited  in  capacity  to  the 
simi)le  issue  of  .m  ortKr,  aiul  to  lake  the  conseiiuence's  of  its  mode  of 
execution  as  '*  one  of  the  uncertainties  of  war."  He  did  not  know  that 
Cornwallis  had  reached  Camden  when  he  advanced,  nor  the  weakncs;- 
of  his  own  force  until  he  ordered  the  battle;  then  assumed  that  a 
general  should  never  retre.it  under  whatever  circumstances,  and 
lacked  the  wisiloni  to  consult  with  other  officers  when  uncertain  as  to 
the  proper  line  of  dut)-. 

(jeneral  Gates  placed  in  the  h.iiuls  of  Adjutant-L;eneral  Williaius 
an  elaborate  ;:jeiier,d  onler,  dated  "  C.imp  Clermont,  15th  of  AuL^ust," 
directin;^  the  "  Grand  army  to  march  prom[)tly  at  ten  o'clock  that 
nitrht."  It  was  evident  from  its  teni.)r  that  the  <ieneral  conunandiuLr 
did  not  even  kiU)w  the  strencjth  of  the  force  th.it  was  to  be  handled. 
Adjutant-<jencral  Williams  at  once  calleil  upon  the  ^jeneral  officers, 
of  whom  thirteen  were  with  the  army,  for  exact  returns  of  their  com- 
mands. The  abstract  was  placed  before  General  G.itcs,  "as  he  came 
from  a  council  of  officers."  It  showed  th.it  the  total,  nominal  strenLjth. 
was  only  three  thousand  and  fifty-two  men.  Turning  to  his  chief  of 
staff,  he  simply  said,  "  Sir,  the  numbers  are  certainly  below  the  esti- 
mate made  this  morninj.;.  There  was  no  dissenting  voice  in  the 
council  where  the  orders  have  just  been  read  ;  there  are  enouf;h  for 
our  purpose."  The  orders  were  then  published  in  the  army,  without 
deliberation  or  consultation  with  anybody. 

Throui^h  the  coincidence  of  each  army  attempting  to  surprise  the 
other,  they  left  their  respective  camps  at  the  same  hour,  ten  o'clock, 
so  as  to  gain  time  to  strd^e  the  adversary  before  daylight  on  the 
following  morning. 

Colonel  Armand  with  his  cavalry,  only  sixty  men,  led  the  advance, 
although  he  remonstr.ited  at  the  detail  of  mounted  men  as  a  pioneer 
corps  for  night  service,  since  the  profoundest  silence  was  enjoined  in 
orders.  Colonel  I'orterfield's  light  infantrv  were  ordered  to  march 
upon  his  right  flank  and  Major  Armstrong  on  the  left  flank,  each  in 
single  file,  two  hundred  yards  from  the  road. 

Colonel  Armand's  orders  were,  "  being  thus  supported,  in  ca.se  of 
an  attack  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  in   front,  not  only  to  support  the 


i7So.] 


flATTI  K   OF  CAMnKN. 


5'3 


shock  of  the  ciK-my's  horse,  hut  to  rout  them  ;  and  to  consiilcr  tlic 
order,  to  stand  the  att.icK-;  of  tlie  enemy's  cavahy,  l)i'  tlicir  numbers 
what  they  ina\-,  as  positive."  Hetwccn  two  and  three  o'cloik  ni  the 
morniiv^  the  advance  ^'uard  of  tlie  British  army,  consistinij  of  twenty 
I,i-i;ion  cavah-y  and  as  many  mounted  infantry,  confronti'd,  hotly 
attacked  and  r(juted  Armand's  detachment.  Colonel  Portertleld 
f  lithfulh-  e.xecuted  his  orders  anil  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  skir- 
nnMi ;  hni  the  prdnijjt  .nrival  of  tlic  li;-;ht  infantry,  tlie  'rucnt\--third 
and  riiirt\-  third  British  rei^inients  in  support  of  their  adv.mce  t;uartl. 
compelled  hiiu  to  retire.  The  retreat  of  Armand's  cavalry  threw  the 
I'irst  Maryland  bri;^Mde  into  confusion  ;  and  both  armies,  well  satisfied 
with  their  e.xperieiue  of  a  ni;^ht  attack,  awaited  the  morning'  and 
fi.)rnied  their  lines  for  action.  It  was  still  within  the  power  of  Gen- 
eral Gates  to  fall  hack  to  a  stron;^  position  ;  but  he  lacked  nerve  and 
decision  for  such  an  hour.  A  prisoner  who  fell  into  the  haiuls  of  the 
Americ.uis  reported  the  I5ritish  force  to  be  tliree  thousand  stron^j, 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Lonl  C'ornwallis.  This  fact  was 
reported  to  (ieneral  Gates.     .\djutant-;4ene,al  Williams  says,  "  Gen- 


eral Gates  called  tlie  i^t. 
"  what  is  to  be  done.  ' 
Uallant  Stevens  excl.iime 


.•neral  officers  toL;ether  in  the  rear,  askinr^  — 
*  All  were  mute  for  a  few  moments,  when  the 
d,"  "  Gentlemen,  is  it  not  too  late  7ic>:v  to  do 


anythini;  but  fi<;ht."     "When   the  Adjutant-General  went  to  call  the 
Maron  I  )e  Kalb  to  council,  he  s 


u'd,  "  anil  has  the  General   sjiven 


(HI 


orilers  to  retreat  the  arm\',"  thus  indicatint^  his  opinion  of  the  proper 
action  required.  '■  The  Baron  did  not  however  oppose  the  suj^Ljes- 
tion  of  General  .Stevens;  and  every  measure  that  ensued  was  prepara- 
tory for  action."  Adjutant-yieneral  Williams  says  "  that  the  General 
seemed  disposed  to  await  events — he  rave  )io  orders.''  "Upon  his 
suj^gesting  a  brisk  attack  by  Stevens'  briLjade  upon  tlic  British  right, 
he  answered,  "  Sir,  that's  ri-dit ;  let  it  be  ilone." 


o^^ 


m 


"  This  was  the  last 
ler  the  (.leputy  Adjutant-general  received."     Reference  is  made  to 
ap  "  Battle  of  Camden."     This  battle,  as  far  as  it  was  a  battle,  on 


the  part  of  the  Americans,  ami  not  a  rout,  was  confined  to  the  right 
wing  where  the  gallant  De  Kalb  fought  his  small  command  admirably. 
lie  did  not  know  that  the  rest  of  the  army  had  fled,  until,  surrounded 
by  overwhelming  nuinbers,  he  learned  the  fate  of  the  day. 

The  British  army  had  passed  Sander's  creek  and  entered  upon  a 
narrow  belt  of  solid  land,  bordered  on  each  side  by  an  impassable 
swamp.  The  American  army  was  flanked  by  the  same  swamps  ;  but 
the  interval  rapidly  widened  in  the  direction  of  Rugely's  Mills,  so 


:yi 


!'  ^^' 


r 


!»"<     ■    i. 


I 


516 


BATTI.F.   OF  CANfI)F:\. 


1 1 780. 


tliat  their  flanks,  the  left  especially,  became  cxposeil  in  case  the 
cn^Mj^ement  was  pressed  and  they  failed  to  hold  their  orij^inal  ^'round. 
'llie  artillery  was  then  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  front  line  ;  and 
Major  Armstron^^'s  lij^lit  infantry,  which  liad  retreated  at  the  first 
encounter,  was  ortlereil  to  cover  a  small  interval  between  the  left  wiiiLj 
and  the  swamp  in  th;'.t  cpiarter.  Frequent  skirmishes  during;  the 
ni^ht  disclt-sed  the  relative  positions  of  the  armies;  and  the  British 
army  advanced  at  dawn  of  day. 

"Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  commanded  the  rij^lit  wiiiij,  con- 
sisting of  three  companies  of  light  infantry,  the  Twenty-tiiird  and 
Thirty-third  British  re;^iments.  Lord  Raw  don  commanded  the  left, 
con^^istiny  of  the  volunteers  of  L'eland,  the  Legion  Inf.mtry,  Hamil- 
ton's corps  and  Bryan's  refugees.  Two  six  pounders  and  two  three 
pounders,  were  to  the  left  of  the  road,  viiuler  Lieutenant  McLeod. 
The  tv  oattalions  of  the  Seventy-first  reijiment,  with  two  six  pound- 
ers, formed  the  second  line.  The  Legion  cavalry  remained  in  column, 
on  account  of  the  thickness  of  the  woods  to  the  right  of  the  main 
road,  close  to  the  first  battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  with 
orders  to  act  as  opportunity  offired,  or  necessity  required." 

The  Second  M.iryland  brigade,  General  Gist  commanding,  with 
the  Delaware  troops  under  Baron  De  Kalb,  formed  the  American 
right  ;  the  North  Carolina  militia  formed  tiie  centre,  under  General 
Caswell  ;  and  the  equally  untried  Virginia  militia,  under  Stevens, 
were  on  the  left.  The  First  Maryland  brigade  forined  the  second  line, 
and  the  artillery  under  the  direction  of  Captain  Singleton,  was  so 
posted  as  to  command  the  road. 

The  morning  was  calm  and  hazy  ;  and  the  smoke  settled  so  near 
the  earth,  that  "  it  was  difficult,"  says  Cornwallis,  "  to  see  the  effect 
of  a  very  heavy  and  well  supported  fire  on  both  sides."  He  says, 
*'  Observing  a  movement  on  the  American  left  which  I  supposed  to 
be  with  an  intention  to  make  some  alterations  in  their  order,  I 
directed  Lieutenant-cclonel  Webster  to  begin  the  attack."  The 
movement  referred  to,  was  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Adjutant-general 
Williams  to  force  the  brigade  of  Stevens  to  charge  upon  the  British 
right  wing  before  it  could  fully  deploy ;  and  to  give  time  for  their' 
advance,  he  threw  a  small  party  of  skirmishers  forward,  with  orders 
"  to  take  to  single  trees  and  thus  annoy  the  enemy  as  much  as  possi- 
ble." The  British  right  wing  however  was  too  quick  and  spirited  for 
this  movement  of  untried  militia,  who  oid  not  know  how  to  use  the 


I780.J 


UATTI.Ii  OF  CAMDKN. 


517 


bayonet  just  received.  They  came  on  with  a  steady  front  and  loud 
cheers,  instantly  carryin;^  everythinj^  before  them. 

The  Viri^inia  militia  threw  down  their  loaded  arms  and  fled.  The 
North  Car(jlin,i  militia,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  detachment 
under  General  Gregory  who  made  a  short  pause,  and  of  a  part  of 
Dixon's  regiment  who  were  next  in  line  to  the  second  Maryland 
brigade,  fled  also.  The  power  of  example  is  illustr  iti.d  by  Dixon's 
conduct  in  view  of  his  jjosition.  "At  least  two-thirds  of  the  army," 
according  to  Adjutant-general  Williams,  "  fled  without  firing  a  shot." 
The  I'"irst  Maryland  brigade  two  hundred  yards  in  the  rear,  repeatedly 
resisted  tl  j  attack  upon  their  left,  until  the  British  right  wing  over- 
whelmed  them  by  numbers  and  forced  them  to  retire.  It  was  just 
then  that  the  Britjsh  legion,  which  had  pursued  the  mil.cia  until  they 
were  started  t  •  the  rear,  joined  Lieuten.int-colonel  Webster,  and  made 
the  decisive  charge  upon  the  First  Maryland  brigade.  The  Second 
Maryland  brigade  did  not  flinch  ;  but  after  repulsing  Lord  Rawdon 
twice,  charged  bayonet  untler  JJaron  l)e  Kalb,  broke  through  the 
British  left,  wheeled  upon  its  centre,  and  fought  alone  until  the  whole 
British  army  enveloped  them  in  fire.  Baron  De  Kalb  fell,  wounded  in 
eleven  places,  and  could  hardly  be  convinced  that  the  -Xmcricans  were 
not  the  victors,  so  faithfully  had  he  executed  his  orders,  in  the  assur- 
ance of  equal  good  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  other  divisions.  The 
rout  was  utter.  General  Gates  was  carried  away  with  the  militia,  which 
he  calls  "  a  torrent,"  and  knew  nothing  of  the  resistance  so  stubbornly 
maintained  by  the  right  wing  of  his  army. 

Adjutant-general  Williams  says,  "  If  in  this  afHiir  the  militia  fled 
too  soon,  the  regulars  may  be  thought  as  blamable  for  remaining  too 
long  on  the  field  ;  especially  after  all  hope  of  victory  must  have  been 
despaired  of."  General  Gates  hurried  with  General  Caswell  to 
Charlotte,  si.xty  miles  from  the  field  of  battle,  and  by  the  twentieth 
safely  reached  Hillsborough,  one  hundred  and  eighty  miles  from 
Camden,  without  gathering  a  sufficient  force  of  the  fugitives  to  form 
even  an  escort. 

The  North  Carolina  militia  fled  to  their  homes,  or  wherever  they 
could  find  refuge.  General  Stevens  followed  the  Virginians  to  Hills- 
borough, and  back  over  the  route  they  came,  to  attempt  to  rally  them, 
but  their  term  of  service  was  short  and  he  soon  discharged  them. 

General  Cornwallis  reports  his  force  at  two  thousand  two  hundred 
and  thirty-nine  men,  and  his  casualties  si.xty-eight  killed;  two  hundred 
and    fifty-six   wounded   and   missing.     General   Gates   subsequently 


ll?« 


■v 


■r. 


'/"T 


^-"i 


m^^:i'i 


It .  ..i 


I 


I  ilh '' 


II 


'mm 


■■  '.1'  J 


518 


RATTI.K.  OF  CAMDKN. 


[1780. 


reported  the  loss  of  General  Do  Kaib  and  five  ofTicers  killed,  and  tliirty- 
four  officers  wounded,  incliidin<:j  Lieutenant-colonels  Woodford, 
Vauf^han,  Porterfield,  and  l)u  l^uson,  most  of  whom  had  been  taken 
prisoners  ;  and  that  by  the  twenty-ninth  seven  hundred  non-com- 
missioned officers  ,ind  soldiers  of  the  Maryland  division  had  rejoined 
the  .arm)-.  This  is  ,1  remarkable  statement,  c^reatly  to  the  credit  of 
those  troops.  The  Delaware  rcc^iment  had  been  alinost  literally 
destroy(;d.  The  Maryland  troops  lost  between  three  and  four  hundred 
in  killed,  wounded  and  prisoners,  and  the  ori;^Mn;il  force  was  liardly 
fourti.-en  hundred  stron^^. 

General  Gates  undoubtedly,  as  stated  l)y  him,  made  all  the  effort 
within  his  power  to  check  the  flis^ht  ;  but  he  had  no  flower  in  action, 
and  there  is  not  a  redecmincj  fict  durin;^  his  connection  with  the 
Southern  army  to  show  his  fitness  ti)  command  troo|)s.  General'. 
Smallwood  and  Gist  secured  their  escape,  as  did  the  tj^reater  portion 
of  Annand's  cavalry.  The  British  came  into  the  rjossession  of  seven 
pieces  of  artillery,  two  thousand  muskets,  the  entire  baj;;^r;i;4e  train,  and 
prisoners  to  the  number  of  nearly  one  thousand,  accordi!!!:^^  to  tin;  report 
of  ("ornwallis,  includinjj,  (ienerals  I)e  Kalb,  (irej^ory,  and    Rutherford. 

Con.^ress  h.id  assi-nicd  (jeneral  fiates  to  the  comnianil  of  the 
•Southern  Department  at  a  time  when  the  ("ommander-in-chief  had 
st;lected  General  (ireene  feT  the  detail  ;  and  the  battle  of  Cainden  was 
an  impressive  commentary  upon  their  action.  It  is  not  to  be  lost 
slight  of  that  tin;  e.\|)edition  of  (Jdonel  .Suinter  took  lour  hundred  men 
from  the  army  at  a  critical  hour,  and  that  a  reastiuable  resistance  on 
the  part  of  the  militia  who  were  clumsily  ])osted  in  the  most  exposed 
part  of  the  field  would  have  t^iven  increased  value  to  the  yood  conduct 
of  the  American  ris^ht. 

On  the  day  of  .Sumter's  misfortunes  at  h'ishin;^  creek,  a  skirmish 
occurred  at  Musgrove's  Mills,  .South  Carolina,  on  the  I'Lnnoree  River, 
in  which  the  Americans  successfully  surprised  Colonel  I'lnnis,  who  was 
in  command  of  a  mixed  force  of  regulars  and  royalists. 

On  the  twenty-first  a  skirmish  occurreil  at  Wahab's  jjlantati  -n. 
The  house  was  burned,  but  the  Americans  under  Colonel  Davis 
secured  ninety-six  horses,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  stand  of  arms, 
infiicted  a  loss  upon  the  legion,  who  cjuartered  there,  of  sixty  men, 
losing  about  thirty. 

Early  in  September,  Brigadier-general  Patterson  retired  from 
Charleston  on  sick  leave,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Balfour  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  that  post. 


HArri.r:  oi'  (\\iii|':m. 


5 '9 


Licu'cn  m'.-C'iIon;'!  Hrowii  \v,is  slatinncil  .il  Au;_ni-.t.i.  LitMitriiiiit- 
ro'oiicl  (!i)iv.;cr  at  Ninety  six-,  ami  I j'cutcnant-CMl.iiicl  I'linihull  at 
<"aiii(lcn.  (ifiicral  ('i)ni\\Mlli^  aiivanitii  on  tin.'  Uv(Mit\^sco)nil  witli 
the  Scvi.'nth,  'I'wriUy-third,  Tiiiity-liiird  aii'l  Si'vcnty-fiist  rc'i^iineiUs 
of  infaiUr\',  thr  VolmUccrs  dI"  Iiclau'l,  I  [air.iltoii's  coi]),,  IJiyan's 
l^cfiii^cits,  foiir  ])iixi's  of  raniion,  aivl  a  detarhincnl  "f  cav.ilrs',  toward 
("Iiarloltc,  :'!,7  I  Iaiv.;in;.j  Ivock,  In  a  skirniisb,  mar  tln'  (]onit  House 
on  the  twenty  sixth,  while  entering  ihi:  town,  the  I'riti.h  ailvanci'  was 
activ't'lv  re-.i-led,  l)eitv^r  fneil  a|)on  iVoni  !)eiiiiul  slum;  fences  ami  hnild- 
in;_;s.  C'i)IoneI  T.ii'lcton  reports  "  ,il)out  thirty  of  the  enemy  were 
killed  and  taken;  the  kin;.fs  tro'ips  did  not  eonie  out  ot  this  skirmish 
uniuirt.  Major  Iliiv/r  and  Cajjlains  ( ■ainpiiell  ,iml  McDonald  were 
woimdeil,  and  twelve  non-coniini->^ioned  ol'licers  ,ind  \n>-\\  were  ^-'Med 
and  wouiideck  The  American  rc-p^rt  states  their  lo-,s  as  "  ( "oknel 
l-'rancis  (.ocke,  ('who  rou;.dit  at  I\,ini-.our'i  Mills) /'///(v/,  Maj.>r  (ir.diani 
and  tweKa;  men  wounded." 

Il  wa^  now  the  |)urpose  of  fiiMieral  ("ornwalHs  to  take  active 
measures  for  the  invasion  of  Xortii  ("arolina;  hut  the  whole  re;_;ion, 
drained  i)y  the  I'acoiet,  l"y:-;er,  I'amoree,  and  Saluda  Rivers  was  a 
Irouhle^diTie  one  to  leave  in  his  tar.  (  )f  the  peoj)Ie  ol  Mecklenhur;.^ 
("ount_\-,  aroinul  Charlotte.  ( 'oloiud  'I'arleton  thus  t;i\'es  iiis  oi)inion, 
"It  was '.'videnl  that  the  counties  of  MeckK:nl)Ui;.;'  and  Rohan  were 
mon:  hostile  t(j  I-,n;.dand  than  anx'otluus  in  ,\nuuica.  The  vi;.Mlance 
and  animosity  of  these  districts  checked  the  (\xertions  of  the  well- 
affected,  and  totally  destroyed  all  communications  between  the  kiiv^'s 
troops  and  the  loyalists  in  the  other  parti  of  tlu;  |)rovimH'.  \o  Hrit- 
i-ih  commander  could  obtain  an\'  intormat  ion  ;  the  fora;4in;_^  jjarties 
were  ever_\'  d,iy  harassed  by  tlu;  inh.ibitants,  who  did  not  reni.iin  at 
hiuiu-  to  receive  payment  for  tiie  products  of  their  plantations,  but 
L',enerali_\-  fired  from  covert  places  to  annos-  the  IJritish  detachments. 
Individuals,  with  e.'<[)resses,  were;  fre<pientl\'  murdered.  Notwith- 
slandin;^  tlieir  checks  and  losses,  tluv  continued  their  hostilities  with 
nnwearii'd  |)erseveranci',  and  the  Ihitish  troops  were  so  effectually 
i)Iockaded,  that  ver\'  ^i^w  out  of  a  ;_Meat  number  of  messen^^ers  could 
re.ich  Charlotte,  in  the  be;.dnnin;.;'  of  (  )clobe'r,  to  idve  intelli;_;enct^  of 
l'"er;4uson's  situation."  These  statements  clearly  indie, ite  the  tact  that 
the  British  polic\'  w.is  dcvelopinj^  an  increased  anta;.;onism  amon;; 
the  people,  and  that  the  conquest  did  not  extend  beyond  (jjarrisoii 
limits.     'I'his  irrej^ular  warfare  was  bearing  fruit. 

Colonel   Clark  threatened  Auijusta,  and  in  two  days  inflicted  con- 


'_.^f      *    I 


\ 


\%  i-, 


ill! 


^t* 


fill 


i  I  mm 


i      1 


'  i 


;2o 


H.MTI.K    f>V   CAMDKV. 


|l7«o. 


si(lii,il)lc  loss  u])()H  the  [^.ini-^MH,  !)iit  w.is  repulsed,  I-iciitcii.iiif colniul 
Hmw  II,  the  post  coinni.iiHlci ,  l)cin',j  wiuindcil,  and  Cipt.iin  Jolmsun 
killed.  C'dIoiuI  r.iilctoii  s.ij's  tli.it  the  Iliiti^li  li'ss  Icll  piiiuip.iily 
upon  their  Iiidi.ui  auxili.uirs.  (ieiicr.il  ("i>nuvaiiis  states  thai  the 
Indi.ms  [)ursued  and  si;ai])ed  inaiu'  nf  llic  Aiiii.ricaiis. 

(  )n  the  eit^htli  <it  (kli)l)er  tlie  hatth:  of  Kinj.fs  M.Mintaiii  entered 
into  tin:  operatiiiiis  of  the  eampai;_,Mi  and  (hd  virv  inmh  to  olf^tt  the 
Hriti>ii  vietor)' at  (".imdeii.  i'arleton  and  l'"eri.Mis()n  operated  aJini;.; 
jiarallel  tjelts  separ.iti'd  h)'  the  ( '.itaw  l)a  and  Iho.ul  l\ivi:rsas  c  ireuni- 
stanees  o!  pursuit  oi"  scoutin;^  determined,  and  the  latte;  offieer  who 
h.id  hoped  to  cut  ol'f  Cojoiiul  ( "lark's  de-taelinient  and  otlur  l)order 
parti-rin  corps,  l)et'ore  winter,  tound  hini^c  II  eoiniielled  to  take  r(  he^e 
oil  Kind's  M.)untain  on  tlie  >ixtli  of  (  )elober,  elosely  |>uriued  hy  a 
superior  foree'.  (Jolnnei  Isaie  Slieli>y  with  a  force  liom  SnlUx'an 
( 'oun'.)'  (  now  in  TeiinesNeei ;  ('olonel  WVihain  ( 'anipl)ell,  witii  men  troni 
W'asliinyton  County,  \'ir;.u'nia  ;  (Joloiiel  lleiijamin  ( 'le\i  land  with 
men  from  Wilkes  and  Surre_\- ("ountie^  ;  {'oloiu!  Ciiarles  Mel)owell, 
with  men  hoiii  Wilkes  and  Rutherford  (J)untie>,  \ortii  ('arolina; 
Coloiu'l  John  S(.;\iir  with  men  tVoiii  Sullivan,  iiMciied  the  ( 'ow  ])ens, 
on  Broad  Kivc  r  on  the  sixth  ol  <  >etol)er.  and  were  joined  llu-  same 
evenin;,;  h)'  (Joloiiel  Jaiiies  Williams  of  South  Carolina  with  a  small 
force,  the  total  command  numlieriiiL;  neaii)'  or  (juiti'  sixli'i'ii  hundred 
men.  uiio  h.id  been  selected  f>rtl;e  purpose.  It  was  ,ui  improui[)lu, 
un[)aid  ami)' of  volmlteer.-^,  h.istil)- combined  for  the  purposi' of  riddiii;^ 
the  country  of  l-'eiLjuson's  corps. 

KiiiLj's  Mountain,  aljout  .i  mile  loiv.;  anil  about  ,i  liuiulred  let  t 
above  the  surroundiiiL:,  country,  is  one  of  a  series  of  rocky  summits 
extendiii'4  from  the  south-e.ist  to  the  northwest,  and  is  just  within 
the  boundary  line  of  North  (Carolina,  as  indicated  on  the  map  "  (  )[)er.i- 
lions  in  .Southern  .States." 

Nine  hundred  men  were  selected  to  storm  tlie  hill  in  front  and  on 
the  Hanks.  The  detachment  of  the  .Seventy- first  Hiitish  ret;ul,irs, 
loiiijht  with  such  sjjirit  that  in  three  b.iyoiiet  cliarj^cs  they  crowdetl 
their  assailants  to  the  foot  of  the  hill.  Major  I"'er;4iison  w.is  killed  and 
the  command  devolved  u|)(jn  ('aptain  Abr.di.im  De  Teyster,  ot  the 
Kiiifi's  American  rci;iment.  iXfter  an  h(.)iir  of  desperate  struf^yle  the 
C(miinand  surrendered. 

The  American  casualties  were  Colonel  Williams,  Major  Chromile, 
C.iptain   M.ittocks,   two  lieutenants,  four  ensigns  and    nineteen    men 


H.i 


I -Ho.] 


killi 


IlAI  ri.l-;    (>l-    CAMDI'.N'. 


521 


)iu;    major,  three   c;i[)l;iiiis,  liirLC    licuttn.mts   aiiil  rilty-tliii f 


pi  i\Mtrs  wcniiulcd. 

'I'lic    15riti-ili  (.asu.iUics  arc  characterized   hv  a 


r(|)()rt    whirl)  is  s(i 


similar   to    thiise    (pI 


,llk 


loll    r  speetiiii^    "the    wdiiihIciI    unable    to 


marth,     that  it  louhrms   the  ■'(  aiera 


lly 


aecei) 


ted 


)iiiioM  that  a  dehi) 


eiate  sl.ur^diter  w.is  lu.ide  of  the  so-called   lOry  troo])s.       in.-  ca.-.iiallies 
are  reported  .as,   "  i"\vo   colonels,  three   ca|)taiii^  ,iiid 


lui 


one  pruM 


uo  liiiiHirea  a 
ti  s  killed,  one  hundred   and  t  \sent\'- seven  nri^Mte-.  wounded 


/; 


md  />,///:■  1(11(1 


blc  /, 


('  IIUUl 


It. 


•It  on  the  hehl 


( (lie  I'oli  )IU; 


tw-I 


w  (.  .1 


pt.iiii 


and  with  otlur  olhcers  ,and  men,  six  hundrec 


land 


>rt\' 


:it  prisoner- 


The  re;^nilars  lost,  jjcsides  M.ijor  l'"eri,ni^on,  one  capt.iin,  two  In  uteiKints 
,ind  tlfleeii  privates  killed  ;  thirty-five  woiinderi  but  iiiniliU  In  iiuxirli  and 
lelt  oil  the  ;^round  :   two  c.ipt.iiiis  and  sixtj-er^ht  t,d\in  priioncr-,." 
l'"iftee'n    hundred    imi-^kets  ,iiid  other  arms,  with  the  l).i'''M'.'e,  were 


il.t 


I  .intured 


irletoii  thus  briell)'  sums  up  his  statement 


he  action 


.i>  dispute-il  with  Ljre.il  br.ivery  near  .m  hour,  when  the  de.ith  of  the 


allan 


t   1- 


er'Uison   threw 


effort  was,  made  aft( 


whole    corps  into  tot.d    contusion, 
.t   ll 


\, 


er    tlii^    event,  to    ie-~.i->t   the-  eiieiii)  s   b.u'h.ii  ity  or 
revciH^e  tile  fill  of  their  Icider." 

Lossiii;^   and  D.iwsun  justly  re;^fard   this  .ictioii  ,0  one   ol    the-  most 

ny 


h^tinate  o 


f  ll 


le   u.ir,   ,uid   llu 


,is-.ociate-d    skirmi-ihes  alicads' 


bru 


iioliceil,  are  but    indie, itive  of  tlu 
ch.ir.icter  ot  the  c.imi),iiL;n. 


intense 


ly 


personal 


,111(1 


•structi\( 


It  w,is  now  evidi-nt,"  >ays    l.irlet' 


>n, 


l)e)-oiid  contr.idictioii,  tli.it 


the  i)iili>h    i^c'iier.il    h.id  not    adopted    the    most    eli;_;ibl(.:    pl.m    tor  tin 


invasion   ol     North    (J.ir 


oun.i. 


W 


iiiiisboioiiLdi   u.is  M'lected    tor   the 


winter  t|u,irters   of  the   .irmy,  .and   the  sick   wen;  pi. iced  .it  ( '.muleii, 
where  "  redoubts  were    jjuilt,  to  m.ike    up  lor  the  b.idiie-,^  of  the  posi- 


lioii. 


W 


OIKS    were    .iKo   erec 


coinmumc.itions  with  Lh.irle^ton,  .md  .iKo  .1 


ted   at    \ 

1  .ii~ 


ilioii  s    reirv,   t' )    secure 


ll 


le 


It  N 


metv--ix. 


Tl 


le  success  o 


f  llu 


iiiiericms  .1 


t  K 


III', 


M 


011111. nil. 


■ly 


Tark 


toll. 


aiH 


i  tl 


le  distance  ol    (  omwalli-is   arm 


y.  1 


)roii 


ipt( 


d  m.iiu'  of  the 


disaffected  inli.ibit.mts  of  .South  (".iroliiia  to  bre.ik  their  p.iroK;,  and  to 

M.irion,'   in   the   e.i~.tern  part  of  the  province." 


unite  un  ier  a  le.ider, 


.Sumter  still  operated  on  the 


b.iiik 


Hrci.id  River,  cuttin.;  off  fora-j- 


W 


lys 


einvss 


ini;  )-,arties,  and  eiidaiv^eniiL;  the  po-t  ,it  Ninety-six.  .M.ijor 
ol  the  Sixty-third  liriti-ii  reLjimetit,  and  >ome  c.iv.iliy  ^A  the  legion, 
.lUeinpted  to  surprse  him  at  I-'i-^h  U.im  Ford,  on  the  ninth  of  .Novem- 
ber, lo.st  twenty-live  men  as  prisoners,  and  failetl  in  the  attempt. 
Later  in  llic  month,  Colonel  Sumter,  .stronL;ly  reinforced  by  Colonels 


>l 


ISi 


% 


•\  I'- 


I'fi 


ill 


ill 


n 


K\  rni'    <  >l'    (.  AMDIN. 


Thomas  and    Hiatton,  and    Majors  McCall   and 


l:^^>. 


\l 


imni()n( 


1,  of  S, 


)utri 


Carolina,  niarclu'd  touaixl  NiiK't) -six  to  attempt   its  (:a[)Uiri'.  but  was 


[•iiisu!.'d    li_\' 


iuc\   TailL'tiMi,    and     a   skn-iiiisli    ensued,    N 


ovi 


mbi 


lucnticth,  ,it    lilackstoik's  plantations,  on    tlie  Tiger  River,  which  left 
Colonel  Sumter  in  [lossession  of  the  field. 

1  he'  skirmish  is  i^iven  in   order  tn   indicate  the   extraordinary  con- 
American  statement  of  their 


tlict  in  reports  of  this  p,arti-.an  warfare- 
own  loss,  three  killed,  fear  wounded,  anions;  the  latter  (iener.il  Sumter; 

of  th ;  enem>-,  ninety-two  killed  and    on'     '        '      "  

ton's  statement,  .\mericans  killed 


luindreil   wounde 
uid  wounded. uiju.irds  ot 


•  irlc- 


om-  Hun- 


dred, 


.and  liit\-  made   prisoner- 


Cope  killed,  four  officers 'and  fort_\--fiv 
men  killed  dwd  wounded. 


l^riti-h   loss.  Lieuten.mts  ("lihson  .iiid 


e  iion-commissioned  oiiicers  ,uu 


Stedman  "  takes  the  whole  account  of  the  action  from  Macken/ 


le  s 


strictures   on    1  arieton 


encies  m 


iiul  add 


s   campai;-jn,      \er_\-  justly   reviewin;^   incon>ist- 
arletoir>  re|)ort, which  dis!)ro\-e  his  statement  of  casu.ilties 
le  wounded   of  the  15riti^h  det.ichnient  were  left  to  the 

o  decl.ire 


r 


mercy  of  the  eiu;m>' ;  audit  is  hut  iu-.tice  to  (jeneral  .Sumter  t 


th.it    the   strictest    huin.unt\-   tool 


place   upoi 


1   tlu 


|)re 


•nt 


occasion 


the\- were  sui)plied  with  i-very  comfort  in  his  p. 


ower. 


Alt; 


ioii'_di 


•arie- 


ton w.is  repulsed  at  lU.u  kstock's  Hill,  the  immediate  effect-^  were 
nearly  the  same  as  a  vict(jry.  General  Sumter  bein;^  dis.ibled  by  his 
wound  from  keeping;  the  field,  his  followers  dispersed,  after  conveyin;^ 
him  to  a  place  of  s.d'et\-." 


Tl 


le  summ 


er  and    fdl    camj 


Xll'Ml    Ml 


the  .Soethern  .St.ites   h,ul  been 


)ne  ot  con>l,int  actieif: 


and 


as  the  \ear  I  "So   (U'ew  to  its  close  then 


w.is  no  cess.iticai  ot  diin.iiuls  upon  the  \-i'rilance  o 


f  eitl 


ler  .irmv. 


remnants  ot  ( iener.il  (jatt 


es  ,irmy  were  Peiiii^  reorL;.ini/ed  .is  nij 


)i( 


lly 


as 


pt)ssible,  and  before  the  departure  of  that  oftlcer  to  answer  before  a 
Court  of  liKjuiry  ordered  by  Con;^ress,  ,is  to  the  disaster  at  Camden, 
lie  h.ui  collected  a  nominal  force  of  'wo  thousaiul  three  hundred   and 


seven  men,  more    thin  h.ilt   of  whom  were   mihti.i.  and    as  afterwards 


ft  I 


(h 


-t.ited    1)\'  tieiieral  (ireeiu 


ul    ei'ht   hundreil    in    the   whole   force 


were  properly  clothed  .iiul  ciiuippeil." 

The  post  commander  at  Charleston,  l.ieuten.int-coionel  H.ilfour, 
was  takin;:^  extreme  measures  to  terrify  and  intimid.ite  the  people; 
Marion  had  increased  his  p.ulis.in  detachment  to  the  strenL;th  of  an 
efTicient  corps,  and 
tions    at    the   north,    the   camp.iii^n   o 


h  no  severit\'  of  climate  such  .is  impaired  opera- 


f   1781 


{tract ic. illy   fjigan   whe 


11 


(iener.il  N.ith.iuiel  (ireene  arrived  to  t.ike  comm.iiul  of  the  Southern 
Department  011  the  third  of  December,  17S0. 


l['  I  ' 


I 1  Am  fill  am 

■■la  /Ir/f/.ifi. 
urn- Mil'' 


! 


p ' 


'  i  1 


'i^iji* 


CHAPTKR    LXVI. 

MINOR    MI.NTIOX,    1780.     EUROI.'E.W    COALlIKiN    AGAINST 
LSCA.Wl).    GKXERAL  GRKF-NK    AT    Till;    SOUTH. 

'"I  '^1 1  v.  _\c.ir  i7<So  closed  with  tlic  promise  of  still  more  active  oi)or,i- 
J_  tions  in  the  Soutiierii  Dcpartmi-iit  ;  but  there  were  many 
hindrances  to  prevent  proiii[)t  support  from  the  North.  The  defeat 
of  the  American  army  at  Camden  w.is  not  known  hv  (ieneral  Wash- 
ini^fton  until  September,  and  it  was  impossible  to  spare  from  the 
Northern  army  a  sufficient  force  to  co[>e  u  itii  that  of  Lord  Cornuallis. 

The  second  ilivisioii  of  I'rencli  troops,  so  lonj^  looketl  for,  and 
reported  as  blockaded  m  the  port  of  Ikest,  did  not  arrive.  The 
blockade  of  Newport  compelled  the  l-"rench  ami)-  to  remain  almost 
idle,  as  a  support  to  the  fleet,  and  the  American  armv  rapidl}'  ilimin- 
ished  in  numbers  as  winter  drew  near. 

Occ.isional  demonstrations  were  made  as  if  to  attack  New  York, 
but  chiefly  to  prevent  the  detachment  of  any  portion  of  its  garrison  to 
the  South.  A  serious  attack  upon  the  city  was  impracticable,  until 
reinforcements  should  arrive  from  France. 

Duriny  the  month  of  October,  liowcver.  La  Fayette  elaborated  .1 
plai:,  which  was  so  far  advanced  that  boats  were  built  and  placcil 
upon  w,i;_;i)ns,  thereb\'  to  unite  the  ailvantaj^es  of  attack  both  be- 
laud ami  water.  This  jilan  included  I'ort  Wasiiington,  the  cit\'  of 
New  York  and  Stateii  Island,  as  objectives  of  simultaneous  attack, 
and  proposed  to  make  the  blow  as  sudden  as  that  upon  Trenton  in 
1776.  It  was  ab.uiiloned  for  want  of  boats.  Tiiere  were  few  periods 
during  the  war  when  more  diverse  and  widely  separated  interests 
required  the  attention  of  the  American  Commander-in-chief. 

Major  Carleton,  with  a  force  of  eight  hundred  troops,  regulars, 
Canadians  and  Indians,  captured  Forts  George  and  Ann  in  October. 
Fort  Fdward  was  saved  through  the  sagacity  of  Colonel  Livingston, 


#1 


*  1  : 


m'l 


i;  I 


5-4 


MINMl;    MIAMI  i\. 


[.7«<>. 


wliM  liaviii"  ,1  ;.;airi'^nM  of  only  MViiit_\-iiiiU'  iiicii,  :i\iiti  il  at  tn  k,  l)y 
siiiiliii.;  a  letter  t.>  tlie  I 'linin.inili'v;  :>rrieer  <>!'  \'"y\  (iem.u-  (to  l)c 
iiittiee]ite(l  1)\  the  eiieiiu  I  e\,i;.';'/  I'/tin;;  his  own  sticirMh  .iiul  dec'l.ir- 
ill'_;  Ill's  lillljHi--e  til  yn  \i)  tile  liMlie  of  that  post.  I  he  I'piitish  troops 
lio\ve\ir,  ai'Iually  aiK'aiKHfl  to  the  \iiinit\'  ol'  Sar.itoU'i.  buriu.il  soiiii; 
houses,  ami  then  returned  to  Lake  ('h.inii)lain. 

An  iiuinsion  froni  l*'ort  Ni.i;_;ara  into  the  Mohawk  V^alley  brought 
aii'lher  l)rii  f  stru:;'He  with  l-'-ir  John  Jolmson,  Joseph  lirandt  and 
the  Indian  ^.  I'lie  (  )neidas,  friendly  to  tlu;  United  States,  were 
cxiielled  tViiin  their  lioine^,  the  Schoharie  ri'i^ioii  w.i^  desolated,  ami 
much  wheat  was  iK'stmyed. 

(  )n  the  -ixih  ^i\'  N'ovenilx'r,  (leneial  \Vashin;^toii  confide  tl  to  Geii- 
cr.i!  Schu\lerthe  fict.that  some  leader^  in  Vermont  wcri;  correspond- 
ill!.;  with  Iiritish  offici.ils  in  ("ana<la,  and  direited  him  to  concert 
measures  with  (Icner.il  C  linton  to  deleii  and  thwart  their  plans. 
The  ])rompt  resjumse  of  (ieneral  Scliu\l(  r  \\  a ;  characteristic  of  liis 
entiri'  career  durin;^  the  war;  and  it  is  hut  justice  to  sa_\ .  that  L;ari)le(l 
documents, and  sneers  at  his  hr^h  social  position  and  t  ulture,iiavc  in 
some  iiistancis  usurped  tlu;  place  oi  history  and  dislioiioreil  reiords 
otherwise  reput.ihK-  for  ;.;e'iu.'ral  accur.icy  of  statement.  These  nujvc- 
meiits  re(|uired  thri-e  additional  re;_;iincnts  to  1)1- sent  t(;  .Albany,  and 
constant  une.isiness  prevailed  aloii;^'  tile  whole  northern  aiid  iiortli- 
westi  rn  frontiers. 

( )n  the  si\(utli  of  Xovemlxr  it  was  known  to  \\'asliin;_;tiin  that 
the  .\nieric,ui  arm\'  w,is  "  e\|)eriencin;^  almost  d.iily  want;"  while 
the  "  I5ritish  armv  in  \ew  \'oik  ums  derivin;^  am])le  supplies  from  a 
trade  with  New  N'ork,  New  Jerse)-  and  Connecticut,  which  had,  by 
decrees,  become  so  common  tiiat  it  was  liardly  thought  a  crime." 

(ieneral  Sullivan  liaviiiL;  left  the  armw  took  his  seat  in  ("oiif^rcss, 
.September  eleventh.  In  a  letter  of  November  twentieth,  \\'ashin<^- 
toii  uses  the  foll'iwint^  urgent  and  1, iconic  terms,  in  writiiiL;  to  him: 
"  ("oni_,M"ess  will  deceive  themselves,  if  they  ima^^ine  th.it  the  army,  or 
a  St.it  ■  that  is  the  tlu'ater  of  w,ir,  cm  rub  throuL;li  a  second  cam- 
paign, as  the  l.ist.  It  would  be  as  unreasonable  to  sujipose  that 
because  a  man  had  rolled  a  snowball  till  it  had  acpiired  the  size  of  a 
horse,  he  mii^lit  do  it  until  it  was  the  si/e  of  .i  house.  M.itters  may 
l)e  pushed  to  ,1  certain  point,  be\ond  which  we  c>.n  not  move  them. 
Ten  months'  ji.iy  is  now  due  tn  thi:  army.  I'A'cry  dep.irtment  of  it  is 
so  much  indebted  that  we  have  not  credit  for  a  sin^de  e.xpense,  and 
some  of  the   States  arc  harassed  and  oppressed  to  a  dcgr'jc  beyond 


m 


[17B0. 


1 7  So. 


MlN'ti;    Ml  \TK)N. 


525 


hearinj^.  .  .  To  ilcpciid,  iin(l<r  these  circiinistaiucs,  u\)nn  tin- 
rrsonncs  of  tlir  cunntiv,  una  i-lnl  hy  fuici'.Mi  hiavcry.  will,  I  am 
Cdnfidcnl,  !)!•  t'>  It-. Ill  u|)')ii  a  l)i'it<<-ii  rccii." 

licncral  Sullivan  lia<l  aiK  iscii  lliat  liic  I'lcnrli  llicf  sIhmiM  fiHTC 
its  \\,>\'fn)in  Xr\\'])i)rl  In  lli^lmi,  ami  the  i''rrni  h  .inny  rciiurt  at 
lica(l(iuart(Ts.  This  |)rii|K)  ,ili(>u  li.ul  Ixcm  ur^.'cd  at  a  i  nutrrciui'  held 
with  t  he  ( "(Hint  d<-  l\Mi  h.iiiiluMu,  at  I  larttcird,  ('nmiri  tiiut ,  hut  it  w.is 
tint  ,idiij)tfd.  As  iMily  .IS  ()(l(ihtr  sixtciillh,  (icMrl.d  i.rsllr  left 
\cw  \in]<  uitli  iKMiiy  thrrc  thnu -and  tmops  ami  landed  at  I'orts 
nuaith,  \'ii!.<iiiia  :  hut  aiteiuard^  le  emhaikeil,  and  landeil  ,il  ('li.iiles- 
tmi,  late  in  I  Jeeeinher.  (ciIoikI  Koehamheau,  smi  <it  (  .uint  de 
Km  iiamheau,  left  Newpnit  on  the  l\veiit)'-ei;4llth  of  (  )i  t ohi-r,  ran  the 
■';auiitlet  of  till-  Hrilish  lleet  (hiriiv>  a  ;,',ale,  and  salel\'  re.iehed  h'lanee, 
with  a  formal  apjjlii  at  ion  hir  addit  ional  aid  of  men,  arms  ,md  money 
'l'li<-  <  h'V.ilier  de  Tenia)-  died  at  N'e\\|)(ul,  ou  ihe  fdteenth  of 
Di'Ccnihii",  and  was  sntieedi'd  in  eoniniand  of  the  lleet,  h\-  ('he\',dier 
l)cslou(lu-s.  Some  inilie(tual  iie;,',oti,it ions  took  ])iae<'  lookiiU',  to  a 
union  ot  S]),iiiish  and  I'leiuh  ships  in  a  eommon  movement  on  the 
American  co.ist  :  hut  no  pr.utical  results  were  realized,  more  than  to 
hold  tiie  Ihilish  ships  last  helore  New  jiort,  and  thus  |)reveiit  their 
o])crations  down  the  .Atlantic  loa-^t .  (  olonel  h  K'ury,  \\  ho  had  heen 
distiii;.;uished  .at  l'"ort  Miffhii  .uid  Stony  I'oint,  joined  the  l'"reiKli 
army  under    Koi  h.imheau. 

<  )n  th(.'  twentieth  of  l)eeenil)er.  (uneral  W.ishini^ton  wrot(^  to 
Henj.imin  I'r.inklin,  Minister.it  the  Court  of  N'ers.ijlles,  statin;^  tli.it 
"the  e.imp.iiL;n  h.ul  heen  thus  inaeti\e,  .iftt'r  .1  ll.itleriiv^  p!os|)ect  at 
the  openin<;  of  it  .111(1  vicjoroiis  stru'^fijles  to  m.ike  it  a  lU-cisive  one, 
thr<)Ui;h  failure  of  the  expected  iiav.il  superiorit)'  which  u.istlie  pi\'ot 
upon  which  I'verytliin;^  turned,"  .i-id  .idded  :  "The  movements  of 
l,.ird  (ornwallis  duriiiL^  thep.ist  month  or  two  have  l>een  ritri'i^rnifc. 
W'li.it  turn  the  Lite  reinforceiiieiit.s,  which  h.ive  been  sent  to  him,  may 
S^ive  to  his  affairs,  remains  to  be  known.  1  have  ninforccd  our 
Southern  army,  principally  with  i\orse  ;  but  tiie  leiiL^lh  of  the  inarch 
is  so   much  opposed   to  the    me.isiire  that  every  corjis  is   in  a  threaten 


or 


deirr 


ee  riimeil 


11  ii.ipp)',  iioweve'r,  m    .issurnif^  )du 


th.it 


better  disposition  never  prevailed  in  the  leL;islatiires  of  the  several 
States,  tli.iii  at  this  time.  The  folly  of  temporary  expeilieiits  is  seen 
into  and  exploded,  and  vi|4(jrous  efforts  will  be  used  to  obt.iin  a  |)er- 
maiu'nt  army  and  carry  on  tlie  war  .system.itically,  if  the  obstin.icy 
of  Great   Ihit.iin  sliall   compel   us  to  continue  it.     We  want  nothin^^ 


■i  I    ■ 


I  ! 


m  ¥ 


wc^ 


MINI  Ik    MKNTION. 


[1780. 


I)iit  tlu'  .lid  (.fa  loan  to  i:i\.il)lc  iis  to  put  our  fiuaiiCL'S  into  a  tolcrablf^ 
train,  llic  country  dot-s  not  want  rcsoiuw  -,  but  wc  want  tlic  nic.ins 
of  tlrawin;.;  them  t'ortli." 

It  appears  fnun  tin's  letter  that  Washiiv^'ton  had  readied  a  point 
\vlu:re  he  telt  that  ultiin  ite  sueeess  was  not  f,ir  dist.int.  'l"he  recon- 
struction of  the  arni>'  to  w  hich  lie  refers,  w.is  a  i>l,in  then  pendinj;  for 
till-  consolidaticjn  of  battalions,  rctlucin.j  thi.-ir  numbers  ami  tlu.'reby 
settling;  upon  soincthin>^'  like  a  permanent  arniv  establishment. 

The  new  army  was  to  consist  of  tlfty  rc;4imcnts  of  foot,  including 
1  Iazen'.-^.  s])eciall\-  reserved-  -  four  rij:;iments  of  artillery,  and  one  of  arti- 
ficers, with  tile  two  |)artisan  corps  undei'  Armand  .lud  Lei',  d['A  tour 
other  leu;ionary  corjis,  two-tliii'd-.  horse  .\nA  one-third  foot.  All  new 
enlistments  were  to  be  lor  the  w.ir.  The  total  loive  u[)on  the  rees- 
tablished com])any  basis  wouKl  amount  to  thirty-six  thou.sand  men. 
Xot  more  than  half  that  number  were  ever  in  the  field  at  the  same 
time,  and  the  full  complement  was  never  recruited,  llazeii  s  ri'^iment. 
<nid  the  corps  of  Armand  and  I  ,ee  wi're  recruite<l  <it  larcje.  Ihe  other 
re;4iments  were  assi<^ned  as  follows:  to  Mass.ichusetts  ,md  Virfjim'a. 
eleven  re;4imi'nts  each  ;  l\-nnsylvam'a,  nine  ;  (."oune-cticut,  six  ;  Mary- 
laiul.  tne;  North  Carolina,  four  ;  New  York,  three;  New  Hampshire, 
New  Jerse)-  ;ind  South  Carolina,  two  e.ich  ;  Rhode  Isl.md,  Delaware 
anti  (ieori^ia,  one  each. 

'I'liis  reorganization  was  .itteudcd  with  dil'licultiivs.  Ther;-  were 
nian\'  who  had  taken  commissions  with  the  purpose  of  devotiiv^  their 
life  to  military  attainment.  Their  entire  life,  (as  a  soKlier  would 
underst.uid  the  expression)  w.is  involved  in  their  ndlitary  service. 
The  consolidation  involved  sacrifices,  and  there  was  a  stroui^  part)'  in 
Coni;rcss,  "  led  by  .Samuel  Adams,"  which  as  Ilildreth  concisely  states 
the  fact.  ■'  was  very  jealous  of  military  power,  and  of  everythin;^  which 
tend(,:d  to  t;ive  a  permanent  cliaracter  to  the  army."  The  retirement 
of  oflkers  on  ])artial  pay  was  bitterly  opposeil  by  this  ])arty  ;  and  the 
jealousy  of  a  re;:;ular  army,  the  value  of  which  was  in  Washington's 
estimation,  and  in  fact,  one  of  the  threat  lessons  of  the  war,  wms  the 
perpetual  cause  of  waste,  disaster,  and  the  postponement  of  success. 

Colonel  Robert  H.  Harrison,  former  secretary  to  the  Commander- 
in-chief  had  become  Chii'f  Justice  of  Mar\'land,  and  was  succeeded  in 
the  staff  by  Jonathan  Trumbull,  Jr.  Hand  was  appointed  Adjutant- 
general,  vice  .Scammel  resigned.  Smallwood  succeeded  to  command 
of  a  divisi(jn,  vice  I  )e  Kalb.  killetl  in  battle.  Morgan  was  promoted  as 
Urigadier-general,  and  si.-nt   to  the   Southern   Department,   together 


17'"  I 


MIN'ok    MRSIIkV. 


537 


willi  ( irncr.il  StL'iibcn  aiiil  Lcc's  corns,  thrrc  hiiiidrril  .md  lift)- strmi;^, 
toj^ctlii-T  uitli  Ki)^ciu-iki)  .IS  L'lv^inecr,  vici-  \h\  I'mtail  cipuircil  at 
Charleston. 

A  spci  it'  t.ix  (if  six  luilliiiiis  wms  imposed,  ami  in  spite  of  countless 
minor  cml)arrassiniiit>  the  sixth  annual  canipai;^n  nf  the  war  drew 
near  it.s  close. 

On  the  tweiity-eiLjhth  of  N'ovenil)  ■:,  Washington  desi;4natcd  tiic 
winter  (piarters  for  the  army,  his  own  Ix-inif  established  at  New 
Windsor.  The  I'eniisyiv.ini.i  line  weie  established  near  Moiristown  ; 
the  Jerse)'  line  at  I'ompton  :  tin-  Maryland  regiment  of  horse  at  Lan- 
caster, I'ennsylv.inia  ;  .md  Siieldon's  horse  at  Colchester,  Cviiniecticiit  ; 
one  New  York  re-immt  at  I'ort  Schuyler,  one  at  Sarato;^.!,  aiul  the 
remainder  of  the  line  ,it  Albaii)-,  Schenect.idy,  and  other  eX[)osecl 
posts. 

In  the  location  of  troops  in  southern  New  En;^land,  where  the 
I'"rench  an  \-  \\,is  ipiartered,  there  w.is  much  loc.d  apprehension  lest 
for.ij^e  wouIlI  be  inatle(|uate  to  the  demand  ;  ,md  some  local  feelin<j 
was  aroused  in  Connecticut  ai^ainst  the  assi^niments  made.  In  .1 
letter  to  ("io\eriior  Trumbull,  of  December  seventeenth,  Washington 
plainl)-  asserted  his  prero;jative  as  Commander-in-chief  to  direct  the 
movements  of  the  army,  assertinij  that  any  local  interference  intrenched 
upon  his  i)rerogat;ve  and  endani;ereil  the  nationaf  cause.  Governor 
Trumbull,  as  alwa\'s,  fully  sui)ported  Washini;ton. 

The  condition  ot  (ire.it  Hrit.iin  at  this  period  of  the  stru;4;4le  was 
one  of  su[)renie  tri.d.  ller  insuKir  position  was  su;4<jcstive  u\'  inde- 
peiuience  ;  but  hei  maritime  superiority  was  a  source  of  universal 
jealousy  and  env\'.  Whatever  may  have  been  her  errors  of  policy  or 
her  failure  to  compromise  issues  with  forei;.^ni  states,  the  close  of  1780 
iound  her  in  [)ractic,d  coullict  with  lawope,  and  under  ;ip[irehensions 
of  inx'asion  from  France.  Spain  and  I'r.mce  were  united  in  open  war, 
and  their  combined  lleets  ihreatenetl  her  West  India  ])ossessions. 
-Spain  was  pre.-.sin;^  the  sie;^e  of  (iibraltar.  Denmark  and  Sweden 
had  already  unitetl  with  Catharine  of  Russia  to  adopt  the  famous 
system  of"  Armed  Neutrality,"  declaring  that  "  free  ships  make  free 
goods,"  and  that  neutrals  might  carry  any  goods  or  supplies  wherever 
they  pleased  with  complete  immunity  from  search  or  capture.  This 
was  a  blow  at  British  commerce.  Even  in  the  ICast  Indies  her  crown 
was  one  of  thorns.  Ilyder  Ali  swept  tlirough  the  province  of  Madras, 
and  Warren    Hastings    was  contending,  as    for   life,  to   save  British 


suprem:i 


IC)' 


from  overthrow. 


i^fu. 


t'i  '!•■  I 


i'U 


IJI 


U.' 


1  ■ 


f! 


if! 


528 


MIM>K    MKMIMN'. 


[17S0. 


France  sent  aiil  to  llyilir  Ali  as  well  as  to  America,  and  thereby 
was  limited  in  her  contributions  to  the  army  of  Washinj^ton. 

ICarly  in  ScptenibiT  a  corrcspoiulence  h.ul  bren  well  adv  acetl 
between  tlir  United  States  and  Holland,  lookin;^  to  a  commercial 
treat)'  between  tiie  twii  nations.  Laurens  was  sent  as  a  commissioner 
to  Holland,  was  taken  prisoner,  c.irried  to  l'ai<;land,  and  confined  in  the 
Towi-r  on  ,1  ch,ir;4e  of  hi;^h  teason.  I  lis  papers  were  captured,  and 
as  the  result  of  a  brief  correspondence  bctwi-en  the  British  Cabinet 
and  the  States-(  ieneral  of  Holland,  the  british  L;overnment  declareil 
war  against  that  st.ite  on  the  second  day  of  December.  Instructions 
had  been  previously  sent  to  her  fleets,  and  immediate  blows  were 
struck  .it  the  Dutch  colonies  and  Dutch  conmit.'rce. 

Domestic  t'xcitenients  added  tlii-ir  burden  to  the  t^'reat  external 
pressure  which  seemed  to  thre.iten  the  Isl.md  Minpire.  Ki^hty  tliou- 
s.uul  volunteers  had  been  enrolled  in  Ireland,  in  view  of  ai)prehended 
invasion  from  I'r.mce.  The  .i;.;it.itions  for  parliamentary  reform 
became  earnest,  and  the  independence  of  the  Irish  Parliament  was 
said  to  be  in  peril.  Meanwhile  the  Hritish  advocates  of  "peace  with 
America  at  the  price  of  recoi^nized  independence  "  became  more 
earnest,  ami  the  crisis  rendered  the  detachment  of  any  considerable 
body  of  troops  to  increase  the  armies  at  Nl-w  York  and  Charleston, 
absolutely  impossible.  The  period  w.is  one  which  vindicated  the 
cl.iim  of  Gre.it  Hrit.iin  to  the  admiration  of  the  world  for  her  wonder- 
ful cap.icity  to  withst.md  external  force,  and  no  less  emphatically  dis- 
closed the  equally  wonderful  resources  at  her  control.  It  was  in  exacc 
kecpi.i^  with  the  stru_L;i;le  which  made  the  American  Colonics  uncon- 
querable by  force  of  .irms.  Thus  Entfland  and  h'rance  alike  were 
restrained  from  strengthening  the  contendini^  armies  of  the  New 
World. 

General  Greene  accepted  the  southern  command  with  eagerness, 
supported  by  the  confidence  of  Washington.  General  L;i  Fayette 
desired  to  accompany  him  ;  but  in  view  of  his  intimate  relations  to 
the  P'rench  alliance,  his  services  were  deemed  essential  to  successful 
oi)erations  at  the  north. 

General  Greene  started  for  the  south.  There  was  breadth  of  terri- 
tory sufficient  to  satisfy  any  reasonable  ambition  ;  but  he  needed 
an  army.  He  resoh'ed  to  develop  an  army,  in  accordance  with  the 
peculiar  kind  of  service  which  would  be  required,  and  his  suggestion 
was  approved  by  Washington  when  he  first  submitted  his  plan  on  the 
eighth    of   November,  1780.     He  would  have  that    army  a    "flying 


[1730. 

icrcby 

,  need 
ncrcial 
ssioncr 
1  in  tlic 
.h1,  ;uul 
J!;il)iiK"t 
ccl.ircd 
actions 
•s  were 

;xtornal 
:y  thou- 
;hciuk:cl 

reform 
cnt  was 
ace  witli 
ne  more 
ddcrablc 

irlcstoii, 
Ltcd    the 

wondcr- 
:a!ly  dis- 

iii  exacc 
s  uncon 
ike  were 
the   New 

!agerness, 

Fayette 

Uitions  to 

successful 

:h  of  terri- 
le  needed 
e  with  the 
suggestion 
Ian  on  tlie 
a    "flying 


1780,1 


MINOR   MENTION. 


529 


army,"  lii^^htly  equipped,  mobile,  and  as  familiar  as  possible  with  the 
country  in  whicli  operations  were  to  i)e  prosecut  hI.  The  (Jommander- 
in-chiff  addressed  letters  to  (iovernur  llKjmas  S.  Lee  of  Maryland, 
to  Governor  Al>ner  Nash  of  North  Carolina,  and  to  Governor  Thomas 
Jeffersr)n  of  Virginia,  invokinLf  their  cordial  cooperation  in  the  work 
of  the  new  Department  coirnnander. 

Tile  siiiithern  arm)',  as  Greene  wrote  to  General  Knox,  "  is  shadov 
rather  than  substance,  having  only  an  im.iglnary  existen.  "  Con- 
gress could  not  supply  tr()0[)s  ;  but  !)>■  the  .idding  of  Maryland  and 
Delaware  to  his  department,  he  secunil  the  control  of  militia, addi- 
ticjnal  to  that  which  he  was  to  draw  from  the  actual  fieUl  of  o[)era- 
tions.  He  was  also  clotlied  with  the  same  powers  which  General 
(jates  had  been  empowered  to  exercise,  such  as  authority  to  dr.iw 
upon  the  Southern  States  for  troops  or  money  and  to  iin press  subsis- 
tence or  transportation,  whenever  unavoidable  necessity  should 
require  it. 

On  the  twenty-third  of  November  he  began  his  journey,  attended 
by  General  the  liaron  Steuben  and  iiis  aids  Colonel  Morris  and  Major 
Ikirnet.  At  each  State  capital  he  urged  the  necessity  of  immediate 
action.  To  Governor  Rodney  of  Delaware,  he  wrote  : — "  Do  not  suffer 
those  States,  now  struggling  with  the  enemy,  to  sink  under  their 
oppression,  for  want  of  a  reasonable  support."  To  Governor  Lee,  of 
Maryland: — "Unless  they  are  soon  succored  and  countenanced  by 
a  good  regular  force,  their  distresses  will  inevitably  break  their  spirits, 
and  they  will  be  compelled  to  reconcile  themselves  to  their  misfor- 
tunes. There  is  no  alternative  but  base  submission,  or  an  effectual 
prosecution  of  the  war."  Generals  Gist  and  SmalKvood  were  at  once 
employed  by  these  two  States,  upon  recruiting  service.  General 
Greene's  order  of  November  twentieth,  thus  gives  clearness  to  his 
will, — "  You  will  please  to  make  all  your  applications  in  writing,  that 
they  may  appear  hereafter  for  our  justification  ;  that  we  left  nothing 
unessayed  to  promote  the  public  service.  Let  your  ap])lications  be 
as  pressing  as  our  necessities  are  urgent ;  after  which,  if  the  northern 
States  are  lost,  we  shall  stand  justified.  The  greatest  consccjuences 
depend  upon  your  activity  and  zeal  in  the  business." 

Upon  reaching  Virginia,  he  found  that  the  State  was  necessarily 
absorbed  in  its  own  defense.  General  Leslie  had  taken  possession 
of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth,  and  fortified  both.  Generals  Muhlen- 
berg and  Weedon,  had  been  sent  by  Washington  to  organize  the 
militia,  and  upon  General  Greene's  arrival  they  were  organizing  their 
34 


ittf'l 


.  ''1  ■ 

's'  .t' 

r  ;'V 


I  I 


'    f 


M 


M*1*l 


'  ' 


m 


'    '     1''  W- 


(S. 


530 


MINOR    MliNTlON. 


L178D. 


forces  to  oppose  any  advance  of  General  Leslie  be)-ond  the  immedi- 
ate limits  of  the  two  posts  which  his  arm\' "fariisoned.  I'he  consoli- 
dation of  iTfriments  and  the  reduction  of  their  number,  left  several 
valuable  officers  out  of  service  ;  but  nearl\-  all  of  these,  as  uell  as 
Generals  IMuhlenbcrg  and  Weedon.  had  served  under  General  Greene 
at  the  Udrth.  Anions  the  officers  thus  left  witliout  commands  was 
Colonel  Edward  CarriuL^ton.  The  first  thinij  General  Greene  deter- 
mined upon  was  "  to  select  depots,  and  laboratories,— posts  of  rest  and 
communication,  and  to  i)rovitle  transportation  for  hospital  antl  other 
army  stores." 

Justice  Johnson  states  that  ''he  fixed  his  eye  upon  Colonel  Car- 
rins^ton  as  eminently  qualified  to  undertake  the  task  of  comljinini^f 
and  conductint;  the  means  at  the  Quartermaster-'^eneral's  depart 
ment  ;  that  he  obeyed  the  call  to  the  office  <ind  discharged  it  with 
unequaled  zeal  and  fitlelity."  Chief-justice  Marshall  ronfirms  tlu' 
statement.  The  principal  depot  of  stores  and  arms  was  established 
at  Prince  Edward  Court  House,  and  General  the  Baron  Steuben  was 
charged  with  maintaining  the  supply  of  powder  from  the  manufac- 
tories, and  of  lead  from  the  mines  in  Fincastle  County.  He  was  also 
placed  in  command  of  the  District  of  Virginia,  with  a  special  charge 
"  to  collect,  organize,  discipline  and  expedite  the  recruits  for  the 
Southern  army." 

l^efore  his  departure  for  the  field  General  Greene  wrote  to  Gover- 
nor Jefferson,  urging  the  immediate  completion  of  the  regiments, 
under  the  reduced  standard,  to  their  maximum  ;  and  makes  the  fol- 
lowii!g  points  emphatic:  "It  is  perfectly  consistent,  in  all  cases,  to 
carry  on  war  abroad,  rather  than  at  home,  as  well  in  matters  of  expense, 
as  in  humanity  to  the  inhabitants.  15ut  this  policy  is  rendered  doubly 
necessary  to  Virginia,  from  the  ease  with  which  the  enemy  can  pene- 
trate through  North  Cuolina  and  possess  themselves  of  all  t)ie  low 
country  of  Virginia.  .  .  It  must  be  the  extreme  of  folly  to  hazard 
our  liberties  upon  so  ])recarious  a  dependence,"  referring  to  the 
militia.  "They  are  the  bulwark  of  civil  liberty  if  they  are  not 
depended  upon,  as  a  princi[)al,  but  employed  as  an  auxiliary." 
'' Officers  arc  tlie -ocry  soul  of  an  arnty,M^^S.  you  may  a.,  -veil  attempt 
to  animate  a  dead  body  into  action,  as  to  expect  to  employ  an  army 
to  advantage,  when  the  officers  are  not  perfectly  easy  in  their  circum- 
stances, and  happy  in  the  service." 

In  the  sphere  of  Logistics  which  so  materially  affects  all  military 
operations,  General  Greene  had  peculiar  experience,  and  he  evinced 


I7S".; 


MI.;()R    MKNli-iV. 


531 


great  (ii->ciiinitiatioii  and  practical  judgment.  In  this  Icttor  to  Gov- 
ern<)r  Jefferson,  he;  says  :  "  Tlie  Lite  distressint;-  accounts  from  tl>e 
Southern  army  claim  llie  immediate  attention  of  ;^i)vernnu:nt,  bulli 
with  respect  to  provisions  and  clothinL,^  It  is  imjjossible  (dv  men  to 
remain  long  in  the  field  unless  they  are  well  furnished  with  both 
these  articles;  and  to  expose  them  to  the  want  of  either, will  soon 
transfer  tlicm  from  the  field  to  the  iiospital,  or  lay  them  uu'ler  the 
necessity  of  desertiiiL;'."  .  .  .  "  (ireat  pains  should  be  taken  to  fix 
up(jn  some  place  for  fei;ding  tin;  army  with  live  stock,  and  I  think  of 
none  unlos  it  be  putting  up  a  large  quantit)'  of  beeves  t<>  stall-feed." 

.  .  "The  distress  and  suffering  of  the  peo[)le  of  North  and  South 
Carolina  deserve  the  most  speedy  support  to  keep  alive  that  spirit  of 
enterprise  which  has  [)revailed  among  them  lately,  so  much  to  their 
honor.  It  is  much  e.isier  to  o[)pose  the  enemy  while  tiie  tide  of 
sentiment  runs  in  oar  fivor,  than  it  will  be  to  secure  Virginia  after 
they  are  o\errun." 

Orders  were  issued  to  Colonel  CiM-rington  "  to  explore  the  Dan, 
Yadkin  and  Catawba,  and  make  iiimself  thoroughly  acquainted  with 
the  streams  into  which  they  discharged  themselves."  This  order  was 
executed  with  great  ex.ictness.  and  the  casual  reader  of  general  history 
wh(j  has  'egarded  the  subsetjuent  movements  of  (General  (jreene  as 
accidentcd,  will  see  that  a  previous  knowledge  of  the  country  in  which 
he  was  to  operate  was  one  element  of  ids  military  success.  Colonel 
Carrington  accompanied  General  (jreene  to  Richmond  after  the 
organization  of  his  department.  General  Stevens  executed  the  sur- 
ve\-  of  the  Vadkin.  Kosciusko,  Greene's  engineer-in-chief,  e.\amined 
the  Catawba,  and  other  officers  visited  the  Dan.  ihe  resu.t  of  this 
foretliought  m.iterially  affected  the  subsequent  campaign. 

On  the  second  of  December,  General  (jreene  reached  Charlotte, 
and  immediately  relieved  General  Gates  of  the  command,  under  cir- 
cumstances which  redounded  to  the  credit  of  both  officers.  Mutual 
courtesies  were  exchanged,  and  General  Gates  went  to  his  farm.  The 
condition  of  his  army  was  Cieneral  Cireene's  first  care.  He  found  that 
everything  was  needed,  .uid  in  a  letter  to  (iovernor  Jefferson,  states 
quite  cle,ui>-  the  facts.  A  few  paragraphs  are  given  :  "  I  Und  the 
troops  in  a  most  wretched  condition,  destitute  of  everything  necessary 
either  for  comfort  or  convenience,  and  may  literally  be  saitl  to  be 
naked."  "  It  will  answer  no  gootl  purpose  to  send  men  here  in  such 
a  condition."  "  There  must  be  either  pride,  or  principle,  to  make  a 
soi^lier.     No  man  will   thiid<  himself  bound    to  fi'dit  the  battles  of  a 


'fv«i^*^i!!i' 


sitii 


n 


i 

|ii 

1^. 

i 

i 

bHf 

hH] 

■i*}*' 

m 

■9 

;^^ll|f@#i! 


^*'m 


I* 


MINOR    MFNTION. 


L1780 


state  that  leaves  him  to  ])erish  for  want  of  cl()tlliIl^^  nor  can  you  inspire 
a  soldier  with  the  sentiment  of  pride  while  iiis  situation  renders  liim 
more  an  object  of  i)ity  than  of  en\-y.  The  life  of  a  soldier  in  the  best 
estate, is  liable  to  iiuninurable  hardships  ;  but  where  these  are  ag;j;ra- 
vated  1)}'  the  want  of  ])ro\isions  and  clothinj;.  his  condition  becomes 
intoler.ible ;  nor  can  men  Inn;;  contend  with  such  complicated  diffi- 
culties ami  distress.  Death,  (iesertion,  and  the  hospital  must  soon 
swallow  up  an  army  under  such  circumstances,  and  if  il  were  possible 
l>ir  men  to  maintain  such  a  wretched  existence,  they  wf)uld  have  no 
spirit  to  fice  their  enemies,  and  would  inevitably  diss^race  themselves 
and  their  commander.  It  is  impossible  to  presume  discipline  ulu'ii 
troops  are  in  want  of  everythinj.^  ;  to  attem[)t  severity  will  only  thin 
the  ranks  by  a  more  hast)'  desertion." 

For  two  months  General  Greene  remained  in  camp.  He  antici- 
pated the  necessity  for  axes,  and  even  nails,  and  fabricated  cheap 
substitutes  for  articles  th.it  covdd  not  be  readily  secured  otherwise. 

On  the  twenti^Lii  of  December,  havin_y  been  delaj-ed  four  days  by 
rains,  the  huts  at  Charlotte  were  abandoned,  the  main  army  reachinj^ 
Hicks  cn-ek,  a  branch  of  the  l'eedee,near  Chtraw  Hill,  on  the  twenty- 
sixth.  General  Mor^jan  was  detached,  however,  on  the  sixteenth, 
with  three  hundred  ami  twenty  from  the  Maryland  line,  two  luuulred 
Virginia  militia,  and  Colonel  WashiuL^ton's  horse,  less  tlian  a  hundred 
stron<j,  to  cross  the  C.itawba,  and  "  take  command  in  that  quarter,  to 
act  offensively  or  defensivelv,  to  protect  the  country,  spirit  up  the  peo- 
ple, annoy  the  enemy,  collect  [)rovisions  and  foraije,  form  ma<^azines, 
prevent  plundering,  etc."     .     .     . 

M,-  ion  at  once  placed  himself  in  conmiunication  with  General 
Greene.  In  a  letter  to  that  officer,  responsive  to  one  aildressed  to 
General  Gates,  he  says,  "  Your  letter  of  the  22d  last  month  to  Gen- 
eral Gates  is  before  me.  I  am  fully  sensible  your  service  is  hard  and 
sufferings  great  ,  but  how  great  the  prize  foi-  which  we  contend.  I 
like  your  plan  of  frecjuently  shifting  >i)ur  ground.  It  fre([uently  pre- 
vents a  surprise,  and  perhaps  the  total  loss  of  your  party.  Until  a 
more  permanent  army  can  be  collected  than  is  in  the  field  at  present, 
we  must  endeavor  to  keep  up  a  partisan  war,  and  preserve  the  tide  of 
sentiment  among  the  jieople  in  our  fivor  as  much  as  possible.  Spies 
are  the  iirs  of  an  anity,  and  without  them  a  general  is  always  groping 
in  the  eiark." 

Marion  was  then  on  Black  River,  but  soon  returned  to  his  camp 
in  the  forks  of  Tedee  and  Lynch  Rivers,  and  on  the  twenty-seventh  of 


i78o.] 


MINOR   MF-NTION. 


533 


December  ro[)ortL'd  toCicncral  Greene  the  arrival  of  General  Leslie  at 
Charleston,  his  march  to  Caniik'n.  .mil  the  establishment  of  Colonel 
Watson  at  Nelson's  Ferry  with  two  hundred  men.  From  that  time 
forward  the  eampaij^n  was  fairly  in  motion.  With  Morgan  on  the 
west  and  Marion  in  the  eastern  districts,  the  new  commanding;  officer 
had  carefully  prepared  his  way  to  contend  with  the  British  forces  in  a 
manner  of  warfare  which  should  suit  itself  to  the  character  of  his 
troops,  and  the  country  in  which  the  war  was  to  be  carried  on.  It  is 
very  clear  from  the  unofficial  letters  of  (rcner.d  Greene  to  La  Fayette 
and  other  officers,  that  he  realizeil  the  j^rave  responsibilities  of  his 
position  and  endeavored  to  anticipate  the  contin;;encies  of  the  cam- 
pai_i,m.  A  reference  to  chapter  thirty-six  will  show  that  at  that  early 
period  of  the  war,  he  understood  the  importance  of  preparin;^  in 
advance  for  an  army  movement;  and  as  already  indicated,  much  of 
his  success  at  the  south  was  secureil  by  the  tedious  system  of  recon- 
noitrini;    which  he  inauLjurated  before  he  marched  from  Virginia. 

Other  troops  followed  slowly.  The  patience  of  Baron  Steuben  was 
severely  tasked.  On  the  fifteenth  of  December  Colonel  Lee  marched 
with  his  corps,  three  hundred  stront;,  and  Colonel  Christoj^her  Greene 
accompanied  him  with  four  hundred  men,  but  they  did  not  reach  the 
Peedee  until  the  twelfth  of  January. 

The  closing  active  campait^n  of  the  war  for  ,\merican  Independence 
thus  opened,  and  its  principal  military  events  will  be  considered  in 
detail. 


y ^< 


m^' 


■^5*1 


'  n  r 


W  .  ii 


.  -1 


CHAl'TKR    LXVII. 

CONDiriOX  OF  SOL'TIIEKN  AFFAIRS.  MUTINY  W  TIIK  NORTH. 
Ol'l. RATIONS  OF  GKXERALS  C.RKF.NK  AND  CORNWAI.LIS. 
RATTI.T:    (IF    COWPHNS,     1781. 

TI 1 1'^  cami)ai;^ni  of  17S1  was  the  last  of  tlic  Aineiicaii  war,  but  in 
some  respects  it  was  less  lanu'^tlv  supporteil  than  were  tliose 
of  prt'\ious  years.  The  American  army  coiikl  not  he  recriiited  up  to 
tile  new  stand, u'd.  and  tlie  British  recei\-ed  no  consider. d)le  reinforce- 
ments tVom  .ibroad.  'l"he  .\mericaii  people  seemed  t<j  consider  the 
jireseiiee  o\  tlie  French  troops  as  e([ui\alent.  rather  tii.ui  .is  ,in  en- 
coura;4ement.  to  extr.i  exertion  ;  and  a  corresponiliu'^  impression  of 
tlie  I'"u;.;hsh  crown  that  the  south  w.is  ahiiost  conquered  and  would 
(juite  LHuerally  rail)- to  the  royal  standard,  had  its  tendencx'.  eiiuall)- 
to  quiet  the  ICiv^li^h  authorities  .ind  prevent  the  shiiiment  of  troops. 

The  addition  of  1  [oll.iiul  to  the  enemies  of  ICii,;] md  had  its  effect 
also,  .^ince  it  compelled  En;4l,ind  to  leave  American  affairs  almost 
entirely  to  the  cue  ot  officers  then  on  dut_\'  in  the  I'nited  .States; 
and  on  the  other  h.uul,  the  Americans  coulil  not  l.iil  to  see  that  any 
hu'^c  addition  to  the  I?ritisli  armvifrom  abroad. w. is  impossible.  In 
addition  to  tlK>-e  con-iderations,  there  was  a  sense  of  fatigue  which 
aflected  the  people  on  both  >ides  of  the  Atl.intic.  as  if  there  had  been 
sufficient  fi^htin;.^-  over  an  issue  whiih  could  ha\'e  but  one  ])ossible 
result.  Si'/'ordfii'ii.  'Idie  lCnL;lish  whi;4s  remonstrated  against  its  con- 
tinuance, and  the  Cabinet  itself  began  to  realize  the  f.ict  that  the  war 
was  uippling  all  elVorts  in  other  'Jircctions  ;  wliilc  the  Americans 
themselves,  outside  of  the  Southern  States,  largely  entertained  the 
conviction  that  the  war  would  soon  end,  and  therefore  failed  to  make 
the  necessary  exertions  to  enti  it  sun.imarily,  by  supplying  the  neces- 
.sary  force,  at  once.  Money,  food  and  clothing,  were  as  scarce  as  at 
an)-  previous  jjerio  1,  and  protractetl  sacrilke,  uncompensated  labor 
and   unpaid   services,  began  to   wear   out    both  soldiers  and  people. 


VAI.LIS. 


r,  but  in 

■re  tln'-^i" 
■a  up  t'^ 
cinforco- 
sidcr  the 
;is  an  en- 
cssiou  of 
id  wouKl 
equally 


troop- 


its  e 


vs 


ffcct 


almost 


i\  States  ; 
that  any 
blc.     In 
hich 


;si 


•  nie  w 

had  be<n 
he  possible 
list  its  con- 
t  the  war 

Americans 


■la 


Itameil 


tht 


cl  to  make 
the  neces- 
arce  as  at 
ted  labor 
le. 


Isa 


ukI  peop 


\Sh0efv//t// ' 


li-'-^ 


*u 


ijKiilitiioiiLi 


>         4 


U' 


I!  .«.».. .'-r:^^^^ 


•F 


:-i:.  ■ 


m  i; 


>! 


;»     ^. 


i7Si. 


rf^NPITION    or    SOUl-|lr.UN'    AIIAIKS. 


535 


Hostilities  wi'ir  t(Mi  inacti\c  to  .uoiisc  the  north  to  united  action: 
and  ihi'  I'aiL^lish  foire's  at  tlie  south  were  too  superior  in  nuinlxr-^  to 
encour.r^e  tiu'  soutiiern  ])eo|)le  to  combine  for  resistance,  unaided  by 
reL^ul.ir  troops.  It  was  just  the  time  when  the  Hritish  Cabinet  could 
have  made  a  stronij  reinforcement  ver)-  impressive  ;  provided  it  could 
command  I'.ni^Iish  sxinpathy  :  ami  it  was  just  the  time  that  the 
American  people  needed  the  pressure  of  some  permanent  danj^er  to 
arousi'  tlu'iu  to  the  ofiinsi\-e. 

The  I'Vench  .iriny  in  .\merica  sustained  an  important  relation  to 
this  period.  It  prevented  (leneral  Clinton  from  riskin;^  the  offensive, 
and  to  the  same  e.vtent  lessenetl  the  zeal  of  the  New  Kn;4land  people 
in  the  preparatiiMis  for  troojis  for  the  new  campaij^n,  because  the 
nr;,;eiK'y  of  tln'ir  emplo\-inent  did  notappear  immediate  and  absolute. 

The  acti\e  oi)erations  of  the  war  eventualK'  transferred  l.a  l"ay- 
I'tte,  and  then  Washington  and  KodiambiMU,  to  the  Southern  depart- 


ni 


ent,  u  lu're  (in: 


ene  liad  hwn  es 


tal)l 


i^hec 


1  in  December,  I  rSo. 


On  the  p.irt  of  the    Hritish    .iriny,  Cornwallis  held   tlu'  chief  place 
of  responsible  comm.iud.      Phillips  and  .\rnold    nuule  a  diversion  into 


V 


ir'nnia   to   strenutiien    hi>   second   invasion  of  North  Carol 


ma,  a 


nd 


Arnolil  ultimately  m.ide  an  incursion  into  Connecticut  to  suspend  the 


transfer  of  northeri 


LUKiican  troo[)s  to  the  sou 


th. 


ins  latter   in- 


cursion, 


»owe\er,   w  .is   ei 


itireU'   i<£norcd    1)\'  W'.ishinijton,   u  ho  had   .i 


fixed   objective  of  pursmt.  and   til, it  was, to  capture    .\e 
capture  Cornwallis. 


\' 


orl 


('r  to 


It  1 


las   been 


assertetl   that  ( 


jeneral 


Clint 


on  \v 


as  out  of  fav 


or  with 


the  Crown  and   that  on  the  contrarv  Cornwallis  was  .i  l.uorite  :  that 


he  obtained  reinforcements  wiiich  were  refused  to  Clinton.     .\ 


profit- 


less controvers)'  subsetiucntly  took  place  between  those  officers,  and 
the  ;j;eneral  f.icts  will  ap[)e,ir  in  their  proper  connection.  .\  sincjlc 
statement  will  d(^  much  to  explain  the  ])ositions  of  these  officers  and 
<iisi)ose  of  tVivolous  accusations  to  their  discretlit. 

The  attitude  of  the  Hritish    Cabinet  was  based  upon  the  invinci- 


bilitv  and  sufTiciencv  of  the  forces  sent   t 


o  suppress 


tl 


ic  revolution. 


.Alhision  has  been  twice  ni.ule  to  the  neL;lect  of  the  military  counsels 
of  (Jeneral  Andierst.  Demands  for  leinrorcemeiits,  stiMiij^'  assuran- 
ces that  the  forces  were  insufficient,  repe.itetl  unsuccessful  campaigns, 
each  expected  to  close  the  war,  the  I'rench  intervention,  and  the 
accumulating  enemies  wlio  were  iletermined  to  cripple  the  Hritish 
empire,  coni[)elleil  the  Cibinct,  by  natural  loj^ic,  to  trust  those  who 
were  mostly  in  harmony  with  its  opinions  and  policy. 


.  t 


t-^:'- 


..rr    !li 

I 


r(iM>mo\   OF  SOUTlll'KN    AI'lAIkS. 


[I78I. 


The  positive  assurances  of  General  Clinton  and  of  C'ornuallis,  '.vliicli 
were  continued  until  after  the  h,itt!e  at  (iiiilfonl  Court  Flouse,-  -that 
British  supremacy  in  tlie  Soutlurn  St.ites  had  been  restored,  and  that 
the  people  were  in  arms  for  the  C'rown,  were  enuie_;h  to  elieek  rein- 
forcement'^ and  ecntr.ist  tlie  conchtion  of  (n  neral  Ch'ntnn.at  New 
N'ork,  wlio  was  in  fearnf  |(i>in;_;  that  po^t,  and  h,id  no  confidence  in 
ultimate  success.unlcss  largely  streiiLjthcned  both  in    irmv  aticl  fleet. 

The  entire  histor}-  of  the  \tar,  ami  therefore  tlie  career  f)f  the 
IJritish  commanders,  is  to  be  inter[)ret<;d  !jy  similar  consider.itions, 
which  controlled  their  actimi.  shaped  issues,  and  determined  cam- 
paigns. It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  purpose  to  state  the  matter 
thus  brielly. 

The  campai;,'n  of  17X1  will  be  taken  up  in  detail,  in  oriU'r  that  its 
military  \alue  and  rel.itions  m.iy  be  nmre  <listinctl\-  separated  from 
general  histor\'.  It  was  the  culminatiiv^^  eampaii^n  of  a  lont^  war,  .1 
campaiL;n  where  the  forces  on  both  sides  were  inferior  to  the  forces 
previously  eii'^ai^ed,  and  where  the  success  of  either  part)',  anal\/ed 
separately,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  seemitl  im])(js>ible  ;  and 
yet  a  cami)ai;.Mi,  wlu-re  the  success  of  eitlur  i>arty  seemed  positively 
certain,  in  case  of  a  th(;;ou!4h,  conci'iitrated  effort. 

This  campai;4n  will  be  considered  as  follows: 

I.  Alutiny  of  the  American  Army.     Its  history  .and  efTccts. 

II.  The  o[)erations  of  GentM-al  Greene  at  the  South. 

III.  .Xrnold's  (j[)erations  in  VirL';inia. 

IV.  La  I'ayette's  operations  in  \'ir_Lmiia. 

V.  Arnold's  raid  into  ( ."onnecticut. 
VL  Washini^ton  on  the  ()ffjn>i\e. 
These  operations  substantialK'  ended   hostilities,  and   include  the 

battles  of  Coupens,  Guilford,  and  Ilobkirk's  Hill  (near  Camden),  the 
sietjes  of  Ninety-six  and  Augusta,  the  battle  of  Kutaw  Sprinjj^s  and 
the  siege  of  Vorktown,  as  well  as  the  minor  operations  before  James- 
town, Petersburg,  Richmond,  ami  New  London. 

I.   Mutiny  of  the  American  Arm\'. 

The  war  which  now  entered  upon  its  seventh  year,  was  a  different 
war  from  that  which  Great  liritain  or  the  American  people  anticipated 
when  the  struggle  began.  The  contract  which  George  III.  made  with 
soldiers  was  considered  a  favor  to  the  enlisted  men,  and  the  terms, 
"  three  years  or  during  the  war,"  were  regarded  as  better  than  a 
regular  enlistment  for  five,  seven,  or  more  years.  The  term  of  three 
years,  according  to  military  usage,  was  a  short  term. 


i 

-  ;'  .  ^    % 

»  ! 

i 

iD'ii 

si 
L 

luic  the 
■n),  the 

inijs  ami 
James- 


I-Sl. 


(JONDITffiN   n\-    sol.'TKMKN    AM  AlKS. 


537 


A  simil.'ir  enlistment  of  Ann  riciii  troops  was  luadc  under  the  sup- 
position lliat  tlu'  three  )'ears  was  tin:  iitaxi'-'ii,  and  tli.it  tliu  term 
"  titirii'.i:;  the  ::'(ir,"  was  simpl)'  an  assurance  oi  earlier  discharf^e,  and 
they  hoped  the  war  would  not  last  for  the  full  three  years. 

As  the  ye, w  17S1  opened  and  the  prospi'ct  of  .1  new  year  of  struL;;^le 
became  certain,  and  the  invasion  of  tlu;  Southern  States  becjan  to  indi- 
cate the  prospect  of  a  southern  campai;^!),  which  was  at  all  times  un- 
popular with  nortlu'rn  troo])s,  a  disaffection  was  dcwlopeil  which  at 
last  broia:  forth  in  open  mutiii)-,  and  a  ])ereini)tor)'  (lem.ind  for  (.lis- 
charge.     This  irritation  was  aijLjr.ivated  by  hunL;er,  cold,  ,ind  povert)'. 

Marshall  s.ijvs :  "The  winter  brou'^ht  not  much  rel.ixation  from 
toil,  and  none  from  sufferin!^.  '\'\\v  soldiers  were  i)erpetu.illy  on  the 
point  of  st.irvation,  were  oi'teii  entirely  without  food,  were  exposed 
without  i)roper  clothinc;,  to  tlu-  ri;,;ors  of  winter:  and  had  now  served 
almost  twelve  months  without  pa}-." 

'•'["his  situ.ition  w.is  coniiuou  to  the  whole  army  ;  and  had  been  of 
such  lon;4  continu.mce,  th.it  scarcely  the  hope  of  ,1  chaiv^e  could  be 
realized."  "  It  w.is  iu)t  e.is\'  to  persuade  the  milit.iry  that  their  breth- 
ren in  civil  life  were  un.ible  to  make  j^reater  exertions  in  su[iport  of 
tile  w,n-,  or  that  its  burdens  ouj^dit  not  to  be  more  equally  borne." 

( )n  the  first  of  J.inuary  the  Pennsylv.mi.i  line  revolted  ;  C.iptain 
Billini^s  was  killed  in  an  attem[)t  to  suppress  the  mulin\-  ;  (ieiieral 
W'.iyne  w.is  ])()werless  to  restore  order,  and  thirteen  humlred  men, 
with  six  ijuns,  started  to  Princeton,  with  the  declared  purpose  to  m.irch 
to  Philadelphia,  and  obtain  redress.  They  dem.mded  clothing,  the 
residue  of  their  bounty,  and  full  arrears  of  pay.  A  committee  from 
Coni^ress  and  the  State  authorities  of  Pennsylvania,  at  once  entered 
into  uej^otiations  with  the  troops  for  terms  of  coin[)romise. 

The  Americ.in  Commander-in-chief  was  then  ,it  Xew  Windsor. 
A  messenger  from  (icner.d  W'.iyne  informed  him  on  the  third  of  J.inu- 
ary of  the  revolt,  and  the  terms  demanded.  It  appears  from  W'ash- 
inj^ton's  letters  that  it  was  his  impulse,  at  the  first  intimation  of  the 
trouble,  to  go  in  person  and  attempt  its  control.  I  lis  second  impres- 
sion W.IS  to  reserve  his  influenci.'  .ind  authority  until  all  other  means 
were  exhausted.  The  complaint  of  the  mutineers  was  but  a  statement 
of  the  comlition  of  all  the  ami)-,  so  fir  as  the  soldiers  h.id  served  three 
years;  and  the  suffering  and  fiilure  to  receive  pay  were  absolutely 
universal.  Leaving  the  preliminary  discussion  with  the  civil  authori- 
ties who  were  responsible  for  much  of  the  trouble,  the  Commander-in- 
chief  appealed  to  the  Governors  of  the  northern  States,  for  a  force  of 


ISf'f 


fl 


'\.f.  \ 


V         f 


,p^' '  ■>;        i  tl 


•ij 


'{(    :tt¥^**' 


till 

,11  I 


:f>^' 


'-{■      r 


538 


CONDI  IK  .\    ()|.    SiTIIIKUN    AFTAIKS. 


[17S1. 


militia  to  meet  an\'  attacks  tVi>in  N\'\v  Yoik-,  aiul  ck'cliiU'il  to  iiitiilcrc 
until  lie  fouiiil  tlial  tlic  pa^siitii  lia<l  passed  and  lu;  could  fiiul  troops 
\vlii>  would  at  all  hazards  ixi-cuti-  his  will.  It  w.is  one  of  tlif  most 
dirfii  ult  pa^sa;4rs  in  tlu"  war,  and  was  so  handlrd  that  the  ('ommandcr- 
iu-chii-'f  rt'taimil  his  prcsti;^c  and  rc^aini.(l  i()ntri>l  of  the  army. 

There  was  a  double  phase  to  this  mutiny,  .iiul  tieiieral  Clinton 
watched  its  development  with  interest.  I'.aj^er  to  avail  himself  of  the 
disaffection  which  communicated  itself  to  the  Jersey  troops,  aiid  to 
invade  \ew  Jersey  itself,  he  seems  to  have  remembered  the  unfortu- 
nate march  to  .Spiin^fuld  in  17S0,  ,iiul  remained  in  New  \'ork,  walch- 
ini,f  the  conduct  of  Washiiv^ton. 

In  a  letter  to  Lord  Germaine  he  says,  "General  \\'.ishin<»ton  has 
not  moved  a  man  from  his  .irmy,  ("near  West  Toint)  as  yet  ;  and  as  it 
is  prob.d:>le  their  demantls  are  nearly  the  >,ime  with  the  Penns\lvania 
line,  it  is  not  thou;4ht  likely  he  will.  I  am.  however,  in  a  situation  to 
avail  myself  of  favorable  events,  but  t«i  stir  before  they  offer  tni|j;ht 
mar  all." 

Gener.d  Clintot)  receivtd  information  of  the  revolt  .is  early  as 
Washini^ton,  on  the  mornini^  of  the  twentx-third,  and  sent  messens.jers 
to  the  American  army  with  propositions,  lookin;^  to  their  return  to 
British  allegiance,  lie  entirely  misconceived  the  nature  of  the  dis- 
affection, ;ind  his  .ii^ents  were  ret. lined  in  custody. 

It  is  sufficient  to  s.iy  that  a  portion  of  the  troops  were  tlischar<Ted 
without  critic.il  examination  of  their  enlistments,  on  their  own  oath; 
that  ni,in\-  promptly  reenlisteil,  that  as  soon  as  Washini;ton  found  that 
he  had  troops  who  did  not  share  in  the  open  mutin)-,  he  used  force 
and  suppressed  the  dis.iffection,  and  that  the  soldiers  themselves  huntj 
several  aj^eiits  wdio  brou'^ht  pro])ositions  from  (ieneral  Clinton  which 
invited  them  to  abandon  their  fla;_,f  ;ind  join  his  command.  The 
mutin\-  of  the  Americ.m  army  at  theopenin;^  of  the  campaiLjn  of  1781, 
was  a  natural  outbreak  which  luiman  nature  could  not  resist,  and 
whatever  of  discredit  may  attach  to  the  revolt,  it  will  never  be  unas- 
sociated  with  the  fact  that  while  the  emerijency  was  one  that  over- 
whelmed every  milit.iry  obligation  by  its  pressure,  it  did  not  affect 
the  fealty  of  the  soldiers  to  the  cause  for  wiiich  they  took  up  arms. 
It  impaired  discipline,  and  disre<;arded  authority  ;  but  it  also  h.id  in 
its  manifest. ilions,  m.iny  of  tlie  elements  of  l.uvful  revolution,  (Ai^ 
state  itself  Imviiii:;  failed  in  duty  to  its  defenders. 

La  Fayette  thus  wrote  to  his  wife,  "  Ilum.m  patience  has  its 
limits.     No  European  army  would  suffer  the  tenth  part  of  what  the 


fi7fii. 


1781,1 


CONDITIONT   OF   Sf)lJ  IIIKKN    AIK.M  liS. 


539 


-K-*' 


-I 


mi 


1-1  * 


Americans  suffer.  It  takes  ci/hens  to  support  luinf^er,  nakedness, 
toil,  and  the  total  want  of  pay,  wliicli  constitute  the  condition  of  our 
soldiers,  tilt' liardiest  and  most  patient  that  are  to  be  found  in  the  world." 

An  appeal  was  at  once  made  to  the  Northern  States  for  money, 
and  enough  was  secured  to  hvhv^  up  three  mouths  of  the  arrears  of 
pay.  The  .States  of  Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire  also  ^ave 
twenty-four  dollars  extra,  in  s[)ecie,  to  each  soldier  enlisted  from  the 
respective  .States.  Colonel  Laurens  was  appointed  as  special  a<;ent  to 
visit  France  and  secure  a  loan,  which  durin;^  the  year  was  increased 
by  two  other  lo.uis,  as  hereafter  noticed.  This  dependence  upon 
France,  however,  was  calculated  to  less(.'n  a  sense  of  responsibility  at 
home;  ami  Count  de  Ver^ennes,  under  date  of  l"*ebruary  fifteenth, 
when  advised  of  the  mission  of  Colonel  Laurens,  used  the  following; 
lanj^ua^n;  :  '' Con<;ress  relies  too  much  on  France  f(ir  subsidies  to  main- 
tain their  army.  They  must  absolutely  refrain  from  such  exorbitant 
demands.  The  <jreat  expenses  of  the  war  render  it  impossible  for 
France  to.  meet  these  demands  if  persisted  in." 

The  chief  ilifficulty,  however,  grew  out  of  the  individuality  of  the 
States,  and  tin;  f.ict  that  Con;_jress  was  rather  advisory  than  authori- 
tative in  its  jurisdiction.  \  partial  relief  came  with  the  adoption  of 
Articles  of  Confetleration,  which  took  effect  on  the  second  of  NLirch, 
17S1,  when  Congress  assembled  under  the  new  powers  conceded  by 
ih.it  instrument.  Maryland  yielded  her  assent  on  the  preceding  day. 
and  the  long  period  of  four  years  .iiul  four  months  had  transpired  from 
their  first  adoption  by  Congress  and  their  submission  to  the  States  for 
acceptance. 

During  these  events  which  were  threatening  the  very  existence  of 
the  American  army,  the  blockade  of  the  French  fleet  was  still  main- 
tained with  vigor.  Tlic  British  squadron  occupied  (jardiner%-  Hay, 
Long  Island,  for  winter  anchorage,  and  was  thus  enabled  to  keep  a 
close  watch  upon  all  vessels  entering  or  dc]).trting  from  the  Sound. 

During  the  latter  part  of  January,  it  temporarily  lost  its  numerical 
superiority  through  a  violent  storm  which  sunk  the  Culloden,  74,  dis- 
masted the  Bedford,  and  d'.ove  the  America  out  to  sea.  The  interval 
was  improved  to  dispatch  several  ships  to  the  Chesapeake,  to  coop- 
erate with  an  expedition  against  Arnold,  which  will  be  noticed  in  its 
connection. 

The  American  army  had  become  so  reduced  as  hardly  to  exceed 
five  thousand  men  for  duty,  and  the  French  troops  were  not  dispos- 
able for  fjeneral  service,  so  long  as  the  fleet  was  confined  to  port. 


t.     * 


i-,-r  i 


r  i-„ 

1 

0  'f'  "" 

4' 

f"-^ 

II 

1 

lii 


1 1 
I 


! 


i"^ 


,  1 ,  i 


m 


540 


I  I  >\i)|  iln\    OK   SOi;  Ilil'.KN    AI'TAIRS. 


I17H1 


ImiiIlt  tlu'-c  iliscour.r^iiv^  circiiin-it.inccs,  the  ICuropcui  St.itos  did 
not  Idsc  thoir  C()ii(k1im)cij  in  the  .iIjiHty  iiiul  resources  of  the  Ainericiin 
Coinm.inder-in-chief.  It  wcmiKI  not  he  ;in  uinvarrant.iblc  assertion  to 
say  that  tliis  confidence  ;.;re\v  out  of  their  hal)itu.il  reco^jnition  of  per- 
sonal i^dvcrnnirnts  at  home,  and  that  tlicy  (jiiite  naturally  ,i,'ave  him 
a  eorrtspondin^  cretlit  for  powers  uliich  were  beyond  his  preroi^ativc 
and  the  jurisdiction  of  C"on;^ress  itself.  His  reputation  as  a  wise  com- 
m  inder  was  well  established. 

Mrs.  Hache,  ihur^hter  of  I'Vanklin,  tiuis  cites  a  letter  from  her 
f.ither.  which  is  su^i^estivc  of  the  estimation  in  which  he  was  held  in 
I'rance  :  "  My  father  savs.  if  you  see  (irneral  \V^l>llinl4ton,  assure:  him 
of  uiy  very  ^^reat  and  sincere  resjiect,  and  tell  him  that  a//  the  old 
giiicrals  Itrrc  aniHsc  thniisiivix  in  stiiiiyin:;  tltc  accounts  0/  fiis  operations, 
and  af^provc  hi^^hly  of  lii^  conduct."  It  is  eipially  certain  tliat  no  cx- 
trava;4ant  estimate  can  be  placed  upon  the  services  of  Gener.d  La 
I''a\'ette,  whose  letters  ur|^ed  the  supply  of  men  and  money,  with  the 
most  pointed  assur.mce  that  the  American  States  would  realize  suc- 
cess, .ind  be  amply  able  to  refund  all  advances  which  mi,Ljht  be  made 
by  the  KiiV-j. 

The  influence  of  Adams.  Franklin  and  Jay  at  Holland,  France 
and  Spain  was  stroiv_^dy  marked,  and  characteristic  of  the  Ainerican 
temper. 

The  single  intimation  of  Colonel  Laurens,  upon  his  .irrival  at  i'aris, 
that  money  was  indispensable,  and  th.it  l'"r, uue  would  do  well  to 
hold  the  American  nation  up,  rather  than  have  it  left  to  join  its  re 
.sources  with  F-n;^laiul  a;:jainst  I'^-ance,  was  another  incident  of  the 
opening;  year  which  stronij[ly  persuaded  the  I'rench  minister  to  render 
pecuniary  aid  to  meet  the  emen^ency.  This  cur.iory  reference  to  the 
condition  of  tlie  United  States,  durin;^  the  early  part  o{  17S1,  will 
indicate  the  circumstances  uniler  which  the  mutiny  at  the  north  took 
place  and  the  campaiLni  at  the  south  opened. 

General  Greene  s  Sontlicr)i  Canif^aic^n.  Reference  is  made  to  map 
"  Operations  in  Southern  States," 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  General  Greene  sent  Morfjan  to 
the  Catawba  district,  with  three  hundred  and  ninety  continental 
troops  under  Lieutenant-coh^nel  Howard,  Colonel  Washington's 
horse,  and  two  companies  of  Virgini.i  militia.  These"  companies,  com- 
manded by  Captains  Triplett  and  Tait  were  not  ordinary  militia  ; 
but  consisted  for  the  most  part  of  old  soldiers  who  had  served  their 
terms  and  reiinlisted  as  substitutes  for  other  militia.     Upon  reachmg 


1781. 


condhion-  ok  SOUrHKRN'  aik.mrs. 


541 


^f'f 


'— t 


, 


Uroad  River,  (iciiciul  MorLj.in  was  joiiii!(l  hv  (n  iummI  Davidson  and 
Colonel  rickcns,  an<l  Majors  McDowell  and  (■iinniiij^iiani,  with  nearly 
seven  hiindreil  vnluntixTs  and  militia  fntn\  (ieovj^ii  and  tiie  Carolinas. 
General  (jrcene's  immediate  command  was  not  far  from  two  thou- 
sand men,  mostl>' militia ;  and  his  station  was  nearly  seventy  miles 
cast,  .1  little  north,  from  \Viiinsl)oroii;^h,  then  the  headcjuarters  of 
Corinvallis.  Mor^jan  was  on  the  I'.icolet,  .1  branch  of  Broad  River, 
about  fifty  miles  nortiiwcst  of  Winnsborou^cfli,  havin.Lj  established  his 
camp  on  the  twtMUy-fiflh  of  December,  1780.  llis  po^i''""  ^':.eat- 
cned  not  only  Ninety-six,  but  the  entire  line  of  small  posts  in  the  rear 
of  the  i'ritish  army. 

A  British  invasion  of  North  Carolina  was  clearly  inadmissible 
while  the  American  troops  were  thus  on  both  flaidvs  ;  and  Lord  Corn- 
wallis  determined  to  strike  Mor-^an  aiul  (ireene,  in  turn,  before  their 
forces  should  be  further  increased  from  the  militia,  or  the  north. 
I-ieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  was  detached  on  the  first  of  January, 
with  the  Lcyion  and  a  portion  of  the  First  battalion  of  the  Seventy- 
first  British  rei^iment,  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  with  orders  to  pur- 
.suc  Morgan  and  drive  him  across  liroad  River. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  of  December,  General  Grei'ue  detached 
Washington's  cavalry  and  McCall's  mounted  militia,  in  all  two  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men,  tc  surprise  a  party  of  loyalists  twenty  miles  south 
of  his  camp.  They  were  pursued,  overtaken  and  for  the  most  part 
killed.  Justice  Johnson  says,  "  the  killed  and  wounded  were  reporied 
at  one  hundred  and  fifty,  and  the  prisoners  at  forty,"  and  adds,  "  si'^h 
were  the  bloody  sacrifices  at  that  time  offered  up  at  the  shrine  of 
civil  discord."  A  detachment  was  also  sent  to  surprise  Williams, 
(sec  map),  a  small  stockade  fort  ■  but  the  garrison  retired  without 
resistance. 

Lord  Cornwallis  marched  up  the  west  bank  of  the  Catawba,  leav- 
ing orders  to  General  Leslie,  then  on  the  march  from  Charleston,  to 
follow.  Heavy  rains  delayed  the  march  of  the  main  army,  encumbered 
as  It  was  with  a  considerable  baggage  train,  while  Tarleton,  not 
apprehensive  that  it  would  fail  to  support  his  advance,  pushed  for- 
ward rapidly,  crowded  Morgan  over  the  Pacolet,  and  by  crossing  at 
an  upper  ford  drove  him  still  further  back  to  the  Cowpens,  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  Broad  River  itself. 

Colonel  Tarleton  states  that  he  originally  "  started  with  the 
Legion,  five  hundred  and  fifty  men,  (Cornwallis  puts  the  number  at 
six  hundred.)  the  first  battalion  of  the  Seventy-first  regiment,  con- 


>      f 


jVr  r 


!•-' 


i 


*iM 


i-*a 


.f 


1*.  ^' 


542 


CONDITION  OF  SOUTHERN   AFFAIRS. 


I1781. 


sisting  of  two  hundred  men,  and  two  thrce-poundcrs ;  but  had  not 
proceeded  above  twenty  miles  from  lirierly  Ferry,  before  he  had 
undoubted  proof  that  the  report  which  occasioned  the  order  for  the 
h'ght  troops  to  march  was  erroneous,  and  that  Ninety-six  was  secure." 
Upon  application  to  CornwaUis,  his  baggage  was  forwarded  under  the 
escort  of  two  hundred  men  from  the  Seventh  British  regiment,  and 
fifty  dragoons,  designed  as  a  reinforcement  for  Ninety-six.  These 
troops  were  added  to  Tarleton's  command,  making  the  whole  detach- 
ment one  thousand  strong,  besides  a  few  loyalists.  He  commcnce(l 
his  advnncc  on  the  twelfth.  The  Ennoree  and  Tiger  were  crossed 
on  th  I'ourteenth,  and  advices  from  Cornwallis  indicated  that  he 
would  move  up  the  east  bank  of  liroad  River  so  as  to  cut  off  Morgan's 
retreat.  Cornwallis  reached  Turkey  Creek,  (see  maj))  on  the  evening 
of  the  sixteenth,  and  there  waitetl  for  General  Leslie,  whose  force 
consisted  of  thirteen  hundred  and  fifty  men. 

That  officer  marched  from  Charleston  directly  for  Camden,  and 
was  so  delayed  by  swamps,  high  water,  and  other  difficulties  of  the 
way,  that  the  success  of  the  whole  movement  devolved  upon  the 
action  of  Tarleton  alone.  Cornwallis  himself  was  nearly  twenty-five 
miles  from  Tarleton  when  the  battle  of  Cowpens  was  fought,  and 
according  to  Tarleton,  had  plenty  of  time  to  have  reached  Ramsour's 
Mills,  which  would  have  effectuall}-  cut  off  Morgan's  retreat.  The 
delay  of  General  Leslie  at  Camden,  according  to  Lord  Cornwallis' 
statement,  was,  "  that  Genend  Greene  might  be  kept  in  suspense  as 
long  as  possible  as  to  the  proposed  movements." 

The  battle  of  Cowpens  was  fought  near  Broad  River,  about  two 
miles  south  of  the  North  Carolina  boundary  line,  on  ground  used 
especially  for  pasture,  which  gave  name  to  the  locality. 

The  field  of  battle  itself  was  open  woodland,  sloping  to  the  front, 
and  well  adapted  for  skirmishing,  while  sufficiently  clear  of  under- 
growth f )r  the  movements  of  mounted  men.  Tarleton  says,  "there 
could  be  no  better."  "  Broad  River  wound  around  Morgan's  left 
within  six  miles,  and  ran  parallel  with  his  rear,"  so  that  there  was 
no  possibility  of  escape,  in  case  of  defeat.  Morgan  occupied  the 
summit,  which  was  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  level  ground, 
and  formed  his  regular  troops  at  the  highest  point.  The  Maryland 
battalion,  nearl)-  three  hundred  .strong,  were  on  the  left,  and  the 
companies  of  Virginia  militia  under  Triplett  and  Tate  were  next  in 
order,  with  Beatles'  Georgians,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  on 
the   extreme    right.      Lieutenant-colonel    Howard   commanded   this 


1781.] 


CONDITION    OF   SOUTIIKRN   AFFAIKn. 


543 


line.  See  map  "  liattle  of  Cowpcns."  One  hundred  and  fifty  yards 
to  the  front,  a  force  of  two  hundred  and  seventy  miHtia  were  {)osted 
under  Colonel  Pickens,  in  open  order.  Major  Cunningham,  of 
Georgia,  and  Major  McDowell,  of  South  Carolina,  with  one  hundred 
and  fifty  i)icked  men,  were  stationed  still  further  in  advance,  about  an 
equal  distance,  as  skirmishers,  with  orders  to  take  to  trees — not  to  fire 
until  the  enemy  were  within  fifty  yards  ;  and  then  to  fall  back,  firing 
at  ivilU  as  tliey  could  find  cover. 

Colonel  Pickens  had  orders  in  like  manner  to  reserve  fire  until  the 
enemy  came  within  fifty  yards,  and  after  two  volleys  to  retire  to  the 
left  of  the  regulars  ;  but  if  charged  by  cavalry,  only  owq  man  in  three 
was  to  fire,  while  the  others  must  withhold  fire  until  a  charge  was 
made,  or  the  troopers  should  turn  back.  The  regulars  were  advised 
of  these  instructions  and  cautioned,  in  case  of  being  forced  from  their 
own  position,  to  retire  in  good  order  to  tlic  next  hill,  and  be  pre|i,ircd 
at  anytime  to  f.ice  about  and  attack.  In  the  rear  of  the  higli  ground 
was  a  second  small  elevation  behind  whicii  W  ashington's  cavalry  and 
Colonel  TilcCall's  mounted  men  were  out  of  cannon  range,  and  in 
reserve  for  time!)'  use.  Morgan  has  tiuis  apologized  for  his  choice  of 
ground  :  ''  1  v.ould  not  have  hail  a  swamp  in  view  of  my  militia  on 
any  Cdusideration  ;  tliey  would  have, made  for  it,  and  nothing  could 
have  detained  them  from  it.  i\\\i\  as  to  covering  my  wings,  I  knew 
my  adversary,  and  was  perfect!)'  sure  I  sliouki  have  nothing  but 
downright  fighting.  As  to  retreat,  it  was  the  verj-  thing  1  wisheil  to 
cut  off  all  hope  of.  I  would  have  thanked  Tarleton  had  he  surrounded 
me  with  his  cavalry.  It  would  have  been  better  than  placing  my  own 
men  in  the  rear  to  shoot  down  those  vsho  broke  from  the  ranks. 
When  men  are  forced  to  fight,  they  will  sell  their  lives  clearly  ;  and 
I  knew  that  the  dread  of  'r.irleton's  cavalry  would  give  due  v.-eight 
to  the  protection  of  my  bayonets,  and  keep  my  troops  fic.m  breaking 
as  ihiford's  regiment  did.  Had  I  crossed  the  river,  one-half  of  the 
militia  would  immedi.ilely  have  abandoned  me." 

The  British  advance  was  made  as  early  as  seven  o'clock  in  the 
mornirig,  January  seventh.  The  troops  li.id  marched  from  early  dawn 
and  were  wet!  worn  down  ;  but  Tarleton  had  intimations  that  addi- 
tional militia  were  on  the  march  to  join  Morgan,  and  he  prepared  to 
risk  the  action  with  equal  numbers,  trusting  to  the  discii)line  and 
superiority  of  his  troops  for  the  decision  of  the  battle.  His  formation 
is  detailed  upon  the  map.  His  advance  was  prom[)t  .md  spiriteil. 
The  American  skirmishers  fired  effectively,  and  fell  back  into  the  first 


M 


i  \ 


t  ii 


p  '    I 


n  i  n 


,     : 

1 

,    1'  ' 

, 

ll 

r 

i  ':•■■ 

:,:,;, 


54-1 


coMurioN  (.)!•  sotriii.ks  aiiaii:s. 


[17S1. 


line,  .Mvl  1I1C  militia  after  one  steady,  deadly  fire,  fell  back  als(j  and 
bei',aii  to  move  aemss  tin.'  fi(jnt  of  tlie  second  line  to  take  prjsitioii  on 
then'  left  as  ordiTed. 

'1  In;  ISiiti^li  troops  takin;^  ^iie  wIioK;  movement  as  assurance  of 
t'asy  victfuy  ad\aneed  rapidly,  with  shouts,  only  to  find  themselves 
101  (ronti<l  hy  the  main  hody,  whieli  received  them  withont  llinehinfj. 
The  Urili-ih  ;.;nns  were  tluii  moved  to  the  front,  and  llit\'  dr.r.;oons 
from  each  I'.ritish  extremity  ioll.)wed  the  retrealini;-  militia  when  the 
first  line  hrola-.  lint  upon  the  resistance  of  liie  main  body,  the 
Sevent\'-fir>t  I'rili^h  re;;imenl,  which  had  been  in  reserve,  and  'i'arle- 
ton,  uith  two  hundred  dia;.',oons  advaneed  to  the  ch,n';.;c.  As  tlu; 
Uriti^h  left  ,isi  eniled  the  hill  to  turn  the  American  ri;.;lit ,  t  he  militia 
there  stationed  well-  oidered  1)\'  .Miii;.;an  to  s\\in;.;  back,  thu-^  makin;^ 
a  crotchet  to  tlu'  rear,  and  to  hold  liu-  po-^ition  until  (Colonel  I'ickens 
could  brill;,;  up  the  militia  \v  ho  \v-eri:  ahead)'  formiii!^  for  thai  purpose, 
while  the  American  ca\ah_v  spurred  around  the  left  of  the  rej^ulars 
.and  attacked  the  I'.ritish  ri;,dit  which  had  tliiiN  fir  followed  the  retn.'at- 
in;.;  militia.  Lieutenant-colonel  1  bjward  mi-it,il;in;4  this  cli.in;.;e  of  posi- 
tion in  his  rieht  for  the  cotilin;.M:nt  moviiiunt  to  the  rear,  ordered  the 
re;,;ulars  ;il-o  to  retreat.  The  Uritisli  had  lo-,l  man}'  oflu.-eis  and  tlu;y 
pressed  on  in  some  disorder.  The  issue  of  the'  d.iy  was  at  its  crisis  ; 
when  Mor^'an  ordered  the  troo|)^to  f  ice  about,  deliver  lire  and  chari^e 
with  the  l)ayonet.  The  IJiiti-^h  were'  within  lhirt\'  \'ards.  The  effect 
was  immediate  and  conclusivt;  at  that  part  of  the  held.  Washinj^ton 
wasjust  then  en;^a;,;(,'d  with  the  artillery  emleavorin;,;  to  capture  tin.' 
L^uns.  and  the  l'>riti-,h  infantr\'  and  ca\'alr)'  lied  or  surrendered. 
Nearly  ever)'  :^;unner  was  killed  or  wounded  while  f.iithftilly  fi^htiiiL; 
by  his  L^un.  'I'lie  .Seventy-first  ret^iment  with  iarleton's  horse  were 
still  on  the  American  ri_L;ht  win;^f,  until  I'ickens'  militi.i  came  up  vIl,'- 
orously  altackin^^  their  Hank.  Hein;^  now  unde'r  cross  fire  they  also 
threw  down  their  arms  and  surnmlereil.  T.irleton  esca])ed  with  forty 
horse;  after  a  vain  dash  to  save  the  eriins.uul  ri'store  order.  'i'arletf)n 
;ind  W'ashiu'^fton  here  me't  face  to  f.ice,  the  former  receiced  a  cut  on 
his  h.md  and  the  latter  .i  pistol  shot  in  his  knee. 

lie  thus  st.ites  the  f.icts.  "The  militia,  after  a  short  contest 
were  (lislo(l<.jed,  and  the  Jkitish  ap[)roached  the  continentals.  The 
lire  on  both  sides  was  well  supportetl  and  produced  much  slaui;htcr. 
The  cavalry  on  the  ric,dit  charLjed  the  enemy's  left  with  great  gallan- 
try but  were  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  reserve  and  hy  a  charge 
of  Colonel   Washington's  c.iv.ilry.     As  the  contest  in   the  front  line 


I7M. 


ONunioN  f)r  sf)iJiiii:kN  am'airs. 


545 


seemed  cfiually  h.il.iiu.cd,  In;  tlioii;.;!)!  tin- adv. nice  of  llic  Scvcnty-fir^l 
into  line  ami  a  iiiDvciiicnl  of  the  c avail)'  in  rr-.i.-ivi-,  to  llin.atLii  IIk 
eiu-iiiy's  left  flank,  would  piil  a  vicloiiuii-,  pcricjd  to  tin:  ai:tion.  .\(»  tinir 
was  lohl.  Tin-  cavalrv  wi.-re  ordcifd  to  incline  tollic  left  and  to  torin 
a  line  wliic.ii  would  cniliract;  llu-  whole  of  the  eneniyV.  rii^ht  flank. 
Upon  tin:  .idv.inee  of  the  .Sevenly-fir-^l,  .ill  the  ir.fantry  .-r^ain  nioveu 
on.  The  continentals  ;ind  h.ickwoodsnien  ;j,.ivi;  L;rounil.  1  he  Hritish 
ru^h(■d  tdi  w.nd.  Ai\  order  u, is  ;^iven  to  the  cavalry  to  ch.ir;^^.'.  An 
un(-.\i)ii:l','d  n re  from  the  Anicricin-,  who  came  about  .i->  they  were 
retreatin;.;,  sloi)]).(l  tlu-  Hriti-^h  and  threw  them  into  lonfusion.  i-xer- 
lions  to  make  them  .idv.mce  were  useless.  l  he  cav. dry  which  had 
n(jt  been  eiii^.i^ed  fell  into  disorder  .and  an  unacinunt.ible  jianic  ex 
tended  itself  alon^^  the  whole  line.  Neither  promises  nor  threat-, 
could  .'iv.iil." 

1  he  r)rili->h  casualties,  were  st.ited  by  (jeneral  (Jornw.illis  ,it  ten 
officers  ,ind  ninety  men  killed,  twenty-nine  officers  .and  flvi-  hundred 
men  captured.  Ileonnt^  the  number  wounded.  MorLJ.m  .accounts 
for  ^i\  huiulred  |)risoneis  turned  over  to  the  lonunissary  officer.  The 
Urili-ih  , army  ret uruh  of  k'cbru.iry  nr^t,  report-,  diminution  from  List 
return,  J.mu.iry  fifteenth,  .is  sevtn  hundred  .and  ei^llty-fou^  men; 
which  closely  .ipjjro.ximates  (he  tot.d  Ion-,.  The  American  casualties 
Were  twelve  killed,  and  sixty  wounded. 

'l"wo  st.ind.irds,  thirt)--rive  w.i^^oih,  oik;  hundred  horses,  ei^ht  hun- 
dred musket-,  ,ind  two  ciiuion  were  .imon;.;  t  he  tro|)hies  of  the  victory. 
LossiiiL,'  -,t.iles  that  these  i^uns  .alternately  chanj^ed  (jwners,  ;it  Sara- 
toj^.i,  Camden,  (Jowpeiis,  ,ind  (iuilfijrd. 

T.irleton  severely  criticises  Lord  Cornwallis  for  neglect  to  .advise 
In'm  .as  to  his  movements,  and  s.aj's,  uilli  some  bitterness,  th.it  ".as 
I'ers^uson's  dis.aster  rn.ade  the  fir-.t  inv.ision  of  North  Carolina,  so  the 
battle  of  Cow[)ens  would  prcjbably  make  the  second  eipially  dis- 
astrous." 

He  rejoined    the  army  on   ihe   followin,!^^  d.iy^  and    insists  tli.it  a 
prompt  movement  made  at  th.it  time,  mi<,dit  have  rescued  the  prison 
crs.     (jeiier.il  Monfan  carried  out  his  plan  of  b.ittle  with  almost  entire 
success.      Le.ivinj^    his  severely  wounded   under   a    fl.ii;   of  truce,  .and 
his  cavalry  to  cover  his  retreat,  he  crossed   IJro.id    River  that   iiiLjlU 


wi 


th    his   inf.mtry   and   i)risoners,    .and    f(jrded    the    (J.itawb.i    on    tl 


twenty-fourth.      On    the   same   ni^lit   Ctirnwallis  reachc'd    Iv.iinsour's 
Mills,  at   the  junction    of  the   r(jad    from   Cowpens   with    that    upon 
which  his  army  marched.     Here  he  halted  two  days  to  burn  surplus 
35 


(  I 


...         i    . 
■i 


546 


CONDITION   OF   SOUTHERN  AFFAIRS. 


[17S1 


b'lgS-'^S*-'  •''"tJ  warrons,  and  by  tliis  delay  lost  his  opportunity  to  over- 
take lM()i\i;an.  The  American  commaiul  was  only  twenty  miles  in 
advance,  and  the  Catawba  was  fordable  until  heavy  rains  on  tlie 
twent\--SLveiUh  and  tw  cnty-eif^hth  raised  the  waters,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth,  when  Cornwallis  reached  its  bank,  it  could  not  be 
crossed.  Morgan  started  his  prisoners  for  Virginia  on  the  twenty- 
fifth,  and  made  every  possible  effort  to  rally  militia  and  cover  his 
retreat  until  General  Greene  couKl  come  to  his  assistance.  It  has 
been  generally  stated  tliat  Cornwallis  pursued  so  closely  upon  Morgan 
that  a  sudden  flood  alone  saved  the  latter.  Morgan's  letter  to  Greene 
dated  the  twenty -fifth,  at  his  camp  on  the  east  side  of  the  Catawba, 
settles  the  question  of  the  date  of  his  crossing  the  river. 

As  General  Leslie  joined  Cornwallis  on  the  eighteenth  and  nine- 
teenth, there  was  ample  time  to  have  redeemed  Cowpcns  ;  but  a 
somewhat  characteristic  hesitation  at  a  critical  hour,  and  indecision 
under  pressure,  lost  him  the  precii)us  opportunity. 

(lencral  Morgan  remained  but  a  few  weeks  in  the  service.  Severe 
rheumatism  settled  in  his  limbs,  and  his  active  days  soon  ended. 
l-Vom  Bur,ker  Hill  to  Quebec,  through  liurgoyne's  campaign,  and 
wherever  he  was  entrusted  with  command,  he  had  jiroved  his  courage 
anil  his  fertility  in  resources  during  periods  of  great  danger;  and 
Congress  vied  with  States  and  citizens,  in  honorable  testimonials  to 
his  valor,  as  the  victor  at  Cowpens. 


'im 


[17S1 


ife  ^^  7Ji  "  ~3«:-  "IT^^- 


W'l 


't'   -'- 


**  1 


*   TKipier     y    7A7£        ^    Mtt  hij/ftuam 


?~ 


% 


-^; 


.^_i 


;r^  ■*--" 


? 


i  — ii: 


.'^-i  _;^ 


^ 


,  t 


-  --_  ."'--% =1-^-- 


i^ 


■j:^-: 


-X~^  ^ -^ 

js  '^-  .„  r--y'~' 


'\' 


'-^— . 


-^---Tli^^i^T 


::i:e:,^-,.^: 


"•^^ 


-  -  —    -  -^  '    •     '       --   -    —    '  -'    ,     ,   Om/iiYtr/wu//Jn/»'/i/if'(t>/.(a/7i/ujtor 


1 1    ii>'--l 


^"^ ! 


!■; 


Hii 


',.  i 

■ .    ■•;. 

i' 

I    Hi 

•  1 


chapti:r  lxviii. 


FROM  COWl'KNS  TO  (;riLI-(M<I)  COURT  HoUSi:.     MANGiUVERS 


OK    lllK  AKMIKS,     1 78 1. 


A 


MESSMNGI'-R  from  (iciicr.il  Muiyaii  rciciicd  tjciicr.il  (jiecnc, 
at  Ill's  cam])  on   J  lick's  Creek,  a   fork  of  tlic  Great   Republic, 
Jainiar)- twenty- fifth.  i^Si.aiul   informetl   him  of  t!ie  jjattle  of  Cow- 


pens,  tli.it  a  larL;e  nuinljer  oi   prisoners  were  to  lie   provic 


to    I) 


detl    {, 


or, 


.uu 


that  the  .irnu'  o 


f  C 


)rn\valhs  was  m   ])ursiiit. 


he  completeness  o 


f 


the   success   re[K)rted    m.ule  the  contrast   of  his   inahilit)'  to  improve 
it,  ver\-  tant.ilizinLj  and  p.iiiiful. 

The  ai  my,  inclvuiini^  Morj^an's  corps,  numhereti  only  one  thousand 
tour  hundred  and  twenty-six  infantr)',  forty-seven  artillerists  ,nul  two 
liundretl  and  tliirt)'  cavalry.  '1  he  militia  numbered  four  hundred. 
These  numbers  lluctuated  j^reatlv.  since  the  Southern  militia  were 
quite  like  the  minute  men  of  1775  6,  who  volunteered  for  prcssin;^ 
duty,  and  then  returned  to  the  ordinary  pursuits  of  life.  There  was 
no  money,  little  clothiii;^.  and  constant  hardship.  A  sitv^jle  extract 
Ironi  a  letter  written  by  (leneral  (ireene  to  General  Sunitei,  two 
da)s  before  the  battle  of  Cowpens,  contains  this  parai^raph  :   "More 


than 


half 


our  me 


mb 


ers  are 


in  a  manner  naked  ;   so  much  so  that 


we 


can  not  put  them  (jn  the  least  kind  of  duty.  Indeetl  there  is  a  great 
number  that  have  not  a  rag  of  clothes  on  them  except  a  little  piece 
of  blanket,  in  the  Indian  form,  around  their  waists." 

It  was  under  such  circumstances  that  this  commander  was  sum- 
moned to  save  the  fruits  of  Morgan's  victory,  to  expel  the  British 
army  from  the  Carolinas,  and  to  vindicate  the  supremacy  and  power  of 
the  United  States.  For  three  days  he  devoted  his  time  to  putting 
this  noinnial  army  in  preparation  for  taking  the  field  ;  and  on  the 
twenty-eighth,  accompanied  by  one  aid,  a  guide  and  a  sergeant's  party 
of  cavalry,  he  started  for  Morgan's  commantl.  On  the  night  of  the 
thirtieth,  after  a  ride  of  over   jnc  hundred  and  twenty-five  miles,  he 


;     I.    '  -. 


1, 


P  i: 


;>■! 


?4^ 


was  w  1 


:ki>m  (dwriNs   lo  cimmimu)  coukc  iiolsi: 


I17H1 


ih  M 


Sin.illwoK 


01;^. m.      Ili^  K'ttiTs  to  N'.irmmi,  thru   in  l'(in;_;ri.'s^,  to  (iist, 
Rutlcil''i',    \\',i-^liiii''toii    .111(1    otlurs,    irc    lull    nl    ui'hmU 


ippcals  for   at  least   t'lvc   thous.uul   iiil'aiilr)-  aiul  six  or  I'i^^ht  liuiulri 


Horse. 


It  was  an  fxtfaoriliii.uy  stati-  of  .iftairs,  when  a  victor)-  scenird  but 
til'.'  fi.st  stcj)  toward  ilis.istcr.  ,niil  wIkmi  cw\\  !  hr  Cmiin.incicr-in-cliiof 


w.is  tonstr.iinc(i  to  write 


1 


wish 


11. 1-1  1; 


111 


my  power  to  eoii;.Matu- 


l.ite  \oii  on   the  brilli.mt  .iiid   inipiiii.iiit    \ 


ictui\-  of   (iL'ilei.il 


.M 


orLian. 


/ithout  tlu-  a\ 


o\- 


wliii'h   the   (li-Ntr( 


ot    the  (lepailiiieiit    \'ou    enm- 


iiKiiul,  and  ,i[iprelu'ii--i')iis  of  |)o-,terior  i\int>,  intermix.      1  I.imeiit  th.it 


vou  will  liiid    It  so  dillicult    to  .ivoid  .1  ''eiier.u    .letiou 


lor 


>nv  niislor- 


tunes  can    only  he  completid   \)y  the   dispersion   of  )-our  littli'  ami}- 
which  will  he  the  most  probable  consecpieiue  of  such  .111  event." 
It  niu-.t    be  bo;iie    in  mind   that  .\rnold   l.iiided   in  ^ 


fourth   d.i\'  of  J,uiu,ir\',wilh    sixteen   hundred   re;_;Lilar  Iri 


;mi,i  on  tiie 
ops,  so  th.it 


deiieral  Steuben's  local 


^poiisibilities  were  .is  pres^iii;,;  as  when  (ii:n- 


eral   (ireeiie    [)assed   thr<iu;_;h    VirL;iiiia    on    his    way    to    the    .Southern 
l)e])arlment. 


A  biief  tliversion  fr 


om 


th 


e    immediate  narrative   is  necess;u\',  in 


oriUr  to  indicate  the  exact  circumstances  which  controlled  both 
Cjeiiei.ds  (Ireeiie  ami  (.drnwallis,  in  their  subseciuent  movements,  ;uul 
to  correct   the   impression    thai   the    c.iiiipai;^!!  consisted   simply  of  a 


swift 


pursuit  and  successiul  retre.it,  ;in(.l,oiu:  where  ra\  iiies  .1111 


d  ll( 


f 


alone  determined  the  result.  i  he  spriii;^  c.r.iiji.iii^n  of  17.S1  w.is  <i;u-  o 
(ijhr<i/ui//s,  .iiul  there  was  no  relre.it  of  (ieiur.il  (ireeiie  wliith  ditl 
not  constitute  a  manujuver,  having  in  view  an  ultimate  eng.igement, 
with  the  recovery  of  the  South  as  the  cliief  objective. 

A  st.itement  of  Arnold's  position  and  operations  up  to  the  first  of 

le   left 
ired 


I'el 


)ru.irv,  H  an    essenti.il   eUinen 


t    to    i)e    I, 


ikeii   mlo   \iew. 


New  York  t)n  the  nineteenth  of  Di. 


mber,  17.^0,  with  sixt 


een  liuiii 


men. 


It 


ii)pe,irs   from  Geiur.il 


Clint 


on  s   letters  th.it    he  did  not  relv 


upon  th.it  officer's  discretion,  .ind  attached  laeuteii.mt-cok)nels  .Simeoe 
<iiul  iJuiidas  to  the  i.  ■  iinmand,  "two  officers  of  tried  .ibility  and  experi- 
ence, and  possessing  the  entire  confidence  of  their  ct)mmander."  The 
Queen's  Rangers,  and  the  Eighteenth  British  regiment  (Scotchj,  re- 
sjjectively  comm.inded  by  the  officers  named,  Rirmed  the  larger  portion 
{){  Arnold's  division.  The  characteristic  accompaniment  of  the  ii.ival 
movements  of  the  [)eriod,  a  gale,  separated  the  tleet  on  the  twent)-- 
«ixth  and  twenty-seventh  of  December;  but  on  the  thirty-tirst,  with- 
t>ut  waiting  for  other  transports  still  at  sea,  twelve  iumdred  men  were 


FiF^frf 


lirrti. 


1781.I 


IRON!  C(j\vri:N"s  TO  (;uii,i'(M<i)  coukr  imusi';. 


?49 


transfiTiiHl  Id  sin.ill  vessels  and  moved  up  tlu;  J.inirs  Kivrr.  (  )n  tlic 
ni^Mit  (if  J.iiiu.uy  third,  Liiuti'ii.mt-i'oliMU'l  Sinu-or  laudid  at  lluod's 
roiiit  with  niic  hiiiidri'd  .md  tliiity  of  tlic  (Jucom's  RaiiLjcrs  ,iml  the 
lii^;ht  inraiilrv  .md  L;ri'n.idii:rs  i.t'  the  I'.iLjliteeiUh  rrL^imcnt,  spiki'd  the 
Liiins  of  a  hatti'iv,  w  ln\'h  ua-.  ahandoiu'il  l)v  llic  small  tlctachmoiit  ot 
fifty  'ncii  who  (jceiipiid  it,  and  on  the  fourth  the  iN]ii'clition  laiulccl 
at  \\'(.'sto\  ci',  lUMil)  t\vtiU)'-l'ive  ndlcs  hilow  Uichmond,  and  marched 
imuK'diitclv  to  that  fit}-.  On  tin-  .d'lcrnoon  of  tin.-  fifth,  Arnold 
filtered  Kiehnioiiil.  I.ieuteiiant-coloiiel  Siincoe  (iiiiekl)'  dislotf^ed  a 
force  of  two  hundred  irre;.;ul,irs,  militia  whieh  Colonel  John  Nichols 
had  asseinhled  on  Kiehmond  Hill,  .md  .1  few  mounted  men  who  were 
on  .Shrove  Hill  .dso  retired  as  the  l»ritish  troo[)s  adv.mced.  'The 
Raiii^ers,  li^^lit  inlantry  .md  L;renidiers,  proceeded  promptly  to  W^est- 
h, nil,  ne.ui)'  seven  miles  ahove  Rieliniond,  .md  destro)-ed  ,1  foundry, 
l.ihor.ilory  and  soiiu:  shops,  ,is  well  as  the  auditiU''s  records  which  h.ul 
been  withdrawn  troni  kichnioiul  for  s.ifety.  and  returned  to  the  city 
in  the  eveiiinL,^.  Arnold  sent  to  tiovernor  Jefferson  a  propos.il  to 
compromise  the  terms  of  his  incursion,  and  to  save  the  buildin;^'s  if 
vessels  miijiit  come  u[)  the  river  .uul  remove  tobacco  .md  other 
plunder.  Upon  its  rejection,  he  burned  so  much  ot  the  city  as  time 
permit  ted,  and  retunieil  to  Westover  on  the  sixth,  without  los>  to  his 
command.  Tlie  expedition  w.is  a  surprise,  but  the  loss,  except  to 
private  [iropertx' and  the  c.ipture  of  the  books  and  p.ipe:.  of  the  coun- 
cil, was  very  inconsiiler.ible.  Five  br.iss  i^uiis,  three  hundred  st.md 
of  arms,  found  in  the  loft  of  the  capitol  and  in  .1  w.r^oii,  .md  some 
(lu.u'terni.ister  stores,  constiiuleil  the  chief  articles  c.iplured.  I'lxen 
the  workshops  .md  w,uehou>es  were  not  wholly  consumed.  Reference 
is  li.id  to  maps  "  Oper.itions  in  .Southern  St.ites,"  .md  "Arnold  at 
Richmoiul." 

On  the  cii^htli,  Lieutenant-colonel  Siincoe  visited  Charles  City 
Court  I  louse,  ami,  accordin;^  to  Tarleton's  narr.itive,  killed  or  wounded 
twent)'  militi.i,  with  a  loss  of  one  man  killed  and  three  woimdetl. 

Cieiier.il  .Steuben  hid  in  v.iin  attempted  to  e([uip  a  sul'i'icient  force 
to  anticipate  the  movement.  Of  six  hundred  men  at  Chestertlekl 
Court  House,  he  h.id  clothint;'  fi>r  only  one  hundred  .md  t'lfty.  The 
appearance  of  some  militi.i  at  Manchester,  liowever,  and  inforni.ition 
that  (ieneral  Steuben  was  at  I'etersburt^.  led  Arnold  to  hasten  back 
to  save  his  line  of  retreat,  and  he  proceeded  at  once  to  I'ortsmouth 
to  put  it  in  a  defensive  condition. 


i 


At  this  time  (jeiier.il 


^esiie  also  receive 


d  ad 


vices 


that  General 


ijj>\  i^' 


55" 


IkiiM    (  nWI'KNS    I'O   CUIl.lnkl.   iiM   i;r    IKU^i:. 


[1781. 


I'liillips  was  pR'parin;^'  to  Icivc  New  Vdik  witli  ;uIilitioi),il  troops  for 
Viri;iiiia.  so  tliat  tli<j  difficiiltirs  in  tlic  way  of  rocciviii;^  reinforcements 
from  the  north  incrcasetl  clail>',  anil  the  whole  Southern  army  was  in 
inirsuit  of  Morgan. 

As  the  minil  reverts  to  tiie  contentions  for  hi'^h  command  which 
characterized  the  first  years  of  the  war.  and  one  officer  after  another, 
then  so  ambitious,  dis.ippears  froni  battlr  record,  it  looks  as  if  the 
man  who  sat  by  Morgan  on  the  t)anks  of  the  C.itawbaon  the  thirtieth 
of  January,  17.S1,  must  have  felt  as  if  a  new  i^eneration  hail  taken  the 
place  of  old  Comrades,  and  that  he  was  only  w.iitinL;  to  pass  away  also. 

The  hazard  of  delay  .iroused  him  to  action.  l,ee  w.is  ordered  to 
hasten  back  .md  join  Morgan  without  del.iy.  The  commissary  of 
supplies  was  ordered  to  remove  ever\thin_Lj  from  the  sea  coast  to  the 
interior.  'Ihc  commissaries  at  Hillsborou;_jh  and  Salisbury  were 
placed  in  readiness  to  move  the  prisoners  into  the  upper  counties  of 
Virginia.  Colonel  Carrin<^ton,  Ouartcrmastcr-i^eneral,  was  ordered  to 
collect  ma;^azines  on  the  Roanoke.  Letters  were  written  to  (ieneral 
Steuben  to  hasten  on  his  recruits;  to  the  ;^'overnors  of  North  Carolina 
and  Viri^inia,  to  fill  up  their  (piotas  of  ret^ulars  and  to  call  into  the  field 
all  the  militia  the>-  could  arm  ;  to  Shellj\-,  C'ampbell  and  the  other 
participants  in  the  battle  of  Kiiv^'s  Mountain,  to  bid  them  come  out 
once  more,  to  repel  the  threatened  invasion;  to  Ceneral  Iluger,  "  to 
march  to  (iuilford  Court  House  direct  iiihteail  of  to  Salisbury,"  adding, 
"  from  Cornwallis'  jJressiiiLj  disposition  and  the  contemi)t  he  has  for 
our  army,  we  ma\'  jirecipitate  him  into  some  capit.il  misfortune." 

Just  then,  the  tiilings  came  that  a  garrison  had  been  landed  at 
Wilmington,  almost  in  the  rear  of  the  small  army  which  he  left  at 
Hick's  Creek.  The  terms  of  service  of  the  Virginia  militia  brigade 
was  about  expiring  ar  '  according  to  precedent  they  were  to  be  dis- 
charged at  the  place  where  they  organized.  Availing  himself  of  this 
opportunity  he  placed  General  Stevens  in  command,  consigned  to 
him  the  escort  of  the  prisoners  then  in  depot  at  Hillsborough  and 
thereby  saved  a  detail  from  his  other  troops.  General  Stevens  dis- 
charged the  duty  and  reported  back  promptly  to  meet  the  responsi- 
bilities of  the  campaign. 

The  condition  of  Cornvvallis  requires  passing  notice.  He  af- 
firms that  "  his  second  invasion  of  North  Carolina  was  approved 
by  General  Clinton  :  "  "  that  the  defense  of  the  frontier  of  South 
Carolina,  even  against  an  inferior  army,  would  be,  from  its  extent, 
the    nature   of  the    climate  and  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants, 


17^1.1 


FkoM  (OWTFA'S  TO  f;fn.r<iiu)  cnrkr  iiousk. 


55« 


utterly  inii)ractic;iblc,  while  the  tiiLiny  could  draw  supplies  frdm 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia."  ()ftlu;  affair  at  ("owpcns  he  says, 
"  the  disaster  of  the  scventeentli  of  January  can  not  be  imputed  to 
any  defect  in  my  conduct,  as  the  detachment  sent,  was  certaiidy 
superior  to  tlie  forct;  a;^'ainst  whicli  it  was  sent,  and,  put  under  the 
comm.uui  of  an  officer  of  e\|)erience  anil  tried  abilities,"  " '1  lie  pub- 
lic faith  was  pledi^ed  to  our  friends  in  North  Carolina,  and  I  believed 
my  remaining;'  force  to  be  superior  to  that  under  the  command  of 
Gener.il  (jreeiie,"  but,  "our  hopes  of  success  were  not  founded  only 
upon  the  efforts  of  the  corps  under  my  immediate  command,  which 
did  not  much  exceed  three  thousaiul  men  ;  but  principally  ufjon  thi- 
most  positive  assurances,  triven  by  apparent!)-  credible  deputies  .md 
emissaries,  that  111)011  the  approach  of  a  ISritish  arm\'in  North  Carolina, 
a  great  body  of  the  inhabitants  were-  ready  to  join  and  to  coi')i)erate 
with  it,  in  emleavorinq  ton-store  his  Majesty's  ^dverninent."  "All 
inducements  in  my  power  were  made  iis(,-  of  without  material  ellect  ; 
aiul  ever\-  man  in  the  arm_\-  must  havt;  been  convince-d  that  the 
accounts  of  our  emissaries  had  greatly  cx.igLjerated  the  number  of 
those  who  professed  friendship  for  us: — a  very  inconsiderable  num- 
ber could  be  prevailed  upu'i  to  remain  with  us,  or  to  exert  themselves 
in  an>-  form  whatever." 

It  will  hereafter  appear  that  Cornwallis'  movement  lost  sight  of  a 
possible  dependence  uj)on  support  from  the  Ihitish  army  in  Virginia. 
and  that  his  selection  ;(  the  Salisbury  route,  for  hi ;  iiuMsion,  contem- 
l)laled  the  control  of  the  river  sources, so  as  to  force  (jvccii?  eastward 
.111(1  make  his  destruction  or  capture  more  certain. 

When  (ireenc  took  command  on  the  Catawba, on  the  thirty-first 
of  January,  the  army  of  Cornwallis  was  only  eighteen  miles  below, 
unable  to  cross  the  river  by  reason  of  high  waier.  (ireene  summoned 
the  neigliboring  militia  to  turn  out  and  guard  the  fords  as  the  water 
lell.  l?eatie's  !'"ord,  where  the  army  encamped,  is  about  six  miles 
above  McCowan's  Ford  and  nearer  to  .Salisbury.  On  the  evening  of 
January  thirty-first,  Morgan  was  sent  forward  toward  Salisbury  while 
General  Greene  remained  to  bring  off  the  militia.  The  river  fell 
rajiidl}-  and  Colonels  Webster  and  Tarlcton  crossed  at  Ik-itie's  Ford 
■shortl)-  .ifter  it  w.is  abandoned,  General  Davidson,  witli  three  hun- 
ilred  men,  met  the  division  of  Cornv.-allis  toward  morning,  FY-bruary 
first,  and  while  resisting  their  crossing  at  McCowan's  Ford,  was  killed, 
and  his  men  were  scatteretl.  A  few  rendezvoused  at  Tarrant's  Farm 
ten  miles  on  the  road  to  Salisbury,  but  were  there  attacked  and  cut  to 


w\ 

II   i 


W.  I: 


I   i 


r 

[! 

[  i 
( 

j. 

r 


m 


i 

-1 

I  . 

!■ 

ilr    III          flB       ^- 

i 

1  i!  1 

ilil. 

55^ 


KKOM   (dWriNS    lO   Crn.loKI)   ColkT    IIOUSK. 


fi:ai. 


pieces  !))•  'raik'ton.  ]W  the  third,  Mdri^an  hail  crossed  the  Y.idkin. 
("orinv.illis  burned  most  of  iiis  reniaiuiii'^f  b.ii^'i^a^e  atui  waj^oiis, 
doubled  teams,  nioiiiUeii  a  portion  of  his  infantry  ami  sent  a  stron;^ 
corps  under  General  ()'IIari  in  pinsuit.  It  rained  all  day  on  the 
fust  of  I'l'bruary.  (ireriie  kmw  that  within  t'vo  dav's  the  water 
from  tlie  mountains  would  fill  the  \'adkin.  As  yet  it  w.is  not  so  deep 
but  that  liis  cavalry  crossed  safely,  and  liis  forethouj^ht  in  havini^ 
boats  provided,  enabled  him  to  secure  all  his  commaiul.  M.iny  in- 
habitants followed  the  army,  retirin;^  in  dread  oi  Tarleton,  and  the 
vantMiartl  of  the  British  force  only  captured  the  reariuost  wagons, 
A  useless  cannon. ule  was  maintained  durin^f  the  da\ .  ("ornwallis 
remained  at  Salisbury  four  da\'s,  and  passed  the  Yadkin  on  the  eij^htii. 
(jreene  marched  on  the  fourth,  after  one  day's  halt,  and  unitetl  his 
command  at  (iuiltord  Court   House. 

A  council  of  war  was  heUl  which  advised  not  to  offer  battle.  The 
re  united  ami)'  only  numbered  two  thousand  and  thirty-six  men,  incluil- 
ing  fourteen  hundred  and  twenty-six  regulars.  .Some  course  of  action 
was  to  be  immeiliatel)'  decided  upon.  Colonel  Carrington  joined  the 
command,  with  the  report, that  boats  had  been  secured,  and  secreted 
.dong  the  D.m,  so  as  to  be  collected  on  a  few  liours'  winning.  The 
Ihitish  army  was  at  Salem,  only  twenty-five  miles  from  Guilfi^rd. 
This  was  on  the  tenth  of  February.  Preparatory  to  tiie  march. 
General  (ireene  organized  a  light  corps  of  .seven  hundred  picked 
troops  under  Colonels  Williams,  Carrington,  Howard,  Washington 
and  l.ee,  to  cover  his  rear. 

Kosciu.sko  had  joined  Greene,  and  was  sent  forward  to  throw  up 
a  breastwork  to  cover  the  landing  of  the  boats,  and  the  army  com- 
menced it.^  march. 

Cornwallis  bore  to  the  left  to  cross  above  Greene.  lie  had  no 
idea  that  Greene  could  effect  a  cro.ssing  at  the  few  ferries  which  lay 
below  the  possible  fording  places,  while  by  cutting  him  off  from  vhe 
fords  above,  he  cmdd  follow  down  the  river  and  strike  his  small  com- 
mand as  well  as  the  army  marching  from  the  camp  on  the  I'eedee. 
Hut  that  army  had  already  joined  Greene.  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Ger- 
maine,  of  March  nineteenth,  he  says,  "  I  was  informed  that  the 
American  commander  could  not  collect  many  flats  at  any  of  the 
femes  on  the  River  Dan."  Colonel  Carrington,  however,  had  been 
specially  charged  with  this  duty  by  General  Greene,  with  the  iid  of 
Captain  Smith,  of  the  Maryland  line ;  had  anticipated  almost  any 
contingency  which  should  require  the  passage  of  the  river ;   and  so 


^rjw'j 


r7Ri. 


M<()M   COWTKNS    TO   ClJII.IOl;!)   CU'RI'    lIolJSK. 


5S3 


provided  boats  at  Hnvd's  and  Irwin's  fcrrirs,  which  were  nei;^lil)(irin;^ 
ferries,  that  on  the  fourteenth  of  I'ebniary  thij  wliolc  division  safely 
crossed  the  river,  sccureil  their  boats,  and  were  bi'ynnd  riMch  of  the 
enemy.  Tarlcton  thus  reports  this  affair :  "The  h^jlit  aiiny  (Wilhams) 
whicli  was  tlic  last  in  crnssiii|^r,  ^as  so  closely  pursued,  that  scarcely 
had  its  rear  laiuied  when  the  Hritish  advance  appeared  on  the  oppo- 
site bank;  and  in  tiie  last  twenty-four  hours  it  is  said  to  h.avi.'  marched 
forty  miles.  The  hardships  suffered  by  the  Hritish  troops  for  want 
of  tlieir  tciits  antl  usual  ba;4i;a^e,  in  this  loni^  and  rapid  pursuit 
throu;^h  a  w  ild  and  unst-tlleil  country,  were  uncommoidy  ;^reat  ;  yet 
such  was  tlu'ir  ardor  in  tin:  service  that  thej-  submitted  to  them,  with- 
out a  blow,to  the  American  army.before  it  crossed  the  Roanoke."' 
Tarleton  adds,  "That  the  American  army  escaped  without  sufferuitf 
any  material  injury,  seems  more  owin;^  to  a  train  of  fortunate  inci- 
dents, jutliciously  improved  by  their  commaniler,  than  to  an\'  want  of 
enterprise  or  activity  in  the  army  that  pursued.  Vet  the  o[)er.itions 
of  1-ord  L'ornwallis,  duriuL^^  the  pursuit,  would  probably  have  been 
more  efficacious,  liail  not  the  unfortunate  affair  at  the  Cowpens  de- 
prived him  of  almost  the  whole  of  his  light  troops." 

Lord  Cornwallis  returned  to  IlillsborouL;h  and  issued  a  proclama- 
tion, "  but,"  says  Tarleton,  "  the  misfortunes  consequent  on  premature 
risings  had  considerabl)-  thinned  out  the  loyalists,  originally  more 
numerous  in  North  Carolina  than  in  an\- of  the  other  colonies.  Their 
spirits  may  be  said  to  have  been  broken  by  repeatetl  persecutions. 
Still,  the  zeal  of  some  was  not  repressed  ;  and  considerable  numbers 
were  preparing  to  assemble,  when  General  (ireene,  reinforced  with  six 
hundred  Virginia  militia  under  Cieneral  Stevens,  took  the  resolution 
of  again  crossing  the  Dan,  and  re-entering  North  Carolina."  Lieuten- 
ant-colonei  Lee,  with  his  legion,  was  detached  across  the  river  on  the 
twenty-first  of  I'ebruary,  and  the  next  day  General  Greene  passetl  it 
with  tVte  rest  of  the  army. 

Meanwhile  General  Greene  posted  a  portion  of  his  army  at  Hali- 
fax Court  House,  and  made  every  exertion  to  prepare  an  offensive 
return.  On  the  seventeenth,  his  whole  force  in  camp  consisted  of 
one  thousand  and  seventy-eight  regular  infantry — sixty-four  artillery, 
and  one  hundred  and  seventv-six  cavalrv,  with  one  hundred  and 
twelve    legionary   infantry,   so    many   troops    had   been   detached   in 

'  "  The  upper  Ko.inoke  is  known  as  ihe  Dan;  the  upper  Peedee  as  the  Vadkiu  ;  the 
upper  west  branch  of  the  Santee,  fust  as  the  Cotiijaroe,  ami  then  as  Broad  ;  the  upper  east 
liranch,  first  as  tile  Wateree,  and  then  as  (.."atawha." 


fJlJ 


'  V      1 

1  ■ 

lit  i 


L  ■• 


ii 


■4-^m 


I 


I'V: 


''[^^■J' 


I-- 


M;:'^ 


554 


FI^CIM   COWPKXS   TO   c;UII,FORl)   COURT   ilOUSK 


[1781. 


charcjc  of  prisoners,  the  baggage,  and  the  sick.  The  Delaware 
troops  under  Kirkuood,  so  terribly  cut  up  at  Camden,  did  not 
exceed  eighty  men  for  duty.  (3n  the  nineteenth,  Stevens  was 
ordered  by  (ireene  to  enga<^;e  volunteers  for  the  service,  and  he 
joined  within  three  days,  with  nearly  eight  hundred  men. 

By  the  twenty-third  the  whole  army  was  demonstrating  towards 
Guilford,  and  Lee  and  Pickens  hovered  near  the  outposts  of  Cornwallis. 

At  this  time  the  loyalists  were  organizing  a  corps  under  Colonel 
Pyle  upon  the  marshes  of  the  Maw,  and  Tarleton  was  sent  to  assist 
and  protect  them.  More  than  four  hundred  had  collected  a  little 
north  of  the  old  Hillsborough  and  Salisbury  road,  two  miles  from  the 
Allamance  River,  in  Orange  County,  Virginia.  Lee  and  Pickens  fell  in 
with  this  party,  having  been  atlvised  of  their  m(jvemcnts  by  two  men 
whom  they  picked  up  while  hunting  for  Tarleton.  Tarleton  says, 
"  the  loyalists  were  proceeding  to  Tarleton'.s  encampment,  unappre- 
hensive of  danger,  when  they  were  met  in  a  lane,  by  Lee  with  his  legion. 
Unfortunately,  mistaking  the  American  cavalry  for  Tarleton's  dra- 
goons they  allowed  themselves  to  be  surrounded  ;  no  quarter  was 
granted;  between  two  and  three  hundred  were  inhumanly  butchered. 
IIum;uiity  shudders  at  the  recital,  but  cold  and  unfeeling  policy 
aroused  it,  as  the  most  effective  means  of  intimidating  the  friends  of 
royal  government." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  loyalists  commenced  the  firing  as  soon 
as  they  recognized  the  Maryland  troops  in  tlie  rear  of  Lee,  and  that 
Lee  himself  had  hoped  to  pass  and  strike  at  Tarleton  hiirself;  but 
after  the  firing  began,  it  was  continued,  until  the  whole  party  were 
killed,  wounded,  or  driven  intii  the  woods. 

Cornwallis  withdrew  from  Hillsborough  on  the  following  day,  even 
!,efore  the  expiration  of  the  time  designated  in  his  proclamation  for 
the  people  to  report  to  him.  for  duty.  .Stedman,  then  his  commissary, 
i'  timates  that  the  army  could  not  be  supported  at  that  i)i)int.  On 
the  twenty-seventh  he  crossed  the  ILaw  and  fixed  his  camp  near 
Allamance  Creek,  one  of  its  tributaries.  Greene  adopted  a  line  of 
march  nearly  parallel  to  that  of  liis  adversary,  and  advanced  to  the 
heights  between  Reedy  Fork  and  Troublesome  Creek,  having  his 
liivided  headquarters  near  the  Speedwell  iron  works  and  Boyd's 
Mill,  on  two  streams,  Greene  had  gained  the  choice  of  position  en- 
tirely, reversing  the  old  relations  of  tlie  armies.  He  could  give  battle, 
retire  as  he  advanced,  or  move  nto  Virginia  by  the  upper  fords  which 
Cornwallis  had  so  eageriv  controlled  a  few  weeks  before.     It  will  be 


Si  , 


[1781. 


'781.1 


FROM   COWPENS  TO   GUILFORD  COURT   HOUSE. 


555 


noticed  that  the  camp  of  Cornwallis,  between  the  Haw  and  Deep 
rivers,  was  where  the  roads  from  Salisbury,  Guilford  and  Hillsborough 
unite,  and  thus  controlled  the  direct  road  to  Wilmington,  his  depot 
of  clothing  and  supplies,  of  which  his  army  was  already  in  great  need. 
The  light  troops  of  both  armies  were  actively  employed,  daily,  and  on 
the  si.\th  of  March,  a  skirmish  at  Wetzcll's  Mills,  which  was  skillfully 
anticipated  and  supported  by  the  whole  British  army,  put  in  peril  the 
whole  column  of  Williams  and  Lee. 

On  the  eighth,  commissioners  finally  settled  upon  a  plan  of  ex- 
change of  prisoners,  the  British  having  exacted  paroles  of  the  militia 
wherever  they  went,  while  charging  them  to  the  account  as  if  captured 
in  battle.  Colonel  Carrington  and  Frederick  Cornwallis  made  an 
adjustment  so  that  General  Greene  obtained  some  officers  who  would 
have  otherwise  been  idle  during  the  campaign,  but  the  arrangement 
had  no  immediate  value  as  to  private  soldiers  and  militia. 

In  the  midst  of  these  anxieties  troops  began  to  arrive,  and  on  the 
twelfth  Greene  determined  to  offer  battle.  On  the  thirteenth  orders 
were  issued  for  all  detachments  to  report  at  Guilford  Court  House, 
and  on  the  fourteenth  of  March,  General  Greene  was  in  readiness  for 
the  struggle. 


1 
1 

<  1  i> 

:     'i   ; 

: 

;i 

1 

1-; 

'     '-ti, 

■ 

CHAPTER   LXIX. 

BATTLE  OF  CUILFORD  COURT  HOUSE.     1781. 

THE  American  army  which  was  formed  for  battle  near  Gm'lford 
Court  House,  March  fifteenth,  1781,  consisted  of  four  thmisand 
four  hundred  and  four  men  :  including  one  thousand  four  hundred 
and  ninety  regular  infantry,  and  one  hundred  and  sixty-one  cavalry. 
Lieutenant-colonels  Lee  and  Campbell  were  sent, early  in  the  morning, 
to  feci  the  enemy  and  skirmish  with  its  advance  column. 

Cornwallis  accepted  the  challenge,  sent  his  baggage  back  to  Bell's 
Mill,  on  Deep  River,  and  marched  toward  Guilford.  The  cavalry, 
the  light  infantry  of  the  guards,  and  the  Yagers,  composed  his  ad- 
vance guard.  "A  sharp  conflict,"  says  Tarleton,  " 'Misued  between 
the  advanced  parties  of  the  two  armies.  In  the  onset,  the  fire  of  the 
Americans  was  heavy,  and  the  charge  of  their  cavalry  was  spirited. 
Notwithstanding  their  numbers  and  opposition,  the  gallantry  of  the 
light  infantry  of  the  guards,  assisted  by  the  legion,  made  impression 
upon  their  centre  before  the  Twenty-third  regiment  arrived  to  give 
support  to  the  advanced  troops.  Captain  Goodricks,  of  the  guards, 
fell  in  this  contest ;  and  between  twenty  and  thirty  of  the  guards, 
dragoons,  and  Yagers  were  killed  and  wounded.  The  king's  troops 
moved  on  until  they  arrived  in  sight  of  the  American  army."  Refer- 
ence is  made  to  map  "  liattle  of  Guilford;"  and  the  narrative  will 
follow  the  movements  of  the  attacking  force.  The  American  first 
line  was  formed  in  the  edge  of  \voods,behind  open  ground,  and  under 
cover  of  fences.  From  this  point  the  surface  gradually  ascended  to 
the  Court  House,  and  was  quite  thickly  wooded.  Other  hills  were  on 
either  side,  and  the  Court  House  itself  stood  upon  a  still  more  abrupt 
ascent.  The  first  line  consisted  of  North  Carolina  militia  under  Gen- 
erals Butler  and  Eaton,  one  thousand  and  sixty  men,  besides  officers. 
Captain  Singleton  occupied  the  road,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
The  riffht  was  covered  bv  Lvnch's  riflemen,  two  hundred  men  ;  Kirk- 


Ilplf 


.^^i-: 


Guilford 
liousand 
hundred 
cavalry, 
mornini;, 

to  Bell's 
:  cavalry, 
I  his  ad- 
bctwecn 
re  of  the 
spirited, 
ry  of  the 
npression 
1  to  give 
e  guards, 
;  guards, 
's  troops 
'     Refer- 
rative  will 
rican    first 
\nd  under 
ccnded  to 
Is  were  on 
3re  abrupt 
nder  Gen- 
es officers, 
f  artillery, 
icn  ;  Kirk- 


I 

0 


rum/ii/fff  a^<f/?min/M  O'/  f"»m/r^ 


.).j(J' 


i-»»i', 


M    '' 


'i    I 


1 


.nr 


i 


il':" 

*■';  . 

';  '  1 

1 

HI 
iljl 

1 

k 

1 
i 

,     ! 

■A ' 

I78I.] 


HATTLE  or  r.uii.i'oun  court  house. 


557 


immu 


•\, 


wood's  Dcla wares,  not  exceed ini:j  eighty  men,  and  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  under  Colonel  Washin_c;ton.  The  left  was  covered  by  Camp- 
bell's riflemen  and  the  legion  infantry,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  and  Lee's  horse. 

Tl'ie  American  second  line,  about  three  hundred  yards  in  the  rear, 
consisted  of  the  Virginia  militia  under  Generals  Stevens  and  LAwson, 
eleven  hundred  and  twenty-three  men.  rank  and  file,  posted  in  woods 
and  on  both  sides  of  the  road.  Behind  this  line  Stevens  had  placed  a 
few  veterans  to  keep  the  militia  up  to  duty.  The  American  third  line 
was  more  than  tlncc  hundred  yards  further  in  the  rear,  upon  high 
ground,  with  the  /r/i  slii:^litly  refused ;  and  was  composed  entirely 
of  regulars.  Kirkwood  had  been  detached  from  the  right,  as  already 
noticed,  to  take  a  position  on  the  corresponding  flank  of  the  first  line. 
General  linger  was  in  command  of  the  right  wing,  consisting  of  Vir- 
ginia troops,  and  Colonel  Williams  commanded  the  left  wing,  com- 
posed of  M.irj'land  troops.  As  this  division  of  regulars  would  very 
naturally  be  regarded  as  a  veteran  corps,  it  is  but  proper  to  state 
that  the  Second  Maryland  regiment,  Lieutenant  colonel  Ford  com- 
manding, consisted  of  the  new  levies,  most  of  whom  had  never  been 
in  action  or  under  fire  at  all ;  and  that  fully  one-half  of  the  Virginia 
brigade  was  made  up  of  similar  troops.  Colonel  Gunby's  command, 
which  had  been  handled  by  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  at  Cowpens. 
was  the  only  regular  infantry  which  could  be  called  veteran.  A  por- 
tion of  the  North  Carolina  militia  had  been  forced  into  the  service, 
under  suspicion  of  disloyalty,  as  a  punishment,  and  with  here  and 
there  a  few  substitutes,  and  with  good  officers,  it  was  a  feeble  force 
to  resist  any  persistent  attack  of  British  troops.  Its  flanks  were  so 
well  covered,  however,  that  General  Greene  must  have  had  faith  in 
their  ability  to  make  some  resistance,  when  thus  well  supported  and 
so  admirably  disposed.  General  Stevens  posted  some  of  his  old 
soldiers  in  the  rear  of  his  line  to  anticipate  any  disorder,  as  many  of 
the  Virginia  militia  also,  were  raw  troops,  then  for  the  first  time 
brought  to  the  field.  In  thus  carefully  stating  the  battle  formation 
of  the  American  army,  it  is  proper  to  notice  a  characteristic  letter 
from  General  Morgan  to  General  Greene,  under  date  of  February 
twentieth,  which  seems  to  have  suggested  to  General  Greene  his 
plan  of  battle.  "  I  expect  Lord  Cornwallis  will  push  you  until  you 
are  obliged  to  fight  him,  on  which  much  will  depend.  You'll  have, 
from  what  I  see,  a  great  number  of  militia.  If  they  fight,  you'll  beat 
Cornwallis  ;   if  not,  he  will  beat  you,  and  perhaps  cut  your  regulars 


'i(ii3..'  \ 


Mil? 


s 


.»f'''t:l 


II' 


! 


i  \ 


IS, 


V  : 

>. 

, 

[ 

i 

r  ^  A 


5S8 


BATTI.;-;   OK   (UJII.KORl)  COURT   HOUSK. 


[1781. 


to  pieces.  I  am  infornicil  tliat  anioriL^  tlic-  militia  will  be  a  suimber 
of  old  soldiers.  I  think  it  would  be  advisable  to  select  them  from 
the  militia,  and  put  them  in  the  midst  of  the  ret^ulars.  Sc/crt  the 
rijlcmcn  also  and  Ji^i^/tf  tliiiii  on  tho  Jlanks,  under  i:itcrprisin<^  ojfuirs 
li'ho  arc  acquaintod  loitlt  that  kind  of  fighting:;,  and  put  the  remain- 
der of  the  militia  in  the  eentre  ivith  some  pieked  troops  in  their  rear, 
li'ith  orders  to  sh(>(!t  doion  the  first  man  that  runs.  If  aii\-thinf:j  will 
succeed,  a  disposition  of  liiis  kind  will.  I  hopi:  you  will  not  look 
upon  this,  as  dictating;-;  but  as  m\- opMiiion,  in  a  matter  tliat  I  am 
much  concerned  in." 

It  is  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  th.it  at  least  six  hundred  of  the  mili- 
tia were  enrolled  for  six  werks  on!)-,  ineludin;^  tiie  march  to  the  field 
and  the  rL-turn  march  f  )r  discharge,  so  that  (.ieneral  (ireene  had  littU; 
time  to  lose.  'I'he  formation  of  the  arm\-  for  battle  has  been  severely 
criticised,  on  the  Ljround  that  the  regulars  were  so  fu-  in  the  rear  ; 
but  the  tlanking  bodies  in  th'.;  first  line  were  fully  equal  in  nuiTiber  to 
the  small  veteran  corps  of  the  reserve,  and  the)-  were  men  who  had 
tested  their  mettle  thoroughly  on  other  fields.  The  disposition  of  the 
troops  seems  to  have  so  equalized  the  commands  as  to  impart  strength 
to  all  parts,  and  to  leave  the  militia  alone,  at  no  point.  If  Kirkwood's 
command  had  c<")vered  Singleton's  guns  in  the  centre,  possibly  it 
would  have  strengthened  the  line  ;  but  might  have  sacrificed  him,  with 
the  militia  ;  and  the  supports  were  near  enough,  if  there  had  been 
any  resistance  at  all. 

The  liritish  riglit  wing  consisted  of  the  regiment  of  Bose  (Hes- 
sian) and  the  Seventy-first  l^ritish  '-eneral  Leslie  commanding,  with 
the  First  battalion  of  guards  in  reserve,  under  Lieutenant-coKjnel  Nor- 
ton ;  and  the  left  wing  consisted  of  the  Twenty-third  i-nd  Thirty-third 
British,  Lieutenant-colonel  Webster  commanding,  with  the  grena- 
diers and  Second  battalion  of  the  guards  in  reserve,  under  Gener;J 
O'liara.  The  light  infantry  and  Yagers  were  to  the  left  and  rear  of 
the  artillery,  which  occupied  the  road  and  exchangetl  fire  with  Single- 
ton's guns  while  the  British  line  was  forming.  The  American  line,  it 
will  be  observed,  considerably  overlapped  the  British,  thereby  endan- 
gering  itsfi.mks  in  case  of  a  direct  advance.  The  British  army  had 
marched  through  a  defile,  to  their  position,  and  had  not  sufficieni 
room  for  deployment  until  they  passed  beyond  a  small  creek  which 
crossed  the  Salisbury  road.  It  will  be  at  once  seen  that  the  Ameri- 
can first  line,  with  Stevens  and  Lawson  behind  its  immediate  centre, 
was  a  strung  line,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  entire  British  force 


i78i.] 


hatti.p:  ok  cuii^fori,)  court  }iousi>:. 


559 


was  but  little  if  any  over  two  thousand  strong;,  after  deduction  of  the 
baggage  guard  sent  to  Bell's  Mills.  The  tabular  statement  at  close  of 
thischapter  indicates  the  condition  of  the  army  of  General  Cornwallis 
at  different  dates. 

'I'arleton's  dragoons  were  kept  in  column,  on  the  road,  in  the  rear, 
to  act  as  opportunity  should  be  furnished  by  the  events  of  the  day, 
and  to  cover  the  artillery  which  could  advance  only  by  the  road.  It 
will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  map,  that  Lord  Cornwallis  appreciated 
the  danger  that  threatened  his  tl.inks,  upon  a  simple  advance  against 
the  centre,  and  as  soon  as  the  militia  gave  way,  so  that  he  felt  the 
sharp  fire  of  the  flanking  parties,  the  Twenty-third  and  Thirty-third 
regiments  changed  direction  to  the  left,  to  let  in  their  reserves  on 
the  right,  while  the  light  infantry  antl  Yagers  marcheil  obliquely  to 
ihe  ver)'  left  extreme.  The  right  wing  also  took  up  its  reserves,  so 
that  the  combint'd  line  became  co-c.\tensive  with  the  entire  Amoricm 
front.  Lieutenant  O'll.ira  was  killed  at  his  guns.dunng  the  artillery 
firing  which  was  maintained  quite  steadily  tluring  the  hist  twenty 
minutes,  before  the  IJrilish  army  entered  the  open  ground  to  charge 
the  militia.  'The  advance  was  steady  and  in  good  order.  When 
within  about  one  hundred  and  forty  yards  of  the  fence  the  North 
Carolina  nii'.itia  delivered  a  partial  volley  and  fled,  abandoning  every- 
thing. Singleton's  guns  necessarily  retreated  up  the  road  as  soon  as 
left  without  support.  A  considerable  portion  of  Eaton's  brigade 
dashed  behind  Campbell's  riflemen  and  took  refuge  in  thick  woods, 
on  a  hill  (see  map)  and  the  remainder  of  the  division  fell  back  upon 
the  second  line,  which  opened  its  files  for  them  to  pass  through, and 
promptly  resumt^-j  a  steady  front  toward  the  enemy.  The  British 
left  wing  was  sevt:rely  galled  by  the  fire  of  Kirkwood,  Lynch  and 
Washington  ;  but  finally  forced  them  back  to  a  corresponding  posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  the  second  line.  The  British  right  wing  was 
equal  1)'  iinnoyed  by  the  riflemen  of  Campbell,  the  legionary  infan- 
try and  Lee.  The  British  centre  had  swept  on  at  a  bayonet  charge 
againt  the  second  line,  and  the  first  battalion  of  guards,  with  the  regi- 
ment of  liose,  wheeled  to  the  right,to  clear  their  flanks  of  these  assail- 
ants. The  uoods  were  so  thick,  and  so  filled  with  underbrush  that 
their  bayonets  were  of  little  practical  value.  As  the  riflemen  fell 
back  the  pursuit  was  continued  up  the  hill  so  far,  that  these  regiments 
were  absolutely  detached  from  the  army  and  engaged  in  a  separate 
battle  until  the  principal  action  was  practically  ended.  While  the 
British  army  lost  numbers  by  their  absence,  it   is  not  probable  t'lat 


■<  I 


^?''i 


V 


Mil 


II 


560 


HAri'l.K   OF   CJL'II.lORl)    COUkI'    IloUSF''. 


[1781. 


I 


Campbell  .uul  \.vc,  after  their  gallant  coiuliict  in  the  mornin;^,  woiiltl 
have  let  slip  an  opportniiity  to  attack  the  Hritisii  in  the  rear,  if  tlie 
t^uards  and  Hessians  h;i(l  adiiered  to  the  ori;^inial  onler  of  battle. 
The  manner  in  which  this  flanking  detachment  sustained  itself  will 
lie  hereaftir  noticeti. 

Meanwhile  the  British  centre  and  left  wine;-  moved  directly  upon 
the  Vir;4ini,i  militia,  which  resisted  for  awhile  with  i^reat  spirit,  but 
was  finally  compelled  to  <;ive  way  and  seek  cover  behind  the  conti- 
nental troops,  or  in  the  wot/ds.  Kirkwood  and  Washinj^toii  hastened 
to  their  oriL;inal  positions  on  the  right  of  the  reserve  line  as  soon  as 
the  seconil  line  L;ave  way. 

rile  Jhitish  centre  was  embarrassed  by  the  woods,  and  its  advance 
became  uiUMpial.  The  Seventy-fnst  dropj)ed  behind,  !:^reatly  impeded 
by  ravines,  and,  i)ossibly  and  very  naturally,  to  be  reaily,  if  needed  to 
support  the  two  reL;iments  which  had  broken  off  from  its  ri^dit,  and 
were  actively  en;^at,fed  at  the  time.  Cornwallis  says,  "  the}-  advanced 
upcjii  he.irin.^  active  firinij  upon  their  left  ami  front." 

The  Thirty-third,  the  li.L^dit  infantry,  ;uid  V.r^ers  pressed  after 
Kirkwooil  and  T^)  nch  whom  they  had  o|)posed  from  the  be^inniuL;'  nf 
tile  action,  drop[)in_L;  the  Twenl)--third  l>ehind,  and  this  rej^iment,  like 
the  Seventy-first  of  the  li^ht  wiiiLj  w.is  aijain  dropped,  when  the 
Second  battalion  of  tiie  j^uards  and  the  grenadiers  advanced  towaitl 
the  American  third  line. 

Lieutenant-ct)lonel  Webster  advanced  directly  upon  the  American 
rei^ulars,  and  made  two  successive  char;j;es,  which  were  repulsed. 
Colout'l  (iuiil)}'  with  the  I'^irst  Marvland  regiment,  supported  h_v  the 
left  win;^  of  (ieueral  lluger's  command,  deliveretl  a  well  directed  fire, 
resorted  to  the  bayonet  and  compelled  the  assailin;jj  column  t(j  cross 
a  deep  ravine  and  take  refut^e  upon  a  hill  to  its  rear.  Tarleton  says, 
"  At  this  period  the  event  of  tlu;  .action  was  doubtful,  and  victory 
alternately  presided  over  either  army.  Webster,  liowever,  gained  an 
excellent  position  till  he  could  he.ir  of  the  progress  of  the  king's  troops 
on  his  right." 

The  Americans  had  thus  repulsetl  and  detached  the  British  left, 
and  the  extreme  Hritisii  right  was  engaged  with  Campbell  and  Lee  at 
a  disadvantage,  more  than  a  mile  to  the  right  and  rear.  The  Second 
battalion  of  the  guards  and  the  grenadiers  were  continuing  their 
march,  and  without  waiting  for  support,  made  an  impetuous  attack 
upon  the  left  of  the  American  reserve  near  the  Court  House.  The 
Second  Maryland  regiment  gave  way  almost  instantly,  losing  the  guns 


I7S1.I 


nATII.K   c>I-   (ICII.IORI)   roiJKT   IIoL'Si:. 


5^.1 


wliicli  li.id  been  witluliMWM  to  this  line.  Tlic  adv mcc  of  the;  ;^niiir(is 
had  not  hrcii  piTccivcd  hy  Coloiud  Williams  on  arcount  of  an  iiiti;r- 
vcniii;^  i.liiiii])  of  trees  (see  111,1)))  until  the)'  made  their  char;4e.  Its 
effect  was  to  thre.iten  the  entire  line,  take  it  in  the  rear,  and  force  it 
towards  \V('l)-.ter.  The  I''irst  Maryland  wheeletl  to  the  left  and  used 
the  bayonet.  Colonel  Gunby  was  almost  imni'-diately  dismounted, 
and  Lieutenant-colonel  Howard  took  command.  Tarletoii  and  Corn- 
wallis  confirm  the  statement  of  the  s^ndlant  conduct  of  this  regiment. 
Tarleton  says,  "The  Maryland  brit^fade,  followed  by  Washiiv^ton's 
cavalr\',  moviiv.r  upon  them  before  they  could  receive  assistance,  retook 
the  cannon  and  repulsed  the  ^aiardi  with  great  slau;j;hter,  the  Ljrcjund 
beini(  open.  Colonel  VVashinLjton's  dra,i,foons  killed  Colonel  Stewart 
and  several  of  his  men,  and  pursued  the  remainder  into  the  Woods. 
Gcner.d  O'l  laia,  though  wounded,  rallied  the  remainder  of  the  Second 
battalion  of  the  Ljuards  to  the  Twenty-third  and  Seventy  firit,  who  had 
inclined  from  the  riyht  aiul  left,  and  were  now  a|)pr(;achin^r  open 
ground." 

To  cover  their  advance,  Lieutenant  McLeod  was  placed  with  two 
guns  upon  a  small  knoll  near  the  road,  which  should  have  been  held 
by  Singleton,  and  checked  the  American  advance.until  the  arrivtd  of 
the  two  Ihitish  regiments  last  referred  to  ex|)osed  the  Maryland  regi- 
ment to  the  attack  of  a  largely  superior  force.  The  ^Vmerican  onset 
was  so  persistent  and  the  moment  was  so  critical  that  General  Corn- 
vvallis  commenced  this  artillery  fire  before  the  guards  were  disengaged, 
and  while  they  were  actually  exposed  to  its  effect.  When  the  First 
M.iryland  regiment  wheeled  upon  the  guards,  it  uncovered  the  Vir- 
ginia- line,  and  Lieutenant-cohjnel  Webster  availed  himself  of  the 
opportunity  to  recross  the  ravine  and  join  the  main  body.  Tarleton's 
dragoons  had  JList  returned  from  the  support  of  the  regiment  of  Bose, 
and  was  immediately  followed  by  the  J""irst  battalion  of  the  guards. 
The  force  now  concentrated  near  the  Court  House  could  not  be 
resisted,  and  General  (jreenc  ordered  a  retreat.  This  retreat  was 
made  under  cover  of  Colonel  Greene's  regiment,  which  from  its  situa- 
tion had  been  held  fast  to  watch  the  movements  of  Webster  after 
he  occupied  the  hill  nearly  opposite,  and  had  taken  no  active  part 
in  the  operations  to  its  Ictt. 

The  Twenty-third   and   Seventy-first  regiments  followed  a  short 
distance    in   pursuit ;  but   Tarleton    says,    "  Larl  Cornwallis  did    not 
think  it  advisable  for  the  British   cavalry  to  charge  the  enemy,  who 
were  retreatine  in  good  order." 
36 


Ml 


f 


'^\. 


^i  •     i\ 


)  i  I 


r 


w3;Bi 


tK 


5<)j 


liATlI.K    or   (iUIU'OUU   COURT    lloUSI'. 


[1781 


'  \» 


3    ■  i 


The  ciMitf^t  between  Campbell  and  the  Lc^^ion  h';.jht  infantry,  sup- 
ported by  a  few  militia  who  rallied  in  ihewond'^,  h.i<l  in  the  miMntinio 
been  so  spirited,  that  the  Hritish  regiments  "  found  men  behind  trei;s 
on  all  sitles  of  them,"  and  Tarleton  sa\'s,  that  "  when  ho  made  his 
cluiri^e.he  found  officers  and  men  of  both  corps  in  the  possession  of 
the  enemy."  He  had  been  sent  in  that  direction  on  account  of  the 
continuous  firiiv^  which  had  lieeii  noticed  by  Cornw.illis  ;  and  at  the 
time  he  was  so  detached,  there  was  no  oi)[)ortiniity  to  handle  his  cav- 
alry to  advanta'^fe  at  the  centre.  The /Vmericaa  riflemen  had  their 
choice  of  t^round,  and  their  motle  of  fi;^litint;  was  destructive  to  the 
j^uards  anil  i  lessians,  with  little  loss  to  themielves.  His  arrival  was 
opportune,  anil  the  .Americans  retreated  to  the  woods.  Fortunately 
for  Tarleton,  Colonel  Lee  had  abandoned  the  hopr  n['  resist.ince,  more 
than  to  check  pursuit,  and  hail  made  a  detour  for  llu:  purpose  of  join- 
iiiL,^  the  main  army  at  the  Court  House  before  that  officer  appeared. 

He  lost  a  ^reat  opportunit)',  and  in  fict  failed  to  reach  the  main 
army  until  the  ne.\t  morniuLj.  He  states  that  if  General  Greene  iiad 
known  the  condition  of  the  IJritish  arm\',  a  retreat  would  have  been 
unnecessai')-,  and  the  victory  certain.  He  did  not  reach  Greene,  how- 
ever, and  (lid  not  so  aihise  him.  His  arrival  at  that  moment  would 
have  settled  the  issue. 

Tarleton  t^ives  it  as  his  opinion  that  "  if  the  .American  artillery  had 
pre-occupied  the  small  hill  by  the  road-side,  the  Twenty-third  and 
Seventy-first  regiments  could  not  have  united  with  the  guards;  and 
the  result  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  army  of  Cornwallis."  He 
says,  that  "  one-third  of  the  British  army  was  killed  or  wounded  d.ur- 
ing  the  two  hours  of  battle."  The  casualties  arc  stated  as  given  in 
the  official  Returns,  made  up  immediately  after  the  battle,  and  the 
numerous  conjectures  which  have  exaggerated  the  losses  on  both 
sides,  arc  of  little  value,  when  the  acknowledged  facts  and  the  admit- 
ted valor  of  the  troops,  who  did  any  fighting,  on  either  side,  suffi- 
ciently indicate  the  desperate  character  of  the  action. 

Britisli  casualties — Royal  Artillery,  Lieutenant  O'Hara,  and  one 
man  killed  ;  four  wounded.  Guards — Lieutenant-colonel  Stewart, 
eight  sergeants,  twenty-eight  rank  and  file  killed  ;  Captains  Schmultz, 
Maynard,  and  Goodrick  died  of  wounds  ;  Captains  Lord  Douglas, 
Smeaton,  and  Maitland,  Ensign  Stewart,  Adjutant  Colquhoun,  two 
sergeants,  and  one  hundred  and  forty  three  rank  and  file  wounded, 
and  twenty-two  missing.  Tivcnty-tliird  regiment :  Lieutenant  Robin- 
.son  and  twelve  men  killed ;  Captain  Peter,  one  sergeant,  and  forty- 


■i;:: 


Wijf'Vi 


n^i-] 


nATTI.K   OF  OUII-FOUl)  COURT    IIOUSK. 


V>1 


tlircc  woumli'd.  ritirly-th.irtl  n^^iinciit :  LicitteiiiuU-colDncl  Webster 
(licnl  (/f  uoiiiuls  ;  Miisii^ii  T.ilbDt,  and  Ww  men  killed  ;  Lieutenruits 
Salvin  and  Wynyaiul,  Knsigns  Kell\-,  (iore,  and  IIuL,'hes,  Adjutant 
I'^ox,  ami  filty-six   men,   uuundi'd  ;    Scvoity-Jirst :    Va\sv^\\  (irant  and 


twelve  me 


n  kill 


ed,  filtv-six   nii.-n  woim 


led.      /, 


\(>'iiiii 


lit  of'  /iosc  :    Cap- 


tain 


\V 


ilni()U>k\'  am 


I    V. 


n-.i''n    l)e    Trott,   died   of  woumU;    ten    men 


killed  ;    Lieutenants  SclnKijner  and  Graise,  and  sixtv'-two  men  killed 


til  re 


missiii'. 


British    Lt'irion  —  Lieutenant-colonel     Tarlet 


on 


uid 


thiitecn  men  wminded  ;  three  men  killed.  Total  casualties  reported: 
l'"i\  e  lumdied  and  torty-iour.  (ieiuial  lloward  who  volunteered  to 
aceomiiany  ( 'nrnuallis.  was  also  wonmled. 

Sert^eant  Lamb  relates  that  he  s.iw  Lord  (.'ornwallis  crossing'  clear 
ground,  where  the  t;uards  sufferetl  so  severel)',  ridint;  upon  a  dragoon 
horse,  {\\\~>  own  having;  been  shot,)  and  that  he  was  carried  directly 
tow.ird  the   Americans.     The  trooper's  saildle-ba;4s  were  underneath 


t  lie  lioi'e 


emb.u-rassni'r  Ins  c 


ontn 


)r  th 


e  creature. 


amlj 


sei/.ee 


the 


bri( 


turned   the  horse's   head,  and   r.m   in'  the  side   until   tlu 


wentv-tinrd    reijunent   was 


amecl 


Cornwalli 


anc 


1    I 


eslie   wi-re 


tile  only  i;ener,d  officers  of  the  Hritish  army  who  were  ncjt  wounded. 

American  Casualties.  Virginia  KLgulars-Owiz  cai)tani,  two  sub- 
alterns, and  twenty  si.v  men  killetl  ;  four  ser-^eants  and  tliirty-five 
men  wounded,  and  thirty-nine  men  niissin^^^    Maryland  Regulars :  One 


major,  one  su 


baltern,  and  thirteen  k 


led  ;    live  ciptains,  one  seri;eant, 


aiK 


1  tiiirty 


si.x  men  wouiu 


let!  ;  ninety-seven  missini;'.   Dela^care  Battalion 


—  seven  killed;  thirteen  wounded,  fifteen  missin<^.  ll'asliington's  ilc- 
tachment  of  First  ami  Third  cavalry,  three  killed  ;  two  captains,  two 
baiterns,  and  four  wounded  (prisoners.)  tliree  missing.     Lee's  Corps, 


su 
thr 


oe   Ki 


lied 


Mie    captain,    c 


i'dit 


'men   woun 


ded    (i 


irisoner 


niissme. 


Tot; 


u    casualties    ot    re^.rulars, 


tl 


iree    luuu 


red  ami   t 


seven 


wenty- 


nine.      (jcner. 


lUijer  was  also   wouiuiecl 


.SV, 


II 


evens    lyriirade 


r/.— T 


wo 


captains  and   nine   m 


en  killcii.     15ricradier-!J:eneral  Steve 


ns,   one  cap- 


lain,  four  sul)alterns,  and  thirty  men  woutuled.  One  major,  three 
.-uljaiterns,  and  one  humlred  and  thirty-si.x  men  missiiiLj.  Laivson's 
Urii^atlt' — One  killeil.     One  major,  t 


wo  su 


bait 


erns,   and  thirteen  men 


woumled.     One  subalt 


ern,    ei"' 


hty- 


si.x   men   missim 


Campbell's  am 


mis  am!  one  ni.ui  killei 


oiu:  cap- 


Lynch's  Rijle  Regiments — Two  capt, 

tain,  one  subaltern,  and   fourteen   men   wouiuletl  ;   one  captain,  seven 


su 


bait 


erns, 


ant 


emiitv-six     missiiu 


Tot. 


caiiualties    ^) 


f    Virtrinia 


militia,  four  hundred  and  eiylit,     Xorth  Carolina  militia,  si.x  killed  ; 
one  captain,  one   subaltern,  and  three  men  wounded;    two  captains, 


'  n 


>  M 


i 


,  L  i 


,  xt    . 


i;;i:l 


■  *i 


564 


li.M  ri,F,   OF   GUII.FOKD  COURT   HOUSK. 


l'78l. 


nine  subalterns,  and  five  hundred  and  fifty-two  missincj.  Total 
casualties  of  bni^aile,  five  hundred  and  seventy- ft)iir.  Total  Ameri- 
can casualties,  tiiirteen  hundred  and  eleven.  The  lar|.^e  nunih(.T  of 
missing  are  accounted  for  by  both  British  and  Anieiican  authorities, 
as  havinij  fled  to  their  homes.  Two  days  afterwanl  the  returns  of 
the  Vir«jinia  Re;^ulars  showed  seven  hundred  .md  fifty-two  men 
present,  and  of  the  Marylaiui  Hri;j;.;(le,  five  huiulred  and  I'ifty.  which 
reduced  tluir  loss,  reported  on  the  seventeenth  as  two  luiiulred  and 
si.\ty-one  men,  to  one  humlred  and  cii^hty-eiLjht. 

(ieneral  (ireene  retreated  nearly  twelve  miles  to  the  iron  works  on 
Troublesome  Creek.  Alth()u;_;h  the  American  army  had  thus  fallen 
back  to  the  rendezvous  which  had  been  selected  in  c.ise  of  defeat,  it  was 
not  disheartened.  (~)n  tlie  morniuLj  of  the  sixteenth,  preparations 
were  matie  for  battle,  on  the  conviction  that  Cornwallis  wouKl  jnir- 
suc.  The  resistance  wiiich  liad  been  made,  aroused  the  remnants  of 
the  militia  to  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  previous  failure  ;  and  the 
exainple  of  the  First  Maryland  encourai^ed  them  to  seek  an  oppor- 
tunity to  redeem  their  credit.  Surgeons  were  sent  to  Guilford,  where 
they  found  that  all  possible  care  had  been  taken  of  their  v.'ounded  by 
the  Hritish  officers. 

Greene,  writing  on  the  same  day,  says,  "  the  enemy  fjained  his 
cause,  but  is  ruined  by  the  success  of  it."  Tarlcton  rejjarded  "  the 
vict' —  as  the  pledge  of  ultimate  defeat."  "The  Hritish  had  the 
name ,  the  Americans  the  good  consequences  of  victory,"  wrote 
Ramsey. 

"Another  such  victory  would  ruin  the  British  army,"  said  Fox  in 
the  House  of  Commons. 

Pitt  and  other  political  leaders  in  Great  Britain,  regard*  d  it  as  the 
"  precursor  of  ruin  to  British  supremac\-  in  the  south  "  ;  a.id  the  cor- 
respondence of  Cornwallis,  official  and  unofficicU,  bre.ithes  but  one 
sentiment  as  to  the  repugnance  of  the  southern  people  at  large  to 
respect  British  authority. 

After  providing  for  the  bailly  wounded  to  the  best  of  his  ability, 
and  leaving  those  who  could  not  march  to  the  protection  of  a  flag  of 
truce,  he  issued  a  formal  proclamation  of  victory  and  a  rallying  call 
to  the  people,  and  immediately  crossed  Deep  Rivr,  as  if  on  the  march 
to  Salisbury.  Recrossing  it  lower  down,  he  moved  to  Ramsour's  Mills. 
General  Greene  gathered  such  troops  as  had  a  reasonable  time  of  ser- 
vice before  them,  and  marched  to  Buffalo  Ford,  when  he  ordered  an 
inspection  of  his  command  with  view  to  a  spirited  pursuit  and  the 


I78>.1 


nATi'i.r.  (>v  GUILFORD  COURT  Housr:. 


5^>5 


Contingency  of  anotlicr  b.ittlc.  It  hccdinc  necessary  to  send  back  to 
his  train  for  additional  amnuuiition,  lead  and  bullet  moulds,  so  tliat 
he  did  nut  re.uh  RamM)ur's  Mills  until  tlie  t\vcnty-ei;-;litli,  one  day 
after  Coniwallis  liad  britlj^ed  the  river  and  nioveti  on  tow.u-il  Cross 
Creek  (F.i)'ettevillej  on  the  ilirect  \Vihnin;4ton  road. 

"'lie  Hriti-.h  army  was  almost  tlestitute  of  clothini^  and  other  needed 
supidies.  The  destruction  of  their  train  durini;  the  winter  had  been 
a  constant  source  of  troubli;,  .md  the  lo.;s  h.id  not  been  compensated 
by  results.  Messenj;ers  were  sent  to  Lorel  Rawdon,  then  at  Camden, 
w,irnin,L,f  him  that  (jreene  would  probably  invade  South  Carolina,  and 
the  army,  reduced  to  '•  not  quite  fifteen  hundred  men  1,1435)  throui^h 
sickness,  desertion,  .md  losses  in  battle,"  marched  to  Wilmitv^'ton, 
reaching  that  town  on  the  seventh  of  April.  The  messcn;^^ers  f.uled 
to  reach  Lord  Rawdon,  and  General  Greene  entered  ui)on  his  South 
Carolina  campaign. 

Noir, — State  o!  the  troops  that  marehccl  uitli  ilie  army  uiuler  tlie  ciiiiiinainl  of  I.ieuteti- 
aiit-Coneral  Karl  Cornwallis.     (Oflieial.) 

UWK    AMi    1  lir.    I'KI^IM     AMI    IM     llUt    l)riV. 


u 

li 
1" 

Li 

B 

s 

Hril^sh 

German. 

Provincials. 

Dates. 

S  = 
St  3 

u 

c 
0 
S 

"u 

0 

1 

•*    - 

it 

"  -1. 

."J 

3 

^  r. 

£.5 

s 

r.  ^ 

y,  '- 

■3 

u, 

Jamiary  15, 17S1. 

6(p 

167 

41 

286 

328 

240 

237 

69 

347 

I  "3 

451 

256 

3224 

February  i,  17S1. 

6(j() 

279 

.^34 

234 

345 

117 

174 

2S7 

2440 

March  i,  17S1.  . . 

605 

258 

122 

212 

313 

97 

174 

212 

2213 

April  I,  17S1 

4>i 

r82 

22' 

161 

■-'45 

••>7 

174 

224 

1723 

The  force  ultimately  able  to  march  to  Virginia,  lia^  already  been  slated  at  141=  men. 


ft 


■t 


!^ 

• 

;i 

■  \ 


i 


CHAPTER    LXX. 


1  [f'l 


:  I'! 


!f  1:1^ 


>    : 


j|;f^  ^" 


1 

II 

% 

SOUTHERN  CAMPAIGN.     13A  TTLi:  OK  IIOBKIRK'S  HILL.     I'ARTISAN 

WARFARE. 

GI'.XI".  KAI.  ("iRI'LENI'l  resolved  to  move  directly  against  the  niili- 
taiy  i)()st.s  of  .South  Carolina,  irre.spective  of  the  action  of  Lord 
Cornwallis.  He  did  not  believe  tiiat  pursuit  would  be  attempted. 
Mven  in  th.it  case,  he  would  at  least  relieve  North  Carolina  from 
danger,  and  would  occup_\-  such  a  position  as  to  be  able  to  attack 
either  Rawdon,  or  Cornwallis,  witliout  their  possible  cooperation 
against  him.  He  moved  so  rapidly  that  he  reached  Rugely's  Mills 
before  Cornwallis  knew  that  he  had  left  Deep  River;  and  it  was  then 
too  late  to  intercept  his  march  to  the  south.  That  officer  luid  already 
dcterminetl  that  the  most  hopeful  methoil  of  reducing  the  Southern 
States,  w.is  b)-  occupation  of  Virginia,  ami  by  control  of  Chesapeake 
J3a\-  and  its  contributory  water  courses.  This  plan  involved  a  sep.ua- 
tion  of  the  south  from  the  north,  so  that  neither  could  aid  the  other. 
He  resolved  to  march  to  Virginia,  by  the  shortest  route,  and  to  effect 
a  junction  with  General  Philli[xs,  who  arrived  in  Chesapeake  Bay  on 
the  twenty-sixth  of  March,  with  two  thousand  troops  from  New  York, 
and  with  instructions  to  report  to  Lord  Cornwallis  and  act  under  his 
orders. 

The  narrative  would  be  incomplete  without  some  further  reference 
to  this  sudden  abandonment  of  a  campaign  which  hatl  been  so  en- 
tangled and  eventful,  espicially  as  the  military  policy  of  the  British 
Cabinet  and  of  General  Clinton  are  involved  in  the  movement. 

Gene:-.il  Ci>rnwalhs,  in  liis  answer  to  General  Clinton's  "  Narra- 
tive," thus  states  the  case:  "I  could  not  remain  at  Wilmington, 
lest  Gerieral  Creene  should  succeed  against  Lord  Rawdon,  md,  b\- 
returning  to  North  Carolina,  hive  it  in  his  power  to  cut  off  e\ery 
means  of  saving  my  small  corps,  except  that  disgraceful  one  of  an 
embarkation,  with   the   loss  of  the  cavalry,  and  eveiy  horse  in  the 


f " 


■  Hritish 

J>nii/ooii.t. 
3  Antfficiittt 


ezi      Jforse. 


^ 

^ 


N 


\ 


"*5 


/ 


/ 


Woods. 


^/  Vriujnin!,  in  ('oTinnn. 


4-  iqiBi  /iaeive  q 


Cf,'!S/j""»i»  t'^'n'ritan First Lmt. 


Ccmpikd  an  J  Drawn  hy  ('ol  ^"amttfjlon . 


-  :  \ 


!   ..  ■  ,  ■■■ 


i  ■' 


5 


ii  : 


H  :    <: 


ru 


m 


■ 

1 
), 

> 
1 

i 
': 

1^  C  ' 

t 

1 

1 

1   ■    .    :U   :   ■. 

i 

Iilf'1''; 

H 

£|jjt''B  ■'  i 

H 

Rtiii'm    '\  ■ 

wYf^^ 


•>\  ' 


iT^^i  I 


Sf)U'rUKHN   f:AMI'AI(;N. 


S67 


ariiU'."  .  .  "  I  was  iimst  firmlv  ix'-'suadcd,  tliat  until  \'ii;^'iiiia  was 
Induced,  W(,'(<)ii!i|  ikpI  Imld  tlic  iiiurt;  soutli'-iii  proviiK  i-; ;  and  that, 
afl<T  its  irdiutinn,  tlic)-  woidd  fall,  iiitlioiit  much  diffu  ulty."  ( )n 
tlic  ci'iditcc  nth  of  Apiil  111-  advi-,cd  l.nrd  ( icrniainc,  t  hat.  "thr^.^rcat 
rcintui'cc.'mcnls  miiI  l)y  V''ii;.',iiiia  tu  (icmral  (incur,  u'hilst.  (ji'iinal 
Arnold  was  in  Uic  ( 'insa])iala  ,  an'  tonviiuiM;;  iiroof-;  thai  small  expe- 
ditions do  not  fri^diten  that  powerln!  province." 

(iener.d  ( 'ornwallis  wroli-  to  deiieral  (Clinton  on  the  tonth  of 
April:  "I  (an  not  i;el|)  e.\|)iessi?i;.;  my  wishes  that  the  Chesa])eakc 
ma)'  heeome  the  seat  of  war,  e\in  (if  neeessaryj  at  liie  (■\■pe^^e  o( 
abandonin;;  .\e\\-  S'ork.  I'nlil  Vir;'j'nia  ii  in  a  measure  Md)dued,  our 
hold  of  the  ('aroiinas  mu^t  he  difliinlt,  if  not  ])re(Mriou  .."  The  fol- 
lowin;.;  appreciation  of  the  theatre  of  operations  i^  inehided  in  the 
sauH-  lett(rr.  "  The'  ri\'ers  of  Vir'.;inia  aie  ad\ant a^^'eous  to  an  inv.id- 
in;;  army  ;  hut  North  (  aiolina  i  ,  ol  all  tin-  provinca-s  in  Anterica,  the 
most  dilfK  alt  to  attaclc,  Mnde  ,1  material  assistanci'  could  lie;'/)!  fiom 
the  inhabitants,  t  lie  cont  iar\'  ol  \\-!n'i  h  I  have  sullicieiitly  ivpeiiencedj 
on  account  ol  its  ;;i'at  extent,  o(  the  numbei  less  imsiit  and  triadss, 
and  the  l<.'tal  want  ol  interior  n.ivi;_;ation."  In  repl\',  "iiiicral  (llinton, 
under  d.i.te  of  May  twent)'-ninth,  sa)'s,  "  i  lad  it  bee-n  po  .^ible  for  )'our 
Lordshiji,  in  \-our  letter  to  me  of  the  loth  ull.,  to  have  intim.iti-d  the 
prol.>abilit)' of  your  intention  lo  form  a  junction  with  (jeneral  I'hillips, 
I  should  certainly  havi'  endeavored  to  ha\'e  stojjpid  )ou,  as  I  did 
tiien,  and  do  now,  considi'i'  such  a  move  as  lik(  1\'  tu  be  dan;4cious  lo 
oiir  interests  in  the  southern  colonic's."  in  a  dis]jatch  to  (lener.il 
I'hillips,  of  April  thirteenth,  markeil  ".urr,/  tim/  iut>\f  /wirii/i-,"  .\u^\ 
uhich  Lord  (rjrnwallis  found  at  I'etirsbur;.;  ,dter  the  death  of  ( ieii 
<ral  I'hillips,  (ieneral  (llinlou  says,  "His  Lordship  tells  uk;  Ik;  wants 
reinlorceiuents.  I  would  ask- -  how  can  th.tt  be  possible  ,-'  And,  if  it 
is,  what  hopes  can  I  ha\e,  of  a  force  sulliciinl  to  undertake  any  solid 
•  •ixration?  yXs  my  invitation  to  Lord  (Jornwallis  to  lome  to  the 
Chesapeake,  was  upon  a  supposition  that  everythin;.^  would  bi-  settled 
in  tlu;  ('aroiinas,   1   do   not  think   he  wi"  come."  .      "If  Jaird 

Cornwailis  ])n)poscs  anythin!.[  necessary  for  his  operations,  \ou  ol 
course  must  adopt  it,  if  jdu  can  ;  /< /////;;  iiif  /.-//cw  yniir  Ihouyjil': 
t  Iter  I  oil  y 

A  dispati  h  whic  h  he  leceived  from  Whitehall  I'alacc  says,  "  Lord 
Cicort^e  (iermaine  stron;.;ly  recommends  to  (jener.il  (."linton,  either  to 
remain  in  s.;ood  luinior,  in  fidl  confidence  to  be  suppoited  as  mm  h  as 
the  nature  of  the  service  will  admit  of,  or  avail   liimself  of  tlie  leave 


J't 


:6    1 


i^ 


',   1 1 


1 


I 


Pi 


:| 


III! 


'fit 


1 


tP.       ,)'<l 


5CS 


SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN, 


I1781. 


of  cominc;  home,  as  no  good  can  arise,  if  there  is  not  full  confulcnce 
between  tlie  t^eneral  and  the  minister,"  and,  on  the  sixth  of  Jiuie, 
Lord  Germaine  wrote  to  (ieneral  Clinton,  "  Lord  Cornwallis"  opinion 
entirely  coincides  witli  mine,  of  the  ;,;reat  importance  of  pusiiint,'  tlie 
war  on  tlie  side  of  \'irL;inia,  w  ith  all  the  f  irce  that  can  be  spared." 

It  is  impracticable  more  than  to  notice  these  leadin;^^  facts,  in  the 
examination  of  voluminous  correspondence  and  dispatches,  which 
illustrate  the  relations  of  these  officers,  and  the  policy  of  the  crown. 
General  Clinton  had  sutj;t;ested  to  General  Phillips,  a  movement  u[) 
the  Delaware  with  the  continijenc)-  of  r.n  attack  upon  Philadelphia, 
to  be  supported  by  a  movement  on  his  part,  from  New  York  ;  and  he 
was  at  the  same  time  ha\in_L;  difficult}-  with  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  of 
whom  he  s.ud  ;  "  lie  is  more  impracticable  than  ever,  swearin;^  to  me 
(Clinton)  that  he  knows  notliinL:j  of  his  recall  ;  to  other.-,,  he  says  he 
is  "ointr  home  immediatclv."  Rumors  of  a  French  naval  reinforce- 
ment  prevailed,  and  the  situation  of  General  Clinton  was  doubly  em- 
barrassing, by  the  contrast  of  the  condition  of  the  South  with  that 
which  he  guaranteed  when  CharlestcMi  was  captured  antl  Cornwallis 
was  left  in  command.  He  very  properly  declared  "a  n;ival  suprem- 
acy to  be  the  first  essential  element  to  success  in  Virginia,"  and  at 
the  same  time  realized  the  uncertaint)'  of  securing  that  supremacy, 
so  long  as  the  fleets  of  Spain  and  France  were  opjerating  in  the  West 
Indies,  within  striking  distance  of  the  American  coast.  Differences 
of  opinion  between  the  naval,  as  well  as  the  military  commanders, 
ultimately  pro\'ed  fatal  to  the  campaign  ;  and  at  this  time,  the  Cabi- 
net was  almost  equally  divided  between  an  assurance  of  easy  victory 
at  the  South,  and  apprehensions  of  the  i)ossible  fruits  of  the  Eurojiean 
coalition  against  Great  Britain. 

General  Cornwallis  wrote  to  General  Clinton,  April  twenty-third, 
"  My  present  undertaking  sits  heavy  on  my  minil.  I  have  experi- 
enced the  distresses  and  dangers  of  marching  some  hundreds  of 
miles,  in  a  country  chiefly  hostile,  without  one  active  or  useful  friend 
— without  intelh'gcncc  and  without  communication  with  any  part  of 
the  country.  The  situ.ition  in  which  I  leave  South  Carolina,  adds 
much  to  my  anxiety  ;  yet  I  am  untler  the  necessity  of  adopting  this 
hazardous  enterprise,  hastih',  and  with  the  appearance  of  precipita- 
tion, as  I  find  there  is  no  prospect  of  speedy  reinforcements  from 
Europe;  and  that  the  return  of  General  Greene  to  North  Carolina, 
either  with  or  without  success,  would  put  a  junction  with  General 
Phillips  out  of  my  power." 


Tfrr 


78S1.] 


SOUTHKKN   CAMIWICX. 


569 


Lord  Cornw.illis  hc;4an  liis  march  fmm  \Vilinin[;ton  on  the 
t\V(.'iit\--ririh  of  Ai)ril,  havinij  "  rcmaiiu'd  rii^liteeii  days  at  that  post, 
to  refresh  and  refit  his  army."  He  sent  orders  to  (ieneral  I'hillips  to 
marclj  ;.nd  meet  iiim  at  Petersburs^,  llien  t()ol<  a  direct  route,  fia 
Smithfield,  Lcwisburt^,  and  Halifax  Court  House,  as  indicated  on 
maj)  "  Outline  of  Atlantic  Coast,"  and  reachetl  the  desi;4nated  ren- 
dezvous without  serious  interruption,  on  the  twentieth  of  May. 
Meanwhile.  General  Phillips  reached  PetersbiirL;  on  the  eii^hth,  died  of 
sudden  illness  on  the  thirleenlh,  and  w,is  succeeded  in  command  by 
General  Arnold,  pendini;  the  arrival  of  Lord  Cornwallis.  The  opera- 
tions of  the  Middle  Department  will  be  considered  in  connection 
with  General  La  Fayette's  Virginia  campai;^n. 

The  movements  of  General  Greene  will  be  first  followed  to  the 
close  of  active  oper.itions  at  the  South. 

Duriu'^-  the  march  to  Rui^ely's  Mills,  on  the  sixth  of  April,  he  had 
detached  Colonel  Lee  with  orders  to  join  Marion,  and  break  LortI 
Rawdon's  communications  with  Charleston.  Sumter,  already  recov- 
ered from,  his  wound  and  restored  to  dutv,  was  located  between 
Camden  and  Ninet\--six ;  and  General  Pickering,  with  militia,  was 
instructed  to  operate  bi^tween  Ninety-six  and  Augusta. 

On  the  twcnt)--third  of  April,  Lee  and  !\Iarion  captured  Fort 
Watson,  a  post  on  the  Santee  River,  on  the  Charleston  road,  directly 
in  the  rear  of  Camden.  This  capture  was  attended  by  incidents 
which  illustrate  the  minor  operations  of  war.  The  fort  was  a  siinple 
stockade,  upon  an  Indian  mound  forty  feet  high,  near  th.e  Santee, 
and  at  the  upper  end  of  Scott's  Lake.  The  garrison  consisted  of 
eighty  regulars  and  forty  royalists.  The  stockade  was  surroundetl  by 
fallen  trees,  doing  service  as  abatis,  but  not  firmly  einbctlded  in  the 
ground.  The  supply  i:^^  water  for  the  garrison  was  from  the  lake. 
This  was  cut  off.  Then  a  trench  was  dug  to  the  level  of  the  river- 
bed, and  the  garrison  became  independent  of  lake  and  river.  The 
assailants  had  no  artillery,  and  the  range  of  fire  was  over  the  heads 
of  the  garrison.  To  meet  this  emergency  the  ingenious  device  of  a 
log  crib,  filled  with  sand,  was  resorted  to.  From  its  summit,  the 
skilled  riflemen  picked  off  the  garrison,  and  the  fi)rt  surrendered. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Watson,  and  the  immediate  seizure  of  the  passes 
through  the  hills,  cut  off  Lord  Rawdon's  sapply-route  on  the  no>ch 
side  of  the  Santee.  Colonel  Watson,  then  en  route  to  Camden  with 
five  hundred  men  to  reinf'rce  its  garrison,  was  compelled  to  retrace 
his  steps  and  march  up  the  west  bank 


1 


:.t 


H 


.  \ 


';'    ' 


% 


570 


SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGM. 


[17S1. 


itS'- 


The  advance  of  Lcc  and  Marion  a;^ainst  l'"ort  Watson  liad  been 
made  as  early  as  tlie  fifteentli  ;  and  application  was  in  ide  to  General 
Greene  for  one  piece- of  artillery.  The  L^uns  lo-.t  atCniilford  had  been 
partly  replaced  l)y  two  which  were  l)n)u;^dit  down  from  Olipli.int's 
Mills,  ,it  the  head  of  the  C.itawb.i,  and  Colonel  Il.irrison  was  then  on 
his  march  with  two  other  pieces  from  the  ;4ener,d  depot  ,il  Prince 
Kdward  (Joint  House.  A  'j^un  could  not  In-  sent  directly  to  .M.uion 
without  passin;4  thron;^di  (Jaindc'n,  and  there  was  no  wa;^on  road  acr<jss 
I'ine  Tree  Creek.  U[)on  a  report  that  Colonel  W(d)st(.-r  was  approach- 
ing; C'amden,  Colonel  C^arrirv^toii  was  ordered  to  take  the  artillery 
and  ba;.;;4a;^e  l)ack  to  Rii;_;ely's  MiiK,  aiidC'aptain  I'^indley  was  to  start 
from  that  point  down  the  lilack  River  road  to  join  M.uion  with  one 
^'un,  so  that  he  mi;_;ht  meet. Watson  in  the  field,  if  he  found  opportu- 
nity to  do  so.  Cireeiie  sent  his  cavalry  to  the  east  i)aid<  of  I'ine  Tree 
Creek,  to  anticipitt;  any  movement  to  cut  off  the  escort  which  accom- 
panietl  the  ;_;un,  and  .idvanced  on  the  nineteenth  to  l,o;^fTown,  within 
half  a  mile  of  Camden,  where  he  made  (h.'monstrations  to  the  e.ist 
and  south-e.ist  of  the  town,  but  fiiletl  to  draw  I.oi'd  Rawdoii  from  the 
l)ost.  His  own  f)rce  was  too  weak  to  venture  an  assault.  ( )n  the 
twenty-fourth  General  (ireiMie  withdrew  to  Hobkirk  Hill,  and  sent 
orders  to  Colonel  ("arrin;^t(jn  to  return  with  the  artillery  and  supplies 
for  the  troops.  That  oftlce'r  had  moved  the  l^uus  and  bac^i^a^^e  t<t 
I,)nch's  ('reek,  nearly  ei^^ht  miles  beyond  ivu^^ely's  Mills,  so  that  he 
was  unable  to  execute  the  orde-r  of  recall  until  afte-r  niiie  o'clock  ot 
the  morniuL;'  of  the  twenty-fifth.  Ratiou>  were  at  once  distributed 
and  the  troops  were  at  breakfist,  wlum  the  subsecjue'iit  attack  was 
made  upon  their  position  by  Lord  Rawd.on.  The-^e  ficts  are  [^uven  as 
e.xplanation  of  the  reported  ne:jli;^ence  and  surprise;  of  the  .Americm 
camp.     On  the  previous  day  the  followin;;-  order  had  been  issued  : 

"Ca>u'  luiMRi  (.'.\Mi)i  N,  N"i:iii  i,)i;Aicn  i(,  7'ii<u/iir,  .Ipril  2j,th. 
*'  T/if  i^riurd/  orders  rrs/^n'/i/r.^'  /^tisscs  arc  /'iinctiiiil/v  to  be  o!>srn'r(/. 
Xoiw  (trc  to  bo  <^r<7ii/oii  but  hv  ooiiiiiiiiitidints  of  corf's.  I'lio  rolls  aro  It' 
ho  calloil  at  lodst  three  tiiites  <r  ibu\  <viil  itll  ubseiitoi's  re/<orte(l  aiui 
punislud.  i> (fleers  of  every  rank  are  to  e'>i/Jiiie  tl/eiiiselies  to  tlieir  re- 
sfieetive  duties.  And  ererj  j^art  of  the  tinny  must  be  in.  readiness  to 
stand  at  arms  at  a  momenfs  ^oari/in^i;." 

The  battle  of  Ilobkirk's  Hill,  sometimes  and  quite  correctly  called 
the  battle  of  Camden,  occurred  on  the  folIowiiiL;  da)-,  (iener.il  Greene 
had  sent  orders    to  Marion    to  join   him  as   soon  as  he  should  reduce 


.i^-'-i^  ■ 


.7«r.) 


SOUllII'.KV    CAM  PA  lev. 


3/ 


l-'ort  Watson,  and  lliat  officer  started  for  the  main  army  on  tlic  L'ven- 
iii;4  of  tlic  twenty-third.  Lord  R.awdon  was  advi-^cd  of«tiiis  movemrnt, 
.md  resolved  to  attack  his  advcr-^ary  before  he  couM  be  thus  rciiif)rced. 
He  liad  al-o  h.'arned  from  a  deserter  that  Colonel  (],irrinL;ton  had  been 
sent  to  Rie^'ely's  Mills  with  the  artilU-ry,  but  had  not  Ixn-n  advised  of 
his  return.  Reference  is  made  to  maps,  "  I?attle  of  I  lobkirk  Ilill," 
antl  "  (.)()erations  in  .Southern  States." 

Ilnbkirk's  llill  is  described  as  a  narrow  sand  rid;_;e  of  very  little 
elevation,  which  separates  the  he.id  sprin;^s  of  two  small  branches,  the 
one  runnintj  into  the  Wateree,  the  other  into  Pine  Tree  Creek.  It 
was  quite  thickly  w(joded,  quite  abrupt  toward  CamiU-n,  sloping  more 
gradually,  eastw.ird,  and  protected  from  apjiroach  on  the  east  and 
north-east  by  impassable  swamps. 

The  country  between  the  hill  and  Log  Town  was  also  covered  by 
trees  and  thick  shrubbery;  from  Lf)g  Town  to  ("amden  the  woods  had 
been  cut  down,  to  prevent  their  being  used  to  cover  an  advancing 
enemy.  When  Lord  Rawdon  understood  Ceneral  Crecne's  position, 
he  pi, iced  the  post  in  charge  of  convalescents  from  the  general  hos- 
pit.il,  and  by  a  detour  to  the  east,  attempted  to  surprise  the  American 
camp.  Lord  Rawdon  had  already  been  advised  by  Colonel  H.dfour, 
that  the  Conuiiander-in-chief  liad  ilirected  the  abandonment  of  Cam- 
den ;  but  the  operations  of  (ireene.  M.uion,  Lee  and  Sumter,  had 
rendered  such  a  movement  imi)r,i.cticable.  On  that  .account  he  had 
directed  Colonel  Watson  to  join  him.  His  protracted  dcla\",  through 
the  movements  of  the  American  partisan  corps,  left  the  post  greatly 
exposed.  Several  skirinishes  had  already  taken  place  near  Camden, 
and  Tarleton  states  that  "'  Lord  Rawdon  had  learned  from  [jrisoners, 
that  "  Greene's  army  was  n(.it  bv  any  means  so  numerous  as  lie  had 
appreluiuled,  hut  that  consideraljle  reinforcements  were  expected. 
To  bala.TCC  this  he  received  the  uiifavor.ible  intelligence  that  Marion 
had  already  takei\  such  a  position  as  rendered  it  impracticable  for 
Colonel  Watson  to  join  him." 

The  command,  consisting  of  about  nme  hundred  men,  with  fifty 
dragoons,  marched  at  ten  (j'clock,  and  by  filing  close  to  the  swamp 
on  their  right,  gained  the  woods  unpcrccived.  This  route  of  march 
also  carried  the  British  column  to  the  left  of  the  American  front, 
which  had  less  naturiil  strentrth,  and  brought  on   an   immediate  skir- 


m 


ish  with   the    pickets,   nearly  a  mile    from   the   camp.     The 


se  were 


commanded  b\'  Captains   Benson   and   Morgan,   of  Virginia,  besides 
Kirkwoud's  small  detachment  of  Delaware  troops.     I'he  resistance  was 


^^m 


i 


1 1 


. 


1 

■ 

v 

^  f 

'; 

1 

i 

r 

i 

I! 

t 

1 

\<\ 


'  I  i4'< 


572 


SOUIIIKkN   CAMI'AKJV. 


[17S.. 


so   cfriciciit    .IS    to    delay  tlu-   .uKmiicc    until    tlu;    Amcriiaii    line  was 


f( 


01  nu'd 


'I'lu'  Si\t\'-tliir(l  l^riti^h  rcL;iimiit  fDrmcd  t!u'  ri;_;lit,  tlic  Nuw  York 
volimtcrts  tlu;  cciitic,  and  the  kinj^'s  AniiMicins  the  K  It,  of  tlu;  first 
line.  Tlu:  Volunteers  of  Ireland  on  tlie  riii^lit,  aiul  Ciptain  Robert- 
son's dctarlinuiit,  formed  a  supportiii'^j  line;    aiul  tin-   South   Carolina 


re''niH-nt  ,ind  the  dra-jooris  were   still    in    nscrvi 


The   front  was  too 


narn.'W,  and  the  pl.m  of  (ieiu  ral  Cneent'  was  well  desi;_;ned  to  cnveloii 
aiul    eru'>h   it.      The   secondary   diaiuam  on    the    map   indieates   that 


1)1. m. 


nc 


imerican   riL;ht   wuilt  consisted  o 


f  ( 


uneral 


lui'cr  s  l)ri- 


^ade,  u  illi  the  ix\i,nineiits  of  I,ieuteiiant-e<;lonels  (".implnll  ,iiul  I  lawcs  ; 


and  tlu  lilt  will' 


under 


Col 


one 


(lunhy  and  Liiuten.uit-eoK 


nel  I'^ord, 


C 


ololle 


w 


li.ims  conimandiie. 


It  wa--  <|i 


lite-  similar  to  the-  format! 


on 


.f  tl 


le  reserve  line   at    the    battle  of  (iiiilfnrd.      The    North    Carolina 


militia,  consislin;/  ol   about  two  liundie 


d  a 


nd  fifty  men  under  Colonel 


Tl 


10  .irtil- 


Reade,  formed  the  it'serve,  but  took  no  p.irt  in  the  actiui 
iery,  three  ^uiis,  under  Colonel  I  larrisoii,  just  arrived,  was  masked  in 
tlu-  centre,  and  orders  were  iijiveii  for  the  reLjiments  on  the  ris^lii:  and 
left  (if  the  :4uns  to  open  for  their  fire  ;   ,iiid  tlu;n  to  "  char^^e  tlu:  enemy 


wi 


th  th 


broken. 


le  ba\'oiiet,  witlilioldiiv,;  their  own  lire  until  the  jinti :,li  linii;  w.is 
The  reiiiments  on    tlu:   ri''lit    and    left   of  the    line-,  were  to 


left  and  lij^ht  obli(|ue,  upon  the  res|)i:etive  tianks  of  the  adv.uiciii;^ 
eiu-my.  Much  confidence  was  felt  in  the-  assurance  that  Lord  Kaw- 
don  was  unadvised  of  tlu;  return  of  tlu:  .ntiller)-,  and  implicit  reliance 


pi, 


w.is  placed  upon  the  rcjiiTK-nts  a 


It    th 


;ntr( 


Colonel  Washington 


was  sent  to  double  tlu;  ri'dit  Hank  .ind  t.ike  them  in  the  rear.' 


too  contracted. 


lual   tile 


jnt 


Lord  Kawdoii  (juickly  perceived  that  his  front  was 
and  as  at  (juilford,  the  reserves  were  brouLjht  up  to 
of  the  enemy.  Lieutenant-colone!  Campbell  wi.h  tlu;  Si.xty-third 
Uritish  rc;^dment  and  the  kiiu^'s  Americans  [iressed  on  tirmly,  notwilh- 
staiidint;  the  fire  of  tlie  artillery,  while  Campbell  on  tiie  rii^ht,  aild 
Lord  on  the  left  of  tlu:  American  line,  were-  descendiiv^f  the  hill  with 
spirit,  in  accordance  with  the  ])l.iii  of  battle.  Holh  of  the  liritish 
wings,  brought  up  so  hurriedly  to  the  support  of  the  original  column, 
began  to  give  way  under  pressure.  l'"ord  fell,  severely  wounded, 
and  his  men  hesitated  in  their  advance.  Captain  Heatty  on  the  right 
ol  Colonel  (junby's  regiment,  was  mortally  wounded.  His  own  com- 
pany on  tlie  right  of  the  regiment,  began  a  hasty  firing,  and  almost 
iiTimcdiatcly  after,  fell  back  in  disorder.  It  was  the  critic.d  moment 
of  the  battle.     The  interval  thus  made,  was  filled   by  the   IJritisli  ad- 


^^ 


*'V 


rVf 


i;'^). 


1781. 


SOUTHERN   CAMPAIGN, 


573 


vance,  and  roluiu.l  (junhy  made  llu:  j^rand  mistake  of  rttiriii;^  the 
other  companies,  to  ic-fonu  tiu;  n-^.n'mcut.  'I  his  nioviinctit,  says 
Greene,  "^ave  the  wliole  re^^imciit  an  idra  of  a  ret  real,  w  hie  li  sf)oii 
spread  throiiLjh  the  Second  rcninieiit,  v.hicli  (i.ll  b.ick  aeruidiii^Iy. 
They  i)oth  raih'ed  afterwards,  but  it  was  too  late.  'I'he  enemy  liad 
!L;aiiied  tlie  eminence,  silenced  the  artillery,  and  obli;.fed  us  to  liaul 
it  off." 

(jreene  hiniseif  puhed  at  the  dracj  ropes  to  encoura;.;e  his  men, 
and,  "the  lmids  were  simply  hauled  into  the  IjusIks  ,it  the  rear 
of  the  hill;  and  overlooked  i)y  the  l}iili-.h  troo])-,  in  tiii-ir  brief 
pursuit." 

Tarlcton  says,  "The}'  pursued  tluee  miles;  but  the  enemy's  cav- 
alry beint;  superior  to  the  Hritish,  their  draj^foons  could  not  risk  inucli  ; 
and  Lord  Rawdon  would  luit  suffer  the  infantry  to  break  their  order 
for  any  benefit  that  mi;4ht  be  expected  IVom  a  puisuit  of  the 
fu^n'tives." 

M(  anwliile  Cf.'lonel  Wa^-hinj^ton  had  made  a  compli.-te  circuit  as 
far  as  I  ,<)l;  Town,  captiirinL;  or  ])arolliiiLj  as  he  went;  jjut  the  defeat 
of  the  American  centre  spoiled  (jeneral  (iretiie's  ucll  arran^^ed  plan 
of  i)attle.  Tarh'ton  sajs,  "  ,1  part  of  the  eiiem)''s  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  \\  ashinj^ton,  litlur  by  design,  or  throa;.di  i;.;noian(  c-  of  the 
^tale  of  the  action,  came  round  to  tlie  rear,  and  exacted  paroles  froiti 
>ome  of  (he  Ihitish  officers  who  la}'  wounded  in  the  field  ;  t!u:y  like- 
wise carried  off  several  wounded  men."  'I'iie  desl^ni  of  (Jeneral 
Greene  was  based  u[)on  confidence  in  his  best  troop-. 

(jreat  discrepancies  occur  in  the  statements  as  toOeiieral  (ireene's 
force.  These  statements  seem  to  have  a  simi)le  solution.  The  returns 
of  April  twenty-sixth,  the  day  after  the  action,  show  ])re>ent  lor  duty, 
eleven  hundred  and  ei;.;hty  four  men  ;  but  crmlain  no  column  ol  total 
numbers.  'I'lie  addition  of  the  casualties  makes  that  total  fourteen 
iiunclred  and  forty-six  men,  which  is  very  near  Lossini^'s  fiLjures. 
Chief-Justice  Marshall  statc;s  the  number  of  Continental  troops  en- 
fjaj^ed  in  the  action  to  have  rather  exceeded  twelve  hundrc-d.  Ram- 
sey and  (lordon,  and  tho.->e  who  adopted  their  figures,  •''  the  cas- 
ualties of  the  day. 

The  American  loss  included  Caplain  15eatty,  one  ..>  'ant  and 
eighteen  men  k-illed^  I j'eutc:nant-colonels  T'ord  and  Cai..pbell,  Cap- 
tain J.  .Smith,  1st  Maryland,  C^iptain  Dunholin,  Virginia,  Captain 
(Li(;utenantj  Bruff,  Maryland,  Lieutenant  ( j.illowa.y,  Maryland,  Lieu- 
tenant Hiiil,  Virginia,  and  one  hundred  and  eight  men,  xvounded,  three 


&. 


!  h  . 


574 


SOL  niKKN    CA.Ml'AUJN. 


I1781. 


serg<.-aiits  and  one  hundrccl  and  tliiity-thrcc  men  inissiiiff.  Of  tfie 
last  number,  sonic  were  killed,  and  forty-seven  were  known  to  be 
wounded,  and  prisoners.  Total  casnnllies,  two  hundred  and  seventy- 
one. 

The  Hritish  loss  was  one  officer  anti  thirty-eifjht  men  killed, 
twelve  officers  and  two  huiuli  J  and  seven  men  tccii/tdfcl  and  miss- 
iitg.     Tot.d  casualties,  two  hundred  and  fifty-eii^ht. 

Gener.il  Greene  retired  to  Ruyely's  Mills,  and  Lord  Rawdon  fell 
back  to  Camtlen. 

"The  victory  at  Hobkirk's  Hill,"  r.ays  Stedman,  "  like  tliat  at 
(iuilford  Comtl  louse  ....  produced  no  consecjuence  beneficial 
to  the  British  interest."  "  Even  in  Charlesttjii  itself,  many  of  the 
inhabitants,  ;dthou<^h  awed  and  restr.iined  by  tlie  presence  of  the 
Ljarrison,  t;ave  si^iis  of  evident  dissatisfaction.  Sumter  i^ii  the  mirth- 
west  frotitier,  and  Marion  on  the  north-east,  Irad  krpt  alive  the 
embers  of  revolt  ;  but  they  now  burst  forth  in  a  flame,  a.i  soon 
as  intelliLjeiice  was  received  that  Geiural  (irecne  hatl  entered  the 
province." 

On  the  seventh  of  May,  Colonil  \V'atsoii  joined  Lord  Rawdon, 
and  General  (jreene  declined  to  be  drawn  into  battle. 

On  the  ninth  of  M.iy,  such  st'Jies  as  could  not  be  removed  were 
destroyed,  and  on  the  tenth,  Lord  Rawdon  evacuated  Camden  .md 
retired  to  ^L■)nk's  Corner. 

Fort  Mott  surrendered  to  Lee  and  .^Lu■ion  on  the  twelfth.  This 
fort  was  a  stockade  defense,  built  around  a  private  mansion.  Mrs. 
Rebecca  Mott,  the  owner,  furnished  General  Marion  with  an  East 
India  bow  and  arrows,  with  which  combustible  missiles  were  shot  upon 
the  roof,  to  fire  the  buildine^. 

On  the  eleventh  of  May,  General  Sumter  occupied  Oranjeburfr. 

On  the  fifteenth,  Lee  reduced  (iranby. 

On  the  fifth  of  June,  .Xui^nista  surrendered,  ha\inij  been  under 
observation,  and  practically  under  siec^c,  from  the  sixteenth  of  April, 
when  the  Geor^da  militia  under  Colonels  Williams,  IJaker  and  Ham- 
mond first  established  their  camp  within  ;,:un-sliot  of  the  defenses. 
Pickens,  Lee  and  Clark  afterward  participated  in  tiie  siei^c.  .As  in 
the  case  of  Fort  Watson  a  lo^^  crib,  filled  with  sand,  called  "  a  May- 
ham  tower,"  from  Lieutenant-colonel  Mayham  who  devised  it,  in  the 
first  instance,  during  the  siege  of  Fort  Watson,  was  a  prominent 
element  in  securing  command  of  the  defenses.  The  garrison  was 
largely  made  up  of  Lidian  auxiliaries 


Wfll 


t    r 


1781. 1 


SOUTIIKKN   C.\MrAIi;\. 


575 


Tliis 
Mrs. 
11  East 
it  upon 


(icncral  (jrcL'tic  was  l)cf<jrc  Niiicty-six,  as  (.Mrl)-  as  tlic  twenty-first 
of  M.iy.     Jwusciiisku  plumed  tlie  a[)pr()aclics. 

On  the  scvcntli  of  June,  Lord  Rawdon  left  Cliarlestoii  with  tiie 
flank  companies  of  tliree  rcginunts  uliieh  liad  just  arrived,  and  on  the 
twenty-fust  thi;  sieLie  was  raised,  after  the  condition  of  tlie  'r.urison 
lud  beconii;  critical,  (jeneral  Greene  retired  northward,  was  followed 
by  I^ord  Rawdon  as  far  as  the  Mnnoree.and  eventually  retireil  behiiul 
the  ryf,^cr  and  Mroad  Rivers.  Upon  learning  that  Lord  Rawdon  had 
abandoneil  Ninety-six  and  divided  his  forces,  to  cover  the  outposts 
of  Charleston,  General  Greene  ordered  his  hospital  and  b.ig;4aLje, 
then  at  W'innsborou'^li  to  be  transferred  to  CaiuiKii,  anil  marched 
his  arni)-  to  the  Ilii^h  Hills  of  Santee,  for  rest,  durint;  the  extreme 
summer  iieat.  While  operations  at  the  extreme  south  were  gradually 
losing.;  ma;4nitude  and  the  o[)erations  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  the 
movements  of  armies,  the  partisan  skirmishes  were  constant,  anu  bit- 
terly conducted. 

At  Cjuinb)'  l)ritlL;e,  Jul)'  hcventecntli,  al  .Moid^'s  C^jrner,  at  Dor- 
chester on  Cooper  River,  .dinost  to  tli'j  Charleston  picket  lines,  and 
through  the  entire  region  so  recently  occii[)iecl  by  the  British  troops, 
the  activities  and  antagonisms  of  local  w.ul'.irc  were  uninterrupted  by 
the  summer's  heat,  and  the  short  repose  of  the  main  armies. 

Little  quarter  was  given  in  contests  intwi.eii  Aiiiiricaii::,  and  the 
adventures  of  .Sumter,  Lee,  Marion,  and  Wade  llampton,  Ilorr)-. 
and  royalist  partisan  Iculer-^,  would  fill  volunii's.  They  dcfniilely 
illustrate  the  misguided  policy  which  attended  ilie  prosecution  of  the 
war.  The  IJritiNh  army  was  numeric, dly  une([ual  to  the  demands 
upon  its  service  ;  and  the  substitution  of  proclamations,  confiscations, 
and  hanging,  only  multi[)lied  enemies,  without  securing  respect  or 
obedience.  Colonel  HaUour,  the  post  commander  at  Charleston,  was 
an  energetic  commander;  but  llie  hiule^s  execution  of  Colonel 
Hayncs  without  a  trial,  and  other  deeds  of  extreme  severit)'.  tarnished 
his  name,  and  the  actjuiescence  of  Lord  Rawdon  in  his  action  in  that 
single  case,  called  forth  from  the  Duke  of  Richmond  and  otiier  leading 
statesmen  unfjualified  reprobation. 

The  British  army  could  not  j)rotect.  The  .\merican  army  could 
not  rescue.  Tiie  frightful  elements  of  civil  war  per.etr.ited  all  neigh- 
borhoods. There  was  no  such  place  as  home.  Too  often  in  the 
extremity  of  the  struggle  there  was  no  such  thing  as  family.  The 
bitterest  foes  were  those  within  the  household.  T/te  waste  of  ivar 
was  sloivly  wearing  out  the  tear  itself. 


W 


'  \\ 


: 


' 


i  . 


I 


if 


<^ 


/a 


/a 


7*  s 


9. 


m      ->. 


^y 


y 


/A 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-S) 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


Ire  iiM 

f  ^  IIM 
i  iz  II II  2.0 


1.8 


U    IIIIII.6 


I 


L<? 


57' 


SOUTHERN  CAMTAIGN 


[1781. 


KKITISH    EKFKCTIVK    FORCE    I>f    AMERICA. 

Note.     From  "Oiigiual  Rciuni^  in  the  I'.nti-li  R^iopI  (Jlfico.     P,\ic  M.iy  ist,  17S1. 

Now  York i-',257         '••'-'  I'lori'la 433 

C)M  ;ui  Expe^liiion 1.7'^^         West  Florida l.l.Sj 

'       uiidor  C'.eneral  Eolic 2,27s         Nova  Scotia  3,130 

"         "       "  "  '■         Arii.iKl....      1,553         liermuda }>>(> 

•'       "  •■  ••  Pliillip-,.. ,  .     2,t[(i         I'roviilcnco  Uland 12^ 

South  Carolina 7.-54         Ccorijiii ''^■'^7 

27,240  6,134 

Total 33. 374. 


?'■: 


m 


[1781. 


17S1. 
.  433 

.  1,1*^5 
.  3.13" 

;■,(!() 
12S 

SS7 

0,134 


■i-- 

/.:^-==- 


J  ■       ■.   • -•  .■  ;>J*^  ?  -  i  \?        *  »  Ci  ^'.  —  -      --  -  -'      ..   -'    '. —  '  ^-   -    ■- 


i. 

'  "''    "  1 

■             ' 

! 

►    1 

'..\ 

\ 

-*  M 


■'  *^ 


m. .  .1 


1 ' 


i. 


CHAPTER    LXXI. 

BATTLE   OF   EUTAW   SPRINGS.     CLOSINC    EVENTS   OF  THE 

CAMl'AKiX.     1781. 

LORD  RAWDON  sailed  homcwMrd  to  recruit  his  licalth,  but 
was  taken  prisoner  by  Count  de  Grasse,  and  carried  to  Chesa- 
peake Iliy,  where  CorinvaUis  soon  shari.*,'.  his  fortunes.  Lieutenant- 
coh)nel  Stewart  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  British  army  in  the 
Southern  Department,  with  headquarti;rs  at  Oran;4ebur:^-,  South 
Carolina,  (jeneral  Cireene,  w;!0  had  bci;  1  restin;j;  his  army  at  the 
Hi;j;li  Hills  of  tlie  Santee,  had  been  reinforced  bv  seven  hundred  con- 
tinental troops  from  North  Carolin.i  under  (Jreneral  Jethro  Sunnier, 
and  marched  with  very  nearly  two  thousand  six  hundred  men,  on  the 
twenty-secoiul  of  August,  to  enii;a!^e  the  British  ,irm\'.  Orders  had 
been  sent  to  Lee,  Marion,  and  Picken  .  to  join  his  command.  Colonel 
Stewart  fell  back  forty  miles,  and  established  his  camp  at  Eutaw 
Sprint^^s.  See  map  "  Battle  of  l'",utaw  Sprini^rs."  This  movement  was 
not  made  under  fear  of  attack,  but  to  secure  supplies  for  his  army. 
He  states  the  matter  stpiarely,  in  his  ofhcicd  report  to  f'.arl  Cornwallis, 
as  follows,  "  The  army  uiuler  m\' command  bein;^  much  in  want  of 
necessaries,  and  there  beiny  at  the  same  time  a  convoy  of  provisions 
on  the  march  from  Cliarleston,  which  would  have  necessaril\-  obliged 
me  to  make  a  detachment  of  at  least  four  hundred  men  (which  at  the 
time  I  could  ill  aff  )rd,  the  army  beiuL^  much  weakened  b\'  sickness)  to 
meet  the  convoy  at  Abirtin's.  fift_\--si.\  miles  from  camp,  I  therefore 
thouLjht  it  advisable  to  retire  by  slow  marches  to  the  Eulaws,  where 
I  might  have  an  opportunity  ol'  receiving  my  sujiplies,  and  disen- 
cumber myself  from  the  sick,  without  risking  my  escorts,  or  suffer 
myself  to  be  attacked  to  disadvantage,  sln)uld  the  enemy  have  crcssed 
the  Congaree." 

On  the  seventh  of  September,  General  Greene  encamped  at  Bur- 
dell's  pl.intation.on  the  Santee  River,  seven  miles  from  Eutaw  Sprii.gs. 
37 


ii 


I'  f 


I  ^\f' 


5/ 


7« 


BATTI.K   OK   EUTAW    SPRINGS. 


[1781 


On  the  ciVhth  of  September,  the  battle  of  luitaw  Spiiii'^s  was 
foiiglit.  It  was  t. h.e  last  battle  n{  the  la^t  Southern  c-anipai;4n  of  the 
war,  and  its  conditions  and  results  arc  therefore  niatt'iiai  elenienls  to 
complete  this  narrative.  Colonel  Stew.irt  learned  of  the  jio.iilion  of 
General  Greene's  camp,  as  he  statc=  in  his  ortui<d  report,  i'rom  two 
deserters,  about  six  o'clock  in  the  mo.iiiig. 

Stcdman  saj's,  "  Unfortunately,  their  report  was  neither  credited 
nor  inquired  into;  but  thev  thep.iselves  were  sent  to  prison."  Sted- 
man  was  not  present,  and  Colonel  Stewart's  report  credit.-^  the  desert- 
ers with  information  ufxin  which,  in  part,  he  acted.  Major  Coffin  had, 
however,  been  previously  dispatched  with  one  hundred  and  forty 
inf.mtr}-  and  fifty  cavalry,  in  order  to  i^ain  intelliLjence  of  the  enemy; 
and  he  ,1  p  ^'-ted  that  they  appeared  in  force  in  front,  then  about  four 
miles  from  camp.  Colonel  Stewart  adds,  "I'indiiiL,'  tln--  enenu'  in 
force  s(j  near  me,  I  determined  to  flight  them  ;  as.  from  their  numer- 
ous cav.dry,  it  seemed  to  be  attended  w  ith  dani^crous  consecpiences, 
I  immediately  formed  the  line  of  Ijattle,  with  the  rij^lit  of  the  army 
to  liutaw  Branch,  and  its  left  cro^^in;^  the  road  leading  to  Roclic's 
plantation,  leaving-  a  cori)s  on  a  conmianding  situ.ition  to  cover  the 
Charleston  road,  and  to  act  as  a  reser\e." 

The  hue  was  in  the  woods,  in  adv.mce-  of  the  c.imp,  anci  the  tents 
were  left  staiulini;'.  Major  Majoribanks  was  on  the  extreme  ri_L,dit,  in 
a  clor-e  thicket,  neai'l)-  covered  from  si^^ht.  'I  he  1  bird  Ihitish,  known 
as  the  "  Iii-^h  liufl^,"  which  landed  on  the  third  of  June,  constitLited 
the  rii^ht  wint;  jiroper,  with  the  American  Ro_\alists  umler  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Cruder  at  the  centre;  and  the  Sixty-third  and  .Sixt\-- 
fourtli  ]hiti>h  took  [).»sition  on  the  left.  .\  small  reserve  of  intantry 
with  Captain  Coffin's  detachment,  constituted  the  rem.iinder  vf  the 
liritish  force,  which  did  not  exceed  two  thousand  men,  all  told. 
"  Major  Sheridan  with  a  detachment  of  New  York  volunteers  took 
post  in  a  house,  to  check  the  enemy  should  they  attempt  to  pass  it." 
This  brick  house  and  its  yarden  fence,  (palisaded,)  jM-oved  as  efficient 
a  />o/nl  of  resistance,  as  did  the  Chew  house,  at  the  b.ittle  of  Brandy- 
wine. 

General  Greene  advanced  early  in  the  inornin;^,  leaving;  his  camp  a 
httle  after  four  o'clock  of  the  eighth  o^  .September.  "The  front  was 
composed,"  accordinL^  to  liis  ofticial  rejjort,  "of  four  small  battalions 
of  militia,  two  of  North,  and  two  of  South  Carolina."  General  M.uion 
cornmanded  the  rii;ht  wint^,  and  General  Pickens  tlie  left  wing.  Colo- 
nel Malmady  commanded  tlie  centre,  which  was  composed  of  North 


ipin 


t  r    1 


I7SI.1 


llAiri.K    OF    Kl'lAW    SI'RINGS 


579 


Canilina  militi.i,  with  ;i  small  artillery  detachment  under  Lieutenant 
(jaines,  and  two  three-j)i)Lini!Lrs,  whieh  rested  nn  the  road.  "The 
second  line  ci  in>isted  of  three  small  bri;.;ades  ot'  eonlinent.il  troops, 
one  of  North  Carolina,  one  of  Virginia,  and  one  <<{'  Mar)'land,"-- 
re>pectively  under  the  command  of  ( Jeiieral  Sumner,  Colonel  Camp- 
bell, and  (J)lonel  Williams.  Two  six-pounders  under  Captain  Jkown 
were  on  tin:  road.  Lieutenant-colonel  \\'ashin^i;ton,  with  his  cavalry, 
Aud  the  Delaware  troo[)s  (Kirkwood's)  formed  the  body  of  the  reserve. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Lee  with  his  leL,Mon  covered  tlv  rii^ht  Hank,  and 
Lieutenant-colonel  ILiiderson,  w  ith  the  State  troops,  the  K.'ft.  The 
American  force  slii^htiy  exceeded  twenty-three  humlred  nun.  Such 
were  the  relative  tactic. il  positions  of  the  armies;  but  the  rV^htiuL;'  was 
less  systematic  than  the  artificial  formations.  .Some  m.itter-of-f.ict 
elements,  much  less  formal,  preceded  the  strut;yle.  A  piM'tion  of  the 
ISritish  aini\'  had  been  sent  out  to  iHl;-  sweet  potatoes,  which  were 
just  ripe,  and  were  much  liked  by  the  soldiers.  Colonel  StCivart  says, 
nearly  at  the  close  of  his  report,  "  I  omitted  to  inform  \-our  lordship, 
in  its  prop(M'  place,  of  the  armies  h.u'incj  f(->r  some  cime  been  miu'h  in 
want  of  bread,  there  beiiiL;  no  oKi  corn,  or  mills,  near  me,  I  was, 
theri'fore,  under  the  necessit\-  of  sendin;,;'  out  rooiiiti^  pariii.'!,  from 
each  corps,  under  an  officer,  to  collect  potatoes  every  mornini:;  at  da\-- 
break  ;  and  unfortunately,  th, it  of  the  llank  battalions  and  "Huff;" 
l.avitiL;'  Ljone  too  f.ir,  in  front,  fell  into  the  enem\''s  hands  before  the 
action  began,  whicli  not  only  weakened  my  line,  but  incre;;sed  their 
number  of  prisoners." 

The  rootin;^  party  thus  found  the  vanguard  of  General  Greene's 
arm)-,  which  they  were  not  seeking,  ami  left  the  swi.'et  potatoes  which 
they  were  seeking,  with  all  pi>ssible  energy;  and  ihe  pursuit  of  the 
rooting  party,  un.irmed  as  the\'  were,  imparted  vigor  to  the  Americ.in 
adVcUice,  and  increased  the  number  of  prisoners  afterwr.rds  rej>ortetl. 
Captain  Coffin,  wlio  had  been  sent  to  the  front,  also  h.id  >  short  skir- 
mish three  miles  before  the  British  camp;  and  left  forty  of  his  men 
in  the  hands  of  the  Americans.     Some  of  his  party  were  killed. 

As  nearly  .'ill  critical  events  in  human  history  have  their  minor 
determining  issues,  so  this  final  battle  of  the  St)uthern  campaign  of 
tl;e  war  under  notice,  is  easily  brought  to  plain  solution. 

The  American  army  was  superior  in  numbers,  and  was  well-offi- 
cered.    The  prelini.inary  skirmish  with  Coffin,  and  the  surprise  of  the 


rooting  party,  imparted  zest  to  their 


ad 


vance. 


It 


w.is   nearly  nine 


ly 


,(111'"  IV.'! 


" 


V\ 


o'clock  when  the  opposing  forces  met  in  battle,  and  the  artillery  fire 


5SO 


liATll.K    Ol    \:l  lAW    Sl'KINGS. 


[iTSi. 


-    I  ■;■ 


m 


'm 


on  cillii'r  --idc,  \v,is  liinitcil  to  tlic  r,m;.n;  of  the  road.  Tlic  "  dislrihii- 
tidii  lit'  the  IJriti^li  .nlillcr}-  tliroU'^di  their  liiir,"  referred  Id  l)y  several 
lii^tiMiaU'-,  w.is  ^iiii])l\-  the  lueatiuii  of  three  '.niiis  in  the  centre  of  a 
.small  fiont  of  a  few  hundred   \ards  ;    and    both   armies   fou'^ht   under 


ll 


ic  shade'  I  if  forest  t  r 


(  e>,  where  tlie  .American  arm)'  had  every  advan- 
taL;e  ol    position,  and  wlurt'  iudi\idual  meiit  had  its  i)est  opportunit)'. 

I'hrs  battle  illuslr.ites  the  fair  avera;^;i'  of  mililar_\-  transactions, 
when  stripped  i,f  the  poetical  adornments  uhich  deceive  youllilul 
•ispiiants  lor  L;lor_\',  aiul  (.■nthuse  tlu;  people  with  hen/ied  excitement 
t)ver  victories  w  i  m. 

l'"i.;htin;4  is  lianl  work.  The  beautiful  formation  of  paracK:  v.m- 
ishes  in  the  field.  I'lie  word  "s/,ii,(r,"  me.in s  y/c.v/  //oi/ :  but  the 
idea  of  perfect  selt'-po>se--sion,  so  that  depleted  reLMinents  unite  a;_;,iin 
•  IS  f.i'-t  .IS  men  fall,  .md  the  .u^Ljrei^ate  loss  is  .v/w/'/i'  d  ilnii'niHt io)i  cj'  it 
pri'Diptlv  (7(',si >/-///>  front,  is  theore'ticd  .\\\^\  impossible'.  Ww.  iiior,ih\ 
or  inerti.i  of  .m  arm\',  ;.^i\e'S  it  ph_\'sical  power;  and  this  is  made  up 
of  ele'inents  wl'.ich  must  come  out  ot  fixt'd  conditions.  These  condi- 
tions.ire,  either  ,in  ex.ict  and  ii.itienl  tr.iiniiiL;,  or  the  impulsion  which 
comes  from  some  oxerwlulmiuL;  p.ission.  C'oncord,  J  ,exin;:;ton,  and 
lUinker  I  liil  illustr.ite  the  latt<r  ;  ,ind  both  the  I'ritish  ,ind  lles-,i.in 
troops  .ilmost  invariablx' denioustiMted  the  \-alue  of  the  first  condition. 
I'he  Americ.m  continental  ,irm>',  -o  lar  as  iierm.ineiit,  acquired  like 
discipline,  and  their  b.itl.ilioiis  suffer  very  little  discount,  wlxn  en- 
t;,iL;ed  under  eipi.d  circuiii-lances  with  the'r  opponents. 

'"lie  b.ittk'  of  l'',ulaw  S[)iin;.;s  w.is  well  fouidlt,  until  the  battle,  lik'e- 
that  of  i5emiin;.^ton.  proinisetl  ,i  short  m.irch  to  e.isy  victory,  and  then 
liceii.se  siip[)l.mled  discipline,  and  v.iiKiuished  victory. 

riie  .ictii>n  be;.;an  i)etween  the  ai  tiller)'  dct.ichments,  mm\  their  fire 
was  m.iinlair  d  with  much  \i;-;or,  until  om;  ot  the  iSritish  ,ind  two  of 
the  American  pieces  wi:rc  tlisniounted.  I'he  Hritish  left  wiuL;',  "  b)- 
an  unknown  mist.dvc,"  sa)'s  t'oloiiel  Stew.irl,  "  aiU'.inced  .md  drove 
the  miiitia  and  North  ("aroiini.iiis  before  them;  but  uiiexpe'c  teill)' 
fmdinLr  the  \  ii.;ini,i  and  .M.ir)'l.ind  line  re.id)"  lormed,  .and  .it  the 
same  time  recei\'in;4  a  hea\  )■  tire,  occisioiied  some  conlusinn."  1  he 
North  ( 'ar,)lin,i  mnui.i,  liou  (.'x  tr,  tired  sc\'enteen  rounds  before  their 
retrc.t,  .ind  .Sumner  so  [)romptl)'  pu-^hed  the  battalions  of  .Ashe,  .\rm- 
stroni;' .md  IMount  into  the  \^.\\^,  that  the  llrsl  line  was  restored,  and 
tlie  British  in  turn  retre.ited.  The  reserve  then  c.imc  to  their  sii[)- 
port.  The  American  secoml  hue  w.is  promptly  broii;4ht  up,  .it  a 
bayonet  charge,  and  the  Dritish  left  win;^  in  turn  gave  w.i)-. 


w 


;7««1 


l!\  III  I''.   UK   |.:|;  lAW    SI'klNC'^. 


5R1 


("(ilniicl  I  liiiilcrsuii  \v,i'^  wouiidcd  cnly  in  t!ic  ,u  t  i'Ui,  ,ii\(l  I  .itutcti- 
aiit-CdldiK  1  W'.kU;  Il.iin|)1<in  siK-cmlcd  to  I  he  ciirnni.ind  of  t  he  i  .iv.ilty 
on  the  h.'lt  n.iiili.  \\'.idiiii;;tiin,  with  Kirkwoml,  ,id\Mni.id  tnUMid  the 
pohitioii  occupiitl  !)>■  M.ii<iril),inks,  ,iiid  \.rv  thirat-Mi  'd  the  ISiitish 
k'ft.  Till'  l)a>-.i!u.'l  cli, u;.;r  li-d  by  ('m1(,ii(I  Willi, im^  ^h.ltt^^e(l  the 
Hrili^h  Idt  \\\ny,.  'I  he  tiM()|is  hidkc  iutu  disordir  .uul  tied  throu;_di 
their  iMiiip  {n  the  cover  ol  the  lioii-~e  .die.idv  occupit'd  hy  Major 
Slieiid.in.  Whili;  tJK'  Ilriti^h  oftiei  in  ueri'  r.illyiu;.;  tlieir  men  ,iiid 
lorniiiijj  the  line  .iiieu,  Awd  olili(|iuly  to  the  left,  across  the  o|ie;i 
;4iouiid  hihind  their  camp,  a  portion  ot"  the  Ani'Tiean  troops  were 
pliiiulcrini;  tlie  tents,  drinkin;^  luiii,  and  r,aerilu;inL;-  tlie  p.irtial  success 
alread)'  attaineil. 

Idle  position  ot"  Major  M.ijorihanks  was  siuh  a^  to  eiidaie.^er  tlu- 
Anicric.i'i  left  win;.;-.  Colonel  \\'ashin;,;ton  attemptin;^  in  vain  to  dis- 
Iodi;e  him,  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  toi^cther  with  nearl>' 
loitN'  ol  his  lui'ii.  I'lie  ihiiket  \s'.is  too  (Kmisl-  for  the  iiio\einent  of 
e.u'alr)-,  and  the  men  were'  taken,  one-  liy  one.  \sithont  oppoilnnil)'  to 
resist.  Kirku  tK)d  and  Hampton  made  a  similar  attempt  with  jjiasis- 
tcnl  v.ilor,  hut  M.ijoribanks  only  retired  to  a  siiH  ^troii'^cr  i)o-,iiion, 
ami  eventu,ill\-  hehiiul  the  palisades  of  the  L;ardin 

(ie'Ueral  (iieeiie  made  eveiv  pi)-.sil)le  I'lTort  to  restore  liis  line,  t)ut 
no  troops  coiild  witii>land  the'  iiot  t'ire  to  which  they  were  expo-cd. 
1  he  .irtilleiymen  were  in  open  |.;roiind,  an('  nearl\-  ev'e-ry  one  U'll  upon 
the  lield.  The  lion-;c  which  .Sheridan  occupied,  h, id  \vindi  iws  in  the 
njot',  ,ind  was  practic.dly,  a-^  (general  lireenc  re[)orls  it,  a  ih'w  story 
lioiisr.  l''in(iin;4  it->  c.ipture  in..)ossible,  and  that  his  men  were  exposed 
to  absolute  slauL,diter,  he  abandoned  the  L^uns  ,iiul  retired  to  llurdeli's 
plantation.  The  battle  was  one  of  i.MX'at  acli\-ity  on  both  sides.  'I'he 
unarmed  rootini;'  party  of  course  carried  back  with  them  an  ilenient 
of  disortler.  The  r>iiti>h  KTl,  made  up  of  the  veteran  Sixty-third  and 
Si.\t\'-lourth,  had  served  duriiiL;-  the  war  from  their  landin;j;  on  St.iten 
Island  in  I77<j(sce  pa;_;e  _'oc;i.  I'hey  made  an  unauthori/.ed  pluiv.je 
upon  tile  .American  centre  to  capture  its  L;uns,  at  the  be^^innini;  of  the 
fi!^ht,  and  U)st  cor.fidence  b)'  the  repulse  which  attended  the  advaiict; 
of  .Sumner.  The  b,i)-oiu  t  charge  of  Williams  and  (',mii)bell  which 
{"ollowed,  was  efficient  and  determinin;,^.  The  conduct  of  .Majoribanks 
was  eijuall)-  o])i)ortune,  on  the  Hritisli  rii^iit,  'i'he  occupation  ot  the 
brick  house  ,ind  _t;ardeii,  ami  the  plunder  of  the  Hritish  cimp,  taken 
together,  s.ived  Colonel  .Stewart's  ariH)-. 

The  American    casu.Llties  are    given  by  General  Greene,  as  one 


1 

i 


-  ( 

i0M  '»  i»ir.^!'.,    '■ 


5 


S2 


HAT  11, 1',   OF    liUr.WV    Si'klNCS. 


[1781 


lirutrnant-cnloiirl.  .i\  rapt.iiii^,  five  ^uhaltv.'rii';.  four  scrvint-^,  and 
iiin(.'t\--<.M;_;iil  rank  ,iii<l  file,  Icili/d  ;  two  lifiitfiiant-CDlimch,  seven  cap- 
t.iins,  twenty  lieutiMiant-^.  tweiit}'  fniir  serL^t-ant^,  and  two  luinilred 
and  nine  rank  and  file  wound-jd.  I'utal  casualties  four  hundred  and 
ei^^llt. 

I'he  l^rili-^h  casualties  are  ^^iven  l)y  Colon  !  Stewart  as  three  com- 
missioned Mtiicers,  six  ser^^i'ant-^,  .iiui  seventy-six  men,  killed  ;  sixtei;n 
coinmi  — ioned  oftieers,  twent>'  serL;(:ants.  and  two  hundred  and  thirt)-- 
tw.)  men  mi>>in;.;.     T'ltal  casualties,  six  huuiired  and  ninet>--thr(;e. 

1)11  llie  ni;^ht  of  the  ninth.  Colonel  Stewart  retired  to  Monk's 
Cotui  r,  ha\iii:_;  broken  uj)  aid  abandoned  one  thousaml  st.ind  of  arms 
which  he  threw  into  the  river,  and  let't  seventy  wounded  men  to  the 
care  ot  the  Americ.nis. 

Stedm  in  sa>'s,  "  both  armies  had  suffiire  1  so  much  that  for  somi- 
tinii'  .it'terwards  neither  ot  tliem  was  in  a  situation  to  un  lertake  any- 
thin'4"  a'_;ainst  tlie  other,"  and  adds.  ••  Indeed  this  was  the  last  action 
of  an\'  couseiiuence  that  happened  in  South  Carolina  between  tlie 
kiiV-;'s  Iroiips  and  the  .Americans.  The  form-.r.  from  tins  time  chietly 
confined  them-^elves  to  i  "h.irli.'stou  Neck  ,ind  '^ome  posts  in  its  nei;.;h- 
l.)orhi'0(i,  the  securit\"  of  the  town  .lopearin;,;  to  be  their  [)rinci[)al 
()V)iect  ;  .md  (ieiieral  (ireene.  either  was  iMt  or  did  not  think  liimself 
in  sufficient  force  to  attempt  to  reduce  it." 

T.irleton  says,  '•  Iti^  im[)os>ible  to  ilo  justice  to  the  spirit,  patience 
,ind  invincible  fortitude  displayed  by  the  commanders,  officers  and 
suUliers  during  these  ilreadfu!  cam[),ii;4ns  in  the  two  Carolinas.  They 
h.ul  iv>t  onI_\-  to  C'Mitend  with  men,  .ind  the-.e  b)-  no  mi;ans  deficient 
in  braver)'  and  enterprise,  but  the)'  encountered  and  surmounted 
difficulties  and  fiti;.;ues  finm  the  climate  and  the  country,  wliich 
would  appear  iiisu])erabK.'  in  tlieui-)-,  ,ind  alnin-^t  increiHijle  in  the 
relations."  ..."  Durin;.;  the  ;.;reater  part  of  the  time  they  were 
totall)-  ckNtitute  of  bread,  and  tin;  country  atT)rded  iki  vcL^etables  for 
a  suljstitute.  .Salt  at  leiv^^th  failed,  and  their  oul\-  rt.sources  were 
water  and  the  wild  cattle  which  tliev  I'ound  in  the  W(,)ods.  In  the  last 
expedition  tlft\-  men  perished  tliroUL,di  mere  fatiL^ue."  .  .  "  We 
must  not,  however,  confine  the  praise  entirely  to  the  Ihitish  troops; 
as  a  detachment  of  Hessians  which  haiJ  been  lent  upon  the  occ.i-ion 
b)'  (ieneral  l)e  Ho-^e,  tles.rvi;di)-  came  in  for  their  pro[)er  share.  1  ho 
same  justice  recjuire^  tli.it  the  Americans  should  not  be  deprived  of 
their  share  of  this  fatal  i^lory.  They  hail  the  same  difficulties  to  en- 
counter, joined  to  a  fortune  on  the  field  tjenerally  adverse  :  yet  on 


li7«i 


It'll 


1 

y 

ji 


'        i 


H 


II 


ft  >i 


i 


iV' 


f 

J    i 

m 

itSi.I 


HAi'i'ii',  OK  KircAVV  si'i<r\'Os. 


5H.? 


the  whnl(;  the  c.'unp.'ii;.',!)  f (  rmiiialcl  in  llicir  favor,  Cicinral  Greene 
li.iviii;;  iccDvrnMl  tin-  far  ;.ncali'r  part  <>{'  (icur.jia  .iiiil  the  two 
(^lrolillas." 

(  )ii  the  twelfth,  General  Greene  crossed  llieSaiitee  at  Nelson's 
I'"ciry,  ami  of  tli<;  fiftiM-nth  was  at  Iiis  old  camf)  at  the  lli;;h  Mills. 
I'ickiMis,  M.ui  n  and  llaniptoii  re^llmed  their  jiartisan  operations,  and 
Grecni;'s  army  was  soon  redined  to  less  than  a  thousand  I'ffeclive 
men,  witii  nearly  six  hundred  uoiindeii  men  from  the  two  armies  in 
his  cliar;4(r. 

'  )ne  I  lector  ( )'Meal  wi'h  a  party  of  royalists  captured  I  lillshorour'h, 
and  mad(;  (iovernor  Uurke  and  tiie  council  prisoners,  hut  was  killed, 
fUirintr  his  retreat  to  \Vilmin;.^rton,  hy  a  jiarty  of  nn'litia. 

(  )n  the  ninth  of  i\'ovemI)cr,  General  Greene's  cainp  was  enlivened 


bv  official  information  of  ll 


\r  siirri'iK 


ler  off 


ornwallis. 


On  t: 


u;    ei'dlteeiltli     tin 


li'Mi  llilU   were    au'.im    aD.indoneii,    and 


nutnerous  minor  ope r, it  ions  concluded  t  In;  Soul  hern  i  am  pal;  ni  of  1781 . 
It  was  a  constant  stru;^f;_jle  to  secure  troops,  ftod,  medicines  and 
annnunition,  while  tlu"  f^^arrison  of  Charleslf)n  had  been  increase  d  to  an 
effective  force  of  nearly  six  thousand  men;  />///  //w  annifs  d Li  not 
again  meet  in  the  field. 


i  f 


) 


i 


<  .« 


,4  if''' 


i  ii 


J    „ 


CIIAI'TI'K    LXXII 

I.A  FAYKI  rj:S  VlKiilNIA  CAMI'.vK.N.     (UNDIIION  (JF    IHI';    TWO 

Ak.MII'.S. 

ON  tlic  t\v<nli(  til  o(  I'Cliniary,  17.S1,  ( Oiun-css  nsolvid  tli.it  ,1 
liiiition  of  tlic  I'ciiiisylv.ini.i  line,  tlicii  near  I -anca^lcr,  and 
wliicli  liad  l)(:(,ii  (.nLjai.jcd  in  ill'.'  previous  inut iiiy,  should  In;  okIckmI 
to  IJKJ  s  mill,  to  coiislitnU;  a  pari  ol  tlu;  soutlniii  ami)'.  I  his  was 
prcdicati  il  ii])on  the  landin<.f  of  a  liiit  ish  force  at  Wiliiiiir.doii,  o?;  ihe 
("ape  l'"'ar  l\iver.  I  hat  lorcc,  however,  h, id  Keen  ina;4iiihed  hcyoiid  its 
real  iniptjitaiu  c  ;  and  tlu;  ulliuiate- iiu  reasc;  oi  the  I'ritish  army  in  Vir 
qini.i  i;radiially  niodilied  the  disposition  oi  the  detachment  ri;ferred  to. 
On  tlic  s.iiiic  day,  (leiieral  1  ,a  I'avettc  was  assigned  to  the  com- 
mand <if  troops  tlu;n  assemhled  at  l'eekd;il!,  havin;,;,  as  his  s|)i;cihc 
objective;  of  opei.it  ions,  a  ia])id  march  to  Vir;;i!iia,  to  </i/>//tff  /'uiic- 
did  Aniolil.  ()win;',  to  the  leinpoiaiy  rediulioii  of  tin;  l'>iitish  ll<-et 
;it  Newport,  Khodc  IsI.ukI,  by  tlu;  storm  ol  January  tw(;nty-scc()nd, 
before  noticed,  M.  1  )esttiiiclies,  th(;n  vommandiii'.',,  ."7(t' Admiral  Ter- 
iiay,  di;cea^ed,  aj.nicd  to  send  one  ship  o(  the  line  and  two  fri;_jat(;s  to 
(diesapeake  ii.iv,  to  prevent  /\i  Hold's  esc.ipe.  The  l(;tters  ol  Count  dt; 
Kochanibeau  slunv  that  he  mn  ■,eiitt;d  to  send  a  detai  hmi;iit  of  l'"r(;nch 
troops  also  ;  but  tin-,  he  stales,  "  was  tlioii;,;lil  to  be  unnecessary  and 
inexpedient  as  the  movement  was  inti;nded  to  be  r.ijiid  ;  it  bein<r 
presumed  that  the  continental  troops  and  militia,  in  Vir^ini.i,  were 
sufficient  to  operate  a;^.iinst  Arnold  by  l.ind."  I'his  small  naval 
detachment,  commanded  by  M.  Dc  lully,  sailed  from  Ni;w[)<jrt  oil 
the  ninth  of  i-'ebriiary,  and  cai>tured  the  I'ritish  fri!.',ale  Romulus, 
44,  in  Lynn  1  la\'eii  liay,  as  well  as  two  jirivateers,  and  ei;_;ht  other 
prizes;  but  the  L'ICveille,  6.4,  drew  loo  much  water  to  ascend  llu; 
I'Llizabetii  River  wliere  Arnold  had  withdrawn  his  few  lij^dit  frigates: — 
the  Surveillante  j^ruuiuied,  and  the  vessels  returned  to  New'ixirt,  on 
the   twenty-fourth.     It  a^jpears  that  the   entire   I'leiicli   tlcct   would 


I7H1.1 


r.A    !•  A  \' 1. 1  I  i;  '^    \IK(.IM.\    r\Mi',M(;N. 


5«5 


liavi-  joined  the  iiKivini'Mil,  with  .i  land  fnn-c  adil'd,  i(  ('omit:  dc 
RiK  liainl)i-,iii  had  icicivcd  httii",  from  (iciicral  W'adiin' Mnn  in  time; 
l)iit  M.  Dr'I'iilly  had  saih-(l  ulicii  (he  pinpositinii  naihi-d  the  I'lcmli 
h(ad<]uarl  <  is. 

Till  division  r)f  La  I'aytlc  consisted  of  tvvilvr  hundred  h;.dit 
iii(.inti)',  iii.idc  ii|>  of  New  I.Ji;dand  and  N'cvv'  Jersey  troops.  He 
:.larted  iimiieiiialely  lor  his  new  coiniiiaiid,  iiMchin;.;  roiii|)lon  on  tlie 
twenty  t  hiid  o(  l''el)ruiry,  l'iiilad(d|)!ii,i  on  tlie  second,, and  ll'sid  of 
I'.lk  on  t  hi'  t  hird  o(  Maia  h.  liie  trm  ps  w  cut  to  Ann.ipohs  by  u.iter 
I  ,a  I',i\'elti-  fust  went  in  an  open  canoe  to  I'.h/.ahethtown,  1  o  ,u  cclerale 
jireparations  for  tin-  attail;  ipon  .Aiiiold.  I)iirin',;  thi-  preh'niinaiy 
examination  lie  vi-.itei'  |>ari  ',  .'•ilenl)en,  tlnnat  N'mklown,  who  enter- 
tained the  idea  that  In-  would  rally  at  lea-.t  five  thousand  militia,  ,'.nd 
then  visited  deiieial  .M u lih  iilier' ^,  at  .Suffolk,  and  actual!)'  made  a 
reeoniioiss.mce  of  /\i  nold'',  defe'iises  at  I'orl  siiiout  h.  I  he  lelmn  of 
tlie  l'"rench  ship,  lo  Ne'wport  (  om])elleii  him  to  return  to  Ann.ipolis 
and  aw.iil   further   iiistructioiis   (loin  \\'asliin;'lon. 

'1  he  (Xpedit  ion  \\,is  immediately  reor;.;.tni/ed.  (ieiiera!  W'.isli- 
in;'Jon  visited  .Newport  on  the  sixth,  and  held  a  t  onfei-'-uce  v^it  Ii  (  ount 
de  Ro(  h;uiil)e-,iu,  on  tile  .Adniiial's  ship.  I'uisu.int  to  jireviou-.  c  or- 
resjiondeiice  with  ("ouiit  de  Rorh.imlie.iu,  he  found  that  eleven  Imn- 
(hed  and  forty  men,  under  I'aron  de  \'ionieni!,  had  already  eml)arl.ed, 
hut  a  dela_\'  in  tin-  ri'|iair  of  one  fri'eite  h.id  prevented  e.arlier  s,iiliu'j_. 
'The  sipiadioii,  coiisistiii:.;  of  ei;dit  ships  of  the  line  and  four  fii'.;ates, 
s.iijid  on  the  ei;ditli.  ( )n  the  tenth,  .Admir.i!  .'Xrhuthnot,  then  at 
(iardiiiei's  llay,  on  tin-  noilli  side  and  cast  end  of  I -on;.;  Isi.nid,  wrote 
fo(ieni'r.il  (  linton  to  w.nii  .\rnold  of  tlie  ex])e<lil  ion,  and  at  once 
s;iiled  \\  it  li  an  eipial  foice,  in  pursuit  of  tin:  I'lciudi  slii[)s.  ()n  the 
sixteenth  a  short  na\Ml  en;.;,i';enient  oci  urred  between  tlie  two  Hee-ls, 
off  (  hesajje.ike  liay,  witli  will  b. danced  n.-sults;  but  the  object  of  the 
expedition  lia\'in;.'_  been  thwarted  by  tin  presem c  of  the  liiitisii 
.squadron,  M.  Destouclies  retuined  to  Newport  on  t  lu'  twent)'sixth, 
aftci'  an  al)seiu:e  (if  only  ei'dileeii  da\'s. 

A  m.iteiial  niodilicatioii  of  the  plan  of  cunpai'.ni  was  iiivoKi'<l  in 
these  failures  of  the  I'reui  li  fleet  to  control  the  (  hes.ipe.ike.  Under 
the  ori'.;inaI  order,  I  ,a  I'asctte  was  instructed  "to  return  to  the  main 
<irmy,  in  case  Arnold  ipiitte'd  Vii;.;inia,  or  tin-  I'leiu  h  lost  superiority 
of  ii.ival  force."  Wasliin;.;ton  wrote  to  l<a  l'"ayett(,'  on  tin;  filth  of 
April,  as  follows:  "  Wliile  wc  laiiH-iil  the  niiscarria^^e  nf  an  enterprise 
wliich  bid  so  fair  for  success,  wc  must  consult:  ourselves  in  the  tliougiit 


* 

;■'{ 

! 

r 

''  *f 

H 


i    i 


II 


;i  . 


It/    '  5 


nm 


I  ff 


;*n^ 


ii,.»  M 


'fi 


f'  !U 


I; 


58G 


)f  h, 


i„\  F.\vi:riK's  viRc.ixiA  campah;n. 


iviii'j  uiiiic  c\cr\ 


thimr 


nnicticahlc  to  accuninlisli  it. 


I 


iin  certain 


that  the  Chevalier  Destnuehes  exertetl  hiinseU'  to  the  utmost  to  t;ain 
the  Cliesapeake.  The  [)oint  upon  which  the  uliole  turned,  the  action 
with  Adniira!  Arbuthnot,  rellects  honor  upon  tlie  chevaher  and  upon 
the  marine  of  France.  As  matters  ha\-  ;  turned  out,  it  is  to  l)e  wished 
that  \'ou  had  not  ^'one  out  of  the  I'.lk  ;    /'///   /  /i,'rrr  //n/xr  of  the  pri)- 


priify  of  iiiiti 
to  1' 


smws  />]'  iiftir  events . 


I. a  I' 


:i\'ette  w.is  also  instrucleil 


to  return 


cral  Gr 


eeiie 


ulade![)hia.      (~)n  the  sixth,  he  was  ortlered  to  join  Cien- 
n  \\',ishin''ton  learned  of  t lie  lamliii'f  (jf  (ieneral 


but 


wne 


Miill 


IDS  m 


iri:inia,  witii  rem 


forcements  to  the  British  armv,  he  coun- 


ternianc 


led  t: 


le  ortler   and   assiijnet 


1    La    1- 


i\-ette  to  ct^mmand   111 


Vir- 


•inia  under  tieiieral  (jreeiie,  to  whom,  .is  well  as  to   WasliiuLTton,  he 


m.ule  his  reports 


f 


jeneral   (jre<'ne   thus  eX))ressed   his  vic'ws  o 


f  tl 


lis 


detail  of  (ienera!  La  Fax'ette,  in  a  ktter  wrilte'ii  "Ten  miles  from 
Cjuilford  Court  House,  March  ei;^iUecnth  "  :  "  1  am  h.ii)]))'  to  hear  the 
M.ircpds  de  La  L.uette  is  comm;^  to  Vir;^ini,i,  thoLr^li  I  am  afr.u'd  from 
.1  hint  ill  one  of  Baron  Steuben's  letters,  th;it  he  will  think  himself  in- 
jured in  beinjjf  superseded  in  the  commaiitk  Could  the  M.injuis  join 
us  at  this  moment,  we  should  hia\e  a  mo>t  j^lorious  campai;_;n.  It 
wmilil  put  Lord  Cornwallis  and  his  whole  .irmy  into  our  iiands."  The 
Baron  Steuben  ,is  usual,  accepted  W'ashini^ton's  ortlers  as  final;  and 
by  a  different  pi. in  th.m  anticipateti  in'  (jeneral  (jreene,  the  I'iryjiiia 
opti-atioiis  of  La  l-ayctlo  dirt  tly  Ld  to  the  final  oifoironiiioiit  and 
iiipturr  of  Lorii  (  oniioal/is. 

.\Lin}'  embarr.is^ments  attended  the  opening  of  this  campai!.ni. 
The  troops  themselves  disliked  their  transfer  to  a  warmer  clim.ite, 
especially  wlien  the}'  were  ordered  to  march  to  the  extreme  south  ; 
and  some  dissatisfaction  was  expressed  at  the  assi;^nment  of  Colonel 
Gimat  and  ]\Lijor  Galvan,  both  excellent  officers,  to  ci>mmands  in  the 
corps.  Desertions  were  frequent  and  the  spirit  of  the  army  w.is  almost 
mutinous.  One  deserter  was  Iuiiil;-,  and  then  La  Layette  ch.iiv^ed  his 
policy,  and  forj^aiw  and  disniisstd  the  seeond  offender.  An  order  was 
issued  decl.irin;4  th.it  " //<•  :oas  setting  out  for  a  diffieii/t  and  i/ani;erons 
ixpedition  ;  but  that  he  hoped  the  soldiers  icoiild  not  abandon  him  ; 
but  that  li'hoever  wished  to  go  away  might  do  so  instantly."  "  I'Vom 
that  hour,"  lie  states  in  his  memoirs,  "all  desertions  ceased,  and  not 
one  man  would  leave."  It  has  already  been  seen  that  Washincrton 
could  send  no  adequate  reinforcements  to  Cieneral  Greene,  and  it  is 
well  to  notice  the  condition  of  the  northern  army  from  which  La 
l'\iyette  had  withdrawn  twxdve  hundred  men. 


7S1 


I   \    rWI'.TTF,  S    VIRCIMA    (ANfPAICX. 


587 


■  ■        la  I 


Condition  of  tlic  American  army.  It  will  be  nmcmbcrocl  that  tlie 
new  arm)-  cstiil)lislunciit  was  fixed  at  tliirt)-- seven  tliousand  men,  and 
tile  innpose  was  to  re.ili/.e  tliis  force  by  the  first  of  January,  17S1. 
The  retjuisitions  h.ul  been  del.iyed.  Marshall  sa\'s,  "The  rei^uhir  force 
(h'awn  from  I'enns\-l\'ania  to  (ieor;_jia  inchisive,  at  mt  time  durinc;  this 
active  .md  intere^tinlr  campaign,  amounted  to  three  thousand  effective 
men.  <  )f  the  northern  troojjs,  twelve  luuKb'ed  had  been  detached 
under  the  AIar(|uis  de  La  I'ayette  to  the  aid  of  \'ir;j;inia.  Including 
these  in  the  estimate,  the  States  from  New  Jersey  to  New  Hampshire 
inclusive,  mi  late  as  the  ninth  of  April,  h.id  furnished  onl\-  five  thou- 
sand elfecti\es.  The  cavairs'  ,inil  artiller_\-  at  no  time  exceeded  one 
thousand."  "  During  Ma)',  the  total  force  reached  se\en  thousand 
nun,  of  whom  rather  mure  than  f)ur  thousand  might  have  been 
relied  on  for  action  ;  but  e\'en  these  had  been  brought  into  camp  too 
late  to  ac(piire  that  discipline  which  is  so  essential  to  military  service." 

W'asliington  tlius  embodies  the  gloomy  condition  of  affiirs  in  his 
di,ir\-,  commencing  the  hrst  nf  AIa\- :  "  Inste.ul  of  having  magazines 
filled  with  ])r(  ■•' .ions,  we  have  a  scanty  [)ittance  scattered  here  and 
there  in  the  cinferent  .States.  Insteatl  of  having  our  arsenals  well 
sup[)lied  with  military  stores,  the)'  are  [joorh'  provided,  and  the  work- 
men are  lea\ing  them.  Insteid  of  ha\'ing  the  v.irious  articles  of  field 
e(.iuijxiL;e  in  readiness  to  deliver,  the  (piarterma-^ter-general  is  but  even 
now  aj)[)l)'ing  to  the  St  ites  (.is  the  dernier  roortito  provide  tlvese 
things  for  their  troops  respectivel)'.  Instead  of  h,i\-ing  a  regular  sy>tem 
of  tr,uisi)ortation  upon  credit,  or  funds  in  the  (piai'tei'inaster's  h.mds 
to  defr.i)'  the  coiitingent  expenses,  we  have  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other;  and  in  all  that  business,  or  a  great  part  of  it,  being  done  by 
militar)'  im[M'essment,  we  are  d.iily  and  hourly  oppressing  the  people, 
souring  their  tempers  and  .ilienating  their  affections.  Instead  of  hav- 
ing the  regiments  com[)!eted  under  the  new  establishment,  and  which 

ought  to  have  been  so  b)'  the of agreeable  to  the  recpn'- 

sitions  of  Congress,  scarce  aiu'  State  in  the  service  has  at  this  time  .m 
eighth  p.u't  of  its  cpiota  in  the  fieKi  ;  and  there  is  little  prospect  that 
I  can  see  of  e\er  getting  more  than  hah'.  In  a  word,  instead  of  having 
everything  in  readiness  to  t,d<e  the  field,  we  have  nothing.  And 
instead  of  having  the  prospect  of  a  glorious  offensive  campaign  before 
us,  we  haw  a  bewilderetl  and  gloom)-  prospect  of  a  detensive  one  ; 
unless  wc  should  receive  a  powerful  ,iid  of  shi[)-,  l.uid  troojis  and 
money  from  our  generous  allies,  and  these  at  present  are  too  contin- 
gent to  build   upon."     "Chimney-corner  patriots,"  abounded,  and  it 


M  iT 


\  I 


v.. 


r 


!t      ■    ■■'. 


m.Ja 


ft' Li  , 


ill 


vS8 


I.A    lAVKITi:  S    NIKCIMA    CAMPAICV. 


[I73l, 


would  be  difficult  to  find  a  period  o(  moilcrii  history  where  "  venality,' 
■' eorruptioii,"  "prostitution  of  office  fir  selfish  ends,"'  "abuse  of 
tru-,t,"  "perversion  of  fmids  from  a  national  to  a  personal  use,"  and 
"  speculations  upon  the  necessities  of  the  times,"  had  been  more  wide- 
s[)re  id  and  offensive  than  as  described  in  uneciuivocal  terms  by  Wash- 
inc^ton  durin;^  the  war  unde"-  notice.  Every  battle  and  every  cam- 
paign wa;.  affected  by  sucii  elements,  aiui  the  diffnsioji  of  political 
rcsponsilnlity  ^till  made  the  I'liitcd  Slitter  only  a  loose  partnershi[>  of 
sc.ittered  ,ind  differentl)'  related  partners. 

On  the  twentieth  of  l''ebru,u>-,  when  the  Virj^inia  campai;:;n  was 
initiated,  Cieneral  W'ashinijtoii  ur;_,^eil  (ieneral  Schuyler  to  acce[)t  the 
luMii  of  the  War  Department,  usiny;  these  words,  "  ()ur  affiirs  arc 
brou;^ht  to  AW  awful  crisis.  NothiiiL,^  will  recover  them  but  the  vi;^or- 
ous  exertion  of  men  of  abilities  who  know  our  wants,  .ind  the  best 
means  of  supplyint;  them.  I'heie  ([ualifications,  sir,  without  a  com- 
pliment, I  think  you  possess.  Why  then,  the  department  bein;^ 
necessary,  should  \'ou  shrink  fn^m  the  duties  of  it  ?  The  L;reater  the 
chaos,  the  gieator  will  be  your  merit  in  brinL^in;^^  forth  ordei."  (ieii- 
er.d  Schuyler  replied  on  the  twenty-fifth  of  I'ebruary,  and  tU.clared 
his  intention  never  to  hold  an\-  ol'fice  under  C  ouL^ress  unless  accom- 
[janied  with  a  rest<jration  of  military  rank,  and  that  "  such  inconveiii- 
ences  would  result  to  themselves  (("onLjressi  from  such  a  restoration,  as 
wosld  necessarily  give  umbrage  to  man)-  officers." 

Generals  Greene,  (iates  and  Sullivan  were  considered  candidates, 
but  the  matter  was  tlropped,  until  (ieneral  Liiicoln  received  the 
appointment,  October  twenty-fitth,  17S1.  Robert  Morris,  whose 
wealth  and  energies  during  the  entire  w.ir  wen-  dev(jted  to  the  cause, 
so  that  he  comin.inded  credit  when  Congress  had  none,  took  charge 
of  the  I*"inancial  Ikireau.  and  Gener.il  McDuugall  was  elected  Secre- 
tary of  Marine. 

The  foregoing  considerations  have  value  in  the  present  connec- 
tion ;  and  further  reference  to  tlu:  condition  of  the  American  north- 
ern army  will  be  deferred  to  its  association  with  operations  against 
Yorktown  and  New  York,  after  (ieneral  Washington  assumed  per- 
sonal command  of  all  the  armies  in  the  tielil. 

Sil nation  of  the  British  army.  On  lh,e  fifth  of  April,  after  La 
Fayette  had  reached  Head  of  Mlk,  (ieneral  Clinton  thu-.  wrote  to 
Lord  Germaine:  "  I  am  pre[)aring  for  every  exertion  within  t!ie  com- 
pass of  my  very  reduced  force,  which  after  the  several  large  detach- 
ments  sent  to  the  southward,  amounts  to  no  more  than  (33/^  auxiliary 


,»,,. 


M 


1781.] 


[,A    FAVETTI'.  S    VIRGINIA    CAMPAKIN. 


589 


troops.  4527  British  and  90^)  Provinci.ils  ready  for  the  field."  (Rrfor- 
ence  is  made  to  note  iii  end  of  chapter.)  A  letter  of  General  Corn- 
wallis  to  General  Clinton  dated  Ajjril  tenth,  was  noticed  in  chapter 
LXX.  On  the  eleventh  of  April.  General  Clinton  wrote  to  General 
Phillips:  "The  security  of  the  Carolinas  is  of  tin:  i^reatest  moment; 
but  the  best  consequences  maybe  expected  from  an  o])eration  up  the 
Chesapeake.  Let  the  same  experiment  be  tried  there  which  has 
hccn  i^o  7r>!sucr(ssfn/  in  the  south."  (Italics  not  in  the  oriLjinal,  but 
sut^gestive  of  (ieneral  Clinton's  anxiety,  and  doubt  as  to  the  [general 
campaign.)  Ife  continues,  -  "  VirL;inia  has  be:jn  hjoked  upon  as  uni- 
versally hostile,  Marylanc'  less  so,  but  has  not  been  tried ;  but  in 
Pennsylvania,  on  both  sides  of  the  Susipiehann.i,  and  between  the 
Chesapeake  and  Delaware,  the  friends  nf  the  kini;'s  interests  are  said 
to  be  numerrnis.  Support  shoukl  be  rendered  to  them,  and  means 
of  provini^  their  tldelit)-  put  into  their  hands.  If  I-ord  Cornwallis 
can  spare  such  part  of  his  forces  as  to  effect  this  movement,  it  is 
greatl)'  to  be  desired."  It  w  ill  be  seen  that  the  war  was  lakini;  the 
direction  which  General  Ch.ules  Lee  had  recommended  to  the  Brit- 
ish commissioners  at  an  early  period,  and  that  the  views  of  Lord 
Cornwallis,  based  u]jon  the  inadequacy  of  the  arm_\-  to  the  conquest 
of  the  .South,  so  long  as  Virginia  was  unsubdued,  were  beginning  to 
.'iffect  General  Clinton  liimself. 

rile  official  report  of  British  troops  tor  duty,  in  Virgin!, i,  made  up 
on  the  fust  of  Ma\%  177S  gives:  under  .\rnold,  fifteen  hundred  and 
fifty-three  men,  and  under  Phillips,  two  thousand  one  lunulred  and 
sixteen  men.  The  army  of  Lord  Cornwallis  increased  this  t"orce  to  a 
little  over  five  thous.ind  men,  <ui  the  twentieth  of  May.  Colonel 
I'arleton  had  received  some  recruits  and  mounted  the  legion  upon 
blooded  horses,  which  were  ipiite  uniformly  kept  by  gentlemen  in  that 
part  of  Virginia.  Colonel  Hamilton's  North  Carolina  Royalists  also 
joined  the  commatul.  In  tlu;  nie.mtime  General  Phillij)s  had  com- 
pleted the  fortifications  which  .Xrnold  began  at  Portsmouth;  and  on 
the  eighteenth  of  iXpril  he  embarkeil  hi>  troops,  sailed  up  the  James 
Iviver  as  far  as  Burwell's  Ferry',  and  marcheil  to  Williamsburg.  The 
militia  fied.  Colonel  -Simcoe  pursuetl,  and  it  was  proposed  to  occupy 
Vorktown  ;  but  the  plan  was  abandoned  for  w^uit  of  the  neces.sary 
force,  both  to  hold  the  post  and  to  meet  La  P'ayette,  who  was  advanc 
iug  toward  Richmond.  "A  small  party  pas^eil  up  the  Chickahominy 
in  boats,  and  destroyed,"  according  to  Arnold's  oifici.il  report.  "  sev- 
eral armed  ships,  the  State  ship-yards,  warehouses,  etc.,  etc.  "     "  On 


^ 


i   : 


^   » 


I    ' 


|o: 


f]'l:t,; 


i    ti 


M  • '% 


t^'- 


tU 


m 


I  if 


W'^ 


m 


5.J0 


LA    lAVKiri.  >    \1K(.;1.\1A   CAMPAIGN. 


[17^1. 


till'  t\vcnt\'-riuirtli,  tin 


aiiDv  sailci 


1  to  ("itv  1 


y  romt,  and  on  the  t\v(.nl>- 


fiftli  in.irclu  d  I'm    IV-tfi-sbiir'',  ,it    ten   u 


in   tin;  nviniiii;. 
Ml 


he 


map  "  AnioKi  at  rrtcrshur;-;.  (niurals  Mcuncn  and  Mulilciilicr^ 
were  tlKii  at  that  po-t  willi  about  one  ihou-aud  niihtia.  A  i-lroil^; 
position  u  a--  taken  up  on  a  liill  east  of  Urandeai.  on  thi..-  Apponiatox 
River,  uhieh  compelled  tlie  llrili-^h  aiiny  to  ni  ike  a  Ion;,;  detour,  with 
view  oi  intereeptin;^  the  Anierican  retreat.  liaron  Steuben  proni[)tly 
foiled  tnis  intention  by  fallin:^  baek  to  Hrandon.  ,ind  lliially  re-crosscil 
the  river  with  a  lo-^-,  of  but  twenty  in  killed  and  wounded.  A  judi- 
cious di>po.-,iii(in  of  hi-^  artilka)- on  ilaker's  liill  covered  hi->  retreat, 
.Arnold  sa)'s,  "the  eiiem}-  were  soon  ol)liL;ed  to  retire  on  the  bridijc, 
with  the  loss  of  one  liinulred  men  killed  .md  wounded  as  we  h.ivc 
since  been  infornieil  ;  our  loss  was  onl\-  one  killed,  .md  ten  woumled. 
The  eneni)-  took  u[)  the  biidi;e,  which  [)re\entetl  our  pursuing;  thein." 
lie  sa\-s,  "  four  thousand  ho_L;shea(ls  of  tob.icco,  one  ship,  and  a  num- 
ber of  .^m.iU  ves--els  on  the-  stocks  .md  in  the  river  were  de-.tro}'ed." 

On  the  twent>-seventh,  •"  Ueneral  Phillips  niarcheJ  to  CheslcrfieUl 
Court  Mouse,  burned  barracks  for  two  ihous.md  men,  throe  hundred 
b.irrels  of  llour,  etc."  On  the  same  da\-  .\niold  marciied  to  ( )^l)orne's, 
thirteen  miles  from  Richmond,  ,ind  "  destroyed,"  s.iys  L,i  I'axette  in  his 
report  to  (.liaieral  Greene,  "  some  vessels  that  had  been  collected  there." 
These  \essLls  h.ul  been  pre[),ired  ftr.m  expedition  a;,,  \in-l  Portsmouth. 
Gener.il  La  l'",i)-ette  w.is  then  .it  i  Lmover  Court  House.  .\in.  .'Id'-- 
report 


ates    that   "  two    ships,  li\'e    briuMutin 


I'--'. 


scnooner,  lo.ulea  wi 


th  tobacco,  cor 


d.li'e 


IL 


)ur,  etc 


lour  shi 


live  briu.intines,  ,ind   ,1  number  oi   small  vessels  were  >un 


hv^ 

tc,  le 


oons   .11 


'1 
into  our 


one 


id 


hand- 


ik 


and 


)urii 


I.     On    bo.ir( 
d 


)f  th 


e    wiiole 


licet 


(^iionc   ol    which   e.^ciped) 


were  taken  and  destro\"etl  .'l.)oul  two  thousand  hoi's 


heads  of  tobacco. 


w 


ant  of  bi.i.its  ,ind  tlie  wmd   l)Iowin;4  hard   prevented  our  c.ipturin;^ 


aianv  o 


f  tlu 


-icamen,  who   took   to  their  bo. its  and   e-^c.ip 


to  shore. 


On    the    thirtieth    the    Hrilish 


.iriu)'     nari 


liei 


1    to    Manchesti 


.ini 


dcst: 


jy 


tw 


elve    inmdreL 


1   hogsheads  of  t'  >bac 


CO. 


T 


M 


irciui- 


a\-e 


ttt. 


lavm;^  arrived   with   his  army  .it   ku  limond,  opposite   to 


Manchester,  the  d,i\'  bef 


Will 


ore. 


.nil 


1   1 


jeuv. 


rom 


.'ter 


•^uun 


.UK 


iamsl)iir; 


joineil    by   the   militi.i    drove 
the)'  were  spect.itors  ol  the  conila- 


^ration,  without  attempting;  to  molest  u- 


(jcner.il 


La  V 


lyotto  says, 


•'Our  rei;ular  force  consisted  of  nine  lumdreil  men,  r.mk  and  file; 
that  of  the  enemy  of  twenty-three  hundred  at  the  lowest  estim.ite. 
Tlic  command  of  the  w.iter,  and  such  a  superiority  of  re;,;ukir  troop.s 
{^avc  them  possession  of  our  shore.      There  w.is  no  crossiiiL;  for  us  but 


IT'^i. 


I. A  iwi': 


S    VlkClNIA    CAMI'.MCV. 


591 


under  a  circuit  of  fii't 


ecu  mil 


md  from  ti 


U'  inrii)   r  and  m/c  oi  Ihcir 


JO,  11 


liicir  pa-Js.iLjc  over   tli 


C    f[VC 


r  uMs   si\  tiiujs  (line! 


'Y  llian  our- 


McliuMnd  bciiiLr  ih-ii-  main  ohject,  1  dcti.T 


mined  to  difcnd  this  cipi- 
mtity  o(   |>ul)Iic  stores   and    tol)acc  >  was    contained." 


t,n,  wlii'ri"   a   ou 


C\t    this  time'  (icnerals  Steuben  an 


i  M 


ulilenher''  were 


furti 


icr  up  thi 


nver,  not  ha\  iii'j;  ellect^d 


a  crossii)'. 


Six  liundred   men   \-entured 


on   tin- 


^ule 


ilrai^oons   ol 


l)ut    were    timel) 
M, 


reealle 


.mci 


henu 


eliai'; 


tn- 


a  tew 


iior   .vel-,un, 


tlew    into   the    boats    witli    i)reci|)itation 


'1  he    enein\'    ha\-o    lost   some    men, 


killed,    [irise^iicr- 


and    deserter'^. 


Since'  the  Ihilisli   arin\'  landed   ,it  ('it\-  I'oiiit 


I  -ioiue' 


11 . 


>ur   t;xcei 


the    t'ourt    ll( 


ibl 


ou>ei   no    public    propert}-   has    been    destroyei 


f. 


>re';om'  is  from  a  letter  ;iddie- 


d  to  ( 


jeiU'iM 


(.r 


eene, 


on 


munk 
(  )n  tlu 


Ki\er 


M 


IV 


I -Si, 


tirs 


t  (jf  M.iv  tiic  Briti-li  t 


roops   marched 


irked   on   the    second,  reached    \\'esto\-er  on   the 


to  (  )->i 

tl 


)orne 


lie 


cmio 


e  Hi- 


ll ril 


and   oil    the 


u.'Ventli,    when    near 


•'    I-laiid,    recei\'ed    iii-U ructions    from    Lord 


Conn*- 
ninth. 


uli-.  to  meet    him  .it 


■tersljun 


,Sever,il 


iiiieiicm    ollicer 


S     We'I 


md  rciched  that  pi, ice  mi  the 
e    c.iptured    b)'    their    sudden 


return. 


.1/, 

Head 


(>:\ii/tiit.<    i> 


f  I.n    /■ 


IVittC. 


[t    1 


i;i.- 


jL-eii    se 


en   that   Iv. 


re.iclieil 


:ik 


m  the  tiiird  o! 


M 


ircii. 


r 


le 


or  the  sixtii. 


Xo  oner,ition   of  the  war   more 


nortjst  c.ilculation  w.i- 
.'arl\-  demoiistr.ite- 


the  wilue  ot  ;^ood  lo  ■  ist ics,  ,iiid  the  ficts  demand  notice  in  connection 


with    thi- 


\' 


ir'ini.i  c.impai'ni. 


M 


esseiv'^ers   were   sent    111   .id\',uiCv 


.iroiise 


til','  ])eople,  and  the  citizen^  of  Xew  Jersey  cheerfully  aideti  the 


[jfogress  ol  lii^  .irmy, 


ncss  o 

iii'j"t(Mi, 


N(Jt 
f  t 


w  iih-t,indiiv'-   the   de'pth   of  the  mud   ,ind  the  extreme  bad- 


le  ro.ids,  tins   ni,irch. 


a\'s 


r.i  ]•" 


aw'tte,    writinLT 


t.)  W 


i-n- 


M, 


ircli    _M 


ir.M, 


hicli  I  cill    raj.)id,    (,is    for   ex,im[)lc   they 


C'lme  in  two  days  tVoni  Morri--to'.\  n  to  Princeton  1  lias  been  perf)rmeil 
with   such  .irdor    and  ,il.iciit\-,  that    a;4reeab!y  to  the    report,  only  two 


men  h,i\-e    been  lelt    be 


hind 


and 


\-ct    these  two    men  li.U'e  eiiib.uked 


;it 


le'iitoii    With    some   rem.un- 


.-i.-:>     .-1 


i''e. 


.\t 


.•\'er\"    place   'A'lierc 


the   detachment   h.ive    h,ilte( 


tl 


lev  li.ive   found  covering'   and   wooc 


read)-  for  tliem,  ,ind  there  li.is  not  been  the  least  conrpkiint  111, ide  to 
me  b)-  the  inh.ibitaiits.  I'A'ery  third  d.i)-  they  h.ive  dr.iwii  their  pro- 
vi>ion-';  the  clothiiiL;'  li,is  also  been  distributed,  and  h.iviiv.;'  embarked 
\estertl.iy  at 'I'reiiton,  thev  p.issed  this  city  ( l'liiladel[)hi.i>   about  two 


o  clock   with   a   wind   which  was   cxtremcK-   lavoiMble. 


Th 


e   .irtillerv 


consisted    of  one   J4,   six     l8s,  two    brass    us,   one    ci^^ht-incii  how- 


592 


I,A    FAVKTIi;  S    VIRGINIA    CAMI'AICV. 


[17S1. 


i:  f 


1:1 1 


iki 


If 


rp 


t/cr,  two  ciujlit-iiich  mortars,  in  all.  luflvc  lira  .y  pieces ;  four  six- 
pounders,  and  two  small  huwitzers.  witli  a  suflicii-nt  (jnantity  of  .im- 
munition  will  be  at  tin-  he, id  of  the  IClk  this  day  and  to-mnrrow.  so 
that  by  the  4th  I  hojie  we  shall  be  \\\n\y  to  sail.  A  ([uantity  of 
medicines  and  instruments,  and  fifteen  Inindred  pairs  of  shoes  will  be 
at  the  he, id  of  i'.lk  before  we  emb.irk."  "  1  ,un  also  as-,ured  that  we 
will  have  a  sufficient  ([iKintit}'  of  bo,its  to  land  the  ilet.ichment,  .md 
two  he,iv\-  ones  will  be  .added  for  the  artillery',  .md  souie  of  the 
priv. lie  armed  vessels  in  the  b,iy  have  been  ordered  to  the  he. id  oftiie 
IClk.  Two  dispatcli  l)o.its  are  tlieri',  and  four  more  h,ive  i)een  .isked 
for.  As  ,1  farther  security  to  our  sulisistence,  I  h.ive  i^ot  the  Minis- 
ter's permission  to  dispose  of  the  I'nnch  flour  and  s.ilt  nuMt  alon;^ 
the  ba_\'  in  case  of  necessity."  I'he  troops  were  promi)tly  forw.irded 
to  Ann.ipolis;  .md  .it  Ii.iltimor,'.  bc'sides  .m  .idv.ince  by  tlu-  merch.ints 
of  two  thousand  i;uine,is.  the  l,ulii,'s  unilertook  tlu'  woik  of  furnishinL; 
his  conim.md  with  suitable  ciothin;_j  for  summer  we.ir.  The  disap- 
pointments incident  to  ihe  failure  of  the  l<"rench  n.ival  lorci.'s  to  con- 
voy and  cover  his  division  compelled  his  return  to  t  he  I'Llk,  .md  by 
the  time  the  order  came  to  move  to  the  extreme  south,  the  dissitis- 
f.iction  of  his  troops  .ihe.idy  .id\'erteil  to  hid  t.iken  pi. ice,  .md  h.id 
been  subst.inti.illy  settle'd.  I  Ic  h.ul  .also  armeil  sewr.il  vessels,  .md 
proposed  to  make  .1  miui.iture  fleet  for  his  own  convoy,  but  "  some 
vessels  were  run  off  le  avoid  him."  .md  tlu-  .idventure  a;.^,iinst  Ports- 
mouth to  capture  /Xrnold  came  to  .an  end.  He  "  visiteil  the  Hermi- 
one  frii^ate,  however,  ami  obt.iincd  a  pled.;e  from  .M.  Delut  inch,  that 
on  his  return  to  Ni-wpor..  M.  Destouches  would  make  ,ui  offer  of  the 
shi[)  L' I'.i'cillc  .md  the  four  frii^Mtes,  to  convoy  twi'Ive  inindred  men 
to  an_\-  i).ut  of  the  continent  wiiich  W.ishiiv^ton  ini^^ht  tiiiuk  |)roper." 
In  this  connection  he  .adds,  '•  These  ships  are  too  stront^  to  be  .ifr.iid 
of  fri^^.ites,  and  too  f.ist  to  be  in  the  least  concerned  by  the  fear  of  a 
squadron." 

The  pl.m  of  L.i  ]'".i\ctte  after  the  f.iilure  of  the  desii;!!  upon  Ports- 
mouth w.is,  "to  take  these  last  vessels  .and  i{o  by  sea  to  Wilmini^ton 
or  (jeorL,^eto\\  II,  and  t.ike  Cornw.illis  in  his  re.ir,  or  in  the  nei;^hborhood 
of  Gener.il  tiieene."  The  i)l.m  w.is  eminently  practicable  and  wise. 
La  Fayette  also  confideiitiall)' advised  (jeneral  Washinijton  that  "two 
millions  and  a  half  had  been  i,nven  to  l""raifl<lin,"  addiiv^,  "  .Marcpiis  do 
'Castries  and  Count  de  Veryennes  .are  tr\-inL;  to  obtain  a  sum  more 
adequate  to  our  w.ants  ;  this,  however,  the  minister  of  finance  luia 
requested  mc  not  to  mention,  as  it  was  as  yet  an   uncertainty,  and 


178. .1 


I. A    r.Wt   iri,  S    VIkOINIA    CASII'MiiV. 


593 


;  1 


:'M 


WDuld  pciliaps  <^\vo  ill-Ljioundcd  lidpts"  dc^tnutivt"  of  tlu'  intcrii.il 
(•rr( nt-^  wi,"  oiif^lit  ti)  make."  ( )n  the  lliiitiH-nth  (it  ;\pril,  Iia\int,r  ,■(■. 
CL-ivcd  iintiri'  from  ( IriUTal  (inciic  that  "lie  rx[)rclcd  tliat  d  irnwallis 
wiiiild  fall  hark  \.i>  Wilmiili^tun,  ,ind  that  liis  own  project  was  to  cany 
the  war  into  Soiitli  Carolina."  l,a  l",i}'i. ttc  reviewed  the  suL^t^cstioii 
tliat  a  corps  of  ii'.dit  i  ilantry  1)l'  .niharkcil  at  Philadelphia,  on  hoard 
of  a  li;^ht  sijuadron,  which  nii;^ht  have  hecn  upon  the  seat  of  war  in  a 
very  short  passaj^o."  »  'n  the  twenty-t.ij^htli  of  April,  hi'  wrote  from 
1  l.inover  ( "ourt  llouse  to  (lenenil  (ireene:  "Ilavin;^  received  inteU 
li;_;eiice  that  (ieiieral  I'hillip^'  aiiny  wei'e  preparing;'  for  offensive  opera- 
tions, I  left  at  Haltiniore  everj'thin;^  that  would  impede  our  march- 
to  follow  us  uiuler  a  proper  escort,  and  with  al)(jut  a  tiiousand  men, 
officers  included,  hastened  toward  Richmond,  two  hundred  miles, 
wliich  I  apprehended  would  he  a  princi[)al  oljject  uith  the  eueni)'." 
Thi-^  outline  hiiiv^s  l<,i  h'ax'ette  up  to  the  d.ite  when  in:  reported  his 
arrival  near  i\ichniond  and  the  n-treat  of  (lenerals  I'hillips  and 
Arnold  tin-  <\dv  followinu'. 


a\  I 


tte  had  marched  with   'n-eat  celeritv,  leavin'_{  his 


artil 


■ry 


hehind,  whiili  he  said  "  mii^ht  a])])ear  a  strani^e  wliim  ;   hut   it  sa\'ed 


K'.chmoiKl 


.uu!   add 


deneral 


hilhp 


KUl 


Mven    tile    siunal 


fe 


attack   wiien    he    learned   o 


)f   his  (l.a    I'' 


ixette  s)   unexi)ecled   arrival.' 


A  chain  of  expresses  was  at  once  e>tahli>hed  to  Point  Comfort.  A 
detachment  was  sent  to  \\  illiansshurL;'  to  annoy  the  enemy,  and  if 
])ossible  prevent  th 


ir  estahhshiiiL^r  .i  permanent  ])o 


^t.      On  tl 


le  i 


i-hth 


M 


IV  he  writes : 


There  is  no  rtLihtini"  here  unless  von  have  a  naval 


iperiority,  or  an  army  moimted  on  race  hors 


PhiU 


ips'  plan  against 


KlClll 


nond   lias   hcen   defe.ited.      lit 


was 


iruin'f  toward    Portsmouth 


/iii: 


It  ani)e,ir- 


lavt;  husiness  to  tr.msact  with  t 


wo   armies, 


aiK 


1   tl 


lis 


is  rather  too  much."      l.a  P"<i\e'tte   had  just   leariUHl   of  the  marc 

to  re.ich 


1    ol 


I  ,ord  Coriuvallis  nort 


iward 


and  w.is  makiiiLr  an  eltor' 


II 


iii- 


fa.\  ,uid  cut  him 


([   fi 


on\  union  \\\ 


th  P 


:lllllI)S. 


r 


le  sudden    return  o 


f 


'ieneral  i'hillips  to  liiandon  on  the  eiL;htli,  defeated  that  eiiteri)rise  ; 
but  did  not  divert  him  from  his  recoL^nition  of  the  claims  ot  General 
Greene  to  be  supported,  lie  sa\s,  "  I'.ach  of  these  armies  is  more 
th.in  double  the  superior  of  me.  We  have  no  boats,  (cw  militia,  and 
less  ;nins.  I  will  tr\-  to  do  f.ir  the  best.  Notliin;^  can  attract  my 
si^dit  from  the  supplies  and  reintorcements  tiestined  to  General 
Greene's  army.  While  I  am  goini,^  (^marching)  to  get  beaten  by 
both  armies  (Phillips'  and  Cornwallis")  or  each  of  them  separately, 
the  Baron  remains  at  Richmond,  where  he  hurries  the  collection 
38 


Hl'"'*^..'!  ■■ 


•  v 


r  ) 


liii  ^  ■ 


504 


l.A    I'.W  I'l'li;  S    VIKilIMA    CWll'AKIV. 


'7'" 


;if  recruits  and  cvn)-  ■itlur  rrtiuisitc.  I  \\,iw  t'.irlMildrn  cvcrv'  ili'p.irt- 
iiirnt  ti)  •^\\c  iiii:  .invtliiiv.;  tli.it  may  t)c  thmh^lit  ii-^t  ful  to  (icinTal 
(iiwiu-,  .111(1  ■-litPuKl  a  l)attlc  \)c  (.'Xpi'i.  trd  lan  rv<nt  uln\ii  I  uiM  try 
to  ]<cc[)  c)||",i  no  loiisidiiation  will  iinwiit  our  Mndiii;;  to  (aroliii.i 
t'iL,dit  luiiuhvil  rill  uits.  who  1  Iiii|n-  niav  hi  i'(iuiiii)cd  in  a  fort  nij^lit. 
W'h'-ii  (joncral  (inrm-  hcconu^  cijual  to  offi-ndvc  o|Krations,  this 
(|uartrr  will  l)c  ii  lifwd.  I  Iia\r  writtni  to  W  a\  iir  to  jia'-tm  iiis 
inari  li  ;  hut  unK'>-^  I  am  \rvy  hard  pu^hrd,  -hall  r(.M|uc>t  him  to  pro. 
iTcd  to  till'  suuthuard.  (icmral  (ircciu'  \\a^  on  ihr  twciitN'-^iNlli 
before  L'anick'n,  l)ut  did  not  think  hini'-rir  ciiual  to  the  stonniiv^^  the 
works."  (K'niTal  \\'a-hin;j,ton  thus  n'phcd  :  "  N'our  dctiaaiiination  to 
avoid  .III  eir.;a;^'rnu'nt  with  vour  prrsiait  foi\c,  i-  ctTtainlx'  iiidicioiis.  1 
hope  the  I'enn-ylwmians  h.ive  ht'.Min  tlnir  ni.ireh  hetoic  thi-. 
(ieneral  \\'a\ne  has  Wc-ii  pressed  i)oth  hy  ('on;_;r('ss  and  th'/  I'loard  of 
War  to  ir.ake  as  nuK  h  expedition  a--  po^-ihle,  and  cxtraordiihnA' 
po\ver;>  ,ire  ;^i\i.'n  him  to  inahli-  him  to  |)roi.aire  pro\  i-^ioiis." 

On  the  eii^liteiaith  of  May  ordrrs  wire  leicixa'd  from  ( ieiier.il 
dreene.  (Inwlino;  ( ieneral  I  .a  faeette  to  takr  eomm.nid  in  N'iiLUuia 
and  t(>  suid  all  reports  to  the  C'oniniaiider-m-eliief  It  i.->  worilu'  of 
record,  that  while  (ieneral  (ireene  was  almost  the  onl)-  one  of  the' 
general  olficer--  ot  \~'<>,  \^'ho  served  actively  throu-h  the  \\,ir,  under 
the  direct  order>  ot  the  ('omniaiideran-chie'f,  both  of  them,  .dd^e,  aiul 
without  di- ippomtmeiit  reposetl  entire  coulldciice  in  (leiier.il  1  .a  l''a\-- 
ette.  rile  tore;M)inL;  extracts  from  his  pa[)ers,  indie. ite  the  oeca-^ioii 
for  that  coiiihlence. 

When  I. a  l".i\-ette  assumed  comic. iiid.  M.i_\  ei^^hteeiilh,  he  "  took 
a  position,  between  the  r.imunky  .md  (  hickahominy  Rivers,  which 
ecpi.ill)-  t.ivired  Kicdinioiid  and  otlur  inten-stiii^  points  of  the  State. 
;ind  sent  ( ieneral  Wdsoii  with  iniliti.i  toward  Willi. un-lnuL;." 

Uijon  the  return  of  (ietier.il  I'hillips  to  Peiershur-.  M,i\-  niiuli,  he 
took  ])o.,itioii  .it  Wilton,  ten  miles  below  Ivieiiniond.  I'p.ai  ,io[)lic.i- 
tion  Irom  North  (".irolina  for  aniniunition.  ( ieiu  r.il  Muhlenberg  wan 
.sent  with  fivv  hundred  meii,  to  tscort  tweiit)-  thou-.ind  c.irti  idi^es  over 
the  Ajiponiatox  :  and  to  di\ert  the  eiieni)  '>  .attention,  Colonel  ( iim.it, 
with  his  battalion  .and  lour  pieces  of  .irtiilery,  .is^unied  their  position 
so  th.it  the  absence  of  the  troops  was  not  dii-eovered.  I'o  Colonel 
Haniilloii  he  wr.'te,  .iii  the  tweiit) -third,  tiius  laconic, ill\' :  "both 
armies  h.i\e  tornied  their  junc"  ion.  Their  infintr\-  is  ne.ir  live  to  (jiie, 
their  c.u-.ilryteii  to  one.  We  h.ive  no  continent. ils.  Is  it  not  strair^e 
that   General    Wayne's    detachment  "  (the    seven  liundred   rennsvl- 


17"! 


IN    lAVI   in:  S  VIRGINIA    CAMPAIGN. 


v.ini.iiim  "  call   not    l)c   licinl  dI 


The 


V  air    to   'J 


n   to   (■ 


irniin.i 


595 


hut 


shniilil    1    li.ivc  tlu'ii)  Imt  ,1   It  u  (I,i_\ -,    I   am   at    lil)cit_\-  to  kci])   thcin. 
'I'liis  ixiiiiissioii    I    will    ini|)ii)\c,  so    tar  , is   to    nt'fivi'  one  Mow  ;   that 


t) 


)ciiiti  i)iat,  I  ni,i\'  l)f  l)i'at  with  ^mhic  (Iciciua' 


111'  commaiii 


1  of  t 


ic 


watirs.  thi"  MUX  iioiit\'  iii   casaliA-  ami  tin 


I'.it  ilisproportioii  of  our 
f'oivc  i^.ivi'  the  riKiu)'  sucli  ail\ ant.ii^cs  that  I  liiirst  not  vi'iitiiii'  out 
and  listrn  to  my  foiulnL-ss  for  rntrrpfisr  ;  to  sprak  tiiith,  I  was  afr.iiil 
of  m_\>ill,  as  mm  ii  a-.  o|  thr  ciirmy.      Imh  piiiilrnn    li.is  irmlrriii  inc 


till.'  mofi'   iMUtioiis,  as 


>iiow    iiu'  own  vainith;   hut   if  tin-  l'cniH\ 


1- 


v.miaiis  iduic,  I. old  ("ornwallis  shall  pa\'  sonu'thin;^  tor  his  \ii.  t<ir\'.' 


!• 


roll 


1   this  timi-,   foi  ward,  thr  operations  of  thf  two  .iriiiics  were 


charai.  til  i/rd   !))■  <:onst.inl    uti\it_\',   f.ich  o'lkcr  sustainiu;^   iiis  rcpu- 
t.ition  ;  and  tlir  ui'irisonu-   m.iri.'liin's  and   counlrrinaichinirs  I'lulcd 


.is  un 


tort  uiMtolv  for   I. Old    ( 


oinw 


allis,  as  did   his  pursuit   of  General 


irci'iic,  w  itlioiit  di'trai  till!'  from 


ds 


.1- 


a   solilK'r. 


I  III   the  t\\  (•nt\--si.\tl 


>f    M 


,i\' 


arii\aloi  riMnlon.i-incnts  under  ( inu'ral  I  .cslir,  thi-;  toi\(    l)ciiv^  i  arri< 


i.fuil   (  ornwallis   ai  know  i('d;_jrd   the 

d 


mti 


-ft 


"icial  ri'turns,  as  two  thousand  two    hundred  .mil  sivcntv-ei;^ht 


nun.  am 


1  inforni(i.l    (iiiinal    (liiiton.  that  in 


sjiould  iirori'i'i 


to  di- 


a  iMVette 


lUi    l\  ii-limond. 


SC'Coll! 


letter,  as  follow ^ 


I 


<  )u   the  .-^ame   il.w  he   wrote   a 


n  of  HrJLra- 


lu.'i-veneral 


iriiold,   to    l;o 
dies  1 


li.ive   i.'ons(  iited  to  the  leque 
to   Ne\v'    NDrk 


he   conceives   that    \'our 


e.vceiiency   wishes  him   to  attend  )'ou,  and    Ins   preseiil   iiidi-'po^ilioii 


renders  iiini  uneijual  to  the  fali;_;ue  of  servic 


>f 


II 


e  wu 


re pre sen 


t  tl 


le 


horrid  enormities   wliich    .ire   committed  l)\-  our   priv.ileers   in  Chesa 


)eake  l).i\' 


.im 


I   I 


must   join  my  earnest  wish  that  some  remedy  may 


)c  applie 


d  ti 


in   e\il   which  IS  so  very  prejudici.il   to  hi- 


M 


service 


It  will  he  noticed  that  the  o]-)crations  of  Arnold  wli 


lie   m 


V 


ijesty 


ir-'iiiM, 


as    elsewlu're,    consists 


collision   v.i 


th  A 


mericans  m   force 


)f   r.iit 
fn 


,s  n[)on    proijerty,   and    iiu'ojveil    no 


[t   was  known   to    (ieneral 


ton    .nil 


pu 


i)Iicl\',    tli.it    W'ashini/ton's    instructions    to 


La    F 


Clin- 
:ivette 


expressly  forhade  any  terms  with  Arnold  which  should  exempt  him 
from  punishment  for  tlesertion  .iiid  treason,  .\n.\iet_\'  fov  the  safety 
of  Arnokl  is  referred  to  !)y  (ieneral  Clinto,i  in  sever. il  disp.Uches,  hut 


on 


Al 


)ril 


tith  he  apoIoL^elic.ilIy  explained   tli.it  the  words  usei 


i  d 


urmg 


the   pendeiic}'   of  the   French    attack 


me.in 


t   "  the    security  oi  him, 


(Arnold)  the  troops  under  his  orders  and  the  posts  on  the  Flizabeth 
river,  as   the   principal  objects   of  your  (Phillips')  cxiiedition,  ami   )/o 


more  than  relieving  them  of  ihcir  supposed  danger. 


This  dispatch 


* 

I 

!■ 

l 

m 

f 

-  ; 

1 

■  I 


I  ' 


■ 


M 


ji!ii.3jfM 


1        'iH    ■ ! 


if 


;; 


t 


I  ;■  ,   t 

;"0 


(J  I 


ii;.! 


'!!■ 


\   :! 


N"i 


596 


I. A    lAVi:i  I'K'S    V11;(,I\IA    (  AMI'AKA". 


[I7SI. 


was  oprtiv'd  I)y  I.oril  ('ornw.illis  after  the  dr. itli  of  ricticr.il  I'liillips. 
A  Ic'ttiT  of  MarJi  twrilty-fouiUl  closL-tl  lluis:  "1'.  S.  l'ra>'  stiul 
Kii!4ailicr-;^iiu'ral  Arnold  here  hy  llio  first  oi)|)ort unity,  if  )-oii  slioiild 
not  liavi"  p.irticular  ociMsjon  for  his  siTvici's."  I'liis  was  rcci'ixL'd  by 
l<ord  ( 'oiiiumIIIs  May  twiiitirtli.  Tlir  position  of  ('iciu'rals  I'liillips 
and  Arnold,  ii:  view  of  tin-  rilations  of  llu'  two  ofJKirs  durin;j;  tlu' 
.S,irato;_;.i  campai;^ti,  had  hren  --iicli  .is  foi  h.idi-  />7(7/(A7/// ,•  i)ut  the 
oblij^.itiiiii  of  (itiiiral  (linlon  to  protri.t  Arnold  u.is  pcn-mptory. 

Upon  thv-  ilcath  of  i'liillips,  Arnold  wrote  to  (inifral  La  ['"ayrttc, 
who  declined  personal  correspondeiu'.  with  him.  .\rnold  thre.itined 
to  send  his  prisoners  of  w.ir  to  the  \\\st  Indies,  hut  ,is  .ilre.uly  indi- 
c.ited,  liis  retirement  to  Wnv  Voik  followed  the  arriv.d  of  (iener.d 
(!ornw,illis. 

On  the  thirt\'-first  of  M.iy.  ("leneral  \\'ashiiv_;ton  wrote  to  I,,i 
I""a\ette',  "  Vour  conduct  upon  every  occ.ision  meets  iny  approh.ilion, 
but  ill  none  more  tli.m  in  your  refusiiv^to  hold  a  corres[)i>'-  'ence  with 
Arnold." 

It  appears  th.it  ,in  .attempt  h.id  been  rn.uW  .il  fuNt  to  conce.il  fiom 
La  I'ayettethe  f  k  t  of  ( ieiier.il  rhilli[)s'  dece.ise ;  .iiid  some  direct  cor- 
respondence of  .Arnukl  ,\ith  London  olTici.ils  h.ul  disturbed  ( leiier.d 
Clinton.  When  (icneral  Coriuv.illis  re.iched  I'etersburi^,  he  found 
that  (leiUMcd  Clinton  h.id  conceived  pl.ms  for  a  broader  raiv^e  of 
oper.itions  than  the  mere  contpiest  of  VirL;ini.i,  and  tiius  wrote  :  "  In 
refjard  to  taking;  possesMion  ot  riiil.ideljjhi.i.  (prop  ised  by  (leneral 
Clinton)  by  an  incursion  (even  il  pr.ictic.ible)  wi'.hoiii  ,iu  intention  of 
keepin;^^  or  burnin.;  it,  (neither  of  which  .i|)pe.ir  to  be  pr.icticablej  I 
should  apprehend  it  would  du  more  h.irm  than  t,a)od  to  the  c.iuse  of 
Britain.  If  offensive  war  is  inteii,led.  X'ir^qiiia  .ip[)e.irs  to  me  to  be 
the  only  province  in  which  tliere  is  a  stake,  liut  to  reduce  this  pro- 
vince and  keep  p.osscssion  of  the  countr) ,  a  considerable  army  would 
be  necessary,  lor  with  a  sm  dl  lorce,  the  business  woukl  probably  ter- 
minate unfavorably,  thou;_,di  the  bet,Mnnin;4  ini|;lit  be  successful.  /// 
casi  il  is  iho!ii;;/it  cxf^rduiit  and  a  proj^cr  ariny  for  the  attiiiipt  can 
be  found,  I  hope  your  /■'.xcil/ciicy  ivill  do  iih  tlir  jiistioc  to  bclicvr 
that  I  luit/nr  wis//  nor  expect  to  lin^'c  the  eoinnuiiid  of  it,  lea-oiiii:;  you 
at  AVrt'  ]'ori'  on  the  difcnsivc.  Such  sentiments  are  S(>  fir  from  mv 
heart  that  I  can  ivith  great  truth  assure  you  that  feic  things  couhi 
give  vie  greater  pleasure  titan  I'etng  relieved  hv  your  presence  from  a 
stti  it  ion  of  so  much  anxiety  and  responsibility." 

(Italics  not  in  orii^inal  manuscript,  but  so  placed  in  justice  to  Lord 


'r'v 


r   I 


ullips. 
sriul 
iiuuld 

•.1  bv 


GaUJCiM^Jh 


\swr% 


'   '       ■'  — .-■-■-.       .      ^  ■ 

\  ^ 


to       ^    '  fort-  '  ..■■'Mh/Mfiivii'K/ 


K^.'/x"-""""'^'-^/^.^^^^    .»V 


-'•v   '*"''W»^.   > 


'C  ,V///^VA'      '^^ 


(bmjtUeol ^  Orann  fy  tU  (U/rinifi»tiE 


•V 


t 


V 


if  1 


1/81.1 


LA   FAYETTE  S  VIRGINIA   CAMPAIGX. 


597 


Coriiwallis,  as  indicating  an  error  on  tlie  part  of  General  Clinton,  who 
afterwards  declared  that  "  Lord  Cornwallis  tried  to  t/tt/ic  him  into  a 
resignation  of  the  general  command.") 

Upon  the  departure  of  Arnold  the  Virginia  campaign  became  the 
theatre  of  more  active  operations  between  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
and  Earl  Cornwai  is. 


ti  i 


I  « 


: 

\ 

t 

i 

.1 

i 
1 

t                  [ 

i:  y  1  ; 

|1 

i       1 

i 

1 

ciiArri'K  Lxxiri. 


'ii 


,  >  M 


!■  i  r 


i^ 


Si-;1 


■,  M 


I.A    [   \V1    in;  AN!)  (  (ik.WVAI.I.IS  IN   VIRfllNIA. 

EAKl.  (  oKXWAl.I.IS,  .still  f.i!lli<r  ivitifMacl  fiMin  Xrvv  N'ork, 
comm.-mdcd  srvm  tli<iii -.and  (Ttlcicnt  IliitiAli  tr'H,|H,  .tml  I)C';.iii 
lii-.  cainpai;^!!  in  \'ir;j,inia  witli  lici])!-  and  \'i;;nr.  1  Ir  ('inliolK-d  tin.' 
\\al(i--c()iii'.scs  and  inlets  \vhi(  li  <'\|)M-,rd  \'ii;.;inia  to  i:aval  attack',  and 
his  a<lv('isai_\-  la_\-  within  a  day's  man  h,  with  an  ariTi\'  dI  Ics-^  than 
t  \vciit\'-ii;_;Iit  hnndicd  inlantr}',  iiulmlin;.;  iniliti.i,  and  witii  Irs-,  tli.m 
one  Iiniidfcd  disciplinrd  civalry.  The  topoi.jraphiial  li-atuir^  of  tlu; 
country  pccnliarly  cnihana'-^ed  tin;  opnations  ot  the  Atnerie.m  troops 
as  well  as  hindered  th.'  concent r.itioii  of  State  militia.  Man)-  navi- 
Ljahle  rivers  ran  -lO  nearl\'  jiarallel  that  ,i  small  naval  force  coukl  ([uit'kly 
slntt  an  assailin;^  arm)-  from  section  to  sect  ion,  and  the  locil  militia 
\slierever  concentrated,  conk!  not  he  transferred  with  e(pi,il  celerity 
t(;  re-:^t  ii'cnr--ions  or  meet  or:.;ani/.e(l  troops. 

(^jiMief.d  ("ornw.illis  apj)reciati-(l  his  ])o-,ition,  and  endeavored  to  so 
avail  himself  of  his  sui^rior  force,  as  to  strike  other  or^^anized  forces 
at  advanta;.;e,  ,iiid  at  the  s.inie  time  annihilate  depots  and  prevent 
tin:  accumul.it  ion  of  suj)plies,  which  were  vital  to  <  lener.d  (irec.'ue's 
arm_\-  at  the  Miuth.  ,is  well  as  to  successful  operations  ai^aiilst  the 
liriti^h  .nm\-  in  \'ii;.Mni.i  itself.  'I'hc  State  auth(jrities  were  not  want- 
in;,;  in  \i;^or,  hut  the  |)res-.urc  was  as  universal  as  the  exposure. 

The  time  was  ,it  hand  when  the  w.ir  determined  towaid  one  field 
of  opeiations,  and  tliat  was  occupied  by  I  ,a  I'aj'ette  and  Cornwallis. 
A  liritish  asceudenc)- there  would  make  tin;  severance  of  the  south 
from  the  north  tomplete;  and  would  le,i\e  to  (jeneial  (irc'cne  a  barren 
triumph  in  the  (,'arolinas.  'l"h(j  lime  was  at  ii.ind  when  one  exhaustive 
effort  was  called  for  on  the  |)art  of  the  American  Cotv^rc'ss  atid  tht- 
Commander-in-chief  of  its  armies.  Ihe  statesmen  of  Vir_L,nni;i  realized 
the  einer^atic)',  and  all  alike  looked  to  W'ashiii'^ton  for  relief;  but 
while  RicharcJ  llenrv  Lee  and  (jtln  r  e.irnest    men   uri/ed   that   dicta- 


^^  .rk, 

l)i';,;.in 
■,1  thr 
k,  aiul 
-.  llian 
->  til. Ill 
i)f  the 
truDiis 


V  iiavi- 


|UK:kl\' 

iniliti.i 

:clcril\' 


!  t 


(!  to  so 


I  llTl'S 


prevent 
irci'iic's 
list  tlu: 
)t  w.int- 


lu:    lirKi 


rnuallis. 
ic  soiitli 
a  l)arrL-n 
liaustivc 


•md  the 

rcaliziil 

icf;    but 

it  dicta- 


IT"! 


I. A    I.Wl.iri;    AND    COKWVAI.I.Is    I\    X'lCCIMA. 


3'i(^ 


toiiil  powers  slioiild  be  ;.mmii1i(1  to  the    (/ornniaiider-in-(  liief,  as  after 
the    b.iltle   of  '1  icntoii.  ('loveriior   Jefferson  ami  aiiolli<'r  i  lass,  e(|iiall/ 


e.iriii^l,    deprei'ati'd    ,in\'  eonei 


■ntration    of  aiithorit 


V  wnu  n    we)uiil   as- 


^inula 


le    tl 


11'    rulinv    ( 


Iciii'i.t    to    tile   I'oyal    pr<ro'.'ativi'    of    i 


.iiropean 


princes.      ,M1  elas^c-.   urL;ed    \\'a-liiiv.;lon    to    animate'  tlu:    stni '_;•_', !<■   l)V 
his    pers<inal    ])re-encc.       ('on;.;re-^s    was    di-,tituti-    of    aiilhoiit_\-    and 


resources  equal   to  tlu:    issue;    but    when    t  li.it    i-,Mi' 


fnial! 


\'    ripi  iu.:(l 


Washiiuj.ton  seized  the  o])porlunity  and  ai  liie-v<Ml  its  inasfer}'. 

(ieneral  lii^tor)'  is  full  of  llu-  ci\,il  nUMsiire's.  so  feeble  and  uncer- 
tain, u'iiich  urou;.;ht  in  \ain  for  an  ad'i|uate  ineria-,e'  of  the  ariii)-; 
and  the'  louv  \v,n'  w.is  iia^teniu'/  to  its  e'lul,  ihroiedi  the  earnest  alliance 


,f    ]■ 


iMUce   aiul    the  \\ise  iiiili1ar\'  conduct  of  W'.ediin'/ton    on  the-  one 


hand,   and   .i   in.uvejlous  uaiit   of  eoncentrated  <  ffort   on  the   part   uf 
(ireat  Hrit.iiii. 

\\'asliin;_;ton  knew  how  and  when    to    di-,re;,;,ird    all   e\'])osed  locali- 
tit:--  and  seizt.'   deterniinin;.;  o|)porl  unit}'  in  \ie\\'   of  the  whole   theatre 


i{  war.     Clinton    failed    oji    the    other    hand,   in    strate','\- 


wnue    SI 


If- 


po-'scssecl   and    l)iM\e   iii 


batt 


le,    and    was   con 


fu-ed    bv   tlu:   extent   of 


operations  re(|uirin'.;"  attent  ion.       The    Ihiti-^h   ('abinet   did    luit  apjire- 
(.iate   the  real    daiu/er  s'i'liieh    threatened    the  ro\'al  ciuse  in  .Anu'iica 


.f  tl 


and  til.-  protet'tion  ot    their   niinierous   colo;iies  as  well  a    the  \nulica- 
tioii  of  their  honor  at  -ea,  had  ln'Coiiu    matters  of  suiurior  nionu-nt. 


1  .a  I- 


i\'ette  and  ( 'ornwalli-.  reali/.i 


d  tl 


)<■  niaenit ude  ,,(  the  eainiiai'/ti 


wliu  h  t  lie\-  liad  undertaken 


and  its  details   redound    to   their   Imnor. 


ndiii''  that   lu:   (ould    not    hold    Kiclimoiiil,    (ieneral    I  .a    haxcit 


( :    n  • 


moved  tile  nio^t  \alual)le  stores,  ,'uid   marciied    nortiiwanl   toward   the 


l'{ap])ahannoek    t'j 
h'ne  under  ( iener.il  W 


ure    the   ^-p((■die',t    union  uitii  I  lie  I'enii'-vK'ania 
lyiie.  and  tlun  -^ouvdit  b)'  all  po^-,ible    nu'ans  to 


avoid  a  [.general  eiu^^e^enu'ii 
tiu'  rear  of  the   Itrilish  fori 


It.  while  daih'  h  ira^siii-r  tlu.:  ri'_'lit  llank  and 


h 


le  ass.iiibly  ol"  \'ii'.;inia,  quii  keiietl 


to  fre.-.ii  acti\it)-  by  the  ur;.4i:ncy  of  the  peril,  retired  to  Charlottesville, 
Ma\-  t wenty-loiirtli,   and   put    forth    all    the    proper    eiiei",)'  within   its 

])ow  er. 

Iifti'eii  millions  <if  lliiU  of  Credit,  realiziii;;  a  nominal  v'.iliu:  of  one 
dollar  to  fort)',  the  declaration  of  marti.d  l.iw  within  twenty  mih-s  of 
an  army  head(|uaiters,  and  a]i])eals  to  the  militi.i,  were  re-orted  to  as 
i:\traordinaiynie.isures;  but  1  his  interpo^-it ion  of  paper  appe.ds  and 
resolutions  could  not  ':top  ( airnw.illi^.  Cliarlottis\ille  had  been  the 
depot  for  the  prisoner.s  captured  at  Saratoga,  and  their  rescue  had 
been  one  of  the  objectives  of  the  o(  cupatioii   of  the   upper    Dan   bv 


'If  I 


'!■;    f< 


I    • 


ii'J 


i*^ 


*..         -. 


m. 


^: 


'I 


iM 


I .' 


'  i ,' 


nm  \ 


%u-^ 


-i , 


ri 


.    f; 


ill 


i! 

!■ 

i   I 


'oo 


i.A  FA\i;rri:;  and  iok.nwai.i  is   i\  xikcima 


[-7^1. 


that  otTicrr  in  tlic  prcviuus  \\Mr  :  tliwartnl  indeed  I)\- Cirnera!  ( iieeuc's 
uell-CDii^idiTid  ni(i\'emeiit  dnwn  the  Ki)aiMke  cr  Iowlt  I)an.  1  hcso 
])rist)ners  were  iidw  pas-cd  (i\-er  the  iiKuimain--  tn  \\'iiu'he-.ter. 

Meanwhile,  and  liy  tlie  tw  ent\- fifth  cf  Ma)-,  deiierd  ('ornwalH-^ 
was  on  the  niari.fi.  'llic  J.inu's  I\i\er\\.is  creased  .it  W'e-'lover  and 
his  lie.u'.iinarter-  were  e-t,ibh\died  at  l>ird^  i.>KuUatii>n.  !'>>•  the'  U'^c 
of  hd.it-,  previiiii^I)'  enlist  rueled  liy  Ariii^lif  .i\\(\  hy  " -wimniinL;  all 
the  llllrse^  luit  the  he-^t.  tlie  entire  .irin_\-,  inf  ml  ry .  ea\  .diy  .iiid  .irtil- 
!er\-,  eoiriif.etcd  tlie  p.i>s.e4e,"  as  I'.irleton  st.ite^,  "  in  less  tlian  three- 
d.iys." 

On  the  tw■ent}••■^e^■entll  the  arni_\-  enc, imped  near  White  (  ),ik 
Swamp.  .\t  this  jxiint  inf 'rm.ition  w.is  dhtained  th.it  (le-nei-.d  I  ..i 
I'.iyette  l;ad  .d)andiiiud  KiehiiMnd  ,md  crushed  the  (  hii  kah'iminy. 
'I'he  arin\-  nu^-ed  tow.ird  I'lottom  Hride^c  mi  th.it  ri\-er.  ;md  tlie  Aiiieri- 
e.uis  crossed  the  rannmk\-  River.  "  .\  \c\v  da_\s  afterw.irds."  s;i\-s 
'r.irlel'in,  *•  ,in  Anu  rieaii  i)atriil  was  c.iptuied  and  aniun:;  other  p.ipers 
from  tlie  M.uxpii-^  de  La  I'.iyelte,  to  ( ieneral  ( ireeiie,  Sleuhc-n.  etc.. 
om;  letter,  achlre-setl  to  Mr.  leherson,  the  ( ioveriior  of  \'irL;ini.i,  was 
particular!)-  striking;-.  After  e\hortin_;  liiat  j^entleinan  to  turn  out 
the  militia,  he  [^roplh-t'uoHv  thchuiii  tliat  the  llriti-^h  succe>s  in  \'ir- 
^inia  resembled  the  |-"reneh  inv.ision  ,md  posses-^iMIl  ot  1 1, mover  in  the 
precedin;^  w,ir,  and  w.is  likel)-  to  li.ue  -similar  con>ei[uences,  if  the 
t;<)vernnu  lit  and  tlie  countr\-  would  exert  theiiiseh-e--  at  the  ])ie>ent 
juncture."  'I'.irletijii  liiiii--ilf  w.i>  ne\-er  more  thorough!)-  in  lii-  lavor- 
ite  element.  His  K''_;i(jn  w,is  splendid!)- mounted  with  the  best  ■-tMek 
of  the  coimtiA- :  at  tlie  simple  eo-t  of  bridles  ,md  -.idiUes,  wlieii  others 
were  not  f  niii.l  in  ;_;ent!emeirs  st,i!)le>.  With  two  liundred  m\A  fill)- 
men,  a!!  but  sexeiit)-  )iis  own  ilr,i;.>,oons,  lie  was  di-^j.'.itehed  in  tlie  be- 
L^innin;4  of  luiu'  toward  (  li.irlottes\il!i'.  (lo\-ernor  Jeiferson  and  the 
Viri^inia  A>--embl)-  wire  tlie  obiecti\-es  ot  pursuit.  1  ,ieuteii,mt-co!o- 
ncl  Simeoe.  witii  tlie  V.e_;ers,  ,ind  the  infintry  and  hussars  ot  tlie 
l^tin;_;crs,  w.is  ,it  tlie  sanie  time  sent  to  I'oint  e)f  I-'oiIn-,  w-liere  P),iron 
Steulieii  wa>  then  statioiietl  in  eliar;_;e  of  the  arsenal  .md  i.ibor.itoiy 
prt:viously  e-t.ib;i>lied  at  that  i)l,iee.  See  m.ip,  "  l.a  h'.iyette  in  Vir- 
i;inia." 

Tarlcton  marched  between  the  South  Anna  and  North  Ann.i 
rivers  at  hi;,'h  speed,  notwilhst.mdin;,;;  the  summer  heat,  "halted  at 
noon,"  on  the  tiiird,  "just  Ion;;  eiioie^li  to  refresh  men  and  horses, 
presseti  firw-.ird  a;_;ain  in  the  afternoon,  li  dted  at  eli-ven,  iieMr  L()ui->,i 
Court  liouse,  and   remained  on  a  plentiful   [)lantation  till  two  o'clock 


■;it 


■r 


''I 


[-7S1. 


>:^r.l 


I  A    lANI-rrF.    AND    <  mkwvaI.I.IS    IX    \  III, IMA. 


601 


»•      I 


ill  tin  ninriii!!;,;.  ,i'  wliich  tinii;  he  .i;.;,iiii  rf>uincil  lii>  iiMri-h."  "  liLforc 
(lawn.  In;  fell  in  with  lwrl\i:  w.r^'Mis  that  were  on  their  journey.  uii<ler 
a  smaU  inward,  fVuin  the  upjier  [lart^  of  X'irj^Miiia  .uul  Marxlamh  witli 
arms  and  tldthin;^  for  the  e'lntiiiriita!  trumps  in  Smith  Lai'uhn.i." 
These  were  bunieil,  "  ti>  .-aee  time  and  a\nid  a  detail  (nv  their  e'cort." 
Several  e.int  ine>  u  ere  made  at  private  maiivinns,  inchidin;^  CuKniel 
jnhit  Sinun-.,  la  nicin'Der  of  the  .\-^^emhl\'»  and  two  brnthers  of  (icn- 
eral  Xel-M.n,  and  after  a  short  halt  near  the  residence  of  Dr.  W'.dker, 
the  march  was  re>umeiL  Tarh  ton  sa\.i  lie  '•  inia;4ined  that  ,1  march 
of  se\cnt\'  tiiiles  in  twent_\-fonr  honrs,  with  the  canticjii  he  had  n^ed, 
nii;^ht  jierhaps  L;i\'e  him  the  ad\anta;4e  of  a  surprise.  He  therefore 
approached  the  l\i\-ianna,  which  rivi-r  he-,  at  thefoiit  of  tiie  hill  on 
which  the  town  is  situated,  with  ail  po>siijle  espedit  ion.  The  cavalr>' 
char;^^eil  throu;_;Ii  the  water  uitii  wry  little  lo-^  .md  nmted  the  detach- 
ment po-,icd  at  that  place."  .Se\'en  members  of  the  Le;4i->lature 
were  •-ecnri  d.  r)ri;,;adier-;;enc.ral  .Scott  anil  a  t'cw  other  officers  were 
captnred.  The  ca-nalties  were  trilhii.;'.  "  '  )ne  thous.Hul  arms  were 
broken  np.  lom-  hundred  bari'els  of  powtkr  ami  several  ho;4.-ihe.uls  of 
tob.icco  were  de->troye<l." 

.\  d.ct.u'hmeiit  of  dra^'oon-i  under  Ciptain  .McLeod  \n-^iled  Monti- 
cello,  the  Country  seat  of  jeffer.-on.  three  miles  from  Ch.Lrlottesville, 
bnt  their  appro  ich  was  discovered  aiul  the  *  iowiaior  escaped.  I'iie 
spe.iker  o(  the  .\<-.em!)Iy  also  escaped  and  that  body  at  once  a-^-eni- 
bled  at  St.umtoii,  beyond  the  mountain■^.  The  books,  papers  and 
furniture  of  (iovernor  jeffer-on  were  not  disturbed;  but  his  wines 
were  freely  n^^ed,  or  w.e-^ted,  without  the  .uitlioiity  of  the  command 
Ihl;   officer. 

On  the  twelfth  of  June.  Gener.d  Nelson  was  elected,  (lovernor, 
rici'  Mr.  jt  ffei-.-on,  w  lio  h.id  dccliiud  le-electioii  in  order  th.it  the 
<,'xecuti\e  office  >liould  be  held  by  .1  man  of  military  knowled;_;;e  and 
experience. 

On  the  (.la)'  of  his  arrival,  tow.ird  ex'eniii'^,  Tarleton  started  ilown 
the  kiviaiina  toward  !\Mnt  of  l'"o;k,  to  coiiperate  with  Simcoe's  expe- 
dition. I  his  expeilitii  ,n  was  (pii'e  ditTeriuitly  conducted  troni  th.it  ot 
Tarleton.  Colonel  Simcoe  is  oIUmi  underrated,  because  of  freiiuent 
ferocitv  in  -'horteniiiL;  tV^ht--.  lie  kilU.'d  an  enemy  ,is  fa>t  as  he  could, 
up  to  the  !a>t  point  of  resistance  ;  but  he  was  shrewd  .iiul  cool,  and 
maiKiL^ed  his  operations  with  much  deliber.ition.  e\en  when  heated  by 
the  arilor  of  battle.  He  appio.iched  tiie  H.iron  Steuben's  position  so 
as  to  make  the  mo.st   phuisible  di-.[)lay  of  his  forces,   and  made  the 


i 


I 


in 


;  !■ 


''  if 

A' 

n 

■HI 


'in 


"i 


i  y.,  ^. 


002 


I.A    lAVF.ri'K    AND   COKNWAI.I.IS    1\    VIKCWMA. 


I17S1 


impression,  a-;  C'lnr.villis  desi^^ncd,  th.it  the  main  army  was  near 
General  Steuben,  ha\-in;4"  .ulviet's  ot"  hi-  approaeh,  rem<>\eil  a  portion 
ot"  the  ]nil)iie  stores,  ,iltiioUL;h,  as  thi'  river  w.is  deep,  lie  mi;^dit  have 
Iield  tlic  detensive  with  success  if  he  had  l<nown  the  streivj^tli 
opposeil.  lie  retired  hMui  liis  pi")sition,  however,  ,ind  all  pubHc  prop- 
erty that  '•em.uned  at  the  thpnl  was  destroved  or  disponed  of.  The 
small  .ivms  were  old  and  irider,;'oin,';  re]),ur  ;  hut  some  \Mluable  stores 
besides  e.mnon  ,uid  m(irt,irs  were'   imon;^  the  s[)oi]s. 

Tile  p<isiii,in  of  the  armies,  thus  r.irly  in  June,  17S1.  is  a  m,iterial 
fact  in  the  con>ider,ition  .)f  the  future  operations  of  tiu'  w.ir. 

So  f.ir  as  rel.itedi  to  the  I^ritish  army  in  Viri^inia,  Cornwallis  was 
ecjual  to  the  position,  lie  h.ul  the  support  of  his  [^ovei'nnu'iit  ,ind  an 
ade(|uate  forci'  in  hand.  lie  sha|)ed  his  pl.ms  upon  the  pi-esiunption 
th,it  army  he.id(pi,irters  at  New  \'ork  would  Imld  iti  nwn,  ,uui  would 
occup)'  till"  attenli'in  of  the  ami)-  of  \\'ashin;,;ton  ,nul  Roch.uiibeau, 
wliich,  con^bincd  .is  it  was.  diel  not  e([ual  the  troops  at  <  ieneral  C!lin- 
ton's  ilispos.d. 

It  is  not  out  of  place  to  a;_;,un  refer  to  the  niilitai)-  principles 
■lire. lely  tlefined,  which  cnmpel  wise  cnmm.inders  to  rei^ard  the  destruc- 
tion ui'  i)i)i)osinL;  .irmies  as  more  important  th.m  .in\-  ordinary  i;u,ud 
dutv  over  towns  and  cities. 


Cornw.illis  b; 


ised    nis    movemen 


ts.   therefi 


ire, 


upon   the   .'issur.mce 


near   lU-vd   Creek,   in  the   heart 


that  his  arm\'  w.is  .it  his  own  dispnsal  for  the  coiKiuest  of  \'ir;4inia. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  of  this.  |Ic  followe'd  T.uieton  .ml  Simcoe 
to  Elk  Hill,  a  pl.mtation  of  Jeffersnn, 
of  \'irL;ini,i,  and  thus  re-unitinl  his  forces. 

Ili<  m.irch  h.id  unt  been  made  re^^.irdless  uf  tin;  oper.itions  of   La 
I'.iN'ette,  but  a  (k'l.ichment  h.id  been  sent  tow.inl  R.iccoon 


as  11 


IS  own  purpose  w.is  to  tullow  in  force 


t  was  still   ins  jiKin  to  em- 


plo\-  c,ivalr\"  to  bre.ik  up  depots  of  supplies,  by  r.ipid  nio\-emenls,  and 
to  niaich  with  the  m.iin  .irmv  .e'.iinst  or''.ini/.cil  troops.      A 


s  an   mill- 


cation 


his  (hscreet  miht.irv  o<)lic\-,  an  cinler 


^ued 


to  Colonel  T 


irle 


ton  on  tile   ninth  ot   June,  d.ileil  "c.inip  at    jelkTson  s,      is  (juoted  — 
"  destrov  all  the   eiiemv's   stores  ,ind    t 


.ind  the  I  ).m 


.iiid  it   tlier( 


nouU 


coiiec 


ted 


at    a    private 


house 


obacco,    between    James    River 
1  be  a  (juantity  of  provisit)ns  or  corn 
would    h.ive    you    destroy  it,    even 


.ilthou'di    there   should    1 


)e    no   p 


roof  of   its   ! 


Kill', 


intended    for   the 


)UPlic  servi 


Ce,  /< 


'iariiii^  (iion^i^ii  for  the  supf^ort  of  the  family 


as 


thi 


Vl 


IS 


the  greatest  reason  to  apprehend  that  sueh  provisio)ts  xoitl  be  iilti- 


niate/v  appropriated  by  the  enejny  to  the  use  of  (ienera/  (in 


•ne  s  ar/ny, 


.731 


1781.1 


I.A    lAYr/rTK   AND   COKNWAI  LIS    I\    VIkCIMA. 


6c)j 


-;  iu:i\r 
>urtion 

It  h.n-e 

c  prop- 
r.  Tlie 
J  stores 

11, it  dial 

illi-^  was 
:  and  an 
luiiption 
d  uouUl 
aiubcau, 
ral  Clin- 

irinciplcs 

tlcstnic- 

,ry  i^uard 

issur.uico 
\'ir;_;inia. 
1  Siincoe 
the   heart 

ins  ot  La 
"(lid  as  it 
n  to  ein- 
lents,  and 
^  an  intli- 
nel  Tarli:- 
(juoted — 
nes  Ri vei- 
ns Of  coi'n 
f  it,  even 
d  t"nr  tlu: 
;    tU  I  licit 

•II  be  nlti- 
■>//s  iViny, 


7i'lii(li  from  the  pnsriit  stntr  of  the  Caroli)uis,  must  dcpetui  on  this 
province  for  sn/'/'lies."  I  Itah'cs  not  in  ori<;ina!  order,  but  so  indicated 
as  to  nlaee  tluse  instructions  in  association  witli  tlujse  of  \Vaslun<r- 
ttiii  to  ("jeneral  (ireent'.  full)'  as  >tern.  on   l)a;^e  -4,v) 

Before  further  notic  of  tin's  canii)ai;.4n,  it  should  he  l)orn»:  in  nnnd 
that  f.ir  away  at  \\'etlur>rield,  Coiniecticut.  on  the  twentx'-fnst  of 
May,  the  d,i\-  after  the  arrival  of  (  ornwalli-^  at  i'eter>burL;-,  Washing- 
ton and  Roi-haniheau  were  in  conference  ;  and  that  the)'  deliberate!)' 
diNCusseil  the  propi  iit\-  of  an  attack  uptui  New  York.  This  fact  must 
be  kept  in  mind,  in  order  to  .i])preciate  the  resultini;'  embarrassments 
which  folloued  the  oper.it ions  of  Lord  Comwallis,  under  the  elemands 
of  Clinton  lor  help  at  headipiarters. 

During-  the  march  of  Lord  Comwallis  to  lU'rd  Creek,  La  I'"ayitte 
elTected  a  junction  with  ( iener.il  \\'a\-ne.  near  K.iccoon  l'\jrd  on  tlu' 
Rapitlan.  liii-^  \\a^  on  the  -e\t  ntii.  1>\-  reference  to  the  map  it 
will  bo  seen  that  La  L,i\ette  was  nearl)'  north  t'rom  the  camp  of 
Comwallis.  ]i)-  a  prompt  march  to  Charlottesville-  he  couM  effect  a 
union  with  llirou  Steuben,  wlio  was  not  lar  distant  southward,  .md 
then  move  eastward  toward  the  Ihitisli  arm)-,  reserving;-  to  himself  a 
retreat  at  will,  while  still  threateniuL;  their  rear.  T.irleton  thus  states 
the  movement:  "  l  he  ^Lu■llui-,  de  La  l-'.r.ette,  w  ho  had  previously- 
practiced  defensive  mancvuvers  with  skill  and  securit)',  being  now- 
reinforced  by  General  \Va\-ne  and  about  ei;4iit  hundred  continentals, 
and  some  detachments  o\  nnlitia,  followed  the  Jiritish  as  the\-  pro- 
ceedLci  down  Janus  Ri\er.  This  de^ij^ii  bein;^  judieiou^I)-  .nr.iiiL^ed 
and  e.-<ecuted  with  extreme  caution,  allowed  opportunit)'  fir  the  junc- 
tion of  liaron  Steuben,  confined  the  small  detachme".ts  of  the  kin^j's 
troops,  and  bot'i  saveil  the  propert)-  and  animated  the  droopin'^ 
spirits  of  the  \'^irL;inians." 

On  the  thirteenth,  Tarleton  reported  to  Comwallis  his  own  move- 
ments. Ihis  letter  was  intetce])tetl  b\-  La  l'",i\-t.'tte';-  scouts,  and  as 
promptl)-  published  for  warm'iiL;'  to  the  people.  On  the  lourteenth, 
Comw-.dlis  notified  T.irleton  that  he  proposed  to  move  the  next  d.iy 
to  W'estham,  near  Richmond.  T.irleton  sa\s :  "  While  the  ro)-wl 
army  inarched,  the  rear  ami  left  tl.ink  were  covered  by  the  Ihitish 
Leyion  and  the  Scvcnt)--sixth  re;j;imcnt  on  horseback;  and  on  its 
arrival  at  Richmond,  Lieutenant-colonel  .Simcoe  with  his  corps  w-as 
l)osted  at  Weslham,  and  his  own  (T.irleton's)  corjjs  at  ^K'adow' 
Briil_L;e.  During;  these  operations  the  ^Llr((uis  de  La  Fayette  con- 
tinned  to  advance  his  light   troops  to   harass  the  [jatrols.     On  the 


,    \ 
t 

M 


1  : 


u 


!'. 


6o4 


I,.\    I'.WKirK    AMJ   CoKNWAl.l.lS    IN    VIKi.lMA. 


[17S1. 


'.■■■I 


<im 


>  c 


ci'^litci'iitli,  1k'  1  r.iiK'tnni  in.nlc  ,1  forced  m.ircli  to  iiUcrcci)t  Gcmra! 
M 11  li  1  c II bn ;.;■-;  d.  tailnnriii ,  who  cv.ulod  the  bh)\v  by  an  c.irly  rclrcit, 
du<\  the  I'nilish  l,(.';;ion  irturncd  to  tlie  royal  army." 

I. a  I'aycttc  thus  rc])orts  tiiis  occurrence  to  Cuiural  (Ireene,  from 
'•  Mr.  T\-re's  jjlaniation.  t\vcnt>'  miles  from  Williamdjur:^.  June  f>venty- 
NC\enth,  l.-Si  :"  "On  the  ei.;hteeiith,  the  liiitidi  army  moved  lowanl 
us  with  a  desiL^ii,  as  1  anpreheiid,  to  -strike  at  a  detached  corps  com- 
manded by  (General  .Muhleiiber-.  Upon  this,  the  li-ht  infantry  and 
I'liinsyUaniaiis  manhed,  under  tieneral  Wayne,  when  tlie  enemy 
returned  into  town,  dde-  ildv  followiiv^'  I  was  joined  by  (ieiieral 
.Steuljeii's  tor[)s.  and  on  the  ni;dn  nf  tlir  twentieth,  Kiehmond  was 
evaeuateil."  C"ornwallis  thus  left  kieiuni>nd  on  the  twentieth,  and 
ilireeted  his  course  by  liottom  JSiui-e  and  New  Kent  (,'ourt  House 
for  \\'i!liams!)ur;4.  "At  tin:  tiiiie  liu.-  royal  army  cptitted  New  Kent, 
the  mail';  boi!)-  of  tiie  Americans  approached  within  twelve  miles  of 
that  place,"  sa_\-s  Taileton.  '■  whicli  eircum-^tance  nearly  occasione(l 
Marl  Coriuvallis  to  counterm.ueh  ;  but  upon  rellection.  he  pur-^ued 
liis  desi;^n  of  moving  to  WiilianisbmL;-,  where  he  arrived  un  tlie 
fifteenth  of  June." 

Within  six  miles  of  Williamsbur;.;  the  next  m  'ruiiv^-,  a  sharp  skir- 
midi  ensued.  The  (jueen's  Ran;^ers  iSimcoei  hae!  marched  down  the 
Chiekahominy,  j^u.irdm^^  th.e  British  re.ir  and  riL,dit  tlank.  They  were 
closc'y  pressed  by  tlu;  .Xmeiaean  ad\auee  i^uard  uiuler  Cobniel  Hutler. 
-upporteil  by  \\'a\  lie.  La  l'a\ette  <a>s,  "  the  whole  British  army 
c '.me  out  to  save  SimC'ie."  I'arletou  had  marched  to  Ikirwell  s 
lA-rry  on  the  James  Iviver,  and  ^  i\-,  '•  liet'ore  the  horses  were  un- 
bridletl,  the  sound  of  musketry  and  cannon  anuouneeil  tlu.'  coiiuneiice- 
ment  of  an  action  at  the  outpost,  .uiii  l.m'd  (.'hewlon  <oon  afterwards 
delivered  iCarl  Cornwallis'  orders  for  the  cavalry  and  mounted  int.intry 
to  repair  witli  exjiedilion  to  the  arniw  who  wi;re  already  movin;^  to 
the  relief  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Siiucoe.  The  loss  in  this  .iff.nr  was 
nearly  equal,  upwards  of  thirty  beiiiL;  killetl  and  wounded  on  e.ich 
side.  The  .Americans  retreated  to  their  army  at  lyre's  plant.ition, 
.unl  the  kinc^'s  trooj^s  returned  in  the  eveniivj;  to  Williamsbur;^.  where 
they  found  some  recruits  for  the  i^uards  wlio  h.ul  arrived  clurin;^'  their 
.ibsence."  This  la-.t  ]),iraoranh  shows  that  La  l""ayette  correctly  sup- 
posed that  the  main  army  turned  to  meet  his  attack,  and  he  thus 
closes  his  report  :  "  I'iie  [)ost  the)-  now  occup)'  is  strou;,^,  under  the 
protection  of  their  shipping, /;/</■  itpivdrds  of  one  hionhid  iiiilrs  fro)n 
thi    Point  of  York."      Under  date  of  June  30th,  Lord  Curnsvallis  re- 


' 


( 


11731. 

Gcnrr.il 
rclfc.it, 

\c,  from 
twenty- 
1  idw.iril 

pS    COI11- 

itry  and 

(.MUMUy 

(icncral 

loml  was 

th,    and 

t   IIdu-^c 

;\v    Kent, 

mi  Us  of 

ccasiiincd 

pursued 

1    on    tlu.' 

Kirp  skir- 
down  the 
i'hcy  were 
lel  lUitler, 
t.ish  army 
Hurwi'U's 
\vi  ro   un- 

afterwarils 
d  infantry 
m'lvini;'  to 

affiir  was 
;d  on  each 
plantation, 
uri;',  where 
uriiv^  their 
rectly  sup- 
ui   lie  thus 

under  the 
mi/iS  from 
n  wall  is  re- 


iTSi.) 


I, A    lAM   111.    AMI   lORNNVAI.I.lS    IN    V1K(,INIA. 


005 


piirts  his  lo>s  at  three  ofricer-,  and  ihirty  privates  killed  >ind  wmindcd, 
and  thai  "three  Anniuan  oll'ui  rs  and  lwenty-ei;^ht  pri\ales  were 
taker.  pri^'>iur<.'  Hut  .1  new  eli  ment  '.ad  entered  intotiie  c.imp.iiyn. 
(Jn  the  twent)--i\th,  Mirii;^n  Aniiel  pi, iced  in  his  hand>  di-p.itehes 
fpim  (icncral  ClintdU,  the  first  d.iled  June  1  itii,  .dre.idy  litticn  days 
old.  He-ides  \\\\  e-tiiiMte  th.it  "  the  coutinent.d-.  nndi  i  i,,i  I'',iyettc 
could  .not  excceil  one  tlujiis.iuil,  ,nul  th.it  the  l'cini~._\'lv.ini.i  line  under 
Wayne  uere  so  di'sconcerted  that  their  cifficers  were  .iir.iid  to  trust 
iheiuuilh  .iniuuinitiiin,"  I  this  however  m.iy  have  since-  .illered),  he 
Ma\s,  "'['lie  tlet.ichmeiUs  I  h,i\e  m.ide  horn  this  .irniy  into  tin-  Chesa- 
peake, since  ( ieiier.il  I.e-.lie's  expediiiun  in  (  Ictuher  List,  in-  h.  -ive,  have 
aniounted  to  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  .unl  seventy- fnir  effect- 
ives ;  ,ind  .it  the  time  your  lordship  made  thejuncti<in  with  the  corps 
there  were  under  M.ijnr-'^ener.il  I'hillips'  orders  five  thousand  three 
hundred  .md  iour;  ,1  force  I  should  h.ive  liopetl  would  ijc  sufficient  of 
itself  to  have  c.irried  on  ooer.itions  in  ,in\'  of  the  southern  provinces 
of  America  ;  where,  .is  ippc.irs  from  intercepted  letters  of  \\".i-,hinL;ton 
and  I-,i  K.iyettc.  the\-  ,ire  in  no  situation  to  stand  e\Tn  a;^Minst  a 
<//:•«/<'// of  th.it  army.  .  .  .  liy  the  interceptetl  letters  enclosed  to 
your  lordship,  you  will  observe  th.it  I  am  thrcateneil  with  a  sie;^e  of 
thi>  pi-t.  M  >■  present  effective  f  irce  is  only  ten  thons  md  niue  iuiiulred 
.ind  thiity-one.  It  is  proh.ible  th.it  the  enemy  m.iy  colu-ct  for  such 
.m  ohjict,  a  least  tweiily  thousantl,  besides  reinlorcemeiUs  to  the 
l'"rencii,  (which  from  pr.'Uy  ;4'oo  1  autii  irity  I  li.ive  riM-^on  to  expect), 
and  the   numerous   militia   of  the   five   lu  i;,;iiborinL;   pro\inces.     Thus 


circuni^t.mced.  I  .im   i)ersu  ided   your 


hi;)  will  be  of  opinion  th.it 


the  sooner  I  concentr.ite  my  f  )rces  the  be'iter." 

The  lollowiiv^  Corps  were  therefore  to  be  f)rw.inK;d  to  New  York 
in  succession  as  tiny  c<iuld  be  sp.ired,  "  two  batt.ilions  of  li;-;"ht  infintr)'. 
Forty-third  re;^Mme!U,  Seventy-sixth  or  MiL^hticth  re;4iment,  two  b.it- 
talions  of  Ans|),ich,  (Jaeen's  R.in;,;er>,  c.iv.ih)'  and  infmtry,  the 
remain-  of  the  Seventeenth  li;-;ht  dr.r^oons,  .uul  such  proi)ortion  of 
the  .ulillery  as  could  be  sp.ired,  p  irticul.irly  men."  A  second  dis- 
patch by  the  s.ime  messcULjer,  d.iled>  June  15th,  says,  "  I  reipiest  you 
will  immedi.itely  emb.irk  .1  part  of  the  troops  st.ited  in  the  letter 
inclosed,  bej^inniiv^  with  tiie  liL;ht  infmtry.  and  sentl  them  to  me  with 
all  possible  disp.itch.  ...  I  ilo  not  think  it  .idvisable  to  leave 
more  troo[)s  in  th.it  unhe.ilthy  clim.Ue  at  this  season  of  the  _\ear  than 
wh.it  are  absolutely  wanted  for  a  defensive,  and  ilesultory  water 
excursions." 


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[17SI 


Loni  ("'  irn  A-.i'lis  w.i-^  thus  .i^-;uicil  tli.it  c<i:i])cratioii  fioiii  Xc\v  York, 
via  I'll jl. uU' I plii. I,  ,is  |)rc\  ii>usly  piop  ).c(l,  n.  otlicrwisc,  w.is  inii)ri)b;ible, 
ami  witli  the  i)ro|ioscil  rciUnji  i^m  of  his  .iiiny  the  comiucst  ot' Vii'.^inia 
became  iiii])i)-,-,ibk'.  The  (|iK.'-.tioii  t.t'  ret  liiiiii.'.  aii\'  army  at  all  in 
Virijiiiia  \\,i-  it  (nui'  a  practical  oiu'.  <  )ii  tin;  thirtieth,  he  replied 
from  \\'i!liatiis!)Lir|4,  ••  \'.nir  e\ceH(.ncy  bjiii;  cliar.;eil  u'itli  the  \vei;^lit 
of  the  wiiuli:  Aiihrican  war,  youi' opinions  n\  course  .ire  less  partial, 
aiul  ,iie  ilirected  to  .ill  pirt--;  upon  vieuin\;'  X'ork,  I  was  clearly  of 
opinion  that  it  f.ir  exceeili  our  power,  cou-istrnt  with  your  pl.ms,  to 
111, ike  safe  (lefeusivi;  jxists  there  and  ,it  (iloucester,  both  of  which 
would  lie  neei-^^.iry  for  tlie  protection  of  .shii)pinL,^  .  .  .  As  ni,i;^'- 
.iziiies,  itc,  ni,i\'  be  ile^troyed  by  oica-^ioii.il  expeditions  troni  New 
York,  .iiul  ihrre  i-  little  chance  of  (.•^tabli^hiri'^'  a  post  capable  of  ;_;iviu_L; 
elTectu.iI  protectio:i  to  shi[)s  of  war,  I  submit  to  )our  excelkncy's 
consideration,  wluther  it  is  worth  while  to  hold  .1  sickly  delensive 
pi)st  (Portsinouthi  in  this  iViy,  which  will  .ilways  be  expo-^^il  to  .1 
sudden  h'rench  att.ick,  ,ind  w  hich  experience  iiiakis  no  (.liversioii  in 
favor  of  the  southern  .irnu'."  While  these  disp.Uches  were  being 
exclia;i;4ed,  .1  cipher  disp.itch  from  (i^Mieral  (."iinlon  of  Junetwent}-- 
eighth,  receivetl  by  Lord  C'ornwallis  Jul)  ei;.;htli,  a;4ain  .ivowed  a  pur- 
pose of  ni.ikiuL;  a  r.ipid  nio\ement  to  seize  tlie  stores,  etc.,  colUcted 
.It  I'hil.ulelphia,  and  atterw.ird  to  u>e  the  force  so  em[)loyed  to  rein- 
force N'l'w  Voik.  nr;4in:^'  eml)arkation  of  the  troops  before  nu-ntioneii, 
and  off.  riii^r  to  "  return  wh.itever  m,i\'  have  been  too  ;^re.it  .1  propor- 
tion (^\.  the  mo  nent  the  expi'dition  is  over."  On  the  date  of  receipt, 
Lord  Cornw.ilhs  re[>lied,  ih.it  "  the  troops  were  re.id)'  to  i_Mnl),irk',  and 
deprecited  the  delenlion  of  dt'/tiisii't'  po^ls  in  the  country,  which  cm 
not  h.ive  the  sli;4htest  iiitluence  on  the  w.ir  in  (.'.irolina,  ,ind  which 
gives  us  some  .acres  of  ,111  unhe.ilth)'  sw.imi),  .md  forevi  r  liable  t(j 
become  .1  prey  to  a  foreign  enemy  with  a  tenipcM.iry  su[)eriority  .it 
sea.  ,  .  .  Desultory  cxi)editions  in  tlu:  Ches.ipeake  may  be 
undertaken  trom  New  York  with  .is  much  e.ise  .uid  mor.'  s.itety, 
whene\-er  there  is  re.ison  to  suppose  tli.it  our  n.iv.il  force  is  likely  to 
be  superior  for  twr)  or  tlirre  mt)iiths."'  Ine  letter  cited,  also  describes 
the  att.ick  o(  La  L.iyette  at  J.imestown  winch  will  l)e  noticed. 

The  position  assumed  b\-  Cornw.illis  in  his  correspondence  was 
verified  by  his  ultim.ite  c.ipture.  He  tlesired  to  li.ive  the  Virginia 
army  equal  to  .1  coiuiuest  of  the  State,  and  .ible  to  support  itself,  or 
as  the  alteriiati\  e,  to  ab.indon  the  p.issive  occup.ition  of  posts  which 
could    tlr.iw    no    atiecju.ite    resources  from    tiie  country  .iround,  and 


J'i 


17SI 


I78I.1 


I, A    r.WITTK    .\M>   roRWV AI.IIs    I\    VIkiilNIA. 


Cm: 


could  l)c  assuic(l  of  111) ';(ciirit)- liy  MM.  SulVKii'iil  li.is  been  said  to 
iiulicati;  till-  umcitaint)- of  his  lut uii:  upt'r.itiDtH  and  llir  I'lnbarrass- 
mi.iits  uliicli  li>ll<i\\  cd  tlK'Mi.  I'licsL'  itiiitiinud  until  ii  iutcucrincnts, 
thrif  tii(iu>aiid  nu'U,  .ilth(>u;.;li  iint  Kiu'-tliiid  nt'tlic  luimlxr  rxpi'cli'd, 
arrived  at  New  Vi)rk  antl  (iiiieral  C'linloii  .is  late  as  J  id)-  elewntii,  (not 
received  until  the  twentieth,)  "  authuii/ed  iiiui  t<»  di-einb.iik  the  troops 
then  .it  I'ortsiiioiith  and  re.idy  to^.iil  t'nr  New  \'ork."  Me.mwhile  the 
Cfinditiou  of  tliin;.js  ch.mi^ed.  lie  hid  been  eonipelled  to  ;ict  upon 
the  supn.isition  that  tiie  depK'tion  ot  hi^  eounuand  would  end  the 
Vir_nini,i  caniiMi;^n.  1  he  endjirk.ilion  of  troops  was  to  bi:  ni.ide 
from  Portsmouth. 

l)urin;4  this  time  the  .\merican  army  ii.ul  followed  closely  upon 
the  retirin:^  arm\' of  Lord  (."ornw.illis. 

I,. I  i'.iyette  thn-^  wrote  to  W,ishin;^non  on  the  twenty-ei;4hlh  of 
June  :  "  The  i  nem\'  li.ue  been  so  kind  ,is  to  retire  before  us.  Twice 
I  Ljave  them  .1  eh.mce  of  iV^htin;^  it.ikin;4  cire  not  to  eni^.i^^e  them 
farther  th.m  1  pleased)  but  tin  \-  continued  tluir  retrograde  motions. 
Our  mnnbers  ,ire.  1  thiidc,  ex.e^gerated  to  them,  and  oui  >eeniin^ 
boldness  confnnis  the  opinion.  I  thou;_;ht  .it  tlrst,  I.iu'd  Cornwallis 
wanted  to  L;et  me  as  low  down  as  possible,  and  u->e  his  c.ivalry  to 
adv.mt.ii^e.  His  lorilshij)  had  (c.vclusive  of  the  remfircements  from 
i'ort^niouth,  s.iid  to  be  six  hundred  1  tour  thous.md  men,  ei;^ht  luin- 
dri'd  of  whom  were  dr.i;_;oons,  or  mounted  '■  inf.mt  r_\."  Our  loree  is 
almost  his,  but  oid\'  one  tliou>and  t'lve  hundreil  rejular^.  .uul  fil'tv 
dra;4oons.  One  little  action  more  particularly  m.irk.s  the  retre.U  of 
the  enem\'.  l'"rom  the  pi. ice  whence  he  ilrst  be;,;,in  to  retire  to  Wil- 
li.imsburL;'.  is  upw.irds  (d  one  huiuireil  miles.  The  old  .irms  .it  the 
I'oiut  of  I'Ork  h.ive  been  t.iken-out  of  the  w.iter.  The  cimion  u;if^ 
tlirown  into  the  river  und.im.iL^ed,  when  t!ie\-  marched  b.ick  to  Rich- 
mond; so  th.it  his  lordship  did  us  no  h.irm,  of  consetiuence,  but  lost 
an  immense  part  of  his  former  conquests  and  did  not  m.ike  any  in 
this  St.ite.  (ieneral  tireene  only  demanded  of  me,  to  hold  mvt^rounJ 
in  VirL;ini.i.  I  tlon't  know  but  wh.it  wc  shall,  in  our  turn,  become  the 
jjursuiiii;  eneni)'." 

rile  m.'vemenl  of  Lord  Cornwallis  to  Portsmouth,  noniin.dly 
bei^un  on  the  lourth  of  Jul\-,  was  del.iyeil  until  the  ninth,  the  fourth 
and  fifth  bein<^  occupied  in  the  reinowd  of  the  lie.iv\-  bagi^.i>4C.  Gen- 
er.il  La  Favette  adv. meed  to  Green  SpriiiLj,  within  a  few  miles  of  James- 
town, and  sent  liglU  p.irties  in  atlvance,  to  alt.ick  the  Pritish  rear 
guard.     The  (Jueen's  Rangers  crossed   James   Ri\er   on   the   tourlh. 


I-   ;i 


'11    I   ' 


.      1 


I     I 


!i 


i 


(X)S 


I. A    IA\I    III'.    AM)    (I  iKWVAI  I  IS    l\    Vlli,IM\. 


|I7''I. 


':i;. 


;!l  »■*'. 


:      ^41' 


ill 


but  tlic  iniiii  .iniu'  -fiil  Min.iiiicd  on  the  iMitli  •\i\>\  'I'll''  nritili 
pnsition  li.iil  n.ilin.il  tifiv.Mh.  Iln'  li'lit  w.'.s  lOViTi'il  by  |i(imls  and 
sw.iiiip-^,  .iDil  IxImi'i'  the  iciitrc.'  .nil!  Iclt,  tin'  ;Mipnnil  u.is  sdlnw  .unl 
rniry,  th.it  it  nnilil  Ix'  iim,.c(1  mily  liy  imi mw  i-,iiis(\v,i\'s.  r.irlttnii 
•i.is'-^,  "  li>'  liii' il  .1  iii'",ri)  anil  a  dra  'mom.  ami  cliai;'/-!!  t  in  in  Id  lc'i;.;n 
di'scrtiini,  .md  ",i\c  I  ai  ^>'  inlrlli;.;.'iu'(',  and  tu  u'])ic^iiil,  that  tip'  Wmly 
of  tin'  kin",'s  triH)|i ,  had  i  m-  .fd  lainc--  l\iv<'r;  and  li''  ■.n|i]iM.i'd  il 
"inn. I  |iii.l)al)l<'  lliat  Li  I'ayctli'  aitcd  n|iiin  t  hi--  false  intiin;'('nci', 
r.ithrr  than  tliiun^di  [luii^rrii/  iiii/('r."  addin;;,  "  /c/-  //  /.v  ///,'  m/fr  ///.s/ir/zn' 
of  t/iis  t>liir(>'s I tiiiniiittiiti;;  liiiiisrll  i/iiriii;[  ,i  very  (liifhiilt  uuiifhiiini." 
'r.nii'ton's  opinion  is  I'lirrci'l,  with  thi .  iiualifii'atinn,  that  in  view 
of  the  nariow  and  difrnnlt  a]i])i<ia(Iii's  to  tin-  lliili-^h  (amp,  tint 
Anuiican  ad\ani('  incss,  d  on  too  ho'l_\',  wlnli'  the  adniirahli-  Kti- 
I'mi'i"  of  tlu'  Hiitidi  tioops  indniHil  the  snpportin;;  |iaiti('s  also  to 
cross  thi'  iaiis('\va\s,  only  to  finil  tlii'Misclvcs  rinifrontc  i|  l)\-  at  least 
thi'iee  their  nmnhers.  Some  di  eiedit  has  Ween  cast  upon  <  ieneial 
\\'a\ne  tor  this  e"<posiii'e  'if  the  Anien'ean  aiin_\',  hut  the  ji.iHt'  oj  thi! 
i-nenu'  was  simple'  nndere^tiniated.  Ills  m  ll-posses-,ion  and  daiin;^' 
wen'  ne\'(  I'  mole'  i oiispicnous,  and  the  rennsylvania  troo])s  nmler  his 
command  joirdit  on  ('cpial  terms  with  the  hcsl  troops  ot  (."oinw.illis. 
'I'he  Amerii'aii  ai'nu',  exiept  the  militia  under  liaron  Steiilien,  leji 
.■amp  alionl  t  hiee  o\  loeK,  ,ind  reacheil  the  llritish  front  alxuit  live,  on 
[he  afternoon  of  tlu'  sixth.  A  few  dia;.;oons  and  the  iil1e  detachments 
of  M.ijors  ("ail  and  Willis  cro-,s''d  the  causeway  Inst,  and  took-  cover 
in  a  wdo<l  Hear  the  Wiiiianishur;,;  load.  iAiniaiid's  and  Mercer's  c.iv- 
alry,  with  Mcl'heron  followed,  Ciptain  Sava-e  with  two  ;;uns  and 
two  hatlalions  of  li;.;ht  infmtry  umler  Major  ( iaU  an  and  Major  Willis, 
(of  C'onnect icut,)  cnne  n'Xt,  and  these  troops  were  supported  by 
(icneral  \\'a)Uie's  iVnnsylv.mia  brij^ade.  'I  h  '  pickets  were  att  .clu'd 
vi;;()rously  and  driven  in,  althou;_,di  proniptl\' j  u|)iiorted  b\-  the  \'a;;ers. 
'I  he  two  ;4uns  and  the  batt.ilious  of  Willis  .■(id  (i.dvan  cann:  to  tlnu'r 
support.  I  .leutenant-coloiiel  Merci'r  and  Major  Mci'hi'ison,  respect- 
i\el\,  took  command  o!"  thi'  rillenien  on  the  ri;'Jit  and  lel;,  while  the 
cavalry  advanced  upon  the  r.ritisli  hoisc  which  formed  in  a  field  to 
the  rear  oj'  the  picket.  'I'arleton,  then  acting;  nniler  the  immediate 
orders  of  ( Oi  nw.dlis,  says,  "the  Rritish  cavalry  sui)porled  the  pickets 
on  the'  led,  in  order  to  contain  tlie  eiienu'  within  tlu^  woods  and  to 
prevent  their  see'iiv^  tlu;  main  .irni\'.  l^pon  the  first  cannon-shot 
iioni  the  enemy  tlu'  15r;lish  arm}-  formed  and  advanced,  when  tlio 
tlragO(jns  fell  through  the  intervals  m.ide  for  them  by  the  infmtry." 


>••;,■ 


1781.1 


I, A    lAVi:  III;    \M>   (•(»KNVV\I,I,IS    I.V    VIK(;iNIA. 


(kx) 


'llic  111  it:  li  ri;;lil  1 1  iii -,i  .ted  of  tin  Twcnl  \'  t  liii  <  1,  'I'liirly-t  liiid,  and 
Sr'vcnly-liist  rcvjiiu'iits,  (N'mkc's  hii  '.idc  r/a-  W'l  l),tii,  killed  at  (iiiil- 
(iird.)  llic  (iiiaid  .,  lie  .aaii^,  1 W)  Wat  I  al  inns  of  li;dil  inlaiit  i)-  and  t  liifc 
^utis,  (nminaiidi  ,))■  I  .iiiiiciiant-i'iiliiiicl  N'uikc,  and  were  i)np.)-.it(,' 
t  lie  ]i<i'ai  mil  111  Majiii-  Ml  riicr  nil.  I'lic  i{iiti;li  left  cniia^lcd  nl'llic 
I'dfty-tliird,  I'u  tut  y- .i\t  li  and  la;;litictli  ic'|.;iiiH.'iit^,  "\  it  li  li,dit  cnin- 
pailics,  Mi|>|i.iitc(l  h)i  a^ciuiid  line.  i)y  I  arlitnii's  li';^ioii  ami  twnj.Mins, 
all  iiiidt  T  I  .iiiiti'iiaiit-i'oliiiicl  |)iiiidas,  and  iDiirrontcd  Mriaa'f,  whose 
rillciiuii  \\<if  i)aiii.dly  iDvcrcd  !>>•  an  cmdmii  anc  diti  h  and  a  rail  liiici;. 
^u|p]>iiHi  d  liy  the  two  small  hattali'in,  ol  ii  mt  imnlals. 

Allil    hlirj    (i[)])i)>it  idll    the   lilSt    lilir  \\AVr   WAV.       'i'llc   Amiliiall   K'ft 

liail  alnad)'  rctiii'd.  \\'a\nc  ant  ici]<al'i|  tin'  ad^amin;/  I'liliimn-.  by  a 
hold  l)ay.incl  iiiai;.;i',  imimili  itrly  sii|i|)iirt(  d  liy  I ,  a  I''ayi  ttc,  wIid  lia<l 
rnially  nursed  the  taiiscvsa}' ;  and  siicli  was  the  \'i;.;(ir  ol  llic  idiinii'l 
llial  till'  Aimiiean  at  niv  rxliicalcd  its  front,  and  ictind  iin|uirsui'(l 
to  its  iani|).  1 -a  I'ayctti;  had  hi-i  lioisi-  shot  and  w.is  conspicuous  lor 
personal  d.iiin;;,  in  the  thick'i'sl  ot  the  li;dit. 

'1  he  American  casualties  so  far  as  reported,  wei'i;  one  hundred  and 
i'i:.;hteen  men  killed,  wnumlcd  ,ind  niissin;.;.  'I'lu:  I'liilish  casualties 
were  se\ent_\'-ri\e. 

I,, I  l''ayette  u  ilhdrew  to  M.ilvern  !  lill  to  rest  his  troops,  and  ( 'orn- 
wallis  hastened  his  depart  iire  lor  SnUoJl;  ,uid  rortsnnuth.  Taiieton 
cl.iinis  that  C  "ornwallis  could  haw;  destroyed  I  ,a  l''a)'ette's  arm\'  Wy  a 
viijorous  pursuit  that  ni;dit,  r  the  iollowin'_f  niorniii';  ;  hut  he  tails  to 
harmonize  such  a  proje'ct  with  ohedience  to  (ieiier.d  ("linton's  orders, 
and  does  not  streii;_;then  liis  rellectioii  uj)on  his  coinin.indiin.;'  olticcr 
\)y  statin;,;  the  tad  that  the  troop,  did  not  ;.',o  to  New  Yoik,  at  last. 
Lord  Cornwallis  oheyed  oiilers;  and  could  not  re.al  the  future  as 
Lieutenant-colonel    1  arleton  iuteijireted  the  /'i/s/. 

'l'\.:-  followiiv^r  (irder  received  July  Iwelt'ih  1)_\'  the  ( )rpheiis  fri;_;ale, 
certainly  tnust  have  convinced  Lord  (.'ornw.illis  that  he  would  have 
committed  a  fat.il  error  il  he  had  lolk.wed  the  advice  of 'i'ailetoii  : 

"Niw  N'oKK,  'Jii/y  ij/,  17.S1. 
"Mv  I. OKI):  For  HMsiins  whicii  I  think  it  iimn'ccssars  in  iiiiiiiinn  to  you  by  tins 
opportimiiy,  I  rctjui'st  thai  whrUcvcr  ln)ii|)s,  etc.  your  Liii'ilsliip  may  liavt'  cinbarki'd 
tor  this  jilaic,  may  sail  t'oily-ciijlit  hours  al'lrr  llir  (li-pinlure  iiom  llu;  C,'licsa|)rakL' 
of  the  Irijjatc  which  carries  tills  letter;  and  which  has  orders  lo  nnirn  whenevei 
your  Lordship  si,i;nities  to  the  captain  of  her,  that  the  troo|)s,  etc.  .ire  all  on  hoanl 
and  ready  to  ])roceed  on  the  intended  service. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  he,  etc., 

"  11.  Clinton." 


1 


■     1' 


.39 


Af^ 


610 


LA    l''AVKTri':   AND   CORNWAI.LIS   IN    VlU(;i\IA. 


[1781. 


This  ortler  needs  no  comment. 

On  the  ninth  of  Jnly,  I.ieutenant-coloncl  Tarleton  left  Cobiiam 
with  orders  to  ravai^e  tlie  country  as  fir  as  New  ll.iven,  in  i^'dford 
county,  to  destroy  a  depot  of  stipplies  supposed  'o  be  .it  I'rince 
Edward  ("ourt  House,  to  intercept  an\-  Hritisli  prisoners  or  Americ.m 
liL^iit  troops,  returniiv.,^  to  tlie  northw  .inl  fmni  (Jreene's  army;  and 
then  to  retire  at  iiis  leisure  to  Suffolk.  This  expedition  w.is  gone 
fifteen  days,  n)arched  four  lunulreti  miles,  and  is  thus  tlescribed  by 
Tarleton  :  "  The  stores  destrcn'eil,  either  of  a  public  or  private  nature, 
were  not  in  (piantity  or  value,  equivalent  to  the  damaj:^e  sustained  in 
the  skirmishes  on  the  route,  and  the  loss  of  men  and  horses  by  the 
excessive  heat  of  the  climate.  The  stores  which  were  the  principal 
object  of  the  expedition  had  been  conveyed  from  I'rince  I'.dwartl 
Court  House  and  all  that  cpiarter  of  the  countr)-,  to  Hillsborough 
and  General  (ireene's  army,  upwards  of  a  month  before  the  British 
liL,^r:t  troops  began  their  movement."  Reference  is  again  niaoe  to 
map,  which  is  compiled  from  a  recent  militarx-  maj)  of  Virginia, 
prepared  by  tiie  United  St.ites  Engineer  Corps,  and  that  which 
accompanies   T.irleton's  narnitive. 

During  this  incursion,  Cornwallis,  having  forwarded  to  I'ortstuouth 
such  troops  as  were  designetl  for  New  York,  awaited  the  return  of 
Tarleton  at  Suffolk. 

On  tile  twentieth  of  July,  at  one  o'rlock  .\.  M.,  Brigadier-major 
Bowers  placed  in  the  h.uuls  of  Cicneral  Cornwallis  a  dispatch  in  cipher 
from  Sir  llem-y  Clinton,  ilated  July  lith,  1781.  The  following  is  an 
extract  :  "  It  \ou  ha\'e  not  alread)-  passed  the  James  Kiver,  you  will 
continue  on  the  Williamsburg  neck  until  the  frigate  .arrives  with  my 
dispatches  b\-  Captain  Staplet'.tu.  If  \-oa  have  p.issed  and  tnid  it 
expedient  to  recover  that  station  you  will  [)lease  do  it,  and  keep  pos- 
session until  you  hear  from  me.  Whatever  troops  may  have  been 
embarked  by  you  for  this  place  ,ire  likewise  to  remain  until  further 
orders  ;  ami  if  they  should  have  been  sailed,  and  within  your  cdl,  \-ou 
will  be  pleased  to  stoj)  them."  This  dispatch  is  cited  to  show  author- 
ity for  detention  of  the  trc)o[)s.  The  entire  files  of  ilisp, itches  between 
Generals  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  sup[)ort  the  movement  actually  made 
by  Lord  Cornwallis  to  Yorktown,  and  it  was  absolutely  his  only  policy, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  General  Clinton  refused  to  entertain  his  pro- 
position to  abandon  Virginia  wholly,  so  long  as  it  was  not  to  be  held 
in  force  aggressively.  In  justice  to  both,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  in 
homely  phrase  that  each  had   his  hands  full  of  responsibility,  while 


t\ 


I78I.] 


I,A    FAVETTK   A\D   CORNWAIJ.IS   IN    VIk(;iNFA. 


611 


there  was  liut  one  liam!  full  of  resources  to  meet  the  demaml.  New 
York  or  ^'orktl)Wll,  Ch'nton  or  Cornwallis  liad  to  suffer.  CornwaUis 
the  man  of  fu;kl  duty,  exposure  and  triak  was  tlu:  victim  of  these 
inadequate  resources.  In  this  the  final  chsaster,  lie  lost  ikj  honor,  and 
in  his  late,  luv^laiid,  then  stniL;L,din|4  with  the  civilized  world,  lost  no 
.^lory. 

On  the  first  of  Auj^uist,  Cornwallis  proccetlcd  by  water  to  York- 
town,  the  main  body  of  the  army  foUowin;^,  and  cxecutinc;  the  move- 
ment by  the  fourth.  (  )n  the  sixth,  '[".u'leton  sailed  to  IIam[)ton, 
threw  liis  horses  into  deej)  water  near  shore,  landetl  without  loss,  and 
joined  Cornwallis  on  the  seventh.  General  O'llara's  division 
remained  at  I'ortsmoutii  to  destroy  the  works.  .in<l  on  the  twenty- 
second  the  I'ritish  army  was  concentrated  at  Yorktown  and  Glou- 
cester Point,  just  across  the  river. 

Oil  the  thirteenth  of  AuLjust,  General  La  J'"a\-ette  established  his 
head([uarters  in  the  forks  of  the  I'amunky  and  Mattaponey  rivers, 
from  which  place  he  detached  lit;ht  troops  to  the  rear  of  Gloucester 
to  antici[)ate  .any  .attempt  of  his  .adversary  to  march  north,  and  Gen- 
eral Wayne  was  sent  .across  the  James  River,  liemonstratiuLj  beyond 
Suffolk  and  near  Portsmouth,  for  the  purpose  of  anticipating^  an 
attempt  of  Cornwallis  to  retreat  into  North  Carulin.i.  He  Ljives  ,as 
an  additional  re.ison  for  this  jiolicy,  the  belief,  th.it  in  case  the  prom- 
ised licet  of  Count  de  (irasse  should  arrive,  he  would  thus  be  able  to 
co()perate  more  promptly,  and  if  not,  that  he  would  be  so  situated  .as 
to  occupy  Portsmouth,  and  prevent  the  escape  of  Cornw.dlis  by  sea 
in  case  that  officer  should  attempt  to  return  to  that  post  .ukI  emb,u-k 
for  New  York. 

Repeated  skirmishes  took  place.  While  the  l^ritish  .irmy  was 
fortifying;"  the  two  posts,  Simcoe  was  actively  en,!:;aLyed  with  La 
I'".i\'ette's  li^^ht  troops  in  front  of  Gloucester,  and  Tarleton  made 
repeated  excursions  toward  WilliamsburLj,  where  the  American 
advance  guard  was  established. 

These  movements  were  made  with  extreme  caution.  On  the 
eighth  of  August.  La  Fayette  v.r.ite  to  W.ishingtiMi,  "  We  sliall  act 
agrce.ibly  t^  circumstances,  but  avoid  thawing  ourselves  into  a  false 
mov<-'ment,  which,  if  cavalry  hail  the  command  of  the  rivers,  would  give 
the  enem_\-  the  advantage  of  us.  His  lord^hi|)  plays  so  well,  that  no 
blunder  can  be  hoped  from  him,  to  recover  a  bad  step  of  ours.  .  .  . 
Should  a  fleet  come  in  at  this  moment  our  affairs  would  take  a  very 
liappy  turn." 


■    I 


n  .:■ 


tr 


1 


111 


1 

i 

■1  ■ 

'   i 

i\    \ 

i 

1 

^1 

!Jli;;i 


tiW 


Gl2 


I. A    lAVKlTK    AND  .Ci»KN\VAI,I,lS    IN"    VIRtllNIA. 


\nii. 


On  the  twenty- first  lie  a-.iin  wrote,  "  We  li.ive  liitherto  occupied 
tlu'  fork-;  of  \'ork  Ri\er,  thereby  lookin;^^  both  wa>-.  Some  militia 
have  prevented  the  enemy's  parties  from  reinainin;^  an\-  time  at  or 
near  WiUiamsbur,;-,  ami  talse  .leeounts  have  i;ivei\  tliem  some  .liarni. 
Another  bod>-  of  mihtia  under  C'olonel  Ivmi-,  has  kejjt  them  pretty 
close  in  (ilouee-ter  town  and  fora-i'd  m  their  \-ieinity.  ...  In 
tiie  i)rescnt  state  of  affairs,  my  dear  Ljeneral.  ////'/'<)■('//  a'l/I  n'liii'  votir- 
.v<7/'A'  }'/ri;i//itr.  L  ird  ("ornw.illi--  must  be  .ittaeked  witli  pretty  i.;real 
apparatus;  but  when  ,i  l-"reneh  lleet  takes  po^s^s-^ion  of  the  bay  ,ind 
rivers,  and  we  form  a  land  f- irc;;  superior  to  his,  that  arm\-  must 
sooner  or  later  bi'  f.)rced  to  surrender,  as  we  may  ;_;et  wliat  reintorce 
nients  we  please.  I  hearti!)'  thank  you  for  havin;.;-  orderi.;d  me  to 
remain  in  X'ir^iuia  ;  it  i-.  to  yoiu"  ;,;oi)dne>-^  that  I  am  indebted  tor  the 
most  beautiful  prospect  which  I  nia\-  ever  be'hold." 

On  the  thirtieth,  the  C'ounl  i_le  (.irasse  .irri\ed  in  Chesapeake  Iliy 
with  tweiit\-->iN:  ships  of  the  lin.e.  besides  fri;4;ates  .md  transports.  'I'he 
Briti>h  fri';atc;  (niadaloupe,  JS,  whii.ii  had  -^tarteil  with  'li.-^'patches  for 
New  \'ork,  was  forced  to  return  to  Yorktown,  and  the  Lo\-alist,  20, 
.stationed  in  the'  bay,  was  captured. 

On  tile  third  ol'  SeptembiM-  the  Count  tie  St.  Simon  landed  at  Janie-,- 

town  Island  witii  three  thonsaiul  tw.)  hundred  {•"rencli  troops  and  wa- 

jnined    1)\-  l.a    lM\-ette    at   lireen  Spriir^   on    the   same  day.      '  h\   the 

fifth    the    allies    occupied    Wilii  imsburLj.    about    fifteen    miles    irom 

Yorktown. 

d'he  Count  de  (irasse  had  a  limited  period  fur  i)[)eratioii-.  i.ntlu: 
American  coast,  and  uniteil  with  Count  tie  St.  Simon  in  ur:;m;4  an  im- 
metliate  attack  upon  Yorktwwn  while  it>  ilefeiises  w  ere  incomplete, 
the  latter  wai\in!^  seniorit\- and  proposiiiL;  lo  serve  uiuler  La  l-a>-ette. 
This  officer,  writing  to  \\',isliin;_',ton,  on  the  .uriwil  ot  the  lleet,  which 
had  beei'  met  by  one  of  his  officeTs  u[)on  in.d<in;_;-  C.ipe  llenr)-,  sa\-s, 
•'  I  am  net  so  hasty  as  the  Count  lie  Cr.i.-se,  and  think  that  haxini^  so 
sure  .1  L;ame  to  pla\-,  it  would  be  madiie.-s,  b\-  the  ri-k  ot  an  attack,  to 
<li\-e  aiu-thiii''-  to  chance.  Unless  matters  are  ver\-  (iillereait  hum 
what  1  think  they  are,  my  ojiinion  is,  that  we  ou;4lit  to  be  contiuited 
with  preventiiiL,^  the  enemj-'s  fura;.;es,  with  militia,  without  cuniniittiiiL;- 
our  ret;ul.irs.  Whatever  readines-,  the  Marcpiis  de  St.  .Siniuii  has 
been  pleased  to  e.\press  to  ("olonel  dimat  respi'ctin;^  his  bein'4-  under 
mc,  I  -shall  do  nothin-  without  paying;-  that  liefcre-nce  wl  ich  is  thie  to 
a;^e,  talents  and  experience;  but  would  rather  incline  tc  the  c.iutious 
line  of  conduct    I   have  of  late   adopted."      "I    hope  you  will  find  we 


[lyii. 


178. .1 


I. A    l\N'i;i"l'l',    AM)    rORVWAIIIS    IN    VlkCINTA. 


^"3 


have  taken  tin-  ht^t  piccaulimi-;  to  Ic^sc  1  his  loidsliip's  (Cornwallis') 
escape.  I  lianlly  believe  he  will  make  the  attem|)t.  1  f  he  does,  he 
must  L;i\e  up  ship^,  artiller_\',  !)a;_;L;,i;4e,  part  of  the  horses,  all  the 
iU';_;roes;  must  be  eeil.iiuto  lo^c-  tin;  third  ol  his  arm)',  aiul  run  tiie 
^n-eate>l  ri^k  to  lose  tlie  whole,  wi'.hi  ait  L^ainiiv,;'  that  ;_;iory  whicll  he 
ina)-  derive  from  a  brilii.mt  defense."  .li^iu/i,  "September  ei;4hth." 
"  Ilxou  knew  how  slowly  thini^s  ;^ro  on  in  this  country  I  I  The  ;j;over- 
iior  doivs  what  he  can  ;  the  whei.'ls  of  L^'owriimmt  are  >o  ru-t\'that  no 
Ljo\'i'rnor  whatm'er  will  Ix;  able  to  set  them  free  a^^ain.  Time  will 
prove  that  Mr.  jrfferson  has  been  too  severely  char;4ed."  .  .  .  "  We 
will  trw  if  not  dan ;.;ertiu-^.  upon  a  l.ir;_;e  scale,  to  form  .1  i^ood  idea  of 
thework>;  but  unless  I  am  ^^reatly  deceived,  theri:  will  be  madness 
in  attackin;4  them  now.  with  our  lorce.  M,\r<piis  dc  St.  Simon,  Count 
de  (ira-'se  .iiul  (ieneral  i)ii  I'urtad  .e^ree  with  nn-  in  opinion;  but 
should  i.iird  ('<irnwallis  come  out  .r^.iin-t  such  .1  pnsitioii  as  ue  have, 
ever\-body  thinks  th.it  he  cm  not  but  repmt  ol'  it  ;  and  .-should  he 
be.it  us,  he  mu-^t  soon  prep, ire  for  another  l)att!e.'" 

Durin;^^  this  pciiiid  Lurd  ('onuKMllis  h,i<l  -eriously  entertained  a 
purjjose  ol  .itt.ickiiiu;'  tlu-'  .illied  army  and  mad.t;  .1  c.iri;ful  reconnois- 
s.ance  to  .iseert.iin  its  [)o-;iti.  in  and  force,  i  .ituleii.mt-colonel  Tarletoti 
in  his  nariaii\r,  more  lli.ui  once  intimates  that  Lord  t/ornw.dlis  hatl 
no  rr^ht  to  drjjend  iip'in  the  .issui.mces  cont. lined  in  tin;  disp, itches 
of  (jener.d  Clinton,  as  bfin;4  positi\e  pr.Muisi's  to  fuinish  aid,  ,ind 
.sa\-s,  "  kaiLiland  musi  lament  the  inacti\it\'  of  the  kin;_;"'s  troops, 
whether  it  proceeded  from  the  noble  Iciil's  miscoiicejition,  or  from 
the  su_^;_;e--t  ions  ofconluKnti.il  .itteiidants,  who  construed  the  Com- 
mander-in-ciuef's  letters  into  a  definite  promise  ol  relief."  The  dis- 
patches ([tmted  on  pai;es  (O,  .uul  (',1  are  the  b.isis  for  the  i^pinion 
of  Lord  Cornw.illis  .md  ft)r  the  intini.itions  of  Lieuten.int-colonel  ''".irle- 
ton.  I  le  also  .iiL^ues  th.it  "Lord  Coriiw.illis  mu-t  hive  known  the 
.superiority  of  the  b'reiich  n.u.il  lorce,  which  (iener.i!  liinton  could 
not  ha\-e  known,  when  he  w  rote  his  ddsp, itches."  This  po-^ition  isjnores 
the  fact  that  the  a;^^_;re;4-.ite  Ihiti^h  n.n.il  f  ir^e-  on  the  American  coast 
was  su])posed  to  .)e  sii[)eri(.)r  to  th.it  of  l'"r,ince.  .illliou;_;li  divided  .md 
unfortunate  circum-t.inces  combined  to  prevent  its  concert  of  action. 
This  was  bevond  the  control  of  both  (reiier.ils  Ciint>)n  ,iiul  t'ornw  .illis. 
The  letters  of  (iener.il  L.i  h'.i)-ette,  .lire, id)-  cited,  show  tl',.it  he  was 
coiuluctin;.;  the  campaiL^n  with  reference  tt)  ju>t  such  .1  movement  as 
Lieutenant-colonel  Tarleton  advised,  ant!  tliat  its  promise  of  success 
was  small. 


I: 


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H     ! 


614 


I.A    l-.WKl'l'K    AND   CORNWAl.l.IS    IN    Vlk(.IMA. 


L1781. 


It  is  no  injustice  to  Tarloton  or  Clinton,  to  state,  tli.it  tiieir  entire 
correspondence  ,ind  ilisciission  upon  the  events  of  tlic  war,  partakes 
of  the  nature  of  i)ersonaI  controvers\',  ami  tlie  conclusions  are  very 
often  unjust  to  others,  rarely  to  tliemsel\'e>. 

Tlu-  time  \\m--  at  hand  for  the  arri\-al  of  \Vailiin;4t(jn  himself.  He- 
fore  enterin;4  upon  that  portion  of  the  narrative,  a  brief  statement 
of  the  naval  movements  which  involved  such  confusion  of  liritish 
opinion  and  realizetl  such  determinin;_j  consecpiences,  is  proi)crly  in 
place. 

Just  after  the  ,irri\al  of  reinforct'inents  for  (leneral  ('liuton,  already 
naticetl,  the  fount  de  i5arra<.  under  d.ite  (.f  May  elev<tuli,  informed 
Washini^^ton  that  the  Count  de  (irasse,  then  in  the  \\'e>t  Indie-s,  cx- 
pecteil  to  leave  Cape  I-'rancuis  for  the  Chesapeak-e.  with  fiom  tweiUy- 
fi\'e  to  twenty-nine  sail  of  the  line,  and  thri'e  thousand  two  hundred 
sokliers :  but  that  such  were  his  (■iiL;a':;"ements  with  land  and  naval 
forces  (if  ."-^paiu,  then  in  the  West  Indies,  that  hv  mu<t  return  b)-  the 
middle  of  (  Ictobcr.  '^he^e  fict>  materially  chan;.;'.:d  the  plan  of  eam- 
paiL;n.  New  V^vk  had  lic'cn  the  obji'ctiw-  <>\  .ittack,  accurdin;,;  to  the 
original  purpose  of  Ceneral  \\'a-hin;^lon.  altiiouL^h  not  fiMired  by 
Gener.d  R.icii  inibeau  or  the  I'rench  i;overnment.  Then:  were  too 
man\'  contin;_;riiciis  which  rendered  an_\-  permanent  I'"i'iMich  naval 
superiority  at  New  \'ork'  uncertain,  if  not  impossible. 

\\"ashinL;ton  promptU-  notified  l.a  I'',i)-ette,  by  letter  of  Au;4ust 
fifteenth,  (<f  the  chan;^'e  of  plan,  and  e.\plaiiu;d  t.i  that  officer  the 
importance- of  coiitriilliiv,;'  all  avenues  of  esc  pe,  so  ih.it  a  conce-ntr.ited 
movement  could  be  made  a;4ain--t  Lord  Comwallis.  It  has  been  seen 
that  (jeneral  I  ..i  I-",i_\ette  w.is  of  full  accord  in  opiiii.n.  ,ind  eepia!  to 
the  dut\'.  The  Count  de  Ibarras,  conini.indin;^  the  frencii  --iiuadron 
at  the  north,  con-,istiiv_;  of  ses'en  ships  (A'  tlie  line,  u,is  tlie  senior  of 
Count  de  (jra>^e,  and  liad  discretion.u')'  autiiority  from  tlu;  Mar-^hal 
de  Castries,  I-'rencli  Minister  of  Marine,  to  cruise  for  iiiiti-h  --hips  off 
tile  iianks  of  X'.wfoundk'inil  ;  but  he  w.u'veil  rank  ,md  independent 
command,  ami  by  thi^  pr<;mpt  expo-^ure  of  his  small  fleet  ar.d  a  well- 
planned  voya_L;e,  contributed  LMeatly  to  the  final  re-^ult.  .Admiral 
Rodney  comniandin;^  the  liriti-h  nival  force  in  the  West  Indies, 
learned  uf  the  proposed  moxcmeiu  of  Count  de  (irasse,  and  detached 
Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  fourteen  sliii)s  of  the;  line  to  intercept  him. 
The  I'Vench  force  sent  to  the  Americin  co.ist  was  ;.;reater  th.ui  under 
the  existin;^  circumstances  he  could  have  anticipated.  Admiral  Rod- 
ney presented  the  facLs  fully,  duriny  November  and   December,  17S1, 


^■^ 


1781.] 


I.A    KAYKI'lK    AM)   CORNWAI.I.IS    IN    VIKiilMA. 


6,5 


beforr  tlu'  House  of  ( 'oinnioiis.  hut  the  discussion  is  immatni.il,  al- 
tliiiu;_;h  he  had  IJ'irkc  as  his  cciisur.  The  (h;fi:ii-^r  of  .\diniral  (Graves, 
U'ho  succerdcd  Adniiial  .Aihuihiiot  at  \\-\v  ^^)l•k,  criuallv  discloses 
one  simple  fact,  \^liich  is  the  iiiati-rial  fact,  ih.it  the  l''retu  li  Ih.et  was 
equal  to  cope  with  an\-  uhich  it  niii^ht  meet,  and  Count  de  Grasse 
was  wi^e  in  thus  increa-^ini;'  his  sipiadron.  'i"he  I^itiih  llect,  so  de- 
tached from  the  West  India  squ.uh-on,  anlicipatid  tli.it  it  liad  only  to 
supph'nieiit  the  \e\c  ^'oik  .lud  Xeupoit  fleets,  and  w,is  not  etpial  to 
the  d(.inand.  l-'aihire  in  eonccrt  of  action  br(ni;4ht  additional  disap- 
pointment. 

Admiral  I  lf)0(l  s.iiled  for  America,  crossed  the  mouth  of  flusape.ikc 
Kay  just  before  the  arri\al  of  Count  de  (jrassc.  without  miterin;^  it; 
looked  into  iJel.iuare  ]jay  and  sailfnl  for  New  \'orl;,  where  he  arrived 
y\uL:just  twenty-ei_L;hth,  ,ind  reporte'd  to  Admir.d  (iraves.  That  officer 
had  but  five  ships  of  the  line  read)'  for  sea:  but  ujion  ad\ices  that 
Count  de  Jiarras  had  cei'taiid)'  started  from  Xewport  fiir  the  Chesa- 
peake, he  took  comniand  of  th.e  entire  -.ip.Mdn'n,  and  promptly  sailetl 
with  nineteen  ships  of  the  line,  on  the  List  '.^'i  Au;4ust.  On  the  fifth 
of  .September  he  passed  within  tile  capes  without  l;nowled;_;e  of  the 
presence  of  a  superior  adver>ar\'  foice.  The  I''rench  lleet  was  weak- 
ened by  the  .d)>ence  of  se\'i.ntecn  hundred  seamen  who  weri'  up 
James  l\i\er,  .am.  upon  first  intimation  that  a  sipiadroii  was  in  the 
'ifini;.,;,  (/ount  de  (irasse  supposed  it  to  be  the  sipKidro'i  (jf  C'ount  de 
I5arras.  The  r!L;h!  win;,;,  however,  mo\-,.d  prMniptlv  ijut  of  the  Ijaj' 
soiit Invar, {,  fiillowed  frum  I._\-na  ISa)-  b\-  the  remaiuin;^  shi[)s  as  the)' 
could  slip  anclior  and  m.dce  headw.iy.  The  llee'ts  mau'euvered 
for  five  d,i\'s  w  ilhiiul  comin;^  to  a  _L;eneraI  action,  but  with  sever.al 
shar[)  encounters.  The  J-"rench  casualties  were  two  hundred  ami 
twenty  killed  and  wi)unded,  and  the  I-Jii^lish  were  thre,  liundred  and 
thirt\--si.\'.  .Several  ships  suffered  considerable  dam,iL;e.  Meanwhile, 
see  ma[)  "  ()p(M"atioiis  in  (.'hesape.ikt.'  l>.i}'."  .Xdmii'al  li.irr.is  entereil 
the  bay  from  the  north  with  seven  shi|)s  of  the  line,  finuleen  trans- 
ports and  a  supply  of  sit'^^^e  i,'uns.  which  were  of  vital  importance  to 
the  allied  army.  Admiral  (jraves  ai^ain  entered  the  ba\-  ;  but  bein<^ 
advised  of  the  .arrival  of  Count  de  H.irr.is  and  a[)prehendin;^  danyer 
to  his  fleet  from  the  Lateness  of  the  se.ison.  with  no  fn'r  prospect  of 
an  engagement  (jii  c(iual,  or  e\en  fiir  terms,  he  s.uled  for  New  York. 

Such  vvas  the  condition  01  afiairs  when  W'.ishinj^ton  re.iched  La 
Fayette's  heailquarters.  The  I'rench  fleet  numbered  thirt)--five  ships 
of  the  line,  and  no  hostile  scpiadron  was  in  si^ht. 


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It  is  a  fact  to  he  iK'ticcd,  tli.it  iliiiiii;.;  the  war  of  1775  l7>Sr,  tlicse 
naval  opcTatioiiN  in  C'licsapcaki'  Uav  l)hiu;.;lil  to-i  llici  one  of  the 
heaviest  naval  aiMianicuts  knt)\\ii  to  mariliine  wairaie,  the  opposint; 
squailions  niiniheriiiL;  filty-two  ships  of  the  line  when  AdmiivJ  Graves 
sailed  for  New  \'ork. 

Nmi.  \l-\'Ui!h  iJiti,>i:.\  On  the  Jl  St  dl' A  iiuii-il,  I  7-^l ,  W'aslim^l' Ml,  wi  iliiii;  Inini 
1  l<M(l  On. 11  lev-.  Km:;^  Ici  n  .  lo  ( Im  (.■lUfU'  I  i\  iiiy-l.ni,  iiilni  iiicil  hi  in  lli.il  "In-  inli  mlcd 
10  in:ilili  in  |ii  immi  willi  ilu  wlmir  ol  llu'  I'lincli  Ainn  .ni.l  .1  il<  t:irhiniiil  Imni  llic 
AiiuTic.in  Arui\.  uiili  .is  niuili  ili>|.,ilili  ,i>  tiicnnisi.im  c  .  w.mM  .iiiinil.  iiilo  \'in;ini.i. 
l)(lic\  ilit;,  ill.  1 1  Willi  tlir  .11  lii.il  cil  ( 'u'liii  .!f  (ir.issc  ;iii.l  lii>  llirl  willi  .1  limly  iit  I  unrli 
IH)op>  1)1)  ImmiJ.  llirir  vvcinhl  l.c  the  |,|i.ir-l  •  in|.iii  I  nnil.\  l.i  n  .llh  r  lllc  x'.hiilr  lillll>h 
liircc  in  the  Sunlh,  .iiiJ  to  uiin  ihr  1  ho.i^ictl  cxik  ri.iii'iii'-  111  ih.ii  i|ii.irtri  "  I  lii~  Uitii, 
i.iUi'ii  liiiin  ill.  I.u  iim^lmi  ri)iii"-|i(iin|iii(T.  IS  |iul>li>hi<!  in  hill,  \y-\-  \\ .  |'.  1(1.  .^I.ii; 
\\\\.  Hist  (l-'i'li,.  l-s.  .1.  .Hill  nii,'(s  ••  riiniiiuu'il  1  li.  Ill  M  s,  cnii  .1  I'.un.niciil  .\i  iii\ .  .is 
the  great  object  ot  the  Si.iiis,  i!  iIkv  n-;^.iril  mjiiiuI  I'nlit  y,  riudriu  (   in  l^coiioiny 


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CHAPTER    LXXIV. 

WASHINGTON    AM>    KOCII  \MI!1:M '.      ARNOLD    AT   NEW    LONDON. 
FRiiM     rili;    Ili;i)SiiN     Vn    ^OKKroWN. 

Till'.  c,ini]),ii;_,'H  nf  17S1  illiistratiHl  wise  stratt:;.,')'.  ])r.)in[)t  lopjstics, 
and  '^ucccs^fiil  tactics.  mikK-i'  lirciinistanccs  of  j^rcat  dilticult}'. 
1  lu'se  can  !)c  apprcciatcil  only  by  coiist.int  ict'crcncc  to  the  whoKr 
tlicatrc  of  war.  'I'lu;  extent  of  coast,  and  the  nature  of  the  country 
behind  that  coast,  are  physical  facts  uhich  enhance  the  \ahie  of  the 
successes  reah'/.ed,  and  indicate  the  substantial  aid  which  the  United 
States  received  throui^h  the  su[)|)ort  of  l""rance.  The  Iiritish.  opera- 
tions were  jiredicateil  upon  the  control  ol  .Anierican  waters.  New 
\  ork  was  still  the  general  base,  and  tiirouLdi  the  nioventents  made  in 
the  middle  and  southrrn  /ones,  which  were  carrii.'d  on  from  Ports- 
mouth and  ("hark'-^toii,  the  stru;j;L;ie  w.is  L;radually  coniin;^-  t(5  a  sim- 
ple issui'  with  Lord  ("ornuallis.  who  liad  in  turn  coumianded  in  each 
x.onr.  I. a  l'"a_\'ette  and  <ireene  held  iioiuinal  relations  of  niutii  il  sup- 
port; but  neither  could  receive  early  information  of  tile  niovcinents 
of  the  other,  so  ,is  to  act  in  lull  accord,  ai)d  the  information  which 
was  from  time  to  time  receiveii,  w.is  so  differently  inter[)retiHl,  that  it 
was  for  ,1  Ioul;  time  uncertam  wh,it  were  the  real  fruits  of  Cinnlen. 
Cowpens  and  (juiltord.  The  march  of  Lord  Cornwallis  into  Virginia 
was  tile  first  emph.itic  fact  which  en.d;led  (jcneral  \\'ashinL;ton  to 
plan  an  efricieut  offensive.  Tile  repeated  detachment  of  troops  from 
New  York  so  sensibly  lesseiU'il  the  capacit}'  of  its  ;^.irrison  for  exten- 
sive field  service  at  the  north,  tli, it  the  American  Commander-in-chief 
determined  to  attack  that  po-t,  and  as  a  second, ir>'  pur[)ose,  thereby  to 
divert  General  Clinton  from  giving  further  aid  to  troops  in  the  Sinithern 
States.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  tlie  prudent  conduct  of  the  N'irginia 
campaign  eventually  rallied  to  the  support  of  General  La  l'"ayette  an 
army,  including  militia,  nearly  as  large  as  tiiat  of  Washington,  and  the 
nominal  strength  of  the  ahied  army  near  Vorktown,  early  in  Septem- 
ber w.is  nearly  or  (|uite  as  great  as  that  of  Loid  Conuvallis, 


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[17S1 


Tliric  ufic  otliii  I'Icim-iits  uliiili,  .1-  in  prrvioii-^  iMmii.iii^iis, 
h.uupirnl  npiMMti'-n^  ,it  tlir  north.  I  lu  Imli.in-  unc  -till  trniil)lr- 
souH-  in  WcMmu  Nc  \s  N'miK,  ,in.l  the  (  .m.K'.i.in  iVoiitin-  coiUiniu'd  to 
(irm.mil  .ittcniion.  I'lu'  Anniii,  ,in  n.ivy  h.id  pi.n.  ticills'  di-.ipiH  aicd. 
'riir  ■.(.•, ircity  ot'  moiii)-  .iiul  ,1  |io\\  i  rlcss  iwriiitiiiL;'  -rrviji.',  Iik-ilmm-J 
thr  (lil'luultii'-  of  iMrr>in;^  on  thr  way  in  a  m.iiHU  r  that  would  u-c  to 
the  best  ,idv.int.i;;r  the  tro,.])-;  o|'  I'r.ince. 

<  )ii    the    t'.\eni\-lh -^t    of    M.iy,   .1   military   cnilferenci-    uas    held    at 
Wctheistield.  (.'oniu'erieiit,  loiir   mile-   -,011th   from  I  lai  tlord,  at   \vhu  ii 
Generals  Kocli.imhiMU  and  I'ha-telhix  on  the'  part  of  ,lie  lM-eni  h  army, 
iiH'l  W'a-hiiv^toii  fir  the   imr])o-e  of  determimn;.;  a  plan   lor  the  en-ii- 
ill"-  lampaivMi,      A-  the  n'-iilt  of  the  intervie'w.  tin:  ("omit  de  Ivocham- 
be.in    wrote   to  ('mint    de  ( Ira-'.v',  rcMpie-liii;.;   him   to   -end   hi-  lleet  to 
act    in    Cooperation    with   ('omit  de  I'.arras,  and  to   elo-e    the    port   ol 
New  \'ork.      It    has   ,ihcad\'   bee-n    noticed    liiat    the   ( "ount  de-  ( jra-se 
indicated  lii-   piirpo-e  to  -ail   fir  the  ("he-ape  ike.  but  to  return  to  the 
We-t   Indie-   b\-  the  muldle'   of  (  )ctobe-r,  .iiul   that    the  l'"rench  i^overn- 
nu'iit  did  not    deem  a  m<i\ement    upon  New   \  oik  a-   pr.ictical)le.      It 
i-  to  Ik;  made  prominent   in  tin-  connection,  a-  the'   ke_\-  to  the  policy 
(.if  l-'rancc,  th.it  her  navv-  was  upon  a  f  ire'i-ii  coa-t,  th.it    it  was  -pared 
with  difficulty  from   the  \\\v-t  Indies,  .md  th.it  the  burden  of  -uch  aw 
cspetiition  N'.'ould.  ,dm  i-t  entirely  re-t    up  i!i  her  shoulder-.      With  the 
exception   of  the  C"rimean  w.ir  in   1S34.  if  that  indeed  be  an  exception, 
there  is  h.irdl\'  to  be   found  in  mihtar\-  annal-  a  more  cordial  co.ipera- 
tion  than  that  which  characleri/.ed  the  n  iv\-  and  army  ol  i.oai-  X\  1. 
in    .lid   of    the    United    St.ite-  durin.;-   the    w.ir    of     177;    i7,Si.      'The 
iiiniiidiatc  JHiution    of  the   two  .irmies   w.is   t'lr-t   deierinuied    upon   .it 
Welhersficid,  so  as  to  be   prep.ired  f)r  an>-  i^ood  opporlumt>-  to  be;4in 
operations.      The  Americ.m  .irm>-,  which  exhibited  an  ctlccti\e  streiv^th 
of  less   th.m    f)rty--ix  huiiiired   nun,  w.is  ordered  to  I'eekskill  on  the 
Hatlson.      The    (^.caml    de    Roch.imbe.ui    with   the    Duke   de    I„iu/un, 
tnarehed  from  Newvport.  acro-s  the  St.ite  of  Connecticut  .md  took  post 
at  Ridyebury.     This    w.is  a  sm.iU   vilki;4e  ne.ir  .S.ilem,  on   the   ro.id  to 
D.mbury.   about    fifteim    miles  b.ick    from    1-on.;    I-l.md   Sound.     Tin: 
first   offensive    dcsi;_;n  was   to  .itt.ick    Morris.mi.i,  where  Colonel  iJe- 
l.mcey's  RefLii^ees  had  their  heMdijuarters.      This  corp-,,  both  mounted 
and  foot,  was  the  terror  of  the  rcL;ion,  and  Westchester  County  became 
the  field  of  tlu.ir  o[)er,itions,  as  at  its  first  op^.mi/.ition  in  1776.      Dur- 
in;^  one  f  H'ay  as  fir  as  tiie  L'rotoii  River,  a  detachment  had  sur[)rised 
a    sin.ill    post    coinni mded    by    Colonel    Christopher    Green,   already 


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\V  A^lllVCTMN    AND    RncMI  \MI1K  \I ' 


^)I9 


noticc-d  for  L^ond  (.-ondiu-t  at  l?imkcr  IliU,  (jmhiA-  aiM  Ucil  IVmk,  .ind 
lir  had  hrcii  mistrcatc  d.  witli  a  >i\iiity  whirh  amu^i  il  tlu:  indij^n.ition 
of  \\'a^lilii;.;l'in  and  diMiiaiidfd  piiiiishiiK'nt . 

A  .V(V('^/r/  dr-,i'_;ii  to  !).•  coiuMi!'r''n!l\'  atlcmptrd.  \va^  to  si'izr  the 
Hrili'-li  po-,t'^  at  [hr  iMith  ciid  of  NJ  •  ,v  \'ork  Ulaiid.  Siirldon's  dra- 
;,;.iniis  and  -"iiu'  c  out  iiUMil.d  troops  \w\\:  to  coopi.TaU'  witli  a  iTriU'li 
iIi\i>ioii  iindiT  the  l)iik(,-  dc  I.auzuii  in  the  fornuT  luterpri-e,  whiK.' 
(ii'UiTal  LiiKohi  \va^  a^^i'.nicd  to  the  toiniuiuil  of  ,i  detachnienl  of 
troop-  friiiii  the  American  arm\  to  pi'i>eiiite  the  Litter,  This  force 
was  to  d(.>eetui  the-  lliid-oii  iiy  ho, it-,  ,iiid  tlie  third  ol  July  was  dc- 
sJLjnated  foil)oth  attacks.  ( jo\  eriior  (  liiilon  ( il  .\e\\  ^'ork  \\,i- .idviM'd 
f)f  \V,i^hin;.;;oir.s  pkm,  so  th,il  he  coiilii  coiicenti.ite  tlie  N'e'W  \'ork 
inilitia  in  c;i-e  (»f  success,  and  -i'^n.il  ;4un-^  ,i!id  fire-,  h.id  been  pre- 
arrani^ed.  to  i;i\-e  liini  notice'  of  ,i  fivor.i'oie  re-idt.  W.iihiir^^toii,  as  a 
niatti'r  of  tact,  looked  hi_\ond  tin-  o-ten-ihle  purpo>e  ot  tlu.'sc  orders, 
and  h'jped  th.it  a-urprisc  of  these  po-i- wonld  induce  (iener.il  Clinton 
to  .ittempt  their  rtcipture,  and  thu-  \n\n  \  on  a  ;^'ener.il  action  between 
the  .innies.  Ilu;  re'ported  det  iclnnent  of  a  coiiiideraljle  ior.ii^in;^ 
torce'  from  New  \'oik'  _;irri>on  into  .New  Jer-i\"  .ilso  induced  the 
belief  that  the  i".n;^li-h  commander  entertained  no  ten-  a-  to  the 
^,it'et\-  of  tlie-e  det.iclied  posts,  ,ind  th.it  tliey  would  be  but  indit'fer- 
^•nliv  i^uarded. 

(■lencr.il  Lincoln  left  I'eek-kiii  with  I'i;.'''  '  hundred  men  on  the  t'ir--t 
of  |une.  ])r(K'eedi  d  to  Tidier'.-  I'omt,  i,..,i  took  bo. its,  and  uith 
niuflled  oars  rowed  down  ]"api>an  SiM  at  ni-lit.  <  )n  the  mornini^-  ot 
tile  si'cond,  !)>■  hu;4L;iiv^'  tlic  eastern  shore,  he  re,:ched  1  )obb's  Ferry 
witjiout  bein;4'  discovered  by  the-  Jhiti^h,  \\',i->hin!4toii  mo\-ed  at 
ikiyli:_;iit,  (about  tlireo  o'clock  in  that  lalitudei  witiiout  b.e^j^-.ij^c, 
leaviiv,;  his  tuits  st.mdini;,  i),is-e'd  throir^h  I'arrytown,  ,ind  reached 
Valentine's  lliii,  lour  mile,-,  above  Kin ;j,s'Hrid!,;e,  b\' -unrise  of  the  thiri.1. 
He  w.is  thu-.  in  ,i  L;ood  position  to  support  and  cor)[)erate  with  either 
expedition. 

(ie-nera!  Lincoln  crossed  the  llud.son  in  a  >mall  i)oat  .ind  l.mded 
at  old  I'drt  Lee,  to  reconnoitre  the  countr\-  oiiposuc.  I L;  at  once 
(observed  a  Hriti:.!)  >hip  of  w,ir  Is'Iiil;  near  the  ^ilore  .md  that  a  lar^jc 
Hritish  cimp  h.id  been  e-ta!)!i-hed  on  the  extreme  north  end  ol  New 
York  Islau'.'.  A  surpri.-e  of  h'ort  \\a--hmi.;ton,  or  the  uutpo.-,ts  further 
u()  the  i-l,i!ui,  was  of  course  impo-sible.  I'he  troops  previou-.l\'  sent 
to  New  Jerse}-iiad  returned  and  reoccui)ied  the  Hritish  advance  lines 
to    the    northw.ird.      (ieiieral    Lincoln   left    I'cckskill  witli  alternative 


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[178! 


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for  this  oniiT'ciu-v,  .mil  In-  .it  nncf  n.'crosscd 


orders,  ;.'xprcssiy  proviiliiv^  lur 
till'  ii\i  T,  I.inilcd  hi-  tniDps  ju->t  .•il)()\i'  Spu\t(ii  Diivwl  i'riil<,  iic.ir 
Old  l'\irt  Iiilrpi.-mKiur.  .111(1  ihm  (KCiipird  hi-h  ;-;ii>mid  iilmi-  Kiiv^'s 
Mri(l|4i',  so  as  to  .ut  in  iiinciTt  with  the  Duke  di-  L.ui/iin.  and  cut  off 
.iiiy  ili'tachmciit  uliieh  nii;.dit  .ittiinpt  to  cross  tin.'  li.iiK'in  to  support 
Doliucry.  The  Duke  de  l.,ui/.un  in  the  mcatiwhili-  h.id  onl>-  riMchcd 
Ivist  Clu'stiT.  His  lioo|)s  h.id  been  we.uifd  !)>■  .1  liot  iiLuiii  over 
roii;^di  1  oiinti_\-  .md  were  se\i'r,il  lioms  later  lli.m  the  time  tlesi;;iiatc-(l 
for  the  .itt.iek.  The  troops  ot"  (  u'lier.il  Liiuoln  were  discovered  hy  .1 
f()ia;4inL,'  party  of  ne.irl>-  fourteen  hundred  nun,  .iiul  a  sharp  skiriin\^li 
ensued.  The  Duke  de  I..iii/un  he.iid  ..ir  firiiv.;  and  inarcluxl  to  its 
relief.  W.i^hin;_;ton  h.ul  .ilre.id\- marchi-d.  .md  ui)on  his  appro  ich  the 
nriti-.h  retired  to  New  \'o'k  Isl.nid.  W.i^hiiv^nou  reconnoitred  the 
position  durin;4  the  .ifteiiioon,  tluMi  fell  b.ickto  \'. dentine's  llilK.uul 
on  the  next  d.iv  to  DohhV  I'erry,  where  C'ouiU  de  ko(.haml)LMU  joined 
him  on  the  sixth. 

On  the  ei'.dith,  Sir  IIenr\'  Clinton  enclosed  snnie  iiiterce|)ted 
letters  of  \\'.ishin:_;ton  to  Cornw.iUi-.  stated  tint  he  w.is  "  threatened 
with  .1  sie.H-,"  an<l  asked  for  "two  ihous.iiul  troops,"  addin;j[,  "the 
sooner  the)-  come  tlu'  bettel'." 

Me.mwhile  the  .Vniericm  c  imp  had  been  est.iblished  with  its 
rii^ht  on  the  Hudson,  covered  b)'  e.irlli works,  and  its  left  .icross  S.iw 
Mill  river.  I"or  loc.ility,  see  m.ip  •'  Hudson  River  i  li|.dilands."  The 
l"'rench  .army  occu[)iei_l  tiie  h;lls  still  further  e.istw.ird,  .is  fir  .is  the 
river  Ihoux. 

("letier.il  \\'a--hin;;toii,  Count  de  Roclianil'n'  •  and  (ienerals  de 
Hoville  ,ind  Ihi  TorLiil  crossed  to  the  Jersey  1'  and  with  a  sm.ill 

escort  of  one  huiulri.'d  .md  fift)-  New  Jers'  m.ide  ex.imin.ition 

of  tile    New    York    Iskind    outposts.      'I  .   imniedi.itely   followed 

by  a  ricoiinoissdiiit'  in  forcr,  of  the  entiu.  British  fri^it.  from  Kiivjj's 
Hrid;^fe  down  the  Hmlsoii  Ri\er  ,ind  .ilon;.;  Hell  (iate  channel.  The 
command  consisted  of  five  llioii-.md  men.  in  two  divisions,  respectively 
led  li_v  the  Count  de  C'hastellux  .md  Crener.il  Lincoln.  The  troops 
m.irched  durin;^  the  e\-'.ui:;^  of  July  twenty-tlrst,  reacheil  King's 
Bii<h_;e  at  d,i}'liL;ht.  and.  formed  on  the  hills  back  of  I'ort  Iiulepen- 
de-nce.  I.auzun's  L.mcers  and  Sheldon's  Iiijht  inf.mtry  scoured  the 
vicinit\' of  Morris.mi.i,  .md  Sheldon's  tlr.icToons  went  ;is  f.ir  .is  {'"roir's 
Neck.  Tile  Refii_^ees  fled  to  isl.mds,  to  vessels,  and  to  the  woods. 
A  few  were  c;i[)tured.  but  Del.ince\-  himself  h.-ivin<;  succeeiled  Major 
Andrd  •■...  Aujui mt-yeneral,  no  longer  remained  at  the    hcadcjua.ters 


•  t 


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nf  liis  old  corps  .ind  was  not  exposed  to  cai)liirc.  GlmiltuIs  Wasliiiirj. 
toll  .ind  Roch.'inibcaii,  ,ittcnd(;d  by  a  sciu.idion  of  dra^^rooiis.  tlicii  made 
a  canTul.  Ostentatious  examination  of  all  tho  Hritish  ad\'iiiee  works, 
and  the  liiu:  of  the  Harlem.  jMssiii;.;  rejiealedlj-  under  I'iri'  from  ves- 
sels and  jiickcts.  iSy  midni;^ht  iif  tlie  tweut)- third  ihey  returned  to 
thi  ir  eneampment.  Mr.  Ir\in;;  says,  "  Tlie  immediate  effeet  of  this 
threatenin;^  movement  .ippi-.irs  in  a  letter  of  Sir  I  leniy  (  linton  to 
CornwaUis,  d.ited  July  2^)111,"  recpiestin;^  him  to  order  tiuee  re'^dments 
to  New  Vi)rk  from  Carolina,  writin;.^.  "  I  sh.dl  iMcjbabK'  want  them, 
as  well  as  tin-  troops  jou  may  be  ablf  to  s])are  me  from  the  Chesa- 
pe.ike,  for  such  offensive  or  defensive  operations  ,is  ma\'  n[':r  in  this 
(|uarter."  (."ornwalli-  h.id  already  ordered  two  of  the  lunnpian  re;^i- 
ments,  which  could  be  sjjared  durin;^  the  inactive  summer  months, 
from  Carolina  to  \ew  York,  and  was  "  refjuested  to  renew  the  order." 
It  has  been  seen  in  .1  pre\ious  chapter  that  Clinton  had  [)eremptorily 
.ind  repeatedly  ordered  troops  from  Vorktown  befon;  the  reconnois- 
sance  above  referred  to.  Clinton's  dispatcher  of  June  Sth,  lith,  \  }[h. 
19th  and  2Stli,  as  well  as  of  July  1st,  ,ire  of  this  L;eneral  character. 
In  that  of  tin:  Sth  he  thus  su;4!j;esli\'e!y  limits  the  pre\ious  semi- 
independent  commaml  of  CornwaUis.  (That  officer  had  directly  con- 
sulted the  Home  War  Office  and  had  been  sui)pi.rted  in  his  suij^^es- 
tions.)  "  As  _\-(iur  lordship  is  now  so  near,  it  will  be  unnecessary  for 
\'ou  to  send  \<uu  dispatches  innnediately  to  the  INIinister;  you  will 
therefore  be  so  L;ood  as  to  send  them  to  me  in  the  fiiture." 

The  position  of  the  American  Comm.mder-in-chief  ,it  this  time  w.i- 
one  of  peculiar  persona!  moitification.  Appeals  to  .St.ite  authorities 
failed  to  fdl  up  his  arm}'.  Three  thous.ind  Hessian  reiidorcemcnts 
had  landetl  at  New  \'ork,  .md  the  q;overnment  as  well  as  himself 
wcnld  be  comiiromised  before  the  whole  world,  by  fiilure  to  meet  the 
just  demands  which  the  I'Vench  ,ui.\iliaries  hail  ;i  ri;:;lit  to  press  upon 
his  .ittention.  Relief  came  most  opportunely.  The  fri'^Mte  Concorde 
arrived  at  Newport,  and  a  reiteration  of  ihe  purpii>e  of  Count  de 
Grasse  to  leave  St.  DomiuL^o  on  the  third  of  August,  for  tin;  Chesa- 
peake direct,  was  announced  by  a  special  messeiiL^er. 

The  possibilities  of  the  future  at  once  (pnckentnl  him  to  iiumetliati' 
action.  With  a  reticence  so  close,  that  the  army  could  not  fithom  his 
plans,  he  re-ori;anized  his  forces  for  a  ftr/sc  (f(iiio)istratio>i  ai;ainst  New 
York  and  a  rcnl  moroiiciit  upon  Yorktown.  The  exci-llent  Logistics 
of  La  F.iyette's  march  in  February,  were  to  be  ecpialed  b\-  the  energy 
and  favoring  circumstances  which  attended  the  progress  of  the  allied 


■     \ 


vV 


I' 

M 


h 

.1 


I  ■ : 


i 


'  m 


Hi 


b22 


armies  uiuier 


WASHINGTON   AND    ROCHAMnKAU. 


[1781. 


tin-  I 


)crsoiial 


lircctidii   of  \Vashin£?toii.     Lt:tters  tn  tlu; 


Governors  (if  nortlicni  States  called  for  aid  as  if  to  capture  New  York'. 
Letters  to  La  I''a\'ettc  and  the  Count  de  (irasse  embodied  such  inti- 
mations of  his  plans  as  would  Induce  proper  caution  to  i)revent  the 
escape  of  Lortl  C'oruwallis,  and  secure'  liausportation  at  ILmcI  of  Lllc. 


Other  letters  to  authnrilies  in  \e\v  J 
definin;^  a  plan   of  operatioris   a;_;ain 
,f 


erse_\-  and  riiiladelpiiia,  expressly 
St    Ni:\v  ^'ork   :•/(!  Staten    Isl.md. 


with  the  a-  airance  01  .imple  r.aval  support,  were  exposed  to  interceji- 
tion  and  fell  into  the  hands  of  (ieneral  (  lintoii. 

As  late  as  the  nineteenth,  the  roads  leadiiiLT  to  Kinij's  Hritl'je  were 


cleared  ot  ob.-,trucf ions,  and  the  arni\'  was  put  in  readiness  '  .dvancc 
<i;^'ain.-t  New  York  Island.  ( )n  the  same  d.i)-  the  Xeu  Jersey  retji- 
meiit  and  that  of  Colonel  Hazen  cmsse  1  the  Ihidson  ,it  Dohb's  I'err)'. 
to  threaten  .Staten  Island,  and  ostensibly  to  cowr  some  bake-house-^ 
wliich  were  beiiiL;  erectetl  for  t!ie  purpose  of  L^ixiiiL;  color  to  the  slu)\»' 
of  oi^eration--  .iLj.iinst  New  York.  The  plan  of  a  lari^e  encampment 
had  been  prepared,  which  embraced  .Sprini^field  and  the  Chatham 
I'ass  to  Morristown,  .iiid  this  was  .dlowed  to  find  its  way  to  (.'liiUon's 
headcpiarters.  (ieneral  Heath  was  assiL;"ned  to  command  of  the  ilud- 
son-river  po-^t■-,  with  two  rei^inients  from  New  l[am[5shire,  ten  trom 
Massachusetts,  fi\e  from  Connecticut,  the  Third  arlillcy,  Sheldon's 
dragoons,  the  iiwaiid  cor[)s.  all  local  comp.mies,  .iiul  the  militia. 

The  f  lilowini^f  forces  were  selecteil  to  ;'.ccompan\'  the  Commander- 
in-chief,  viz.,  the  light  infantr\-  under  Colonel  .Scammel,  four  light  com- 
panies from  New  York  and  Connecticut,  the  i\hode  Island  regiment, 
under  the  new  army  otablishmeiit.  two  New  York  regiments,  that  nf 
New  Jer>e\-  and  li.izen's  regiment,  (the  last  two  alre.uly  acreiss  the 
Hudson)  and  Lamb's  artiH^r^-,  in  all  .ibout  two  thousand  nu'ii. 

The  Anu'ricm  troops  crossed  on  the  twent\'-fns' ,  at  King's  l'\,'rr\', 
and  encamped  near  Ilaverstraw.  The  French  arm)-  f(.)llowed,  and 
the  ami)'  was  uniieil  on  the  twenty-t'ifih.  During  the  deki)-  in  the 
/a.s.sagc  of  the  trooi)s,  Count  ile  Kochambeau  accomp.inied  General 
Washington  to  a  final  inspection  of  West  Point  :  and  the  heaikpiar- 
ter.s  at  New  Windsor,  between  that  post  and  Newburgh,  were  substan- 
tially ■ibaiuU)ned. 

The  .\merican  army  marched  promptl)'  toward  Springfield  on  the 
Railway,  anil  the  French  army  for  Whippany,  toward  Trenton.  The 
American  train  was  accompanied  by  bateaux  on  wheels,  as  if  to  cross 
more  proinptl}-  to  Staten  Island,  and  Washington  thus  states  his  ob- 
ject :   "  That  much  trouble  was  taken,  and  finesse  used,  to  misguide 


f 


I 


I7SI.1 


\V.\sni\(;i()\   AND    KOCHAMIiKAL', 


623 


and  bcwildor  Sir  llcmy  Clinton  in  ix'ij^cird  to  the  rc.i!  object,  by  ficti- 
tious communications  as  well  as  b\'  makinij  a  dcci-.'])tive  provision  of 
ovens,  fcirai^e  and  Ijd  its  in  liis  neii^liborlmod,  i>  certain.  NDr  were 
less  pains  takm  to  iiecei\e  our  own  .irmy,  for  1  liad  al\\a\--.  concei\ed 
when  the  imjiosition  does  not  completely  take  place  at  home,  it  woukl 
never  sufficiently  succeed  abroad." 

General  \Vasiiin'_;ton  and  suits,  reached  riiikulelphia  about  noon, 
August  thirtieth.  The  armv  had  aln  ,'d\-  ri'alized  tlu;  fact  that  thev 
were  de-'iined  Miuthw.ird.  ."^oine  dissali-^faction  \\as  manifesteil  ;  but 
Count  de  l\oehand)eau  ad\anced  twentj-  thou>aiul  tloliars  in  L;old 
upon  the  pIedL;e  of  Robert  Moiris  that  he  would  refund  the  sum  by 
till'  fu>t  of  (  Ictobcr,  .uul  the  iffe ct  upon  the  troop^,  who  had  lony 
\)vcu  without  iii/j'  pay,  was  in>pirin;^'.  'Ihe  ani\al  of  Colonel  John 
Laurens  from  f'rance,  1  re,icliin_L;'  r>o>toii  an  Cue  tu  enty-fiflli,  1  \va^  a 
source  of  >till  (Kcper  satisf iction.  lie  broui^ht  cloihin!4,  ammunition, 
and  hail'ct  million  of  dollars  in  ca->h,  as  ,1  [lait  of  six  millions  of  li\re.-., 
$1 , 1  I  1 , 1  1  I ,  L;eiurou^l\'  furnished  b_\-  l.oui-.  WT.  Adtiitional  ^ums 
were  pledi^ed.  I)r.  fiaiiklin  hael  seeurinl  a  loan  of  fmr  minions  of 
livres.  $740,740  to  cover  Americ.m  ilrafl>,  before  the  .urival  of  Colonel 
I^aurens,  and  Count  de  \'rr;,;ennes  had  agreed  to  L;uar,uitee  a  lo.m  in 
Holland  fir  ten  million  lisies.  Si,S5i.S3i  more. 

On  the  -icond  of  September  the  American  .irniy  made  its  ihini 
•^l.id  entrv  into  I'hiKuklphia,  ami  w.i>  receiveil  with  enthu-iasm.  On 
the  ne.\t  d.i\'  the  l-"rench  ,u'm>',  after  ,1  brit'f  h.ilt  to  eieaii  iiiiilorm,-. 
and  accoutrements,  made  it>  brilli.mt  passaL;^'  throu;..;h  the  Aniericm 
capital.  'Iheir  rich  f(U'ei;,;n  uniforms  coiUra.^tetl  with  the  fuled  cloth- 
uig  of  the  ceiluuiii  that  had  iias>ed  the  t!a_\-  betore.  The  whole  popu- 
lation a^ain  minided  .ill  tokens  (if  cou'^ratulation  antl  joy;  but  there 
was  p.o  time  i\)V  protracted  honors.  The  i)lainl\'  e(|uipped  (.let.ichnuuL 
of  \\'a>hint;ton's  veterans,  Imwever,  lost  no  credit,  accordini,y  to  the 
h'reiich  autlhjritie-^,  in  the  steadiness  of  their  march  and  their  tltness 
fir  battle. 

I)isi)atches  here  received  from  (iener.d  l.a  I'"a)ette,  dated  on  the 
twenty-first  of  Au^^ust,  infirnied  (ieneral  Washington  that  "the 
Ihitish  troops  were  fjrtif\-in;4  Cloucester "--  that  "a  small  _^arri>on 
still   remained  at    i'ortsmoudi  "— -  that    he   "had  written   to   the   Cov- 


ermu'  to  collect  si\  hundred  militia   upon    I'lkickwater 


to   Cn'lieral 


tirci^ory  near  l'orl>mouth,  that  he  h.ul  an  acceiunt  that  the  enem\- 
intcntled  to  push  a  tletachment  to  Carolina,"-— to  (ieneral  \\a\-ne  "to 
move  to  the  st)uthward  and   be   ready  to  cross   the   James   at  W  est- 


I 


1.,  I 


■••I 


n 


t  u 


i\ 


».  I 


624 


AKNDi.I)   Al'    NI.W    I.ONDijN. 


[1781. 


'! 


over,"  .111(1  tli.it  "the  anii>' wiiulil  soon  assciiihio  a'^ain  uprni  the 
w. iters  ut'  the  Cliiek.ihoniiii)'."  riii>  letter  h.is  been  previmisly 
iiiiticei.1,  lor  other  exlraets.  He  h.ul  achisid  (ieiier.il  W'a.shiiiL^toii 
of  the  oeeup.itioii  of  Yorktowii,  in  .1  letter  d.ited  .\u;j;iist  ei;4hth. 
Up  to  this  time  no  further  iiitelliL;ence  had  been  reeeivetl  of  the 
movements  ■ifthe  Count  de  (ir,is>e. 

Un  the  >eeoiul  of  September,  while  tli"  American  arm;.'  was 
iviarehin;.;  tlirou;_;h  I'liil.iddphi.i,  Sir  Ileiirv  Clinton  sent  a  courier 
ves,-(,;l  to  VMrktown,  With  the  foUowin;,;  dispatch:  {Clinton  to  Li>ni- 
:£'(r//.'.v>  "  September  scccJiid,  17S1."  tin  c_\'])her.i  R-..,.'i\-ed  fifteenth 
Sei)tember.  "  Mi',  \\'ashin;^loii  i>  mo\in;_;'  an  ,irni\'  to  the  southward 
with  an  ,ippeaiane>:  o'  li.iste.  .uid  ;4i\'es  out  th.il  he  expects  the  coup- 
cr.Uion  of  , I  Considerable  hreiich  armament.  Vour  lords!ii[),  hiiwcver, 
in.i\"  l)e  .isstired,  til, it  if  tlii-.  ^llould  be  the  cise,  I  sh.ill  either  ende.ivor 
to  reiniorce  the  .irmy  under  )■  aii-  c  unm.ind  by  .ill  the  iiu.ius  within  the 
compa'^^  ot  uiy  power,  or  in.il'.e  eve'r\  pos>il)i('  ihxersion  in  _\iiiir  l.ivor." 

'•  !'.  .S.  \\  ,.sliiii;_;ton,  it  is  s.iiii.  wa--  to  be  at  'rrcnlo.i  tiiis  il.iy,  and 
mean-  to  'ui  \\\  ve-scls  to  Chri-ti.ui.i  Creek,  .ind  h'om  thence,  hy  ile.ul 
of  Elk.  down  C'he-.ipe.ike,  in  \es>els  .ilso.  ,  .  .  W.ishiiv^toii  h.is 
about  f<iur  thou -.and  l''rencii  ;md  two  til'  'U -.111  d  rebel  ti'oops  with  him." 

l)n  the  liltii  of  .September.  ( ieiier.il  W'.i-hiu-toii  sl.irted  t'or  lie. id 
o\  I'dk.  lie  had  ju-t  pM^,>eil  Che.-.ter  when  .1  courier  met  him  with 
dispatches  wiiicli  .miiounced  tiie  .ini'wil  ol  the  L'ount  de  (jra.sse.  lie 
returned  to  Chester  to  .uKa'se  (..'ount  de  Koch.imbe.iu  ol  the  news,  .iiid 
nio  ■■  directly  on,  re.ichiii;,;'  llead  of  Lik  the  luxt  iiioruin;^.  'I'his 
di  .[,atcii  reaclieil  I'uil.idelpiu.i  duriiii;-  ,1  b  iiiipiet  ;_;iven  by  tiie  French 
utficers  to  liie  (,  hewilier  de  Lu/.erne,  acconii).inied  b_\-  tiie  .uldition.il 
.imiouncement  ot  the  l.indiuL;'  of  Coimt  de  .St.  .siiuoii,  .ind  In-,  junction 
with  La  ].''.i\-ette.  The  y.\Ay  had  closci  uitii  a  re\'iew  ot  the  I'"rench 
.iriu\-,  which  had  been  atteiuJed  b\'  the  rre>idcnt  ol  CoiiLjress  ;  and  the 
cit)-  w.is  thrilled  with  fresh  pride  and  hope,  .is  the-^e  successive  e.xcite- 
iikmUt  cime  m  to  bri-iiteii  tlie  nation. il  life.  Un  the  day  that  W'ash- 
in^.;ton  .irri\ed  ,it  Ile.ul  of  l-,lk,  -Su'  ileiir)'  Clinton  sent  the  followiiii^ 
di>p.itch  to  Lord  Cornw.illis: 

"  CiinUin  to  Lcri/u'ii//!.^,  Seiit.  sixth,  at  noon.  (In  cypher.)  (Re- 
ceiveil  .-li.xteenth  September; : 

"  As  1  find  by  )our  letters  that  Do  Grassc  has  got  into  the  Chesa- 
peake, .ind  I  have  no  doubt  til, it  \V.ishini;toil  is  movir.L;  witii,  at  le.i^t 
six  thou-.uul  l''rencli  .md  rebel  troops  ay.iinst  you,  I  think  the  best 
u.i)'  to  relieve  )-ou,  is  to  join  you,  as   sooii   as   possible,  with  all  the 


1. 


i78r. 


ARNOLD   AT   NF.W    LONDON', 


''^-'5 


lusly 


fiiicf  that  can  be  spared  from  licre.  which  is  al)i.nit  four  thousanci 
men.  /'//(;)'  <irr  alr.iuiy  tuibarkrii,  (Itah'cs  not  in  the  (U'ii^inali,  and 
will  pill. :cc(i  ihc  in>tant  I  receive  intm  inalinn  Irnni  the  adnural  that 
we  ni.i_\-  vintnre  ;  or  that  fnim  other  intelli;_;ence  the  cominmlorc 
and  1  shoulil  judi^e'  sufficient  to  mow  upon.  15y  accounts  from 
ICuropc  we  have  every  reaxjn  to  e.xpect  Admiial  ni;d)\'  hourly  on  the 
coast." 

<  This   Ni.Kth   day  of   September  wa.s    L.a    l'a\ette's   twenty-fourth 
birthday.) 

(.)n  the  same  (\\\  a  15riti>li  torcc   from    Xew   \'ork  landed   in   New 
I'.iv^land. 

As  soon  as  (leneral  L'linton  found  th.it  Washin^jton  had  moved 
against  Cornwallis,  he  attempted  to  check  liis  march  b_\'  ,\\\  inwr-ion 
of  Connecticut  ;  and  this  was  intrusted  to  the  connnand  ot  (ieiii  r,d 
Ik-nctlict  Arnold.  It  was  his  native  State,  and  he  had  become  an 
oljject  of  .IS  intense  hati'cd  as  lie  h.ul  lormerly  commanded  liomaLje. 
No  po-sible  selection  could  ha\'e  been  more  injudicious,  , is  a  matter 
of  nnlitary  polic)',  not  exceptiiiL;  that  of  'r.irleton  or  Sinicoc  :  and  no 
man  \v.l-^  better  prepared  b_\-  his  .mtecedents  to  move  whereAer  he 
could  >a!ely  destro)-  lite  .ind  propL-rtw  i'e;_;".irdless  ot  restraint.  The- 
man  whom  I'liilliiis  antl  C.'oriiw.dlis  could  not  .associate  with,  except 
officially,  and  wiiom  Clinton  eiulureil  under  the  pressure  of  |),ist  tr.i- 
lernU)-  in  his  treason,  w.is  Just  the  man  whom  \\",i^liin:;ton  could  safely 
lea\e  to  the  cire  of  the  citizens  and  miiiti.i  of  Ne'w  ICuL^land.  An)' 
te-mpor,iry  success  would  only  insure  his  ile-truction.  .V  wild  anim.il 
could  commit  r,iv,iL;e,  but  an  aroused  people  would  ma^-ter  him 
.it  last.  .So  with  Arnolij.  It  was  a  \'er)-  ;4ra\'e  error  to  pre-unu; 
that  lie,  of  all  men.  could  afu  ct  the  mo\ements  ot  \\'.i-hin;^'ton  ,ind 
Rochambeau.  If  Clinton  had  taken  the  ;4arrison  of  Xew  Vork,  or 
half  of  it.  into  the  ikdd,  lie  would  h.ive  aided,  pos^ibl\'  havt:  saved 
I'ornw.illis. 

The  expedition  of  .\rnold  consisting,;- of  the  'riiirt}--eiL:hth,  one  hun- 
tlrcd  V,i;_;iM-s,  the'  Third  batt.ilion  of  New  Jersey  \-olunteers,  the  loyal 
.Vnieric.ms,  .\merican  Rekii^ees  and  artillerists,  .uul  three  six  pound- 
ers ,ind  one  howitzer,  left  New  York  September  fourth.  ,ind  1  indetl  on 
ijolh  sides  of  New  London  harl)or  i\ul>'  on  the  ^ixth.  Captain  IScas- 
ley's  report  to  the  .admiral  stales  that  it  was  .ibout  half  i)a.^t  six  when 
the  vessels  entered  thi'  liarb  w  :  and  .iccordm;  to  .\rnold's  report  the 
landing  was  eftected  about  nine  o'clock.  Reterence  is  made  to  map 
"  Ijcnedicl  Arnold  at  .W.a  London."  This  expedition  was  tor  pur- 
40 


< 


\\ 


\   \ 
It 

V 

1   \ 


'    \ 


\   I 


;  1 


' 


. :.,  •  m: 


,  "i 


II 


Si 


If 


626 


AKNol.I)    .\r    NKW    LONDON. 


[1731, 


poses  of  plmiiK-T  .iml  ilc-olalion,  wilhoiit  anticiji.ition  of  h.ittK-. 
AriioKl  Liiidcd  oil  tlu-  west  side,  mi  ,i->  to  eiUci"  the  trnvii.  "  An  un- 
finisheil  mere  Ijieasluoik  or  \v. iter  battery,"  as  I  l.unpste.ul  -l)'le>  it. 
called  I'ort  rrimihull,  almost  open.  !aiul\var(i,  wai  the  oiil)-  defensive 
Wiirk,  exeept  .i  >mall  redoubt  on  hi,;lier  ;.;iMim,l  in  tliereai.  called 
I'ort  I'olly  or  I'ort  Non-^eii-^e.  fort  rrnmbuU  was  oeeupied.  !))•  Cap- 
tain A<iam  Shople}'.^  di  taehme'nt  of  State  troo[)s,  less  than  thirt_\- 
>lroiv_j,  usuall)'  stated  .it  twenty-lhrec  or  four  men  l)i.'>ide~-  himself, 
Arnold  (ielaclu.'d  Capt.iin  W'illett  with  fuu'  e  mip.iniesof  the  i'iiirt)' 
eiylith  to  oeeup)'  Imhi  rrunibull,  .uul  adv.ineed  directly  upon  ihi; 
town.  C.ipt.iin  W'lllett's  loree  was  joined  b_\- one  hundred  and  twenty 
American  Ketie^eis,  under  Cq)t.iin  frink",  who  Iku!  l)i.'en  sent  be  l.ien- 
teiiant-colouel  L'pham  froni  I'ort  l'"r.uiklin,  ,i  slock, uie  firt.it  Idowl'-, 
Neck.  .Simcoe's  old  hcidipiarters  on  Lon;_;  I-^kind.  iiearle  oppusile 
New  London.  •l)urin!_;  the  previous  j'e.ir,  17.S0,  there  had  Ijeen 
ori;.ini/.ed  on  I-on;4  Isl.iiul  .1  lUuuii  i>/'  .[ssociatiif  /.i<\<itis/s.  nicludin!^ 
such  per-ous  ,is  wouKl  ,iid  the  kin;^,  but  ileclined  ,i  reiqil.ir  niilit<ir\- 
ser\ici.-'.  It  pro\oked  fri;4htlul  collision^  with  citi/.eMis  of  ojipusite  sen- 
tinuaus,  ,uul  some  ot  the  more  b.irb, irons  mnior  oper.itions  of  ci\'il 
w,ir.  Dui'ii;;  Jui)'.  17S1,  Admir.d  Harms  sent  .1  detachnu.-nt  of  troops 
from  Newport,  witii  thi'ee  fri;^ate>.  to  reduce  l'~ort  Willi, im,  then  l;,ii- 
I'isunecl  !))•  nearly  ei;,;ht  hundred  l\.efuL;ees,  but  .ib.imhjiied  the  enter- 
l)rise  .liter  the  c,i[)ture  of  s(;me  British  m. nines  .it  lluntiir^toii  Ikiy. 
Los>in;4  st.ites  th.it  the  as-oci,ition  w.i-.  dissoK'ed  kite  in  1781,  beciuse 
ot  the  manilvit  miscinef  it  w,is  workini^^  to  the  ro\,il  c.iiise." 

C.ipt.iiu  .Saoplcy"^  men  delivered  one  Voile)',  dis.iblui;,;  f  )ur  or  fivi-  (jl 
the  assail, ints,  and  .ibaiuloned  the  lort.  t.ikin;_;  bo.Us  for  l'"ort  Griswold 
(Jne  !)o.it  w.is  sh.ittered  by  ,1  nine  po'under  b.ill,  but  about  tweiilv 
of  his  men  s.ifely  joinetl  the  other  -aarison.  .\rnokl  ni'  '  with  only  a 
nominal  resistance  from  hustil)'  .iiiiied  citizens,  there  bein;^  no  con- 
siderable milit.u'y  force  in  the  vicinity. 

The  ri;^ht  win^;',  under  Lienten.inl-colonel  li\'er,  l.mded  back  of 
I'ine  Iskiiul,  .md  m,n\hed  in  two  divisions,  the  l''ift\'-fourth  .ind 
Fortieth  re:;iments  respecti\  el\- le.uliiiL;' e.ich.  i'lie  New  Jerscv  Volun- 
teers and  .irliller\'  w  li,i  kiiided  List,  wen:  in  the  re.ir,  .uul  fell  behind, 
vvliile  makiii;.;  the  circuit  of  some  .sw.imp)'  L^numd,  so  th.it  the)'  did 
not  re  ,icli  the  summit  of  the  hill  upon  which  Fort  firiswold  rested 
until  .diei  the  slonnin;^  p.irt)-  _L;aineil  possessujii  of  the  r.impart.  As 
soon  ,is  AriioKl  secured  possession  of  l'"ort  I'l  iinibuU,  he  noticed  that 
"the  shipping  in  the  h.irbor  w.is   .ictively  en-.iged   in  prep.ir.itioiis  to 


ip:*  '^ 


I7SI. 


I7SI.1 


AUN-  M  \>    A  I     NI.W     l.(iN'l)(»\. 


627 


ri'tiri'  up  till'  Xorwich  Rivrr  "  i  N'oiwich,  only  tliiiti-cii  mik'-;  (list.uit. 
was  Aninl(i's  biitli-pLicci.  and  tliiis  states  tlic  lasi;  in  liis  ii.port  :  "  ! 
Idunil  till--  i'n(--iiiy's  shi])-^  wduK!  (.•■^capc.  uiiUss  wc  cmild  possess  nur- 
srK'cs  ()t  I'nrt  ( i:  i->i\  m1(1.  p'roni  inlorniatinn  I  iTcei\  rd,  lirfore  and 
iitlcr  111)'  l.nuliiiL;,  1  liad  i\M.-,iin  ti>lKlie\e  that  I'Oit  (Iri-wnld,  on 
Gruton  side,  wa-)  very  inenmplete  ;  and  I  was  assured  by  tVie'ids  to 
^overiiinent,  ,itter  in\-  landin.;',  th.it  there  were  only  twenty  or  thirty 
men  in  tiie  fort,  the  iiihai)itants  in  [general  heiiiL;  (Mi  hoard  the  -hips 
and  hns)-  in  sa\iie4  their  pr^piat)-.  1  tlieretore  di-.p,itehi^d  aw  oi'tleer 
to  I.ieul'  r.anl-eoloiiel  I'.yer,  with  the  intelhi;ence  I  had,  recei\i'(l,  and 
re(juested  iiini  to  make  an  att.iek  on  the  lorl  as  soon  a-^  pos-ihk' ;  at 
whieh  time'  1  e.\[)eeted  the'  liowit/er  ua>  up,  and  would  lia\-e  been 
made  use  ok  <  )n  my  ;_;aininL;-  a  hei^^ht  of  L^round  in  the  ic  ar  of  New 
London  from  uliieli  1  had  a  i^ood  jirospeet  of  I'ort  ( iri-w  okl,  I  louivl  it 
nuu  h  more  lormi(kible  than  I  expeeted,  or  I  li.id  torni'-  '  in  itle.i  of 
from  the  inform. ilion  I  had  i)elore  ri_eei\ed.  I  obser\  ..  '  the  sai;;-. 
time  tii.il  tile  men  who  liad  escaped  lioni  k'ort  rrumbii  '  ad  cros.-ed 
in  bo, 1 1,-^  and  iiail  thrown  themsi.'l\es  into  l-'oit  (iri-\<okk  and  a  ki\'or- 
able  wind  >prinL;inL;  up  about  this  time,  theenemy">  -hip>  w  ere  e>c.i|)- 
in;^'  up  the  river,  notwit hstandin;^  the  lire  from  h'ort  rrunibull  and  a 
six-])ounder  I  liad  brote^lit  u  itli  me.  I  immediate])- tli.>p, itched  ,1  bo,:t, 
with  .111  officer,  to  Lii'uten.int-colonel  I-',)er  to  countermand  m)'  first 
order;  but  the  ofticer  .irri'.  c-d  .1  tew  minules  too  Lite.  After  ;i  most 
obstin.ite  delense  of  iie.ir  f  )rt)-  minutes,  the  fort  w.is  c.irried  b)-  the 
superior   br.i\er\'  ,iiid  perse\'er.iiR\' of  the  ass.iil.mts." 

The  ch  ir.icter  of  Arnold's  incursion  is  indicated  b\'  iiis  confidence 
that  he  w.is  to  meet  with  no  serious  oppo-itioti  .iiid  courted  none. 
While  he  was  w.itchiiv^  I'urt  (Iriswojd,  the  l'"ortieth  and  l'"ift\-  fourth 
were  storiniii:_;'  its  works.  The  outline  of  this  u'oik,  with  ,1  sm.ill 
ud\'.inceil  reiloubt.  connected  with  a  eovered  w.i)'.  '  ciurectl)'  ;_;i\'en 
on  the  map,  .iiul  .iii)'  \  isilor,  ,is  Lite  as  1  .'s7<),  could  tr.ice  the  -teep 
]>,ir,il)et,  to  the  south,  the  b.islions.  the  deep  ditch,  and  even  ex.inn'ne 
the  old  well,  and  the  t  ri.iiiL;ular  i)rea>twork  which  j^ni.irdi'd  the  entrance. 
A  sm.ill  kiioU  near  b),  Aver)-'s  Hill  or  I.eihj;e,  was  the  rendezvous 
lor  the  .is-...iil.mt>,  who  did  not  wail  for  their  .irtillei)-,  but  witii 
eager  confidence,  alter  q.itherin;^  their  forces,  were  read)-  to  ad- 
v.mce  to  the  .assault.  The  position  w.is  stroii;;-  :  but  its  defenders 
were  \\-\v.  'Idle  sm.ill  reinforcement  from  I-"ort  Trumbull  did  not 
make  tiie  garrison  more  th.m  one  luuulreil  and  sixt)-  all  told.  It  was 
a  severe  test  for  the   h.mdful  of  men  wiio  .saw  the  a[)proaching  rcgu- 


:  ! 


MS 


i' 


<1 


i;f 


■  i'.  i 


\'\ 


U  (f 


6jS 


AKN(M.l)   Al'    M:W    I.<iMio\. 


|i:.ii. 


lars,  wlio  kiu'A'  that  the  opposite  shore  \v;is  ahv,ul\'  i;i  r>iiu--ii  p  )^- 
scsMJon  .uul  th.it  tlK'ir  li\cs  \\\\c  to  be  imixrilcd,  scLiiiiir^ls',  inr  hon- 
or's sakr.  Hut  >i  siu'Ci-ssful  (k'U'usc  nii;^ht  rrwrsc  tht;  \vh' ilc  i-;>iK:. 
N(j\v  l.itiidoii  h.iil  then  ii'it  been  fneil.  I'he  diil)' po^.-^ible  pniiUot 
resistance  was  l'"oit  (IriswoKl.  Success  wnuKl  I'.rive  the  Urili^li  ri^jht 
\vin;4  to  their  >hips. 

Accoriiiiv,;  to  Arnold's  report,  when  liis  inessen_L,^'r  reached  Lieu- 
teiU'inl-ciilonel  I'L\'er,  "  lie  had  ahcady  sent  C'aptain  In'ckwith  with  .i 
flaL,^  to  deni.md  a  surrender."  Cai)tain  ShnpKy  recei\eil  the  tlai;, 
accorcUuL;  to  tiic  statennT.ts  contained  in  Lieuten.mt  Sti'iilien  llam- 
steaii'>  narrative  and  llie  equally  intere-<tinL;'  work  dI"  Miss  ( "aulkins, 
conipileil  from  the  >l,ilenients  of  sur\'iv(irs  of  llie  a-sault.  .//  /irst,  "a 
council  of  war  unaniuMUsly  voted  that  th.'  i;arri>on  \\a^  !ii/,>/'/c  in 
defend  themselves  a;_;"ainst  so  superior  .i  tOrce."  "  Colonel  Nath.m 
(ialiup  of  the  (Irotoii  nnlitia.  who  was  present,  iir^isted  h<.wi\er,  that 
in.'  Could  procure  a  r.-inforcenieiit  of  t\\o  or  three'  hundre'd  piilitia, 
III  Jlllccii  iiuiiutc.<:,\\  the  ;^arrison  wouUl  holdout;  .and  Lieute'nant- 
colonel  Ledxard  was  unfortunatel)-  milled  by  thc^e  as-.urance>,  and 
ri'turned.  throu;_;h  ("a[)tain  Shop!e_\-.  ,in  answer,  declinin^^  to  comply 
with  the  ortler.  Unfoi  tunate!_\-  the  Colonel  failed  to  meet  with  that 
succe-s  which  he  expected  -his  men  ot'fiiia'  to  iiuit  titc  tiuiiiy  in  the 
fiiid,  but  pcrciiif'toyily  rfiiliiiiii^i^^  to  iut,r  tlic  fort  to  fiy^lit  a^^ainst  siioli 
[)\(Xt  odds  witli  no  iliaiur  to  osod/'i." 

As  ,1  /dir,  iiitsiucrssjiil  re-i>tancc  involved,  oi-dinarily,  only  a  tair 
surrentler,  and  .is  onl\"  ^ucll  men  .i>  jjuli.i  be  ri'adily  r.iilu.'d  could  par- 
ticip.ite  in  the  defense,  it  is  evident  that  the  quot.ition  m.ule  cm  not 
be  precisely  historical.  .Militia  wcuid  ha\e  preferred  tlie  tort  to  the 
exjKisuie  of  Ciroton  llill.  H.irber,  in  his  Historic. il  (JoUeclions,  -tates 
that  "  on  the  advance  of  the  enem\'  Colonel  Ledv.ird,  liavin;^  but  one 
hunched  .md  fifty  men  with  him  in  the  fort,  sent  <iut  an  officer  to  [^et 
assistance,  .is  there  were  a  number  of  hundreds  of  people  collecteti  in 
the  \icinity  ;  this  officer  by  drinking;  too  much,  becime  intoxie.iteil, 
and  no  ri'inforcemeiU  w.i>  obtained." 

The  defuse  of  J'"orl  (in>\\old  durin;^  the  .ifternoon  of  September 
sixth,  17S1,  was  correct!)-  characterized  by  Arnold  as  "most  obsti- 
nate."  His  officially  re[)orted  loss,  viz.,  "one  m.ijor,  one  captain,  one 
lieutenant,  two  ensi;j;ns,  two  sergeants  <ind  forty  rank  an<l  file  killed; 
aiui  one  lieutenant-colonel,  two  c.ipt.iins,  one  lirutenant,  one  ensign, 
eight  sergeants,  two  drummers  and  one  hundred  and  twent\'-seven 
rank  and   file  wounded,  total  of  casualties  one  lumdred  and  sixty- 


Tfl 


':^i. 


1781. 


AUM  nil    A  I     M  W    loNlii  i\. 


620 


t'lrcc,"  and  exceed in;^  the  number  of  tlie-'_;.nris()ii,  iiulie.itcs  the  ch.ir- 
acter  of  the  ^l■•^i-,tance. 

rile  b.ittle  was  slmrf,  and  i--  l)iielly  stated.  The  storniiii;^  parties 
en  ihr  s(,utli  and  -outh-east  uxre  eoinpcHed  [n  pass  a  decj)  diteli  and 
cHnib  an  enihankineiU  at  least  t\\el\e  teei  in  hei;4ht.  The  storniiiiL,' 
part)'  fr' Mu  the  .Mst  eventuall)'  pressed  tlnoip^h  three  i  nibrasures  or 
dee|i  cuts  in  t  he  rampart  fl.uikin;^'  the-  salient  anL;le,  Ini-  \\  iiich  tliere 
\\i;re,  so  far  ,is  known,  no  [^uns.  I'he  th'st  repulse  was  cemiplete  and 
u  ith  ;^M'eat  slaui;hter.  I'he  si'cond  .issault  erowmd  the  paiapet,  .ind 
from  tin:  moment  the  troo|)s  leaped  into  tin:  small  are.i  of  tlie  parade, 
tiure  was  imlisei  iminate  buti'laa'y.  All  that  the  ,\meiiean  militia  did 
at  KiuL^'s  ^bulntain.  and  all  that  I'.irletou  <iid  to  ;i\-en;.;e  his  defeat  at 
(owpeus,  was  summed  up  in  the  punishment  ot'  the  ;^arrisoii  of  [-"ort 
(iri'Wold  tor  their  obstinate'  defense.  'I'iiere  is  no  recKemin;,;  fi-ature 
whieh  In'stor)  can  reco;4ni/e\  'Idle  lar;4ir  poitiou  of  the  Ihitish  cas- 
ualtie.s  occurreil  outside  o|  the  tort,  when  tluy  wi-re  on  the  trx'iiv^^  ad- 
v.mce.  ,nid  th.e_\-  could  iK/t,  and  no  troops  could,  inflict  _L;reat  loss  ujion 
active  opi^onents  thiii;,,^  iVoni  the  co\-er  of.short  pickets,  supermounting 
the  par.ipet.  The  autlioi'ities  ,ire  conclusive;  tliat  the  .\merican  loss 
was  iusi'Miil'ic  nil  until  the  Ihitish  troojjs  occupied  the  works  and  tlu- 
^.irrisou  'iKivl  piactic.il'y  \-ielded  the  contest. 

.Ariioid  sax's  "ei;^lit)'-ti\'e  men  were  found  dead  in  h'ort  (iriswold, 
and  si\t_\' wounded,  most  ot"  tlicni  niortallw"  He  atlds,  '•  I  iielieve 
we  have  .lijout  seventy  prisoners  Iiesides  the  wouruled.  who  are  pa- 
roled." This  included  both  sides  ol"  the  ri\er.  1  fe  s.iys  "  their  (the 
American)  lo;;s  on  the  other  side  itlie  New  London  side)  must  have 
been  considerable  ;    but  can  not  be  asce-rtainetl." 

"  Lieuten.mt-colonel  I'l)'er  and  three  other  officers  of  the  I'ifty- 
fourth  were  wounded.  Major  Mont;_;omer)'  was  killed  !))•  a  spe.ir  in 
enteriiv,;"  the  enemy's  works,  and  M.ijor  riroomlleld  succeeded!  to  tlie 
commaiul." 

The  Liate  of  the  fort  was  opened  by  order  of  Lieutenant-colonel 
Ledvard  ;  and  Lieutenant-colonel  lUiskirk,  of  the  New  Jt-rsev  V'olun- 
teers,  arrived  in  time  to  ]:)articipate  in  the  closini^  scene,  so  th.it  the 
wanton  sl,iu;4irier  of  Ledyard  after  he  surrendered  his  sword  is  to  be 
cluuL^ed  to  the  menior)-  of  an  Anie'ric.m  lowilist,  .ind  //<>/  to  a  Ih'itish 
regular  oflucr.  When  once  this  work  be;4,m,  the  wounded  were  inH 
.spared  and  the  tr.i^ctly  was  complete. 

Meanwhile  Arnold  was  actively  cnijaf^ed  in  less  d.uv^erous  work. 
He  says  "  ten  or  twelve  ships  were  burned,  and  one  loaded  with  naval 


( 


\\ 


1 


11 


iM: 


m 


I'M'     ■•■' 


■)<i^<- 


N" 


^30 


ARNOLD   AT    NKW    !<>Nli<)N. 


[1781 


stcirr-;,  ann'iuc^  the  furmn-.  tlu-  (.-.irL;'"!  (>f  ilir  Il.mii.ili,  Captain  Watson, 
ff'mi  I.'indiiii.  l,iU!_\'  capliirod  l)y  tlu'  ciu'iii)-.  Tlie  uliulc  of  wiiicii 
\va-  hiinicil  with  tin-  slorrs,  wliii.'!)  prov-cd  tn  ci  int.iiii  a  lar;j,r  (|uantity 
nt'  piiwdcv  iinkiiitwii  to  11^.  Till-  fX|)lii>i()n  nf  IIk'  pnwder  and  tlu: 
cliarv^c  of  wind  soon  .jfti^T  thr  slmt-s  win  Ihi'd.  coninuinif.itcd  the 
tlanics  to  part  of  tlir  t<-)wn.  wliicli  w,i<,  notwitlistandinL;  rffort  to  inc- 
viMit  it,  uril'mtnnatily  ('i -^troycd."  Sixty-five  dwcllin^^s,  tliirty-onc 
stores  and  \\ai\'iiouscs,  tij^lity  ^hips,  twiMity  barns,  .1  nici'tinL;-lionsi.', 
C'urt-liDusc,  j.iil.  tlu'  ni.irkct  and  custunidinnsr  uitc  anionic  the  tri>- 
j)hics  wliicli  cnd'-'d  the  inilit.iry  .ichicveiiU'iits  of  r)ciu:dii.t  Arnold, 
and  passed  him  ovir  to  the  care  df  universal  history. 

His  darin;^  >pirit  was  indeed  frettetl  hy  repeated  iniiistiee,  but  his 
iin;,'overn,ible  temper  almost  invariabi)'  induced  the  occa^i<in  tor  his 
m.my  disappointments.  With  the  \  indic.itii  m  of  his  vah  ir  at  Sarato'_;a, 
tlure  must  be  as  freely  perpetuated,  the  inevitable  doom  wliich  au.iits 
.1  tr.iitor. 

I'rom  this  episode  of  .ui  imjiortant  canipaiij;!!  the  attention  is  at 
once  diverted  to  operations  which  it  did  not  embarrass. 

While  the  allied  army  was  wailin;^  lor  .ulditional  transportation  at 
I  lead  of  F.Ik,  (ieiieral  W.ishiiv.'ton.  accom[)anied  by  Count  de  Rocham- 
be.iii,  \isited  l)altimoic,  where  they  were  rreei\ed  with  illuminations 
and  ci\il  honors.  ( )n  tlu:  ninth,  accompanied  b_\-  one  stalf  oflicer,  he 
visited,  for  tlu-  first  time  durin;^  -.ix  ye.irs,  his  home  at  Mount  Vt num. 
(  )n  the  tenth  his  own  suite  .and  Count  de  Koch.imbe.iu  and  suiti' 
became  his  Laie.--ts.  On  the  ek'\-enth  ( ieneral  Ch.istelhix  .md  aids-de- 
camp were  addetl  to  tlu-  eomp.uu'.      ( 'u   the  twelfth   the   hospitalities 


of  the  m.msion  \'ielded  thei 


r  c:,ii 


m  to  the  behest.- 


luty, 


and   on  the 


oinniaiuk-'r-m- 


fourteenth    day  of    .Septcmlicr,    17S1,  the   .American    C 

cjii-!  reached  the  headquarters  of  General  La  Fayette  at  Williamsburg. 


I,,,  f. 


1178J 

/at  son, 
which 

u.uitity 

iiul    till-' 

till   the 

to  \)rc- 
.iity-onu 
...house, 

liic  tri>- 

>,  but  his 

,11  I'll"  his 
S.uato'^.i, 
i,:h  awaits 

nlion  is  at 

nrtation  at 
I.  Rocliani- 

Liniiiii^^i*"'''" 
..nicer,  hr 

nt  WrnoD. 
aivl    suite 

ncl  ai(ls-<le- 
osi)itaiitit.-s 
xiul   on  the 

niiianiler-in- 
iUiamsburg. 


Co//i/'ilci/ffnif/)r(fn7/  //y  fW  (\/rr/>ii'/on. 


(i;JO* 


1 

1- 

k 


<"■■ 


W'[ 


1  ^  {    '■ 


"I   \\ 


CIIAPTi:k     LXXV. 

SiF.C.K  or    YOKKKiWX.     .st   KR1:\I)J;K    of   COKNWALI.IS.     CLOSE   OF 

CAMl'AK.N.      1781. 


C"^  (lOn  stratCL^)'   bifoic   Xi  \v   York   isDl.ilcd   Clinton;    anil    eijuai 
X  ^tr,iti;^y   in    \'ir;4ini,i  arul  the   I  lic>.ii)caki;  isol.ilcd  C'ornwallis. 

riu'  lornKT,  outL;LiuTalc-i|.  coulil  not  overtake  the  AiTH.-rican  arniy  by 
land, — could  not  divert  it>  conunaniiin^;  _L;eniTal  from  the  crowning 
objective  of  his  eampai;,;!!.  -could  ntit  resohe  to  lia/.ard  sonK'tiiinLj  <it 
his  own  pot  and  throw  the  bulk  of  hi'^  aini_\'  upon  l'hiladeli)hia  and 
the  Amtrican  ri  ar  ;  while  to  relieve  Yorkt(j\\n  b_v  -^e.i  recpiired  inune- 
diate  action  and  tiie  support  of  an  adecpiate  lleet.  I  he  folhjwing 
dispatch  uiiliciles  tlv  |)osition  ot  Lord  L'(^rnwallis: 

[Conrwa/Iis    to    C.liii'oii.\       "  \'ork,     i6th    September,    1781.       In 
cypher.      l)i>patche->  of  Jd   and  dth  lalre.ul)'    noticed)  acknowledjjjeii. 

The  enet!i\'s  lleet  has  returned.  *  Two  line  of  battle  ships,  and  one 
tri_L;at<:-,  lie  at  the  mouth  of  this  ri\er ;  and  three  or  four  line  of  battle 
ships,  several  tri;^,ites  ,ind  transports,  went  up  the  bay  on  iJthand 
I4lh.  1  hear  W'.ishini^ton  arrived  at  WillianisburL;  on  the  14th. 
Som.  (if  his  troops  emb.uked  at  I  bad  of  I'.lk.  and  the  others  arrived 
at  Haltiinore  on  the  iJth.  If  I  had  no  hopes  of  relict',  I  would  rather 
risk  an  action  than  dctentl  my  h.df  tinished  works;  but  as  you  say 
Dis^by  is  hourl\-  expecteil.  and  piomise  e\'er)'  exertion  to  assist  me,  I 
do  not  think  mx'sclf  justified  in  putting  the  fiti'  of  the  war  on  so  iles- 
perale  an  attemjjt.  \W  examiniu;,;  the  transport-^  with  care,  ,ind  turn- 
ing out  useless  mouths,  m_\'  provisions  will  last  si.\  weeks  from  this 
da\-,  if  we  can  preserve  them  from  accidents.  The  cavalrj-  must,  I 
fear,  be  all  lost.  I  am  of  oj)inion,  that  you  can  do  me  no  effectual 
service,  but  bycoininL;  directly  to  this  pl.ice.  Lieutenant  Conway  of 
this  conmiand  is  Just  exch.myed.  He  assures  me  that  since  the 
Rhode  Island  sc]uadron  has  joined  they  have  thirty-six  sail  of  the 


il 


i. 


6j2 


sii:(;h  or  yorktonv.v. 


fi78i 


fM;i  .'*■■: 


v,::;3 


iL,*'lll)lJ; 


mv: 


I  mw 


line.     'I'lii-  pi, 111'  !•<  ill  no  state-  of  drtVusi;.      If  ymi  lan  imt  n'licvc  mc 
vcr\'  soon,  \<Mi  nni--l  lie  prip.iri'il  to  luar  tiir  woi-'t. 
1  lia\  c  tlu'  hiiiKir  111  hr,  rU., 

I'likWVAI.LIS." 

The  t'liijiiw  in;^f  ili-;i)ati.  lies  air  litt'il  in  tlii--  innnr.'tioii  : 
{C/iiidiii  io  (.'orjruui/lis.)  "  New  \'i>rk.  Sept.  JHh.  17S1.  In  lyiilicr. 
(Rcccivril  Sr|)t.  J>)lli,  ir^i'-  I'ori'i^i.in;,;  ili-i>ati.-h  aeknou  U/il^^i'il. 
At  a  iTlcctiiv.;  of  the  i^'i'iirral  .mil  lla;_;  1  illk'iis  iiclil  this  ila\',  it  was 
ilt-'tcrmiiu'd  that  ahow  \\w  thiui^aiiil  nun  rank  and  fiK'.  siiall  l)c  cin- 
baikcd  on  hoard  the  kin;.;'-  >hiiis.  aiul  tlu'  jnint  cxcrliuns  of  the  arm)- 
and  na\'_v  made  in  a  lew  ^\.\\-  to  ii'liew;  nmu,  and  atterwanU  ti>  i.;oi'>|)- 
crate  with  \'i Hi.  I'lii:  lleet  ei)n-,i-,t-^  of  lwent_\'-tiiree  sail  of  thi;  line. 
three  ol  whieh  are  tliree-deekers.  Theri'  i-  ever)'  rea^'Mi  to  hope  \m- 
start  from  luMiee  tlu;  5th  '  >l  <  irtohcr. 

"  r.  S.  A  imiral  l)i;j,l)\  i--  iliis  moment  arii\-ed  at  llu'  ilool^.  with 
three  >ailot  tin;  liiu'.  A>  ,1  vent  ni\',  ii' >t  kiinwiiv,;  whether  the\'  eau 
he  seen  by  11-.  1  reipu-t  th.it  il  all  is  well,  upuii  heariii;,;  a  coiisiiK'raMe 
nriiiL;  towards  the  eiUraiue  nf  the  C'h  '-apeake,  t  hree  lar;4e  >e[),irate 
smokes  nia\'  he  made  parallel  to  it,  and  if  )oii  possess  the  [)o>t  ot 
(jloucester,  /e/^/'.      1  shall  -end  aiintlur  runner  soim," 

rile  foliowiii;^  di>i)ateh  wa^  sent  in  re]>l\- : 

"York,  10  1'.  M.,  Sept,  Jiilh,  17S1.  in  e_\  [)her.  I  Imvl  \-enturi.d 
these  l.ist  tw'i  tla>s  tn  lonk  ( ieiieral  W'ashiiu.'ton's  whole  force  in  the 
fa'..'  in  their  po>ili.i!i  mi  the  out-ide  ^.A  my  works,  and  1  have  the 
pleasnre  to  a->nre  your  e\eel!eney  thai  there  wis  but  one  wii^h 
throu!j,hiHit  the  whiile  army,  whieh  was  that  tlu:  eiuiii)'  w mid 
atlvaiice.  I  ha\-i.'  this  cvenin'^  ree<'i\-e  1  your  letti-r  ot'  the  2.\i\\  whieh 
has  ^'ivenmr  the  ;;reate-t  --ati-f ution.  I  sh.dl  re'tire  this  ni ;;ht  within 
the  works,  and  have  no  d.oubt  if  relief  arrives  ju  ,tn\-  reasonabli;  time, 
York  and  (iloucester  will  be  bntli  in  [)OSse>>i.)n  of  I  lis  Maiest\''s 
troops.  I  believe  }'i)nr  excellency  must  depend  more  on  the  sound 
of  our  cannon  than  the  >iL;i'al  of  -mokes  fir  inturmation  ;  however,  I 
will  attempt  it  on  the  Ciloucester  side  ;   ineilicines  .ire  w.mted." 

(Clinton  to  Coriii^'dfiis.)  "  New  York,  Sept.  :'5tli,  17S1,  (duplicatel 
in  cypher,  received  October  Jd.  Wy  Lord:  -My  1  .tter  of  yesterda\- 
will  have  informed  your  lonlsliip  of  tlu:  number  of  ships  ami  troops 
we  can  briny  with  us.  It  is  supposed  the  necessary  repairs  of  the 
fleet  will   detain  us   here   to  the  fifth  of   October     <ind  your  lordshi[) 


I       •' 


[1781 


vc  mo 


IS. 


vnlim'. 


Hl'iCU 


It  \v,i- 


)L'  1111- 


.irm\' 


1    C<  HI))- 


ic  liiu- 


)l)l'   \\l- 


Willi 


■)■  cm 

|),UMtC 


11 


turcii 


_■  m  tin- 

IVC    till- 

ic  wisli 
\v'  mid 
1  which 
:  within 
Ic  time, 
iaii'sty's 
c  sound 
wcvcr,  I 


iphc.iti') 
jstcrd.u' 
1  tn.io;)-. 
i  of  the 
lordship 


i-«i  I 


SIKtiK  Ml'   \-()kls  1()\V\. 


^'33 


mu-t  he  sen^ilili'  th.it  unfnresccii  accidents  nia\'  I-mi  ;then  it  nut  a  day 
nr  two  Imi^cr;  I  tlu'iidure  entreat  yi>u  to  lnsi;  no  time  in  liitiiv^r  un 
kiMw  yt)iif  real  sitnati' 'n,  and  y<inr  npininn  how  upuii  our  an  iwil  wi 
cm   l)est  .ict   til   fiaiu  .1  junction     with   }'on,  t(i;_;ether   with   tiie  t\act 


■-treiivth  iif  the  cneiiiN 


lle.t, 


and  what  part   ol    the  (  he^aiuMke  tlK\ 


appear  to  he  must  icajoiis  (if.      I  ha\'e  the  Imn.ir  to  he,  etc., 

I  I.  Cl.IN  \i>\." 
"  I'.  .S.   As  yniir    liird-hip   mu^t    h.ive   hetter  intellit^eiice    than  we 
piissihly  cm  ha\e,  I  recpiest    \'ini  will  send  .i  trn-.ty  per-on   to  rach  u\' 

■\-enth  of  lU'.Kl   nicmth,  with   ever\'  infnrm.iliun 


IOCS  aliMUl    till 


t  he  ca| 

respectiii;.;  tin;  force  and  -itu.ition  of  tlu:  eiirniy  \'on  nia_\-  jiidL;c  neces- 
sary .iml   direction-^    to  continue   there    until   our  ,irri\'.d,  when   sma 


ill 


\'cs.>els  w  1 


1  be  sent  to  hriiv^  off  any  [ier>on  thry  m.a\'  I'md  there. 


lie  loll,  iwiii''  rei)l\-  hnu'. 


h.'  corre-^i)  Mideiice  of  these  officers  up 


li)  the  pr.ictical  operations  of  the  sie;^e  : 

(i'oniiiUtllis  to   (liiitoD.s     ''  \'orl-:town,  X'ir'^inia,  ( )ctol)(r  3d,  17S1, 


in  c\-i)her.      Sir 
It.      d 


received  \'oiir  w 


tler  of  the  twenty-fifth  September 


la-t  ni;^ht.  'I'he  enemy  are  encamped  .d.'oul  two  miles  Iroiii  us,  (  )n 
the'  ni^^iit  of  the  iDth  of  Se|)tenil)er  tlu'y  broke  ;4round.  and  made  two 
reilouhts  .iboiit  i_-le\-en  hundred  _\',irds  tiinu  our  wmks,  which,  with 
some  work-  that  had  b.:en  cm^t riicte'd  to  ^icure  our  exterior  position, 
oecupN'  a  ''orue   between  two  creeks   which   iiearlv  embrace  this  i)ost. 


'P> 


!ie\-  li,i\'e  tinislu-d  t  Iicm:  rei 


th 


doul)ts,  ,md  I  expect   the\'  will  '''o  on  witli 


tl'.cir  work>  this  ni'h 


t.      I- 


rum  the  tmu:  that  the  eiienU'  h,i\e  ei\-eil  u- 


nd  the  uncommon    exi'rtioiis  of  the  troops,  our  works  are  in  a  belter 


state  of  defense  ih.ui  we  had  reason  to  ho[)L'.      1  can  see   no  means  o 


f 


lormnv''  a    pmction  with   us   bu 


t   1)\-  \'ork  Ri 


ver  :  and  I   iJo 


not  thml 


that  an\'  di\'t;rsion  would   be   ot   ,in\'  usi;   to   us. 


0 


ur  accoun 


ts  of  tlu 


slreiiL^th   of    the    l'"rench   fleet   have   in    ^eiienil   been,   that   lhe\-   were 
,ul  of  ihe  line;   they  haw   fre'i|uentl\-  ch.m;^'e'd  their 


thirt\-li\'e  or  six 


position;   two  shij)-^   of  the   line  ami   one   lri;_;,ite   he   .it    the  niou 


ih  of 


ll 


us  river, 


ar.d    our  la>t   accounts  wei 


e,  that    the  body  of  the   tle-et 


\\\ 


between  ihe  t.ii!  of  the  llorse-sh.oe  and  Vork-s[)it.      Ami  it  is  likewise 
saitl   th.at   four  line  of    battle   ships   la\   a   few    da\-s  .i;^o  in    Hami)t 
Road.      I  see   little  chan 


on 


ce    ol    m\ 


■  beiny  able  to  send  persons  to  wail 
k)r)Oj  at  the  capes,  but  I  will  if  possible.      I  ha   e  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

C(iRN\VAI,l.i,>." 

British  Position.     York  or  Yorktown,  ten  miles  up  York  Ri\'er,  is 
situated  upon  tlic  south  or  ri^Iit  bank  (wliich  was  then  quite  a  bhiff,) 


1*1' 


C    ' 


•l  t 


' 


r     * 


1  it 


km 


^}^^ 


'^'hA 


SdXlK   OF   YORKTOWN. 


[1731 


between  two  sin. ill  .iceks,  whicli  acordiii;^  to  Coniwallis  "  nearly  c;m- 
braced  tin;  post."  The  British  ri;.;ht  resteij  on  ,i  sw. imp  w  hich  bor- 
dered the  creek,  west  of  the  town.  Iiatteiiis  one,  two  and  three, 
see  map  "Sie;:;eor  N'orktown."  covered  this  .ipproacn  ;  and  a  lar;:;e 
redouijt",  completely  iVai/ed  .iiid  fronted  l)_\-  .il),itis,  had  been  built  upon 
tiic  l)lulf  bex'ond  'his  creek,  westward,  betu'Ci-n  the  \\'illianisbur;4  ro.id 
and  the  ri\'er.  Tin's  redoubt  w.is  occupied  b)'  the  I'usileers  ;  .ind  the 
Ciuadaloupe,  jS,  frij^ate,  l.iy  ,it  anchor  off  the  month  of  the  creek. 
I'lu-  e.;^t  blanch  nf  tliis  creel;  ilowed  throu_L;h  a  dee[)  ravine,  or 
■' L;i->rL;e."  as  Coriuvallis  >t)les  it.  It  will  be  seen  that  .my  approach 
to  the  town  from  the  west  oi-  the  front,  was  hardl)-  pr.icticable,  and  a 
retreat  of  the  ;_;arrison,  by  the  same  route,  Wv)uld  be  as  difllcult.  'J"o 
the  south  east,  followin<4  tiie  i'.)urse  ol  the  river,  was  a  l.irL^e  space  t)f 
soliti  surface  cut  into  raviiu's,  uniler  co\'er  of  oin.'  of  wiiich  the  besie_L;- 
ers  ultimati'ly  nio\-ed  tow.ud  their  second  p.irallel,  thus  shortenin;^ 
the  z.";;"-/.ag  a[)i)ro,iches.  (  )n  the  ln;_;h  •;niand  in  fi'ont  of  the  f^reat 
ra\ine  or  j-^orj^e,  the  ISi'itish  had  located  sew.'i'.d  ledoubts.  U  h,is 
been  seen  tnat  l.onl  Cornwallis  abandoned  them  upon  recei]>t  of 
Clinton's  dispatch  of  the  twent\--fourth.  Tarleton  severely  criticises 
the  movement;  but  hi.-^  opinion  is  to  be  associated  with  his  other 
wpinion  which  fa\'ored  <ui  attack  ui'jon  the  Anuric.ui  cuni*.  lie 
entirely  omits  important  consider, itions.  'I'o  ii.ive  retained  the  re- 
doubts until  they  were  assaulted  would  h.ive  dcMnanded  succc^ssful 
resistance,  ■^ince  their  defenders  ci.akl  not  re-cross  that  lavine  uniier 
}M'essL:re.  Cornwallis  sa\'ed  the  ^^.irrisons  by  .ibandoninL;'  the  works, 
rin-'ir  conse([uer.t  occupation  by  the  l'"rt;nch  w.is  ot  v.due  to  the  be- 
siegers, because  it  brou;4ht  them  within  easy  r.uv^c  ot  f'lre,  uid  the 
riivine  in  tLuai  protected  them  from  an)' sail)-  from  the  g.naison.  In 
view  of  the  whole  situation,  the  natur.il  aj)proaches  were  from  the 
north-east,  hence  the  redoubts  five,  six,  seven  and  ei;4ht  received 
more  care.  Houses  had  been  leveled,  and  a  second  Ime  of  trenches 
iiad  been  i)!aced  in  their  rear,  a^  a  last  tlefense.  I'wo  reiioubts  had 
•ilso  been  ■ulvanceil  mto  the  oi)eii  ground  in  front.  The  allied  armies 
made  their  regul.w  siege  a[)proaches  entn-el)'  upon  this  front. 

Liloitccstir  J\)i/t/,  aci^is^  the  river,  a  n^Ue  dist.mt,  iuul  been  first  for- 
titled.  With  swam^JS  flanking  l)Oth  the  retiring  shores,  there  was 
solid  surtace  in  front,  and  then  tor  more  than  a  mile  the  ground  was 
clear  of  w  ootls. 

A))U'ni.cin  Position.  On  the  day  after  (lenend  W'aslungton's  arri- 
val at   Williamsburg,  he  notified   Count  de  Gr.isse  that   "  such   of  the 


'7S1.1 


SllXnC   OF   YORKTOWN. 


635 


American  troojm  as  found  insufficirnt  transportation  at  Head  of  Elk, 
wen"  niarcliin;^  to  Baltimore,  to  be  pr.t  on  board  of  transports  'hat 
luiLjiit  \n:  collected  there,  and  retpiested  assistance  in  this  respect. 
In  u  postscript  he  r<,'niarks  that  "  Iiis  wishes  had  been  anticii)ated." 
Admiral  llirras,  uh<i  arrived  on  the  ttMitli,  h.id  alread)'  sent  ten  trans- 
ports from  the  squadnm;  two  frij;ates  captured  in  tlie  recent  naval 
action,  ,ind  some  other  prize  vessels,  to  move  the  troops.  1  1k_\'  em- 
barked at  Annapoli>  for  James  River. 

On  the  seventeenth,  (ieiieral  Washington,  the  Count  de  Rocham- 
beau,  (jeneral  Knox,  and  General  Du  I'ortail  embarked  on  the  Queen 
Charlotte,  and  visited  Count  de  (irasse  on  his  t1aL;-shii),  tiie  Ville  de 
I'viris,  arrivin;,;  on  the  eiL;hteenth.  Tliey  were  received  with  appropri- 
ate honors,  and  cmfirmed  their  plans  fir  conducting  the  siege.  By 
reason  of  se\-ere  and  contrar_\-  wiiuls  they  did  nof  regain  Williamsburg 
until  the  twenty-second.  Tlie  American  Commander-in-chief  was  at 
once  confront!  d  w  ith  a  ([uesf  ion  which  threatened  to  destroy  his  v/ell- 
laid  plans,  'idle  arrival  of  Admir.d  Digbv'  at  New  York  with  three 
ships  of  the  line,  reported  at  si.v,  inclined  Count  de  (irasse  t(.)  re-unite 
his  entire  Heet,  leave  two  vessels  at  the  mouth  of  \'ork,  four  frigates 
and  some  corvettes  in  the  James,  and  theii  sail  tow.ird  New  ^'ork  to 
intcrcei)t  or  engage  the  15ritish  fleet — //ic//  "to  act  in  concert;  but 
each  on  his  side."  An  earnest  ai>peal  b\-  La  Fayette  in  person,  i)er- 
suaded  the  Count  de  Grasse  to  change  his  [)urpose  and  accej)!  the' 
judLmient  of  the  sjer.erals  commanding  the  land  t'orces.  On  the 
twent\-fiftli,  the  remaining  troops  reached  Williamsburg,  making  a 
total  force  of  twelve  thousand  regular  troojjs,  besides  militia,  which 
exceeded  tour  thousaiitl  men. 

On  the  twent\--eighlh,  tiie  entire  army  advar.ced  and  took  a  posi- 
tion within  about  two  miles  of  the  British  advanced  works,  and  on  the 
twenty-ninth,  after  a  thorough  reconnoissance,  the  movement  began 
for  encircling  the  town  .md  closing  in  upon  its  defemi'  -s.  On  the 
thirtieth  it  was  found  th.at  Lord  Cornw.illis  had  withdrawn  his  troops 
from  the  front,  and  the  allied  lines  were  established  in  the  general 
form  of  a  semi-circle,  witli  each  extreme  resting  on  the  York  River. 
During  the  skirmishing  incident  to  reconnoitering  service  Colonel 
Scammel,  whose  services  had  greatly  endeared  him  to  the  Command- 
er-in-chief and  to  the  army,  was  triortally  wounded,  taken  prisoner, 
and  carried  into  Yorktov.'ii.  lie  was  removed  to  Willi  'lurg  by 
consent  of  Lt)rd  Cornw.illis,  but  died  on  the  sixth  of  October. 

General    Lincoln   occupied  the  banks  of  \Vormle)''s  Creek,  ne.ir 


'     1 

i, 

■    t 
i 

1: 

■■■ 

I. 


m 


I 


"'ii  •  1  i 

>1M  S       ?     I 


:i,-,'  ' 


6^6 


sii:(;i:  nF  vorr ru\v\. 


17S1 


'iJrll       ' 

If  ' 


i> 


w 


Moore's  lioiHr,  and  tlic  '^oniT.iI  arranL^enuMit  of  the  diIum-  trmijj.s, 
before  the  active  ninTatinns  of  the  sie^nj  l)eL;Mii,  i-^  iii'licated  oi\  the 
iiiai). 

On  the  (iloiicester  side,  the  Neck  was  occujM'ed  In-  the  Duke  de 
Lauzun  with  liis  le;,;i<)n  of  ca\air)\  and  a  l)(iil)'  uf  \'ir;_;iiiia  niihtia  under 
General  \\'ee(h)n.  l'aL;ht  hiuuhed  marine^  from  the  .S(|iiadr()n  of 
Count  tie  Gra>se  landed  on  tiie  fir>t  of  Oc'uber  to  reinforce  tlu:  de- 
taclinient.  (jeneial  de  C.'lois\-  was  in  coinniand,  ,ind  altlu)ii;_;li  repeMted 
skirmishes  ensued,  no  per-istent  elforts  \\  ere  n'.ule  to  break  throu;_;li 
the  .American  line-s,  and  the  off(.n.-i\e  action  of  the  aliies  was  Innited 
to  the  confinement  ot  the  l>riti-li  ti'oops  to  its  dL'fen>i -.  and  the  area  in 
front  of  the  works.  ( )n  one  oica-^ion.  while  cowrin;^  a  lora;_;in!^  part}'. 
Colonel  Tarleton  was  unhorsed.  The  liritish  lost  one  officer  and 
eleven  nu;n  .i.n:\  the  l'"rench  llussars  lost  two  officers  and  i'lHirteen 
men.  The  contradictory  opinions  expre^^sed  as  t(,i  the  nu'rils  of  this 
skirmisli  are  ^ettled,  by  'r.irU'ton's  own  re'[)ort  of  it,  where  he  ^a_\'s  : 
"  .\  dra;_;oon".s  hor>e  of  the  l>rili->h  le_L;ion,  ])lunL;ed,  on  beiiiL;  struck 
with  a  sjiear,  and  oxerthn.-w  I  .ieuteiianl-coloncl  I'arlelon  and  hi^ 
horse.  '1  hi-^  circum-^tance  h.ippeiun;^  t(j  occur  so  much  niMier  to  tlie 
body  of  the  ]''rench  than  the  liritish  cav, dry,  excited  ,in  apprehension 
in  the  latter  tor  the  safely  of  their  comm.indin;^  oflicer.  Impelled  by 
this  idea  tlu:  whole  of  the  l-av^li.^h  rear  set  out  in  full  speed  from  its 
«.iist,int  situation,  and  arri\'ed  in  such  disorder  that  its  chai'^e  was 
unable  to  make  an)' im[)res-.ion  ui)oii  tlu'  Duke  de  I.au/un's  iliHsars, 
Meanwhile  Tarleton  escaped  the  enemy  and  obta.iiie'd  another  horse, 
wlien,  perceiving  the  broken  state  of  liis  cavalr_\-.  occa-<ioned  In-  their 
anxi(.t\'  for  his  satet)-.  lie  ordere-d  a  retre'.it,  to  afford  them  .m  oppor- 
tunity of  recovering;  froni  their  confusion." 

Colonel  Tarleton's  closiiv.',  ad\enture  of  the  war,  w  hit,  h  liid  not 
lessen  his  reputation  as  a  dashini;  cavalr)  officer,  failetl,  .is  did  his 
whole  career,  in  est.iblishiny  him  an_\   fame  as  a  scientific  soldier. 

It  w;is  not  until  the  sixth  th.it  the  heavy  ;4uns  were  broiu^ht  up, 
and  then  the  utmost  vi;j,or  was  used  to  pu-h  the  sieije.  The  Count 
de  Grassc  consented  to  sta\-  on  the  coast  until  the  first  of  November, 
notwithstandin;.;  the  detention  would  be  L;reater  than  he  at  first 
anticipated,  since  it  was  well  understood  th.it  .Sir  llenry  Clinton 
would  attempt  to  relieve  the  post  as  soon  as  lie  ctjuld  procure  a 
squadron  sufficiently  stronj^  to  risk  a  conflict  with  the  French  fleet. 

Wasliington  reported  to  the  l^resident  of  Congress,  under  date 
of  October  t\\  elflh,    '  that  the   first  parallel  had   been  opened  on  the 


[i7Si 


1781.J 


SILCr:    OK    VORKKiWN. 


^i7 


ff- 


^i.\tll,  at  iii.;lit,  williin  >i\-  liuivlrcd  xards  of  tlic  enenn-.  am!  under 
tlu'  dircition  nf  (ieiural  l.iiaul  1.  both  l'"n.ii  li  and  Anniicaii  troops 
participaliu;,;  in  tin-  nnuenicnt.  ^  )\\c  l'"rLncli  officxT  unuiulcd,  and 
sixteen  privatL"^  killed  and  wdiindiMJ  cominisci!  the  easualtie.^." 

•  t  )n  the  >evi  nth  ,ind  eii^lith.  wmk  w.is  advanced  upon  tlii-^  i)aral- 
lel  ;  ^e\■^.■^al  redi lulils  were  (,>tal)ii-.lird  and  the  I'Veiieh  mounted  heavy 
l^uns  at  the  redoubt^i  u  Inch  the  iiiatish  abindoneil  mi  the  lueiity- 
iiinth."  "On  thennilii,  at  \\w  o'clock  in  the  al'ternoon.  the  American 
balteryon  ih-  1  i:-;ht  opeiU'd  with  -^ix  eiL^htecn  and  twenty-four  pound- 
ers, two  nioilar^  .md  tuo  IiowitziTs  ;  the  I'leiich  havin -opened  lire 
on  the  lett,  at  three  o'clock,  with  tour  tweK'e  pouiulers  and  >ix  howit- 
zers. This  tire  was  directed  a;4.iin>t  tlu;  embr.i^uies.  dismount  iii;^ 
^,;uns,  de^tro\'in;4  tin.:  hastil)'  constructed  e.u'thwoiks  .nid  pre-parini; 
the  \\  ay  tor  the  next  achance. 

■' <  )n  the  tenth,  two  l-'ie'iieh  batteries,  one  of  two  ei^^hteen  and 
twi'iitx'-fuur  pounders  and  six  mortars  and  howitzers,  and  the  other 
of  tour  eiyiiteePi  poundei^,  opriK-d  tire,  and  two  American  batteries, 
one  ot  lour  eii^hteeii  pounders  and  one  of  two  mortars,  joined  in  the 
camudiade. 

'•  DuriiiL,^  the  evenini;'  a  hot  shot  tr'Mii  one  of  the  l-'rench  batteries 
set  the  Iri^a.e  Charon,  44,  nii  hre  and  in  the  mornini;  two  transports 
shared  the  sa-"e  fate.  Tlu'  (iu.ulaloupe  and  other  \"es.iels  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  (iloucesti-r  ^hore  to  e-^capo  injur}'  from  shot  and  shell 
which  ]ja>^etl  o\er  the  cit)'. 

'■  (  )n  t!ie  eleventh,  the  second  parallel  was  istab!i>hed  within  three 
luindred  \arils  of  tlu;  i)iiti>h  works,  with  tlu:  loss  of  but  one  man 
killed  and  two  or  three  wounded." 

The  condition  ot  :itVairs  within  these  works  is  very  clearh'  indi- 
cated by  tlu:  oflicial  rejjorts  of  Lord  Cornwallis,  aiul  he,  of  all  men, 
w.is  better  situ.ited  to  estimate  the  results  thus  f.ir  reali/.ed  by  the 
i)esieL;iiVi'  forces.  (  )n  the  tenth  he  leceived  a  dispatch  from  Sir  llenr\- 
Clinton  i)y  tlu'  haiulsof  Major  Cochran,  tlated  "  New  N'ork,  September 
3CJtii,  "  (duplicate),  in  cypher,  whicli  reads  as  follows,  "  I  .im  doiny 
everything;  in  my  power  to  relieve  you  b)'  a  <lirect  nu»\e,  aiuI  I  have 
e\ery  reason  to  hoi)e,  from  tlu.-  assurance  L^iveui  me  this  day  by 
Admiral  (iravt  s.  that  wt'  m.iy  i)ass  the  b:ir  by  the  12th  of  October,  if 
the  winds  permit  and  no  unfortunati'  accident  ha]ij)ens.      Answer." 

{Corini'cil/ix  U)  L/iiitou.)  "October  iith,  i7Si,i2M.  In  c\pher. 
Cochran  arrived  yesterday.  I  have  only  to  report  that  nothing;  but 
a  direct  move  to  York  River,  which  includes  a  successful  naval  action, 


r 


1'  I 


\ 


I 
3 


■I  "  ',  i 


'■  ? 


'I 


u 


jfy'-'": 


■pi  f 


I      H' 


*r  V 


;H\, 


638 


M1',GI-;   tiF   Yi>KKln\VN. 


[1781 


can  save  mc  The  enciny  made  tlu-ir  fust  paralKI  on  the  iiiLjht  of  the 
sixili,  al  the  (Ust.incc- of  si^c  hundred  y.inls,  ,uid  h,ue  [xniected  it,  and 
cDnstructed  [)lact~  i>t  arms  and  batteries  with  L;reat  re-L^ul.irity  aiul 
cuUiiMi.  On  the'  evenin;^'  of  the  ninth  tlieir  batteries  opened  and 
have  since  cominmil  lirinL;  witiiout  inteiinission,  \viti>  about  iMity 
cannon,  nii)>llv  lieav)',  and  sixletn  mortars,  from  ei_L;l»t  to  sixteen 
inches.  \\\;  li.ue  lo^t  ai)(>ut  seveiit)  men,  ,uiil  many  of  our  works  are 
considerabl)'  d, unaided  ;  ,ind  in  >,uch  woiks.  on  di-iadvantaLjeous 
ground,  aj^.iinst  so  pou^rtul  ,in  attack,  one  can  not  iio[)o  to  make  a 
ver}-  Ioiil;  resistance."  "  1'.  .S.  ( )clober  llth,  5  1'.  M.  Since  my 
lette-r  was  urineii  we  h,i\e  lost  tiiirty  men." 

"October  iJtli,  7  I'.  M.  I>ast  iul.',1u  the  eneni\'  made  their  second 
parallel  at  the  di>t,UKe  of  three  luuidred  y.ird.-^.  We  continue  to  lose 
men  \i'r\-  fast." 

On  the  thirteenth  ;ind  fourteenth  the  allies  maintained  fire  from 
mortars,  i)ut  occupied  the  time,  chielly,  in  completing;  the  second 
j)arallel.  The  line  of  redoubts  uii.l  batteries  niurked  F.  (i-'rench)  had 
been  completed,  but  it  was  oseiui.d  to  the  completion  of  this  panillel 
that  the  two  advanced  reiloubl>  on  the  Urili>h  left  should  be  reducetl 
and  taken  into  tlie  line>.  Such  had  been  the  el'fect  of  the  fire,  so  fir 
as  couiil  be  ascertained,  that  it  was  decided  to  take  those  b\-  assault, 
and  details  of  troojjs  wei'c  m.ule  for  the  pui'ijose. 

The  American  li^i'ht  infintry,  under  the  directi(jii  of  Cjcner.il  l..\ 
I'ayette,  were  as-^iL;ned  to  the  .is>,iiilt  of  the  redoubt  nearest  the 
river,  and  the  force  w.is  (n-;^ani/,eil  a-,  follow^  :  —Colonel  Gimat's  b.iltal- 
ion  led  the  v.in,  f  illowed  by  th.it  of  Colonel  1  lamiilon  who  took  com- 
mand, then  Colonel  Laurens  uitii  ei;4hty  men,  to  take  the  redoubt  m 
tlaiik,  .ind  Colonel  i).irl)er's  jj.itlalion,  as  a  supiiorting  column. 

1  he-  l-'rench  column,  utKler  the  direction  of  Baron  de  \'iomenil. 
was  led  by  the' German  (iren. idler  re'^imeiit  of  tjoiml  William  I'osbach 
lie  l)eii.\  I'onts,  sii[)porledL  by  tiie  grenadier-^  n\  the  re;^iment  of 
Gatinais.  I'liis  reL;iinent  had  been  formed  out  ol  that  of  Auveri;ne, 
once  coniiiKiiuled  b_v  1  )e  Rochambeau,  and  once  known  .!•>  the 
Rcgiiiunt  /)' Aiii't'ri^iic  ^siiiis  liic/w,"  Awxcv'^nv,  without  a  stain."  The 
greii.idiers  were  draw  n  up  to  receive  their  instructions  and  De  Kocham- 
bcau,  in  person,  pledL;eil  himself  to  ask  of  Louis  XV'L  the  restoration 
of  their  old  name  if  the>-  did  their  duty.  ^^Lhe  king  sub.sequently  re- 
deemed this  pleilge.j 

The  attacks  w  ere  made  simultaneously,  upon  rocket  signals,  accord- 
ing to  agreement.      The   redoubt  nearest   the  river  was  defended  by  a 


17^1. 


SllCGl':   OF   YOKRrOWX. 


'j'j 


(Ict.'icliinciit  of  less  tlian  sixt>"  nicn.  ("ulnni'l  I  [aniirnni  iccl  the  nuMi 
rapidly  fdrw.ird  with  unlo.tilcil  nuiskcts,  eiiiiihinc;"  wvlt  abatis  as  best 
possibu',  and  in  a  very  shurt  time  he  was  over  tlu'  |iaraj)et.  Laurens 
entercti  lioni  the  rear,  and  tlu;  occupation  '>t  tlie  work  was  secured  in 
a  t'ew  minutes.  (Colonel  ( liin.it  .uid  ( "olouel  Barber  who  camr  u;)  with 
his  reserve  ])rompt!y  and  foilowi:d  the  advance,  were  i)otli  wounded. 
The  .\mirican  los-.  wa>  one  >ei-;_;(.'ant  and  eiL;ht  [)rivates  killed,  seven 
officers  and  twentv-hve  noii-cominission(;(l  officer.^  ami  pri\'ates 
wounded,  'i'lu-  liritish  loss  was  but  eiL;ht  killed,  (the  resistance  ha\- 
in;_;  ceased  as  soon  .is  the  Ameiitan  troops  commamled  tlK:  position) 
and  seventeen  [)ri.>oncrs,  includin;^  .M.ijor  c'ampbe'll,  who  commanded 
the  redoubt. 

The  redoubt  which  u.is  as-,ailed  b_\-  the  iM-ench  wa>  defendeil  b)- 
more  than  a  hundred  men.  The  l""iencli  >appers  removed  the  abatis 
deliberatel)-,  under  Hre,  and  when  a  path  wa^  cleared,  a  stead>-  \a;4or- 
ous  ehar;4e  with  the  ba\'onet  elTected  the'  result.  C"ount  de  Dumas, 
the  Chev.ilier  de  Lameth,  .Xdjutant-L^eneral  of  La  l'"a>-ette,  and  the 
Count  de  Deux  I'onts  were  wounded,  lietore  the  >iL;nal  liael  been 
i^iven  some  liL;ht  words  pa--.t'd  between  the  lliron  de  X'iomenil  and 
(ieneral  La  Fa\-ette,  ,is  to  the  superiority  of  the  French  ;_^renadiers  for 
these  attacks,  .ind  as  soon  as  the  Americans  achieved  their  success. 
La  l''a\-etle,  with  [M-ompt  pL.isantry,  sent  .NLijor  ISariier  to  tender  .my 
needed  ar^sistancc.  I'iie  reeloubts  were  taken  into  tiie  second  parallel 
before  morninL;. 

The  fillowin,;  dispatch,  in  c_\i)her,  dated  October  15th,  l7Si,is 
the  amiouncement  wiiich  Lord  Cornwalljs  nmie  to  Sir  lL:nr_\-  Llinton 
ot  this  dis.ister  : 

"Sir:  Last  e'\etMni;  the  enem\-  carried  m\-  two  aiK'anced  redoubts 
b\-  storm,  and  durnii;  the  nii^ht  h.ive  included  the-,e  in  their  second 
p.irallel,  which  the\-  are  at  present  bu>\-  m  perfectm;^-.  My  situ.ition 
lias  now  become  ver\-  critical.  We  dare  not  show  a  -un  to  tlu:ir  old 
batteries,  and  1  expect  tlial  then'  new  ones  will  open  to-morrow 
morning;,  so  that  we  >hall  .>oi)n  be  exposed  to  ,in  assault  in  ruineil 
work^,  in  a  bad  [lo-^ition,  and  with  weakene'd  numbers.  Tiie  satel>-  ot 
the  place  is  thercture  so  prec.uious  that  I  can  not  recommend  lli.it 
the  fleet  and  army  should  run  -reat  risk  in  endeivorm-  to  save  us." 

The  same  officer  wrote  on  the  twentieth,  i;i\  ini;  .m  .iccount  of  a 
sortie  made  from  liie  ])ost,  ami  of  his  attempt  to  rescue  the  duel  por- 
tion of  his  .irmy  ;  ami  the  narrative  will  adopt  his  description  a:,  mon: 
personal  and  impre-^sivc  than  that  of  the  American  officers. 


m 


■1 

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f 

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. 


UP  ■■■  f 


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\-ilf. 


140 


SIKGK   or    ViiRKloWN. 


[1731 


{Coni:c,i/iis  Im  C/intoii.)  Octubrr  JOlli.  "A  litth'  licfori;  liay 
liiMke,  (111  tlu'  iiiiiiiiiii-  of  tlu:  'sixteenth.  1  iM-dcrcil  ,1  sortie  ul  .ihoiit 
ihrrc  huMilri'd  aii'l  lluy  men  uniU'r  LiciitriMMt-cnldiu'l  .\.l)i'ri.-r()inl)ir, 
t(i  .itl.u'k  t\\.>  iMtlirirs  uIikIi  aiiiKMird  In  \^c  m  llu;  ;^i\Mtr-.t.  lurw.inl- 
niss  .iiiil  to  ^\i\\ic  the  ;-;iiii^.  .N  (U'tachnieMt  of  '^iiariU  witli  the  ei;_;ht- 
ielh  C'  iin[),iii\'  nt  ;_;i'(;n.i:iiei-.  uiuUm'  thi-  C'  iniin.iiul  ot  Lieiiteiiaiit-i'iilniiel 
I.aki',  attacked  \\\v  (inc.  and  nni'  tit  h;_;ht  int'antry  under  the  coinm.ind 
<it'  M.ij'ir  Arin^tuni;^  cmninanded  the  nthei-,  .imI  Imth  sncceeded  in 
t(ircin'4  the  redoubts  that  C(i\'crt:d  them,  ^pikiii;.;  ele\en  ;,;nn--.  and  lall- 
iiii;  or  \\oun(hn;^  ahonl  one  huiuhed  l-Vcncli  troops,  which  liad  the 
•Miaid  of  th.it  part  of  the  trenches,  .md  with  htlle  !o>s  on  oui"  side. 
'l'iii>  .ictioii  pro\ed  of  hltU-  pnbhc  .id\  ant.e^e,  tor  the  cannon  lia\in;4 
been  spiked  in  ,1  hurry,  were  --o  m  rcnde.ed  lil  !or  serxice  a;4ain,  .md 
liefore  d.irk  tiie  whole  p.ir.dlel  .md  batti'iies  ,ipj)i_'ared  to  be'  ne.iiiy 
ciMiiplct'..'.  .\t  tin's  tune  we  kiie'W  th.it  tht're  w.i,-.  no  [i.irt  ol  thi;  whole 
iVont  .itt.ickeil  oil  which  we  could  ^how  ,1  >in;4le  ;_;uu.  ,md  our  shells 
were  iie.irK'  (.■\pended.  I  thereiore  had  only  to  chiio-.L'  be,  ween  pre- 
li.irin;,;  to  >urrcndcr  next  d.iw  or  ende.udiin;,;  to  L^et  oif  with  tlu; 
Ljreate^t  p.irt.  ot  the  troops,  ,iiu!  1  determined  to  .itteinpl  tlje'  l.itter. 
It  mii^ht.  ,Lt  le.ist  del.iy  the  eneni}'  in  the  prosecution  oi'  tur- 
tlu'r  eiiterjirises.  Sixteen  lar;_;e  bo. Us  were  ordi'red  to  be  in  ri'.idine--, 
to  receive  troojis  pn  cisel)'  .U  ten  o'chnk.  With  tlK>e  I  hopeil  to 
p.i^s  the  int.mtry  diirin;,,^  the  iii.;ht.  .ibaiidonin:^  our  b.i;4;4a;4e,  and  le.i\- 
in;4  .1  detacliiiu'iit  to  c.ipitul.ite-  lor  lii,:  to\\ns-pe'o])le.  .m.l  the  sick  .md 
wounded,  on  wliieh  subject  .1  letter  w.i^  re.id)'  to  l)e  delivered  Xo  (icn- 
er.il  \\'.ishin;_;toi).  .  .  .  \,\  ith  the  utmost  secrec)'  the  li^^ht  in- 
tantrx-.  j^re.itcr  put  ol"  tlu:  ;4u.ir<U,  ,md  p.irt  of  the  ruent_\'-third  rc;4i- 
nieiit  l.mded  .it  (iloucester;  but  .it  this  critic, il  moment,  the  we.ilher, 
irom  beiiiL^  modiuate  ,ind  cilm.  ch,in.;i:d  to  .1  most  vioK'ut  storm  of 
wiml  and  r.iin.  ,md  dro\-e  ,ill  o|  tlu;  bo, its.  some  of  which  li.id  tiMops 
on  bo.ird,  down  the  ri\'er.  ...  In  this  situ.ition  with  mv  little 
force  (livideij.  tlu;  enemy's  batteries  opeiU'd  .it  d.iv'bre.ik  ;  the  p.i^s.ii^e 
between  this  place  and  (Iloucester  was  much  exposed  ;  bat  the  buats 
beiivj;  now  returned,  they  were  oniered  to  briiu,;'  back  the  troops,  ami 
the\' joined  us  in  tlu;  fore'iioon  without  much  loss.  (Jar  works  were 
in  the  ineintimc  i-^oiiu^-  to  ruin.  We  ,it  th.it  time  coulil  not  lire  a 
,sini;le  gun,  unl)-  one  eiL^ht  inch  ,md  a  little  more  th.iii  one  lumdrcd 
cohorii  shells  rem, lined.     ...      I  therefore  proposed  to  capitulate." 

At  about  ten  o'clock  of  tiie  morninLi,"  of  the  seventeenth  of  Octobci 
an<l  .iluiost  at  the  hour  when  Sir   lleiiry  Clinton,  with  a  l.ind  force  of 


H!  I 


[I78I 


i;rfi.] 


,i;:(,i-:  mk  v(ikk  p  avn. 


t.41 


SL'Vrll  thuu^.md  <\\n[cv  tninp-^  un.lrr  tonvny  of  turilt>-ClVr  sliips  nt 
tlu-  linr,  two  lifiie-;  and  ri-lil  iVi- itcN  wciv  -.liliii-  <1<>\mi  llu-  Hay  of 
Nrw  Noik  to  -o  to  tlu-  ivlirfof  tlu'  w.u-n-out  :^arri>on,  a  (la-  was  sent 
lu  tin;  Aiiu-ncan  iiLMdquart.T.,  wit!)  the  followin-  note: 


I  * 


"  F.arl  Cornwalli^  to  (JcucimI  \\'a>lii:r.;ton. 

•■  N'..KK,    17"'/    ('./."'"■',    17S1. 

"SlU:  1  1.1-oi.or.r  a  c<'-,>ation  of  lio-lilities  for  tw.-nt\-foui  hour^ 
and  that  twooflUcis  he  appointed  by  eaeh  side,  to  inert  at  Mr. 
Moore'-;  house,  to  >cttle  t^Tni^  i\>v  the;   >un-ender  of  tlie  po>ls  o|    \  oik 

and  ( ill  uice^ter. 

"  I  liave  the  hontir  to  he,  etc., 

•'  L'(  iKNWAl.l.ls." 

(General  W.i-hin-ton  to  I'.arl  ("ornwallis  (  Ke'pK' 1 : 

••AlV    l.oKli:    1  ha\e  had    the   honor  of  receivin-   your  lord-,hiii's 

letter  of  thi-^  date. 

"An  ardent  desire  to  spare  the  furtluT  effu>ion  of  l)!o,,d  will 
rea.lily  incline  nu-  to  listen  to  such  ternr.  for  the  Mirrendier  of  your 
piisis  ,,f  ^■ork  and  ("doucester  ,is  ,ire  adnns>il)le. 

"1  \vi>h.  i.reviou-^ly  te)  the  nie.-tin.;  of  eoniini-.>ioni  rs,  that  youi 
lordship's  proposals  in  writin-  may  he  sent  to  the  .Xnimcan  hues,  for 
which  purp.^se  a  susp.'usion  of  hctilitie.  durni-  two  hours  fnun  the 
deliveiy  of  tills  letter,  will  he  •aanted. 

••  1  have  the  honor  to  he,  etc., 

'•  (JKoRGi;  W.\-iiiN(;n>N-'" 

In  .icco'.dance  witli  this  condition  Karl  Cornwallis  suhnutted  a 
proposition  at  half-pa.t  f.rar  in  the  afternoon;  hut  it.  terms  hein- 
too  -eneral,  commissioners  were  appointed:  the  V>-count  de  No.ulles 
and  Lieutenant-colonel  l.auren>  on  the  part  ^d'  the  allies,  and  Colonel 
Dundas  and  Major  Ros.  on  the  part  ot  the  lhit,-^h,  to  d.efme  the 
conditions  more  e.xphcitly.  On  the  ei^hteentli,  the  arUcle.  were 
rompleted  ;  on  the  nmeteenth  ihcy  were  si-ned  hy  Co:nwalhs  and 
Thomas  Svmonds  at  Vorktoun.  and  hy  Ceor-e  W.ishinoton,  Le 
Compte  de  Rochamheau  and  I.c  Compte  de  Harras,  feu"  himselt 
andC-omptede  (Wrasse,  -in   the   trenche.   hefore   Vorktown,   in   Vn- 

i^inia." 

At  tuelve  o'clock,  the  two  redouhts  on  the  left  Hank  ol  York  were 
delivered  over,  one  to  American   intantry  and   the  other  to    French 

grenadiers. 

41 


I 


I,    ' 


^k 


« if 

i 


!       " 


<;i: 


'A 

■y^-' 

!  ■ 

<  >  A 


i  f 


'^  Is 


(,42 


SIKOi;   111'    VuKRldWX. 


[i7bi. 


At  iiUf  (■\loik.  t\v.>  works  oil  lln  (ilouoe-AttT  si\li'  were  (UIi\crc(l 
rcspcctiv (.;>■  to  I'h'ik'ii  aiul  Amciiian  troops.  At  tuo  o'clock,  t'a  • 
garrison  ol  \oik  in.uclu\l  out  to  ihc  .ipi)oiiU'..i  pl.ico  in  front  of  the 
post,  uitli  shouMrriHl  ,uni-,  rolot^  cixd.  liiu'ns  L)c\itiii;_'.  ,1  liritish 
inarcli.  L;ioiiiuled  ll;cif  .iiin>  .iiui  H'tuiiu'd  to  tlu'ii'  I'ncaiiipiiu'nt--  to 
rein.ini  until  tii-iuiU  lud  to  tlicir  srvcral  (K'-.t in.Uions  in  \'ii;4ini,i. 
jM.iryl.inil.  .ind  l'i;nn>_\-lv,u)i.i.  At  three  o'clock,  the  L;,irrison  oftilou- 
cestt'r  ni.irched  «Hit,  the  c.i\.ih_\'  with  ili.iwn  ^words,  tnini[)ets  sound- 
ing; and  tile  inlanlry  .is  piocrihed  lor  the  ;4,irri-^on  of  Wirk. 

'I'he  l.ind  foici's  btcinie  pri-oiier>  to  the  L^nited  Slates,  .ind  the 
marine  hirce>  to  tlie  n.ival  arniv  ot  I'r.mce. 

The  i^'eiier.d  conditions  <if  the  .surrender  were  the  same  ,is  those 
observed  when  tieiieial  l.incohi  surrendered  Ciiarh-ton  durnvj;  17S0. 

rile  Ihiti-h  troops  niarch'.'d  to  llie  tleld  ot  (.e'reinouy  u  it h  tlieir 
u>ual  sleadine>>,  ,iiid  the  whole  army  h.uiiv^  received  an  is>ue  I'i'  new 
clothin;;,  their  ap>pearance  u  ,is  as  ^oldieily  .1-  it  on  i;,irri-on  par.uie. 
W  hell  (ienei.il  tt'Har.i  a])pr(i.iclu-d  (icneial  \\'.i^hinL;ton  .md  .ipolo- 
^ized  tor  the  .ibseiice  ot  (ieneral  Coinw.uh--.  011  .iccount  ot  iiuii'^poTi- 
tion,  he'  was  reterrtd  to  (ieneral  Lincoln.  lh.it  ot't'icer  recei\ed,  .md 
,is  proniptiv  letunuii  hi-^  >word.  ,md  the  tlO(lp■^  h.uiiv^  ikpo^ited 
their  arms  returned  to  the  po>t.  1  he  .ibsence  ot  I'.arl  L'ornwalli^  has 
been  ot'teii  critici'-ed,  ,1-.  it"  liis  excuse  w.i>  but  .1  sham.  lie  w.is  too 
I^Dod  d  se)ldier  to  dod_L;c  di^aj^rt-e.ible  duty,  and  the  u:i'_;enerous  critics 
mi;^lit  recall  t!ic  months  of  str.iin  to  which  he  li.ul  bei  n  >ul)jected,  be- 
fore p.issiii;^  censure  upon  oiu'  w  iio  h.id  parsed  tlirou^h  so  severe  an 
orde.il.  rile  subsequent  Courtesies  which  ])a-sed  between  himself  .iiul 
W'ashiiv^toii  ,11  e-  matti'rs  of  liistMi}' ;  .md  the  milit.ir\- s.ij;MCity  of  1  .ord 
Cornw.dli--  was  e(pi.d  to  ids  yood  ta^te,  w  hen,  in  resjxuise  to  .1  toast 
L,dveii  b)-  (JeiieiMl  \\'ashii!L;t(m,  '•  '/'/.u  Ih-itish  .ln//r,"  I'-,irl  (.'ornw.illis 
turning;  to  his  host,  liuis  i.loseil— •' .\iid  when  the  iUustiious  p,.rt  that 
_\(iur  l--.\cellenc_\- h.is  borne  m  this  Ion;,;;  .md  l.iborious  contest  becomes 
matter  of  history,  fuiie  will  gather  _\-our  bri_L;htest  l.mrels  r.ither  from 
the  l).ml^s  o!  the  Dei, u\ are  th.in  from  those  of  the  (..'lies.ipeake." 

It  w.isoii  the  nuieteciuh  of  (  )ctober.  while  the  surre'iider  w.is  in 
pro|,n-ess.  tliat  Sir  1  leiH-\-  (  iiiiton  left  S,iiul>-  1  lock,  llem.idethe' 
(Ja|)es  oil  the  tw  Liit_\ -foui  th,  but  retiiiiied  on  the  twenty-ninth,  when 
assuretl  th.it  the  kite  of  the  canip,ii;_;ii  w.is  settleil. 

"  The  ;;eiier.il  return  of  officers  .md  pii\ates  siirreiukreii  at  York- 
towii,  ,is  taken  from  the  ori5:;inal  muster  rolls,  is  st.itod  by  the  com- 
missary of  prisoners  to  have  been  as  follows: — General  and  stall,  79; 


7f 


,so. 


17'..! 


SI  EG  I'   n|.-    S'OKKTOWN. 


^m 


artillery,  :: j  ;  ^^iiarck,  ^2':  liL^lit  inf.mtiy. ''j;!  ;  i-th  rc;^!.,  -'45;  ^31.1 
ri'i;t..  ::  Vi  :  33<'  '*':-;'^--  -''•^^ :  43''  'i';-;t-  35'j  ;  71 -t  n-.^t.,  300  ;  jfnli  rc;4t., 
715;  Sutli  ri'i^t.,  (')Si)  ;  tun  l),itl.iliiins  nf  AunilkIi,  1077,  (tlioc  two 
l).ittalinii>  aldiu'  liaiUoloiU'ls  prc-^cnti  I'riiu.c  I  Icrcditary,  4S4  ;  Kc;^i- 
mcnt  of  (K  I'losc,  ;i4w;  \'a'^i:rs,  74;  liriti^h  Ici^ion,  J41  ;  (Juclu's 
K. miners,  3J0;  N'Mrlli  Carnliiia  voU.,  14J  ;  riomrrs,  44  ;  l-',n;_;iin  rrs,  j^  : 
Total,  iiulii(iiiv.r  conmiis^ary  ilcpartnu'iit  and  So  followi  rs  ot"  the 
arm\-,  7,-47  men  :  Total  of  offu'crs  ami  iik:ii,  alniic,  7,073  ;  seamen  ami 
trom  >liii)|iiii;:;,  about  (joo  ofticeis  and  men."  Other  autliorities 
increase  liii^  numhir  to  (jver  8,cxjo.  It  is  es'ident  troin  this  npoit 
that  the  recoid  office  return  of  Au^u-^t  13th. cited  on  paLje  460  and  as 
intim.ited  e!-euliere,  o\er-estiinates  tiie  real!)-  e!'lecti\-c  fori;e.  The 
retinii  nt  June  l--t,  17SJ,  for  e\ani[)le,  carries  the  "late  ;^Mrrisun  ot 
Vorktowii  "  inti)  the  reciu'd  ,is  S,,So6  me'U. 

Sewi'tN'-tu  e  l)ra--s  L^un-.  fn)  iron  ;^uns,  18  Cierm.in  and  .six  Hritish 
re;,4imeiUal  st.mdards,  were  amnn;,;  the  trophies  caiitured. 

'I'he  militai)-  chest  contained  i^'j,!!,  6s.  sterliiv.^'.  The  Guada- 
loiipe,  jS  ;  the  ('/</  l-iiwey,  []].■  iienetta  (sl()0|)).  1:4,  ,ind  \'ulcan, 
lue  ship,  _'4 ;  tl;irt\-  transpmis,  t'ltteen  L;alle\-s,  ant!  many  smaller 
\  essels.  u  ith  ne  irl_\'  nine  hundred  nfiicers  and  seamen,  were  surren- 
dered ti)  the  ImimicIi. 

The  lUnetta  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  I'Larl  Cornwallis  as  a 
dispatch  vessel,  to  be  returned,  or  accounted  tor  tu  the  Count  de 
(jrassc. 

The  American  casualties  dmang  the  sie;:je,  ujj  in  the  sixteenth,  as 
recorded  in  \\'ashin;4t(jn's  I)i,ii-y,  weri'  twent\'-three  killed,  sixt\'-five 
wouniied  ;  the  I-'rench,  fiftv-!  wo  killed,  one  hundred  ami  thirt\-four 
wountleel.  I'lu:  I'ritisii  cisu.dties  were  one  hundred  .md  filtx'-si.x 
killeil,  thi-ee  Innuired  ,iml  twenty-six  wnunded,  antl  seventy  missiiv,.;. 
.Major  (..'ochraii,  actin;^  .ud-de-c.inip  to  I'l.irl  Cornwallis,  was  the  (.)idy 
British  Iield  officer  who  tell  duriiv,;  the  sieL;e. 

In  the  letter  of  I",,irl  t'ornwallis  o\  the  twentii.'tli  of  (October  there 
occurs  the  lollowiuL:;  expression  ,is  to  his  tieatment  alter  the  surrender. 

"The  treatment,  in  t;encral,  that  we  have  received  trom  the 
enemy  since  our  surrender,  has  been  periectly  ^ood  and  proper;  but 
the  kiiulness  antl  attentionth.it  has  been  shown  us  b\- the  l''rench 
officers  in  particular,  their  delicate  seiisibilit}-  (jf  our  situ.ition,  their 
i;enerous  and  pressint;  ofter  of  mone\-,  both  jrablic  and  private,  to 
any  amount,  has  re,dl\'  s^one  bevoml  what  1  cm  possibly  describe. 
and  will,  I  hope,  m,d>;e  .in   impression  011  the    breast   of  ever\-  British 


-I 


^(S5■ 


'ki  i 


!     '  ■ 


t' 


W-  ?!  I 


if 


1 


■1 

'  8 


Hi;i  ■'■ 


1.11 


Hi     I'ta'  ( i  ,     1 


!K,J.J 


ml 


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li. 


1  f 


G44 


SIKOK   "I'    \i>kkT  'WN. 


['781 


ciniciT,  w  lu-nc\'rr  tile  fiiiiuiic  of  w.ir  slnuild   put    ,iny  iit'tlinii  intu  our 

'1  hi--  tf^tiiiU'ni.il  of  I'.arl  (  oniu  alii-'  i>  worthy  <if  lastii);^  iiifiition 
and  is  in  liai'inon\'  willi  his  own  L^cneroiis  (.-UaiMctfr  and   condiut. 

It  is  in  thi>  |ilan;  pioiu'i-  ;o  [iKar  iiini  with  Hm'^oyiu'.  who,  with 
likt.'  nii-^lort  nnrs,  achicNct!  1  iC'.ord  un^uri).i-^--i'd,  il  r(|iialf<i,  i))'  any 
othiT  llrilish  ( iciicTal,  lor  iinl  inn;^,  uusch'ish  and  .'killlul  coniUirt  nmlcr 
(.•ii\  iinisiancr^  of  prciirart'.'d  tii  d  uliich  no  mi-^loit  uiu'  coiild  lann-^h. 

I''roni  l.on;;  I-lan<i  to  \'oi  i.iuw  n,  (Ai.'n  in  -pitr  of  t  he  carlv  n  rors 
of  Miihtary  policy  wa'rii  attach  to  this  kind  of  war  and  which  were 
niaintainoi  Ii\'  tin-  Ihiti-h  (Jahnict,  lie  showed  hini:>ell  the  ri\al  ol 
llowe  in  stiatcLMc  >kill.  ol  Lhntoii  in  coura,;e,  and  -^niurior  to  both  in 
appreciation  of  tlie  opportunities  awA  (.ieniand-.  of  the  ])idtiacted 
stru;_;;4kj.  'The  narritix'e  h,H  •^ulVicieiitl)-  inii-.t  rateii  the  dilTicuhies  ol 
liis  .'-e'lA'ice  ;  aiid  tlie  ciit ici.-nis  o|' 'larlelon  and  ('hnton,  alter  llic  war 
c'lixed.  do  iMt  di-ck)>e  facts  to -i)(.\\  that  he  liad  ahc  i'Mali\  e^  of  act  ion, 
in  the  Southern  or  \'ir;^inia  canip,ii'.;ns,  wliich  afforded  hnn  an\-  liettcr 
mihtary  opportunities  than  tIio>e  which  he  in  eacli  ca-^e  inipro\ed  to 
the  lull  extent  of  the  troo|)s  autl  resources  at  hii  coinniand. 

It  would  he  unju-'t  to  ( ieneral  Clinton  to  lake  his  own  corri'-^pond- 
fiicc  01  e\en  his  own  defense  as  eN[)l,inator_\-  (>{'  his  inteicour-^e  with 
( leiieral  Cornwallis  during;'  the  C.n'olina  and  \'irL;inia  cainpai_;n<.  In 
ids  vindication,  which  realU'  lies  in  circumstance-^  l)L'_\-ond  his  con- 
tiol,  ikj  re>ts  too  much  upon  thi'  a>,-umption  that  one  <jf  the  two 
ollicers  must  hear  the  i(.''-|ion>il)ilit)'  of  the'  failures,  overlookdn;;  too 
olteii  the  l,ut,  that  ad(  cpiatc  -upport  was  not  furnished.  He  had., 
howe\cr,  in  hi^  extreme  a-^urance  of  success,  eiicoura^cti  the  ihiti^h 
ministr\-,  in  a  directicjii  exact  i\"  in  liarmou)-  with  its  hia-  and  wi-hes, 
and  his  repeated  ckums  foi'  more  troops  induced  a  coiuictioii  of  in- 
elllcienc}'.  lie  was  brave,  ,is  a  soK.lier,  but  timid  and  uncial, dn  in 
])oiic),  and  his  excellence  !a\'  in  execution,  when  the  woik  wa-.  belore 
him  .md  action  was  the  only  alternative.  Too  much  was  expected  of 
the  ISritish  ( ieneraU,  with  the  resources  at  their  disi)osal,  and  the 
entire  st.aies  ol  p.iper  controversy  seems  like  so  man_\'  attempts  to  save 
one  at  another'.-.  eX[)en>e.  IncdNsc  there  had  to  be  a  scape-L^oat  for 
•;vci'\'  unexpected  inilitar\-  tlisaster. 

On  the  date  last  referred  to,  October  twentieth,  1 7S  i .( ieneral 
V\'ashin.;ton  closed  an  order  of  con|.;ratulation  to  the  allieil  arm\'  in 
the  followiii;^-  words  : 

"  Dixiiie  service  is  to  be  performed  t(j-morruw  in  the  several  brii^ades 


[»78l 


sii:(;k  (>i  \'<'kKin\vN. 


64: 


!»    J. 


ami  Jivi^iiins.  1  lir  C'Miiiin.in(K'r-in-iiii(t'  ciuiuslly  rcCdiiimnitU  lli.it 
tlir   ti(iu|)-,  iidt  '111  (liit_\,  slioiilcl  uni\i  rsilly  altind,  with  lii.it  -^^irinii-.. 

lR-'^>   llT  (IcjlOltnicnt     ,111    :     L;IMlltH(l'-    nf    IuMII     ullilll     llu'    ITLir^nitinn    nt 

such  rriti  lau'il  .iiii!  a^toiii~.limi^f  iiili'!i)i)^itiiiii>  ot  I'rovidcncc  di  iiKiiul 
t4  II  >." 

In  (.Iti^iir^  the  cani-T  o!  tlu.-M.'  twu  iii'.u  wlm  liavr  filliil  pnniuiicnt 
places  in  the  Daltk'  !iaiiati\T,  sn  luar  it>  cIdsc,  there  iLiitain-.  mily  lu 
add  the  ■^iiv^K:  .stati;niiiit,  that  the  ci  irrc^pc  mdciu  i;  cnihudicd  111  tlu: 
text  is  tn  be  accepted  as  ■Aritleii  in  ;^iMid  tailh  !))•  both  parties.  And 
e.ich  sullered.      77/,   /■);iu//  flu  I  u'l/s  in  tlatr  .wn'. 

W'asliiiv^toii  j)aid  his  re-.[)eet-.  in  person  Id  (.'ount  de  <  ira-^-e,  and 
\-ari<iiis  enterprise-,  were  su'^;_;ested  tor  the  \'iL;orMUs  pidsix  ution  i^{  the 
.id\anta;_;e  alre.ul)'  L;aiiieil.  The  nmsl  pn>niinenl  w  a>  mu:  a;_;ainst 
C'h.irlestDii.  A  second  pinposed  the  t  rauspui  tat  h  iii  ol  1  .a  I'ayetti'  to 
W  ihnin;^!un  with  a  mixed  command  ol  i'rench  and  Anuiieaii  troop-. 
The  ine\-it.ible  delays,  the  lateness  oi  the  -eason,  the  heav)  ilrair^ht 
(if  the  dii'ps,  the  .ni-nientat  ii  ai  of  the  iaitisli  n,i\,ii  torces  011  the 
Noith  ,\merican  Station,  a\\k\  the  ur;.;'.-nl  di  ni.ind  lor  his  preseaice  in 
tlu;  W  e'st  Indies.  \\i.:re  anion  _;  the  causes  which  deterred  the  (..'ouut  dc 
(jrasse  iVoin  such  nio\aMnei!ts  an«l  ewiituali)' susp^-utled  fmther  propo- 
sitions. On  tile  tourth  of  Noxeniber  he  lelt  the  co.ist.  li,i\iiiL;'  rect.ivcd 
houi  \\  asliin_;ton,  C'onL;ress.  and  tiie  American  peopU-,  repeated 
acknou  ledL^nieiits  01  the  services  of  himself  .uul  his  ileet.  A  sl.md 
of  Colors  ami  a  piece  of  ordii.ince  were  \-ott'd  to  himself  and  ("ount  de 
Kocii.unbe.ui,  and  it  '"was  dcowii,  that  there  shouKl  be  a  ni.uble  mon- 
ument erected  at  \'orktown  to  conimemor.ite  the'  alliance  between 
France  and  the  United  Slates  .md  the  victor)'  achieved  by  their  as- 
sociated arms." 

'J'he  Mar(|uis  de  St.  .Simon  embarked  his  troops  October  thirty- 
first,  .md  s.iiled  for  the  West  Indies.  C'ount  de  Rocliambe.iu  remaineil 
in  \'iiL;ini;i,  with  he.idiiu.irters  at  W  iilianisbiir;,;-,  until  the  summer, 
holdin;4  his  couim.md  subjt'Ct  to  onlei.s  tor  an_\  re([uired  de-t.iil.  lie 
.ifterw.u-d  returned  t]irc;u;^di  I'liiladelphia  to  the  Hudson:  tiience  to 
.\ew  l'lni;l.md  in  the  fill,  .uul  s.iileil  from  Boston  for  the  West  Indies 
early  in  December,  l^.Sj.  His  .irm>-,  whether  in  camp  or  on  the 
march,  was  the  theme  of  general  pr.iise  for  its  .idmir.ible  discipline 
and  L^ootl  deportment. 

(iener.il  Lincoln  coiiductetl  the  m.iin  arm\-  to  winter  quarters  in 
New  Jerse\-  and  on  the  Hudson,  and  soon  assumed  Ids  duties  as  Sec- 
retary of  W.ir;  St.  Clair  and  Wayne  went  south  to  the  reinforcement 


!'    I' 


! 


i< 


1'   «■  - 


ill 


^4 


IS 

! 

; 


1: 


I: 


11 


!l 


h    1. 


.ti 


646 


sii:(;r:  of  yorkthwn. 


[•781. 


of  Grcciu',  and  the  army  was  thus  widely  distrihiitcd  at  tlic  close  of 
this  last  arti\-i' I  .ini]i,ii';ti.  La  l"a\-i'ltf  sifiti;_;  iiu  prospect  of  active 
servici',  retiiriud  to  I'lamr,  hrariii;,;  willi  liiiii  ihr  atHctii  ni  of  the 
Anu-ricaii  pi-opK'.  next  to  that  with  whii  h  th(>-  iionorecl  Washiii;,;- 
ton.  'The  u^ual  relaxation  of  niilitai)' ol)li'.;at  ion  took  plue,  iiureascd 
gre.itly  hy  the  con\iction  that  ])eaee  was  not  tai  distant,  and  the 
iisu.il  ront  iiie  of  eni!)ariMssiiU'nt  fol  loved  the  eHoit>  to  maintain  an  army. 

Sir  (iuy  Carletoii  sueceeded  Sii'  Ileiiry  I'linton  early  in  May,  17SJ, 
and  on  the  seventii,  he  ,id\ise'd  \\'a>hin;.;ton  tlial  he-  had  l)een  asso- 
ciated with  Adniirai  l)i;-;b>'  in  ,1  conunission  to  consider  the  terms  of 
permanent  pe.ice. 

The  moderate  i)art)-  in  I"aif,'land  rceeix'ed  tVesh  streiv^th  ;  the  min- 
istr_\-  snccumlied  to  the  foree  of  the  la^t  hlow.  l''i,uu'e  was  as  ea^er 
as  other  nations  to  sto[)  the  cost  .itid  waste  ol"  war,  and  the  sie^je  of 
Yorktown  eventually  wr(iu;^ht  out  tor  the  people  of  tile  United  States 
their  Xation.il  Inde[)endence. 


liKiiisii  I'lrriirrn-i    I'Uuck. 
NoiK. — l''niin  "  Orii,'iiKd  Ivctunis  !:•  llu'    l!illi>h   Kcidnl  <  itVicc."     Date  Sfptcmlicr   1-.1. 


.781 


Ni.w  \'oi;K                           \'ii;iaNi\ 
I 'I  lti^Il f'l.)::  5?-14  •  • 

C  iLl  llKUl i(l>()    JL'U^    .  . 

I'lin  iiuials 21; 1137    .. 


Sotrrii  ('  a;ni  ina 

?<|-;-t 

I5i)li 

:ii55 


Total  1(1,701 

(il  i)i;ia.\ 

Hilii>li . 

Cit-MllKUl 4^0    . 

1'h>\  incials 511S    . 


SSS5 

F.ASr    I'l.iiKlIiA 

•■••     ?4''  


W  I  ■>!    I'i  wi;a)\ 
374 


?3- 
21  I 


1084 

\i>v.\  Scotia 

British 1745   , . . . 

vJcrman 5(12   .... 

Provincials i  '45    .... 


546 


rKOVniKNCK    Isl.AMi 
135     


3452 


135 


"43 

l!i  i;\iri)AS 
■     3=4 


354 


Tut.il 42,075, 

Troops  uniU'R  CoiiNWAi.i.is  in  ViR'aNiA. 
Note.      From  "  Orii^iiial  Kctunis  in  the  llriti>h  Keconl  <>|tiLc."     I).ite  .Auj^usi  ist,  1781, 


British 5541 

German 2 1 4S 


I'rovincials 1 1  37 

On  1  )Ltaciiinciits 607 


7680 


Total,  9,433. 


1744 


in 


ir.iDA 


TiirlilouMi, 


—---J  Amrnrtm. 
Ih-nrh  . 
oritiJt, 


o  Artilirors 
oLiibdratoiy 


&n'  C/uthti 


(b/n/ti/ea  a/i(/Ifrmin  (n  fv/.  fafrefu//t>/t 


r 


■I 


1 


I' 
I? 


n 


I?' 


s 


ii 


ulo 


/ 


I  •/< 


kr 


m 


I    t 


CHAPTER    LXXVI. 


CONCLUSION. 


IIS  tlic  consideration  of  the  battles  and  some  of  tlic  associated 
minor  oi)erations  of  tlie  war  of  1775--1781,  in  connection  with 
cstablislied  principles  which  must  interpret  the  relations  and  value  of 
inilitar)'  facts  and  military  contluct,  tliere  are  found  some  incidents 
of  the  history  which  are  ver)-  properly  retouched,  at  the  close  of  the 
narrative.  While  partl>-  involved  in  the  general  notice  of  the  "  Revo- 
lutionary Epoch  "and  more  directly  suggested  by  the  discussion  of 
"Wars  between  Nations"  and  "  Military  Principles  Defined,"  they 
arc  worthy  of  re-statcmcnt,  as  the  legitimate  effects  of  permanent 
causes. 

Giucral  Features  of  the  Strir^yjc.  This  conllict,  in  the  governing 
resistance  of  its  authorized  atlvocates,  was  Revolutionary  ;  and  neither 
an  Insurrection  nor  a  simple  Rebellion.  It  necessarily  partook  of 
elements  which  characterize  Civil  War  (Chapter  VI),  and  these  elements 
were  multiplied,  exactly  in  proportion  as  tlio  armies  were  too  small, 
or  too  detached,  to  strike  decisive  blows  in  the  field.  Sonic  of  the 
partisan  corps,  on  both  sides,  as  with  the  guerilla  parties  during  the 
Peninsul.i  war  in  Portugal  and  Spain,  tlu'  wars  of  Vendee,  and  at 
certain  stages  of  the  American  civil  war  of  1S61 -5,  were  numerous, 
active  and  unsparing,  just  as  the)-  were  at  the  time  beyond  the 
iniluence  and  control  of  organized  troops.  While  skirmishing  and 
scouting  parties,  which  form  the  light  troops  of  a  regular  army,  are 
called  upon  to  sever  communications,  seize  and  destroy  depots  of 
supplies,  or  otherwise  disable  an  adversary,  thereby  to  reduce  his 
means  oi  offensive  action,  it  is  however  no  more  certain  now,  than  it 
was  during  the  period  under  notice,  that  violence  ic  ^on-resisting 
soldiers,  or  citizens,  and  the  infliction  of  sufferirT  .  pon  the  defense- 
less people  of  the  country  where  war  prevails,  is   .     .»  to  the  best  sue- 


i' 

■i    1 

\ 

''!•;■ 

t     • 

■:!C 

! 

'?' 

i      |. 

1 

i  r 

1 

^ 

1 

\  \ 
\  I 

P 

•  t 

1 

'1 

^  H 

% 

,.  i- 

1? 

ip  1 

ill 


M.       5 


II 


. 


'I  "K  ;t> 


4:  A'  *' 


648 


(■0.\(I.I',vl(  )\. 


f'T'^i- 


cess.  1*^  is  110  less  a  violation  of  the  ii;;hts  and  obi i[;at ions  of  u.ir 
itself,  and  ii.])UL;nant  to  the  spirit  of  that  Christianity  whicii  a 'mits  ot 
no  war,  whate\er.  nnless  to  subsciA'e  ri;^hti. '>usnes<  and  enl^rce  ]KM':e. 

The  cau'^e'-  uh.ieh,  trom  llie  very  ince[)lion  ot  the  conllict,  sciined 
to  force  a  wroiit;  ••  Military  I'oliey  "  upon  the  ISrilish  Cabinet,  were 
consid.ei'e'.I  in  the  preliminary  ili>cussions  :  and  thi-  ])erpi.tu,itiiin  i4th.it 
policy  was  interwoven  with  the  pr(i;4ress  of  e\'er_\-  canipai;^!!.  The 
adoption  of  the  \  iews  of  tlie  niodcrati'  parly  in  l".n'_;land,  as  late  a-- 
tlio  close  of  ]iurt;()\nc's  campaign,  even  at  the  co>t  of  .American 
Independence,  would  ha\e  secured  to  Great  llritain  a  natural  ally,  and 
one  well  located  to  afford  matt'rial  aid  to  her  operation^  in  the  West 
Intlies.  It  mi;_;ht  also  have  avealed  the  hairopean  Coalition  which 
drew  inspiration,  if  not  its  e\i-^tence,  front  the  proIoUL^ed  stru;4L;le  in 
Anuaica.  The  pi<i_L;ress  of  all  attemi)ts  at  reconciliation  wasattentled 
b\-  the  asMunption,  that  an  imprincipled  .iiul  groundless  rebi'llion, 
impelletl  bv  ,ni  oriL;inal  purpc^-^e  to  obtain  n,itional  independence, 
was  the  kind  of  opposition  which  was  to  be  reduced  to  terms.  This 
failure  to  appreciate  the  real  chanicter  of  the  issue  between  (ireat 
Jh'itain  and  the  Colonies,  involved.  , it  the  very  outset,  a  fulure  to 
furnisl  adeipiate  means  for  the  pro-^ecution  of  the  war;  and  the  erroi' 
S^rew  more  and  more  glarin!^^  as  the  pressure  tVoni  other  atlvers  iries 
made  it  impossible  to  supplement  the  defect.  This  error  was  recip- 
rocated b_\-  the  American  peojjle.  Their  conduct  of  the  war  durin;^,' 
each  succe^-.sive  canipaii;n  is  clearl)'  indicative  of  a  fu'ure  to  atlopt 
an  energetic  Militar_\'  I'ol'cx',  which  alone  prtunised  early  success. 
Its  neglect  involved  nearly  seven  \ears  of  struggle  and  more  than 
eight  yiars  of  umest  and  waste.  i'he  pressure  of  an  emergency 
would  indeed,  now  and  tlien.  amuse  a  fexerish,  popular  response; 
but  when  th',-  danger  passed  b\',  relaxation  ensued  ;  ami  t'aon — a 
series  of  uncertainties,  fluctuations  an  1  disasters,  just  at  times,  when 
exhaustive  measures  were  \-ital  to  success.  That  nudtiplication  of 
miseries,  which  were  often  related  to  mere  hunger,  c<.)ld,  ov  want  of 
money,  had  its  germ  in  this  lack  of  conscious  obligation  to  devote 
all  available  appliaiucs  to  tin  quickest  fossiblc  ilcstniction  of  the  Ih'it- 
isli  art)iv. 

There  were  natural  causes  f)r  this  state  of  affairs.  Tiie  jealousy 
of  central  authoril}'  which  individualized  states,  extendetl  its  enfee- 
bling influence  to  ctanmunilies  e\en  siualler  than  states.  Loc.il  and 
sectional  prejudices  were  h.irdly  less  destructive,  through  their  para- 
lyzing force,  than  P)ritish  armies  were  in  the  O[)er.itions  of  the  field. 


IitSi. 


r7Si.] 


CONCLUSION. 


649 


Tlie  letters  of  General  Greene,  embodied  in  a  st.itcinent  of  tlie  true 
conditions  to  perni.ment  success,  as  cited  on  page  S5,  are  expressive 
of  the  true  military  ])olicy  which  belonged  to  the  colonics  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war. 

It  is  impossible  to  examine  the  narrative,  condensed  as  it  is,  with- 
out the  conviction  that  a  thorough  co(iperatii)n  of  the  colonies  in 
ihe  effort  to  raise  a  national  army,  irrespective  of  local  dangers,  would 
have  lessened  those  d.ingers  and  would  ha\-e  diminished  the  co.-t  and 
shortenetl  the  duration  of  the  war.  l-"rom  the  man\'  documents, 
muster-rolls  .and  official  statements  which  h.ive  bet-n  cited,  it  appears 
that  thert?  were  si:ver,d  occasions  when  the  prom[jt  su])[)iM-t  of  the 
American  army  would  h.ivc  achie\'ed  victory;  anil  it  is  eiiuall)' true 
that  the  British  armv  rrpcited.ly  had  as  good  .assurance  of  success, 
but  for  its  over-estim.ite  of  the  .American  forces  in  the  ileUl.  And  \-et 
in  proportion  as  the  iSritish  forces  diminished,  or  witliheld  tlie  offen- 
sive, so  did  their  opponents  seem  imp.itieiit  of  further  sacrifice;  .and 
the  consl.int  lluctuations  of  the  American  arm_\'.  together  with  great 
scarcit}'  of  ,arm\'  -^applies,  as  well  as  of  money,  made  the  oiiening  and 
close  of  every  campaign  to  appear  .is  if  .1  single  bold  stroke  of  the 
Hritish  troops  must  end  the  struggle. 

I'.ven  when  the  fill  of  Vork'tmvn  drew  near,  the  effective  strength 
of  \\'a-.liington's  ann\' at  the  north  was  le-^s  than  that  of  the  combined 
French  armies  of  Rochambe.iu  and  .St.  Simon,  and  was  not  superior 
to  the  arm_\-  of  Cornwallis  itself  in  respect  of  numbers. 

The  ■ii)prehensions  of  I. a  h^-.yette  and  of  the  I'reiich  Minister  ot 
I'inance,  that  the  .\mericans  would  depend  too  implicitl}'  upon  ex- 
tern.U  aid,  aiul  would  fail  to  meet  a  corresponding  res[)on;-iibiiit  \-,  were 
l>arli.ill_\-  confirmeii  ;  and  the  occ.asion.al  coaipl.iiut  that  the  I'rench 
arm\'  and  n,iv\'  tlid  no  more,  w.is  Iargel_\-  based  upon  a  I'onsciousness 
of  in.ulequate  home  effort,  and  ihe  f.itigue  experienced  under  the 
pressure  of  protracted  struggle. 

Tlie  reluctance  of  .States  to  waive  'eadership  and  recogni/e  one 
permanent  responsibility,  which  imp.iired  the  efficiency  ot  military 
action  earl)-  in  the  w.ar,  was  followed  b\-  extreme  je.ilousy  of  .1  well 
organized  and  highl}'  disciplined  army.  Because  I3unlcer  Hill  ex- 
pres.sed  the  capacity  of  true  valor  to  resist  efficiently,  umler  favoring 
opportunity,  it  did  not  follow  that  the  fresh  regiments  of  Stark, 
Chester,  Prescott,  or  Christopher  Greene  were,  man  for  m.ui,  in  open 
field,  the  fighting  peers  of  the  Hritish  I-'ifth, 'rhirt\--eigluh,  and  h^ort)-- 
second  regiment.s   wliich  withered   uniler  their  fire.     The  warnings, 


I    f 


1^ 


!:K 


•    i 


i  ' 


m 


fi; 

■ 

I'i 

1 

ill 

i> 

! 

if 


^m| 


I, 


urm 


r?«i,r 


im¥ 


appeals  and  protests  of  Wasliint^ton  were  even  more  earnest  for  dis- 
ciplined men  than  fur  food  or  clothin;.^.  !Ic  knew  well  that  money 
and  su])plies  would  follow  success  ;  and  he  knew  just  a-^  well  that  the 
pcop'e  wouKl  have  contulence  in  an  annv  only  in  the  projxjrtion  that 
strict  discipline,  exact  accountability,  and  fitness  to  sustain  the  stru;^- 
s^le  would  L^ive  the  i)]edL;e  of  an  earnest  purpose  to  hnish  the  w.ir, 
The  patriotism  which  enduvetl  starvation  and  exposure  at  V-dley 
Fori:je  and  Motristown  had  its  stren;4th  in  the  discipline  attained; 
because  a  conscious  fitness  for  duty  inspired  pride  ant!  coura.i;e,  while 
the  true  patriot  was  williiiLj  to  underj^o  the  i)roper  trainin^j  which 
would  L;ive  to  his  eneri^ies  the  best  cipacity  to  .u.hieve. 

With  this  brief  rcsiiiiic  of  the  errors  ami  shortcomiuL^s  of  both 
Great  J5ritain  and  the  American  peojile  in  the  direction  of  Militnry 
Policy,  there  is  involved  another  class  of  considerations  which  inspire 
awe,  and  unmistakably  declare  the  true  Philosophy  of  tiie  American 
.struc;t;le  for  National  Independence. 

The  /('/v//i7'  ret^arded  the  el'fectUcd  resistance  of  the  colonies  to  be 
just  as  impossible  as  I'viiiLj  Pharaoh  of  Iv^ypt  believed  the  persistent 
deir.andi  nf  the  j^reatest  [)<ilriotic  leader  of  ancient  times  to  be  absurd, 
and  innocent  of  dani^er  to  his  ancestral  rii^hts  and  royal  preroijative. 

The  latter,  in  their  long  protracted  im{)ortunity  for  satisf.iction. 
equality  and  peace,  bes(ju|^ht,  then  resisted,  strui;L;"letl  on,  and  still 
resisted,  until  the  purjiose  to  be  emancipated  became  a  part  of  the 
inner  life.  It  w.is  at  the  hearth-stone  as  well  as  in  the  skirmish.  It 
was  before  the  domestic  altar,  a-,  well  .is  in  the  tent  or  barracks.  The 
iiands  of  women  wrouijht  in  >ileiice  and  in  tears,  while  their  lui>b,uids 
foui^ht  the  battle  amid  tumult  and  carnage.  It  was  with  all  childi^.h 
sports  until  mimic  wax  gave  [)rcci)cious  vigor  to  j'outh,  .nul  boys  took 
part  in  a  conlhct  with  men.  Ikit  as  from  year  to  year,  deliverance 
ever  beckoned  forward,  onl\'  to  recede,  campaign  after  campaign,  and 
still  there  was  hope,  and  with  it  progress  ;  the  American  peo[)le  did. 
nt)t  even  then  anticipate  the  great  duration  of  th.it  ^'.earisorne  struggle, 
all}-  more  than  the  Hebrew  militia  forecast  their  forty  years  of  tire- 
some marchings  in  [)ursuit  of  indej'-endence  and  peace.  It  was  well 
they  did  not.  Great  Britain  was  blind  to  operations  of  the  laws 
which  gave  her  Iicr  liberl>-.  .Vmerica  wa-:  blind  to  the  cost  o'i  rescu- 
ing /w/ta/Av/ liberty,  riie  blindness  of  the  one  withheld  the  force. 
The  blindness  of  the  other  Mupplieil  the  faith. 

Tlie  Chariot  of  the  Ruler  ot  the  Universe  rode  through  and  r.ver 
the  theatre  ot  ■'  ar.      'ilusc  on   the  on<,  side  were  stayed,  and  these  on 


1781. 


CONCLUSION'. 


651 


the  otliLT  side  wcm-c  cncourii;^a'd.  The  weakness  of  physiccd  mij^ht 
and  power  in  a  moral  strui;j^'ie,  was  made  to  exalt  tlie  emotional  and 
the  spiritual,  and  to  vindicate  man,  \n-  the  interposition  of  his  Maker. 

])ad  Militarj-  l'olic\',  as  a  niatti:r  of  human  science,  matle  the  war 
of  1775  17S1  lon;.^  and  costly.  Infinite  wisdom  ordained  for  both 
parties  an  independent  prosperity,  a  lii;4her  mission  among  the  n.itions. 

Thus  while  "  Militar)-  .Science  is  the  key  to  military  historj-,"  there 
i.s  an  inner  realm  of  unseen  c<iu-<e  which  the  key  of  Providence  ak.nie 
controls,  ,ind  that  nation  which  has  the  sul)limer  faith  will  L;ather  the 
fruit  of  peace,  while  others  lan;4uish  in  the  pursuit  throuL;h  the  endless 
issues  of  contro\'ers)'  and  blood. 

There  is  still  another  lesson  to  be  drawn  fi'<jm  this  narr.itive, 
and  one  wiu'ch  the  very  weakness  of  the  .\merican  army  at  that 
period  has  made  impressive  for  all  time,  and  that  is,  the  ultimate 
dependence  of  all  nations  up(;n  moral  coiuictions,  for  the  vindication 
of  either  personal  or  national  libert)'.  Under  the  "  .\[)oloc;y  for  the 
Art  of  War,"  the  necessity  for  standniL;  armies  was  made  manifest. 
Under  the  review  of  the  .\merican  Revolution,  the  cai.)acitv  of  a  i)eo- 
])le  leti  by  a  sm.dl  army  has  been  denieii^trated..  It  is  a  confirmation 
of  the  tjjeneral  principles  with  which  the  narrative  opened  ;  and  an 
encouras^ement  to  all  naticjns  that  there  is  to  be  a  time  when  the 
administration  of  civil  law  alone  will  rcipiire  physical  force  ;  and  when 
the  superior  obligation  of  equal  justice  will  alike  end  armaments  and 
armies. 

With  this  inevitable  side  drift  which  carries  military  policy  into 
all  the  responsibilities  of  a  national  life,  there  is  a  necessary  recurrence 
to  other  elements  of  the  war  under  r.otice. 

The  St!(itco;v  of  the  war  of  1775-81  is  best  appreciated  by  exam- 
ination and  application  of  the  principles  heretofore  stated.  Their 
repetition  is  not  required.  That  the  location  of  the  .\merican  head- 
([uarters  in  New  Jerse_\'  and  on  tlu;  Hudson,  atlmitted  of  all  possible 
strati\Q;ic  coiiibiiiat ions  \\\\y\  cow\.'\\Y^*^\\zw.^  which  were  in\'olved  in  move- 
ments of  British  troo[)s  from  Canada,  New  York,  or  by  the  Lhcsapeake, 
is  evident  from  the  readiness  with  which  such  enterprises  were  met 
and  foiled  ;  and  it  is  equally  evident  that  the  so-called  Fabian  policy 
of  Washington  was  based  upon  the  conviction  that  a  true  strategic 
policy  would  be  adopted  ow  the  i)art  of  the  liritish  Cabinet,  and  that 
ivas  to  de^troyhis  arm)-,  and  let  cities,  districts,  ami  provinces  f.dl 
through  tlic  want  of  compact,  sufficient  and  disciplined  defenders. 
The  narrative  affords  the  facts  by  which  to  judge  of  the  skill  employed 


ir 


[I.  i, 


..'t^ 


1 


I''   \     I 

y  4 


r 


:'3  ^ 

H3  , . 


mm  - ' 

pi.:: 


1' 

"i 

6^2 


coNci.nsio.v. 


InHi 


in  tlic  direction  of  strategy.     The   example  cited  suggests  the  direc- 
tion of  intiiiiry. 

/'//<'  L<\!^/s//(S  of  the  American  ariny  were  embarrassed  by  the  !j;reat 
extent  of  the  country,  its  forests  and  mountains,  its  river  courses, 
and  m.irshes,  and  its  widely  diffused  [)opulatioii.  These  elements  did 
not  alone  delay  the  transportation  and  concentration  of  troops,  but 
the  productive  lands  were  unequally  worked,  and  in  some  sections 
there  would  be  no  surplus,  and  no  ready  means  of  accumulating  supplies 
f'MUi  other  sections  more  ilenscly  peopled  or  under  more  general  culture. 
The  Hritish  troops  availed  iluinselves  of  the  adv.mt.iges  which  the 
control  of  the  navigable  waters  and  an  organized  commissariat  sup- 
plied, backed  by  the  i)ower  of  a  great  empire.  But  the  waste  in 
handling  supplies  and  the  misconduct  of  officials  were  not  exclusively 
confined  to  the  Americans,  who  were  incxperiencetl,  and  therefore 
improvident.  Similar  complaints  were  made  of  ISiitish  officials. 
That  class  of  supplies  which  was  taken  b\'  partisan  corps  on  either 
side  was  seldom  carefull)- accounleil  for;  but  this  neglect  is  largely 
incident  to  that  kind  of  military  service.  The  repeated  statements 
of  Cieneral  Washington  as  to  the  prevalence  of  venality,  corruption, 
and  malfeasance  in  office,  were  applied  more  directly  to  the  general 
condition  of  the  country,  and  largely  to  the  oper.itions  of  detached 
state,  and  other  jjublic  agencies,  and  very  seldom  t(,)  the  arm\'  which 
had  become  disciplined  ,ind  rcirganizud  umler  responsible  control. 
The  opportunities  for  fraud  in  the  department  of  logistics,  weie  tluMi, 
,is  ah\a\-s,  more  numerous  than  in  any  other,  and  charges  o{  misciMi- 
tluct  in  the  matter  of  contracts,  for  example,  were  as  frequent  then  as 
in  later  times.  General  Greene  was  well  abused  while  quarterm.ister- 
general,  but  h.is  vindication  was  complete, 

1)1  (iraiid  Tactiis,  >is  well  ;is  in  other  subdivisions  of  the  Art  of 
War.  the  introductory  chapters  sjie'cified  leading  illustrations,  which 
arc  afterwards  more  t'ully  drawn  out  in  iletail.  While  the  AnKMican 
regulars  and  all  really  exjjerienced  militia  disinayed  steailiness  as 
well  as  couragi.',  ecpial  to  that  of  their  .ulversaries,  the  war  illustrated 
a  fact  which  has  been  a  reflection  upon  its  conduct,  but  is  common 
to  all  wars,  that  no  trcjops  .ire  exempt  from  a  li,d)ility  to  panic  i\nd 
sudden  disaster.  At  llobkirk's  Hill,  an  American  regiment  which 
had  distinguished  itself  at  the  Covvpens,  lost  the  battle  by  perfectly 
unnecessary  misconduct  ;  and  at  luitaw  .Springs  tlie  British  Si.xty- 
third  and  Sixt)'-fourth,  veterans,  after  a  too  hasty  advance,  meeting 
unexpected   resistance,   gave  way   in    etjual   disorder.     Washington, 


[I7S. 


Art  of 


1781.I 


CONCLUSION. 


653 


even  at  the  risk  ol  his  hfc.  cnulil  imI  lialt  the  flyiiv^'  rc'i^iinriits  nf  Par- 
sons' bri<^aclc  (papjc  226,)  durin'^  the  retreat  from  \i'\v  \'iMk,  hut 
savetl  his  ariru'  at  Monmouth,  l)y  tiirniiif;  fugitives  imnuiliately  upon 
their  pursuers.  'I'his  instance  ilUistrates  nearl_\-  all  similar  fi'i^hts. 
Discipline  (ends  to  avert  panic;  hut  when  self-possession  is  hjst,  it  \s 
the  iirrisil'h-  and  undetermined  dan<;er  wlu'ch  takes  a\va\'  tiie  breatli, 
and  then  a  shadow  or  a  fancx-,  will  whirl  awav  the  \er\-  men  who 
would  face  any  foe  they  coulil  see  and  measiu'e.  The  ^;reat  defect 
of  the  American  continental  system  was  the  constantly  chan<^inc; 
arm)'  basis,  and  this  was  the  cause  c-f  neari>-  all  tai.:tical  failures  which 
were  not  incident  to  the  ordin,ir_\'  operations  i.f  every  w,u-. 

Reference  is  [larticularly  made  to  Chapters  IX  XIII.  inclusive, 
for  the  laws  by  which  the  conduct  of  the  war  of  l775-i7'Sl,  no  less 
than  of  all  wars,  is  to  be  tested. 

Sn-ii/i^tk  of  AniiiiS.  The  official  records  alread\-  cited  show  that 
the  British  Airce  never  exceeded  about  fort}-  thousand  nu'n  at  any 
period,  and  this  included  the  troops  in  Canada  and  h'lorida,  as  well 
as  at  the  I^ahama  Islands,  and  was  not  until  17S2.  'I'he  Aiiii/uan 
army,  after  1 776,  never  equaled  thirt\--eii;ht  thousand  re^^uhu's  at  a 
sinjj;le  time.  It  is  customary  to  give  a  great  excess  ot  force  to  the 
latter.  The  people  at  large  constituted  a  nominal  militia  of  the 
nature  of  a  fyosse  coiiiitaiiis  -  minute  men — coming  at  call,  ami  dis- 
solving as  quickly.  The\-  were  not  a  proper  armw  The\'  did  indeeti 
check  f(n-a\s,  aiui  affonl  temporary  garrisons;  but  the  smaller  the 
army,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  these  isolated,  transient  detach- 
ments, the  longer  was  the  struggle,  and  the  more  wearing,  as  well  as 
more  unsatisfactory  was  every  local  result. 

The  usual  tabular  statement  of  the  forces  of  the  United  .States 
which  serve<l  at  different  [)erioils  during  the  war,  is  to  bt;  considered 
as  a  total  of  recorile<l  years  of  enlistment,  and  not  as  the  total  of  the 
men  who  served.  Hence  a  man  who  served  from  April  nineteenth, 
J 775,  until  the  formal  cessation  of  hostilities,  April  nineteenth,  1783, 
counted  as  right,  in  the  aggregate. 

The  following  tabic  gives  the  contributions  of  the  various  States 
to  the  C<Mitinental  service,  on  the  ba^-is  stated  : 


New  Himipsliire. 
MassacliuscUs. .  . 
Kho.l 


i-'497     IVliuare 2,386 

69,907     M,-\ryl;in(l 13.912 

ouc   I.iaiul 5.903     Virginia 26,67s 

C'ouucctical 31.939     North  C'aruliiui 7.2f>3 

New  Voil< 17.781     Soutli  Carolina 6,417 

New  Jersey 10,726     Georgia 2,679 

Pennsylvania 25,678 

Total 233771 


f^m 


■  * 

'■I     V 


Pf     I 

^'  W    i 


i 


IF  ! 


'  •■  i 


U  I 


(..  t 


n  >■ 


i.  't 


ni^^ 


I  .•?• 


654 


CONt.l.USION. 


I17S1. 


?u 


The  liritiMi  and  AnKTican  armies  wi-re  alik(^  limited  in  their  ability 
to  concentrate  their  forces.  A  reference  to  the  map  "  Outlines  of 
y\tlantic  Coast,"  fuini-^hes  a  key  to  this  difficulty. 

\Vashin|-lton  controlled  a'l  interior  line  while  at  Midtllebroolc  and 
Morristown.  which  iieail\-  douh'ed  both  his  offensive  atid  defensive 
capacity:  and  the  Hriti-li  fleets  would  have  been  compensated  for  the 
American  line  of  land-march  throu^^h  Virs^inia  and  tlieCarolinas,  if  tin 
uiice;tainties  of  the  sea  and  the  inadeijuate  i^arrison  at  New  York  had 
not  cost  them  nearly  as  much  dela\-  as  embarrassed  the  Americans  in 
crossinc^  the  rivers  and  rouL.;h  countr\-  of  tin   Mates  referrc-d  to, 

X(i:  ,1!  I'o-i'f'i  ?-a/ioii.  I'ndcr  the  head  of"  i'rovideiict  in  war  illus- 
trated," tile  continL;encies  of  maritime  movinieiits  were  adverted  to, 
and  the  narratiw  ha-,  --howii  that  a  fleet  of  tr.msports  rarcl)'  ventured 
even  from  New  V(jrk  to  Newp;ort  without  a  delay  which  defeated  the 
enterprise  on  foot.  The  liritisli  owed  their  chief  success  at  the  ^oulh 
to  tlieir  control  of  the  sea  ;  and  X'luktown  fell  as  soon  as  tlu"  remark- 
ably succe>sful  voyaije  of  the  Count  de  ( irassi-  Miatched  away  that 
supremac)'  in  the  Chesaiicake.  'I'lie  .\meric,in  na\'y  had  Ixen  on^m- 
izi'd  with  fair  promise.  The  names  and  ,irm,uneiit>  o^  th<:  principal 
shij^s,  (.itliev  In'ilt  or  authori/.ed  to  be  built  under  the  sanction  of 
Conj^ress.  have  been  f^iveii  in  tlieir  older  a.s  they  were  authorized. 
That  they  accomplished  very  little  as  a  nav\-  is  involved  in  the  Ljeneral 
statement  of  a  British  naval  blockade  and  .m  almost  undisputed  naval 
su[-.eriorit\-.  At  Newport,  New  iJedtord.  I'liil.ulelphia,  Charleston, 
Savannah  .'uul  other  i)orts,  most  of  these  vessels  were  liurnctl  or  sunk", 
almost  before  they  had  spread  canvas.  .\t  the  outset  of  the  war. 
seamen  and  c;ood  ship-buikiers  abounded  ;  but  heavy  guns  were  not 
ready  wlien  the  ships  were,  and  the  succesi  of  privateering,  which 
[^ave  to  vessels  of  speed  and  iis-jht  draugjht  t.he  best  chance  for  prize 
money,  soon  retluceci  the  number  of  men  from  whom  to  make  14001! 
sailors.  '1  he  protracted  blockade  of  Newi)ort,  the  expeditions  alouLj 
the  coast,  and  the  incursions  which  threatened  the  homes  of  .seafaring 
men  had  a  similar  tendency. 

The  Randolph,  33,  (."aptain  15iddle,  one  of  the  first  ves.scls  put  in 
commission,  blew  up  at  .sea  during  a  night  action,  but  her  commander 
escaped.  The  adventures  of  Captains  Biddle,  John  Paul  Jones,  Hop- 
kins, Barry,  and  others,  are  creditable  to  their  memory;  but  the  main 
fact  remains,  that  while  the  American  army,  in  1781,  was  less  than 
half  its  force  during  the  early  years  of  tlie  war,  tiie  navy  had  but  two 
really  efficient    ships,  that    survived    the    casualties   of  the   contest 


\n< 


1781.1 


CONCI.L'SIOV. 


f^ss 


f Reference  is  niiide  to  note  on   pa^je  144.  close  of  Clia])tei'  XXII.,  for 
the  career  (if  the  American  na\\.! 

/"e;<7>//  0///trrs.  I  )uriii;.;  liie  larl)'  efforts  to  inten\st  I'"  ranee  in 
belialfof  the  .American  cause,  Mr.  Silas  I  )eane  had  iiKhiced  many 
Europe, 111  officers  to  \isit  .Ameiica  under  prouii-^e  of  commissions. 
The  je.ilousv  III  this  mo\'enu.'nt  was  S(.)  great  that  e\in  (ieiieral  (jreene 
at  one  time  tendereil  his  resignation,  and  was  sharply  rebuked  l)y 
Con^iress  for  int(  rierence  with  its  prerogative.  Man\-  failed  to  realize 
thi-   i)urpose   of  their  \-isit —others  failed  to    merit    the  .i|)iiointnients 


received 


anu 


stii 


ither- 
1 


s,  ot    those' u  ii-jse  names  ha\-e  a])i)eared  in  thi^ 


n.iriatiw,    were   an    iionor   to    tln'    ser\'ice 


he    nanu's    of    .Steuben, 


l)e    I 


\.HO.   Ivosciu- 


uiaski. 


1) 


unlessis, 


irtail 


.\ 


rm.uu 


1,  id 


ein 


y 


tiimat  and  otht'rs,  are  associated  with  Iwinorable  niLiition,  wiiile  the 
extraordin.u)'  t-areer  of  the  _\-oulhful  I, a  Fayette  is  so  suL;yestive  of 
tlic  succe'ss  ol  tile  l'"ieiich  alliance,  that  if  liis  earnest  proinptin_gs  liad 
not  ..eiit  him  eaiiy  to  .Vinerica,  it  does  not  ap[)e,ir  how  th.il  alliance 
Could  hav(;  been  so  completel_v  and  succes>full_\'  maintaine 
CLinistances  which  ri4)eateiily  ihre.itened  its  rupture. 


1.1  u 


nd 


J//7a 


iirr  (.  Iidii^rs.     (jener.ils  (i, 


[owe   and   C'linton,  in 


er  cu'- 


succes- 


si\'e 


reiierai   command 


eac 


h  in  turn  m.ide  pri 


leiierals    Hurgoyne,  Ivawdon  and  Cornwallis, 

nd  tlieir 


prisoners  ot  war.  Have  Ijeeii  reineml)ere(.l,  a 


reconl,  with  th.it  of  IJiirgoN-ne,  Kn\-piiausen,  l)oiiop,  Rahl,  ami  scores 


)f  otl 


ler.- 


las    [jet'ii   ins| 


)ire( 


bv   the    motto  with    which    tl 


ICsC 


'age.s 


invited  notice,  "'  J/is/i/it!  it  /'/■(Ch-ricj  nil. 


If  I 


ew  tr.ulitioiis  ol  tlu 


camp,  or  iudo,  iiave  enlivened   this  Idstory 


neith 


ei  has   the   intrusion  of  soci.il   gossip  been   neetUessl}-  interposed 


to  inij),iir 


ll 


le  \'aiue'  o 


t   the  acts  of  soldietv 


Tl 


le  changes  which   tlie 


war  wrought  among  the  Hritisli  characters  who  represented  tlic  pr 

f  !•: 


o  w- 


ess  and  glory  o 
the  United  Stati 


iigland,  were  shared  by  the  leaders  of  the  armies  of 
es.      i'Ywv  of  the  earl)-  commanders  took   part  in  the 


closmir  scenes  o 


f  tl 


le  war.     .Schux'ler,  .Sullivan, 


irnum,  Spencer  and 
others  were  in  the  halls  of  legislation.  The  e.irnest  and  j)atriotic 
Putnam,  who  li.id  so  i)ersiste'ntly  laboreii  to  have  a  second  tight, 
Hunker  Hill,  on  the  memorable  17th  of  June,  1775,  had  retired  fr 


on 


om 


the 


service. 


\V 


ijne  and  .St.  Clair   joined  Greene    in   the  Soutiiern 


department  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis.  Muhlen- 
berg, promoted  Major-gener.d,  retired  to  his  firm  in  Pennsylvania, 
as  elsewhere  stated,  became  Secretary  of  War.     Knox,  al 


so 


Lincoln, 

promoted,  wlio  had  followed  the  fortunes  of  Washington  from  Bos- 
ton in  1775,  to  Yorktown  in    1781,  afterward   succeeded    Lincoln  ns 


IJ 


f 

f-T 

h: 


!'j 


M1     : 


'^     .  ' 


t     • 


i    I 


I* 

r  ir-; 


II 


11 


( .'■ 


636 


CONCI.L'SIOX. 


;.7.s. 


Socrftarx-  of  W.ir,  anil  on  tlic  twciU^-firth  of  Auj^tist,  17S3,  rcceivcil 
from  Sir  ( iuy  (.'arloton.  tlio  >ucci'ssor  of  Sir  I  Icniy  ClintDii,  tlu?  sur- 
rcmlor  of  N\:\v  \'ork.  Jn-rpli  Kccd,  tits'.,  (.'ulmu'!.  tlvii  ai'!  tlo-cainn  . 
tliLMi  tcmliTcd  promotion,  and  tlu'U  Au;Utant-L;cnoral,  had  rcsi^^iicd 
his  (.-omnii^-^ion  as  farlv  as  1777.  hut  .i>  .1  iiH-mhcr  of  (.'oiv^i'css,  or  as 
(iovonior  of  rcnnsyhania.  lie  macK'  liis  military  assui-ialioii  with 
WashiiiL^toii  to  cnuro  to  the  wcll-hciiiL;  of  the  army.  (  )f  ( jowriiurs 
Nelson  and  (Jlinton,  and  others,  who  combined  hi;4h  social  [)osition 
with  L;rcat  military  zeal,  and  of  subordinate  officers  throuLjhout  the 
north  and  soatii,  there  is  allowed  no  fnrthcr  mention  than  tliat  already 
alTorded. 

This  battle  record  has  drawn  to  its  support  many  interprctin;^ 
facts  which  invite,  yet  exclude.  .1  tleparture  into  the  field  of  y,eneral 
history.  Indiviiluals  only  take  their  place,  as  links  in  a  necessary 
chain,  and  their  biograpln*  is  so  cli[  ped  as  simply  to  fdl  the  space 
which  defines  the  principal  battles  ot  the  war. 

If  this  venture  shall  inspire  fre-^h  interest  in  the  " prim  i/'lcs  ivliich 
underlie  luitioiUil  diJiiiSi',"  m  the  spirit  of  its  tledication,  aiul  shall 
command  res[)ect  for  the  valor  which  .ipplied  the  Science  oi  War  to 
the  Hattles  of  the  American  Ivevolutioii,  it  will  have  accomplished  its 
purpose. 

Great  Brit.un  .ind  the  United  States,  jiolitically  separated  by  th.at 
war,  have  so  developed  their  n.itional  life  throuL,di  the  arts  of  peace, 
th.it  the  ocean  is  no  serions  restriction  up.on  their  intercourse,  and 
America,  once  the  child,  then  the  servant,  then  of  mature  ai^e,  now 
competes  in  hon(ir.d)le  emulation,  tor  an  ecpia!  pi, ice  anionic  the 
n.ations. 

There  were  forellashiiiL;s  of  the  future,  even  during;"  the  years  of 
struggle;  and  tew  gathered  the  rays  with  more  prophetic  skill  th;m 
Governor  rown.dl.  In  the  year  1757  he  liatl  been  the  rowd  Governor 
of  the  Colony  of  Massachusetts.  Its  industries  and  its  resources,  -ts 
warfares,  privations  and  sacrifices,  its  marvellous  endurance  und.er  the 
strain  of  cold,  famine  and  Indian  incursions,  and  its  elasticity  whcrt; 
opportunit}-  gave  pl.iy  to  its  red  powers,  ha<l  wrought  into  his  very 
soul  a  recognition  of  the  straight  and  narrow  i>ath  by  which  such  a 
people  must  rise  to  power.  In  writing  of  the  New  World,  during 
January,  17S0,  he  thus  unfolds  his  views: 

'•  N.iture  liath  removed  her  (America)  far  from  the  Old  World  and 
all  its  embroiling  interests  ami  wrangling  politics;  without  an  enemy 
or  a  rival,  or  the  entanglement  of  alliances.     This  new  system  has 


i 


I78I. 


(ONCIX'SION. 


^57 


taken  its  I'qu.il  station  with  the  nations  upon  earth.  Ncj,'otiationH 
arc  of  no  umiscqucncc  cither  to  tlic  rii^lit  or  the  fact.  Tlic  IiiclepLMul- 
cnco  of  America  is  fixed  as  fate,  .  .  .  The  government  of  the 
new  i.'m[)ire  of  America  is  hahlc  indeeil  to  many  ili-;iriiers  ;  hut  it  is 
ynuiii^  and  stroiv,;,  and  will  stru;.;;4le,  h\'  the  viijor  of  internal,  liealiiii^ 
principles  of  life,  a;^.iinst  tiiose  evils,  and  surmount  them.  In  North 
America  the  civili/in;4'  activity  of  the  hum.m  race  forms  the  i^tuwth 
of  the  St.ite  ;  we  see  all  the  iiihahitaiits  not  only  free,  hut  allowing 
our  universal  naturaUzalion  to  all  wlio  wish  to  be  so.  In  a  country 
like  tills,  wliere  every  man  has  the  full  and  free  exertion  of  hi-,  powers, 
.m  unabateii  apphcation  ami  a  perpetual  struq[,q;lc  sharpens  the  wits 
and  i^ives  constant  trainini4  to  the  mind.  ...  In  ;i;4riculture  and 
m  mechanic  handicrafts,  the  New  World  hath  been  led  to  m.uiy  im- 
provements of  im[)K'nients,  tools  and  machines — leading,;;  experience 
by  the  hand  to  man\'  a  new  invention.  This  spirit  of  thus  analyzing 
the  ineclianic  powers  hath  established  a  kind  of  instauration  of  science 
in  their  liands.  The  settlers  find  frai^ments  of  time  in  which  they 
make  most  of  the  articles  of  personal  wear  .uul  household  use,  for 
liome  consumption.  ILvi,  no  l.iws  frame  conditions  on  which  a  man 
is  to  exercise  this  or  th.it  trade.  Here,  no  laws  lock  him  up  in  that 
trade;  aiul  many  a  real  philosoplier,  a  politician,  a  w.irrior,  emerijes 
out  of  this  wilderness,  as  tlie  seed  rises  out  of  the  L^round  where  it 
hath  Iain  buried  for  its  season." 

With  a  peculiar  forecast  as  to  the  necessary  unity  of  tlie  new 
States,  then  held  toLjetlier  b)- so  weak  a  b.ind,  this  writer  proceeds: 
"  The  tiatiirc  of  tlic  coast  ami  of  tlic  iviiiiis,  render  intvigation  a  per- 
petually iiio:'i)ii:;  iiitercoiirse  of  eoiininiiiiealio)i ;  and  the  voaters  of  the 
rivers  render  inland  navigation  but  a  further  process  of  that  coin- 
Munication :  all  which  becomes,  as  it  \s^;c,  one  vital  principle  of 
life,  extcndinj;  through  one  organized  being — one  nation.  Will  that 
most  enterprising  sjiirit  be  stopped  at  Cape  Horn;  or,  not  pass  be- 
yond tlie  (_\ipe  of  Good  Hope?  Ik'fore  long  the;,  will  he  found  trad- 
ing in  the  South  Sea,  in  Spice  Islands,  and  in  China.  Commerce  will 
•  ■pen  the  tloor  to  emigration.  By  const. mt  inrer-communication 
America  will  every  day  approach  nearer  and  nearer  to  Europe." 

"North  America  has  become  a  new  primary  planet,  which,  while  it 
takes  its  own  course  in  its  own  orbit,  must  shift  the  common  centre 
of  gravity." 

If  such  were  the  anticipations  of  good  for  America  and  the  world 
from  \\\n  separate  nationality  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States, 
42 


:JM 


Ife-, 


=  !' 


r  I 
1 1d 

II 


I. 


ri 


«; .. 


:l  11 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


V 


:/. 


C/j 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


Iff  ilM 

!-  m 

It  1^ 


M 
1.4    ill  1.6 


V} 


<^ 


% 


/i 


^;. 


.p^ 


M 


'•^ 


'/ 


4, 


4- 


:\ 


iV 


\ 


«^^ 


^^>^,^  <* 


658 


CONCLUSION. 


L'JM. 


m- 


m 


^k 


:?«.:^ 


when  seen  on!\-  tlinniLjh  the  cj'c  oi'  faith,  (Uiring'  a  critical  period  of 
the  war  n{  1775  Si,  there  is  infinitely  niori'  of  hope  for  tlie  nations  in 
the  assiiran.ce  that  all  the  pro;^ress  then  foreshadowed  has  stren^^lhened 
the  kindly  relations  (jI  Anuric.i  am!  the  mother  countr\',  and  the  les- 
sons of  the  war  nia}-  be  L;ladly  recalled  as  so  many  fresh  incentives  to 
a  perpetual  peace. 

1  he  w.ir  of  1775  17S1,  however,  tlid  not  end  without  a  similar 
as[)iration  for  the  future,  as  a  part  of  that  official  act  i)v  which  the 
American  ('i>nunander-in-chicf  announced  its  approaching;  close;  ;ind 
at  Meridian,  jul\-  4th.  in  the  }ear  of  our  T.ord  one  thousand  eii^ht 
hundred  and  se\ent\'-six,  while  .ill  ci\ili/eil  nations  are  represented  as 
tlic  guests  of  America,  to  hnnnrher  industr_\-.  and  rrjoice  in  her  libert\'; 
thus  in  the  fr.iternit)'  of  that  intercourse  to  relax  all  bomls  but  tlmsi: 
of  concord,  and  thus  to  renew  their  obligations  to  Righteousness,  which 
alone  exalteth  a  nation  ;  and  while  tlie  liall  which  a  centur)-  .ago  w.is 
the  birthi)!,ice  of  the  Repid)lic.  oid\' a  centur\'  Liter  has  become  the 
scene  of  august  ceremonies,  in  which  the  n.itions  bear  jj.irt.  ti.i  ex- 
change greetings  antl  pledge  felloiVship  for  the  welf.ire  of  man,  in  the 
spirit  of  a  broad  hum.init)-,  it  is  not  ill-svnteil,  that  the  closing  senti 
ment  of  a  memorial  record  of  tliat  struggle  should  adopt  tlie  last 
military  order  of  the  struggle  itself. 

"   Hf  MiOUAUTKKS,    April    |S,  17S3. 

"The  Ceaiim.inder-in-cliief  ortlers  the  cessation  tif  hostilities 
between  the  United  .States  of  Americ.iand  the  King  of  Gre.it  lirit.iin 
to  be  publicly  proclaimed  to-morrow  at  twelve  at  the  Xew  Huilding  : 
and  th.it  the  proclamation,  which  will  be  communicated  herewith,  be 
read  to-morrow  morning  at  the  head  of  ever)-  regiment  and  corps  of 
the  arm)- :  after  which,  the  Chaplains  with  the  several  brigades,  will 
render  thanks  to  Almighty  God  foi'  all  his  mercies,  particularly  for  liis 
overruling  the  wrath  of  man  to  His  own  glor\-,  .uul  c.iusing  the  rage 
of  war  to  ce.ise  among  the  nations. 

On  such  a  ha[)i)>' d,i\- which  is  the  h.ubinger  of  peace,  a  day  which 
completes  the  eighth  year  of  the  war,  it  would  be  ingratitude  not  to  re- 
joice, it  would  be  insensibility  not  to  participate,  in  the  general  felicity. 

HatI'V,  Tiikice  IIAI'I'V,  s/ia//  tluy  be  pronounced  licrcaftcr,  ivlio 
have  eontributed  anyt/iiii^i^,  xulio  Juxx'e  perforuied  the  vieanest  ojfiee  in 
ereeting  this  stupendous  fabric  of  freedom  and  empire  on  the  brood  basis 
of  independency,  7i<lio  have  assisted  in  protect in;^  tlie  rights  of  hninan 
nature,  and  establishing  an  asylum  for  the  poor  and  oppressed  of  all 
nations  and  religions." 


■^p 


[IJM. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL    TABLE. 


T  N  statiuij  tlie  principal  authorities  consulted,  it  is  agreeable  to  ackiiowl- 
e.lgo  facilities  furnished  by  gentlemen  in  chari,^'  o{  private  libraries 
ai)road,  esjiecially  'lliomas  Ilu-hes,  Q.  C.  ;  (.  (.:.  Welister,  Esq.,  Secretary 
Athen;runi  Club;  Colnnel  Charles  (J.  Che^ney,  K.  E;  Secretary  Cai)tain 
Douglass  C.alton,  IJriti^h  Sci.  Asso.  ;  Secretary  I-[.  W.  Dates,  I'-xj.,  R.  Ccog. 
Socy.  ;  Sir  T.  I^ultu-,  Hardy,  Colonel  \\.  W.  Deedes,  A.  D.  C,  and  William 
Blackniore,  Es(|.  of  I,ondou  ;  Professors  Rolleston  and  Smith,  of  Oxfiird  ; 
Professor  Areh.er,  of  Edinburgh  ;  Sir  William  Thompson  and  Professors 
Young  and  Thompson,  of  (Glasgow  ;  Vice  J'resldent  Andrews,  of  Queens 
College,  Belfist  ;  Professor  Leslie  and  Steward  Kingston,  of  Trinity  College, 
Dublin. 

The  courtesies  of  the  Athena;um,  Aihcnauim  Junior,  United  Service, 
United  Service  Junior,  the  Army  and  Navy  and  other  London  ciubs  opened 
valuable  libraries  and  are  gratefully  rememberecl. 

'I"he  cordial  aid  of  Adjutant-general  William  S.  Stryker,  of  \ew  fersev.  in 
the  settlement  of  facts  and  nanus  in  connection  with  the  war  history  of  that 
State  has  been  appreciated. 

{Quotations  cited  arc giicn  as  written  by  the  Authors  rc/errcj  to.) 


^    t 


P 
•(If 


[I 


i 


It 
ill 


\ 

■ 


■f        ! 


t       if 


REFERENCES. 


\  f  i 


..  i 


m 


[Euglish  'I'itl.-  s  arc  rttiiincd  for  I'rcni  h  or  Geniiaii  ropririts.) 


A. 

Apams  ;  Life  and  Wo  ks  of  Joliii  Adams. 
Addlpliiii'  1  IInI.  of  Cin.-at  Britain  and  Geo.  III. 
.MK-n's  ( Ir."  I  N'crnuinl. 
Allen's  (luhan)  .Narrative. 
Amnion's  Kemcmliranccr. 
'\"U(.TiL\in  .Archive^. 

"  Orderly  I'ook-;. 

.Andrews'   History  of  the  Warf  of  IJK'Iand, 

1775— 17^J- 
"  History  i)f  the  W'.ir  u  itli  .Vmeric". 

4  v.'ls.      I.oiulun.      17SS. 
Annual  Register,  1 774 — 17^4. 
Army  Returns,  .\inerii;au. 

"   '  "         r.iili-dl. 

Aubiney's  Travel. 

It. 

IjAII.KV's  RceoriK  of  l'atri<jtism. 
liancroft's  Ili^iory  of  the  United  States, 
IJarlier's  and  Hoover's  Historieal  I  i.iUeetions 
New  \'ork, 

"  H isiorical  (,'ollcelioiis,  Ma~s. 

"  "  "  ("onn. 

"  Hi>!orv  of  New  Haven. 

liarllett's  History  nf  Atneriia. 
I'.ar-tow's  Hisiiiy  cif  .\,u   I  lampsliire, 
Hrad ford's  .Ma^--aeliu-etl^. 
Ilelknaii's  .New  Hainp-hiie. 
lieli's  (Aiidre'v),  Journal,  ( Monuioiith). 
Denton's  Herlsuner  '• 'oimly. 
Bolton's  History  of  W'estehestcr  County. 
I!otla's(M.)  ,\nieriean  Revoliuion. 
lioone's  Narrative. 
liutler's  Hi.'^lory  of  the  United  States. 

"  "  "    Kentiu  ky. 

liurgoyne's  letters. 

"  Nariativeand  Do' iiinenis. 


C  \l  DWKI  t.'.s  Cirecnc. 

Camp  I'Mres  of  the  Revolution. 

Caiii|il)eir>  .\niial>  of  Tryon  County,  N.  Y. 

"  I'lorder  \\  .irl.ire. 

"  Virijiiiia. 

(ainpais^n  of  the   N.ival  ,\rniy  under  Count 

1  )e  ( Iras-e. 
Ca-^ell's  illustrated  Hi-tory  of  i;n;:;land. 
(  hapman's  Wyoming. 
Cli:i,trllux,  (.'ouiit  de,  \'i,.,it  to  .Xmeriea. 
( 'iarkV  ( losejih)  Diaiy. 

ijohn)  .Narrative  of  iiattle  of  Bunker 
Hdl. 
Clark's  Naval  History. 
Caulkin's  (Miss)  Hi.-.tory  of  New  London. 
(  levelanil's  (.iroenwciod. 
<- nilin-.'  Sketehes  of  Kentucky. 

"        New  Jersey  (ia/ettc. 
Civil  War  in  .\tueriea. 
Cooper's  Na\al  IIi>lory. 

"       ( 'hronieles  of  Cooperslown. 
•  "onneetieut  ( la/ette. 
Cornualli^'  .An^uer  to  Clinton. 

D. 

Dawson's    liattles  of  the    United  States  by 

Sea  and  Land. 
I  )av's  Historical  ("'illeetions  of  Penn^ylvaniiu 
I  ><■  llerniere's  .Narrative. 
1  >e  II.1.1-'  .Vnuriean  Revolution. 
I  lurr's  Lord  Stirling. 
Dufour's   i'rineiples  of  (iiand    Strategy    and 

'r.i>,lie>. 
I  liinl.ip's  New  York. 

1-"ai;i.k'::  Histo'-y  of  (Jrange  County,  N.  Y. 


KEFERENCES. 


661 


Ellct's  (Mrs.)  Ilomcslic  Ilistor)-  of  Aniciic^n 

kevolutinn. 
Ellct's  (Mrs.)  Women  of  the  Kevoliition. 
Eiicyclcipfilias,  liiog.  and  g<,-n(.'ral. 

r. 

F,\UMKR  and  .Mouifs  Historical    Collections 

of  Xcw  1  lanipshirc. 
I'ranklin's  Life  and  Writings. 
1'  ilson's  Kentucky. 
Kelton's   (jolin)    Kellections,  or    History    of 

IJal'Ie  of  Hunker  Hill. 
Foice's  /Vnierican  .\rcliives. 
Foirost's  Sketches  of  Norfolk  and  Vicinity. 
I'rothinijhani's  Sie:;e  of  iioston. 

a. 

Cl.'VCK.'s  (I'leneral)  Official  Returns. 
Claincs'  New  \'ork  Gazelle  and  Mercuiy. 
(lalloway'.s  I.eiters  to  a  XoMeman. 

"  Kelleclions  on  llie  .Anieriiau  l^cv- 

olutioii. 
( lallnway's  Reply  to  William  Howe's  (  Miser- 

\ations. 
(iardiiier's  .Anecdotes  ol  tiie  Rcvolulion. 
( ienllenian's  Magazine, 
liraham's  Life  of  .Morgan. 

fli-lori'  01  .Vincrica.,  \'ol.  IV. 
( Iraydon's  Memoir-,. 
( iirardine's  Virginia. 

( ireen's  (d.  W.)  (iernian  lOlemeat  in  the  Rev- 
olutionary War. 
(ireen's  Life  of  Greene. 
( iordon's  1 1  isiory  of  Xew  Jcr.-,ev, 

"  "         "  American  Independence. 

II. 

Hai.i,K''K's  Inlernalional  Law. 

Hall's  (Lieut.)  Civil  War. 

Hamilton's  Works,  by  Hamilton. 

Hamh'y's  ((\jlonel)  Operations  of  War. 

Hazard's  Register  of  Pennsylvania. 

Headley's  Washington  and  his  GcneraLs. 

Heath's  Mrmoirs, 

I  [empstead's  (Lieut.)  Narrative. 

Hildreth's  History  of  the  United  States. 

Hinniau's  Connecticut  in  ihe  RevMhition. 

Hinton's  History  of  the  United  Stales. 

History  of  the  Civil  War. 

I  lollister's  Connecticut. 

Holmes'  .\nnals. 

LFolt's  New  ^■oI■k  Gazette. 

Homar's:  Hisiory  of  lioslon. 

Howe's  (Sir  William)  Narralivc. 

"       Historical  Collections  of  Virginia. 
House  of  Commons,  Proceedings. 


Howlaiid  (John),  Life  and   Recollections  of. 
Hahlry's   Hisiory  of  the  American   Revolu. 

lion. 
Hughe-.'  History  of  IJigland. 
Hutcliiuson's  Massachusetts. 
Humphreys'  Putnam, 

I. 

LmI'\i;m.\i.    History  of  the    American    War 

(I  )iililin.)  (.\n  mymous.) 
tr\ing's  Life  of  Washington, 

J. 

Jolmson's  Life  of  Greene. 

"         Traditions  of  the  Revolution. 
History  of  Salon,  X.  [. 

Jomini's  Art  of  War. 

"         Life  of  Xa|>oleoii, 

"         Grand  Military  Campaigns. 

K. 

Kmi;iii's  History  of  L^ngl.md. 

I.. 

La  I'avi  ri  ■.  s  Memoirs  and  Correspondence. 
Land),  ((icreral)  Leaks'  Life  of. 

"       iSergean'),  Journal  of  Occurrences. 
Lee's  Mfnioir>  nf  the  War. 
Lee  (Charles),  Menoirs  and  Correspondence. 
"     Proceedings  of  General  Court  ^LlrtiaL 

( Lieut. -<-'ol.)  .Mtanoirs  of. 
"     (Genl.  ID 
Lee's  C.impaign  of  1778. 
Lodges'    Portraits  of    illustrious  personages, 

vol  S. 
t.ossiug's  Field  P)Ook  of  the  Revolution. 
Washington  and  tlie  Republic. 
Life  of  Schuyler. 
"         Centennial  History  of  America. 

M. 

NLmi.vn's  (Lord)  History  of  Llnglanrl. 

.Manuscript   Letters  and   Reports  at   London 
and  Paris. 

Marshall's  Wa-hington. 
"  Kentucky. 

M.if.in',  Xorlh  Carolina. 

.Mass.ichusclls,   ('onimitlee  of  Safely    Docu- 
ments. 

.M.ixweH's  (Virginia)  Historical  i\egisler. 

.Memoirs  of  Xew  Voik  Hi-storical  Society. 

Mills'  Statistics. 

Memoirs  of  the  C.jurt  of  George  III.,  Duke« 
of  lUickingham  and  Cliaiidos. 

Mine's  W\oinnig. 

Morris'  I  Robert)  Diary 

Moore's  (George  H.I  Treason  of  General  Lee. 


I? 
'4 


m 


^1 

4 


f; 


, 


II 


II 


662 


Kr.I'KRENCES. 


1      [»   ; 


i  .  f 

r 


m 


;.      Ii;fe 


l'^^^ 


&  '' 


T'xl 


Moore's  Diary  of  tho  Anieriiaii  Revolution. 
Moultrie's  Memc'ir>. 
MuhleiilKig,  l.ifc  of. 
Muvniy'>  Eli/.al>ethtoun, 

"        (Kev.  Jamc.i),  llihtory  of  the  W.u. 
Murray's  Impartial   History  of  the  War  in 

America.      2  vcN.      N'mvcasllc.      I7J2. 
Ma])'  of  Aulluir-  ( 'oii.-iiiltcd. 

■'       "   llrili'li  ^Iu^eulll.  I.  'inloii. 

"         "        I  >irRL-r'  and  I.  '^n\in-r'. 
"      "   Bi!ili.>iln!-.iue  Xaliun.ilo.  I'.iii^. 
"      "  Coiign-^'ioiiai  I.iiirajy,  Wa^liinL;!"!!. 
"   U.  S.  Co.i^t  Survey. 
"   U.  S.  l--iit;ineer  Corp^. 
"  New  \'orl<  Historical  .-^ncieiy,  \.  \'. 
"  I'ciiii-yh.inia      1  li-b^rical      ^OLicty, 

I'lula.k-lpliia. 
"  Public  Record  Dflicc,  LoihIju. 
"       "   Roval  Klhiiolo;;ical  Society,  London. 
"   Royal  (ico;.;rapliical  Society,  London. 
"  Natioa.il  <  lee  yr.ipliic.d  Society  I'aiis. 
"       "   \\'a~llinL;U)n'-     Head  (Juarlers,  Mor- 
ri^iiiun,  .V-  f 


Nr.Il. son's  Canipai>;n  of  Riir^ouie. 
New  \mk,  Documentary  History  of. 
New  [ersey.  Revolutionary  Correspondence. 
New  Hampshire,  ILi.storical  Society  Collec- 
tions. 
North  American  Pilot. 

O. 

Ondkriionk's  Kinqs  County. 
"  Queens       " 

SuJTo,!;       " 
Orations    of    Wclis'.er,    Everett,    King    and 
others  in  honor  of  men  and  battles. 

P. 

Paiu  I.\Mr,N'l  Al;Y  F\ct;ister. 

['aimer's  History  of  Lake  Champlain. 

Paris  Cia/ette,   17S0,  Survey  of  Procccedings. 

Summary  of  ( )perations. 
Pennsylvania  .Archives. 
"  Ledj^cr. 

Packet. 
Petersfui's  Rhode  Island. 
Pt.'ck's  WMimini;. 
Pictorial  Hisiiuy  of  George  III. 
Provincial  Convention  of  New  York,  Minutes 

of. 
Proceedings  of  New  Jersey  Historical  Society. 
Putnam  (General),  Life  of. 
Puidic  Record  Office,  London,  Official  Papers. 


R. 

Ramsiy's  .\merican  Revolution. 

Revolution  of  South  Carolina. 
"  Life  of  Washington, 

kaiid.iir.s  jillersiJii. 
Rankin's  I  listory  of  Eraiice. 
Rnynal  (.\blic)  -American  Revolution. 

"  "        Letters  upon  North  Aiiu-iican 

A  Hairs. 
Reed's  (Wni.  P..)  I  ,ilt- ul  Joseph  Kecd. 
Riedesid's  ^ll.u.Mn  Milii.iry  Memoirs. 

"  ( jiaioiiess)  Memoirs. 

Ripley's  iMglit  at  (.'oiicold. 
Rivinglon'-s  Rnyal  (i.uetle,  N.  Y. 

Sakiki.'s  Records  of  the  Revolutionary  War 
Sparks"  liiographies. 

"         Life  .Old  Treason  of  .Arnold. 

"         Washington. 

"         ^\  rilings  of  Washingtiin. 

"        Life  and  Writings  of  I-  r.uiklin. 
Scott's  Military  Diciionary. 
Shattock's  Concord. 
St.  Clair's  Narrative. 
Stednian's  .Vmericin  War. 
Sedgwick's  Life  of  Livingston. 
.St.  Leger's  Account  of  (  Iccurrences. 
Simccic's  Jouinal    ol'   the  Operations  of   the 

t^Hieen's  Rangers. 
Sininis'  Diary. 

"       South  Carolina. 

Sclioharie  County,  N.  Y 
.Stone's  Life  of  lirandt. 

"      Tryoii  County. 

"       .Vyomiiig. 

T. 

■1'ak1!ii.\'s  (J.  X.)  Life  of  (ieneral  Putnam, 
'larletoii's  Narrative  and  Cam[iaign  <i|  1780- 

17S1. 
Transactions  of  Historical  Societies  of  N.Y., 

N.  J.,   Penn.   and  other  States — so  far  as 

published. 
Thatcher's  Military  Journal. 
Tome's  Patties  by  Land  and  Sea. 
'Thompson's  Long  Island. 
'Trumbull's  Autobiography. 

"  History  of  Connecticut. 

V. 

\'an  Cami'I  n  (Major),  Life  of. 

w. 

Wai.ti'.k's  History  of  England  ^nd  Sketches 

of  New  Jersey. 


REFERENCES. 


663 


jlina, 


Aiiu-iican 


Warren's  (Mrs.)  Aincriciu  Rovolution. 
Ward's  (S.)  Hattlos  of  Long  Island. 
\Va>hin_i;ton's  Diary. 
Whcalon's  liUeniational  Law. 
WlioL'lei's  Xorlli  (.'aroiina. 
WecMis'  \V'asliiiii;toii. 

and  Horry's  Marion. 
VVhitehe.id's  Early  History  and  Sketches  of 
Xl'u-  Jitm'v. 

Wlntolcy's   Km-oliitionaiy   History  of  Dela- 
ware. 
Whites  lii>torical  Collections  of  Georgia. 
Wither's  Chronicles  of  the  Border. 


NS'ilkin^on's  Memoirs. 
Willett's  Narrative. 
Williams'  \  erniont 

(•'iilonel  Otho)  Narrative. 
White's  Statistics  of  Georgia. 
Woolsey's  International  Law. 
\Villiam>on's  History  of  Maine. 
Wraxhall's  Historical  Memoirs. 
Writings  of  I'lionias  Jelferson. 

Y. 

YoUNGii's  History  of  the  Britisli  Navy. 


.{■ 


It 


narv  War 


m  I 


klin. 


ns  of   the 


""utnani. 
n  ol  1780- 

isofN.Y., 
-so  far  as 


ADDENDA. 

Arnold's  CampaiRn  ajrainst  Qnebec,  by  John  Joseph  Henry. 

Barnes-s  Centenary  History  of  the  United  Slates 

BurKoyne's  Campaif^n,  by  W.  L.  Stone.     1877. 

Bnrj^oyne's  Orderly  Hook. 

Konblanqiie's  Hurt^oyne.     1876. 

Journal  of  Claude  nian,hard.      Rclited  hv  \Vm.  Piiane 

Memoir  ,.f  Lieutenant-colonel  Til^diman.'  Ai.l  and  Secretary  of  Washinrtoa 

Sietje  of  Savannah,  by  I'rench  ..fficers  of  the  neet  of  D'Estaing. 

Sie>,'e  of  Savannah,  by  Dr.  I'ranklin  H.  HoiiKh, 

Siege  of  fli.irle-t,,,,,  by  same. 

NoTK-Hon.  Isaac  \.  Arnold,  in  his  Life  ,.f  Arnohl,  Chica,.,,   iSSo.  cmphasi.es 
tin;  lollow,,,^  extract  n-om  The.  Vermont  Historical   Societv  Collections,   Vol.  .    p   ^^^ 

JZ\r  \      ]  ''"■'?'"   ■'""'"'  ^""^''^'"^^  '"■  '^'■^-""   '"  -'-'-f-"   Arnohl 

.game      the  g,„„nd,  when    the  enetny  were  rcinforcc.l   In-  the   ntait.   bodv.  whcr,    Gen 

Arnold  was  old„.cd  to  retreat;  hut  bein,g  reinforced,  recuvere.l  his  own,  so  that  (he 
gronn.l  retnatned  at  ei,d,t  o'clock,  yes.etc'ay.  divided  between  tho,.  This  accoutu 
onte  ov  express  (rotn  (ien.  Gales'  Headquarters,  yesterdav  afternoon,  by  Major 
<-  ochran.  •      .•    ■  ■•■joi 

In  the  Ma.^azine  of  History,  May.  ,878.  p,  27,^  ,  John  Austin  Stephens,  Ed.),  a  work 
of  stamhud  value,  ,s  the  following:  "Col.  Philip  V,.u  Courtlandt,  who  commanded  a 
New  York  regtment  engaged  in  the  figh,,  says  that  after  he  had  lei,  his  parade  and 
«-as  march.ng  towards  the  enemy,  he  received  hi,    .rders  Iron.  Gen.  Arnold  " 


m. 


i  Sketches 


'f 


ff'. 


«i 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL   INDEX. 


IN  furnishiMj;  a  Rufcrciicc  Iinlcx,  tin.'  liiitli,  /',  mid  (lo.ilh,  ,/,  of  some  of  the  char.utiT^ 
referred  to  in  tlie  Narrative,  liave  been  indicated,  as  -.UL^i^e^live  of  their  age  at  the  date 
ol  ]iarticular  serviee,  or  opinion. 

The  siilisei[iient  verdict  of  conlei'i|Kir:ui'.'s  has  ai.-.o  been  indicated  in  some  instances  ;  av 
('ornwallis,  siih  (lovr.  (icnl.  of  India  ;   M.mroe,  siih,  I'res.  V.  S.  A. 

Am.  (.American),  Hr.  (IJritish),  /•>.  (French),  //.  (Hessian),  distinguish  officers  of  siniilai 
name  and  rank. 

The  omission  of  names,  sometimes  associated  with  service  in  leading  Iiattles,  is  in  accord- 
ance with  official  reports  or  real  fact.  Tims  Lord  Percy  is  not  named  l)y  General  Clinton 
in  hi^-  very  minute  report,  as  associated  with  the  attack  upon  Fort  Clinton  ;  and  Colonel 
Haslet  (Delaware)  was  memlier  of  p  Court  Martial  at  New  York, while  his  regiment  was  in 
battle  on  Long  Island.  lirigades  were  often  commanded  by  C'olonels,  so  that  /^c'l'soiial 
brigades,  (as  Hitchcock's  Hrigade)  do  not  indicate  the  rank.  On  the  other  hand,  personal 
regiments  participated  in  action  during  the  absence  of  their  colonel,  who  commanded  a 
brigade  or  division.  The  rule  in  the  lirilisli  army  is  given  on  page  171.  There  is  a  fre- 
quent Use  of  titles.which  were  tho-e  of  militia  rank,  The  historical  identity  of  the  men  it 
thus  preserved,  although  they  were  not  in   the  Continental  service  projier. 

Christian  names  are  given,  when  rei(uired  to  distinguish  two  of  similar  name. 

Many  names  are  given,  ir.  /rdcr  to  maintain  due  harmony  with  general  historv,  ami 
because  they  interlink  family  associations  which  are  cherished  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean. 
The  skeleton  (»f  battle  operations  would  be  barren  without  these  associations,  even  .dihougli 
the  battles  themselves  were  sh,ii)ed  by  others,  of  more  priiminent  responsibility. 

Abbreviations,  k.  (killed),  -a.  (wounded), /w.  (taken  ])risoner),  com.  commissioner. 


A. 

PACK 

Abenake,   Indians    addressed    by    liur- 

goyne    306 

Abercrombie,  Col.  44th  Foot,  k.  at  Bun- 
ker Hill 1X0 

Abercro\nbie,  Liout.  Col.  (/>».  in  sliirm- 

ish  at  Crooked  Hillet  'I'avern.  .  .  .   405 
leads  a  sortie  from  \'orktown 640 

Able  bodieil  miMi,  compelled  to  serve   .  ,    2(15 

Abolition   of   .-Vmerican  slavery,  a  mili- 
tary act 41 

Acknowledgments 2  and  651; 

Atts  of  I'arliament  to  be  resisted 117 

Ac(k)land,   John   Duck    Maj.   at    Uemis 

Heights 346 

mortally  wounded 347 

Ac(k)lan<l,  Lady,  with  the  army 350 

Actacon, frigate,  38,  burned  off  Fort  Moul- 
trie      189 

Adair,  John,  sub.  Maj.  Genl.   b.    1757,  J. 
1840. 


r\r.K 
Adair,  John  at  Williamson's  j)lantation.    507 
.Vdams,    John,     (statesman),    sub.    I'res. 
d.  1735,  (/.  1782. 

on  naval  committee 144 

commissioner  to  meet   Lord   Howe, 

1776 223 

criticises  Washington  severely 383 

e.xerts  valuable  influence  abroad    .  .    540 
Adams,  Samuel,  (orator), /i.  1722,  </.  1S03. 
advised  of  Lord  Percy's  movement 

against  Concord 11 

jealous  of  an  army 520 

Adams,   Lieut.   Col.   {Am.)  k.   at    Free- 
man's Farm 342 

Adolphus,  gives  opinion  of  Trenton.  .  .  .    261; 
Agnew,  James,  Maj.  (ienl.  (Jh-). 

with  CenI,  Howe   at   lirandywine.  .    367 

k.  in  battle  of  Cermantown ^.^o 

Alarm   posts,  from   the  Hudson  to   1.    .. 

Sound 233 

Alarm  stations,  in  New  '  ..ocy 499 


l-K     t 


ir 


§1 


?;j 


I 
1 


I     n 


666 


CHKO\f)i,ri<;i(\i    WD  (;i:\ii^\[,  im)1;\. 


1    t! 


,i,»t 


IP 


" .. 


Alli.iiiy,  till'  lu^l  (iliii'tiivc  of  ll.uj^ciyiK'  3115-10 
Allen,  KiIkui,  Col./'.  1737,  ,/.  17S,).  "    ■ 

i)i|;;iiu/CM'\|ifiliti(iii  ;ij;;uii^t  ( 'iuui<l.l   ll>i 

tiiiiluruN  'rii-oiiiki-d^M 1  ii| 

ilsks  for  troops  lo  comUKT  (';iiKiil.i.  iju 
joins  c.\|ic(litioii  ai;aiii-l  .Monucil..  iji 
alli'ni|)ts  lo  Mirprix'  Montreal  ..  .  ijs 
lak on /;•/,(.,  ami  seni  to  I'.n^lanil.  .  .    rjS 

toinnnMit- of  WaNJiinLjton ij- 

(.'xiilaiiailon  of  failure r.'S 

AlIiatiLC,    tii^atf,   take^    I  ,a    laMJllf    to 

Immiuc    jCp5 

.Xiiiancc^,  rarely  of  lastiiij^  (.oheu'iice.  .  .      71) 

Allied  arniyjieforc  Vorktouii dy 

Ai'iiel,     Isnsi^ii,    luini^'s     di^paldie^      lo 

(ornuallis    do; 

America  fails  in  ilnlv  lo  p'rancc 


Ids 

"»7 
'J.  .4 

2  21) 


Ameriean  allairs,  in  July,  I  77d iiji 

I'ecemlier,  177S ^d| 

Jiilv,  17^1 dl7 

A.n\t'rie.in  army,  under  in^lruelion  .....      4> 

eoiUains  many  eihualed  \ni:i dj 

delieicnt  in  l.ogislie> 71-7- 

l.i}''t  Infanlry  organized S7 

loo  e  orj^ani/atioii  of (jii 

condition  before  .St   Joliii'^ l2-^-i) 

takes  license  to  mean  Idiertv l y2 

comlilioii  at   Montie.d 1  v? 

imnioraliiy  rehiikeii 1 ;,() 

re-oiLjani/ed,  1 775 14.) 

condition  before  j'.o^lon l4''-7 

its    streni;lli    al     New    \ork,    .\piil, 

177'' •• l?7 

iriven  from  Canaila ldi-3 

condition  while  in  Caiuid.i 

at  C'liarleston,  177') 

ils  streni;ili,  Aut;ust,  i77d 

on  I.oiii;  Island 

its  streni^th,  .'September,  177(1.  .  . 

ils  slren!;tli  examined 224 

at   ll.irlem  lieii;lit-. -J31 

its  streiiLjtll,  Oelolier,   I776 212 

abandons  Harlem   lleij.;hu 23d 

in  .New  Jersey,  October,  I77() 242 

southern  troo])s  in  New  Jei^ev 247 

Northern,  in  Novendier,  177(1 25? 

l.ee's  j^rand  ilivisitin 

Heath's  division 

\\  asliini^ton's  division  al  Newark 

at    rreiUoii  December,  1776 25I1 

total  strength,  I  leeember.  22d,  1776.  2(17 

controls  the  I  )elaware 2(i.S 

on  a  skeleton  basis 261) 

to  be  made  eighty  ballalions 271) 

junioraiipoiiitmenls.by  Washim^ton.  2S(i 
on      the    Assanjiink,    January     ist, 

1777 ; .' 284 

condition  at  I'luckemin 291 

l)y  divisions  and  briL;ades 21)7 

stretij^th.nt  Urandywine 3dd 

total  streiij;th,  December    1777  ..    3-j'^-i) 

celebrates  the  French  alliance 404 

at  Valley  lortje 404 

stren^;th  early  in    1778 4CXJ 

in   pursuit  of  t'liii;<in 414 

equal  to  Clinton's  in  numbers 416 

at   Newport,  io,ooc,  with  militia.  .  .  448 


2^(1 
25') 


.\meiie. Ill  army,  in  u  iiilenpi.irleis,  1778- 

177')  ■   ' 4?7 

al  .Middlebrook 458 

ul.iced  al  eighty  regul.tr  ballalioiis.   4(13 
ii  irehes    from     Monmouth    lo    iht 

i  ludson     ^46 

.It  .Monisiowii,  winter  of  l77()-l78o.   483 

on  point  of  cMinctioii 484 

sutlers  from  cohi  and  hunger 486 

sulfers  al  the  south  for  clothing. ..  .    «  Ic 

•ullers  d.iily  uaiit  al  ihe  south 524 

re-orgaiii/ed  in  i7.»ii 52(1 

located  hir  winli'i  quarters    527 

in  .1  si.iiv  oC  uiiitiny ['3(1 

reduced  to  5,(i(K)  elleelives 531) 

eondilion  in   17-<l 587 

crosses  the  Hudson,  1  781 (122 

m.irches  to  Springlield ()22 

passes  through  I'hiladelphi.i 623 

position  lielore  \'orklown ^'34-5 

by  si.ues.dui  ing  ihe  war (153 

basis.not  si.ilile 653 

American  artillery,  in  (  leiober,  I77C1 232 

.\meruan     batteries   opru    before    N'ork- 

tou  u    .  .     (137 

.\nieriian     ( 'enliip.iid    \'e-ir,   celebialed 

July  4lh,  !.s7d 658 

.Vnieriean  frig.itis,  ordeied  lo  be  built.  .    144 

their  fate  during  the  war 145 

.Vinerican  (ieuerals  in  Congress (155 

.\merienu  Light   [iil.intrv  attack   redoubt 

al  \orklou  n 638 

.\mencau  milili.i    system    involves    iiiev- 

able  faults  .  ' 15 

.\meiican  mistakes  illu-tiated d^',    8 

.\nierican  Navy  recomnieuded  by  Wash- 
ington       143 

impaired  by  privateer  .service 27S 

insignilicant  in  1 781 (118 

.\merican     pickets    along    tlio     IJrandy- 

u  ine    368 

.American  regulars,  equal   lo  their  adver- 
saries    652 

•American    Revolution,    general    features 

reviewed d4d-7 

.American  ships  destroyed  at  Charleston.   41)5 
.\inerican   War,   its  result,   the   best   lor 

both  nations ( 

a]iplied  true  military  science 17 

I'.iilish   theniy 112 

.Amherst.  Jeli'rey,   Lord,  .ui/>.  Field   Mar- 
shrd,  /'.  1717,  1/.  1797;  slates  40,(-HX) 

troops  to  be  needed 412 

.\tidrc,  John    Maj.   .Assl.  Adjt.    (ierl.  /'. 
r75L"'l7So. 

his  memory  honored 78 

taken  prisoner  al  St.  John's I2q 

describes  Howe's  felo    al    I'hiladel- 

jihia 408 

reports     the     prisoners     token     at 

(ha  lesion 497 

agent  of  (  I'liton  and  Arnold 505 

captured  and  hung  as  a  spy 50ft 

universd  grief  over  his  fate 506 

Angell,  Colonel  (Rhode  Island)  ; 

part  of  his  coinmainl  al  Fort  Mcicer.  394 
al  battle  of  Springlield 50a 


ciiKoNdi.dcK  Ai,  wii  (;i:m;kai,  in/ik\. 


667 


rvci 

:'IN  I77»- 

437 

45-< 

ittalion^.   4(13 

li    to    the 

t4f> 

/7()-i7«o.   48;, 

4H4 

cr 4S6 

billet;....  '.10 

mil' 524 

520 

5i>7 

h(> 

53') 

S^l 

622 

t)22 

i 623 

(>34-5 

(153 

(153 

177^) 232 

)W    N'ork- 

^>37 

L'l-ii'I'vali-'il 

<>5'-< 

ic  liuilt  .  .    144 

145 

N <i55 

k   reilmilit 

.  .       .....    638 

Ivi'^    incv- 

15 

fM7   i 

by  Wa.li- 

.  ■'■ 143 

•icu 27S 

()i8 

!     llraiiilv- 

.'      368 

n'ir  ailvoi- 

652 

il    Imturi's 

f'4''-7 

liiiilosloii .  4()5 
c   best    lor 

( 

,i(.'c r; 

112 

'ii-1.1   Mar. 

Uf.S  40,(KX) 

412 

.    Ccrl.  /'. 

78 

ll's 12<) 

riiiladel- 

408 

token     at 

497 

lold 505 

py soft 

te 51)6 

jrt  Mercer.  394 
500 


.541 

73 


Annapolis  tlic  rendezvous  for  La   I'ay- 

itic'.s  .uiny 5(12 

.Arioiiyiiious  (  London)  o|iininii    ol    batlle 

ol   TrLiilon 282 

AiiMiiilbir,    John,    Col.     at      I'lfeniati's 

I'  .u  ni 

Anli.lani,    Haillc  of,    illuMi.ite>  a   j,'iM<i 

retreat   

Aibiilimol,  M.iriut,  .\iluiir,il,  /■,    1711,,/, 

1794- 

arri\es  at  New  V'ork 476 

readies    (Charleston    with    a    Hriti>h 

,    "f 4'.4 

lands  marines  at  .\Linnl    TuMsint .  .    41^(1 
at   (lardmer's   Day,    folhjus    brencli 

fleet ' 5.S5 

eiii4aj,'es  NL  De^touches 5S5 

Aiehdiike  Charles,  eoninieiils  on    a   Ijiu; 

retreat 73  j 

Arniainents  necessarily  waste  .Sialt'>.  ...      21 1  | 

Ainiand  (Charles)  'railin    Konane,  Mar-  | 

i|iiis,  t.'ol.  /).  I756,(/.  17()3.  I 

with  L.i  Fayette  in  New  Jersey.  .  .  .    3(,t)  | 

at  Jiatlle  of  t  anideii 514 

liis  retjinieiit  reernited  at  luii;e  ....    52I) 

with  cavalry  at  Janu.vstown (his 

reiueinliered d;^ 

Arrnes,  when  large,  bleed  nation-  sloulv 

to  death o|| 

Annies  of  Europe  iner;;e  the  citi/en  in 

the  martinet .  .      j  ^ 

Armies  of  ilie   Revolution,  as  i;iV''!   by 

J^leilnian '.    300 

Anils  |iLncliased  in  France,  1777 271) 

Arms  received  from  France 275 

.\niistrong,  Maj.  {.Im.\,  at  (.anuleii,  ...    J14 
Aiiiisirony,  Maj.  (Ar.  I,  makes  sortie  from 

\  orktowii     (Ml  I 

Annstronj.,',  Joliii.  Ilrij;.  Cenl.  /'.  175S,,/. 

1»43-' 
at   (  harlestoii j^sj 

at  Haddrell's  I'oint 1S4 

at  lirandyu  me -;(,> 

on  the  Schuylkill 3^.. 

at  Ciermantou  n ;s- 

Aruold,  licnedict,   .Maj.  Cenl,  /»,  1740,  ,/ 
l8ui. 
arrives   at  Cambridt^e  with   a   com- 

I'iiiiy IK) 

commissioned    Colonel     by    .Massa- 
chusetts      Ill) 

starts  I'nr  licoiulemi^a no 

joins  Allen,  witliout  troops 11,) 

claims  command  by  seniority i  l() 

over-ruled  liy   Massaclutsetts ijo 

takes  and  abaiulons  St   John's  ...    i  jd 
gathers    a    small      navy    on     Lake 

I'hamplaiii 120 

applies  lor  men  to  conquer  Canada.    120 

disbands  iiis  forces  in  anger 1  jn 

his  business  antecedents  at  (^)iiebec.    120 
represents    Carlelon's   Ibrce   as   less 

than  ()00  men     ;  20 

commands  expedition  to  (,)iiebec.  ,  .    122 
marvelous  endiiiance  in  the  \\  ikler- 

nes.s 1 2", 

arrives  at  I'oint  Le\  i 124 


Arnold  asks  aid  from  .\I  on  ((joinery na 

Ids  army  briome  nr.iliiious 1  (j 

his  captains  refuse  to  serve  lonijer.  .    t  1 4 
anny    restored    to   dutv    by    .Mont- 

i^'onuTy .    ' I  ,, 

•  l.iriiii;  assault  on  i.iuebcc,  reindsed   1  ;(, 

is  wounded  by  nuisket  ball i \ii 

issues  an  unwise  proclamation i(,i 

^ocs  to  .Montreal  on  leave 1(12 

sii^ns  the  cartel  of  Sorcl i(,(, 

lights  a  naval  b.ittle  on  Lake  Cliam- 

Pl'l'" 2S5 

instructed  to  attack  Newport,  R,  1.    294 

omiltetl  in  promotions,  1777 ^qli 

resi;.;ns  in  disgust 2,,(, 

lights  well  at   Rldgelield.  Ct 2()7 

prompt  ])romotion  foljnus 207 

commands  at  i'hil.idelplna 2i).s 

i>rdered  to  watch    Irenion 2i)ij 

sent  north  to  act  with  Schuvler.  .  .  .    3211 

-tans  to  relieve  Fort  Schuyler s.M 

his  division  at  i'reemaii's  Farm.  .  .  .    ',41 

his  relations  to  tli.it  battle 34'    ! 

various  oiiinioiis  cited i-^i-^ 

his  grievances VJ2-? 

compliment.'d  by  \Vashiiigt.in,.\ote.   344 
promott'd  alter  the  surrender  of  liur- 

,  ,"">'"■  , 344 

his     |ias,ioi,aie     daring    at      lleinis 

"'-•'j;h<s : 34;_s 

excited  interview  with  (Jates ^p/ 

viiniicaied    from   \Vilkin(in's  state- 

.•'4',» 


enleis    Phil,idel|iiiia   as    Clinton    n 


tm 


•  •    413 


4')0 

;'>4 


deman 


reprimanded   mildlv   bv  Court  Mar 

tiai :..; 

excuses    hinisell    Irom    active    com- 
mand   

assigned  to  \\cst  I'oint  and  de|)end- 

eiicies ,      i;i,- 

treasonable      corres|)ondence     with 

Clinton -Q- 

demands  reasonable  pledges   of  re- 
ward  '. -05 

li\es  ihe  price  of  his  treason 50O 

escapes  arrest  for  treasnii 506 

lands  in  N'irgiiiia 54,^ 

not  enisle  I  iiy  ('liiiton ^48 

at  Richmond i;4(. 

hurries  to  his  entrenchnunts 54(7 

his  force  in  May  1781 589 

at  I'etersburg i^qo 

destroys  property  at  (.)sliorne    ^()i) 

attempts    corrcsjiondence    with    La 

•■■^ly^'i"^ 5')'' 

returns  to  New  \  ork m)7 

his  relations  to  Jiritish  officers.  ..  .  625 
commands  expedition  to  New  Lcii- 

don 625 

reports  operations  at  New  London.    627 

expected  no  opposition ((27 

reports  casualties  at  Fort  Criswold.  62r) 
closes  his  military  career  in  .America.  630 
receives  justice  for  his  valor  and  his 

treason    (t-^o 

his  birth-place  near  New  London.  .  627 
ds  surrender  of  (Juebec 131  I  Articles  of  confederation  adopted 539 


i': 


if 

i . 


f 


^ 


■I  i  I 


^'^ 


668 


(•IIKM\(>I  OCICAI,    AND     -EMKAI     INDKX. 


AililK  1 V,  Urilisli,  at   Iliiin-,  I  Ifi;;!!!-..  .  .  147 

(li'liTiiilni'il  llu- l)altlt' 111  (iiiiHnr.l,.  ^di 
AttilliTV,     Aiiu'iK'aM,    iliirinij    ( ifliiln'r, 

1776 2}2 

All  of  war,  Apnldi^'v  fcr \^-2\ 

Mi)i-(livisiiiiih  slaU'il t> 

Ashe,   ImIui,  llli^.  doiil.,/'.   1721,1/.  17S1. 

iiiutid  al  liiior  Crifk 4(14 

al  I'.utau  S)>riii^s 5.'^ll 

Assaiipiiik  or    liciifiii  Kivcr 2^4 

Alice,  >aimu'l  J.  .'.  I7.v<,  ■/.  I'SU. 

joins  ilic  army i')7 

III  skiiiiii>li  al  l\i:il  l.inii 'JoS 

is  Inkcii  prisoner -'») 

ta^liallics  of  liis  liallalioii lill 

assit;iiL'(l  to   M  itilin's  liiii^aclf J.'4 

Atii;ii-la.  (').  -Iiip-of-war,  Mows  \ip  lu'ar 

I'l.i  I  MiniT    ;vi? 

Au^iKl.i,  lla.  oiTiipi.'d  \>\  ihi'  'irili^li  .  .  sli) 

if-isN  assault  01  Anu'vicaii  Iroops.  .  5 jo 

Mirii.-ii(k'iv(l  Ivy  llu'  Hiilisli 5,4 

Atilliorily  :   tluro  is  a  divine  rii;li(  of  au- 

tlioriiy 3:1 

Aulhoiity  i^  intrinsic -lly  arliiliaiy .13 

Aux    ircniMis,  readied  liy  (iftural   Ar- 
nold   ' I  ?-' 

Aiix     'Irenililes,     reached     by     (leneral 

<  'ai  leSun 1  ^- 


B. 


I'l  \Cin\  Mi;s,,   daUL;lilei-  of    l''iankliii,  as 

to  \Vasliini;lon 

llailey,  I.iriit.,   {/>'/■}.   k.   at    siege  of  Sa- 
vannah  

Hailev,    (.'(jI.     in    northern    arinv    wiih 

dates ■ 

llainl,    Sir    lames,    at     battle    of     llrier 

(.  reek    

I'aker,  Col.  at  siei;e  of  Aut^iisla,  r,Si  ,  . 

Hall,  Lieut.,  w.  .al'llobkirk's  llill 

I'.alcarras.    Marl,   :,•.    at    battle  of   llidi- 

bardlon 

ill  b.itlle  at  l-'reenian'.>  i'arni 

I'eniis  lleii^hls 

before  the  1  loii-e  of  Coniiuoiis.  .  .  . 
Halance  of  power,  involves  absiin.lities. 
Halfoiir.   I.ieiit,  Col.  succeeds   l'attir-.on 

at  C  harlcstim 

puiMics  bad  niililaiy  policy 

executes  Coloiu-1  Ilayne> 

lialliinore  ihe  seat  of  Cons.;re>s 

generous     to     La     i'ayettc's     coni- 

niand 

renders  honors  to  Rochanibcaii.  .  .  . 
^ives     formal     reception     to   Wash- 

inn;ton 

HaiKioft,  (.'ieorL;e,  (l)iplonuite  and    His- 
torian i  /'.  1800. 

delines  the  war  of  1775-17^3 

renders  just  tribute  to  I'ulnain 

as  to  ])owdcr  before  ISo-lon 

describes    the    repuUe    at     Ihinker 

Hill 

states  forces  al  ISunk   r  llill 

a-' to  ihe  invasion  of  Canada..    ,. 
as  to  the  lialtle  of    Three  Rivers.  .  . 


.=  4" 
4S- 


•I'M 
?7-l 


?'7 

.M'> 
34(1 

340 

2S 

51S 
52-' 

s  7s 


592 
630 


4 

97 
90 

loS 
loo 
1 26 
167 


I'AGII 

Hancrofi  as  to  .American  norllierii  army.  !()!< 

a^  to  Arnold  at  Lrceman's  IV.ini..  .  342 

ai  to  Wadiinglon's  nalionali-in.  . .  .  4<)l 

p.iy-.  tidiutc  to  the  serviceof  women.  4SS 

llarbai  ism,  iinreslrained  in  war 24 

li.iiiL;lit  with  daiii.;er  in  all  ages,  .  .  22 
ll.iiber,  I'rancis,  Col. /'.  1751,,/.    1783 

;e.  in  the  assault  upon  Vorktown..  .  '139 

bears  a  me>-aL;i'  to  I'.aron  X'ioliieiiil.  (i3<) 
Ikiiber  I  !li>ioric,il  (ompilerl  as  to  I'ort 

(liiswiild (12S 

liarnes,   .\,    S.   (rubli^herl    N.    \'.,   con- 
tributes materials 154 

r.arras,  I'aul    l•'rancoi^,  jean    de    ('•Hint, 
.\dmiial,  /'.   175?,  (/,  1S21). 
arrives    with    Iniuh    si|ii,idron    in 

.America 

corre--ponils  with  \Va>hiiigion t)I4 

waive,-,    r.iiik    and    cooper. ile--    with 

other  forco fiI4 

alteinpls    Lort    Willi, ini,    Long    L- 

land ()2fi 

renders  etlieieiit   aid    in    the  (  he--a- 

)Hake 631; 

signs    .\iiicles    of    eapilulation     at 

^■olkto^^  n fi4  I 

r.arren    llill,   >killlidly   01  cupied   by    La 

L.iyi'lte 41  if) 

larren  i--ue>,  !      |uent  in  wars 43 

iairy,  John,  I. /w.)  nav.il   captain,  serves 

w  ilh  credit d^  ( 

kirton.  I.ieiil.  I '(d.  (. /w,),  ca))liire^  ( leiil. 

I'lescutl,  I  /•>■.) 401) 

!a^<■  of  ( )perations  ilhislraled ~.n-\ 

iaskingridge,  the    place   of  (ieiil.   l.ee'.s 

capture   258 

'i.illie   '.^i    Wagram    illiwtralc'^   defective 

h'gisties 71 

'•itlles  to  be  tested  by  lixed  laws 13 

latile  of  Lexington,  (skiimish)  .\pril  nj, 

1775,  its  lessons S-ll 

lUiiiker  I  lill,  lune  I7lh,  1775...    11)4-10 

the  Cedars,  M.iy    Ititli,  1775 1(13-4 

I  ong  Island,  .Aug.  27th,  '7*).  .  .  .    207-1 1 
Harlem  1  leights,  (skirmish  )  Sept.  if), 

I77f)    207-1  1 

Chatterlon     llill,     tWliile     I'lainsi, 

( >ct.  2()ih,  I77f) 241 

'rreiiton,  1  )ee.  2lith,   1776 27*,' -6 

I'riiiceion,  Jaiiy.  3d,  1777 2S,S-() 

1  lubbardton,  July  7th,  1777 310 

( )i  iskany,  J  uly  bth,  1 777 324 

r.enninglon,  Aug.   iClh,  1777 332 

Freeman's  I'arm,  Sept.  li)th,  I "77.  .  330 

I'.ends  Heights,  Oct.  7th,  1-77   ....  345 

liranilyw  ine,  Sept.  11th,  1777 3f)(j 

I'aoli,  (skirmish  I,  Scjn.  20lh,  1777.  .  383 

CermantO'A  n,  (  )ct.  4lh,  1 777 3S4 

MonnioMth,  June  2.~Stli,  l~~^ 4'f' 

\\'\oinmg,  July  41!],  T778    451) 

(^»nakcr  Hill,  .Aug.  2()th,  177S 454 

llrier  Creek  March.  y\,  1779 4f)4 

Chemung,  .Aug.  2()th,   1779 476 

Springlield,  June  28th,   17S0 50a 

Camden,     (Sanders'     Creek),     .Aug. 

i')ih,  17S<' •  •    513 

King's  Mountain,  t)ct.  7th,  1780.  .  .    520 
Fish  Dam  Lord,  Nov.  iSlh,  1780  .  .    521 


CIIKONOLOGICAL  AND   i;i;\i;k\l,   INDKX. 


669 


Blackstocks,  N'liv.  jotli,  17-0     ....   sjj 

Cow|ifns,  jaiiy.  171I1,  17H1 ?  ).• 

(iilillonl,  Sjai-(.-li  151I1,  1711 55(1 

llobkirk's  Hill,  Ajiril  2;lli,  17S1  .  .    571 
Kutavi'  Si'riii:;-;,  Sept.  8tli,  fj-^l.  .  .  .    ),■;^ 

Jain(!.-,t()WM,  July  91I1,  17S1 (1117 

Haumi;  (Ikuim),  (.iciit.  Col,  (//),  soni   i«i 

Heiiiiiiigtnii    ^j- 

ropoiis  till.'  progress  of  his  march. .  .   .iJ) 

foniliis  his  pijiition 1  u 

1^  ilolLMto.l  hy  (iciil.  Stark j  VJ 

llaxttT,  Ci)1.,(/!m  iiidfliMnLMif  Fi.rl  \Va>h- 

iiiK'''Jii -'51 

liayliir,  Lol,,  (Am.)  cavalry  cm   up  lu-ar 

"apiniii,  N.  V   '. 15,) 

lieac'Hi  s.j^iials  thnni^h  Nl-w  J(M-.cy \<,i) 

Ik'o,  'HiuMias,  oil  com.  safc-ly.S.  (, 171J 

i;-a>lic,  Col.,  (,/)/•.)  alt. icks  post  at    t'lc 

'-'t;iiari 11,5 

Ik-al,  ('ol.,    (./w.i    uilh   army    of    N'cu- 

Vork 22  \ 

his  l)rit;ailc  has  hut  a  week  to  serve.  ajO 
Mo.islcy,  Capl.,  (/>'/-.)  reports  .\riiohl  at 

New  l.oiulim C125 

lieally,  Cajit.,  (S.  C.)  with  Ceorgia  troops 

al  (  oupeiis 5^2 

liealty,  Captain,   (Cuiihv's  retjiment)  {k) 

at  ll,)bkirk's  1 1  ill  .  .  .". 572 

Heaufort,  scene  of  hrisii  action 464 

ileckuith,  Capt.,  demaniis  ^urremier  of 

l'"ort  Ciriswolil d.'^ 

lie.lell,  Col.,  (.7w.)  at  the  Cedars    104 

lledtord,     Mass.,    destroyetl     liy      Cenl. 

'■■•^■y    '. 155 

lleliue,  ('apt.,  (/>''-.)  ry.  at  .Monmouth \:\\ 

Kcinis,  ileij^lus  and   vicinilv ',-1(1 

liatile   ' '-,4; 

lleiinington,  liattle ',5.' 

Kenson,  Capt.,    {Am)  before    llobkirk's 

lldl 571 

Heraud,   Capt.  (.7'//.l /(•.  at   siege  of  Sa- 

vaimali 4S2 

licreton,    Capt.    (Br.)    w.    at    i.allle     of 

Monmouth 444 

lUBI.K  gives  (lelinition  of  good  and  li.ul 

watchmen 77 

bibliographical   I'able  honors  true  v.iior  .   21 
l!id  lie,  Xicholas  appointed  naval  cap. tain.  144 

>cr\ei|  with  credit (154 

liigelow.  Major    in    .Arnold's  expedition 

10  Ouebec 121 

liiggin's  liridge,   outpost  of  Charleston 

captured ).)6 

liilllngsport  on  the  Delaware,  captured.    ",1^1 
Hilling.,    Capt.    (Am.)    killed  by    mnti- 

ui'ers 537 

iiird,    llr.  reports  casualties  at  Chatter- 
ton's  Hill 240 

liird,   1-ieui.  Col.,  {/ir.)  k.    at    German- 
town    3go 

liirniingham    Meeting  House,  (Battle  of 

Jlraudywine) 380 

Hlackstock's   Plantation,  scene   of  skir- 

mi.li 522 

island,  'I'lieodcric  Col.  (.Im.)  h.   1742,  ./. 
1790. 
reports       recounoiss.Mice     of      the 
Hrandvwinc i7'>-2 


skirmishes  with   Tarleton',   l.i'gion.   4<jO 
iiloiinl,  M.ijor  (.////.)  at   luitaw  Sprin^js.   5S0 

Ko.iicl  of  w.ir  appointed 580 

Hond,  Col,    his  brig.ule    will  serve    two 

weeks  longer. 276 

llonuer,   i.ieut.  Col.    (Am.)  k.    al     .Mon- 
mouth        444 

ISooiiP,  haniel  Col./).  1735  (?),/,    1S21). 
e,i|)tured    esc.ipes,  defends    liooiies- 

borough 460 

iiordenlown     occupieil   1)V   Col.    Donop 

(//)    '. 276 

bv    (  ol.  Cadwalkider 27f> 

viiifd  !iv  I'lriti-.li  troo]is 404 

liorderie.   de  l.i,  I.ieut.   (I'ulaski's   Corps) 

I.-,  at  Little  Neck 451; 

r.o-e,    liaron    de,    Lieut.  Col.   (Pulaski's 

corp>l,  k.  at  Little  Neck jjig 

liose.  Kegiment  (//.Cat   Ikiltle  of  Cuil- 

ford [;5« 

at  liattle  of  ICutaw  Springs 5S2 

Boston,  forlilled  in  1774 ) 

under  practical  siege      '75 qo 

strength  of  garrison  |        irv  1776.  .      10 

and  vicinity,  see  map. 154 

its  garrison   re-iiiforccd 14(1 

depends  upon  Dorchester  Heights.    112 

siege  prosecute<l  in  1 776 14b 

its  garrison  under  sfiet  discipline.  .  146 
is  threatened  by  American  army.  .  .  150 
is  bombarded  lor  three  nights  .  .  .  151-2 
is  lost  by  occupation  of  Dorchester 

Heights 152 

is  evacc.'ted   153 

not  a  til  base  for  general  operations.    155 

insurrection  1770.  condemned 31 

Bowlnig   (ireen,   Ky.  an  olijective  from 

Louisville,  1S61-5 51 

Botta,  Carlo    Cuiseppe  Guliemo  (Ital.) 
historian,   b.  l'(>%,  d.  1S37. 

as  to  battle  of  Bunker  liill loS 

'I'reiiton    282 

reviews      New     Jersey     campaign 

1776-7 " 292 

Boville,    De,    .Maj.    (ienl.    (/•'/•)     recon- 
noitres with  Washington 620 

Kowdoin,  James,  Pres.  Mass.  council  ad- 
dressed by  Lee 261 

Bowers,     Brigadier     NLij.   (Br.)    brings 

dispatches  to  Coniwallis 610 

Boyd's   Provincials  surprised    at   Kettle 

Creek    464 

Borjuet  River,  the  site  of  Burgoyne's  first 

camp 3()fi 

Braddock's  operations,  of  the  old  type.  .      61 
Bradley's   brigade  to  go  out  of  service 

(60  men) 256 

Brandt,    [oseph  (Moh.awk    Indian)  with 

St'.   I.eger  323 

lays  waste  Cherry  Valley 459 

.Minnisink 474 

renews  hostilities 524 

Brandywine  River  described 367 

Battle  of 3(')9 

conllict  as  to  position  doubteci 380 

not  a  serious  defeat 381 

Bratton,  Col.  in  skirmish  at  Williamson 

Plantation 507 


:}: 


\ 


!  I 


6/0 


CIIRONOL()GICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX, 


m 

:  mm  >l 


!J 


•>m;  'v 


I'.U.K 

lireod's  Hill,  (ISrccd's  pasturi') 97 

ISrowcr,  Col.  part  of  rci;inient  at  lUiiikfr 

Hill     .' lo" 

lireyniaii,  Liotit.   Col.   (//.}  m.iu   l<>  ■>up- 

port   Ilaumc .^-0 

in  tlchiNfil  by  a  severe  storm fii" 

skirmishes  near  Van  Sebaick'^  Mill.    .130 
gives   a  s.ul  re|ioit   of   Uaiun's   dis- 
aster        331 

at  Iiattle  of  Freeman's  I'arni 340 

/('.  in  ISatlle  of  lleniis  Heii^hls  ....    341) 

l!riekell'>  briii.ide  joins  I  iates 337 

liridge,   Ebene/er,    Col.    furnishes     men 
for  Hunker  Hill 

lirierCreek,  the  scene  of  defeat  ol  (ienl. 

Aslie 404 

Hrinsmade,  lames    il.    IN  ;.    New    \  ork 

<:>h--'- - 

Uristol,  50,  tlai;-slnp  of  .\dmir.d  I'arker 

at  Charlestoii ■'> 

British  Army,  at  Hoston,  re-int"orced.  .  .  .    14(1 
excelled  in  Logistics  and  lUseipline.     71 

is  shut  up  in  I'os'on,  1775 lid 

evacuates  lioston 153 

a|)proaclies  New  Vork,  17711 ifo 

in  Canada,  re-inforeed 1(14 

as    assitjned    lo    America  (('olonels 

named) 1 70-1 

in  its  regimental  basis 171 

as  estimated  for  in  1776 173 

organizatiiin  anil  stren_i;th    at    New 

York   ii)i) 

advances  on  l.ur.i;  I.sland 201' 

sends  force  to  Monlressor  Islan.l  .  .    225 
occupies  .Murray  Hill.  New  \ork  .  .   227 

in  possession  of  New  \'ork 227 

land.s  at   l''roi;'s  Neck 2^4 

I'ell's  I'onit.'. 23s 

advances  toward  While  I'laiiis  ....    230 
takes     a     position     before      While 

riains   2;i) 

attacks  Chatterton  Hill 240 

cros.ses  to  the  Huds.  m 242 

captures  Fort  Washiii.i;ton 251 

movements    nncerl.un  ;   by  land  or 

sea .  . 

at  Brunswick,  N.  I 

couuter-mareh  on  the  r)elaware.  .  .  . 

inactive  in  Rhode  Isl.ind 

restricted  in  its  operations 

com|Kired   with   .\mer;ean  .irmy  by 

Stedman 

Official    Relurn    of    |une  3d,    1777, 

(Note) " " 

at   .Saratoi;a   

sails  f;)r    I'hiladelphia 

on  the  Br.mdvwine 3(17 

at  the  Ba'.tle  of  (lermantowii 3.^5 

evacuates  l'hiladel]ihia 413 

Official  Ki:turn  of  .March  26th,  1778  411. 
at  Newp.ort  177S,  and  garrison   spie- 

cilied .  .   44S 

reduced  by   scxxD  men  sent  to  West 

Indies 45S 

Official     Return     of    Au^u.U    151I1, 

(778 ".  .  .   4f'2 

February  5th,  1779 467 

rc-inforced  at  New  York 476 


247 
-57 

2(>3 
27'> 

301 

321 
352 

3t.2 


PAGE 

British  Army,  tJfticial  Keliirn  of  Decem- 
ber isl,  1771) 4S3 

as  distributed   in  17S0 4S5 

in  Southern  .Slates,  17811 4S5 

unileri^oes  hardslii])  at  New  N'ork.     4''5 
C)fliiial  Return  of  .May  1st,  l7,'-'u.  .  .    502 

.\ui;ust    1st,   1780 si2 

December  1st,  17S11 5 12 

draw  s  supjilies  from  N.  J.  .iml  Conn.,   524 

formation  at  battle  of  ( luilford f;-* 

Olticial  Kilurn  of  May  1st,  1781  .  .  .    575 

si'u,  .i.'ii  cbiriui;  .\pril,  17.S1 56S 

ollicer!.    iiDl    lespoiisible  for   fate   of 

Col.  I.edyard 621) 

in  position  at  N'orktown I133 

surrenders  at   Vorktown I142 

Official    Return    of   September    1st, 

1781 64(1 

under  l.'oriiw.iUis     640 

evacuates  New  York I'jb 

ijritish  r'abinet  ads  ise  Jndi.in  auxil- 
iaries   , 304 

proposes  operations  at  the  si.>iilh.  .  .    412 

initiates  a  southern  eamiKii^n 44(1 

adopts  a  new  policy  in   1781 53f 

l.iils  to   realize  the  dan>;er sij~ 

I'll  itisli,  ciimmissioner  in  177b 194 

conciliatory  bilf.    sent    in  iil.ice    of 

Hoops 403 

dra<^oons    and    Indians    rout    each 

"ilier 407 

frii^ates  (Hcu]'y  F^.ist    River  and  the 

Hudson 225 

fni;ales  destroyed   at  Newport 44s 

increase  their  militarv  stores 270 

I  .oj^i^lics  excellent 7; 

operations  in  western   territories...    41)0 
jiolicy  alleeted  by  Arnold's  iiitrij^ue.   50:, 

policy   illustrated ('47-S 

ships  at  Bosion  1775,  stated o'l 

ship>  at  Charleston  ]77(),  stated  .  .      l>7 
luiuu'.  one   in  interest  with  thai   of 

.Xuieriea 057 

Bi'Miifirld.  Maj..    {/>'/■)  succeeds  Fyer  at 

Fort  ( irisu  old 621) 

Bronx  River  .is  ,1  line  nf  defiiisc 230 

Brooklyn  deteiiscs  (ii'dcn'd  by  ( Ienl.  Ler.  ii)- 
(Uleiises  buili  by  I  ienl.  lireene.  .  .  .  HjO 
defenses  .ibandoned  by  (ienl.  W.isli- 

int;loii   21<| 

Brooks,  lohii,  ( 'ill..  I. /«/.  )al  Bunkiilldl.     o'l 

at  Beniis  I  lei.;iits 352 

Brown,    John,      M.ij.,     (sn'w    colonel    at 

MoiiMeal 127 

at  sieL;e  of  i^tuebec 134 

Brow  11,   riioin.is.    I  icul.   Col.,  with   Bro- 

vnieials  at    .Newport 44'^ 

in   comm.ind  at  .Vui^usta,  Ca sHi 

wounded    in    repelliiii;.  assault 520 

Bruff,  CJa|  t,  (./w.)  wounded  at  Ilobkirk's 

Hill 573 

Brunswick    furnishes     troops    for    Great 

Britain    173 

Brunswick,  N.  J.,  Bintisli  depot  of  sup- 
plies  291 

Bryan's  Rcfuj;ees  with  ('urnwallis jii) 

at  Hanging;  Rock   508 

Bryant,  Lieut.    i.h>i.)   at  I'"rogg's  Neck.   234 


T 


*  I 


(•IIROXoi.nciCAI.    AM,     CKNFKAI.     I.NDKX. 


6-1 


PACK 

oin- 

...  4S3 

...  4S5 

• ■ •  4^5 

k.  4S5 

I.  .  .  502 

...  512 

...  512 

nil.,  524 

• ■  •  5?^ 

•  •  ■  ST."; 
.  .  .  ss"' 

;  of 

.  .  (i2() 

•  ■  ■  •'.!.' 
...  042 
1st, 

...  6.|(, 

.  .  .  1)40 

.  .  .  (•;() 

ixil- 

..  .  ;,(.4 

1.  ,.  412 

...  44^ 

•■•  535 

.  . .  59c 

...  194 

■   of 


407 


44> 
27') 


1)1' 


...  I  ;4 

l>ru- 

...  44S 

...  519 

.  .  .  ^^20 

Ilk'..  ■' 

■•  ■  573 
reat 

...  173 

...  291 

..  .  5l() 

.  .  .  5<>S 

etk.  2U 


KM 

36S 


93-4 
95 


Bruyn,  Lieut.    Col.,  (./w.)  .n  J-'ort  (.'lin- 

toll 

UuckminslLT,    Wiiliarii,     I.KutV  ( 'ol  '  Vt   ''''' 

liiiiikvr  Hill '    " 

iSuftlngtoii's  I'ord,  (^vc  note) 

iiuford,  .•Vbraliani,  Cnl.  n-i.   c.il  i'i,,'l',v 

J  aiieloii '  ■ 

''"■H  Klin,  h.ntilo,  iSCi,  illu.l'niif.^  u-\i  '  '     ,,', 

luink.r  IJiil,  <lei,ci-ilK-.l 

Loiiditioiis  of  it.s   oc(;u|i,ilioi 

order.',  involved ,,(, 

ships  en-.iLied ''.'''.''''.'.      ,^«, 

-siliialiou  of  the  arnie.. j-..s 

iviiifoneiiients  re.iiiired •'  •      99 

the  .Auuiiean  forces  eiii,'.it;ed '    100 

lai-.diiit;   of  (lie  I!iiti.,h' troops i„3 

the  moral  issue  involved j,   • 

Biitish  |ilan  o(   aelion '<,,] 

advnne..-,  repulsed lo"-- 

(-linloM  and  l!nr.;oviie  speel.itors  .  .    JoS  ' 
opinion,  of  antlior;  and  oi.. servers.      m3  I 

incidi'iiN  of  linal  assiull jo.  -11  I 

note.-,  upon  liie  liallle U2-ii(i  ' 

resislanee    n.-less    after   ios.,  ,,f    n-. 

il"nl.t jj.  I 

t'linlon^  eoinisel   iu-lee(ed ..',    m\ 

hait  policy  of  ilu-  all.uU i  k", 

the    best    jn.ssilde    residt     for    Loth 

armies  ....  ,  ,, 

.  .      Ill) 

value  01  di.^eiphi'.e  iiieidealed ii(, 

ea>uallie-  of     le-iiiieius     L;ivea     i>y 

'Aasjiim^'lon    (Note).  .  .  .' 

Hunyan,  j.,lin,  (  |\h|  i  /.  \(ri^  J  jds^. 

I'orious    nieiaphor  from   plofe^sion 

ol    arm. 

Hiirgoynr,    Sir    Joini 
1730.  </.  1792. 

arrnes   at   iJo.slon  \wil,    [[„.,^.^^.  ^,,,,1 
C  liiUoii  .  .  , 


lliir 


ln-'ut.     Ceiil.,    /'. 


IS  vyiluessof  the   Hallle   of   Hunker 

."'" ins 

Skives  Ills  opnron  ol    the   haltio  loS 

•I'lvise.s      lo        occupy        HoielRstc, 

"'-"'^'"^ 1,2 

a   reminisceneo    t,f   \u>    experience 

(""tei .;  ,.^ 

assigned  to  e.xiieiliiion  from  Canad.i"   ",<m 

conslitutioii   of  his  army '.,,, 

sails  from  London  for  Quoliec'  .  .    .\    -'o; 

ill    'I'liree  Rivers,  Canada '  '    i(j6 

occupies  ,Sl.   J.ihn'. ,(,s 

Ills  plans  known  in  .\inerica o.,,, 

dcjieieiil  in  li-ht    iioop,  and   iran^- 

P'O'tatioii . 

appeal,  lo  Indian   lril.es ',  .\    :,,,9 

issues  an  impolitic  proclamation.  .      Wi 

IS  aii.sv\eied   by  \Va,-,liiin;lon \ob 

ex])lains  expedition  lo  iieiminglon .    •?2,S 

still  dt'ticii'iit  in  Iransportalioii 32S 

Sends  hack  all  surplus  liai;gat;e!  .'  '.  [    -,2;' 
underj;oes  great  trials.  ..'...  f, .' .' .'  '    'y^n 

arrives  at  Crown  Loiiit '-,,,-. 

his  views  of  a  jiroper  canipaii^n.  .  .  .    \u'- 
arrives     before     Ticondeioga,   July 

.  .'^'■.'"" ^ '.    3"S 

Jiis  artillery  «ron{,T|y  criticised,  64  and  lo.S 

seizes  Mount  ll(j|)e .j,,ri 

occupies  Mount    J  Reliance ',..',   joi, 


Koyne.  controls  Ticnd.'io"  1  .  ^r., 

rnrees   the   l.rid^e.  .  .  .                      ■"  ^'j 

l'"i-iu.'s   the  .Ameiican  aimv     ■,14 

"'akes   lid.  (.Irs.  aLSkencdunonol,.  t,„ 

Issues  a  proclamation    [ulv  lotli'.  ..  u.S 

Is  answered  by  Scluivler.  .  .'  .  .  '.,,  , 

l"ived  to  build   fortv  brid-re,.!  3,, 

•irnvesat  I'ort  Kdward..." :,|,, 

'lis  auxiliaries  untamable..  .  -,->,, 

liotrc.',p..n.-.iblef,„  p,.,„,„,,;,,uli,'i^e,'.  12; 

Inrin.i;  Indians  1,,  be   .d.honed'  bv  ' 

po.lciily." 

"nic.     I.,     L,,rd    (.erina'ine"a."',o 
Indi.ius 

"would   lo>e    evcrv'Irii.ci'bui'not  '' 

connive  u  iih  i!;,ia," 

deceived    by    I'hi 'ip  Skem'.' ...''.' '  r" 

jnit.s  ihc  army  on  reduced   iaiioii^'  \'~ 

iiLstruets  Lieut.  C,,|.  |;,,„nic    lullv..  3-7 

inspects  an, lincrcaM',  Kaume',  c.'.m-  " 

ni.ind ,,,., 

bridL;c-.  ihe  llii.i,.,,!  ui:li  I'al'll.'!  '.  '.  '.  v2() 

SLMid.,  Ilrcym.m    lo  leinfoive  Jl.iumV.  3^) 

reporl,  a,  lo  .iniicd  rmal,!,..  35, 

nveives    harsh     ]r:u;-'    fn.m     (iei'il'  "" 

'■•'i^'- T,5 

make-  a   noble   re>pi.iiv,. V',c 

writes    Lord   (ierniainc  a,    i,,    \\.u- 

laii;Iand '  ,,_ 

Id-  ••  messengers  1,,  Jl,,ue  a'rch',',, ■,,".."  'l^'^y 

seiairc-s  latu.ns   fur  thirtv  da\s      "  'C;7 

rebri.i-es  the  I  Fudson  ..'...'. [  '{./- 

.ipproaiiies  the  .\iiierican  lainp!  .'  .'  .'  ';';s 
lights  a  baitle  al  Freeniairs  Larm 

Ills  Older  of  baillr  excellent 

jails  his  army  on  slmrt 


3 
.i2b 
2b 

.127 


>3'i 
.^41 

1,11   lolls s    ,;. 

Ii.i;iiis  a  bailie   at   llcmis  llei-lits.         "u^ 

ivliie-.  lo   S.iratoj;a .' :,^^, 

stales  the  stren^t'li  of  his  annv'.  ' .'  '    ^^  1 

calls  council  oi'  uar ":,i 

MiireiKlers  his  army  lo  Ceiil.  (, ales'  "^v2 
receives  message  from  Clint, m  ...  .    3^2 

is  fully  vindical,-,! '  '  "    '^^-'i 

his  characler  to  be  Inuioicl .'.  ..  [  '.  .'  3^3 
appears  in  the  House  of  CMiii,i„',ns  3^3 
opposes  pr,),secuti,m  of  the  war.  .  .  .    353 

his  position  fairly  define, 1 35;  • 

his  standanl  of  inililary  obedience!  '.    354 

111-  in.slracti,ins  iiUerpi'ete,! 35O 

his  ileleat  kimwii  in   LuMipe..  V)9 

lUinl,   .Maj.    (./w.)    vapiiiie,|    ,,ii     |,,'„'i..   " 

l-hin,l '^  2,.,^ 

liurkc,  lulmuiul    (slatesmaii)   />.  i-^i    ,/ 
1797. 
descrilies  allaik    on  Fort    Moulliie.    IS; 

his  opini,)ii  ,)f  the  battle aSl 

lUirk,  (lov.  N.  Carolina  taken  ]>ris,;ner.  .    582 
liurnel,     .Maj,ir,    .\id-,le-eaiiip    ,,(    Cenl 

^'cub.n j2q 

Ihirr,  .\ar,iii,  si,/>.  Col.  and  Vice  J 'res.  V. 
I7?b  ;  (/.  1S36. 

a  v,ilunteerin  l-"xpcJition  to(,,icbec     IT 
liush,     Lieut,   (./w.)   /•.   at    siege  \.,f   Sa- 
vannah     '. ,gj 

Ihiskiik,  Lieut.  Col.  induced  the  si  .u.diler 

at  I'ort  Crisvcilil ''.  _      (-^g 

Butler,   John,    Ibig.  (, cnl.   at    Lailk'of 

Ciuilford    ,,« 


I 


1:    I 


•I  B' 


1"      ,» 
■■      ft 


'      I 


672 


CIIR()N(i|,(M.l(  AI,    AMJ     (.I.MKA).     INiii.X. 


i:r:* 


III 


rilik 


I'AOR   '  TAOll 

Hiitler,  Ii.liii,  I  ■"].  u  illi  Si.  I,i'i;i-r.  1777  .    y2\    ('aiKidii    iiu-idril  liv  Aiiurican  tr'«i|is.  .  .    iiS 
ilutlci,    1  lll>lll.l^,  I 'iil<i:nl,  at   .MmjiuimuiIi.    43.) 
at  Stony  rmiil     >7_' 


liiir.; '11  n 

Ityruii,  I'lliii.  A'liiiir.il,  /'.  17.:),  ,/    I7"i>. 

lclll-\r,   1  jihl    I  Ic.VW  , (47 

lu~.  iK-i'l  MMlic'i'-il  l,y  a  vtoiii)    147 

jMH.'^  lo  rm^iiiii  Id  iii;;.il;(:  |)'lv>taiii^  4^" 
his  tied  ai;.!!!!  ili-.iliird    j^m  i 


nnly     iiiaiic     j^raM'i     for     AiiKiii.aii 

.iniiic, itiH 

a>  ju'luiil  l.y  \Va-liiiii;l()n IJ;    0 

iiiMil\<il    luo    imiliially    'lc|n-nilcii' 

a|/|)roa<  hr^ Ij6 

invasion  ol,  a  tailiiri' I'jq 

i-\|]c(|ili(m  floiii,  liro  laic  ill   1777   .  .  279 

cX|iriiilioii  III,  ill   177."!  aliaiMlulii-d  .  .  4(.'I 

iiiv.i-ioii  under  I. a  I'aMlIc  |inipn-cd  402 


(Ains  \i  I  Aiii  K,  Joim,    iJrig.  Gen.,  /'. 
1743,  ,/.  17S(, 

l^iiaidiiiK  lilt'  Oflawarc  Rivir  ,  .  .  -jids, 

\i)  (  i)(i|iriat<'  a,i,Miiist  'I'lrnlDii      .  .  2(17 

to  c  I'Dss  1)1  low   HoidciilMUii ■J71 

is  lliwallcd  li\    i.  1 2~l 

Cl<)-.s(s  llic  l)i  lauaic  I  )i,i-.'J7,  I77(,  ^yli 
joins  WasliiiiHloii  ill  I  rciiloii,  |,iii. 

'.  '777 ^'4 

is    |ir(l|llolrd     I{|  it;.   (  ii'M ■2l)(l 

Cadualladrr.    I.ainljiil,    <'ol.,    al     I'ort 

Wasliiriuloii ^4^ 

CaldwLdl,    (^lia)ilaiii,    has   liis    church 

i)urncd.    17-0 (P  = 

lia^    111-    u'lr    dioi    at    (  oiiiii'i  til  111 

lailll. ^iy, 

fa!!,  Major  1.//'/.),  al    li^iill,-    ..f    lanirs- 

tou  n ,     (ii)-- 

<  ■  inilirid'^r,  M.i",  .•Ijr.  I  ,,(   r.p.^iifd   iv- 

nioval  ol  |..n\dri >,) 

'- ainl)nd;^n'   (Miiiiniiii    iIm-   indr/voiu  |.ii 

liiiiiUcr  llill  dciail <)^ 

Camden,  I'.attir  nl",  al  ^  iiidi-rs  I 'rrrU  .  =;  1  7    1 - 
coii.niaiidi-d  |,y   I     .  I  ,,|.    I  iiiiiliull .  .     :  lo 

l.ani|iaii;ii  of  1775  i .  m  -idcn-d i  ;■) 

'77''  li'^aiii-  Xca  jriM  y  for  Amen 

cans 21)^ 

1777  o|icmd ■j(,4 

I77S  in\olvi-d  ,r\cral  plaiii (u) 

1771)  invoh.-d  --rvcial  |il.ihs 4(1 ; 

17S'),  Condition  ol  aliiir^ )-( 

17-1  opened :;;i4 

17SI   illiislialfd  wise  sliaU'i^y (.17 

I7>  I   Inifliy  re\  lewed (,17 

Cam  I  p1  11  II,  ( iov.,  ol"  Soelh  I  aroliiia 17^ 

(,'ani|iliell,  l.ieiil.  ('.il.    71,1    l-Hot    i/u.i, 

taken  iniMiner i"^:: 

capture-,  Savannah 15.) 

Campliell,  W  ilhain.  Col.  i.lm.)  /■.    174"; 
,/.  17,-1 

at  KinL;\  .Momii  iin 520 

at  (  Iwillord   551, 

71:  at  liohkirk's  1 1  ill 57! 

use-   liayonel  al   I'.iilaw  Spring-.  .  .  .    sSu 
(.'anipliell.  ' 'apt.  I />■/.)   leai  lie-   liiiujoMie 

from  Cliiiion 352 

Campliell,  Maj.  {/ir.)  taken   prisoner  l/i'- 

lore  \'orktown hV) 

(^impliell,   (apt.    (/)';•.!    71-t     1 1.  re.  at 

(.  haiiilie,  N.  <  ' 51, 1 

Caniplndl,    Adj,   i/li.)    "(.ii.nds,"    ,e.    at 

New  I  lav  en,  I  'on  n (70 

Canada  as  a  Ihiiish  hase ci 

a- a  base  (il  operalioiis  in  177;....    117 
not  in  sMiipalhy  wilh  i\cw  Iji^lmel    117 


f()iit;ht  the  Ocean  in  177b 45')  j  ( 'anadian  Acts  of  raiii.in.eni  nl .\ioiis   117 

j  Car  lei  on,  >ii  (  div.  Cov,  of  (  .mada,  >/</' 
(  Miv.  N.  \ ..  I>.  I  7.'4,  </.  1  ^o.s. 

ailopleil  w  |..     pnlh  \ 11^ 

escapes   lio'll    Molllpal   t'j  l^lllehec.  .  IL''( 

una  Me  to  i.iisc  local  Hoop 1  _'i) 

I  oiispn  Moll,  fi,r  ^allantrv  at  '.liieliec    137 

tlolile  ill  Miieliict  tow.ird  |iiisniieis.  137 
"  Ainei  u  an-,    il    not    Inoiler-,    lir-t 

con-ill  -."     I  ;7 

rclius  lioni  I  'iii«  II   I'oiiil '.'.3 

oppo.e-    liidiaii  aasili.iiie-,   I777'--  - /"" 

,11  lively  .iiiU  I'liiiL^oMie y>^ 

-iKcee.l-   (liniiin  in   N'lW  \  ork ,  .  .  .  (i4'i 
Willi    Adinii.il    I  li^liy  a  .  peai  e  (  oin- 

inissioni  I fi46 

siniendeis  New  \'ork  lo(.eii.  Kiiox  (jjf. 

Ciileioii,     M.iici     1 />'^.j,    c.i]iUires     I'oiis 

I  lewi^e  and  Ann s'j^ 

Can,  I  leiil.  I  ol.  1 /w.i    Sjlli    fool,   /;•.   al 

I    h.illei.oii   jlill _•  (I 

Carriiii^l^m.     ImIwioI,    <  ol,,    iMiar.    .M.i^. 
I  i<n.  I  -"iilli  I,  /■.  17411,  1/,   I  -  1'). 

end"!   ed    liy   | r.siii  e  ji.hn -on slo 

eiidoisid    hy  I  Jiief  justice    Mac-liall  =  ;o 

explores  ihe  1  i\i|s  of   \'iieinia :'!o 

Celleils  -lores  on  ihe  Koanok(-  ....  530 

lepoi:  -  liu.Us    iM  reieii  .ihmi;  ilie  I  »aii  --  i 

piovides  1 10;' Is  al   llii-  Icrrie- ~~1 

(  oniniis'ei    on  e\i  liaiiee  o!  pri-onei  .  sss 

lake-  arldleiy  to  Kie_;ely's  M  ills    ...  570 

liriiij4-  .iriillei)  to  llolikirk  llill...  570 

<  arpc  niei,  (^apl.   l.//'Muilli   ailillery  ,il 

I  .oiiy    Island 'Joo 

Carioll,  Charles,  .Md.  .'».  17.57,  ./.  1,132. 

(  onimissioner  10  <  anad.i I  fS 

advises    to   aliaiidon  I   .oi.id.i 1 1. 7 

Carroll,  kev.  lolin,  ,W(/'.  an  lil)i-le>p  Hall 

\  i-Ms    t  aiiad.i    \--' 

Cusuallies,  at    Hunker  1 1  ill ill 

in  sie^eof  l.oslon I  -  I 

ill  (  .11 1. id. I  canipai).;ii I ''I 

a!    I  hue   KiMis I'  ; 

in  allai  k    upon   I'oil   .Monllne I  -  1 

al  |,allM    ..I   l.oni;   I    land 2  11  212 

.It  I' 01 1  \\  a-liine|i,ri 2^1 

at    l,ai;le    oi    'I  ri'iil'i 27  I 

al    I'  I'linan'-    f  arm 3)1 

at   licinis  lleinlil- X^' 

ol    1'iiiii.^oyne's  c.iiiipaij;li (=1 

,il     foils   (  linlon    and  .Mont^omei  y  3  =  11 

a!   latlle   of  ( .(  ini.iiilown 3110     ; 

a!   lo.rl    ,\leri  er V  I 

al    foil    Mijllin i'   , 

.il     Moninoiilh 4-11 

al  the  capliiri'    of  Savaiiii.di I'o 

al    r.rier  Creek -I's 

ui  New    ll.ivcn,Conn 4;'- 


PAIIB 

llS 

li.aii 

!(,,■( 

.  .12=^    l> 

\vu- 

IL'6 

I')(J 

•(I. . 

279 

4<:l 

.-r.l 

402 

117 

i-C.  . 

I'lllC 

IH7 

CI  ^    . 

i:i7 

Iir-t 

1  =7 

....  I  r  ^ 

.  .  .  .  ii'T 
lV,l(, 

.  .  .  .  I  =  '^ 

.  .  .  .  1  I  I 

.  .  .  .  1=1 

.  .  .  .  I'-i 

. . . .   I'  : 

....   I '  I 

- 1 1  'J  I J 

....  -  ^  I 

-•71 

!  p 

3r'- 

\'\ 

iinriy  i  =  'i 
.  .  .  .Vl'i  ; 
.  .     .  .     VI 

i':-, 

Ml 

I'" 

/)'o 

Al'- 


riik()N()i,o(,ic.\i.   AND   (,i;\i;k.\i.   im.i;\. 


^V"3 


Caiuiillics,  at  Stony  I'diiil, 

at    Mirnii^iMk 

at   i'.uilii^    llnok 


at  SIC, 


il    Siv.iiiii.ili . 


■17. i 
471 
17^ 
P- 

v<: 


111   sic;;c  .>!    (  'ii.iilcsliin 

Ill  li.illl  ;   MJ    Spiiii'^jlicM 

a'    11,111  miil;  kn,  k 

at  ImIiIc  ',\  (   aimlcii ;  I  ^ 

ill   h.illlc  of  Kiic.;\  .\r)iiiil,iiii ^-.'M 

at    lil,i.  I,  .|i„k's   I'l.iiitaliiJii ;..| 

at   li.lMli;  .)!    (  !i)U|lclls ;  |; 

at    li.llllc    ni   (;il|]|..|.l :l,2     i 

at   l-ati|c    1,1    ilohkiik'.  IIill r;;^ 

at    li[|i|c   ol    I'aitaiv  >|iiiii^, c-j 

:il   Willi, nil  Omit; 'ill  I 

,1'      ic;.;c   .il    \(iiklir.\  11 1,  (  ) 

t'aswcll,  Ricli.iiil,  l!ri;'.  (  iciil.,  ''    17J1J,,/, 
17^9. 
defeat,    kuvali.li    at    Mumr'.  (   icrk 


<  liccrniail,  I.i.ait.  (.lni.),k.M  (,)iirl,iH:.  H5 
(   liccvcr-.,  l'./>-kicl,i.iiiiirii,i,iry  in,irucici| 

liy  \VasliiiiL;liiii n,(, 

"Jiciiiinit;,  near  I'.liuii.i,   N.  \'     ;,    hatilc. 

licM 


''li''i'i*v     Hill      .i!-.iii.|.iiii.-.|      |,s      kiiiKli 


475 


ip 


IImiIl: 


171 


unite  ,  w  iili  ( i.iir i^ii, 

at  lattle  of  Caiieleil :i; 

•   allieail,     (   ,i|,t.      {/ir.}       ?t'.     a!      .Mwii- 

i"""lli (II 

CaliiaiiMc   II.,  1,1   ku,>i,l,  /'.   I7J1),  ,/.    17./,. 

a'|i|i|,    .iriiii,''!    iieiilr.iJily,  ,u  a;.;.iiii,t 

l-ii'4''iii'l si;7 

I'atilkin-,,  Ml,,,  ,iaii-,  tli.-  ,i,„iiili  of  l',,it 

( liiuoi.l (,_,, 

' '.nail  V  ot  the  wai  of  177:;- I  7-i  i (,^    j 

'  'elltciiiiial    \c,ir    ,jf    Am.     Ilalcjicleiriuc 

llOlClp    li (,;  , 

('c-,,,ilioii  ol  lio,tililies  foiiiially  liecl.iieil  (,;^ 
'  li  iiiil'K.  1 'li.iiil!ili-c)  oci  iiiiicl  ill  177;  -J  I  ■! 
>  li.ii  icioii,  a  -ceoii'lary   linti-li   lii^c,     .      :;  | 

Il  iilior  111    1771').  . '7''  7 

sl.ite  ol  .ill'iir-.  ill  June,  l~~<i 1^1 

sicc^C    ol,     111       |7,S(1 (,j) 

;;airi,oiini   ijSi    ini;iea,c.| :;^i 

t'll.ulc^tou  II,   lleichlslo  lie  01  riipicii  .  .  .  m- 

liuriieil     .lining;    li.i'.lle    of     I'.iinkcr 

Hill ■ 107 

\c(  k    aliiiiiloiicil [.i.j 

(^li.ule-,  ,\ri,h'luk(.'  of  I'rnssia   iijimh  ke- 

tre.i;, -  . 

riiaile,    Ciiv    Court    IIoinc,    \iitc!     I,y 

^'""■•"- '-  5+') 


45',) 


o     i,,iie    at 


11/ > 


<  lie-,a|ii'.ike     liay     memo    ililc     in     n.iv.il 

'"^"".^    •••■' f.l') 

<  llcevci.     I  llVl.l,    ,M,1,~.,   1  0111.   ,ll].|.||c,    .  .   ,  ,, 

'   lieii\    \  alley,  111. 1  .,,i(  le.  .  . 
'    lie'A     l|oii,e,    II, ,1     iii,ilc|ial 

(  ennanlou  n 

<  lieui,,!!,  1.01,1,  .11  William,,!, iiri; („,^ 

'■!"■  ''1.  jolin.  (  ,i|,t.  at   I'.rnkei'ilill 1  10 

<  lic,|ei\    liie^.iile-    in  .S|ieaieei ',   .|Ki,i.iii.    J2i 

<  |liic  ,il;o  lr,ir.|  of  Tra.le  ImIi.iv  iio;u-e,|      -;(, 
< 'liiiiine\  1  0111,  I    jiairiots  ili-i;ii,t    \\a,li- 

'":-;l""   ' =;-7 

'   lin,ilrv  l.avc.l  u] in,.-  manl I   .     .  .  '  _.j 

'   liii, 11,111,1  (   leck,  aniv.il  of  \Va,,liiiiL;toii', 

:inny ,'    ,  ,  _  ,,,f, 

<liii,tiaiiiiy,  ihe  tiue  lile   ol    ,ii|  n.Uioiial 

I'l'         ■■, 41 

'    liiiMli,   l'.eMi,iiiiiii,  ,,11    .Ml,,,  com,    s.ifely  ,, 

'    'lies'.  i,-._,im,  11!   \\  nil  .iiniv   (,l  (.  Ill',  .  .'  ',  jf, 

<  ivil  uii.      ,s,-c  Wir  ,  .  ,  .    ■J,. 

<  imI  u.ii   i:ln,i|,iie,|,  ,11   Willi,    ri.iiii,.  .  .  J  1 1 

liy   I  i\  oil',  c,\|  c.|iti,iii )-| 

Il  ilie  s.inli -!^, 

I    l.iik,   |l,iM,|,  I  ,,|  ,  »  III,    M,   I,,,;,, -I,   ,---     .,_.  , 
'   l.iik.  Sir   l-i.inei,,  :.•.  moil.illv  ,'il   l;,-iiii, 
lleiclil,     


(ink,    (.i.iu;,'    Ko-ei-,,    C,,!.,  /,.    I75_',  ,/. 


iSoS 


.i4'> 


4M 


ea|i|iii,',  X'iiieeiim',  (In, liana)  177,;.    41,5 
<:i,iik,  IJijali,  (  ok,  in  ,kiiini.|i  at  (necn 

^1"'"^; =07 

liekire  .\i|,.Mi-t:i,  (  ;.i ^|,| 

lejiiil,.-  I  ,it  ,\,i;M|,ia 5j,, 

(.:iirk',     \,iiili     Cooliim     iv:;iii,,  lit     at 

t  hail,-, Ion,  1770 |,vj , 

<:iev,liii,|,  I!,  11,,,  (  ,,|.,  ,,t   kin-',   .M.Miii- 

t  nil .' ,      -2,. 

<'Iiiit,ai,   Jaiiie,,    lln:^'.    (;cii.,  .'a    \- \h,  ,/. 

.,       ,  ,,      ,.  ,  ill  'Ireeiie',  (livi,ion _■  57 

.  h.irlollosvill,..  \,..,  tin:  |„i,o,i  ,|,.|„,,  |,„-  I  j„  cminand  of  Koit  Clinion  r  = 

!!ui^;oynes    army 5,,,,  i  7,-.  n,  the  assault  npon  F,nt  1  I, mon  v-o 

v„,te.|   l,v    l.i;l'';'m ?,rJ  ioin,  Sullivai,  a-ain,t   Imli.iii, ,-, 

'  li'-'.  ^^""ii^'l.  M'l.. '''.  174',  .A  IMI.  'ciiiiMii.   (;.-,r^v,   c.'.v.,   l!,i,;.  (ien.,  ../,/-. 

\  lee    I'lc,   /;,    1731;,  ,/.    lA{2. 


e, ,1111111-, loner   to   vi,a  ( '.iii.el.i i;,) 

ailvi,,;,   to   alMiidoii    (an  I'll i*,^ 

(.'liastelliiv,    Francois  Jean,    \l,ii,|iii,    de, 
.Maj.  (ieiil.  /'.   1734,  ,/.   17s,,. 

arrive,    with    koi-liamlieau 50) 

.11  kiil_',,!,iny.  ( ',)iin hiS 

<  ,1111111.1,1,1,  ,a  ,livi,ion fiji) 

vi,ii,   \I,,iinl  Villi, ,11 I,;,, 

vi,il,  ,\iii,i  iea  all,- 1  iln-  w.ii ((■> 

(.Ihallii.-l,!  Ilou-i  ,  nc.ii    keiiiis  II,aM|,|s.  .   J3  )(> 

(Jhalh.uii,  l.oid  (  Wi  ilia  111  I'll  1 )  -I.Ue-nian. 
^.1756,  //.  IS15. 
j;ives  111,  i>|)iiiiou  of  (lie  war 8:;-  ( 

Ch.Uliain,    Ih''    h-'^"'')     lo    .M,ii  1 1,1,  ,n  n 

fa,tiie.ss (T 

Cli.iitmioii     Hill     ,1  1.1, k., I    j.y     |;ini,h 
U'lon^ 


■-■J') 


43 


111  lli-.iili',  .|ivi,ion  at  .New   \'oik..  j  ■  1 

pionioted    lirii;.  (!eii ■>,^l, 

ciiniiMnij,  111  the  I  Ii;^lil.ui,|.,  ,...,,  2,/i 

'111  Conit  ol  licjiiiry  a,  l,i  Si  liiivler.  lu 

01,1, ■!  ,   iniliti.i  1,1  ai,|   I'liliiam.  .....  ')5f) 

modilies  I'uin.iin'.s  fuiioiiL;lis \z,f, 

adi.iurn.  New  \'nrk  leiri.,|aiiire  ....  -(^-i 

coniinan,|,  loirl   i\I()iUj,'oinery. . -^^S 

rejcels  dem.iiid  for  its   surrender.  .  .  3;,) 

escapes  from  I',iit  .NJon'i,',>ir.ery .  ,  .  .  3(),) 

e,i.,|., -rales  with  Wa,hiiij;loii 61, j 

di,tin'4iii,lied  for  sorvifcs 65(1 

('iiiil,  '1,  Sir  llonrv,  Lieut,  (icii.,/-.  173S, 
,/.  171)=;. 

.sent    1,1  .\mcri,  .1,     775 m 

!;ivi,s  -(jiind  advice  at  Ikistim 114 


I 


i 

f 
'i 

1     r 


'i  '.  • 


*•'<  i 


'I  ^'1i 


674  (  III:'  i\'M, '>(,!(  .\I,     \N 

1  AM' 

<!Iitii()i],   -11     lli-niy,  :i'.  a    viyhiuiicT   .-u 

l;  :hk.  I  Hill i.,:- 

ii'l'.i  ■     I'l     !■./•■  I  (>M<  III    111   I  |i  ij'lii      I  I :: 

VI    r      I  .'.•,  ,     I   I',., I,    ,ll     N.  W    \  i;ll 1   )- 

i-    III').    11    'I     hi    •!.        l|l:S      M    1,1    1     lir.S   II'       ,    ,        I   -'I 

VI  ^l<      I  .'ii'l    I  fiihiipiii    Ml  I    In  <M{ii  .iki' 

|;:i> 17^ 

I'liu     I. all'  •MiiA.illi     ill  \\  iliiiiii;.;l'iii  i-T 

I      Ml-     ;i   j.lm  l.iiiKil  lull 17- 

ai  I  ]■.•--    ;il  (  'li.ii  li    |.  ill,  S,  ( ' 1  -  I 

(.111         III     "|)(;l.i   lull  .     ajMiii   I       I  '.|I 

M'.ujlrir      I-- 

Hiiii  ii     \'i  Niw  \  ii'.k I'l'i 

liiir.'      .ii   ^l.iN  11    I    hiirl I')' 

iii:iki-  .    Jii  I    liiiiiili-    '/(    ( 1'  11     I  I'lUi  ' 

<■•'"      I'l') 

111   llll-    I'.lMi'     'if    I  ,,,11;/    I     l.i|,,|     -^1  , 

rouls    I'm    •/li',   lill;;.i'lr   III    .Niw   \'/lk  'Jj: 

I  I  '.l.lia  li'l  u  I'll  I  lo'.M  ;i  I',  ii'  '  I'lli  ■_'  Vy 
(  '.llllliuli'l  ,       I  A)w  (IHl'Mi      tu       |-;li'.i|i- 

I     I..!,. I         'J- 

hi    'lilt'  I'  111  1-    u  nil  I  l'<ui-  iiiiin.il'li.il  'J')- 

I  'iiiiii..iii'l  -  ;ii  .\i  V.  S  ml-. 21): 

will'-  I'l  l'.Mi;;'.\ni-,  '^••|ii  ,  1777.  .  .  .  <(' 
inakr  ,  :iii  .  >.|,ii|iM'iii  '1|(  llir  llii'ls'ili  ;|^f 
'  aj.lm.       I  1,11  -    '  J:iil'.|i    ainl     Mniii 

;"illl'  I '.     '<^'y 

M'liil     I  \|,' 'li:iiiii  I'l  iniiii  Km;;  I'm,     (fiy 

r<-lui  h     '■ .  Ni  A    \'i,!  k (i.i 

ri'lii-M-  I  .1  II.  II'. ,M-  al  I'liil.i'l.  I|,ln.i  .|i,(, 
al!i-iii|.i       I'll  ,11,11111     I, a  |':n.i  111-    al 

I'l.iM.  n    llill,' ', ,.,(, 

aliaml'ih      l'liila-|i-||.liia ( 1  ;■ 

(llll' I  111  I  III-  n  I  |i-,-il  Willi  al-ilil  \  ,  .  1 1  , 
hail  .  al   .Mniiiii'iii' Ii,   |iiiii    •J7,   177'^   .    ,)  I - 

is  |iiii    II'  il  Ia    W  a  liiii'^lijii J-Ji 

al  liallli    i.f    Mm, llll I  ,  I 

inal  r     ii  |.'iil   'I  llll    liallli    ).( 1     ,. 

|i-lii-a'     I'l  \i  .'.-  ^"ll 11'. 

VM  il'-      I  .ii|i|  I  HI  111  iiiH    ii(     III      ui  ak 

I It- 

sail ,  111  1I--.I  i|i:   Ni'-.i  |,i)il ,}rc 

ri-lill  11      in    .Ni   ,\    \'.l  I (cr 

aj'a  111  \\  rill     I'l  I  .'i|il  '  I'liiiiiiin   'it  111 

Wl-.lk   jiiui- 4c/' 

rf|iiiii  ,  III  -  I  iiiii|ii  jiiii  a-,  1  I  ii  il  .il  ,,,  ,jf)ii 
vi/,<--,  \'<-i  |il. llll  k^  anil  SliiMV  I'l-mi.  4'<'. 
aliaii'lun  l-Ilimli'  M;iii'l  .  ,  ,'  ,  ,  .\-;(, 
,iliiiiiili.iis      V'-i|'liiii  k  -     aii'l     "^ti.iiv 

I'oiiil }7'i 

|iiii|)i)M:s  I')  all;ii-k  <  liaili-lmi  .i;'iiiM    .|7'i 

..I  I U  fur  Sou  ill  ('an  lima 4,',-^ 

li-a\i-s    I.ii-ill,    'llll,     K  ll\  |illiiit   1  II     III 

1  niiiinaii'l J-  ( 

1'  I'liiis  I  In;  'I  I'  h:;!  Il  nl  lii     .iiiiiy p  5 

I'   I  I'll  Is    111  1    I '11  IS  i  111   1.1 1    (i.li  1-  .p'l 

ill  l.iili-  i  ol;.;.-iiii/,it  lull   '.I    III-  r\|.i  ill 

lion ivi   1 

i\  ii-iii(i.ri  I  il  liy  ( .1-11,  I'.iiii  i-iiii ,  .  .  .  41)5 

<:a|iluii      (  liaili't'iii 41^7 

is^in      a  latal  |iroi  laiii.il  mn 4i(- 

rc|ii>iK  iIk;  .suliiiiis^iKii  111  (  aluliiia  .  4i).'* 

rcluriis  ill  ciiiifiiliiii  f  |ii  .N'l-w  \'iirk.  eoi 
fiiiii-i    (.III.    Kiiy|ihaiis(ii     in     New 

Jcrvi-y ciKi 

irnaili-s  \vw  |rr'-.i-v (ii'l 

a'ivain  '■-.  iipiiii  S|iiiiij;lii  M cji 

ri-|i'i:ts  11'-  1(1  Ins  liiliin"  |iiuns 5112 


I     'ilM-.k.M,     l,M)l..\. 


<  liiiliiii,  ^ir  111  my, '.lulls  lii.-iM:ii  I,   .New- 

|."ii.  I:,  I I'M 

al,,iii'|iiii  .  till    r-iiiii-ilii  lull i.(i-( 

I  II'!  ,  I  111'!  <  1'  iiiiaiiii-    I  ,,i    |-  .lyi-lir'  . 

nil. I  k   I'liii  l.inial  inn      -■  ..| 

111  i'lill.lli   ,     'A  llll      Allinlil      I'll      W  1    ,1 

I''  ml ri.i; 

|i-|-illl'     1')    l.illil     I  .1-1111,11111-     .\l  linlll's 

I'i-iii     5'." 

■  i-ml  ,  ,\iiilii-  11)  1  Id  (    :i  1  niili.irl    .  ,  ,     c(,c 

II  |l')ll         11.    I  ,')ll|    I  II    lIliilllH      killnii-    1.1 

llll   I'lilll ■'^, 

ill  ■  liiii  •      In     I  ,xi  liaii;,'i-     .\t  1(1. Ill     li.i 

,\i..|ii z,^, 

111 .  11  l.iliDii  ,  I'l  llll  |;i  ill  li  I  iiliim  (, 
1 7-'       ■  ■    -     'Y. 

Willi-  l,i||i|      <   .1    Illl.lllH-       il  -,       I'l      .ll/l 

mill  iiu c  (.-s 

J, 1,1'  1        "-inn  111-     .iii'l     I  III. I'l, I       ;•.  I'li 

.'\iii"lii  >■  f 

\Miii       I  11  11.    riiilli|.,    I')    ai'l    I  uiii- 

w.ili:     c(,7 

sii;;;;  I  ;i  iiiii\  i-  a-aiii  I  I 'li  iI.hIi  l| -Imi  r(.- 
■iWili  I  ,iii'l  I  ii  niiiimi  ,1  '.)i|i'  ,.Mii\  1:  - - 
.V  nil-    '  .1  II,  riiilii],  ,  a     In  lln-  \I  I'Llii- 

-■liiii ,  ,     c  -1) 

a;',iiiii  I'l'ipiiM       riiil.i'li  l|.lii,i   a     tin- 

•ilij'  '  II.'' "^'l'' 

iliipr  I    1'.  '   "lliw  iilli  .         =',7 

ill  II'  ii-iii   111     ll.ili  f'.n    --kill i^iy') 

liiaki  ■    -111  I   ,1  ima'i    nl     I  .,t    \  ,i\i  lii 

iiiiir.       ,  .       '.I.' 

i;lili  1  ^  '   'illiwalli  ,  111     i-iiil    linii|. ,   III 

.\i-«    \i.ik    '.',- 

his  |.l:iii  a;.,.iiii-l   l'iiilai|i-l|.liia 'k/i 

I  ,  n  iiil'.i'  111  II I.ii'j'l.iiicl         '.1.7 

lull  I  11-      I  ln.)|i      llnlli    \   li;.||ila I.irt, 

(  llll  k         Ilii.M  liii-lil      1.1       l|..ii|,        llnlM 

\  ll;'llll,l I.  |. 

Ills    I  111  II-    linli'li-lli  1     Willi    (    i.lim.illl, 

IinlH  '•'! '.I'l 

S'-||.|s  ill    |..il'  111-      In  I   'illiWiilll 'i-Ji. 

ri  iiiiki-    I  1. 11. v., llll     '.L'l 

H 1  111        ilia!     \\',i   liiii-'lnii     lia       '"iiii- 

Sniiili     ,  ,  .    (,:'\ 

will  ...III  •  nlliwalll  -,  ...111  il  -  |.'l  ilili-  'i-J  I 
si  I. lis   ,\li|..|.l   In  '    . .11111  1  111  111 I,\!-    '. 

III  11  l.illnli      In  .Xllinl'l '.-jr     (, 

Sl.lli-       111  .     pklll    In    -III  1  111    \  nil   'nw  II, 

(  Il  I,     C (,y^ 

I'X|.l-'  Is    In     II  ,r.i     (  )i  I,    II!,    17-1      ,   ,   .  ,  '.(7 

II  ill  111  lln-  I  In  ,,i|,i  ,il,i  H...  I.ili-  .  .  ,  ',)-j 
Ills  I  iiiliai  1,1  iiniii  •  I'  '  i.^'n  /'  'I  ,  ,  '.  1  1 
I     ii-lii  V(  i|   1,\    "-.ii   (  iiiv  '    nil  lull     .  .  ,  Cic'i 

llll   v    'In   '//)  <.i-iii,,  I.I  Inn     '.Inm  1    111,    (ijli 
.i,ililii.ii     .i^;iiiir-l    '.Hill     lliil.iiii    (niiiii- 

il.iiin     ,  ,' "^'-i/    *"' 

'ill  I   lilll,  (  'n|   ,(,////,!    Ill  1  lljili->     l-nll     l,i|- 

A'illil (C  I 

m  iiiali,  ,\l,li  ,    '-nil. I  I   1        !||.     (  lii..iii|,i);ii 

llnliali      I'.'i 

111  liiaii,  ,\I:i|,,  i/Ji.)  lillii^Js  ilis])ati  li(;s  In 

'  Miiiwallis '117 

/',  al    S'liiktnwii (14  i 

nlliii,  '  ii|ii  ,  'A'. )     kiMiiiln-     al    j-.iii,iw 

Spiiii;;'* ';7- 

ulliiirii,     l.ii-iil    '  111,,  (//«/.)  ,<'     al    liri.- 

n. ail's   I' ill  111 \.['J 


SH 


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CIII'iiNi  )!.•  )(,;i  ■  \l.      \\l)     M.M.KAl.     I\l«!,,\. 


G75 


(!olleM,   W  il|::irM,  r:i|it.    S,  (j.    lro'.|. 17'^ 

' '"lli-'t,  l:<  ii),iii,ih,  I  .i|.i    '^  < '.  ii'ii.|,  .    .  171^ 

<    '.IImi,    S;r     (  iiMlj'i-,   .11. 1  ,    U,    liill'i     l|')i,|    , 

.11    I  .'iii;;  I   l:iii'l 'J'") 

■•    1,111. Ilr       IIm     I'lll  ••    |.lli'|i-'l     ;.".■. 

1  ''li'.,   ■,       l,.,.,|,  ,     up     ll,.'    I  lll'l    UN.   .  .   .  1'.'. 

;i' I  .ini|.  i!M'      Hiv;i   i-iii  '  i(  '  iiiiiH  1  1 1'    1'  I'.- 

i'|)iiri     'li    iihi  ti'.ii  ci(    N'ir«:ilK  .  .  .  .  171 

I' li- V  •!  i.\  .\'liiiii:il  Arliiiiliii'ii .  .  .  .  i;'- 

I   'il'in  Kil   u  .1)1.1 11     h.r.  il .  :mIv,im1.i,'i- ..  .  .  .  '.r 

'   "I'lll'  I,  :i      '^'1. I'll. I     111    llii-   liiih  .ji  .iiiir.  171 

'    "il.   '     li'l     ,li    IliHll.  1    Mill ',  M', 

'    ''Ii|illl',lili,    A'l|.    (///./    v.'.  :il     l.;ii|l.      1.1 

<,uill..i'l -I.:: 

'    ■illlHIl  .    I'llil'l        (.////)     SI- II I     I'll    .lIKl'la  .   .  I   ■  - 

.ill'.  I   '■  I'.  .il,.ih'l'iii  I    III  I'l.i 11," 

Ml'  '  I    <i'  111     .lll'l   .\'l'iili:il    ll'uvr.  .     .  JJ  1 

iiii.ni';'       Ml  iiii'l'-i  III    (  (/riiu.illi ,.     .  ''|l 

ll|,iil  ,1'     |.,i    I..-..I.1- ,  .  .  l,-h 

(..Kiiinnllii-    'it,   I'lililii    S.ifiiy    :i|)|ii>iiiii 'I 

i,y    M.i     .11  III!  'II    'I 

Ml|l|.l|i       .■1|,|,.,|||||-||    i,\     \I;i   .    .11  hll  .'   II  I'l 

I'lililii    "i.iliiy  vul'     iiiiliiii',     ii|i|.li'   ,  I'l 

'  'iir'ii-    -    IN'-'  I     1.1. I'l    l|...\' jj  i 

'  '.n  •!.     .,  VI   il   \'.il|.  \    |-'.i;;i- I'l} 

'   '.iiL'.i''       '..111'  I    '.I  nil   \\  .1   liiii;'i'.ii     .  I'/i) 

s.il.iy    I'.r   ~"iiii|i  I  .ii'.lih.i   11. mil 'I,  .  17', 
ijliiiii'.i'   I  ..I  .'.■    .1,1.)    'I'dii'-,   :i|i|.lii-,    I.. 

:-'  '"         ■:\' 

,'.<l|i|ll'.ll  .,    II'. 11, 1-    III,   i/ll     llll|.|iiS  Mil  111     '.I 

.111  M    1.11  I'    , 17.; 

;ijll(..I\i-     '.I'ii-t      ',1     li.lllli;      (~iri-   <  )l'ii.|      III 

I;. mil   I 'i^     - 

Jiilii  '-hi  M.      ill, 'I    ■luiri/i-lil      llljr,    .|i-|llii  'I  -■ 
>.)iii  ili.U'.iy  I. ill      III!  lie    iiiuliiiy  III   iJiil- 

I   11  .iiiin  ,  .  .  .       l"t 

"ll'  'il'l     .1   itllil    11   ai.'l    ll  .     ir     ,1111    II 

>)iii,'.i'|i      I..,,    (ll;.  ll'-,  l/iiiit;..   ilu|iaii.)ii- . 

(I'lin    I  >.    I,i.-i   ,1- f.-^l 

'dM'Ihi'iii  'll  1  .11-. II   I'll  1 1  ill  II  111   1710 5:^7 

'iii'lil  I'lll     u|.'.ii    .%liii  ll  llii-  '.\;ii  1)1  1775 

'7-^i  "|.'-ii"l -2 

'Hill 'li-iiii.'   '  III  ii-iH  y  ill    ill  I'lUiil 4'ij 

'iMili'li-i;i'i...ii,  Aiiu,li- ,  a'lii|.iiil '■■)'> 

iiiifiisiiiri  i)f  Airier  Iroops  :ii  ( ':iiii'liii  ^17 

Hiilisli  liDDps  ill  I'.iiliiw  S|)iiiit's..  1:72 

Sijmh  liiiK^s  iiM.iVdiiiahIc     '153 

C'jii;;i<-% ,   .1-11  (Is  1 1  mi  111  III  i-i-  in  <  iiiiil'i  jili^r.  IJ  I 

ill  1  I  inns  i)|,ii.il  I'lll  .  :i|4iiiii  ,1  '  .iini<l.i-  I  2'. 

SIMIlIsi  nillllllllil    iDMllCt  Wil  .111  11^(1111.  I  J  ) 

|ir(i|ii)sis  In  (iniili.y  Imliiuis. 1  s  1 

rciiifidxx'i  tin:  army  111   <  iin.i'l.i      .  .  I'/j 
assign,    I3,8<XJ   iiiiiilia   in    IIm-    .niny 

at   .\i:w  York 1 1^.') 

(Ifdiii-,  lri:av)ii I7'5 

|mb]i  li's   (ii-iij.    l|i)Wi-'s    jiini  laiMii 

'i"ii '')i 

aull|iiri/.Ci  riL,'lily  (ivc    ri';.;iiii(.'iils   lur 

live  y.  .11 222 

leaves   in  \ViislMii(.;l')ii    t!u:  |)i)iity  ni 

New    S'nrk 22, ) 

SUsliinis    Si  liiiy|i-r    111    lln-    N'li  1  In-i  11 

f  lipiii  1  iii'iii    2S5 

coiilri  ^  l.ii^;i   |)i)WcTs  nil  VV.islnnj'i'in.  2')  ( 

linlilsils   sc  .sinli    al   li.illimmi: 2'i'j 

cMilarin's  hntli  army  and  iiiiilinrily  nl 

W  ii.hinjjlnn ;iin 

a'li'jiirii     I'l  l.iiniM.iii    iiii'l  \  ni  k  .  .  .  ;pi 


fMtn 

'  nn^;.'!--.  iiiilliiiM/i   .  1  iiil    I'd  nnliii.i         ..  .yn 

•  I"  '  Inn  ,  !■  I  I  i.i.li  1   '.v    (.  '  !•  Ill     I  1  •    ,  (Il'l 

lixii  ilii'   iiiiiiy  ill    i-ij;lily  l).illiilini|.  ,  4^13 

)im|i.ii  .  Ill  W.i  iinii',lnii  .  \  11 '  11'   . ,  .  .  .  j-t'y 

in'Ini   Ti   I  mill  iniiiM.il   nl    .XiiuiM    .  .(iji, 

i'|ii.ili/i-   lln:    |.,iy  nl    lliiiiiiny |y> 

.i|'|i')i!il       '  i.ili- ,     In    Mjii'lii  I II     I'liri- 

111. Ill  I ji;2 

iii'l'i>  I'l-iin  ylvani.i   ii'i'i|(     milli.  -, -,  ( 

.11111  1  'n  ill      U|i|i'iii  .    llii-  u  .u .  Hj 

nnliliii  ;;ii:illy  iclu'  1  ■! 221 

I  i'.'i|. .    Ill    nniliny \)i 

.111.1  I. In  Ml     I'.uni,    VI  .iif!     Iiv     Uniiii 

"■"■]■■   : ; \'n 

.11   1. 1 1.1'  V  111    I  lynii  (  nun IV,  .\i  u   Vnil  , 

■■■ ' -17  ^ 

.11  .'  n  II'  I'lll  ,      <i  iii|.|i  1     il  .     In     1.1  ill  III" 

iiriii 2'*-, 

'll   '  1  i|ii     >    iiin  'll    I  i.nn  '       I  ( 

.1.  .Ili'lll'ill     ii'|i;|,l.  'I      In     l.iki-     I  II'  I  t      III 

.Nil.'  mil'  I     ... j(ji 

.iilni'iil.il      iiiinii-^     i|.ui"|.i)     jnVDJvi- 

^ni  nil  u.i  .1.: 20 

ml  i  mil  1.1 1  '  niijni- .,  nn  '  I    ,  wilh  |.nwii  , 

.1     iii'-'l .  .  17 

III!  inM  1    V  il  ,    In    I'liiii.un    ini'l    I'n   ,•  nil 


I'll' 


'H  't 


n.v.iy,    llii;;     I  1'  11.,     Iiii'li    ii'h.inii-    iil 

I  .'  im.iiii'iA  II        .  .  ^•',7 

I  1 1 1.1 1,  111'  I'll  111  illy  nniiii'iiii'l 51^7 

111  I'll     In  .|ii     I'll   <  11  III  i.il  .  .  . (ijH 

.1111.1/,'. Ill  1 1'    t'.  W  ,1  Iniij'.i'in ji^-S 

.1     i;;ii''ll..l   iih.i'lii  iiii'l'i   I.il  liiyiilli;  y  a 

I'    r.'ii     iiii'l  ;".'■     I')  r  I  iin  I \ii\ 

'   nir,\.n  ,   1 .11.111.  I  A'/    )  1  \'  li.iii;"  'I  .        .  .  .  ((ji 
I'  I". It  ,    lln-     ,i|'  ii;.ili  '.I    III.-     I  |i  111  ll 

ll"  I       ' »ijl 

I  "ir.'  .\    'ml'  I  'll    ly.iUli  .      (^11;    liMj'i.im. 

I   Im|,.   .\  I,;  .lll'l ,...'...  .'1'.   H 

•   '  'jI.'  .    (i;Mmi;nl  .il    lli  in;  ^  I  |i  ij'lns WJ 

'   "1  lull ,   I  li'.in.i   ,  iiiiii.  I  |.l  ,  IIii'i  ,li  niitii  I  7.'4 

I   ni|iii.i\,  ill-   .\!.,  |,l.iii,    im  T  i|i|.iiv>      .  j12 
'   'iiliilli.    Ml    .i-.i).|ii,    |.-|.ii   ,1  111  .    .1    j'nnil 

"■'"■'I ■'■  ••  ^^ 

'  "1"  .     In  111.    t/h.j     li.    ill     lil.n.k.ini.k'i 

I'l.iniiil  I'm ...  c;22 

'   'nil'  11,      l-./.-k.,       ,ii.Mi  .     )nnli.,l      ii;..iinit 

I'l-  '"";:• • >53 

'.nnriv.illi   ,  liiilirn.k,  ii   Lnnnninary  nl 

I  .\'  liaia',1: 555 

<  ninwiilli .,    I  liiili- ,,    l'..iii,    l.n-iil.    I  n-ii,, 

.tih,    I  inv.    (jiii.  I  ii'h.i,  /.    17  j-,,  1/. 

1-1.5. 

s.iiK  Inr  .\miTii  il,  IiIj.,  177') 173 

l.iii'l  .  .ll    \S  ilinni^^lnii,   .\.  I 175 

.n  1 ',ni|..iiin,:s  I  linl'jii  In  <  .liiuli:,lnn  .  175 

iiiines  ill   Nl-w  V'nik  III  Ail;;iisl.  ...  1 1^5 
Mi'iVL'S  Willi   liriliili   Kisirvi-  In  I'iiil- 

1)11  .ll 2'JI  -2 

dell  all  I.nid  Sliilni;4  inai  I  'iilclyni 

I  I'lll  .)■      .  . 211) 

l.iii'U  nil   .N<iW  V'nik  Isl.inil .  .  225 

j'lini  ill!' a..iaiill  nl   I'nil  Wii  ,liini;lnii  I'^t, 

ill  l.iyiil  l)y  llnwn  ut  JJriiniwn  k.  .  .  .  2i;7 

(:ii|)|ili  <l  liy  ilniM;\  nnli.i ., 25^ 

tin  iimps  al  riiiniiit;lnii 25*) 

^ivi'i     ii{)    Iciiv     ')l     .ili.iniii-,    iilii-r 

Tlilllnli 2H,| 


; 


-1!  '\ 


it. 


676 


CIIRONOI.dCJK  AI,    ANI»    (.INlkAI.     lNlii:\, 


Cornwallis,  h-miiucs  coni'iiniid   of  a   di- 

visimi     .• 2S4 

^l<lllni^lll•^  near  'riciiloii 2S5 

iii.irtlR^  aj;,iinst  W  .i^liiiij^tuii 285 

oiiliiuiiiuiivrt'il  at  llic  Assaii|iiiik    ..  2i)ii 

rf{;aii:s  New   limiisu  icl< 2i)l 

cii};.ij;i's  Stirling  ncai  Woodljridgc .  ;ii'l 

Willi  IIdwc  al  rliaddV  I'linl ^(\■; 

iiiaKts     .1     liiil'iaiil     iiidvc     011     iIk' 

liraiidvu  nil' ...  i;!! 

|HliMics  \\  asliiiinluii  to  ( .lit^trr.  .  .  .  3>-2 

Cllt^■r^  I'liiladi'lpliia ,•^^4 

joins  lliiucal  (ifiniaiitowii 3S6 

at  l!diiiit;-i)iiii,  ,\.  J 31/) 

skirniislirs    wiili     .Mcuj^an    at    K<Il;o 

lldl y,: 

j'>iii.s  Kiiyi'liaii'-fii  at  (lu'-laut  lldl.  ;vi7 

at  Allen tou  11,(7;  >tii(fi'  fur  MminKuilii.  411 

rcaclu's  New  York  uiili  Clinton  .  .  .  440 

makes  an  iiuuision  into  New  Jer.scy  45') 

-.villi  t'lintoii  hcforc  Charlc-tnn.  .  .  .  4cj() 
sutc'i'cds      Clinton  ;      inanlics      lo 

Camden 51 1 

ri^lilly  appieei.ites  (  ieii.  dates  ....  513 
repoil^  tlie  battle  of  Camden.  .  .    515-II1 

invadi  ^  .\orlli  Carolina 514 

skiniii^lies  at  Cliailcilte 5I() 

at  \\  illll^llol■ollL;h.  .•>.  C 521 

hi.s  mardi  tiilieised  by   Tailcton.  .  .  521 

his  position,  Jan.,  l/JSi 535 

error  as  to  restored  lintisli  anlliority  530 

plans  lo  strike  Mnii;aii  and  (lieenc  541 

marches  up  the  Catawba 541 

.sends  Tarletnn  to  strike  Mciryaii...  5)2 

wails  for  Leslie  at   Turkey  Creek  .  .  542 

is  too  late  to  eiit  off  .Mor^jan's  retreat  542 

reports  the  b.itlle  of  Cow  pons 545 

is  eiitiei>ed  by    Tarlelon ^.J^ 

arrives  at  Ranisoiir's  Mills 545 

burns     his     surplus     l)a(;j;aye     and 

\vai.;'Mis ^  \ii 

pursues  Mor_i;aii  across  the  Catawba  5411 
e.xpl.uiis   second    invasion  of  North 

Carolina 5^0 

Sitates  his  opinion  of  Cuwpens  .....  551 

fails  to  iiMb/e  the  support  expected.  551 

is  stojiped  at  the  river  \adkin 551 

Slops  at  S.ili-bury  'our  ilays 552 

burns  addilinnal  ba!.;L;ai;e 552 

is  slo[)ped  at  the  river  Dan 552 

marilies  toward  S.ilcm 552 

writes  to  Lord  (jerniaine ^52 

retires  to  Hillsborough 554 

his  commissary  (Sleilman)  exidains.  554 

crosses  the  Haw  and  .Mlamance.  .  .  554 

marches  toward  (iinllord 556 

fli;hts  the  baitle  o(  tiuilloid 556 

saves  the  liattle  by  artillery 561 

makes  a  narrow  personal  escape.  .  .  563 

declines  to  pursue  I  H\!ene 5(14 

retires  to  Wilinin^ion 5fi5 

jjives  the  streiit;th  of  his  army s^'S 

communicates  his  jilans  to  CHnton.  jbd 

vindicalis  his  position 5')() 

writes  to  Lord  ( ierin.iine 5(17 

is  sustained  by  Loid  (iermaiiie  ....  f'lj 

exiihiins  his  situalii.n 5'is 

marches  lor  Virginia 5O1J 


"AOI 

t'ornwallis,  directs  (icn.  Phillips  to  join 

,il    I'elirsburj; c;(ii) 

is  leiiitorced  l>y  Cen.  Leslie f,<)e 

will  dislndj;e  La  Layette  fioni  Kieli- 

nii'iid 5()c; 

st.ites  the  "horrid  eiioiniities  of  our 

{/>>:)  piivateers  " 51^5 

yives  Arnokl   leave   to   jjo    to    New 

\  iirk 51^5 

states  his  plan  i<\  cani|iaign 5()S 

reali/cs  his  pnsition 5c)f> 

jiiins  Taileton    and    .Sinude    al     Llk 

Kill (i(i2 

l^ives  a  for.ii;iiij;  luder  to  'rarielon.  .    (i(,i2 

retires  to  \\  esthain (103 

retires  to  W  illianisbur^ 004 

en^aj^es  I'.utier  in  a  biisk  action  .    .    604 

li};hts  the  battle  of  Jamestown Oon 

retires  to  I'lirtsiinnuli (kk) 

correspimdence  with  Clinton  no'iced  (>H) 

reaches  \'iiikto\\  n 611 

reconnoitres  La  I'ayette's  position  .    613 

advises  t  linton  of  his  peril 631 

reconiuitres  \V;isliiiij;ton's  podtion.    632 

reports  to  Clinton  the  (acts (133 

withdraws  his  advance  detachineiils  (134 
is  unjustly  criticised  by  'laileton.  .  .    (134 

is  eiKouia};ed  by  Clinton (137 

reports  proi^ress  of  the  sieL;e (<^S 

advises  (..'liiitoii  to  lake  no  risks  .  .  .    (131^ 

makes  sorties  wilhoiit  belielit (140 

attempts  to  escape  to  (.louccsler.  .  .    (J411 
reports  his  purpose  to  surreiuler  .  .  .    ()40 

writes  to  \Vashin14ton f)4l 

si^iis  Articles  of  c.i])itulation     (141 

coniplimeiits  the   strategy  of  Wash- 
ington     642 

ackiiowlctlj^es  ciiiir     ies  received  .  .    ()43 
fully  vindicated  b)      ,e  fads 644 

(oiyell    l-'erry  guaided    111   177O  by  Lord 

.Stirling;   2(14 

Council  of  War  (.liu.)  as  to  iJunker  Hill     93 
called      by     Arnokl     on     ni.irch     lo 

(^hiebee 1 23 

bclore  (Quebec 163 

at  .Sorel  in  ('anada I  Ob 

as  to  retreat  from  Jirooklyii 216 

as  to  retreat  from  New  \'oik 224 

as  to  North  river  defenses 237 

retains  I'ort  Washinj^ton 237 

as  to  ofteiisive  policy 242 

as  to  defense  of  I'lcondero^a 311 

convened  by  WasliinL;loii 3(15 

decides  to  c.oss  the  liraiiuywiiie.  .  .    3()() 

as  to  future  movements 40S 

advises  a  defensive  jiolicy 40() 

before     Savannah 411; 

Court  of  Inipiiry  as  to  panic   in  I'ars'^n's 

i)iij;ade 220 

vindic.ites  .Scliu\  ler 312 

Court-mailial,  as  to  Arnold  ^ie|irimatKt).  490 
as  to  Lee  (susjiension) 445 

Cowardice  of  coinm.iiuler  al   the  Cedars.   l()(i 
rebuked  by  Was'iniL;ion 147 

(.'owpeiis,  lialtl'e   described 542 

Crainahe,  Lieut.,  (jovernor  of  (^)iieliec  ..    I  30 

I  raiie,  I  lliser,   I\e\.    M.   I  1..  .Moiristouii, 

N.    1 2 


CIIRUVDLOGICAI.    AM)    GK.NKKAl.    LN'bKX. 


6;; 


-nam 

|iini 

M..) 

"■-'»? 

ah- 

5"? 

Olll 

5'.*5 

Kew 

5V5 

SO** 

■;.)« 

i;ik 

.  ■  • . 

(i()2 

ill. . 

(i02 

(103 

604 

.  . 

fli)4 

Oo.S 

()(iy 

iccil 

610 

611 

111!    . 

613 

6;u 

11)11. 

632 

('33 

flll> 

('34 

1 .  ,  . 

(.34 

('37 

(.3S 

('3'> 

040 

1  .  .  . 

640 

■  .  .  . 

(140 

641 

(,4r 

a.ii- 

642 

-d  .  . 

('43 

644 

1(13 
216 

224 
237 

'-:37 

010 

311 

3('5 
3()() 
408 
4U() 
4  "J 


54'-: 
13" 

2 


Crimean  war   illu.strates  an  excei)titmal 

alli^MC. '. 7,j 

trodict.     Slx-   onltT.s  <if  hatllc- ami  (lia- 

.  k'rani f,5„s 

Cromiic,  M.ij.  /(•.  ai  Kinij's  Mouiiiain.  .  .    520 
Cromwell,  uiivcr.  Lord  I'lotector  ol  Kiij;- 
ianil,  /i.  i^t)i),  d.  1659. 

the  iiitiTn.-t,'nuin  noticcii s 

Cro.sswick'.^    hridyc   r'liaiicd   by    l!rili>li 

troops,  I)fc.   17  C) 2(14 

Crown  rouil  cvaeuatLHl  by  (.fill.  Carlc- 

Itiii  (Ih:) 2^3 

cvaciialcil  by  Cleiil.  (latcs  (.7///.)...    11)5 
Cruder,  1,1.  Col.,  (/,',.)  ai  Smibury,  Ga.    47,-< 

at  Eutaw  Springs ' 57s 

Crusaders,    defied    social     and    national 

riylils 2- 

Cunniiij^liam,    .Maj.,  joins   Morgan 541 

at  liaille  of  Cowjiens 543 


De  Kstain;-,  Charles  Hector,  Count,  (Z';-.! 
Lieut,  (ieiil.,  /;,    1729,  ,/.   i  7,j4. 
readies  (he   Delaware  with   I'rench 


Heet. 


44  f' 


D. 

Dauckti,  \aphtali,  Rev.  \1.\^.sub.  I'res. 
\'aie  Col.  //.  1727,  (/.  17S0. 
/m.  at    New    Haven,  harshly  treat- 
ed   ' 

Jtaiibuiy,      (01111.,     invaded      by     Civ. 
i'rvnii 


470 


)1 


5"! 


Dartmouth,  Lord  (;eort;e,/'.  1648,,/.  1691 

Ids  opinion  of  the  war .82-3 

I'mposes  a  southern  c.\]ie(litioii.  ...    150 
object'-  to  lioston  as  a  base  of  opera- 

l'""-* 155 

.Javidson,  William,  lirig.  Geul.  (Am.)  b. 
I74(^'.  "'•  1 78 1, 
joins    Mor^raii ^^.^ 

is  k\  at  McCowan's  Kord 551 

Davis,  Col.,   ;   '../.),   capliires    anils    and 

hiMsi-s  ai   A'aliab's  I'laiilatinii.  .  .  .    518 
D.ni-,    Maj.,    iiol    ies    SiiiiUer   of    C.ites 

dile.u 

Davis,  ('apt.,  (./w.i  at  ilaule  of   .'^iiriiic- 

heid ...r. 

Hawsoii,   Henry    15.,  (iii..,ioricai   student 
and  writer) 

faithful  as  a  historian 333 

gives  account    of   Arnold    at    free- 
man'-. I'arin 342 

as    to     I'lattle     of     King's     Moun- 
tain      521 

Day,  Henry,  i:s(p,  lawyer.  New  \ork.  .  .        2 
D.rylon,  fdias.  Col.,  h.  '1735,  ,/.  1807. 

at  the  battle  near   I'^lizabelhtow^i .  .    .^y^ 

De.iii,  Silas,  on  naval  committee 144 

<iintracls  willi  toreigii  olficers (k; 

Dearborn,  Henry,  \\\\,\sul).  M.ij.  (;eii!. ) 
/'.  1 75 1,  ,/.  I8.>,,. 

at  liattle  of  liemis  Height- 347 

Deborre,  IJrig.  Cenl.  altempls  the  posts 

at    Staten    Island 3f)6 

<lisgraoed   at    ISrandywiiie 377 

De    iiose,    part    of   the  re^;!.    at    Iuit;uv 

Sjirings 5S2 

Dedaration  of  Indepeinlence  dated  July 

4th,    177(' 160 

Declaration  of  hidependence  adopted  by 

States '.    1,^5 


sails  at  once  for  New  \r,\V (4(1 

uiiabli;   to  cross  tlu)  bar ^47 

arrives  at   Newport  K.  I \\\   ^.p, 

consults  Sullivan  as  lo  attack.  .  . . !  450 
not  i,ffeiided  by  Sullivan'^  landing.  450 
is  confronted  liy  Ibilish  fleet  .....  450 
liolh  ileets  disabled  and  dispersed.  451 
returns    to   Newport    to    collect    hi, 

ships ,_., 

noble  letter  to  Sullivan ^':^2 

his  dejiarture  brings  a  pnitest 453 

sails  tor  lioston  to  relit 45-3 

offers  to  light  his  land  forces.  .....   453 

fully  vindicated  in  his  course.  .  .  .   452-^3 

A(hiiiral  Howe  ajipear,  off  Boston.  455 
is  Ihrealened  by  .\diiiir.i!  I'.yroii  bc- 

f>re    lioston ' jc- 

sails  for  West   Indies .   455 

appears  oK  the  coast  of  Georgia.  .  .  477 
Minimons  Savannah   to  surrencler.  .    47)) 

leads  an   assaulting  column j^-^\ 

is  twice  wounded i>,i 

reluiiis    to     !•' ranee 4«i3 

1  'efeiise,   Liiu-  of r/. 

Defensive,  (/ii,isi,  and  double  lines  of.le- 

/fii^i;. 56 

with  ollen->i\c'   leliuii 51 

policy  of  Washingloii    223 

De  Fernioy,  Roche,   IJrig.   (..eid.  on   the 

I  )elaware 26.1 

at    Ticonderoga,  , .  , \ii 

De    Fleury,  Loui-,  (/■>-.)   j,r   Kleurv  De. 
De   Gall,  lirig.  Genl.  (/ir.)  at  liattle  of 

liemis    Heights 345 

De    Grasse,    francois   Jo.seph    I'.ud.     /; 
1723,,/.  17S8. 

arrives   in   the  Chesapeake f,i2 

apjiroves  the  ac  Ion  of  La  Layette.  .   613 
engages  ihe  lleet  of  Admiral  (jr.ives.  ()I5 

is   visited  by   W.is'iiiigioii (,{^ 

proposes  to  leave  the  (Jlus  ipe.d^e  .  .  (135 
conform^    In    jadgiiieiit   nl    iiiibtarv 

."'^■" ■'■•■ '.    f'V-. 

signs  capitulation  of  \orktovvii  ,,..   041 

is  honored  by  (.'ongress (,,4 

leaves  the  American  coast 5^  j 

De  ILut,  Col.,   gives  notice  of  reeiilist. 

ments 2"() 

De  Haa-,  appointed  lirig.  (\<:\\ 2c/) 

De    Ilei^ter,    Lieut.    Gen.,    a-.>igned    to 

service  in  .Vmeric.i 173 

arrives  .it  ( iravesenil ii>,) 

lands  en  Long  Island , 200 

occupies  a  po,itioii  before  Flatlnnh  202 
captures  .Maj.  (ien.  Lord  Stirling  .  .  210 
traiislers     his     command     to     New 

Rodielle 2,5 

adv.iiices  lo  \\  liiie  Plains. j  j- 

De    Kalb,  Jiaroii,   .Maj.   ^\c\\.,  b.  1732,./, 
1780. 

Inspector  Gen.  tviv  ('miwav 3c)n 

assigned  to  expedition  lo  Gaiiada.  .    402 

sent  to  .Si)uiherii  dep.ulinent 491 

inarches  to  IlilUborough,  S.  C scx) 


!|- 


i 


\    \ 


m 


if»* 


hi'' 


'm 


6;  8 


CIll.i  iNOI.oiiKAl,    AN 


De  K  .ib,  li.uuii,   Nhij.  (n'll.,  laiiieiit-.   llif 

iillu  illlio  nl  Ills  jpD^ilicui 501) 

al  Mi)iiisti)\vii,  N.  I.,  April  16,  1780  50(1 

.11  liiitr.ild  I'did.  July  (),  l7->o ;o<) 

jniiiiil  liy  (liii.  (I;i'f^,  |iily  25,  lySd  5c") 
lii^  ailvici'  iR'i^lctli'd  liy  (icn.  li.ili's.    5111 

^;all,iii;  cmikIiu';  at  i 'ami Ion 51? 

iiuirlally  woinnlfd  at  Cannlcii ^1'^ 

iciiu'iiihcicil (15;; 

licluiiccy,  I'iiil;,  (ii'ii.,  ciiL;aiiizfs   a   t>at- 

talinii  ol'  lii\ali-i^ li|>i 

dliciiiif,  in  \Vi.-sic-|n.'--U'f  ('(uinly  .  ..   i>iii 

Adj.  (irn.  rviv  Maj.  Aiulif (ui) 

I  i(.d.il(iin.iii',  M.,  oflL'is  to  soctiiv  t^il;al^■^ 

for  \\  a~liini;toii -Iiil' 

I  iflawarc  ii\cr  MniiaN-.,ibU-,  Ironi  ii.c  .  .  .    -"|; 
iib>lnicli.'<l  liy  ihcvaiix  dc  fii>t'  ...    .Vi.( 
1  >cla\\aix'   iiiMi|)-i  nil  lu-arlv  cVLTV  l>atllo 

Hold ' .' |.n 

Dcmiin;,  C'a|it.  (/.'/■.)/(•.  at  Hhaltorliin  Hill   2\{ 
l)onniaik    and   Svvodon   unilo   In    [lolioy 

with  Catliaiino 527 

I  )o  I'cv.stcr,  Alir.diaiM,  (apt.,  at    KinL;'> 

Mountain -.^o 

l)e>lioiiiugli,  I  ioiit.,  70.  at  Monmouili..  .  4,(4 
I  )c.stouclies    >incoo<K    to    oimiinand    ol 

l''ioii'.li  rioot 5^4 

send-  M.   Tiilly  to  aid  La  I'ayoiie.  .    5^4 

saiK   or  the  (licsapoako (u  1 

in  will-lialaiiced  oiigagcnienl    with 

All  uthnot (iij 

De  Tenia.'  arrives  in  America 51'^ 

dic3,    and    succeeded    liy    .M.    Do.. 

touches ■;>4 

l)e   Trovillo,   t'apt.,   shows   j^alLintry   at 

lieaufori \ti.\ 

De  Tiott,  (//.)  Knsign,  i:  at  C.uilfonl  .  .  -.'<?■ 
houx  I'oiils,  t'liuiU  de,  7i'.  at  S'niklown .  (>'y) 
Dcvcns.  Ricli.ird.  Mass  Com  .Salctv,.  0 
Dictator  ri'comnicndcd  in  Pcnn.  in  1  776  2.S() 
Dictatorial  i)Owers  grante<l  \Vashini;tnn 

for  >ix  month-- 2S0 

Dickin.'-on,  John,  takes  an  interest  in  the 

war 86 

Dickinson,  I'liilemon,  Urig.  Gen.,  d.  1732, 
</.  1S08. 

operates  in  New  Jersey 404 

al  the  battle  of  ^Ionnlouth 433 

at  the  battle  of  Sprini;lield 501 

Dighy,  Admiral,  arrives  at  .New  York  .  .   635 
associ.iied     as    peace   commissioner 

H  ith  (ion.  Tarloton 640 

Dillon,    (ion,    oonimands    Franco-Irish 

brii^ade  bolore  Sav.innah 480 

Discipline  ainno  holds  nien  under  fire  .  .    I16 
j;ainod  the  lialtle  of  Hunker  I  lill.  1 13-I1) 

ol  the  .American  army 147 

of  the  lirili'-h  ;u'my 14(1,  513 

inculcated  by  the  war 647-8 

lends  to  avert  panics 653 

iJiscover),   the    handmaid    of    militaiy 

science iS 

Ditmas,  (apt.  (/>>.)  re.  al  .Monmouth.  .  .   444 

Diversions  illustialod 75 

Doniitini,  (apt.  i.l>/i.)  /•.  at  Savannah  .  .  4SJ 
Donop,  Col.  lilo^sianj  at  I.iuip  Island.  .    2ik) 

al  NoA   \  .irk  Island 22|; 

at  Chattorlon  Hill 23c; 


!•   l.i:.\i;kai,   im<i;.\. 

PAt.1 

l)onop,   ('ol.    (Hessian)  at    I'orl    W  ash- 

iin;l"ii -51 

advises  K.dil  to  fortify  'I 'onion.  ..  .  2711 

ab. unions   llorilonlown 27(1 

adviio  to  Coinu.dli^ 2.H(i 

al  ( iorm.inlown 386 

/'.  in  assault  on  I'ort  Mercer 31J4 

I 'ooUy,  Col.  [.I  III.)  in  skirmish  at  Kelllo 

(.'look 4(14 

llorchosler  Hoi^lus  occupied  by  Ameri- 
cans    152 

1  •orchoshr,     N.    ('.,    skirmish     in     1781 

(Moiuodi 575 

Dou^das,  I.okI, /(■.  al  ( lUillord 5(12 

I  lou^las'  bri^ide  in  Spenoor's* divi-.ion. .  221 
Drayton,  Win.  11.,  /'.  1742,  </.  1771). 

(hiif  Justice  of  S.  ('.,  177(1 l-'o 

oil  I  'om    S.'d'eiv,  S.  (' 179 

Du  Huson,  l.iout.  i.\i\..  f'lis   al  Caindon.  fl8 

Du  ('orp>  1  /''/.I  iot;imeiil  a  I  (lormanlown  386 
Dumas,    Mailiieu,   Count   do,  Col,,  .sii/>. 
marshal  deCamp,  and  historian, /'. 

1753.  '/•  1*^37- 

:.'.  in  assault  at  \  orklown 631) 

Dunda-,    l.ioul.   (ol.,    sent    In    \'iri;inia 

with  .\ino!d 548 

a    commissioner    at    surrrndor    of 

\'orklo\vn 641 

Dunliohm.  C.ipi.(./w)   -w.  al    Ilobkirk 

Hill ?73 

Dininioro,  Lord,  burns   Suffolk   and   de- 
mands troops I  3u 

arms  slaves 174 

l.d^os  rofu^o  on  the  Fowey  nutn-of- 

Nvar 86 

1  )u   I'los- is,  Chovalior,  oii^inoer 31)3 

on  <luly  with  La  Fayotle 3i)(> 

romoniboied (155 

Du    I'ortail,    Loboijue,    lirii;.   Cion.    (J-'y.) 

approves  Washington's  caution  ....   404 
uah    Southern    army;   ca])tured    at 

<  harleslon 527 

is   succeeded   as   engineer   by    Kos- 
ciusko      527 

aii]iroves  action  of  La  Fayette 613 

with.W  ashinijton  in  N.  J.,  1781  ...   620 
visits  I'ount  de  (^Irasse  with  Wash- 
ington    f>35 

ronionibored O55 

Duiiuesne,  Captain,  repulsed  at  Boones- 

borou^h,   Ky 460 

I  )urt;ess,  Col.,  at  battle  of  Monmouth  . .   434 

r. 

l-'.Asi'  Kivi-K  under  control  of  a  Uritish 

Hoot 232 

Eaton,  Willi.un,    Hrig.  (ienl.    at    liallle 

of  ( lUilford 556 

Fchelon,seo(  )rderof  battle  and  diagram.  66-8 
Education   involves  preparation   for  full 

duty  as  a  citizen 15 

EfTingham,  Lord,  gives  an  opinion  of  the 

war S3 

Elberl,  U:ig.  (ionl.  at   'I'ybee  Island...   460 

f>ns.  at   Drier  Creek 464 

Eldridge,  Edward,  commissioner  to  meet 

Lord  Howe,  I -,76 223 


Bl 


FACI 

sl>. 

.  .   ;'5i 

. .  .   JT'' 

.  ..    1!7<' 
.  .  .    2*(' 

. .  .   3*50 
.  .  ■   3'J4 

tile 

. . .    464 
cri- 
. . .   I"; J 

TSi 

...    57? 

,  .  .     f<i2 
111..    '.'21 


.  .  •   f'3>^ 

ini.i 

■ ■■■    548 

(if 
. .    .   641 
kirk 

..••   573 
(Ic- 

.  .  .  .      I5L) 

..  174 

n-of- 
...     86 

. . .  :•>')} 

.  .  .    T)(> 
...    (155 

404 

...■  527 
Ki)s- 
..■•  527 
613 

1    .  .  .    ')20 

ash- 
..  f)35 
.  .  655 

.   460 
th  . .   434 


ilish 

.  .    232 
..illlc 

..   55^' 
mil.  66-8 
full 

....      15 
if  the 

..  S3 

.  .  46a 

.  .  4f>4 

meet 

223 


CIIKONOI.OIJIC.M.  AN 

l'.\C,l' 

Elit.ibotlilown     visitpil    by    I.ii'iit.    (mI. 

Ilu^liirk 4S; 

vr-ilfcl  l>y  llic   HiiiMi  armv \'i'i 

Ivlli'.lt  liciij.tiuiii,  Coin.  Palely,  .^.  C  .  .  .  17'i 
I'jiuiitk's  (iKi-siiirs,  attack    Inrl   Clin 

lull (;^ 

l-!iiiiiKii,    Dr.     rhiiiii.is   .\(l(lis    li;!-.   till' 

uivciuotv  inailo  at  'rii-onilfiiiL^a.  liw 
•■'iigl  uicl,   lu-r  L;l'iry    in    iier   iiiti'lliL;fm  o 

aiul   iii<lii>tiy '' 

lc)^l   110   real   ^iiny   in    tin'    N'ir^mia 

taiii|iaii;n 'ii  1 

KiifjiiK'i-r  ^urp-.  (il  1775-17^1 I'- 

F-Mj^iin'ciih)^   (K-lincd p 

luilistiiu'iils    of    ,\iiiL'ricaii     anny    inon' 

ll..  '1  half  ti)  cxiiiiv .'11 

I'lmii^,  Col.,  (/>',''.)  surprised  at  Miis',;iove's 

.Mill, '. ;i- 

I'.iio^,  l.ieiil.    Col.,    starts   viilh    .Vriinlii  - 

e\|n;ilitKiii 11' I 

lOrskiiie,  Sir  \Vii\.,  Urij;.  (ieiil.  e.iiiliiiiii 

at  sea Ii|.' 

■itlvises     l.oul     Coniwallis jKi 

al  IJarreii   !  I  ill.  ...  ;    (of. 

Kurope  ajjaiiist  (ireat  lirit.iin 5J7 

European  ret-riiits  disiriiuiieit  in  1777..  J7') 
Kiiropeaii  armies   iiirr^r    the   eiti/i-ii    in 

I  he  ,oMier I  •; 

Kvaenaliou  of  i!.i-,tnii  liy  1  leiil  Howe..  I  ■;  1 
New  \'ork  by  (ieiil.  W.i^hin'^lon .  .  .  -l'7 
New  ViM'k  by  ( ieiieral  ('.11  lelon  .  .  .'150 
I'hilailelphi.i,  a  mili:ary  necessity..  41  } 
lOv.ut-,  Will.  .\1.  lliMi,  (^choKir  ami  ad- 
vocate, /'.    iSiS 2 

Kwiiii^,  Jaiiie^,  liri;^.  ( leiil.,  f.  i7!o,i' 271 

to  Closs  beloA     rii-lltoil.  Her.    I77()..  271 

.11  Mount  Holly,  i'ec.   2Si|i,  1776..  27(1 

l')utaw  Spriiii;s,  l.i^t  Southern  liallle.  .  .  .  5;"3 
ICyer,  Lieut.  Col.,  l.uid,   near  .Nevv  [.011- 

doii 626 

70,  (mortally),  before   Fort  (jriswoKi  621) 


1\ 

1-  \M1AN  policy  of  \Va-hin;;fon  derided.  .  302 

I'.' irh.iveii  ile-lroyed   by  lii'iil.  ( irey .  .  .  .  455 
I'alcoiier,  William,  as  to  Uritish  position 

at    (.:ii,irlestoii iSS 

l'.innini;'s   i'roviiicials  at  Newport 448 

I  aiiatieisiii  iinre^lraiiied  111  war 24 

I'er^u-oii,  M.ij.,  {/ir.)  at  C'liadd'^  for  1 .  .  3'ji; 
rcjioit-.   his    atiack    upon    l'ula-~ki'> 

ipiailer^ .(|;o 

in   skirmish   w  itii  ( 'ol.  Cl.irk 507 

I'  killed   at  Kint;',  Mount, lin 520 

l''ereuson,   I'honias,  1  om.  S.ifety,  S.  •_'  .  .  1 71) 

l'ibii;ei,  (.'hri^tiati,  C  d.  at  Hunker  Hill.  loi) 

accompanies  .\niold  to  <,>uebec.  ...  131 

distini;iiisheil  at  .Stony   Point 472 

Fellow^,  John.  liri^.  ( iec.l.  at  I  oiij;  Island  217 

in  I'utnam's  division  at  New  \'ork.  .  22o 

join,  the  army  of  (kites 337 

Innards  east  bank   of  the  Hudson..  350 
Fmdley,  ('apt.,  I  /'v;  ~eiit   to  (lent. .Ma- 
rion with  :irlil|ery      =;7c) 

Kuh    I  Kim    I'oid,  skirmish 521 


1   (  i;ni:k.\i.   immx. 


Cy7o 


PAC.K 

I'it/connell,  l''/ek,  si^n  >  protect   a;.;.iinst 

l>l^staiii^ 453 

Fit/j;eralil,    I.iciit.  (  ol.   (  lm.\   ,it    Mon- 
mouth   43(j 

te^lilies  on  tri.d  of  <  ieul,  I.ee \y) 

!•  leiniii),',  (apt.,  /■.  at  b.itlle  of  rrinceton  2rti) 

|-'leur>,  l.oiij.    Do,  Lieut,    .v//'   ('.i|.  (/■>.) 

prisoner  at   lirandywiiie   3S1 

.it  attack  upon  I'orl  Mercer 31)5 

wounded   at    I'ort    .Mdllin ^t)S, 

,it    ^ie;;e    .4    Newport 452 

di.iiin;iii,ln'd  at  Stony  I'oint 473 

|oin>  Ciiunt  l)t;  Koehambeail 525 

rciuembc'risl i,^^ 

h'lcniiii;.;toii    ocriipied  by  Sullivan   in  re- 
treat    2(),S 

f.;^  over  i;,i,t   River  in   I77'i 2i.S 

lirandvwine  KiviT  in  1777 3117 

h'i^kkill   t  reek  ill    1 777 3^1 

I  ■ennantown  in  1777 , 3S() 

fold,  Lieut.  Col.,  i.hii.\  v.illi  new   levies 

at    ( iiiillord 5^7 

7,'.  at  llobknk'.  Ilill 572 

l■'ord^  1. 1  the  lirandywiiie  at  d.ile  of  bat- 
lie ' 367 

l-'oi  lies,  M.ij.,  (  A'r.)  Ill    acti(j|i    near    I'ort 

Ann 315 

bclore   the   lloii^e  ol   tjonimons.  .  .  .  315 

at  bitile  of    Freeman's  I-'arm.  ....  340 

I'orei^n  aid  secured  by  Kii'^Iaiid 171 

o|lpo^itioll  made  in  Parliament      ..  172 

invoked  by  .Viiierica 27.S 

of  adv,-inta^e  to  .America 655 

F'orre^t's  (.I'll.)  battery  at  Trentou 273 

I'orlorn  Hope;   its  re.|uiretnents 63 

l''orni.iii,  Hrij^.  1  leti.,  at  baith'  of  I  'rcr'u.in- 

town 3S7 

operates  in  New  lersey 31)6 

at  battle  of  .Monmouth .  .  414 

testilie,  on  trial  of  ( jeii.  Lee 421) 

I'ormatioti  of  troops  under  (ire  considered  580 

Forts  at  New  \'ork  useless  ai;aiiist  ships  222 

Fort  .Villi,  ab.iiuloiied   before  lhiri;oyne's 

march 31s 

.Villi,  burneii 31  5 

I''or'.s  ( 'linton  and    .Montgomery 355 

I  liiiion   and    Moii'jruinery,  lo--.  iin- 

iiece,>aiy 361 

I'ort  Di'liaiice,  oppodte    l'ii'ondeioi;a  ...  301J 
F.  Iward,  aband'ine  i  by  C.eii.  Schuy- 
ler  .'.  3I() 

I'Mu.ird,   16  mile>  Ir.'iii   l-oit  ( ;eorj»e  32S 

Iclw.ird,  occupied  bv  C.il.  I'.ichraii.  351 

(  leoiee,  captured  m  <  )ct.,  l7"io  ....  523 

(oiswold,  obstinately  deft'iiddl    .  .  .  ti2ij 

(iriswold,  surrendered 62() 

( iuiiby,  surrendered  lo  Lee 574 

Independence,  abandoneil 242 

Independence  (new),  abandoned.  .  .  3()0 

John',,  St.  c.ip'.ured  by  .\lont150mery  |2() 

Forts  Lee  and  Inilepeinleiice,  their  strat- 
egic value 41) 

Lee    and     \Va>h;ii;.;ton     passeil     by 

frii,'ates 232 

l'"oi  t  Mercer,  on  Red  K.uik 393 

Mercer,   reinfoiced 39  + 

.Mercer,  abandoned 3')6 

.Mdiliii,  on  Mud  Island 393 


68o 


Cllk'>.\()l.(»(;iCAI.  AND   CKNKKAI-    INDKX. 


IA(.K 

304 

3' 15 
3')S 
35^ 


'W ' 


Wt-' 


1   V 


mi 


m' 


Fort  Millliii,  rciiifdrctil 

Millliri  M•sl^l^  altai  U,  l  777 

Millliri  i.i|iliiir<l    Nipv,.  1777  ...... 

Mciiiinoiiiii)  ami  (  liiiloii 

Mdiif,    MiiniiiUnil     til    l.ic    ami 

Mariim . 

Mdiiliiii'.  ill  177() I 

Mini  line,  raiiliiii'il  in  17!'() 

Siliii>lii,  at  lnud  111  ilic  Mdliawk.  . 
Srliii\liT,   Mi|i|ilii'i    rrciivid   lor,    in 

Aiij;.,  1777 

.'^cliiiylcr,  t^arri~i>ii  (if.  in  1777 

Silunlfr,  lirni'ly  riiiiloici  intiil  .... 
ScliiiykT,  llirUiim  I's  sLdiiN  pa^s  in 

Slan«  is.  slrciij^llu'iifil 

'riiciiiiUTo^u.  LiMiililiriii  (if  {;,Tii  iMiii . 

1  U  ullcll  I'c't;.!,  c  a|illlUil 

Triiniliull,  i,i|itiiit(l  liy  Caiil.  \\  ilkil 

WatMiii,  lakin  Wy  let-  ami  .Maiimi, 

W'ashiii^'lnii.  rxpo^i'il  iM^lwanl  .... 

N\  asliiiij^um,  i^airiMiii  of 

\\'asliiiii;li'n  aiul  ailiai'Ciit  lUTcii^i's. 

\\  asiiinj.;!''!!,  di'-i  rilnd   liy  diayilim 

%VasliiM:;liiii,  i',i|i|iiii  il 

\Vasliiiij;liiii,         alt.uU         skilluilly 

plaiiiifil 

Fosbadi,  William  dc  I'liix  I'oiil-,  (nl., 
at  \'(irklin\  n 

7t>.  ill  stiiniiiiii;  ii'ddiilit    

Foster,  <  a|.l.  (/>'/:)  altaiks  ilic  post  .it 
thf  (tdar.H 

enforces  a  seven'  laitel 

Founderies  estalilislied  in  I77(j 

Fowey,  Irijja'o,  the  leliitje  of  l.ind  I'liii- 
inore 

at  ^ie^e  uf  Sav.iiinah 

siirreiidend  at  N'oiklmv  n 

Fox.  C'liarlrs  James  1  statesman  I,  /■.  1741), 

gives  iipinioii  cifliallle  uf  t  iiiillind  . 
favors  Independenee,  as  last  resurl  . 

Fox,  Adjt   (/>>.)  w.  at  battle  uf  flirilfi.rd 

Fraser,  iirii;.  (ien.  i  AV.i  at    I  Inee  l\i\er>, 

Canada 

at  '1  icomlcro^a  with  Hinf;uyne  .... 

pursues  St.  (  lair's  army 

gains  creilit  at  llvililiardton 

at  battle  of  Freeman'.s  I'arin 

fit  lialtle  of  llenns  lleifjhls 

mortally   '  oiinded 

Fraser,  Cu\.  Ji).)  sii!>.  lirij,'.  (len..  at 
Huntin,i;ton.  R.  I 

Fraser,  ("apt.  1  A'.i  with  sharpsliooiers  at 

I5ennini;ion 

with  sl-arpdiooiiTs  at  lienns  IleiLjIits 

Franklin,  lieiij.  I  I  liplomate  and  .states. 
man),  />.  \-\U,  U.  1790. 

chairman  Com.  Safety,  T775 rd 

visits  American  camp  near  l!ri>i(in  .    J4,i 
his  estimate  ol  battle  of  liiinker  lid'    lit) 

comndssioMci  to  Canada 151 

commissioner  to  meet   Lord   Howe 

1776 223 

his  estimate  of  \Vashin(;ton 540 

his  influence  in  l',iiro|ie 54U 

secures  a  toreiL;n  loan O23 

France  ijled^L^es  aid  to  .Vmerica 400 

sends  messenger  with  treaty 404 


57» 
's-7 
411(1 

3-'-' 

323 

3-3 

2fo 
31  I 

3i"> 
(iji. 

-M'l 
-47 


251 

-4'^ 

(..ts 
''3v 

"'? 

-7' I 

47^ 

3''4 
3'|i| 
5''3 

314 
3i(' 
31b 

33') 
34=; 
34') 

471 

32(, 

35" 


rAoa 

France  sends  Kochainlieau  with  troops.  490 
does    not    lavor    .New    Noik    as    an 

objective 614 

de^i|l■^    pe.ice   alter  siej;e   uf   Vork- 

tow  n  closes (146 

I' rancis,  (dl.  (.////.)  witluliaws  honi  I'orl 

iiiilepeiidelice 31(1 

k.  at  b.iltle  df  llubb.irdlon 317 

i'ndiiuk   II.  the  dreat,  /'.  1712,1/.  I78(). 

.1^  to  reticence  of  purpose SfiS 

I'reeiii.in's  I'arni,  battle  ol 331J 

I' reiuli  lli-el,  ofl  the  Idlaw.ire (4(> 

.It  New  \  ork  unable  to  enter 447 

enters  New  port  haibor 44S 

(See  1  )'l'',>l.mit^.l 

1  nj^.U'.es  .\diiiiial  lldWc's  licet \^\ 

repair^  .it  liosloii 453 

blockaded  at  Newport ^04 

al  S.u.innah 477 

oil  ihe  Ches.ipcake    dl'J 

eii^.i^cs  .\dmiial  (ir.ivcs'  fleet (115 

leaves  .\merican  coast (144 

(Sec  I  H-  I'larras  and  I  )e  Cras^c  ) 

I'niuli    \i  my  .it  .NcH  |iorl 4";n 

il^  relations  to  .American  success.  .  .  535 

m.irche^  tliroiij;li  Connecticut    filS 

nnilc^  Willi  \V.idiiiiL;lon (120 

lliK  .ilciis  New  N  01  k (120 

ni.ir' lies  through  I'hiladelphia (j23 

is    revieweil     by    the    rresidcnl    of 

t  oii^rcss (123 

opin  .  batteries  before  N'orktown.  .  .  t)3(> 

u  inters  ill  \  iiL^inia (144 

m.iiclies  to  lioston (144 

iu  di-cipliiie  and  conduct '144 

embarks  Idr  I'  ranee (144 

lriL;.itis  built  by  .\inerica  and  their  fate  2~"> 
liiu;.iies  |-linni\  and    Ko^e  pass   I'.uilus 

Hook Ii)3 

|ias^  I' oris  l.ee  and  Washiin^lon  .  .  .  232 

ascend  the  Hudson  to   Tarrytown.  .  235 

.i^ceiid   the  Hudson  to  K ini;^loii .  .  .  327 

I'l  igaie  l.a  Se!i-.iblcbrin);s  !•  leiuh  Treaty  404 

.Mli.ince  takes  la  I'ayelle  to  !•' ranee  4(15 
Frink,   (aplain,   at    .New    l.di:doii    with 

KchiL;ees (121   (> 

l''rothiiiL;liam,  Kichard  H .  (author)  as  to 

Inrces  at  Hiinkci   Hill KX' 

as   to   (ieii.   Ward's    orders   to   Col. 

I'rcscott ()A 

as  to  the  battle  of  Hunker  Hill  ....  108 

I'ront  of  operations 54 

1' rye.  Col  ,  Inrnislus  his  men  for  battle 

of  liunker  Hill 95 


Cii. 

Gadsdkn,  Christopher,  Col.,  b.   1724,  d. 
i.S()5. 

comniamis  i>t  S,  C.  Infantry 179 

in  conimand  .11  (  harleslon 182 

in  command  at  I'ort  jolinson I.S6 

on  Naval  Committee 144 

Gage,  Thomas,  l.ieiil.  ( ien.,  (iov. 

denounces  the  Provincial  Congress.  i; 

rcipiires  2o,ix)o  men 10 

adopts  a  bad  military  policy 10 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


681 


Gage,  prci-i[)ilatc'.  war  by  an  expeilition 

1(1  CnlU'Dnl II 

forlilirs  Mo^tim  N'l'cU   H3 

oHcrs  iiiiiiUil  [larilons ^7 

rcsiilvi's  to  occupy  (iKirlcstdii   ainl 

I  •iirclu-.-.lcr 1)^ 

thriMifiiN  1(1  liiirii  (liiirloliiii    im 

onk'icil  liiiiiic  ;  rctmi)^  to  Lu^liiiul.  14.' 

('■.liiit's,    Liciii,   {.till.)   with    ailillcry    ;il 

Kiilaw  Splines 57() 

( i.llloway,    lo^cjih,    Koyali^l   and   wiilcr. 

as  Id   I'li'iiliiii 274 

cnlK  isc-  lien.  ILiwo 2()^ 

(iallow.iv,   Lieut,  (.//v.)   w.   at    llcdikiik 

Hill, 57-, 

lialliip,  N.ali.iii,  <  (il.,  near  I'cirt  (jiiswold  02S 

(ialvaii,  NLij.,  wiili  La  I'.vyctle    ......  ^-di 

at  li.itiii'  ol  h""^"''"^^!' '"i*^ 

Gambier,  (apt.,  lamU  at    .MoikiI    I'lia- 

ant,  S.  (' 4,/, 

laniU  (lii  Sullivan  Llaml   4i)(j 

GanscMKUi,  rcter,  (.dl.,  h.  174'),  1/.  1S12. 

(Ii'lend-.  I"'(irl  .Schuyler ya 

(Jariliiur's     May,     L.    I.,    ancliorai^c    ol 

liiiluh  tleet  (lit  Newport :;  (,) 

•  iarilnei,  I'linnias,  dil.,  k.  at  Hunker  llill  km; 

.NLi^-..  Com.  S.ilely () 

(Jarilner,  .M.ij.,  re.  at   .Monninutli 4.(4 

Gardner,  .Maine,  liasc  of  .\rnold\  e\pe. 

(lilion 121 

Garlh,  Wng.  Gen.  (/>'»-.)  landed   at    .New 

Haven,  I77() ^(„^ 

with  (ien.  Kr.iser  at  Norwalk,  1771).  471 

Gates,    I'.oiatio,    Maj.   (ieii.,   /'.    172*1,   ./. 
I  Si  lO. 

■\djt.  (irn.  un  oi|;ani/al  ion  of  .irinv.  ijii 

•iupiMsedes  .Sidliv.in  in  Canada Hh) 

ev.icuales  Crown  {'oint n;; 

letter  from  Lee  deriding;  Congress  .  23S 

his  lel.itions  u  ilh  Lee 2'^.S 

t;ive-~  ^tK•nL;lll  of  Norllicrn  arniv.  .255-fi 

seek^  to  supplant  Si  huyler 255 

lelt  wuliout  a  cnminand 25? 

joins  \Va>liin!;ton 256 

letter  from  Washiiii^ton 2(15 

on  leave  to  ^o  to  I'liiladelphia  ....  ■2(t~ 
absent  from  I'renlun  without  lea\e. 27^-7 

decline^  coinniaiid  of   I'iconderoj^a  .  31(1 

his  captious  lonihut 310 

writch  ludely  to  W'.ishiiij^ton 310 

nei;lecteil  northern  posts 310 

captious  letter  to  \\y.  Lovell 311 

takes  leave  of  ab-euee 311 

deportinent  toward  Selmvler 334 

commaitils  northern  dep.iriinent  .  .  .  335 

ij^nores  the  Comniander-iii  Chief.  .  .  335 

advanies  beyond  Stillwater 33() 

hi.s  army  by  briL;ades 3^6 

reports  battle  of  Kreemaii'>  l-'arm.  .  341 

at  Saraiiij;a,  like  S.iul  alter  one  li.iltle  34.J 

altcieation  with  .\rnold 340 

gives  Arnold  leave  of  absence 347 

excited  interview  with  .Arnold 341) 

at  deathlied  of  sir  Iraneis  Clark  .  .  341) 
endangers     lii^     army    at     I'ishkill 

Creek 351 

stren_L;lh  of  ainiy  at  .Saratoga 351 

surrender  of  liurj^oyne 352 


fAOl 

Gates,  Horatio,  Maj   Ciin  ,  receues  letter 

ol   I  .anion   liom  I'.i.u.i.n  .    3J2 

rel.iiii^  troops  not  needed 397 

I'le^ideiit  ul  Ito.ird  ol   W'.n 3^8 

opposes  W  .lshiii^;loii 3(jS 

coinmainls  .it  Lishkill 4i>' 

iU(  line-,  to  lit;ht  In  liaiis 471; 

scut  to  southern  commaiKl 4iji 

joins  De  Kalli  .11  ILlKboroui;!!  ....  Joij 

criticises  southern  oper.itioiii ^(xj 

adopt-,  a  bad  line  ul  march 5(mj 

erii-.-.e-.  tiie  I'edee    510 

i-'Siies  a  proclamation.    510 

adv.ince-,  10  Lynch's  Irci  k 5IU 

unites  w  nil  t  asuell's  militia 510 

criticised   by    I'.irleloii mo 

at  Kui;i-lv's  NLIIs i;ii 

oM'icsiiin.ites  his  force 511 

oveiioiilidelit  and  r.ish 513 

actual  st. lie  of  his  army 514 

the  t;auj,'e  ol  Ins  capacity 514 

orders  nniiiedi.ue  advance 514 

I  alls  Council  of  w.ir 515 

a  b.ntle  without  order-. 515 

hastens  fioin  battle-lield 517 

suiniuoiied  beloie  ('ourl  of  linpiirv.  522 
Galanae's   regiment   (/•;),  distinguished 

at  Vorktowii ('138 

( leiier.d,  ipi.ilillcatioiis   nf   ,1.  lUliiied    by 

Joinuii hd 

tieiieiaU.     .is      origin. illy      n. lined       by 

I.  ongie-,-.      Si) 

Coniini-,sioiis     withlield      bv     W.ish- 

liigton   131) 

promotions   made  tnamed)  give  di- 

s.ili-.f,uliiin iifti 

George    111.,    King    of    (ileal    Uritain, 
I'r.ince,   .iinl   Lel.nid,  /'.   173S,   ,/. 
1S2'1 
applies  lu  (.Catharine  of  Ku-si.i  and 

lloll.nid  I  ir  aid 173 

unwisely  adjourns  rarliament 400 

(.ieorgia  enier.s  upon  w.ir Hfj 

Gerald.  .Monsieur,  (onr.id  .\..  Iirsi  milli- 
ter Iroin  1'  r.mcir 400 

jiledges  I  oui-,  .\\I.  to  aid  .Xnierna  400 
viernjaine,  (ieorge,  Lord  (statesman  I. 

his  o|iiinon  of  the  battle  ol   rreiiton  281 

initi.nes  the  Uurgoyne  (amp.iign  ..  303 

iiiiii.Ues  .St.  I. eger's  incursion     ....  303 

writes  lotien.  Iloweasto  Mingoviie  357 

writes  to  Clinton  as  to   I'ryon  s  raid  470 

sust.uiis  the  intrigue  wi'.h  .Vinuld  .  .  505 

rebukes  Sir  Henry  (.'liiiton 5(17 

sust.iiiis  Cornw.illis     50a 

(iennantown,  bailie,  criticiMin  of  forma- 
tions   5^-*) 

its  location  .ind  aesci  iptioii 3!'4-5 

]i|.in  iinloldcd 386 

praclu  ,illy  an  .\merican  victory  .  .  .  y)\ 

creates  a  sensation  in  I'uioiie 4(W 

(iernsli,  Samuel,  at  battle  ol  Hunkerllill  109 

(iibsoii,  Lieut.  \/-l>.)  k.  at  ISiackstock-.  .  522 

Gilchrist,  Lieut,  (/ir.)  ;o.  at  Monmouth  .  444 

(idl,  .Moses,  .\l.iss.  ('om.  Supplies 9 

(iimat,  Col.,  with  La  I'ayette  in  his  first 

enterprise 396 

at  battle  of  >Linmoinli 443 


1: 


i     . 


p. 


III: 


.■ir4' 


mi: 

■'ii   H: 


1! 

ir     1 


^  ',;■■ 


i4 


682 


ClIU'WOI.ot.HAI     AMI    CMNKKAI.    INDEX. 


(jitiiat  I'ol.,  serve*   «illi  I. a   l-'aycllf  in 

\  iri;iiiia    f^'' 

in  assault  of  n.liiulit  ai  NUikiown. .  dp 

K'.  I>cliiri'  N'url.i'iwii ..  i'\') 

roiiK'iiilii'icil     (i;; 

liisl,   Muidcc.u,    I'ln;^.   lull.,  /'.    174.1,  1/. 

•7M-'. 

on  (.  uurt  n|  Imiiiii\  i^iliuvlci)  ....  .11  J 
skii iiiislu',  Willi  (  oiii\»allis  .11  l'.>l^;i' 

llill V17 

at  lialilc  111' L'auuii'ii. .  .  .    5 Id 

est j|us  lapliiii'   51^ 

icciiiiis  liir  (irii.  Uri'ciic's  aniiy  .  .  .  =j'i 

tiUuici,  Maj.  nl  Marinis,  at  Savaiiii.ili  .  pi 

til(HHO-.UT    I'llHlt,    N.    J.,    .\UUTii;Ml     slllp. 

I'lli;;  iilimcil Ill'' 

uli>iM>ii'i   I'nini,  \'ir^;iiiia.  lU'siTilii'ii .  .  .  iiii 

(itcuiiiud  liy  Smu<ii''s  kaii;;<rs iii  1 

iiivi'slti!  by  allkil  ainiics <>\^ 

iilovcr,  I'lil.,  sn/i.  Itri^.  <lrii. 

toiisinciious    in    iciu.il    Irmii    l.oiij; 

Islaiul -M.t 

ill  skirmish  iioar  No"   IvmlulU'.  .  .  ,  -'.is 

at  liattk' (if  TunlDii    2-2 

|)roiinjli-ii  liri|;.  lli-ii ii|i> 

(III  llic   I  liul-on Jip 

joins  Sclui)li'r  at  Slill«  alcr ih) 

Willi  army  of  Ciali's \\- 

al  >araloL;a ;.:  1 

assi^iu'(l  to  l.a  l''ayi'llf'^  ili\i,-ioii  .  .  44^ 
comiiiamls  lin^ailc  .it  \  .illi'v  i'orm'. 

(Si-c  Ma|i.l. '.....'.,  14s 

pi. Ills  iitit  at  fiiim  Niu  poll 4;: 

orilcri-il  ti>  iiiopiiati-  «  illi  militia  in 

Council  Kill 171 

at  I'loviiliiK!'    l\luulo  I-l.inil 471 

t'loar.  I'.ipt.  4ijtli  (/>'•.), /•.  at  l  liallcilon 

Mill J(i 

tloiuliicl^,  I'apt.,  /■.  near  (iinlfonl ~i'J 

<  ionlon,  Will.,  Kl'V.  Dr.  (aiulior  of  liisioiy 
lif  tile  rmlcil  Stall's.) 

toniinfiils  nil  tin.-  iii^i,  m  177?  ....  m 
i;ivcs   opuii'iii   ol    liallK'    "I    liinilui 

llill l-s 

opinion  of  li.iltlc  of  IrLiiloii j-i 

as  to  Ainod   ii  bail'.,'  of  I'rotnu'.n'^ 

1-  anil :142 

opinion  111   li.illli'  ol  .Moiinioiilh .  .  .  .  445 

Gore,  r.ipi.,  /.-.  at  battle  of  Monmouili.  .  444 

ior^ .  l.ieiil.,  X'.  at  tiiiillonl •.(.•} 

loinfle,  I.ieiii.  l/>'''.)  TC,  a.  Moiiinoiilh  .  .  444  | 

Cioslieii,  armies  separated  by  slnnii Pi  ; 

ios^ip  robiilseil  by  WasliJiij^tiin nj? 

•overiiiii's  Isl.iiiil,  New  N'ork,  e\ai'ii,iteil 

by  Col.  I'reseott 2l(i 

ii.iboiiski,  Count,  X',  beliiu:  I'm!  Clinton  351) 

iiahain,  (  ol.  {.I»i.)  al  lioi;'s  Neek  ....  j ',4 
iiali.iin,  Maj.  (/)»■.). makes  a  sally  Irom 

Savannah 471) 

•  lanani    Joseph,  Maj.  (./w.)  r,'.  at  I  h.ir- 

lotle 511) 

ii.ii^e,  l.ieul,  1//.1  /.-.  at  (iiiilfonl 5113 

iMliil    Taetus  delineii 4s 

m.i.viiiis  lo  be  applied Iio 

at  liiill  isiiii  explained    ()2 

o(  the  war  of  1775  -i;,'^! 652 

tjrant,    C lyases  ^simpsoii,  Cen.  IJ.  S.  A., 
tu/i.  I'residt'iU  twice,  i.  1822. 


(Irani,    Ciyssi-s  Simpson,  (Ion.  U   S,  A, 
.mil   Sherin.in,    in    i.-^dr-s,   in  rc- 

spei  1  oM  li.iiid  Str.iU'ny     57 

Ci.mi,  \|.ij.  (an.  (A/.)  at  l.on^  Island  .  JoJ 

imiis  Cornw.illis  .U  lliiiiiswiek ^57 

pills  (//loll  iheii  ^jii.ird  at   I  renloii  jli'j 
repoii    ,i|    .iii.uk   on    'I'lenlon    emi. 

suleied j(ii) 

at  the  battle  ol   r.i.mdyw  me ^bt) 

attaeks  (ien.  W.iuie  near  I'.ioli.  .  .  .  v^^ 

.It  the  b.itile  of  (lerniantow  1 \i>s, 

threatens  j  .,i  layetleat  r.,iireii  llill  4o«i 

oiit^;eiierah'il  by  la  hiyetle 407 

(ii.ilil,   I  lent.  Col.  i/>'''.)  4i)lli    loot,  /■,  at 

i  .oii(;  Island '.'Ill) 

(iiaiit,  M.ij.  (/i;-.!  .•(•   at  lliibb.iidton  ...  il7 

/i'.  in  ■.toiinin^;  I'oii  Clinton t;c) 

t  o.ini,  l';n-i^;ii,  (/<'i:i  i.  m  b.ittle  ol  ( liiil- 

loid   563 

( li,i\e  ,  .\iliniral. 

iiiininindi   n.ival   forces  ,il    lloslon, 

'77? 143 

pi. Ills     siiKiU     incursions     in     N\v/ 

1  nL;laiid !43 

1,  iclic\id  by  .\ilmiral  shnldham..  14(1 
lelu;        1.1   .Vnicrlc.i   with   reinfince- 

ineiits 303 

•  It    New   N'oik,   I7S() 503 

en;.;.ii;cs  (  luinl  de  dr.issc  ol1  (liesa- 

p.  .ike  May bi  ■; 

betoie  the  lloiise  of  I'omnioiis  ....  614 
I  ir.ixdon,  ('ol.  (.////,) /i.  1752,1/.   I,S|,><. 

desvribes  I'orl  \V.ishiiit;t<in ? ^^■i 

t  iray-on,  William,  Col. 

on  \\  asliiiij^ion's  stall 259 

t  ciiiit  of  lni|iiiry  (Schuyler) 312 

te-tilie.,  on  the  trial  of  l.ee 426 

at  the  b.ittle  of  .Monmouth 435 

(ileal   I'liilaiii  ai^ainst  ihe  c)\ili/cd  uorlil 

in  17.'5o 527 

desires  to  li.ive  peaie (>4tj 

and   the   I'liiteil   Stales  coinpete   in 

the  .Ills  of  peace bjfi 

Cieaton,  ( '.il..  m.|ii  to  (.'.uiada 157 

lej^t.  will  serve  Iwii  weeks  lonf;er  .  .  276 

I  oiirl  of  Imiiiiry  (Schuyler) 312 

lire.  ;ie,    Nalh.iniel,    .^IaJ.  Cell.,   /'.    1740, 
1/.  I7s(i. 

excellent  in  Lo^islici 72 

as  ,1  i\pe  of  the  lieneral So 

his  anteeedents So 

enters  tile  service.  1775 .S5 

si. lies  '.■ertaiii  rei|insites  lo  success.  .  .ss 

condition  of  his  l)rii;ade 147 

builds  field-works  on  l.oiij:  Inland  .  197 

off  duty,  sick,  when  Howe  landed.  .  Ic)3 

ur^es  retreat  Imm  New  ^d  k 221 

j;ives  ri'porl  of  skirmish  at   ll.iilem 

llei'^hts 230 

comin.iiiils  in  New  [eisey 231 

rejiorts    einliiv/lenienl    of    niedic.d 

stoics 232 

applies  to  join  Washinijton 237 

ordered  lo  remove  or  destrov  hay,  etc  243 
•prepares    itinerary  for  niovement  to 

I'hiladelphia 243 

estimates    supplies    for   coluniii    cf 

20,ixx)  men 244 


CIIKDNOLOi.lt  AI.    AMI    l.llNKKAI.    IMMCX. 


083 


PAOI 

A. 

11'- 

57 

1 . 

'.•03 

■•:57 

nil 

ji)'j 

111- 

Jill) 

1  .  • 

-)()(> 

3*<3 

(rt.; 

lilt 

.1.x. 

.     .     . 

4"7 

.  ;il 

.  .  . 

2<X) 

.  .  . 

317 

3=^'» 

ml- 

5f>3 

Inll 

1-13 

s  t  V 

M3 

•  1^ 
259 

-^12 

426 

435 

1(1 

•1.1 

527 
(146 

le 

in 

656 
i?7 

or 

27(> 
312 

17 

•('^ 

72 


.  .  •  • 

147 

;iu.l  . 

i')7 

KM.. 

i.,S 

221 

irloni 

23.1 

231 

>lic.U 

232 

237 

ly,  cti: 

243 

L'lll    tl) 

24? 

,11    .if 

244 

(Jrecne,  Natlianicl,  Maj.  Cicn.,  .-idmits  dli- 

slnulldii-.  iif   tlio  lliulsoii  to  liavi' 

failc'il 241^ 

antici|i.iii.s   attack    on   Kcrt   \\.i>li- 

in^;ti)ii  247 

opinion  as   to  their  vaKic,  njiiic  a> 

Howe's 24? 

((filers     M.irjjan    to     (Icfciid     I'lirt 

\Va>liiiiL;i'iii 24.J 

reports  eiptiire    •(  I'ort  Lee 252 

is   ni.ilii  inu-ly  eritieiseil 252 

COMiiMaiiiU     <livi  ion     at     little    of 

'I'leiit.iii 271 

hoMi   oul|posis  at    I'reiiton    2^5 

leads  U|i  till'   .Milistdiio  iifter  b.iltic 

of  I'riiR'eton 2.jo 

sent,  to  state  to  (.'oii^jress  the      imli- 

tioii  of  the  army 2.(7 

sent  to  iii^))ect  lii;4lilan.l   |io--ls,  .  .  .    2i)7 

ordered  to  follow  ll.uve 3.X1 

selects  American  po-ition  at  Cha.lir.'> 

l'"or.l • 3(17 

eoniniaiuK   the    reserve   at    lir.uuly- 

winc 3(17 

covers  retreat  <if  Ainerieaii  army.  .  .  3.S.) 
commands  (livi-,i. Ill  at  (ieniiantou  n.  3-'7 
advises    to    attack    New    York    aii.i 

rhila.U'l|ilii,i 1.14 

commands  rij^iit  wiii^  at  .M-inimmih  43S 
ordered  to  Newport,  Kliode  Ul.ind    44S 

at  the  siet;e  of  Newport ...   45  1 

unites  in  protest  sent  I)'l''.siaiii^.  .  .  .  453 
g.ies  to  Boston  to  supply  the  I  reiuli 

fleet 457 

applies   for   active   service    at    the 

south 4(15 

quartermaster  j^enl.   in  the    terrihle 

winter  of  17J0 4SS 

appeals  for  aid  for  the  army 41)2 

resijjiis    as  (juarlermaslei-Ljenl 4.^2 

in  coiniiiaiul   iieai  Sprinytield,  New 

Jer>ey ": 500 

succeeds  Arnold  at  West  Point.  .  .  .  506 
plan  hir  a  fiyiiiLj  army  ajiproved. .  .  52S 
writes  letters  to  southern  i;.iveriKir.^   52.^ 

describe-,  the  southern  army 52.) 

his  department  and  |)owers  enlarjjed  529 

i.ssues  a  lac.iiiic  order 521) 

[leculiar  letter  to  Ciovr.  JefTersun.    .    53.) 

excelled   ill    Logistics 530 

ordered  the  whole  country  explored.  531 

readied  Charlotte 531 

wiite.s  to  Ie(Ver>on 531 

discusses  a  -ioldier's  life   531 

in  caini)  for  two  months,  to  orjjanize 

hi^  army 532 

0|iens  the  southern  camjiaiyn 532 

writes   to  .Marion  as  to  often  shift- 
ing quarters 532 

letter  to  La  Fayette 533 

his  position  stated 541 

hears  of  battle  of  Cowpens 547 

army  without  clothing,',  Indian  style.  547 
rides  125  miles  to  join  Morgan....  ^47 
letters  tc  Varnum,  Gi.st,  Smallwuod 

and  others 548 

on  the  banks  of  the  Catawba 550 

ordi  rs  operations  commenced    ....    550 


•■AOf 

Cireeiie,    Natli.miel,    Maj,    (ien.,  Iiiiiriis 

(i.)vern.ir-.  nt  'Mates .  ,  .  ;.;i 

takes  advani.ige  of  heavy  ram-.  .  .  i,yi 

cnnceiitrates  hi-,  army  at  (iuill.iul.  .  55a 

calls  council  of  war,  iiattle  declined  55a 

.irg.mi/.e-.  a  picke.l   light  corji^ 55a 

army  I'Lisscs  ihe  i»,iii  in   saf.lv    ...  553 

occupies   llalilax  Court   House.    ..  f;53 

army  mu^le^^*ll,  total  given    553 

l.dves    posiiioit    between    Haw    an. I 

"'•q'  fi^''- •■•    554 

controls  roa.ls  fniin  Salisburv,  (inil- 

foril  and  llillslioroiigh    555 

near  tiuillord  lourt    il.msc,  iiniles 

battle 555 

light-  the  battle  of  tiuilford ?57-<J 

treats  after  acti.in   at    (luilford..    |;')l 
111-,  opinion  of  battle  of  (luilford.  .  .  .    5(14 

moves  into  South  Carolina t,(i(i 

marches  to  kugely's   Mills jjx) 

onlers  .M.irion  to  join  him 571. 

..pc  ition>  near  Camden 571 

batti    plan  ol   H.ilikirk  Hill  g.iod.  .    573 

retires  lo  Kug.ly's  M  ilN 573 

raises  the  siege  of  Ninety  Six !;74 

g.ies  to  the  High  Hills  o(  Santee..    574 

a.lvaiices  t.)  Miilaw  Springs 577 

onler^  I  .ee,  Mari  m  ami   I'ickeiH   to 

j.iin  him 577 

at  iiurilell's  on    the  S.intee 577 

leinf.irced  by  ( ieiil.  Sumner 577 

lights  battle  of  luitaw  Springs 578 

his  report  of  the  last   attack 5S(>-1  ' 

retires  to  the  High   Hill-. '.    583 

hears  of  surrender  of  Cornwallis.  .  .    583 

his  .iriny  le>s  than  i.xio  men 583 

lecoiuiiiered  a  large  territory 583 

ap.pioves  of   i,a  l'"ayette's    detail    to 

the   south cSd 

directs    I. a     l-'ayette    to    report     t.i 

\V.i^hini;t.iii 594 

hi--  jealousy  of  foreign  appointments 

rebuked 655 

icinain    at  the  south (155 

Greene,  Christopher,  Col. /'.  1737,1/.  17S1. 

goes   t.i  (,)iieb.'C  with  .Arnold 121 

commands   Kort   .Mercer 3^? 

ordered   south,   reaches   the    I'edee, 

.Ian.  I7.SI 533 

/■.  at  post  oil  Croton  River 618 

Cireen,    Colonel,    of    Virginia,    at     Fort 

M  ifllin 394 

('ireeii  Mountain  lioys,  prefer  Warner  to 

.Mien 127 

disgusted   with  Canada 132 

Green     Farms,     Ct.    visited    by     Genl. 

'I'ryoii 471 

Greeting  to  the  public 1-2 

Gregory,  Cieiil.,  at  battle  of  Camden.  .  .      517 

/m.  at  battle   of  l.'anulen 518 

near     I'orlsnioutli 623 

(.irey,     Maj,    (leiil.    (Br.)     at    battle    of 

liran.iywine 3^7 

at  battle  of  Germantown 385 

in  skirmish  at  Chestnut  Hill 397 

threatens   La  Fayette's  righ: 4ot 

destroys     liedfor.l,    F'airhaveu     and 

.Martha's  Vineyard 455 


i| 


I  1  '  ', 


Mim  i 


I'  i! 


684 


CIIRONOLCi.rcAL   AN!)   GENERAL   INDEX. 


Cjrcy,  Maj.  (jciil.  surprises l>ayli)r's   \\ghl 

Imrsc  at    TapiJau 459 

li'.cy,  I.iciit.,  X'.  at  Savamiali 4S1 

tiiiiUcy,  Kicliaril,  Col. /■    1711,,/.  ijijli. 

Eiij^iiiecr  111  t'liiut,  1775 S4 

ljlaii>  rfikiiil)!  at  ISrcLil's  Hill 1)4 

lintliii,     Col     threatens     outposts     near 

rrciiii  11 ;;07 


to     occupy     attL-iUiou,    of     Colom.'l 

Doiiop 

faiK    to    cross    tin;    river    wlicu   cx- 


J71 

27I1 


pcclcil 

l.rillitlis,  i,)r.,  gives  evulence  on  trial  of 

l-^c> 4i5 

tiritlitlis,  Col.,  regt.  at    Harlem    Heij^lUs  229 
(irv)lius,  Hugo,  (Jurist), /'.  J^Sj,  </.   11)45. 

(lehno  war-1 25 

(luanls  anil  (Juiposts,  tlii.-ir  ihuies 39 

l>li;i  !■.  ili^ci  Miiiuation  between  walch- 


Guinea,    coa>t     of,    [/■<>:)    campaign,  e.v.- 

hil)itei.l  gooj  Logistics (19 

Gunby,  Col.,  iliMtinguislied  at   llattle  of 

Guilfonl 557 

loses  credit  at  Hobkirk's  Hill.  ...    572 


H. 

ILvl.i;,  Col.  at  Hubbardlon 3I(> 

regt.  with  Gates 33(1 

Hale,   ^alllan,   Capt.  (,./w.),  i.  1755,1/. 

I77f'. 
exeeuied   as   a  spy   in  Kutgcr's  Or- 
chard , 227 

his  memory  honored 78 

Hall,  l-ieiij.iiiun,   Mass.  (,'oin.  Supplies.  .        ij 
Hall,  (writer),  as  ''j  .Vrnold  at  Freenian's 

Farm 342 

Hadeck,   Henry  \.'.    .\I.ij.    Genl.  {.h/i.}, 
military  author  and  juiisi),  /;.  I.'5I4, 
a.  1772. 
placed  in   command,  1 602 — reasons 

of  I'res.  Lincoln 57 

tlistingnishes  perfect  and  imperfect 

wars 25 

(ielines  rebellion 31 

Hamilton,  .Mexaiuler,  Col.  su/>.  enunent 
Imaiicier,  d.  1757,  </.   1804. 
introduced  to  Weshington  liy  Gen.. 

Greene 72 

saves   his  guns  at    Chalterton   Hill  239 

sent  to  Gates  foi   troops 397 

as  to  D'l-'staing  at  N'.w  York 447 

commands  assault  upon  redoubt.  .  .    ()39 

sent  to  get  shoes  for  the  army 3S4 

Hantillon,  Genl.  (/)'/".),  at  lialtleof  liemis 

Heights 345 

I  lamilton,  (.lovr.  at    Detroit   annoys   the 

we>t 460 

left  I  tetroil  and  recovered  Vincennes  461 
Hauulton,  Lieut.  Col.,  N.  C.  I'rovincials 

/;■/> 496 

llamiltim's  I'rovincials  join  Cornwallis.    589 
rianiley.     Col.,     lir.    Army,     President 
Oueen's  Staflf  College,  1876. 
author  of  "  t^|)eralions  of  War".  ...      53 
as  to  occupation  of  a  capital 53 


Hamley  Col.,  as  to  order  of  battle 66 

as  to  a  good  retreat 73 

Hammond,     .Sir    ;\n<lrew.    Commodore 

commands  I  iowe's  fleet 364 

belore  House  of  Comntons 364 

arrives  in  New  \'ork  with  reinforce- 

inenls 47f) 

ll.immoiiil.  Col.  (./,'v.)  before  .\llgu^ta.  .    574 
llampstead,   Stephen,    Lieut.,   report   of 

1  ort  ( irisw old ()2A 

Il.iinplon,  Wade,  Col.,  distinguished  at 

lailaw  Springs 581 

continues  operations  at   the  South   .    5'*; 
ILiiiau,  troops,  to  be  hired  by  l'',ngland.    171 
Hancock,  John,  .Maj.  Gen.,  I'res.  of  Con 
gress(stale,.maii),  A.  I  "37,  </,  1793. 

on  .\Lrss.  Com.  .Safety c) 

has  notice  of  I'ercy'^  expedition  ...      11 
gives  notice  of  bounty  on   reenlisl- 

ment 244 

ailvises     Wasiiington      of      Howe's 

movements 3(15 

as  a  General  before  New])ort 451 

signs  protest  to  D'Lstaing 453 

Hancock's    Ibidge,   skiriiH>h   at,    >Lirch 

-5.  177'"^ 4<>5 

Hand,  ICdward,  Col..  /',   1744. 

at  Gravesend,  Long  Island 201 

lalK  back  to  i'iatbush 203 

at  Prospect  Hill 205 

at  Frog's  Neck 234 

has  skiimish  with  Hessians 236 

rille  regiment  at  Trenton 275 

promoted 279 

ritlemen  puslicd  toward  Princeton.  .  285 

skirmishes  with  Cornwallis 285 

gall. miry  at  Princeton 289 

appointeil  .Adjl.  Gen.  77iv  Scaminel  52(1 

Han  Ishaw,  Col.,  at  I'rospect  Hill 

Hanging  Rock,  attacked  by  Sumter.  ,  .  .  508 

Hanneman,  Lieut.,  sei:t  to  Col.  IJaume.  330 
ILulem     Heights,    occupied    by    \Vash- 

ingto!)    226 

and  vicinity 228 

Harlem  River  defended  by  earthworks  .  233 
HariKige,    Maj.   (/)'•.)    70.  at    Freenian's 

Farm 341 

Hariiet,  Cornelius,  excluded   from  (ien. 

Clinton's  pardon 175 

Harrington,    Karl   of,   belore   House   of 

Conimons 340 

Harris    (Rawdon's   Capt.),   (Br.),   /•.    p.t 

Bunker  Hill ■.    1 15 

Harrison,  Kobt.  H.,  Col.,  sends  a  rei)ort 

to  President  Hancock.! 375 

becomes  ( !hief  Justice  Oi'  Maryland.  5?6 

at  battle  of  .Monmouth 439 

Harrison,  Speaker  House  of  Delegates, 

Va.,  consulted  by  Washington.  .  .  461 
Harrison,     Penjamin,    visits     American 

';amp     143 

Hart,  dc,  (.'ol.,  reports  rcenlistments.  .  .  .  276 
Haslet,   Col.,    Del.   regt.  joins   army  at 

Brooklyn 197 

attacks     Major     Rogers'     Queen's 

Rangers 236 

his  Delawares,  at  Chatterton  Hill.  .  24c 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    LN'DEX. 


68s 


ILinIcI  ("ol.,  Del.  rpRt. /t.  at   Trinccton .  .   2891 
Hiisliii>;s,    W.irriii   Gov,   (icii.  I!cii^:il.  /'.  1 

1733,  </.  I. Si 8,  ciiiittMidH  for  llntaiii 

ill    liulia 527! 

Iiatlioiii,  ' 'i)l.,  at  \lil^li^illk 474 

lIaul.•^,  ('<i|.,  al  the  li.itlliMil  1  loliUiik  1 1  ill  572  ; 

Hayn(■^.  <'i>l.,  (-•xi't'uK'il  liy  <'<jI.  Ilalloiir.    575  [ 

Ila/cii,  Mosc 0,  Cul.,  /'.  1722  I 

ri'poits  i-Kiv'.'iiU'ius  (if  (  iHiiuallis.  .  .    370! 

regt.  j^chkI  coinliu't  at    lirap.ilywinc.    377 

rcgt.  ri'laiiu'd  in  llic  rii;iilar  army.  .    526 

sent    iiiti>  New  Jir^ty 622 

HazK'viMl.  cninmamuroii  llic  I  d'lauari-  363  | 

t(mi]iliim'iilcil  for  i)ravcry 3()i; 

lioi;lcct(.il  duty 3;^^ 

Head  'Juartir-.  of  American  Army.    (See 

Aniori(.:an  .\riiiy) 2i)l 

Heard's  l)iij;a<le  in  Spencer".-  divi-ioii  .  .    221 
orilircd     to    .'^einfoice    lort    Wasli- 

ini;loM   241) 

Ilcc'i,  \Vni.,  .Maj.  Gen.,/'.  1735,  </.  1S14. 

.1  a -s.  ( 'oni.   Safely () 

a  (ieii.  Ironi  Mas- lo 

appointed  l!ri^.  (ien.  Iiy  ('onj;re--.  .      81) 

as  to  jloreliester  lleii^lits i.;2 

ordered  to  New  \'or'<     i=() 

fffieieiit  in  retreat  (nim  Lon^  Nl'd  216-17 

ordered  to  Kinj^'^  lliiiij^e 221 

reaches  Wliile  I'lains 23> 

assij;neil  lo  the  lliijlilands 247 

at  I'eeksixill 25(1 

ordered  lo  coHeel  boats  for  his  com- 
mand      2gl 

makes     an     attempt    against    I'ort 

Independence 2<)2 

reproved  liy  W'ashinf^toii 21/2 

ordered  froni  lloslon 4(17 

stationeii  in  the  Iliijhlands (122 

his  army  on  the  Hudson (■.•2 

I  leister,  (ieii.  de,  al  l.onj^  Ishiiid 212 

Henry,   I'atrick   (orator  and   slate-in,in>, 
'  b.  173(1,  ,/.  17.).;. 

his  views  of  duty,  in  1775 S-; 

denounced  liy  Lord  Duinnoie Sd 

and  Lee's  inthience  in  Viri;inia.  .  .  .  174 
Henry,  Capt.,  dispatcli  to  the  .\dmiralty  47S 
Henderson,    Lieut.    Col,    .v.    at    lailaw 

.Spriiit;s 5S1 

Hcrkinter,  Nicliohts,  lirii;.  Gen,,  defeated 

aj^ain-t  his  ailvice  at  (,)ri-kany.  .  .    320 
makes  a  counter  iirociamation  to  St. 

Leger 332 

Herrick,  C'ol,,  at  b.ittle  of  l!ennini;lon,  .  332 
Hessc  Cassel,  ISritisli  contract  for  troop-   171 

Hessian  tioops  contracted  for '  7'  ^3 

regiments  at  Fort  Wasliini^lon 2?i 

scattered  througii  the  jer-eys,  Dec,, 

1776 ". 266 

surprised  at  Trenton 2711 

casualties  at  Trenton 274-? 

clfeet  of  their  capture  at  Trenton  ,  ,    27(1 

prisoneis  t;()  to  I'hiladeliihia 27(1 

Ilcwes,  Joseph,  on  Naval  ("omniitlee.  ,  ,  14.) 
Heywood,  Tluimas,  Jr.,  C  oni.  Safety,  S.  C.  171) 
Hill,    Lieut.    (A';-,),    Asst.    l'inj;r,,    made 

map  of  battle  of  (iermantown  .  .384-5 
Hill,    Col,,   enijages    Maj.    Forbes    near 

Fort  Ann 315 


illsborough,  captured  by  royalists.  .  .  .   583 
illliou-e,  Jaine-,('apl,,  uih.  eminent  law- 
yer and  senator,/',  1754,  r/.  1832. 

during  attack  on  New  Haven 461; 

i-lory,  to  be  placed  by  its  inl<:rpreliiig 

jihilosophy 17 

ilchcock.  Col,,  g,dlanlry  at  Princeton,    289 
sent    «ith   (jtecne    and   V'anium   to 

Ho-ion 8.4 

obkirk   Hill,   b.itlle  de-criiied 57! 

opinion  of    I'.irleton 573 

opiniiiii  of  Stedinan    574 

"line-,  Lieut.  {Am.)  k.  at  Savannah. .  .   4H1 
(•od.  Samuel,  Sir,  arrives  in  America  .   filj 

engage-  lleet  of  1  )e  (Ira— e (115 

opkin-,   John    !>,,   Naval   (apt.,  serves 

with  eiedil 654 

opkin-,  Stephen,  on  \a\al  ('oinmitlee   144 
ony,  I>,iiiiel,  t'.ipl,.  in  ,S,  ('.  regiment.    17c) 

commands  regl 184 

ony,  I'eler,  (apt,,  in  S,  (J.  regiment,  .    171; 

active  at  the  South 575 

or-e  r,u  iiig  and  e.\tr.ivag,iiK:e  rebuked 

,n  .Marvland ' fif) 

oili.im,  (  omuKxIore,  up  the  Ihnlsoii,  ,    357 

arrive-  with  i  le— i.in- Iijf; 

ou.ird.  I.ieul.  Col,  al  (  iiupens 544 

at  (iuillord 557 

oward,  I'liig.  (ieii,  (/)'■.),   volunteer,   'v. 

at  Guilford 563 

our  of  i'reiiaration 82 

ouk,  Chri-topher,  and  parly  eestroycd  507 
oue,     Robert,    Urig,    (jen,,    serves     in 

North  Carolina 175 

his  plantation  laid  wa-te 175 

is    exempted    from    (ieii,    (!liiilon's 

pardon 175 

defeated  at   ralnall's  plantation   .  .  .   460 
Houe,   Richard,  Lord,  Admiral,  /'.  1 725, 
./.  1791;. 

arrives  at  New  York 192 

acts  as  peace  comniis-ioner 194 

ucirks  for  peace 195 

confers  with  coiumitlei'  of  Congress  223 
strongly  in  favor  of  peace   .  .    ....   223 

convovs  Gen.  Howe'-  army 363 

leaves  IMiiladelphi.i 413 

escape-  before  I  I'iNlaiiig's  arrival.  .   447 
recalled    to    I'jigland    al     his    own 

iei|uest 447 

reinforced  by  Admiral  liyron 450 

engage-  1  )'F-,taing  olt  Newport....   450 

fleet  di-abled   and  di-persed 450 

regains  New  \'ork 451 

sail-  for  Iio-lon  seeking  D'llstaing.   455 
Howe,  \Vm,,  Sir,  Lieut,  (lenl.,/'.  1730,  </. 
1814. 

sent  to  .Xmerica !0 

landing  at  Moullon's  I'oint I03 

gallant  comluet  at  Hunker  Hill.  .  .  .    104 
commits   a    grave  frror  at   Hunker 

Hill     .,..' 114 

failed  lo  im|>rove  success 1 14 

di-cu— ion  of  his  plan 114 

eminent  in  strategy 1 14 

succiciled  (iage  al  I'x  ston 143 

hi-  ill-judged  proclamation 143 

mainiains  perlect  discipline l&h 


hrr 


*   a"  I' 


V!  »   " 


■'I' 


686 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AM)    (,1:m;KAI,    INDl  \. 


Howe,  Wni.,  Sir,  Lieut.  Geiil.,  regards 

Nc«-  \'(!ik  ri'-  ;i  prime  nbjcclivc  .  . 
as  to  Diirchcster  1  Iti'^lit'^ 

'V.R'U.llL-S    DllnlOIl 

orders  to  snare  privaie  |ini|iiiiy  .  .  . 

sails  fur  Ilaiilax 

from  llaliKi\  to  New  \niU 

writes  1(1  I,..r(l  tieim  liiie 

confers  Willi  tlov.    TrN'^ii   

divided  operaliMiis  eril  ieisicl 

reports  his  anival  at  New   \  ork  .  .  . 

a  peace  eomiui-sioiier 

corresponds  with  \V'a--l)iiii;ton 

his  cour^e  ha>  a  parallel  in  1^61-5,  . 
joined  by  (liiUoii  and  Connvallis.  . 

his  admiraljle  -lratct;y 

detailed  statement  of  his  army  .... 

hinds  troop,  \miIi  ^i^rnal  sUill 

at  battle  of  Lonj^  Island 

{;ains  .s>ullivan's  rear 

neglects  to  improve  sneee,-^ 

t;oes  into  trenches 

reports  American  retreat 

his  error  on  l-oni;  Island 

projioses  terms  of  settlement 

his  instriietions  limited 

lands  in  New   \'ork 

Head    (>uaiier>     at     the     lieekman 
Mansion 

reports  skirmish  at  llarlem  ilei;;lus 

(liseus",ion  of  reports 

calls  for  more  troops  and  ships  .... 

land,  at  l'roj;'s  Neck 

rcinlorced  bv  1  le^sian, 

reinlorced  by  Knyphaiiscn 

valuable  time  lo,t 

good  strategy  and  bad  logistics.  .  .  . 

loses  lime  at  White  I'lains 

l)attle  at  Chattertoii  Hill 

wait^  arriv.il  of  Lord  I'ercv 

AV.isliiiigton'.-,  army  escapes 

marche,  to   i  >obb>  h'erry 

plans  nioveiiuiit   on  riiiladelphia .  . 

marelie-;   to    Kings    liiidge 

his  opinion  of  I'oit-.  lee  .iiid  W'.i^h- 
ingloii 

matures  .i  plan  lor  the  war 

rctpiire-  !;ii.o()()  men      

lialts  (,'oriiwalli,  in  New  Jersey.  .  .  . 

loses  almost  inevitabli'  victory 

complinieiits  t  drnwalli,  on  his  cam- 

l'^'^'" ••••: 

posts  his  nrniy  in   winter  (piarters.  . 
returns   to    New    Vork,    I  tec.    14th, 

1776  ■••    ■: 

learns  condition  of  .Vmencan  army 

paused  at  the  hour  for  action 

his  erroneous  opinion  of  Trenton.  . 

opposed  to  Indian  auxiliaries 

calls  for  more  tioops 

his  winter  quarters  1776,  an  error.  . 

issues  a  proclamai  ion 

withdraws  troop-   from    Rhode    Is- 
land   

man  lies  toward   I'riiu  eloii 

report-  to  I  ord  ('lerniaine  his  jilan- 

Colli  lovir-v  w  iili  t'liiiton  immaterial 

criticised  by  ( iallow^y 


I?" 
152 

154 

f)2 
I0-! 
1(,J 
M' 

I'M 
l')4 
11)4 

I.)? 
I')') 

2o<) 
2(X) 
207 
21  1 
212 
21? 
219 
219 
22;, 
224 


2  JO 
233 

234 

235 

235 
235 
23(1 
23S 
23') 

241 
241 
242 
243 

247 


24^ 

2?4 

254 


25s 

2(,; 
2(19 

2(K} 

275 

279 

27') 

270 

27') 

294 

29S 
29S 

29S 

29S 


Howe,  Win.  Sir,  Lieut.  Genl.,  suddenly 

retires  to  liniiiswick yn) 

is  followed  to  I'iscataway 31K.1 

this  retreat  ciilici-.ed 300 

ailvances  toward  Washington 301 

.li'andon-  New  Jersey 301 

a-ks  for  leinforcenienis 3(11 

«  rile-  a  letter  to  be  inlerce[)tc(l  .  .  .    3(12 

-aiis  for  the  Hel.iware 3(12 

)il.in  of  canip.iign,  1777 3*13 

is  as-iired  by   l;i;rgo\  lie's  letters  .  .  .    3I13 

reaclie-  the  Delaw.iie 3(13 

-ail-  tor  the  Che-apeake 363 

state-  trials  of  .\iueric.in  warfare.  .  .    3(14 

hi-  movement  considered 3(1? 

I.iiid-  up  I'.lk  River jbd 

skirmishes  with  .Maxwell 3(16 

attempt-  to  llank  Washington 37(. 

iirilliaai  strategy  employed 373 

reports  his  movements 375 

his  report  of  battle  of  Ihandywine.    376 

a  -cientihc  soldier 381 

demonstrates  toward  Reading 382 

unjustly  critici-eil  fordelay 382 

capture  of  Wilmington 382 

meets  Washington  near  tioshen . .  .   383 

arniie-  separated  by  storm 383 

le.iche-  ( iermantown 384 

his  plan  of  b.ittlc 385, 

hi:-  re)iort  of  b.itile 38(> 

threatens  Wa-liiiigiun    at  ('hestnut 

Hill ; 3')7 

reports  skirmish  at  I'Mge  Hill 31)7 

retires  to  Philadelphia 398 

inactive  during  winter 401 

reasons  stated  by  himself 402 

recalle<l  to  Kngland 403 

expeditions  to  the  country 415. 

splendid   parting  jiageant  at  Phila- 

ilelphia 408 

Hubbard,  1 'ol.  at  battle  of  liennington.    332 
Hiid-on,  I 'apt.  lands  at  Mount  I'le.i-.mt.  4'i'> 

lands  on  Sullivan'-   Island 40'' 

linger,  I'lancis,  ('apt.  in   S.  ('.  regiment    17') 
linger.    Col.   (A'r.  I,     I'lovineial   legt.    at 

New  port 4?4 

Huger.  Isaac,  Lieut.  Col. /\  1725,1/,  17S2. 

S.  I  .   regt.  at  Tybee  Island 4;i» 

(lirig.  (ienl.i  at  siege  (pf  Savann.ili.  .    4S( 

at  Monk's  ('orner 40*' 

at   battle  of  Citiilford 5?7 

?i'.    at   Guilford 5(13 

at  battle  of  Ilobkirk  Hill 572 

linger,  Maj.  (/>'/•.),  re.  at  c:haiiotle 519 

1  luger,  l^iisign,  X-.  at  (iuiltord 563 

linger,  John,  Com.  Safety,  S.  (" 179 

Hughes,   wrongly    credits   Arnold    with 

plan  to  suipri-e  'rrentim 2(15 

his  ojiinion  of  battle  of    Trenton .  .  .   281 

Hughes,  Lieut,  rt'.  at  taiilHud 5(13 

Hull,  Ma],  at  sioiniing  of  Stony  Point.  .    472 
Ihmiphreys,   .Andrew    H.,    Ihig.    Cenl., 

I'.ngr.  in  Chief,  U.  ,S.  .\rmy 2 

Wumphrey's,    Maj.   (AV.),   at    Lrecnian's 

Larm 340 

Hume,  Lieut.  (.7w.),  A  at  Sav.uinah (>2 

I  luntington'-  r<'g'l  at  I  ong  l-land 20S 

promoted   ling.  Ijenl 296 


.  .  .  3'"-' 

.  . .  3'» 

. . .  300 

. . .  301 

. . .  301 

...  Uii 

•  •  ■  3')2 

. . .  36c 

...  363 

■  •  •  3<'.< 

...  3(.3 

.  .  .  30-? 

...  3''4 

.  . .  3(1=; 

.  .  .  36() 

.  .  366 

...  37c 

•••  373 

• • •  375 

lie.  376 

...  3*  1 

•  •  .  3S2 

...  3*^2 

...  3?2 

■  ■■  3S3 

.-.  3S>3 

...  384 

...  38=, 

.  ■ ..  3J*(' 

lUIt 

•  •  ■  397 

■••  397 

. .  .  3yS 

.  .  .  401 

. .  .  402 

.  .  .  403 

■  •  •  415 

. .  ,  40S 

m.  332 

ml.  41/) 

.  .  .  4'|i' 

rnt  1711 

at 

■•■  454 

.S2. 

•  ■  •  4.59 

1.  .  4S1 

.  .  .  4()f> 

•••  557 

...  5O3 

•••  572 

...  5iq 

...  563 

...  I7() 

CHRONOLOGIC.VL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


6S7 


Hyder  Ali,  sweeps  through  Madras 527 


Johnson,  Sir  John,  excites  Indian  hostil- 

.'Ji'^^ 164 

W-nh  St.  LeRcr  at  Fort  Schuyler 323 

I.  iiiLitcs  hostilities  in  1780 i."^ 

Johnson,  Col.  Erancis,  Court  of  IiK|Mirv, 

Improvemknt  of  success   .  .  "5     1,        (^^''"'vIlmI .'.'  312 

Indc|.en.leiice  has  its  conditions!!.'.'"     ;^;,  I  J'^'""^"".,    William,    l).    S.    Sup,    C.nirt 
Indian  auxiliaries  hriiit,'  railicnl  trouble'   3^^  I  (historical  writer). 

to  l.r  il.hoMvd.  <aid  lUiproyne  '   30^,  '^^  '"  skumishat  WillianiM.ir..  I'lan- 


opposeil  by  (ienl.  Scluiylcr'. i;S 

Indian     in.a^s.icros     in     WyoiniiiL;    and 


India 


(  herrv   Valleys. 


459 


30-1 
•      .3" 
3" 


laii  scouts  and  l!nii^li  dra,i;oon>  rout 

each   other ' ,,.,- 

Iiihani,  Lord,  opposes   the   hue  ol    IlVv 

.sialic 

Insurrection,  see  civil  u.ir 

has  no  apoloijy 

imperils  all;  benelits  none „ 

Interior  and  exterior  linc^  defined.    .!!      5S 
Irvine,  James  Brij;.  tJeiil. /;■;>.  at  Che.s't! 

nut    Hill ^,^. 

Irvine,   Win.,  Col, /,-/,-.  at   •Hiree"  Ki'v'c'rs   167 
Irvm-,   \\adnin;lon,    (historian),    diplo- 
mateand  scholar,  /'.  17S3.  ,/.  1S59. 
as  to  the  retreat  Iroin  Hrooklvn.  .".  .    2rS 
a,s  to  the  inarch  of  (Jates  south   .  .  .    5o<) 

as  to  Jackson,  a  boy  in  battle hh) 

Itinerary    from    Fort    Lee   to    I'hiladel- 

P''''i 243 


234 

<59 


J. 

Jackson,  M.aj.,  rallied  troops  at  Hunker 

Hill 

Jackson,  Lieut.,  with  anillerv  at  Fi'o.nr's 

Neck ' "'^ 

at  F(n-t  I'liiHon ' 

Jackson,    .\ndrew,  .at/'.   Maj.  (;enl,    and 

I'rest.  twice.  /'.  I  767,  ,/.  1,-^45. 

at  skirmish  at  Haii-inj,'  Uock" 500 

Jaojuerie    insurrection,    135S,   illustrates 

civil    war -,,, 

Jamaica  ro.ad  ne;,'lened  at    L.mi;  I-i.i'nd!   2o(') 
Jameson,  .Maj.  reports  a  scout   .'d,,ii-   tlur 

liiandywiiie .,-„ 

Jani/aric,    in    l<j(.  ;     illustrate    niiiii.iiy"''' 

,          i",''"-y '.  4- 

Ja.sper,  ,Vrj;t.,  at   Fort    Moulirie ,,,, 

/'.  at  sieiije  of  Savannah ^s  , 

Jay,  John,  statcsiii. Ill  and   jurist,/..   17415', 

(/.    I82i). 

proposed   to  burn  New  York...,        -\< 

ill  ^P;iin .'.'    '-^', 

Jefferson,  .Mason  and  Wyihc  the  p.itrons 

of  the  west ' ,(•,[ 

JelTerson,  Thomas,  (statesman), <JoV.f«X 
I'lest.  twice, /;.  1743,  ,/.  July  411, 
1826.  J     ,    t     . 

rejects  Arnold's  proposals £4,1 

(ie|ireeales  larj,'er  powers   in  "Wasiil 

'"S"'"        599 

narrowly  escapes  capture  by  I'arle- 


tation , J. 

ccuiiinents  on  civil  discord !   542 

Joiiiini,    Henri    li.uoii  de,  (  miutiI,  niili. 
tary  writer,  />.  1779,  </.  iS(m). 
iL;iiiires   representative  goveinmeiits     27 

delincs  nidiiary  policy .j 

Ui-lins,'iii.shes   war  on  the  iii.ip,  .md 

war  on  the  field 44 

deliiiiiioii   of  base  ol    oper.itioiis.  .  .       ;(i 

upon  a  base  of  operations 51 

niaxiiiis  ill  siratci^v („, 

on   tactical   posiiin'ns 67 

on  the  loi^isiics  of  .Vapolcin 71-2 

opinion  of  a  good  retreat •;3 

delines  .pialities  of  a  t;ood  -eiier.il!      80 

Jones,  .Maj.   X'.  a:   .Savannah 482 

Jones,  C'apt.,  t,rallant  at  Freeman's  Farm  341 
Jimes,  John  I'.'u:,  />.  1747,  ,/.  xy,^ 

appointed  Lieut j, . 

distiiiLjuished  as  a  coinm.indcr (j?4 

Jubilee   at    Valley    F(n|;e    over    Fiencli 

alliance ,u. 

Jubilee    at     I'hiladelphia     in    honor    Ii'f 

Lord  Howe 40^ 


ton 


60  r 


Jesuits,  not  expelled  f..r  their  )elij!,'ion  4' 

Johnson,  Sir  Win.,/..    1714,  ,/.    1774...    3.., 


K. 

K.VSK.ASKIA  (Illinois'),  taken  by  Clark  .  .   4M 

Kelley,  Lieut..  «'.  at  .Moninoiith 444 

Kelley,  I'liisis^n,  7i'.  at  (niilford ^f,.', 

Kennedy,  Lieut.,  /•.  at  Monmouth 444 

Kennett  Meetim,'  House ^^j, 

Kent,  James,  Chief  Justice,  N.  V.  (jurist 
and  authoi ,,  /..  I7()3,  ,/.  iS47'. 

opinion  of  Schiivler  .'. ' 31^ 

Kentucky  forts  j,Mll.iully  defemled  !  ! !  !  !   400 
Keppic,  Admiral,   t^'ives   an   opinion   of 

till-  ».u   ^  ^  ^     y  , 

Kettle  (reck,  skirmish  brlv\<.cn   Tickens 

and  lioyd ,(, , 

Kiechlmes  rille  b:tllalion  at  l;n.,,krvn' !  !  20^ 
Kiiii;ston,  Acljt.  Cei,.,   reports   bmile   ,,f 

Fieeinan's  I'.uin -,41 

Kiiii^stoii  (INopiis)  burm-il ,[[   ^do 

Kiii:;'s  llrid^e  fortified !   b^t) 

Ki.i,t;'s  M.iiiiitain,  battle  described 520 

Kirkwood's  Dclawares,  at  battle  of  Cuil- 

f"!'''   z,cn 

at  battle  of  llobkirk  Hill 571 

at  Untie  ol   lOutaw  Springs Vsr 

Kitchell,  Mr...  I'/al,  noted  for  patriotism  487 
Knowles  t-aiit.,l,'.ndson  Sullivan  Island  490 
Knowlton,  Tho;:ias.  Capl.,  sit/:  Colonel 

at  Hunker  Hill 

KnowltcMi,  /-.  at  Harlem  Heights  .!.... 
Knox,  Col.,  .,///'.  .Maj.  (Jen.  (secretary  of 
war),  6.  1750,  ,/.  1S06. 
Col,  of  artillery i  , , 


95 
22q 


ft     1 


m 


ili^F' 


688 


CllK(»Nt)L()GICAl,    AND    GIAERAL    INlJlA. 


rAi.i'. 
Knox,  liauls  cannon  iVom  Koit  I  ii'(ir,L;i'  t'> 

liii>lon l-tS 

at  Now  Vi)rk li)(i 

to  (livjilc  his  iulilli  ry 2.(^ 

cnlisi",  ;iilillLTyn;in  iii  M;l^■..  ......  ;.'()4 

at  ( id  ni.uiiou  n   3?a 

aJvisrs  to  allack  New  \  mk 404 

at  Moununitli j  V) 

vi.sils  Count  lie  (il^l^.^^• (1  u 

is  inoinoic'il <];!; 

Willi  \\  a.iliiiii^lon  lliiciui;li  llii'  war  .  ()j5 
suciX'L'ds    l.iiuiihi    a.i    >tcrc-i;uv  ot 

War '.  .  ..  (.;? 

recL'ivfs  the  surrciiiliT  of  New  N'ork  11^1.1 
Kno.x,   l.ii'u  .,  ()ti)    I'lMin  ,  ilisliiii;ni-^lieil 

at  Sion\  I'oinl 472 

Kliyphau^cn,    l.u-nl.    (ion.,    /'.    1730,    </. 

sclcctfiJ  to  conini.ind  anxili.u  ics  ...  17.! 

arrive-,  at  M.Ut-n  Uhmd 2  ij 

is  transfcrrcil  to  .New  Koclu'llc  ....  235 

marclics  low.ird  I'ort  Wa>liint;ton  .  242 

at  Korl  \Va-liini;loii 24c) 

at  Konni'll  ,Si|U.ul' 3(17 

at  (.'iiadd'^  l-'or.l 3(<7 

i:iit,'ai;c-.  .M,i\wl11 3O1) 

at  l>raiKlyi\  inc 370 

at  llrandywiiR',  lorccs  Cliadd's  Kcjid  37(1 

at  (jirinaiiiown }r,ti 

at  (.'lifsinut  lldl 31^7 

en  ivitlc-  lor  .Monmouth 413 

at  .M  on  mo. all 434 

retreats  to  New  \  01k  .    442 

ill  conimniiii  at  New  \'ork 4"^3 

cio.ssc".  on  ihc  ice  to  New  Jersey.  .  .  4.^5 

invades  Westchester  (.'ounty,  .N.  Y.  451) 

invades  New  Jersey fP 

at  ^|)iini;lield,  New  Jer.scy 41/J 

not    re>|ion.d)le     for    late    of    .Mrs. 

Caldwell 41)1^ 

retreats  to  Stateii  Island.  . 5(K) 

Kohlcr's  (//  )  heavy  artillery  at   Trenton, 

'777     2,s5 

Kosciusko,   Ihaddeiis,  .Maj.  (Jen.  {/'oA), 

h.  1750?  ,/.  1.-117. 

fortifies  West  I'oint 403 

plans  tamp  lor  ( iate-.   33(1 

hUCeeeils  Dii  I'orl.ul  as  ijii;iiieer-;n- 

Cliief 527 

explore^  the  Calaw  ha 531 

joins  tireene 552 

at  Ninety  Six 574 

remembered (1^; 


L. 

LaceY.  Urig.  (Ion.  (A'r.)   in   skirmish   at 

Crooked  ISillet 405 

La  I'"ayetle,  tiilberl  Mottier,  .Manpus  de, 
Maj.  (.en.,  /'.  1757.  (/.  1S35. 
from  New|iort  to  lio^ton  .iiul  return     58 

assureil  the  I'reneh  .Mli.inee 7c) 

a  volunteer  at  halllc  of  IJrandywine  3'5U 
attacks  rear-gu.ird  ol   ('ornwallis  in 

N.J 3()6 

assij;ned  to  a  division  I'nc  Stephen.    y)i\ 
a»!>H;ned  to  invasion  ol  Canada (oj 


I. a  Fayette,  concurs  witli  Washini.;lon 
as  to  polie) 

in  eoniniaiid  at  ll.uren   II  ill 

his  eharai-ti'risties  sl.ited 

skillful  conduct  at  li.iiien  liill  .... 

pur>iie.-,  t'linton  toward  .Moniiiouth. 

writes  as  to  his  movement^ 

is  tjeiierovi^  to  Cien.  Cliarli>  l>ee  .  .  . 

confers  w  iih  I.ee  as  to  battle 

sliowx  i.jallantry  at  Monmouth 

is  onleied  to  .Newport 

vi>it>  I  ('I'Nt.iiuL;  ,it  l;.i>lon 

coniiiul^  the  retn-ai  from  Newport. 

i;oes  III  I- ranee  in  the  li  i_i;ate  .Mliancc 

return-,  to  .\  me  ilea 

ailjusts  (/'/.I  military  assistance.  .  .  , 

is-,iies  a  mock  appeal  to  ('anada  .  .  . 

jiropusi'-,  an  exiiedition  a;.;ainst  .New 
\-..rk ' 

applie-.  to  join  liieene  at  the  ^onth. 

explain^  the  .American  mutiny 

is  sent  to  capture  .Vrnold 

f^oes  to  \  irL;iiiia 

visits  N'lnktown  and  Suffolk 

reconnoitre-,  I'ortsmouth 

his  instruction-. 

ordered  tii  join  ( Ireene 

reiained  in  \  irt;ini,i 

deals  judiciously  with  deseiiers    .  .. 

advances  toward  Richmond 

at  Hanover  Court  Ilou^e 

iepuNe-.  .111  attempted  laiidiiii; 

reports  his  rapid  march  to  \'irj;inia. 

receives  2.(hk)  i;uiiieas  from  Balti- 
more      

pi. Ills  an  expedition  to  Wilniini^ti'ii 

ill-,  letters  to  Wasliiiv^toii 

alleiniits  to  cut  off  (.ornwallis 

(inds   Phillips'  division  in  his  way.  . 

is  coiilronied  by  two  armies 

aids  (Ireene  with  supplies 

is  sus|;iined  by  Wasliin.^'.ii! 

.issij^ned  to  command   in  Viij^inia.. 

advances  to  Wilton,  below  Rich- 
niond 

unfolds  his  pkiiis  to  1  lamiiton 

a|ipreciates  the  campaiL;n 

makes  a  prediction  of  the  result.  .  .  . 

elfccts  a  junclion  with  W.iyne 

follows  (iMiiw.illis  from  Llk  Hill  .  . 

efficts  a  junction  with  Steuben  .... 

reports  skirmish  at  Willianisburt;  .  . 

reports  movenients  of  Cornwallis  .  . 

lio|)es  to  assume  the  olleiisive 

is  c.nnplimented  by   I'arleton 

eonspicuou-  in  battle  of  Jamestown 

retires  to  Malvern  Hill 

at  I'drksof  I'ainunkyand  Mattapony 

threatens  thi:  rear  of  (  doiicesler.  .  .  . 

avoids  l.ilsc  inovemeiils 

compliments  Coniw.iUis 

lli.mks  Washiiii^ton  for  the  command 

delavs  the  attack  upon  Vorktown.  . 

anticipates  the  action  of  Cornwallis 

ill  full  accord  with  Wa.-liin^toii .  .  .  . 

his  rel.ilions  with  ( Ireene 

his  excellent   loi;istic-.   noticed 

leports  the  conditi.jii  of  his  army.  . 


404 

4"5 
400 
4CX. 
414 
414 
415 
425 
434 
44  i 
45.^ 
455 
4115 
49" 
4')I 
504 


B;'3 
52d 

53'< 
5-i4 
5'S 
5^5 
5«5 

SSI) 

5S(, 

5  SO 
5,S.) 
5'/' 

591 

593 
59a 
593 
593 
593 
593 
593 
594 
594 

594 

594 

()(>) 
'W3 
603 
O04 
604 
fity- 
61.. 

6()S 
609 
6()() 
(jll 
6u 
()ll 

(HI 
(Jl2 
()U 
(H3 
614 
617 
021 
')23 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  CLNERAL  INDEX. 


689 


■  ■  4"5 
.  .  40O 
..  AOi: 
1.  414 
..  414 
..  415 
..  425 
..  434 
.  .  44^ 
..  45J 
t.  455 
uc  4115 

. .  4'rJ 

..  4')i 

.  .  5"4 
k:\v 

.  .  5;'3 
ih.  V^i 

.  .  5.)' 
,..  5-^4 
...  5^5 
...  5»5 
.  .  .  S'^S 
..  .    S'M) 

•  ■■  s'^" 
...  S^^o 
...  5^0 

5^ 

5' 

5' 

5< 

592 

592 
502 
593 
593 
593 
593 
5')4 
una.  .  51J4 
Rich- 

5')4 

594 

S')i 

I.    .   .    .      '!"<> 

(M3 

lill  ..  ()''3 

1 '104 

urn  .  .  '><-)4 
111.  .  .  M 
()<. . 

()OS 

;slown  (>Oi) 
f)()c) 

t.\|H)ll>  'HI 

IM-.   .   .'.  Oil 

()11 

' ()II 

(Jl2 
()U 
013 

614 
017 

1 ()2  I 

inuv.  .   '>23 


LaFayfttc,  rc|)()vts  (he  landing;  dI  lrciii.li 

lnHi|i. (124 

liis  241I1  liirlliday,  Si'|il.  Olli,  ly-il  .  .  ii2j 
iliiccts  lliL'  allaiU  <)|  a  n-ilinilil.  .  .  .  dji 
Ills  iilca^aiiliy  willi  IJaioii  Vioiiu'inl  <>}<) 
U.I1111K  to  Ir.iiici-  alui  lall  wl  \'orl<- 

Icjw  11 (j4() 

lli.->   ^c•lvi^(.•s   icco^lii/'L'd '15; 

L.anilj,  John,  Ci)l.,/'.  173?.  </.  iSoj. 

Willi  Arnold  in  ass.iuli  Ujion  (Jiiclicc  13(1 
CDiumaiuls  post  al  .ViilliDiiy's  Nusc.  355 
at  assault  upon  Fort  .Mi)nii;iiiiu'iy.  .  351; 
aucompaiiics    \VasliiiiL;ti)ii     to    \  ir- 

},'ini,i ()22 

Lamb.  K..  scii;l.  Koyal  Welsh    l'ii..,ilccis 

pulilislii'.  Ill-,    (li.uv |(n 

itliiuts  sullVriiiijs  i>l    ./;/;.  army   in 

Canada I'lS 

(Icscrilii's  Ixitik'  .11  l''n'fiiian's  Kami    ,41 
Ills  opininn  (if  halllf  iif  Muniiioulli,    445 
liis  txpt  riciicx"  of  hank'  of  CJuilloid   5(13 
Lauiclli,   (  lu-\alK'r    dc.   (/■;■.)    :.'.  before 

\ Oikiowii ()U 

LaiiL;il<iii,   .Samuel    Kev.,    I'les.    Harvard 
('ollei;e.  /'.  I  723,  1/.  179T. 
inxoUed  liod's  liles>iii^  upon  111, mil 

to    lUiiiker  Hill ()? 

l.anL;don,  l<ilin.  on  .//v  na\al  eominillee    144 
1  and  i  11!^  1 'I,  liriiisli  I  roups  al  Ihinker  Hill   m; 

i.on^    Islaiul 200 

New  \  urk 225 

!•  roL;'s    .Neek 2;,4 

I'ell's  I'oint 2  ',7 

\'er|ilaiiek's  I'oint 117 

He.id  <jf  LIk }ut, 

in  Soulli  Carolina 493 

I'renel:  troops  al  Newport.  K.  1..  .  .   4^0 

Savannah,  ( ja 473 

Jame^touii,  \'a Oil 

La   Sensible,  lrit;ate,  III  iiii;s   the    Lrciuh 

ircaly 404 

Lasher,  (I'l.  {.In/.)   in   llic   nii;hlaiuls.  .    247 
Latimer,  (ol,,  in  llie  army  of  (iates.  .  .  .    jjlj 
Laurens,  Henry,  (statesman),  l'.   1724,  J. 
1792. 

on  t  oiii.  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Vice-president  of  South  Carolina.  .    iSo 
ca|)tured  on  a  mission   to  Holland.    52S 
Laurens,  John,  Lieut.  I  ol.,  aid  de-camp 
of  \\  ashin;.;loii,  A.  I  753,  </.  1732. 
Judije   Advocate    (  ourl    of   Lupiiiy 

(Sehuylerl 312 

with  La  l.ivelte  in  .New  Jersey.  .  .  .    39(1 

sustains  D'lvtainj; 447 

conspicuous  at  siet^e  of  Newpoit.  .  .    45,4 

in  the  assault  upon  Savannah 4.31 

sent  on  s|iecial  mission  to  France.  .  539 
holds  an   interview  with  Count  \  er- 

gcnnes 540 

brings  back  !;old   for  the  .Vmerican 

army 623 

conspicuous  at  sieL;c  of  Vorktown.  .  63() 
a  commissioner   at    capitulation    of 

^  orklown 640 

Lake,    Lieut,   veil,  (/>»-.)    leads  a   sorlie 

from   \  orktown 640 

Lauzun,  Duke  de,  with  army  of  Kuchain- 

beau   61S 

44 


Lauzun,  al    Kid^ebury,  t'oiinecticut    ...  O19 
routs  Delaiiccy's  Kelut;ees  at  .Moiris- 

saiiia 020 

dek'als     'I'arleton's      Legion      lu'ai 

(iloucesler 638 

l.aw>on\  Virtjinia  iialt.ilion  at   I'lenlon.  273 

Lau.oii  l!nj;.  (ieiil.  at  battle  of  (Juilford  557 

Learned,  Urii;.  (ieiil,,  ordered   to  relieve 

Fort   .Schuyler 324 

at  battle  of  Freem.in's  !■  ,irm 33(1 

lieniis   Heit;lits 347 

S.iratoLja 351 

Ledyaid,  \Villiaiii   Col.,  (./w.i,  /'.  l~SOc/. 

I  731,  coniniaiidn  1' iirt  (iiiswold.  62.S 

wantonly  killed  by   Royalists (129 

Lee,  Kiiha  d  Henry,  (statesiii.ui),/'.  1752, 
,/.  1794.  . 

uiije-.   \  iii;inia  to  arm.     85 

on   .h/i.  nav.il   coinmitlee 144 

Cooperate.,   with    I'.Urick    Heiny    in 

\'irt;inia 174 

sent   to  tiiid    ('liarles    Lee 2()2 

wishes   the    powers  o(    Washington 

enlaiijed 59^ 

Lee,  Henry,  (!ol.  .fii//,  liiii;.  Cenl.^'.  I75'i, 
1/.  iSkS. 

his  skill  with   lij;lit  trooi's 64 

at  storiniii^  of  .Stony  I'oint 472 

makes  a  dash   al  i'aulus   Ib>ok....  475 

Ills  re^iinent  recruited  al  larL;e.    ...  52!) 

ordered  to  sonlhern  de|iarlinelit.  .  .  .  533 

oniered  to  join  .\Iort;an 551) 

with  lienl.  (ireeiie  on   the  Dan....  552 
reerosses     the     D.in,    for    oikiisive 

action ."3 

skirmishes  before  tiuilloid 5110 

in   the  b.Utle  of  Cnillord fi'io 

at  capture  of  Fort  W'.itson 5119 

at  capture  of  Fort  .Moltc 57.1 

al  sie^e  of  .\iij^usta 574 

captures  Foit  Craiiby 574 

Lee,  Charles,  M.aj.  (ienl./'.  1731,  1/.  17S2. 

w  ,  li  (.hit.)  army  before  lioston.  ...  89 

resembled  .Vrnold  in  volcanic  temper  llij 

sent  to  Coiineclicul  to  recruit  troops  149 

ordered  to   New  \  ork 149 

denoiiiices  Contjies. 149 

his  conduct  at  New  York,  (Note).  .  Ibo 

(udered  to  Canada,  then  10  ti.e  south  17  , 

arrives  al  Cliarlcslon,  S.  C' 182 

Is  controlled  by  rresident  l\utled_L;e  1S2 

^ives  wise  counsel  to  the  troops.  .  .  .  183 

visits  Fort  .Sullivan  iluriny  ilic  battle  i8() 

joins  Washington  at  the  north 237 

is  as-i};ned.  under  restrict ini;  orders  237 

reaches   Wiiite    I'lains 238 

writes  to  dates,  deridint;  Congress.  238 

criticises  the  | osition  of  the  army.  .  239 

is  ordered  to  New  Jersey 251) 

in  cam])  at  North  l.'asile 256 

commands  a  lari;e  division 256 

in  New  Jersey  with  Ins  army 258 

is  captured  at  liaskin!.;ridt;e 258 

wriles  to  (iaie-,  im|iroperly 259 

disobeys  W'.ishington's  orders 2f)0 

insolent  to  ( lenl.  Heath 261 

writes  to  R.  H.  Lee  and  1!.  l\ush.  .  26a 

writes  attain  to  H<;atli   ...  262 


fli 


,li\ 


690 


CHRONOLOGICAl,   AND   (iKNKRAI.    INl>i;.\. 


1)1 

asks  C^)llglx•s^  to  cdufiT  with  liiin  . 

proposes  a  coiuprdiiii^c  of  tlic  war 


PACK 

Lee,  his  capture  mildly  noticed  by  Wash- 

iii^loii   263 

(ipposi-s  Wasliiiit;l(in 398 

joins  the  amiy  alu-r  cxchaiij^e 409 

advisi's  VVafiliiiii;lc)ii   4(11) 

I  parole,  ijif<ire  his  excliaiii;e 4ihj 

4IC1 

410 

^ives  improper  iiifonnatioii  to  1  lowe  410 

oppose^  the  pursuit  of  Cliiiloii 417 

be^s  l,a  Kayetle  to  yiel<l   his  eoiu- 

niatul 4' 5 

his  pc-bey  defeetive 417 

comiriaiiiis  a  division  of  ^.(KK)  ineii  .   41)5 
understands  WasliiiiLjlou's  wishes..    422 

cjuililiies  as  lo  orders 424 

retreats  at  Monmouth 437 

lias  an  allereation  wiiii  Washiiij^toii. 440-1 
is  tonvieted  liefore  court  ni.irtial.  .  .    445 

his  cireuiiislances  ccuisidereil 445 

iiis  death  a  lesson 44s 

declare-,  the  canipaii^n  of  177S  to  be 

final ' 44^' 

l.ci^hton,   C'apl.   (Br.)   7r.   at    battle    of 

Monmouth 444 

l.eiich,  Maj.  (.1/11.)  i:  at  Harlem  IIeiL;lils 
L  Isnfant,  Slaj.  (/•>'.)  tries  to  l)urn  abatis 

at  Savannah 

Leslie,   Maj.  (ien.   (A'r.)   lantls  on    New 

V,.ik  Mand 

in  skirmish  at  Harlem  lleit;lits.  .  .  . 
commands  the  assault  at  thattertou 

Hill 

is  stationed  at  Maidenhead,  N.  J..  .    2.^5 
is  ordereii  to  join  Cornwallii 541 


229 

479 
225 

22c) 
240 


497 
52f) 
5-') 
=  41 
?4'- 

54') 

55« 


takes  )iossession  of  Charleston 

inviules  Virt;iMia 

fortilies  rorlsuioulli  and  Noriolk  . 

marches  to  join  (..!ornwallis 

eftects  a  jtUKtion  with  (,'ornwallis. 
is    advised    of    reinforcements    U 

Virginia 

at  the  battle  of  (niilford 

reinforces  Cornwalbs  from  New  York  456 
Leslie,  William,  son  of  Earl  of  Levin,  i. 

at  rrinceton 289 

Lexington  and  Concord,  their  lesson  ...  8 
expedition,  as  judged  by  Stedman  .  II 
expedition,  ns  judged  by  Dr.  Dwiglit  12 
battle,    news   spreads    through    the 

C'olon-ies     Si-6 

Light  Irooii.-,,  their  value  illustrated  .  .  .  .fi3-.4 
Light    Infantry    (.//«.»,    auihori/ed    and 

distributed 87 

Lillington,  Col.  (.-I'll.)  at   Mo.. re's  Creek 

'  Ibidge,  Va 

Lincoln,  .\braham,  I'res.  U.  S.,  twice  /'. 
lS(X)  (/.  1865. 
acts  upon  llie  basis  of  sound  strategy 
Lincoln,   Benjamin,   Maj.  Gen.,  /'.   1733, 
(/.  1810. 

on  Mass.  Com.  Supplies 

joins  the  army  near  New  York  .... 

before  Fort  Independence 292 

jiromoted  Maj.  Gen 296 

I'res.  Court  of  hupiiry,  as  to  Schuyler  312 
sent    to    threaten    ISurgoyne's   com- 
munications      321 


174 


9 
231 


Lincoln  urges  Gen.  Stark  to  join  the  army  331 
sui'ceed.s   to   cununand   of   .AinoM's 

tlivision 347 

at    Saratoga,  after   battle  of    lleiuis 

Heights 350 

makes  a  raid  about  licondcroga  .  .  ;>5l 
succeeds  Gen.  Robert    Howe  at  the 

South 4''4 

opposed  bv  .Maj.  tien.  I'rcvost 464 

unwisely  divides  his  command 4()4 

retreats  to  I'harljston 465 

proposes  the  capture  of  Savannah.  .  477 
sends  vessels  to  land  /■>:  troops.  .  .  .  478 
commands  an  assaulting  column  ...   481 

raises  the  siege  of  Savannah 483 

in  command  at  Charleston 494 

surremh'rs  (.'harle^ton  to  Gen.  Leslie  497 

in  expedition  from  I'eekskill O19 

in  skirmwh  near  lort  Independence  619 
commands  the  right  wing  at  N'ork- 

tuun 635 

receive^  the  ^uiiendei  of  N'orklown.  b42 
conduds     ./w.      army     to      « inter 

(juarter-  ....    '45 

r)n  duly  as  Secretary  of  War 655 

.iiies  of  communication ....      58 

.ines  of  defense 5? 

not  to  be  held  passively 5(1 

,ines    of    operation,    ihe    pathways   M 

armies 54 

parallel  and  deep,  illiistraled 5,4 

.incs  of  Sliennau's    march   to   the   sea, 

reall)  but  one 57 

.iiisiug.  Col.  (//.)  in  attack   upon   Fort 

.Mercer 394 

.i^le,  Lieut.  Col.,  joins  ^l//i.  army  with 

his  recruits 508 

.i'tle,  Moses,  Col.,  sent  men  to   ISuiiker 

Hill  too 

.illie  Neck.  N.  J.,  visited  by  I'eiguson.    45() 
■  ively,  fri^.ile,  opens   fire   upon    Hri'cd's 

Hill oS 

Livingston,     James,     Col.,     recruits     a 

Canadian  battalion 

at  (-'hambly  with  ^Llj.  llrown 129 

at  siege  of  t^tuebec 134 

at  battle  of  I'reenian's  Farm 336 

Livingston,    Henry    1!.,  Col.,  at   Ticon- 

deroga 312 

his  opinion  M  the  ))o^t 312 

at  the  battle  of  I'Veeman's  Farm.  .  .    336 

at  the  battle  of  Monmouth 439 

al  llie  siege  of  Newport 4?! 

at  the  b, It  tie  of  (^)uaki'i's  Hill (54 

Living-.ton,  Willi.un,  Gov.  N.J.,/'.  1741, 
i/.  1 790. 

supports  Washington 246 

Locke,   Francis,  (^ol.  {.■///;.)  X\  at   Char- 
lotte, N.  ('.  .  .  .    5") 

at  Ratii--our's  ^LIIs 519 

Logan,  Maj.  (A»i.)  reconnciin.-s   before 

Fort  Clinton 359 

Logistics  defined 48 

illustrated 68-72 

when  bad,  imperils  all 6g 

embraces  all  executive  functions. .  .     6g 

of  America,  in  war  of  1861-5 6g 

of  I'russia  in  1870 69 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENLKAI,    LNDKX. 


691 


129 

.... 

134 

336 

ci,)n- 

. .  . . 

312 

312 

u.  .  . 

33'> 

439 

.  . .  . 

45t 

. . . . 

454 

1711. 

246 

hai-. 

.  . . . 

5 1') 

.... 

5i<) 

efore 

.... 

359 

48 

...68-72 

.... 

69 

s. .  . 

(>9 

.  *  .  . 

fa9 

<  • .  ■ 

69 

I.OKi'^lii^'S   Ihe  KrtMt  care  .if  Wa-Mii-lcM    14,, 
pRuiiiiK'iii,  ;it    l!lili^ll    laiuliii^;    mi 

Lc.iil;  IvI.umI j,^j 

go.1.1,     (liirinj;      ./w.     iL-Uont      fioiii 

liiiiiiklvii  ....    .ji^, 

ol'  \\  .i-lmi-1,,11  illustraUMl '..^;   () 

<>l  I..1  layc'ik-  in  Viri;ini:i ;,,, 

of  (.iicMl    llriiain  in  .\iiv-.siiii.i  (..im 

l''.''^" '. (.., 

f'fdrcal  I'.iiiaiii  on  ('(last  (it  CiuiniM     '.) 

of  iiiaiili  III  \iirkto\Mi (,..., 

of  tlu-  uai  iif  I775-I7:>3 f,;j 

L111114,   (ill.   (.It//.)   poil     ciiiimiaiKltT    at 
I  iiiiMili-n.i^a. 

ri'in-.ils  to  .s|<fiU'sliorinij;li 'ji  -; 

al  aiiiluiis  vf-s^ols  ami  sldrc- 3(4 

ill  hkiiini-.li  iioar  |-i,it  .\imi ^15 

aliaiulniis  l-i>it  Ann ^13 

I. "Ill-,  Iliai-i'   III,  \i,u-.,  a.s  111  incicciiarv 

I  oiliri-.     M.ij.    (,,.,,;.    ("//.)  ai    \,.u, 

K.   I... ,;4 

Lo-siiii;,  lUnsiiii  jiilni,  (In^ionaii  ol  .\ni. 
l\v\    I,  /',   I -I  5. 

as  111  llunkLr   Hill ,,,S 

as  111  I  l.ili-  ~  iMiiiiiiiii,  I  \.  Ill- 1 2.'~ 

.slalfs  iiiifi.a-iMif  (a-iKiliii.-s  at  I!cii- 
ninL;liin .,  ., 

as  til  Anidlil  at  !■  rci'inan's  I'.iiin,  .  -,4.' 
his  lite  (k'Viited  to  .\nK'iK-aii  liislmv  -54-j 
liis    ii]iiiiiim     iif     l.allle     at     Kmi;'- 

Moinil.iin \      (;.,  [ 

liis  ai.t.iinr.    iif  ilu'  Assnciateil  Kiiv- 


NLihon.   .Stanhope,  (stateMiian    ami    Ins. 
loiian  ).  /'.  1  Sn;. 
his  o|iiiiiiin  "I  lialtle  iif 'rri'nlnii.  .  .    2,Sr 
his  o].iMiiiii  of  battle  lit   Mnnnidutli .   44.) 

.Maiilaml,   Lieut    (  o|„  at   lieaiifurt ,7s 

makes  Ins   way  into  Sa\aimah 471^ 

il|sliiif,'uishi'(l   at  Savaniiali. jSj 

Maillaml.  I'api.,  (/,V,  ),  ;,■..   at  (  iiiilKil .  .    i;(i-j 

^Lll'Unl|,  .111,   ill,  !niU(l    in    |,l,in    „i.;aiiist 

i  1'  lllnll ' o-[ 

Maji.i-      (V-iieials      .ippiinii.il,      .\ni.ilil 


I'inil'.cil 


2i)(i 


.•'"■"- (i.'d 

liis  assistance  leeoi^iii/eil  j;ratefiillv        :; 
!  ouis  XVI.,  Kiiii;  of  Jiaiiee,  /:  1754,  ,/. 
I793- 
(lesiynaUvs    I2,(H)o    men     as     aid   to 

-Aiiieriea j,,, 

furnishes  (>  inilliniis  of  lisics  lor  the 

war f,^,.. 

Louisville.    Kv..    (named     in     Imnor   of 
l.iUlis  .\\1.) 

a  type  ol  t;,ii)d   base  in  tS':r-> -| 

l.unl's    mmp.iny    at     liaille    of     l;iinkiT 


Maji.ribanks,    Maj.,   ^.ill.int    cundiiet    at 

I'lii.nv    Spiin.i^s .-,( 

.Malinady,  Ciil.  at    Knlaw  Sprini,'s 37S 

Malvern  I  Lil,  oeriipied  by  I  ,1    Favetle.    (Vi,, 
-Mainehikes  in    iHi  i,  .supirn-.-i-d,  why .  .  .      42 
Manly,  1   .ipi,  John,  ,;,l,^.^  i,,;,,^.  ,,n,Ts.  .'    140 
.NLirie,  .\iiiiinuiic,    (^luccii   nf    h  lanee. /■. 
'755.  '''•  I7<)J. 
intenedes  lor  the  .Xinerii.m  cniisc.    _).j,, 
.Marion,   Kraneis,  I'nij;.  ( Ifiil,  A.   1732,,/. 
17115. 

ea|ilain   in    1775 j;,, 

his  antecedents j,s(, 

at  l-'i.rt  .Moultrie i<,i, 

detached  by  dates i;,,,. 

in   eoinniuniealiiiii  with  (ireeiie.  .  .  .    532 

oil   I'llatk  Kiver c\2 

It  capture  of  I'ort  Watson joi^ 

applies   fur  artillerv 570 

4 


at  capture  of  I'ort  .Mutle 


nil 


Lynn  D.iy,  the   aiuli..ia.^e  of   (Vmnt    He 

<  iiasse,    I7,si (,,; 

I  Muh,     Thomas,     at     .-/w.    camp     ne.ir 

'■"^'"11 14; 

Lowndes,  Rawlins,  Coin,  .^afety,  S.  C.  .  171, 

Lnean's  .Mill,  scene  of  skirmish' ti^u 

Lovell,   Siilomon,   si^iis    piotcst    ai;ainst 

H'Lstainu 1;  : 


M. 

Mackiazik's,    strieinies    on    'I'arlelon's 

campait;ii ^^^ 

Mackey's  I'mviucials  at  Saratoj^a 350 

MaCiaw,  Col.  at  Loiif;  Lsland,  .' -."i^ 

thinks  he  can  hofl  I'on  Waslnn^ton  241; 

in  command  at  Lort  Wasjiini^ti'm .  .  241) 
declines  siii  render  of  Kui  t  W.ishiiij; 

'"". 240 

iliialities  1 1. .we  s  iihimauim 241) 

^L•^holl,    Lord,    Miilip    Henry,    Lurl    iif 


mmm.inded    riidil    vini;    at     h'utaw 

^P'-'i'K- • " 578 

lontinnes  operations  at  the  south.  .    533 
Marll.iirnMi;li,  Huke,  (John  Chuuhill),  i. 

K.'sd,  ./.    1722. 

iinpr'i\ed   success -f, 

Marshall,  lolm,  (  hicf  justice,  c' S. 
(hisiiiiian  ami  jurist.)  A.  17:5,  ,/ 
iSUi. 

opinion  of  Hunker  Hill joS 

.is  to  nioNenieiit   on  'I'luee  Riveis..    i()6 
^ivcs  ca-iialties  before  White  I'laiiis  240 

I'pminn  ol   .^scliuvler jin 

icpoii     nf    Aiimld     at      Freeman's 

J'  ,11111 T   12 

st.iienii  III  of  niiilinv  raiiv   in  17M.    5-!7 
re)i..it    ol     the    .Ameruan     army    in 

,,      .   ''•^' ■, ••■■   537 

Marlin,  statement  ,is  t.i  Hunker  ILll...      1)7 

NLirlin,    (,(,v.  nf   .\.  (.'.,    pleii^es    10,000 

nun  to  the  cinw  n j-  ^ 

M.iitha's    \ineyar(l,  deslriived    liv   (.eiil. 

'■ic.v.. ■.,....' 4c;t; 

NL'irvland,  apj.oinis  Cnmmittee  of  dbscr- 

\ -11  ion ?.(] 

troops  at  Jirooklui 11,7 

troops  at   Harlem  Hei^;lus 22i| 

troops  on   nearly  every  battle  tield.   41JI 

troops,  ..gallant  conduct  at  Camden  .    516 

troupe  at   Kutaw  .Sprint;, 578 

Mason,    Ccori^e,     (\'a-\     sujiporls     Col. 

Clark  at   the  west 461 

Massacluiselis,    I'mvincial   t'oneiess  01- 

t;ani/ed  !i)r  war.  177(1. q 

calls   n|ion  .\eu    Iji^kmil  fur  30,000 

"leii ■ ^_j 


I  S  I 


^   V 


69  :i 


CURONOLOCICAI,  AND  GENERAL  INDKX. 


Massacluisi'iis,  makes  war 64 

ilr.ilN  (iiic-lillh  alilc  l)n(lii(l  niak-s.  .  2JJ 
troiips    ililaiiu'il     at     Ncxvjuiit     hy 

lll■iti^ll  lll(lvc•llu•lll^ 255 

ordor-  a  iiumimuiu   lo  (liLvnliir  <li- 

St.  SauMiii J?S 

lilicial  111  lis  li(iii|is  ilui  inj;  inuliiiv  .  ?,ii| 
Mallbi.«s,  Jdliii,  oil   sjic'cial   \Sai    (om- 

iiiillfi' A'l" 

M.itllic'\s,    Maj.     (Ifiil.    {/>>■.),    at    l-mt 

\\  aNliiiii^iiMi    2511 

al.iniHil   lui-  villi's  at  I'liim^wick.  .  .  2')! 

at    l!iaii(ly«iiic 3''7 

lays  waste  I'miMiiouth  and  Nnnvalk  .}'i(i 

at  Cnniu UK  lit  I'aims )ir 

Matlicws,  t'dl.  |. /W.I,  captiirci!  liijlit  111- 

l.iiiti  \  ai  ( \c\  iii.iiilowii 3.M) 

Mawlimul,      I  111.,      .illaiks      Mcrn-i     at 

riiiui.'tnii 2SS 

at  (jiii  11  lull's  liiiil;.;c 4115 

Maxwell,  Will,  l!iij^.  ( li'iii.,  /'.ill  IrL-laiui, 
1/.  I7c)>. 

t,'cil.  ill  (.'aiiaila  in  I77() l'i<i 

c'ullectcd  Imats  <m  the  l)clawaro,  .  .  2I14 

coiniuaiuis  at  MmristDwii 2'i( 

near  I'^li/alicthlowii 2i)4 

to  piiisiic  lluwc  to  I'iscata\\ ay .  .  .  .  }'«) 

retires  lielore  Ilime V'l 

skiriiii-lies  ai  Red  flay  Creek 311(1 

yaliantry  before  (liadd's  Ford 3I") 

y;ood  eoiiduet  at  l!raiidy\\  iiu' .(M) 

in  the  reserve  at  (ierniaiitowii ;iSS 

sent  10  proleet    llonleiitowii [1)4 

ordered  to  harass'  Imloirs  retie.it.  413 

skirillislies   at   Moiiiit    Holly 413 

present     when     l.eo     received     his 

orders       (24 

witness  on  trial  ol    l,ec 4-4-7 

goes    with    exiJeditmn    against    In- 
dians    47s 

in  ilii'  action   near  >pring(iehl 41)1) 

liii;4ade  at  .■springliekl. Si-m 

Maxwell,     t'apt.,    patrols     Chailesiown 

Neek (/i 

Mayliam,    luL,    designed    ihe    Ma\h.iin 

touer ' .' 574 

M.iysoii,  James,  Lieut  Col.,  .S.  I'.  Kaiii;ers  171) 
Me.Anhur,   Maj.,  makes  a  gallant   saliy 

from  Savannah ...  471^ 

in  eh.iij;e  of  Ihitisli  sick 511. 

McCiiil's  niounled  men  at  battle  of  (!ow- 

jieiis 54,3 

slaughter  royalists 541 

McConkey's  Kerry,  Washington  crossed 

at,  Dec.  2()',  I77t> 271 

.McCow.m's  lord  forced 551 

MeCiea.  J.ilie,  her  murder,  liiirgojne  not 

respuiisible 325 

Mcl'onaM,    (apt.,    uses    stratagem    at 

I  laiiging  Rock 508 

70.  at  Cli.irlotte 519 

McDon.iid,  Seige.iiit,  at    I'oit    Moultrie, 

■;('.  niorially iSg 

McDonald,   lionald,  raises   a   corps   of 

royalists 1 74 

/'tis,  by  t!(J.  Ca.iwell 174 

McLJougal,    .Mcxander,    lirig.    Cen.,    />. 

ITsU,  ,/.    I7SO 


Mcltoiigal,    in    retreat     from    Long     Ls- 

l.llld.    ... 217 

brigade  in  .•spencer  s  division    221 

brigaile  near  Challerlon  Hill    231; 

succeeds  Heath  at  I'eekskiU      2()f) 

on  the  Hudson ai^.S 

•It  reekskill,  1777 3')8 

at  West  I'oiiit  with  Kosciusko  ....  403 

coinniands  in  tlw  1 1  igliland- 45,S 

Secielarv  of  M.inne 5SS 

.\lcl)o«ell.  l,\Mii,  .Maj.  (ieii.,  L.  >.  .\riiiy, 
/'.  l^l-^. 

at  I'liill  kiiii   62 

Mclii.aill,   (  h.ules,   1  ol.,    al    battle    ol 

Kings  .Mmiiiiaiii 520 

.\L  I  lowell.  .Maj.,  joins  .Mmgiii 541 

at  battle  of  ( 'iiwpeiis 543 

.Mcintosh,  (  dl.,  taken  /'ns.  al  ilrier  (  reek  4(15 

\|(l h.  .Mex.inder,  Maj  .  2d  S.  ( '.  regl  !7<) 

Mcl.aiighrev,  Lieut.  »  ol,,  ,ii  lorl  Clinton  3si) 

.McLean,  (ien.,  at  I'eiiobseoi,  .M.iiiie  .  .  .  474 
.McLe.in,    .Mai.,    uilli     Koy.il    Sioleh    al 

(Jueliec 130 

.Mel  ,eaii,  (apt..  «  I'li  lii^ht  coi  ps  a'  ll.incn 

Hill 4o( 

Mcl.i'od,  l.ielil.,  wilh   .irlilleiy   at    bailie 

of  Cuilford 5O1 

.McLeod,     licui.ild,     raises    a    coips     of 

royalists 174 

McLeod,  Capl.,  .lUempls  ilie  c.iplure  of 

Jefferson fiiu 

Mcl'herson,  i-.  at  (^hiebec 135 

.Mcl'lierson.  Lieut.  (A'r.)  X'.  at  .Savannah.  482 

Ml  I'liersoii,  Maj.  [.I'll.)  ,it  Jamestown.  .  (108 

.Mcl'hers.iii,  .Maj.  1  A'r.l  at  liiier  (reek  .  .  404 

Meeker,  Maj.,  al  Minnisink 474 

.Mecklenburg   Couiiiy,    N.  (.".,   ch.iracter 

of  people 5i() 

Meigs,  Col.,  at  l^luebec 137 

makes  an  iiuuisiou  at  S.ig  Harbor.  2i)7 

at  Slony  I'oinl 172 

Mellon,  Lieiil.,  leailies  fori  Schuyler  ..  323 
.Meiit.il      philosophy      diiecls       mililary 

succi'ss iS 

.Mercer's  iCapl.)  evidence  on  tii.il  of  Lee  431 
Mercer,    Hugh.   Ihig.   Cieii.,   /'.    17.11,    </. 

1777.' 

guarding  till'  Delaware,  Dec,  177(1.  264 

attacked  by  Mawhood  al  I'lineelon  2.S8 

7c'.  morlally  al  I'lineelon 288 

Meicer,    Lieut.    Col.    (.tin.)    cavalry    at 

Jainestovvn    608 

.Merlin,  frigate,  burned  near  I'orl  .Men  er  395 

.Mexico  illuslrates  cnil  war 2ij 

.Middlelon,  .\rlliur,  (.!oin.  S.ifely,  S,  C  .  .  I  71) 
.Mililin,   Ihomas,  (jen.,  /'.  1744,  </.  iSoj. 

prepares  for  assault  on  liosimi 150 

ordered  lo  provide  barracks,  .\'.  \'  .  156 

brigade  at  King's  liridge 221 

instructed  by  \\  ashingion 246 

]iioinoted  Maj.  (ien 296 

on  the  board  of  war 398 

neglecteil  his  duties 398 

lejiorts  at  Valley  i'Orge   ....    40.S 

Miller,  Col.,  k.  al  fort  Washington  ....  2si 

Miles,  Col.,  al  Long  Island 203 

.Military  .Art  levies  u|)iin  all  art lb 

the  enigma  of  essential  force lb 


it 


BB 


217 
221 

2()6 
2<>S 

45S 

5S8 


62 


150 
156 
221 
246 
296 

39«» 
3'Jt* 
41  .S 
251 
21 '3 
If) 


riIN()\.)I,()(;iCA[.    AND    GENERAL    !.\l)|:x.  Cx): 

Monli^omcry,  arrives  at    Ticondt-roca.      i-.'? 
aiiivcs  al  St.   IuIim'-, .^i 


Military   anriarniiils    blti-il    nations    to 

ilcalii 2(1 

Military      ailiicM. ,.1.111,       liDiioiod       in 

Stri|iUirr 21-2 

Military  ilinii.m-,  cf  |„,ili  ariiiio,  ihiriiij' 

....      ""-■war •;  f,55 

Miliiaiy  ((iiiiniaiiclfi^,  >ilfi  tiin  cif  .  ,  .  .  -.(-s,, 
Milil.iiy  toiiiliu  I  ijdi  i„  Ih'  iniiir.ilhil  l,v 

llit^^  Male '.      4,, 

Military    cdiKalioi,    lucf^^aiy    tur     la^t 

iialiniial  iU.-lciiM' 1; 

Military    I, .in'    ^i\<-,    .saiu;!  icii    to    civil 

ll'IC  I- ,_,(, 

Military  In-tniy  in-tinct  wiili  ii.il,ilily.  .      21) 

■Military  iiu 11,1  cdiuIikI  war 41 

Mili'ai),  |iii>()iial,  and  niniiKii.al  aiiion 

liavf  the  sanif  liij;u \i, 

Military  l'(.luy,  of  ( laj;,,  I  770 .....      i,, 

IIk-  Stale  ri-.-.|.oii>il,k.  t,,r ^,, 

not   to  lie  idiiloiiiukd  uiili  luiliiary 

'^"iidiK!     '  ^,,  5 

illii.^lralfd  liy  paral.k-  o|  Sci  i|iliiri'.  .      41 

iilii'ilralcd,  i,".<ii  -5 ,|    _, 

ill  the  Manieliiki>  in  i-ii.tho  jaiii- 
zarif",  ill  iS2h.  ,npl   llu.-  i\|,ii'|,ioii 

of  tllL'  Jc'-Ull- ij 

at  lUinkJr  Hill,  faiiliy    j  |^ 

ol  Indian  aii.\iliaiii>  Lad j-,^ 

in  llie  uar  of  1775-.M ("^,, 

Military  |)rinLi|dc.->  unfolded,  not  iiiale<l      in 
Militaiy  .Mieiiee,  m-ver   more  uortliv  of 

.'-ludy ■  _    _      ,,, 

Under  a  lii[;li(.i  law (,-,', 

Vfililaiy  .s(  ivkl-  of  dilfeienl  arms '.     (,-, 

tlilil.iry    .siiLH-^v.  ;i     matter    of    menial 

l)hiloso|p|i_\ 1^ 

Alilitary  >lore-.  oideied  eoiKcnlrated   at 

Coiieoid,  1775 ,^ 

Military  and  liviI  codes  related 17 

Mduary  valor  honored  in  >acied  lii^toiAv.'i  2 
Miliiia  of  .Mas-aelnisells  orj^ani/eil,  1774  S  ■, 
Mdiiia  the  true  de|iciidence  of  Kngland 

and  .Xnicrii  a |  , 

Militia  sy.>teni  of  Amrriia,  too  traii.Mciit      1; 

Minor  tactics  delined p 

Minnij,'crod,.,  (■,,!„  :,■.,  at  F<,rt  Melccr  .' .'  3,.  | 
Minnisink,    .\,-u    \-,,rU,    laid    uaste     l,v 

Ilraiidt '     ,-  , 

Miiuite  men  of  1775 '.'.'.'.'.'.'.'..'.      ',", 

Mol.di/alioii  ol  (lermany 1.1 

Modern  development  prtgnant  with  strife     22 

Molly  (/,';-.),  Captain .j_,,, 

Moiuk's  Cornel,  skirmi-li  :U ;7:; 

Moncktoii,   J.ieut.   Col.,  41^1   Jir.    Foot, 

^■.  at  1,011:;  Island 0,,,^ 

^■.  at  lled^c  kow,  .Momnonth    ....   44J 
buried  by  .uneiicans  with  honor  .  .    44  } 
Moncrief,  .M.ij.  i/.V.,,  chjcf  lai-uieer  at       ' 
Savannah 


1 28 

12S 


repuls,,lat  St."  John's... 

eapttiies  St.  |oiin\ ,j,| 

tiiids  army  without  discipline      "        n,, 

raptures    Montreal '    y,,. 

dlsf^llMeil  with   the  ariiiv .'.',','.'    ,^, 

dissuaded   from   resi^;niiit; '    p,, 

j"iiis  Arnold    in  a  miow  storm .    it, 

leaves  Woosicr  at  Montreal i  ,, 

demands  Mirieiider  of  (^tuel.ec 1  V, 

-<••  ill  assault   on  (jueliec i3i;^(, 

Moni^r,,„„.,.y,  Mai,,A   at    Fort  Ciiswohito. 

.Mont^;omery,     (ii^.ite,     luirncl     in     the 

,,  "i"!-"" 3f>'. 

MolMoe,  lames,  Lieut,  ill/'.  /■/,■,.  h.  1758, 
•''•  July,  14,  1S31. 

:it    I'.itlle  ut    Trenton n--^ 

.Molites.|men,  (  haile,    \\^.^^u^^  de, '// V(.V(,',   "'" 
"'.  17-;, 
'lei  hues  the  spirit  of  hm  s    ....  -.[ 

.MonlKclio,  jcllei-oirs    home    \isite,i'l',v 

'    •M'l.      M,  I.eod ■     („H, 

M"oie,     K,,l,erl.      i;,i^'.    (;,.„!„    excepicl 

lioiii  Clnil.Hi'-,   p.udoii  -1-5 

.Moore.  (,eoi-e    II.,   Seel.   .\,    \.   ||,,t,„|.      ' 
e.d  .Society. 

disclosed    Fee's  plaits .,,,, 

Moofe's,  re-t,,  in  pail  at   !!iiiil<er  II  ill.' ."  .'    Iihi 
■Mo.. re  s   jloiis,.    ne.ir    \  oikiown,    head- 

'pi'irleis  ol    Fine, in (,y, 

-Mooie'sCieek    I'.ri.l-c,  skirmish 1-1 

Mo>.L,Mii,  I  apt.,    -kiiinishe.s   before    Hob- 

kiik's      lliil ^,j 

Mor-an,    Faiuel,  \Wv^.  Cenl.  !■'.  \'--,-\'j.   '' 
IS02. 

I  iiniinands    1  ille  (oi|.s (,. 

-eiil    to    l;o-i,,ii    in    ,77^,    \vi;),     /•,, 

l.i-lil  Inlaiiliy s_ 

i;oes    to  (Juebec   with  Ariiohl i^j 

i;allant  conduct  at  (,)nebec ni 

made  prisoner  at  (^)uebec ]\-j 

all.uks  I  lessiaiis  on  the  kaiiian...    31H) 

■■en;  lo  army  (.if  ( iates '•,,:; 

at  llallle  of  Ireeman'.s  l^'arin 34I 

at   Haltle  of   llcmis    Heights ..'.    347 

joins  Wa^hiiiijton   from  the  iioiih .  .    \i)y 


skirmishes  wiih  Corawallis. 


3'.)7 


,,  4S2 

Monmouth  and  » icinitv  described  ..  .   4I(}-21 
Moninonth  Kaille  of— 'First  .skirmish.  .  .   433 

second    skirmish ,-,\ 

thud  skirmish . ;, 

-,      '"^'il^' 435 

Moniiioiith,  o|)inions  ol  the  result.  .  .  ,   444--:; 
Montycjinciy,     Kicliard,    iirij,',    (iciil.'  ^/. 
.1737.  ''■-  1775- 
with  .Schuyler,  i(j  invade  Canada.  .  .    120 


reinlorces  .Ma\«cll   in  New  Icixy.    414 
on  Clinioii's   riijhi   think...."....'..    41(1 

lUdinoted   and  sent    s^.mli ^^,|, 

threatens  IJritish  posts 5.1 

lij^llls  battle  ol  I  ou  pells ^^3 

retreats  Irom  Coupeiis cm, 

eludes  pursuit  of  Cornwallis 5,(11 

disabled  by  rhcuinatism   for  further 

'''■iviee ^^^J 

cro.s.ses  the  N'ailkin c;i;i 

sugls'esi,   to  (iiceiie  a  plan   of  battle   557 
.Morris,  tioiiverneiir,  advised  of  .Mililin's 

<-''"idiicl 40S 

Morris,    Kolicrl,    ilinancier    :'.iid    states- 
man), /'.  1734,  (/.  iSod. 
knew  of  attack   on   'rienton  in  ad- 

\'>i''''' 268 

Seciclaiy  of   liiiaiui.il    Hureau....    cSS 

endorses  for   the  United   .•stales.  .  .  .    623 

Morris,  Maj,  .I//1.),  i.  at  I'rinctl  m.  .  .      28(j 


i    «' 


i- 


W\ 


r    rii 


!'   )«U 


r,.^4 


ClIRONOl.'H.ICAI.   AM)   t.l.M.KAl,    1M>1.\. 


Morrisania,  tin-   licKl'iuirlcrii  of   I)i'hiii- 

cey'->    l<ifii'^fc> <>io 

Morri^losM),  ii>  ^lr.\ll•^il•  po^itimi yi 

a  H<>ikI  ivMilu/vdiii,  I  If!.'.  I77(>.....  Jiij 

rcn'>.  iidiii   riioivU'iO'^.i  ic>  lull  at.  J'lii 

MtDimi^.ill  ill,  iKc.  271I1,  177(1....  2-u 

roinli^tiiii  111",  ill  \hx.  271)1,  I77()...  .'70 

winift  i|ii.irU'is,   1777 2.)i 

ii^iiin  Aiiici  iciiii  wiiuor  '|u.iilt'i-..  . .  .pi 

ami    ViilJi'V  l-'or^i-   i'i|n;i!ly  luiirfiil.  .  4St) 

llio  olinrliM-  iif  t'liiiliiii  ill  17S().  ..  jcK) 

Mdrioii's  1 1  III "i>.s 

Morliiii'.i     I'oiiit,   or      Moiilloii'>     I'liinI, 

(NoU) 9S 

Mo-U'Mi  w.w-,  iluir  lypi'. 27 

.MolU',  Ki'liicra,  .ipI- lo  Imrii  loii  Motii-  574 

Moiic,   M.ij.  (./'//.  l, /<•.  at  S.iv.iiUKili.  . .  .  4^2 

.Mottr,  1  '.i|i!.  ,it  i^)iicIh.v 1  iti 

Mollr,    U.l.li.',   l.ii'Ut Col.   2Ih1    S.  ('.   IT^'t,  171) 

Moll,',  Cli.irlo,  Ca|>ti. .ri 1  7c^ 

.MouUli-r,  t'apt.   (.////.  1,  wiili  artilli'ry  .11 

Tri'iiioii 2SH 

.Nfoultoii's  I'oiiu,  (  Notf.) i|S 

Moiiltrii',  i'oit 1 '; 

.Moultik',   Will,    Uri^'.  llciil..  /.   1710,,/. 

I  ^1  '^ . 

I'ol.    Ill     177:; 17: 

hiiilcl.',  !■  (Ill  Sullivan iT'i 

his  aiili\'<'iU'iil^ I  'o 

hi-,  f.iilli  in  i\'>i-.l.in(o 1  ■■  t 

his    i,Mll.UU    tkU'llSC 1-1' 

rescue-,   lieiiiil'ort 41 14 

ilcsi-iilii'S  slau'.^lilcr  at  .Sav.inii.ili .  ...  4^1 
Mount     liiilc|)i.'iuli'iuc',   o|)]io^ilo    Ticon- 

lU  .otj.l 1o-> 

.Mount   \V.i>liini;ioii,   (L.ike    ('liauiplaiii 

foililicd -'«o 

.Mow all.    Lic-iii.,     liuriis    l-'alniou;li,   now 

I'orthiii  1 I  p, 

Moyhin,  Col.,  (|uarti.-nii,i-lcr Jil 

Mulilunliui;^,  iV-lLT,    .Maj.   (ii-nl., /'.  I74'i, 
tl.  1S07. 

I)roilKjlc<l   Illi;^    t'u'll! 2i)'' 

at   battle  of    Iiiiii\<ly«ine 171 

oil   (Jouit  r,f   liuiuiry,  .Selniyler.    .  .  .  \\  i 

at    MiMiiily  vviiii- 1(17 

in  rc>crvi.'   at  Itraiulywiiie 370 

at  1  iormaiuown    l^i 

advi^'s  lo  attaiU  New  N'oik 404 

at    .Moiiiiioulli (44 

his    l)rii;ailo    at    >lonniii:.^    of   Sloiiy 

Point 472 

in  N'lrijini.i f.-'i 

at  .Suliolk jS^:; 

at    i'fli/i~liurL,'li 5)11 

proniotrtl    M.ij.    (ienl;    iclirt'^  In uii 

the  army 655 

MuncjuiTs  Ilou^e    near  l'nMni>  llei^'lits.,  14IJ 

Murfree^horou:,'h,  retreat   from  lS()i-5.,  7; 
.Murphy's    N.  C.   troops   at    --lorniiiii^    of 

Stony  I'oinl \~i 

.Murray  l.iiullcy,  ihe   friend  of  (ireeiie.  .  ■'o 
Musj;rave,  lol.,  occupies  ("hew  llou-e  al 

tiermaiiiown 3s> 

Mus^iove  sent  by  I  ireene  across  Culawba  512 
.Musj;ri)ve's    .Mills,  sUirmisli   at,    111  favor 

of     .VmerieiUi' 51  ^ 

Mutiny  of  .\iiirric.ui  army 5311 


r\Gi 


.Mutiny,   <  oiiiiii  liiut  troops 49I 

New   ji-isey    tlo.ip, 463 

l'enii>ylvania  iruop.s 537 


N. 

N.M'iil.KDN  I.  (lioiiapartf),  Iiuonaparte, 

l-'iiiperor    of    !■  r.liiee,   /'.    17(mj,    J. 

1^21. 
tesleij    i;oo(l    -lialej^y    .ind    loj^lstii.s 

111  lir-.t  lialuiii  camp.iij,'!! fil 

his   metliods   coinpiired   uidi    l!r,id- 

dock's 61 

llM'd   the  swoid  r,i  II. ildl) (i| 

valued  i;oo.|  lo^i   lics (ii( 

styled    liy    Joiiiiiu,    "  hi>    own    bc^l 

duel  of  sliiff  " 72 

uniloiinly  improved  success '(t 

.N'apoleiJii      III.,     i.ouis      lioiKip-ulc,     /'. 

|Si)>,  ,/.  1173. 
maile  war  in  iSyo  wilhoul  notice  .  .      46 

lailed,  lliiouj;li  poor  loi^i-lics I»( 

Na-!i,  AIpiui.  (iov.,  .N.  ('.,  ;uldre»ed   by 

I  till.  (  iieelu: ■;2i) 

N.i-li,  I'r.iiK'ls,   I'liii;.  ( ieii.,  promoted  ..  .  Jijd 
ill  tile  ie>er\e  at  bailie  of  ( jermaii- 

lowii 3S7 

■[■.  a!  b.iille  of  I  ii'miiinlouii 38c} 

Niilioiial  capilal.riUelv  the  luiiiie  objee- 

live  o|  ,1  (  ■unp.uj^n 53 

N.uion.il  wars  eoii^i'jered ...  25 

Nation^  responsible  lor  a  ready  defence.  22 
.\,i\.il     eoiiiiiiiilt'e     :ip|ioiiilei|     by    .-////. 

t'oiij^ress     144 

cooperation  diiriii;,;  I  lie  w.ir O54 

reyubilions  established 144 

Naval  diversion  ( A'r.)  Iroiii  Ne»   Vork.  .  20I 
N'lval   eni,'at;eineiit,  betwoi-ii,  ll'IC-laini* 

iliid   lloue    450 

1  ie-lou(  lies  ,iiid  .\rbullinot 1)12 

i>e  (ira>se  and  Hood (1I3 

.Nav.d    operations    at    llie    sport    of   llio 

elemenls I,  35,  y-f 

not  i^uaraiileiil  by  si.  am  propulsion  3 
N'avy    K-liii.)    orj;aiii/ed,    iind     ils    fale 

144  llioie!  and  27i 

Neil,   I 'apt.  [Am.)  k.  ui  b.uile  ol  I'liiue- 

loii 23S 

Neilson,  (  h.irles,  as  lo  .\riiold  .it    I''ree- 

man's  I-  ai  m 342 

his  lot;  buildiiii;  lortilied 330 

Nelson,  'lliomas,  llriL;.  lien.,  (iov.  \'.i.. 
K  173S,  ,/.  17^,,. 

at  WilbaiiisburL; s'>4 

suicei-ds  lelVerscm  as  (ioveriior (.lol 

his  bioilurs  caplured   bul 

honored  tor  services  rendered iist< 

Nelson,    .Maj.    i.h/i.)    protecis     river    al 

l\i<  hmond ^i)i 

Nesliii,  lirig.  lien,  I />'/•.)  al    1  hree  Rivers  Ibf) 

Newark,  N.  J.,  visited  by  Knypli.iuseii  .  4S5 
.New     Iji'^dand    to    furnish    iioops    for 

(.'.inada 244 

loy.ilis'.  batlalioii  ,i  failure   320 

free  from  ibiii-h  troops 458 

biiiguid  under  relief  from  pressure.  4S.S 

New  I'.iiylaud  as  judged  by  I'lUr^joyne.  .  337 


CIIKONOLOGICAl.     AND    (;|NIK.\I.     |M.|:x. 


■  491 

.  4<'.1 
537 


.    .  (>i 
a.l- 

...  61 

...  (>i 

...  tM, 

...  72 

...  ;(. 

.|(. 

'") 

5 -'I 

L-a. . .  .'lyi 
niiuii- 

S'^/ 

3^>J 

(jl.jfi.:- 

fl'll^C.  22 
.■l//t. 

u» 

''54 

144 

oik . .  Joi 

....'.  4.-" 
hl2 

''I5 

)l    tho 

•  •I,  .??.3'J 
ulsioii  J 
,     I'll  to 
■!  .ui.l  27  S 
I  iiuc- 
23S 

1'  IL-C- 

342 

ii(^ 

..  V.I.. 

?'M 

1- (11  )i 

(lUl 

'150 

vcr    at 

. 5')i 

UM'ii  .  4S5 

244 

320 

4SS 

-.-.ttri.'.  4d.'5 

yiK-.  .  3J7 


NVw  Hampshire  enters  upon  the  w.nr. . .     84 
lilier.il    to    lur    tri)()|.>    diinnj;    ilie 

muliiiy ^jg 

New    n.iin|i.,luie    (liaiil,    lij>^'^|^^    (leii. 

k  lc.''lc>L'l     y^ij 

.Neu      ll.iMM,    (  oim..    liu.nkil    hy    (iiMl 

^,        ,''>"" 4''^ 

new  Jei-M'y  enters  upon  llie  wm s; 

f.iniilie',  lioMoied  hy  I'lus.   I'ullle..  .    4-7 

patriot i>ni  ol'  lier  eiti/ens 4-7 

re(;inienl^  nniliny 4,^1 

Ifirisliiliiro  relieves  siifTer'u  troops.  463 

loi  livf  \(:us  the  tlieatit  of  war  .  .    502 

New  I.onilon,  Incursion  of,  bv  .Vrncjd  025 

Newport,  k.  |„  i1r.  key  to  New  iMit^Liiid    15; 

oixiipicd  l)y  Unlidi  troops ^.^j 

be-iej;id  |]y  .Xnierieaii  tidops 44^ 

tiueateiied  liy  a  /-r.  licet.  ...» 44S 

ahaiidoiied  Ijy  .Sir  Henry  (■jiiiton  .  .    47(1 
New  l\(;eliclle  the  scene  of  a  skirmish.  .    235 
oecni>icd    liy     I.iiiit.    (Jen.     Knyp- 

liaiisen 23^ 

New   \\  indsor,   near   Newinirt;h,  Wa-h 

ingltin's  Headipiarters 467 

ahandoned (,22 

New  \ork  the  jiriniary  llritisli  hase.  ...      51 

enters  upon  the  «.ii- >; 

treated  as  the  liritish  hnso  in  1775  .  iis 
adopts  Deel.iration  of  Indrpeiidenee  Igj 
in  possession  of  the  iirilisli  army.  .  .  227 
evacuated  hy  the  American  arniy  .  .  227 
militia  attracted  hy  Howe's  pro- 
clamation       244 

Nichols,  John,  (,oh  (./w.)  .-n   Kichnion.l, 

^..        V.i 34,, 

ISinety-.Six  t;arri»oned  by  liritish  troops.   41^7 

suecesbfidly  resists  a  siege 574 

is  evacuated  by  llriti^h  troops ^74 

Nixon,    John,   \',n<^'.  (icn.  (./w.)  /-.  173?, 
,/.  1815. 

Col.  at  Uuiikir  Hill Kx) 

in  .Silencer's,  division 221 

guarding  (he  Delaware  in  1776.  ...    265 

ordered  to  .Albany 302 

joins  Sciui\ler  at  .Stillwater 310 

on  court  oi"  impiiry  as  to  Schuyler.  .    312 

in  battle  of  l-'reeman's  Farm ■^3( 

at  Saratoga 35] 

Norfolk,    \'a.,   bcjinbarded    bv  order  of 


695 


PAOI 


.Noiton,  I.ieuf.  Col.  (/ir.)  attacks  Vnuny's 

""Use ^8(i 

Norwalk,  Conn.,  burneil  bv  dei,.  'I'rvon  471) 
\.i..  laid  waste  by  (,eii.  .M.illhews.  ,    4()() 
.Vorri.lgewock  KalU  leaclied  by   \riiold.    122 
.Noiwiih,  Conn.,  the  hirihpl.ice  ol  IJenc- 

dn  t  .\inol(l (y^r 

Nutting,  Ca|)t.,  at  battle  of  iJunker  iiili     0 

o. 

<  )|:jl''- 1 IVHS  of  War,  considered 53 

I  >bierlive>  of  the  war  of  1 775-1  7S  I 53 

libjiclive,  not  to  be  a  capital,  when ...  .53-4 

<  »bliipie  (jrder  of  lialtle. th 

(  lbsia(  les,  considered 55 

<-ibsi ructions,  peculiar  to  this  war 77 

o(  liurgoyne's  campaign 328 

(  HIeiisive  .iiid  defensive  action 47 

Odensive  return,  when  on  the  defensive     51 
"(.•nicer,,   the   very   soul    of  an    army." 

((ireeiie) 530 

to   be   made   easy   jn    tluir  ciicuin. 

stances 53,, 

neither   to   beg,   g.iiiibK-.  delr.iud,  or 

re-ign,  to  li\e.     (Washnigtoii.)  .  . 

dgdeii'-,  legi.,  good  conduct  at  liiandy- 

"i'l'-' 377 

Ullaia,  .Maj.tien.  {/>'/:)/'.  1750,,/.  17,;!. 

pursues  .M(,ig.in ' 552 

-i'.  at  battle  of  l.uillord 561 

destroys  forlilicitiuns  at  I'ortsmuuth  (ill 

joins  (  (irnwallis  at  Vorktown (hi 

surienders  the  army  of  (Jornwallis  .    fj42 
O'llara,    Lieut.    {/>/:)   k.    at    battle    of 

( aiilford cf)2 

Cneiil.i  linliaiis  friendly  to  .\inerica  .  .  .    523 

atlackeil  by  IJrandt 524 

Onondaga   Indian  settlement   destroyed 

hy  troo|)s 463 

On  to  kichniond,  bad  military  policy,  in 


1S61 


44 


Opinions  of  'Irenton  :  Lord  ( .ermaine, 
(  lordon,  liurke,  llughe.s,  Sttdman, 
^\■aller,  Malioii,  .Abbe  Rayiial, 
and  .Anonymous 281-2-3 

Opinions  of  liiinker  1 1  ill,  ( Kaiiiscy) loji 

battle  of  the  Cedars ' 165 


444-5 


Lord  Dunmore ,4,,  Monmouth. 

-North    .\merican    I'llot    gives    plan   of  Operations,   base  of " 'cq 

Charleston  harbor 1;,,  lines  of "     c, 

-Nortli  (.  arobna  enters  upon  the  war >lt  the.itre  of  \, 

inainlains  her  position 17,  f,.„nt  of.  .'.'.".'.'.'.'.'.'. \z 

troop,  sent  to  Western  territories.  .   46(j  /ones    of '      50 

tro,.ps  at  st.n-ming  of  Stony  I'oint.  .   472    Opportnnilv  given  to  men'an.'l  n'at'ions.' ."     30 

mi  itia  .at  battle  of  C  amden 515-17    (j^lcr,  Capi.  (/>';-.),  lands  at  .Mount  I'leas-     ' 

mililia  at  battle  of  Cuilford 556  ant.   S.   C 406 

..     .'Y«"';".T  ■■''  ''•'^'''-'  ''f  J'-'"'''^^-  Springs.    57S    Orders'  of 'b'attle,  dJlii'ied.'  '.'.'.'.['.  '.  ]'.['.  [  [     65 

Noaillc-.,  \iscount  de,  commissioner  at  principles  staled 67 

V     .1    \"''''°^'"  •,••.■•,•■•• ^'-H  illustrated  bv  plate  after  i.age 67 

North,   Lord    Frederick.   Larl  of  Cuil-  Oriskanv,  battle  'of .^ -,23 

fc.rd,  /'   1733.  ,/.  1792.  oriie,  .\ior,  Mass.  Com.  S.ifetv "   0 

anxious  for  pe.ace.  . 400    Osborn.  Sir  Ceorge.  e.xpected'lhe  attack 

liis^  (  oiiciliatory    Hills    reach    New  upon   (lermantouu 3Sf, 

^      ,     *  '■"/^-  •••■•, 4"3    O-wald,    Kle.a/er,  Lieut.  Col.,  at  ()uebee 

Wortliern  frontier  threatened  in  17S1  ..  .    41,0:  with  .\rnold 137 

Northern   tr-op.s  (AV.)  sent  into   Indiana  4O0  I  ie=nhcs  on  trial' of  Lee, .'.'...'.'.' .'.'     42g 


iff 


696 


ClIRONOLOGICAI-    AND    (iENKRAI,    INDEX. 


P. 

PAiiK 

Palmkr,  InsKiit,  Mass,  Com.  Safely. . .  <j 
Panic   tiiids  its  sole   liinitatioii  in  disci- 

|)lin>-   653 

sdiiuliincs   iinnvdiilalile (153 

of  .Vinoriian  ii()c)|im  at  New  Vork.  .  22tt 

miliiia  at  (-'.imdon 517 

of  i;.ii)(l  (.////.)  Irnops   at    llolikiiU's 

lliil 572 

/if.  rc'j;tilars  at  Kiilaw  Spriiii^s. .  . .  5S1) 

I'aiili,  scftio  of  ilis.i>,tfr  [o  (jc'iil.  Wayne.  3'5J 
I'aralile  of  llie  Saviour  illustrates  Milit.iry 

IihIkV 4t 

I'arker,    Sir    I'eter,  Admiral,   6.    If)l6,  </. 
181  r. 

leaves  Cork  for  America 173 

appmailies  ( 'liark'stori I^o 

fails  ill  altack  upon  Kort  Sullivan.  .  iSi; 

reaihcs  New  ^■ork li;5 

sails  for  Newport 255 

Parker,  Hyde,  .\diniral,  convoys  troops  to 

Savannah 451) 

Parliament,  .\cls  of,  to  l)e  resisted,  1776  9 
Parrs,  .Maj.  .//;/.  rille  corps  with  Sullivan, 

'77'» 475 

I'arry,  Calel),  I.ieut.  Col.  (.4m.),  killed  on 

I.oni;    Island    209 

I'arsons,  James,  Com,  Safety,  S.  C 179 

Parsons,  Saniiii  1  II,  Urij;.  tlenl.,  his  ante- 
cedents   207 

at  I.ont;  Island 2'x) 

votes  to  al).indon  ISrooklyn 217 

in  Genl,  rutnani's  division 220 

his  hrif^'ade  panie-stricken 22() 

his  l)riL;ad(.' well  conslituteil 226 

before   I'Ort    liulepeiidente 2()3 

on  tlie  Hudson 2i).S 

at   PeeksUill 502 

is  too  laif  to  save  Norwalk,  Conn.  .  471 
Partisan   warfare  ;  reL;ardle-s  of  parties.  575 
dislini;uislied  from  le^^itiiiiate  opera- 
lions  647 

warfare    at     the    South    continued, 

I7'-^I 533 

Patterson,  .\dj.   (Jenl.  (/;>■.),  holds  inter- 
view   with   Washm^'ton 194 

demands   surrender  of  Fort   Wasli- 

ini^ton 249 

Patterson,    Hrij;.   (lenl.   (/Jr),  reinforces 

Clinton 495 

leaves  Charleston  for  his  health.  ...  518 
Patterson,  Col.  (Am.),  sub.  liritj.  (ienl. 

part  of  regiment  at  lUiiiker  Hill.  .  .  109 

sent  to  Canada 157 

at  Princeton 2H9 

at  Ticonderoi^a 311 

with  Gates ,...    337 

at  Saratojra 35 1 

advises  to  altack  Philadelphia 404 

at  Monmouth 444 

Passage  of  rivers  considered 76 

Paulas  Hook,  attacked  by  M.aj.  Henry  I.ee  475 
Paumier,   Lieut.  (///■.),  w.  at    Monmouth  444 
Peabotly,  Nathaniel, on  special  war  com- 
mittee   490 

Peace  means  rest,  without  waste 20 

the  normal  condition  of  society.  ...  20 

assure.!,  as  armies  are  least  needed.  21 


Penalties  assured,  lessen  crime  an<l  war.  i\ 

l'eek-.kill  .iliandoned  by  (ienl,  I'uln.ini..  3^0 
Pcnnelieek    Hill,  the  camp  of  Washint;- 

ton,  (Kl.   1777 387 

Penobseoi    the  objective  of  a  fatal  expe- 
dition   474 

Pennsylv.uii.t  iiisurrecticm    considered,.  31 
adopts   the  Heclaration  of  Indepen- 
dence    195 

troops,  di>tin)^ui.shed  at  Hrooklyn  .  .  lc)7 

troops,  mutiny 537 

sent  to  S'ir^inia  under  Wayne 5H4 

Pepperill,  Cul,  [Am.),  at  I''r(i;;'s  .Neck.  .  .  231 

Percy,  lluL;h,  P.irl,  I.ieul.  I  ienl.  (Duke  ot 

Noithumberland), /',  1742,1/.  1817. 

comiiiaiul-.  a  bri^jade  at  Itosiun..'.  .  lo 

rescues  the  troops  sent  toldncord.  12 

advises"  tootcupy  I  )oicliester  Hei^jht-.  112 

distiiijjuislied  at  Hunker  Hill 115 

ordered      to      recover      Dorchester 

Heit;hts 153 

is  defeated  by  a  storm 153 

at  battle  of  l.nn};  Kland 202 

stationed  at  Met  iowaii'i  Pass 234 

joins  Howe  at  Wliit(r  Plains 241 

at  att.ick  uiion  I'  'it  Wj-.hin^ton     .  250 

at  Newport,  Rhode  Island 255 

Peter's  Provincials  with  Itaume  at  Ilen- 

ninj;ton 329 

Peter,  ("apt.  (Hr.)  w.  at  battle  of  Guilford  562 
I'etersliuii,',  V'a.,  taken  by   Phillips  ami 

Arnold 5S9 

Philadelphia  engajjes  in  the  war 85 

the  olijective  of  Gen,  Howe  in  1777  53 

ret^.irded  as  a  (leterininiiij;  objective  363 

v\'eleomes  the  .\inerican  army 3(15 

occupied  by  Lord  t'oriiwallis 31^4 

^jives  a  fete  to  ( ien.  Howe }oS 

is  abandoned  by  Gen.  t'linton 412 

its  military  value  considered 412 

weliouies  the  Am.  army,  1781 623 

welcomes  the  Prench  .'irmy,  1781..  .  ()2-t 
Phillips,  Maj,  Gen.  (/>'r,)at  Three  Rivers, 

Canada  ,  . i''(> 

ill  liur^joyne's  campait;n 3<)'< 

occupies  Mount  Hope 30.^ 

pursues  Col.  !  ong  to  Skenesborou^h  315 

returns  to  ricoiiiUroj;a 3'5 

leaches  Port  Georije  with  artillery  .  320 

at  battle  of  Preemaii's  Parm 340 

at  battle  of  Meinis  Heights 345 

invades  \'irgiiiia jbh 

his  force  staled,  .May,  17S1 389 

at  Chesterfield  C.  I  r 59" 

returns  to  Petersburg 593 

dies,  and  succeeded  by  .\rnold  ....  59') 
Phoenix  and  Roebuck,  frigates,  at  Dobbs' 

Kerry 232 

Physical  force,  as  a  sanction  of  law  ....  20 
Pickens,  Andrew,  Col.  (S.  C.)  *.  1739.  </• 
1817. 

surprises  Poyd's  Provincials 464 

joins  Gen.  Morgan 54' 

at  battle  of  Cowpens 543 

before  Augusta 574 

commands    left    wing     at     F^utaw 

Springs 57^ 

continues  active  operations,  1781-2.  5S3 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


697 


il 

.  3f><> 

'.   387 

.  474 
.  3> 

1- 

.  i')7 

.  537 

.  5'^4 

.  234 


153 

>5? 

234 
241 

230 
255 


.  3'^4 
.  4"'* 
.  413 
.  412 
.  623 
.  <)23 

.'  i(i(> 

•  y*^ 
.   3"a 

ini^;li  315 
.  315 
.  3-') 

•  34'> 
.  345 

.  ?S') 

.  51)" 

..  5' 13 

..  5')'' 

is' 

.  .   20 


..  4^)4 

..  541 

..  543 

..  574 
utaw 

.-  578 

il-2.  5S3 


PACE 

IMckrrinfj,    Timothy,  (.'ol. — I!ri(j.   Cicn., 
.(«/'.  See.  War,  Sci-.  Slaic,  /'.  1745, 

./.   |K2(J. 

Micci'cds  Ki'cd  as  Adjt.  (lin.  (./w).   2(/i 

aii|H)iiii('(l  (,»iiar.  iNLns.  (ii-ii 4(/j 

FitkiTiiit,',  linj^.  titii.,  S.  C,  with  militia, 

17K1 «(«) 

I'iKC'on.  John,  Mass.  Com.  Safety 9 

rij;ot,      Maj.     CiCii.     (/>';•.)      tomniands 

lHi;;atlc  at  Itosidii 10 

(listiii^iilshc'd  81  Itiinkcr  Hill 104 

in  cdiuinaiid  at  Ncwpdrt,  R.  I 44*^ 

his  plan  fiT  dcfc'.'>-c  iif  NfWjKprt  ...   451 
npniis  tlic  il^'frat  uf  /Im.  army  ....  454 
Pinikiuy,   Cliarlcs    C,   siili.    l)i|il(imate 
and  StalcMiian,  li.  174C1,  </.  1825. 

a  caplaiM   ii\  South  Carolina 179 

Cum.  .-Tcty 179 

piomiitcd   colonel  and   at   Chr.rlfs- 

t(in iSi 

Pinckniy,  'llinmas,  sub,  Diplomatc  and 
SlalcMiian,  /'    1721).  '/.  1779. 

in  the  Stale  sfrvice  ol  .S.  C 179 

Pitt,  Wniiam  (Statc'sniaii  and  Oratort,  /'. 
I75(),  (/.  l8(/). 

givo.  hi-,  opinion  of  Caiilford sfq 

Pitcairn,  M.aj.  {iir.  marines)  at  CinKoril, 

Mass II 

/f.  at  liimker  Hill li" 

hi--  niiiiiory  honored 12 

I'lans  and  Coiinlcr  i'lans,  1776    2^5 

I'iiiiHlcriiii;.  cndan[;(  led  lienniiigton.  .  .  .   333 
lo^t  the  battle  of  Luiaw  .Springs  .  . .    581 
Pollard.  Ensign  (/>/:),  /;.  at  Savannah   .  .   4S2 
Ponaroy,  Setli,  liriy.  Ccn. 

appointed  ( ien.-in-Chief  hy  Mass..       9 

his  aiiletedeiits H4 

appoini  -1  continental  Uriy.  Gen.  .  .     f*9 

lirave  ,1    liiinkerllill lOo 

declines  an  active  commission loo 

Poor,  Eii'^h,  Ilrij,'.  Gen.,/'.  1736,  </. . 

as  e'ol,,  sent  to  Canada 157 

at  liatlle  of  rrinceton 2.S9 

I'lomoted  Hrij;.  Gen 2()6 

at  'I'icoiideroj^a 311 

at  I'reeiiian's  harm 336 

at  IJemis  Heights 347 

advises  an  attack  upon  Now  York  .   404 

at  liarren  1 1  ill 407 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 444 

with  Sullivan  in  expedition  against 

Indians 475 

Pope,  John,  Maj.  Gen.,  U.  S.  Army,  /'. 
1823. 
his   assignment    in   1S62   illustrates 

Military  Policy 57 

Porter,  Col.,  his  regimenl  will  serve  two 

weeks  longer .  .    276 

Porter's    militia    neglect    their    duty    at 

llarrcn  II ill 41/1 

Porterfield,     Col.,     nth     Va.     rcgt.,     in 

Arnold's  expedition  to  (Quebec.  .    137 
in  skirmishing  at  Chadd's  Eord  .  . .    369 

in  Southern  I'epartment 510 

cflccts  a  junction  v  ith  liates 510 

taken  />ns.  at  bitlle  of  Camden.  ...   51.S 
Port  Koyal    S.  C,  occupied   by   liritish 

troops 4()5 


rAGR 

Portsmouth  laid  waste  l>y  Gen.  Matthews  466 

occupied  by  Gen.  Leslie 525 

fiirtilie<l  by  (ien.  Arnold 54^ 

demolished  by  (icii.  ( I'llara bio 

Potter,  Col.  (./w.l/-.  at  battle  of  Trenton  289 
Potts,    Stacy,    furnishes    Col.    Kalil    liis 

I  le.uii|uarters 273 

Powell,  lirig.  Gen.,  wlih   liurgoyne 215 

I'owell,  (apt.  (/>'/-.)  H'.  at  battle  of  Mon- 

niouth 444 

Powder  greatly  needed  at  lioslon 95 

sci/cil  in  South  C.irolina  aiul  Georgia     7q 
Pownall,    'Ihoma-,    Ilx-liov.,    reads    tlie 

future  of  .America ^56-7 

I'rcscott,  .Maj.  (ien.  {/>>:)  capitured   near 

.Montreal 129 

commands  at  Newport,  K.  1 255 

captured  again  by  Col.  liarton.    .  .  .   4(H) 

exchanged  for  Gen.  Lee 409 

Prescott,  \\  illiam.  Col.,  /'.  1726,  </,  1795. 

llis  antecedents 84 

chief   actor   at   redoubt   on   Hunker 

Hill 93 

advised  the  movement 95 

marched  the  command,  under  orders  96 
conspicuous  lor  gall.int  conduct.  ...  97 
his  relations  to  the  battle  (.Note).  .  .  ()8 
w.lli  Warren  the  last  to  retreat....  iio 
makes   rash  projiosal   to  regain  the 

position >U) 

commands  Governor's  Island,  N.  \'.  197 
in  I'.irson.,'  brigade  at  New  \'oik..    226 

at  I'ell's  l'(jint  with  his  regt 234 

Preparations  for  the  war 82 

I'lesidcnt  of  Congress  reviews  Rocham- 

beau's  army (124 

Prcvost,   Sir    Augustine,   Maj.   Genl.    at 

St.  Augustine,  I'lorida 44b 

ca|ilures  Sunbury,  Georgia 4()4 

deleals  Genl.  .Ashe  at  ISrier  ('reek .   4(j4 
demands   the  surrender  of  Charles- 
ton     465 

retires  to  Savannah 465 

gains  time  by  jiarley  with  D'l'lsiaing.  479 

destroys  roails  and  bridges 479 

makes  gall.int  defense  of  Savannah  479 
"  Priile   or     principle     must    nerve    the 

soldier,"  I  ireeiic 531 

Principles  of  ./w.  /uT'.  the  life  of  English 

liberty 4 

military  science delined  in  Chap.  XL     60 

the  .h>i.  A'fT.  reviewed ^46-7 

Prince  Edward,  C.  II.,  visitetl  by  Tarle- 

ton .  .   622 

Prince  of    Wales    regimenl    nearly    de- 
stroyed      508 

Princeton,  battle,  an  American  success  288-9 
college  occupied  by  liritish  troops.    289 
Prisoners   taken  at  Saratoga  sent  to  Vir- 
ginia     . .  353 

Privateering  111  high  favor 278 

Privateers  and   liritish  cruisers  in  1776..   399 
Proclamation    of,    day    for    fasting    and 

prayer,   1776 IC 

liurgoyne 306 

counter,  of  Washington 306 

of  liurgoyne 318 

Schuyler 31? 


i!'^' ; 


.|it1*' 


f 


698 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    INDEX. 


I'AC.K 

rri>cl:ini:Uion  of  IIowc 279 

Cliiitim 175 

Proctor,   riioni:\>,  Capt.,  commands  guns 

at  CIi.kKI's  Ford 36S 

accompanies    Sullivan     agaiii'.t    In- 

I'i^iis :■■•.••  -+75 

rniiiiotioii^  o(  .li//.  olViccrs  give  (lis•^alis- 

faciion 2(/) 

of  general  officers  ^pccilieil -1)6 

Propped    Hill   occupied   by    Genl.    Put- 
nam, (Note.) Ill 

I'rote-l  sent   to  Count  I)'l'!staing,  unten- 
able    453-4 

I'roviileiice  in  war  illustrated,  Clia|).  \'I1  35 

cmplia-i/ed f'3f>-5i 

I'lovineia!  ( '(ingress,(Mass.)  vole  to  iai.-.e 

an    army 10 

I'ru.ssian  Logistic^  excellent   in  1^70...,  (x) 
I'ula^Ui,  L'asiniir,  Count,    Maj.   Genl.,   /'. 
1747,,/.  I77<). 

rescues   the  post  of  Little  Neck...  451) 

skirmishes  near  Charleston 4(15 

A\  at  siege  of  .Savannah 4S1 

is    reuRinbereil ..  f)-;5 

I'lirehasc  of  powder  and  cannon  author- 
ized    $- 

Putnam,  Kufus,  Col.  engineer  at  lioston  152 

on  Schuyler's  Court  of  Intiuiry 312 

I'uinam,  Isr.iel,  Maj.  Genl.  <^.  1718,1/.  1790 

his  antecedents S4 

an  original  appointment S() 

at  occupation  of  I'.unkcr  Hill 95 

his  rel.itions  to  the  battle,  (Note).  .  9S 

asks  lor  reinforcements 9() 

generally  useful  during  the  battle.  .  102 
his  elforis  10  rally  the  troops  nearly 

fruitless 109 

retires  to  Prospect   llij.,  (Note).  .  .  .  in 

in  command  at  lioston 153 

succeeds  Sullivan   at  lirooklyn 2i'4 

in  conniiand   during  battle  of  Long 

Island 205 

neglects  to  lest  the  reconnoissance. .  206 
senils  .Stirling  to  reinforce  'he  pick- 
ets   207 

commands  live  brigades 220 

advises  to  abandon  New  V'ork 22  ( 

covers  tlie  retreat  from  New  \'ork.  .  225 

his  division   in  ]ieril :!27 

fails  to  clo^e  the  Hudson   river....  243 

has  confidence  in  Fort  Washington.  249 

in  command  at  I'hiladt'lphia.  . .    ..  271 
fails     to   cooperate     in    surprise    of 

Trenton 27(1 

holds  troops  ready  to  go  north 299 

w.'irns  ( lates  of  (.Minion's  movements  3^2 

coniinands  in   the  Highlands 355 

furloughs   New  Y(uk  mililia 35(1 

is  oul-gencraled  by  Gen.  CKuton..  360 

retires  from  {'ishkill 360 

reoccupics  i''isld<ill 361 

li is  patriotism  superior  to  his  general- 
ship   361 

n'ilhholds  troops  from  Washington.  3S4 
makes    weak    demonstrations   upon 

New  \'ork 3S4 

(till    keeps    troops    from     the    main 

army 397 


PAGB 

Putn.im,  Israel,  in  f'onnecticul  until  Dec. 

1777 393 

in  command  al  Hanbury 458 

reiuemljereil  in  his  retirement 655 

Pyle's  loyalists  utterly  routed, (no  (luarter)  554 


<e. 


(,)t'i:i;r.(',  expedition  of  Arnold  organized. 

1775 ' 

statement  of  the  march  and  trials 
assault  uiion  the  lower  town. .  .  , 
reinfiiced      by      McLean's      Royal 

Scolcb 

surrender  demanded  by  .\rnoM.  .  .  . 
surrender  demanded  by  .Moutgomerv 

plan  of  double  assault 

Monlgoriiery's  assault   and  death   i 

Arnokls  assault  and  lall 1 

siege   raised 

Queen's  Rangers  al  t'hadd's  Lord 

al    .Muninouth 

at    I',li/al)ethtown 

sent   lo    N'irginia 

(Juinliy's  i'.ridge,  skirmish   at 

(Juiiiton's     Ijridge,   skirmish    at,    .March 
iSlh,    177,S 


121 

2-24 
130 

130 
131 

L34 
134 
35-'-> 
36-6 
163 
370 
441 
4'W 
548 
575 

405 


K. 


R.vccoox  rillcs  at  Charleston  .  , 185 

Ragg  (/)';•.),  Lieut,  of  marines, /r/j 200 

Rahl,  (Rail)  ('ol.  (Hessian)  at  Chalterton 

Hill 239-40 

at  I'ort  Washington 250 

a  good  lighler 2()3 

in  comnumd  at  Trenton 273 

7C'.  mortally  ai   Trenton 274 

liis  error  at   Trenton 275 

controversy  as  to  his  name  (Note).  .    277 
Railways   supported    Prussian    Logistics 

in  1S70 69 

Ramsey,  iJavid  (.\L  D.),  S.  C.  (historian), 
/'.  1749.."'-  iSf5- 

oiiinion  of  lUmker  Hill 108 

opinion  of  baltle  of  (iuilfird 5(14 

as  to  Canadian  .symi)athy idi 

Ramsey,  Col.,  at  battle  of  .Monmouth  .  .  439 
Ramsour's  ALUs,  (Ramseur)  skirmish. .  .  49S 
Randolph,  frigate,  under  ISiddle.  .  ,  .31)9,  ^54 
Rank  of   I''rench  and   .\merican  otticers 

regulateil 4()i 

Raw  troops  may  be  pushed,  when 116 

Rawdon,  T'rancis,  Lord,  Maniuis  of 
Ilasiings,  Earl,  sii/'.  tJov.  Gen. 
India,  /'.  1754,  (/.  1H25. 

Use-,  good  strategy  at  Camden 50 

gallanlry  at  liimker  Hill 115 

reinforces  Clinton  at  the  South  ....   491 

stationed  at  Camden 5(jf) 

gallant  conduct  at  battle  of  Camden 
plans  an  attack  upon  Greene.  .    . 
attacks  Greene  :d  Hobkirk  Hill, 
pursues  Greene  a  short  distance  . 

retires  10  Camden 573 

details  of  the  battle 571-3 


516 
571 
572 


CHRONOLOGICAL    AND    (;ENKRAr,    INDKX. 


690 


31)3 


Rawdon,    Francis,    goes 

Ninety-Six 

pursues  Giceiu;  to  the  Knnorce. 


i/ed, 

. . . .   121 

1    . 122-24 
....     130 

Loy.ll 
. . . .    130 
....    131 

nuTV   134 
.  .   '•    "34 

nil  135-6 
. .   136-6 

163 

....   370 

441 

490 

548 

575 

larcii 

405 

tS5 

200 

lerton 

.  . .  239-40 

250 

2(->S 

273 

274 

275 

Die)..  277 

'i-.UCr> 

!....    69 


lOS 

^(4 

161 

uth  .  .   439 
i.sh . .  .   49.S 

..399.  ^54 
rfficei's 

491 

u6 

lis    of 
,   Gen. 

50 

115 

ii  ....   49t 

sob 

ixmdcn  516 

571 

liU...  572 
ice  . . .    572 

573 

571-3 


I'ACE 

to    relief     of 

574 
574 

retires  to  .Monii's  (Jorner 574 

coiiiproini-~i'il  l>y  assent  to  I'l.Tlfiuir's 

))(plicy 575 

sails  lio'meuard,  and  is  tapluied  .  .  .    577 

meets  t'orinvalhs  at  Vorkioun  ....    577 

Rawliiigs,  Col.  (.//'/.)  at  Fort  \V.i-liiiiL;loii   24S 

7.'.  at  I''ort  Wasliint^ton -'^o 

Raynal,  .\l)l)e.  opinion  of  Trenloii 2.S2 

Re.ad,  Col.,  at  I'.unker  Hill . 

KeadeV  X'ir^iiiia  niiliti  I  at  Ilol)l<irk  Hi 

Rear  Cnard^.  in  retreat 

tlieir  impiirtaiue 

Kelu  llion  derme<t 

Ree<l,  ('ol.,  at   Princeton 


I.K) 

^  /  2 
74 


31 

2()(. 


102 

5"7 


157 
i?7 

23(1 

2",() 


2fi() 

267 


4SS 


14 


promoted  lirit;.  den 

Reed,  lame-,  ( 'ol.,  at  rail  fence,  Hunker 

Ilill 

Reed,  t'ol.  (S.  C.)  i.  at  Rocky  Mount.  .  . 
Reed,  Joseph,  Adjt.  Gen.,  stid.  Gov.    I'a., 
>.  1741,  '/.  17*5. 

at  I'lOston 

goes  to  New  York 

at  Harlem  1  lei^dits 

his  horse  shot, in  skirmish 

report  of  the  skirmish 

describes  the  want  of  disciidine.  .  .  . 

proposes  to  resiijn 

at  Chatterton  Hill 

reports  as  to  //.  in  New  jer.^ey  .... 
urges  operations  in  New  Jersey.  ... 

distinguished  for  service 65t> 

Reed,  Mrs.  Esther,  wife  of  joseiih  Reed, 

honored  by  Bancroft 

Retnli^tments  in  1776,  vital  to  American 

caii'~e 

Regular  ariv.y,  a  national  police,  nucleus 

for  national  defense    

Regular  army  of  I  Ireat    Britain  and  the 

United  States I4 

Regular  ariiiv,  a  basis  for  national  defense  526 

Regular  army  neces>ary /J5I 

Republic  of  South  Carolina i7(j-So 

Retreat,  as  treated  by  loinini 73 

as  treated  by  .Vrehduke  Charles. ...      73 

as  treated  by  Col.  llamley 73 

when  well  conducted,  to  be  honored 

with  victory 74 

through     -New    Jersey   (See    Wash- 
ington)   

fnnn  I'.arren  Hill  (See  ]).  406)  . 
from  I'liiladelphia  (See  p.  413) 

discussed 

in  American  civil  war.  ..... 

from  Long  Island  (.See  pp.  217-1,8).  ,3-^ 

from  (^)ueb< I"3 

from  Ilubbardton 3'-" 

of  Lee  from  Monmouth 437 

from  Newport 455 

from  Cowjiens 545 

from  (niilford S^-i 

Retreating  army,  pursuit  of  .  .  .    7^ 

Revoluiiim,  delined .     32 

not  an  inherent  right,  but  a  contin- 
gent duty 


I'AOR 

Revolutionary  Epoch  di-eussed 3-7 

Rhode  Islaiul,  as  a  lirili^h  base 58 

enters  upon  war 84 

Richardson,  Col.,  at  Harlem  Heights     .   229 
Richmond,  Va.,  as  an  objective,  IS61-5.      54 
R-ichmond,  Duke,  (CiiarU ■^,  Lennox,)  Sec. 
Slate,  /'.  1735,  1/.  lSu6. 

his  prophecy 4OO 

denounces  Hayne's  execution 575 

Richmond  oceu]>ied  liy  .Arnold 549 

Ridgciiury  the  hcadiiuartei^  of  Kocliam- 

beau 6'8 

Riedesel,  I'riedrich  .\dol|.h,  ISaron,  Maj. 
Gen.,  /'.  1730,  '/.  i^ixj. 

arrives  in  Canada lf'4 

at  Three  Rivers l('(i 

with  liurgoyne's  exjiedition       309 

imrsues  St.  Clair 

mistakes  New  England  sentiment 
detained  at  Castleton  by  7^'.  men. 
plan  to  mount  lli■^  dragoon 

.1       .  .,  _        r    I  ■ _.   '.      I.',... 


314 
321) 
320 
327 
340 


the  hist  re=orl  , 


.33-4 


at  battle  of  Freeman's  I'arm  .  . 

at  battle  of  I'.euiis  Heights 345 

Riedesel,  Madame 35" 

Kivers,  as  lines  of  operation 54 

Rivers,  the  passage   of 7'> 

Roberdeau,    I'>rig.     Genl.,    reports    si.me 

startling    rumors .    194 

brigade  with  Greene 237 

Roberts,  Owen.M.aj.  ist  S.  C.  regt 179 

Robinson,  (.:ol.,  :.'.  at  Green  Springs.  .  .    50S 

Robinson,  Lieut.  (/-)'/•,),  at  Guilford 562 

Kochambeau,  de,  Jean  IJaptiste  Donatien 
de  Vimeur  (/'a).  Marshal,/'.  1725, 
(/.  1S07. 
arrives     at    Newport     with    I'rench 

troops 5"3 

reports  condition  of  .\mericnn  affairs  503 
concerts  operations   with  Washing- 

t<in   5S4 

at  Wetheisfield 603 

again  at   Wetherstleid 61S 

at   Ridgebury,  Connecticut 618 

joins  Washington 620 

reconnoitres  in  New  jersey O20 

■vith   W.ishiiigton  at  West  I'oint...   b22 
lends  $20,(Xjo  in  gold   (U\  pledge  of 

Robert  .Morris 623 

marches  his  armv  through  I'hiladel- 

jihia ; ('23 

his  army  revieweil  l)y  the  President.  624 

joins  Washington  at  Chester 624 

visits  liallimore ^JjO 

visits   .Mount  Vernon ^'30 

visits  Count  De  Grasse 635 

honors  his  old  regiment. ''33 

signs  ca|)itulalioirof  Vorktowu 041 

winters  in  \'irginia,  1781-2.  .....   fi44 

sails  from  Itoston f'44 

his  army  highly  honored "44 

Rochanibeau,  Col.'t/'r.),  goes  to  1- ranee 

for   supplies 525 

Rocheblave  commands  at  K.isk.aski,!.  .  .  461 
Rodney,  George  Bridges,  Lord  Admiral, 

sends   Howe  to  .Vmerica   614 

before  House  of  Conunons 615 

Rodney,   'rhomas,  descriles   the   stormy 

night,  Dec.  20th,  1776 27a 


<:r, 


^i' 


'{i-p 


'.  i 


700 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


PACK 

Rodney,  Cxsar,  Gov.  Del.  addressed  by 

Grcoiu' 529 

Roebuck,  fii.^ate,  .nt   Red  Hook 201 

frigate,  :it  Pliilaileliiliia 395 

Roliaii  r'i;iniy,  N.  1 '.,  us  peoiile 519 

Rocky  MoMit,  ^kiiiiii  .11 507 

Rose,  friL;a;c',  at   Noiv  York,  (map)   l!at- 
tle  of  Lwiii;  Island. 

at  Savannah 47S 

Ross,  Lieut   Col,  reconnoiiies  along   the 

liraiidyu iiie 371 

Ross,   Maj.   (/ir),  sij;ns  capitulation   of 

Yorktown 641 

Royal  Governors  on  shijis  of  war 180 

Riigely's    .Mills,  slau_i;hter  of    American 

cavalry 4')"-S 

Rush,  IJcnjaniin,  (statesman  and  philan- 
tluopist),  />.  1745,  ■/.  1S13. 

sent  to  find    Lee 262 

Rutherford,  Gcnl.,  sent  to  Black  Swamp  464 
Rutledge,    John,   Gov.     S.  C,    and  sii/'. 
Chief  Justice  -Sup.  Court    .S.  C.,  d. 
1739,  '''■  i9')0- 
eininent  in  defense  of  Fort  Sullivan   iSi 
prevents  a  fatal  blunder  of  Lee. ...    1 32 
sends  a  laconic  note  to  Moultrie.  .  .    iSS 

this  note  correctly  cited 1S8 

is  reelected  Governor   4(15 

applies  to  D'Estaing  for  aicl  ai;.iiu>t 

Savannali 477 

has  full  powers  at  Charleston,  1780.   494 
Ru-sell,  \Vm.  Col.  on  Court  of  Lviuiry, 

(Schuyler) ;   ....   312 


S. 

SArRED  History  honors  military  valor..  2t 
Saint  Clair,  Arthur,  Maj.  Gen,,  /'.   1734, 
d.  1818. 

Colonel  in  Canada 166 

at  battle  of   Trenton 274 

at  battle  of  Princeton 2S1) 

appointed   .Adjt.  (Jeid 291; 

at  Ticiinderoi^a 299 

gives  notice  of  l!uri;oyne's  advance.  302 
confident  of  the  strength  of   i'icon- 

deroga 311 

calls  council  ol   war 313 

abandons    Ticonderog.i 313 

retreats  to  Castleton 31b 

joins  Genl.  Greene  at  the  south.  .  .  .  (>$^ 

Saint  John's,  captured  by  .Arnold 120 

captured  by  .\Iontt;omery I2() 

abandoned  by  Sullivan ibS 

occupied  by   lUiri^oyne 169 

5>aint  Leger,    liarry.  Colonel  (/>>.),  com- 
mands   expedition     to     Mohawk 

Valley ....  305 

reaches  Osweijo,  New  York 321) 

executes  a  well  |)lanned  movement.  323 

makes  a  proclamation 324 

.suffers  loss  by  a  sortie    from    Fort 

Schu\ler 324 

fights  Ciiid.  Herkimer  at  Oriskany.  324 
writes    IJurgoyne    hopefully    of   his 

prosjiocts 324 

raises  the  siege  of  Fort  Schuyler. .  .  325 


PAGI 

Saint  Leger.his  retreat  and  its  effect.  .  .  .   325 
Saint     Luc     in     charge    of    lUirgoyne's 

Indian   allies 32f; 

is  olfindcd  by  lUirgoyne's  honesty.  .    327 
.Saint  Sauvier,  Chevalier  de,  i:  at  15i>stoii  455 

is  luMioiud  by  a  monument 455 

Saint  .Simon,  Ciumt  de,  lands  at  James- 
town with  French  troops ()I2 

is  willing  to  serve  under  La  Fayette  612 
participates  in  siege  of  Yorktown.  .  ()I2 
approve-,  of  La  Fayette's  action.  .  .  .   ()I2 

sails  for  the  We^l  Indies 645 

Salvin,    Lieut.  (Br.)  i:  m  battle  of  tJuil- 

ford 5(13 

Sander's  Creek,  (battle  of  Camden) 514 

Sargent,  Colonel,   rejiorts    llritish   move- 
ments      225 

Suil,    King  of   Israel,  after  battle,  like 

( iates  at  Saratoga 344 

.Savage,  Capt.  (./w.)  at  battle  of  James- 
town     608 

Savannah  captured  by  Lieut.  Col.  Camp- 
bell (15r.) 459 

repels  assault  of  allied  armies.  .   477-83 
Scammel,     Alexander,     Col.     Aid     de 
camp,  .\dj.  Genl. 
gives  fal>e  al.irm  .ooklyn...    .   218 

at  battle  of   Freeman's  ]•  arm 33O 

accompanies     Washington    to    Vir- 
ginia     622 

mentally  7.v.  near  Yorktown (135 

Schaick,     Col.,    ;,u'pri-.es    a     vill.igo    of 

Onondaga  Indians 463 

Schmult/,.   (.lajit.    {/ir.)   i.    at    battle    of 

liuilford 562 

Schloo/.er  mi-.stales  Indian  atrocities.  .  .    325 
Schnoener,   Lieut.  (Jir.)  i.   at    battle   of 

Guilford 563 

Schuyler,   Philip,    .Maj.   Gen.,  sii/>.   Sen- 
ator, /-■,  1733,  </.  1804. 

appointed  Brig.  ( ien 89 

sent  to  invade  Canada 120 

i^  delayed  by  dl  health 125 

joins  the  northern  army 127 

caiHures  .St.  JiJin's,  alter  siege.  .  .  .  128-q 
hear-,  from  Washington  as  to  .Mien's 

capture 1 28 

writes  to  Montgomery  and  others.  132-3 
underestimates  tht;  patience  of  Job.  139 
ha-,  the  sympathy  ol  Washington  .  .    139 

opposes  Indian  auxiliaries 158 

negotiates   tor   peace   with   the    .Six 

Nations 159 

is  relieved  by  Gates,  but  reinstated.    310 

orders  torts  put  in  g.)od  order 311 

doubts  the  strei.gth  of  Tieonderoga.   312 

attempts  to  reinlorce  the  post 312 

answers     Burgoyne's     second     i)ro- 

clamation 31B 

obstructs  Burgoyne's  line  of  march.  318 
shares  Washington's  confidence. .  .  .  318 
is  jiulged   by    Marshall,    Kent,   and 

Webster 3I() 

abandons  Fort  George 319 

send-,  Lincoln  to  rear  of  Burgoyne.  321 
sends      troops      to      relieve      Fort 

Schuyler 324 

is  superseded  by  Gates  334 


, 

2l8 

330 

V'ir- 

•  •  . 

622 

(>35 

of 

463 

of 

.  , 

562 

325 

ot 

563 

1011- 

«.) 

.  .  . 

120 

125 

127 

.  .1 

28-9 

pro- 

....318 

.icli.  318 

:....  318 
and 

....  319 

....  319 

yno.  32r 
i'ort 

....  324 

....  334 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND   GENERAL   INDEX. 


70 1 


Schuyler   Philip,  his  deportment  low.inl 

G.iles     . 3" 

in  Coiit;ress,  on  W.ir  Coinmitli'i;     .  .   4)" 

hi>.  character  vindicated 3"i 

decline^  to  la-coinc  Secretary  of  War   588 
Scoit,  Charley  iliij^.  (;en.,^«/^  Gov.  Ky., 
/'.  I74<'i,  </.  I'M"' I. 

Col.  at  lialtle  of  I'lenlon 273 

with  Wa.^iilngton  at   Valley   Forge. 

(See  Map) 

scat   to  reinforce   Maxwell  in  New 

ler.ev 414 

heard  Washin^Jton's  instructions  to 

Lee 422 

at  battle  of  Monmouth 435 

te^lilicN  on  tiial  of  (Jen.  Lec 422-<i 

taken  prisoner  at  Charlottesville.  .  .    (kk.> 
Scott,   John   Morin,   lirig.  Gen., /'.   1730. 

;/.  17S4. 

votes  to  aliandon  I.onij;  Island 217 

in   Gen.  I'utnani's  division   at   New 

York 220 

votes  to  alKiiiiloii  Neiv  York 224 

votes  to  defend  I'lrt  Washington  .  .    237 

promoted  Brig.  Gen 2</i 

before     Kort     In  k'liendeiice     with 

Heath 292 

Scott,    Wiiifield,    Lieut.    Gen.    (.-/w.)   i. 
17S6,  </.  lS6(i. 
his     supersedure     in     Mexico     bad 

military  policy 44 

Seaboth's.  Anspach,   legt.  (//.)  at  siege 

of  Newport 454 

"Sectional     troops    not    favorably    com- 
bined "  (Washington) 294 

Sevier,   John,   Col.    i.l/fi.)    at    battle    of 

king's  .Moiint.iin 520 

Sharpe,  (;ranville  (AV.I,  (riiilantlir-'pist), 
//.  1734,  li.  1S13. 
rcMgneil  office  rather  than  aid  tlie  war     83 
Shay's  rebellion  as  a  type  (^f  civil  war.  .  .      31 
Shee,  Col.,  joins   tlie   arinv  at    llrooklyn 

Heiglils 214 

Shelby,    Isaac,   Col.,  su/k   (iov.    Ky.,   />. 
1750,  (/.  1820. 

at  battle  of  King's  Mountain 520 

.Sheldon,    Klisha,    (.'ol.,    (o    complete    a 

cavalry  battaiimi 266 

attacked'    bv     Tailetnn     .it     Pound 

Kidge...'. ,.   4t'S 

to     cooperate    with    l)e     Lauzun  s 

lancers "'''' 

scatters  Helancey's  Uefugees f)ic) 

on  duty  along  the  Hudson <>2l 

Shepherd,  C.ipt.  i..lr>i.)  i\  at  Savannaii.  .    4^-' 
Sheiburne,   Henry,    Maj.   (Am.)   gallant 

near  "  Tlie  Cedars  " I*^'? 

k.  in  b.ittle  of  Germantown 3»'l 

Sherman,   William     Tecuni.seh,   tleneral 
U.  S.  Army,  /'.  1820. 
accepts  dedication  of  this  volume. 

Personal  Tiibute 

his  march   to  the  sea,  as  a  line  of 

o|)erations  ....      .S7 

in     1861-5,    in    respect    of    giaiid 

strategy 5>7 

Sheridan,  .Maj.  {Ih:)  turns  a   house   into 
a  fort 


■^tS 


Slireve,    Col.    {Ant.)   at    the    lialtle    of 

Springfield 5"' 

Ship-building  in  1776,  well-developecL  .    276 
Shoplev,    .\(iani,    (.:apl.    \Aiii.)    at     Eort 

Truiiibidl 626 

at  I'ort  Griswold 523 

Shuldham,    .Vdmiial,    relieves    Admiral 

Graves  at  Hoston ....    14^^ 

his   o|)inioii   of  Am.   occupation   of 

Dorchester 152 

Siege  of,   lio^toii— (('hapier  .Will.)...    146 
reminiscence  by  Kilwd.  Storr.  (note)   154 

Tort  Schuyler  by  St.  Leger 322 

Newport  by  .Ini.  and  /•>.  troops.  .  .  440 
Savannah  by  Am.  and  /•>.  troops  . .   477 

Cliaileston  by  Gen.  Clinton 4')(> 

Augusta  by  .•/;«.  troops 520 

Ninety-Six  l)y  .Int.  troop, 574 

N'orktown  by  .Int.  and  /•>.  troops.  .   631 
SiUiman    (Maj.   Gen.  Conn.    .Mil.),  with 

brigade  at  New  York 220 

pi-is.  in  skirmisli  near  D.rnluiry  ....   297 
Sill,  .\Lij.  (A.!-.)  k.  in  assault  upon   Fort 

Clintrm   359 

Simcoe,  J.  Grave-,  Lieut.  Col.,  siih.  Gov. 
Canada,  witli  (Queen's  R.iiigers  at 

\)uentin's  l>i idgo V)5 

with  Oueen's  Rangers  at  Hancock's 

Bridge 4^15 

wiili   (Queen's    Rangers   at  Crooked 

Billet    I'averu  .  .  '. 4"s 

-17,  at  battle  of  Moiinnnitii 444 

at  Kli/abethtown,  New  Jersey 499 

joins. Vrnold's  expedition  to  Virginia  54.i 
enters  Kichuiond  and  Westham  ...  541) 
in  skirmish  at  Charle-  Cily  ('.  \\.  .  ;49 
.scatters  militia  near  Williamsburg  .  iS') 
diivcs  Steulien  from  Point  of  Fork,    iioi 

often  underraled  as  a  soldier '>oi 

retires  to  Weslham  on  James  River.  603 
has  sharp  skiiinish  "  ilh  Butler  ....   604 

ha.i  skirmish  wiili  La  Fayette OiKi 

Simms,     John,    of    Virginia    Assembly, 

taken /m T <)oi 

Simpson,  Capt.  [Br.)  k.  at  Savannah  .  .  .    4^2 

Smews  of  war 7'^ 

Singletim,  Capt.  {Am  .  .it   tlie   bailie   of 

Camden 5'''' 

at  tlie  liatlle  of  Ciuilfor  1 5s8 

Skene.  I'hilip.  Lieut.  <.',ol.  (A'r)  com'r.  to 

enl'orce  allegiance   31S 

brought  mischief  cmly 327 

deceives  Lieut.  Col.  Breyinan 330 

surrenders  igiioininiou-.ly 352 

disappears  from  .•\meric.i 353 

Skenesboioiigh  taken  by  Cieii.  I'hillips.  .   314 
Skirmisli  at   .Moore's  Cri'ck  Bridge,  Va., 

Dec.  9,  1775  (noticed) 174 

l>aiibury.  Conn.,  April   25-7,    1777 

(iiuursjini) 297 

near  l'"ort  .\nii,  June  7,  1777  (sharji 

action) 3'? 

Lucan's  Mills Vr- 

Whitemarsli,  Dee.  8,  1777     397 

(Inin'.on's    Bridge,   Va.,    .\Liich    iS, 

"177^ ' •♦"5 

H.iiHiM  k's  Ihiilgc,  .\.  J.,  March  21, 

'77-i    ■!>'' 


702  (  IIRC^NOLOGICAl.    AN 

•  PAt.H 

Skirmisli  at  Crooked  Ilillet  Tavern,  Pciiti. 

May  I,  177S 405 

■l'a|i|iaii.  N.  \.,  Si-nl.  L'7,  177S  (~\n-- 

prisci 45'.i 

Little  NeeU,  N.  J..  <  )el.  \^.  177S  (ii" 

(inaiterl 45') 

Tatiial's  I'laiilalion,  S.  I',,  Nov.  27, 

I77S  (aiiidiu 4(>i< 

licaiilnrl.  S.  ('.,  I'el>.  ;,,  1 771)  (sliarji 

artioni 4l'4 

KetlleCrceU.lia  I'eb.  14,  177')(rcMiti  4''4 
Stono    l-'erry,  S.  ('..  Ajiril    2i>.    17711 

(assault) 4'>? 

I'ouM'!  I\iili;e.  N.  \'.,  July  2,  I77'i--  4''^ 
New    Haven,   Conn.,   July    5.    17711 

(inenr-ioni t'"i 

Fairlielil,   (unn..    Inly   S,   1771)   (in- 

eur-i"n) 471 

Green    I'a rn\~.   (unn.,  July  if.    l''n 

(inenr-i"n) \~\ 

Norwalk,  I'nnn.,  Jnly,   1771^  (ineur 

>ionl 471 

Minni>ink,  N.  V.,  July  22,  177')  lin- 

I'ur^iiMil 474 

Newark,  N.  j.  (ineur>ioii) 4^^ 

VounL;^  Iliiu^e.  N.  \'.,  l'\li.  },  17^11 

(Mirpri^el 4>() 

Waxliaw  (reek,  S.  C,  May  2q,  I7>ii 

(no  i|iiarten 41)7 

RaniMHir's  (kaMi>eur'>)  Mill-,  S,  L'., 

J\nu'  20,  1781.)  (sharji  action)  ....  41.)"^ 
Connecticut    Farms,  N.  J..  June   7, 

17S0  (incur-ion  ) 41)') 

Williamson',,  rianlation.  S.  C,  July 

12,  17?" •  •■  •    5"7 

Rocky   .Mouni.  S.  ('.,  July  -,0,  17S0 

(l)olil  assault  1 SI17 

Rocky  Mount,  S.  I"..  .\u^'.  i,  17^0  .  5117 
Hani^inL;   Rock,  S.  < '.,  .\ul;.  6,  l7?o 

(lornial  enL;a,L;enu'nl  1 s')"" 

Tilt   Wateree,  S.  e'.,  .\uj;.   I?,   I,.i) 

(surpri-el 511 

Fisliini;  Creek,  S.  ('.,  .\ul;   i>,  I7'^" 

(surpri-el s  I  l~l  2 

MnsL:rove's    Mills,    S.  t'..    .Vu;;.    l-, 

17.'<<i 51? 

Waliali's  I'lant.uiiMi,  S.  C,  Sept.  2u, 

17S1) 5l> 

Charlotte,  N.  I.'.,  Sept.  20,  1781).  ...  519 
Fish  I 'am  I'onl,  S.  C,  Nov.  9,  17S0  521 
Hlackstock'-  I'lanlatinn,  S.  C,  Nov. 

20,  17*^1)  (sharp  action)    522 

Chaiie-  Citv  C.  H.,  Va.,  Ian.  S.  17S1  549 
McCowan-'   Foul.    N.    C.,    Feb.    i, 

17S1 551 

Allamance  ('reek,  Feb.  2s,  1781  (no 

quarterl s';4 

Wet/ell's  .Mill,  N.C.,  March  b,  i7,Si   " 

(spirited  action) 555 

I'etersiuiri;,  \'a.,  .\pril  2?,  1781  (re- 
treat secured) S""') 

Brandon,  Va.,  .\pril  25,  1781  (re- 
treat secured) 5S9 

Osborne,  \a.  (-tores  destroyed). . . .  509 
before  old  l-'ort  Independence,  July 

2,    I7S1 b2c) 

New   I.ondoii,  Conn.,  Se|it.  6,  17SI 

(incursion) (12 j 


1    CFNFKAI.    IN!)i:\. 

Skirini-h  at  .'sloniiii^lon,  Conn,  (incursion)  14a 

Ijuinbv   llriil^e  (noticed) ?75 

.Monk's  I'orner,  S.  C.  (noticed)  ....  575 

I'orchesier,  .S.  C'.  (noticed) ^-^ 

W'illiamsburi;,  Va.  (sharp  action)  .  .  (1(14 

(douce-ter,  Va.  (sharp  action) 63(1 

.•^l.ues  armed  by  Lord  Dunniore 174 

.^niall    l'o.\   in  Canada   affects   the   .Im. 

army I ('8 

xn.dKvood,    Willi. un,     Ihit;.    i'lcn..   sun. 

C.ov.  Md„  /'. .  ,/.  1792. 

(  oloiH  1,  at  b.ittlc  of  l.oili;  Island  .  .  197 

ti'.ken  /'V>.  on  Loni.;  l-land 2(i(j 

coi\(r.i-ls  /•'/■.  ami  ./'/(.  olhcers 232 

st.ite-  hi-  opinion  of  Washini^lon. .  .  233 

re.  in  .Ktion  at  Chatterton  Hill    ...  2411 

allempts  the  posts  on  Staten  I-land.  ^(<t 

at  b.illle  of  (Jermantown 3S7 

in  expedition  lo  \\  llmins^ton,  1  >el .  .  3118 

al  battle  of  ( 'ainden 51  > 

-uiceed-  IV  Kail) :;2t> 

recruits  for  (Ireene's  army .=  2'» 

Siiii-alon,  ('ai)l.  (/Ir.)  i\  at  battle  of  (iiiil- 

ford   562 

Sinilli,  lirii;.  Crcn.  (/Vr.)  at  Newport,  K.  I.  454 
Sniilli,    Jo-luia    Ilelt,    a    mere     tool     of 

.\riiold ?()(■ 

.^mith,    Lieut.    (Jol..    lolli    />>•.    Foot,    at 

( 'oiuord I  I-l  L' 

re-cueil  bv  I  old   Ten  y II 

Smilli.  S.iniuel.    Lieut,  Col.  (. //«.)   7i'.   at 

For!  Mililin 39? 

Sinilh,    Maj.    \.lii!.)   k.    in    skirmish    al 

( "oeen  Siuinj; .-c>!- 

"Soldier's  lite  one  of  devotion  "  (Ijreene)  S2t> 

Souih  .\merica  illu-trates  civil  war 2n 

Southern  armies  continue  parti-an  war- 
tare,  17S1 57? 

South  Carolina,  enter-  upon  war -'' 

orijani/e-  troojis  in  1776 171) 

lakes  ihe  form  of  a  Republic l-n 

militia  at  F.iitaw  Sprintrs 57^ 

S|iaiM  ioiiis  I'raiue  a^am-t  Fni^land  .  .  .  47t' 
S|Kuk-,  Jared  1  I  li-tori.m  ), /i.  I7S9,(/'.  i366. 

a-  to  conduct  of  royal  t^overnors  ...  l-i' 

as  to  Arnold  at  lieiiiis  Ileij^hls  ....  34> 
a-    to    Cen.    Sullivan    at    battle    of 

llrandywiiie 37"" 

Spear,   .Mai.  (  '"')  reconnoitres  at   I'uf- 

tinL;ton's  Ford 36S 

Sjiecht,  r.ii^'.  ( '.en,  (//,)  at  battle  of  Free- 

m.m's  f  arm   34< ' 

at  battle  of  I'.emis  lleii;ht- 345 

Speedlove,  Maj,  (/>';.)  k.  at  Hunker  Hill.  lie 
Spencer's  Ordinary  Scene  of  Skirmish    . 
>peneer,  Joseph  N,,  Maj,  Gen.,  h.  1714, 
,/.  1789. 

appointed  111  ii;.  ( ieii.,  I77(') 8r> 

before  Hoston 15b 

commands  division  at  New  \'ork  .  .  221 

opposes  evacuation  ol  New  Vitrk  .  .  221 
is    a-si^ned    to    expedition    aj^ainsl 

Newjiort   294 

enters  Con^jress 655 

Spies  in  war 78 

Hale  and  .\ndre  nuiiioiable 78 

Sprinj^lield,    Mas-.,   seleitid    lor    a    ,i;un 

foundry 294 


CIIRONOI.OGICAr,    AND    (iKNKRAl.     IXDKX. 


7^^l 


i(.» 


Springfield,  \.  J.,  tlm'.iuiied  by  Kiiyp- 

Ikjuscm 499 

Imiiiccl  iluiini;  llio  c;iiiii).iij;ii     501 

Stark,  Juliii,  Mij.  (icii.,  /'.  ly^-^, ./.  162-2. 

t'liloiK'l  ;it  Hunker  Hill,  1775 <)() 

ri'iulir>  |,;iJOil  ^LT\ii_i.- Io(-2 

dc>cril)c>.  liu'  sl.iui^liUT im>-> 

at  hallli'  (if  liciilDii 'J74 

retires  from  llic  army 331 

coniiii.uuls  X.  H,  iiiililin. 331 

wins  tile  billlle  of  I'.eniiiiii^loii 332 

promoted  in  tlu'  army 334 

for  a  lirii'f  permd  with  ( laio^ 337 

a;-->iL;ned      lo     exiiedilion     uilli     l.a 

I'ayelle , 4112 

al  ImmK-  ii(  SprinL^lieM,  N.J 501 

Statesmansliip.  in  war  iihi^l rated 411 

avoid-,  eerlain   i^Mic^ 43 

dcliiieil  liy  Joniini  a>i  military  poliey  44 

it>  >ii^nilieance  ciiM-.idered 45 

Stales-' ieneral   of    Holland,   fiiini^li    no 

lroop^  for  I-jii^land 173 

join  the  eneniie--  of  l'ni;land 5J,-> 

Staunton,     \  ,1,,      made     the     temporary 

"■•M'''''! '•    5'W 

Steam  propuNion  lail-  to  ma-ler  nature.        3 
Stedman,  t'harle^,  lA'y.i,  (slalf  officer  and 

lii>tori.nil   L;ive--   opinion   of  aflair 

at   l.e\niL;ion 11 

battle  of  Hunker  I  111! io> 

critici--e--   (lenl.    Howe   at    Brooklyn 

Hei,i;hts jkj 

statement  a^  to  lle^.^ian^at  'I'lenton 

doulitetl 271 

as  to   battle  ol     irenton 2.^1 

states    the    rel,\tive   >l!en|;tli    of   the 

two  ar.nie^ 300 

on  statf  (il  IloUf,  Clinton  .md  t.'orn- 

wallis    3(H) 

gives  opnuon  of  battle  ol  llidibard- 

ton 31(1 

repoits  .Arnold  at  I'reem.m's  |-arm  .    342 
reviews  Clinton's  move  up  the  Hud- 
son      3?'' 

as  to  battle  of  Monmouth 445 

unjust  to  H'K^ta'ng 447 

describes  >torm  off  Newport jO 

lllliu.^t   to  Knyphausen foo 

critieises  Tarlelon  at  lilaeksloekV.  .    ^22 
explains  retreat  of  Cornwallis  from 

Hillsborough ?f4 

commissary  lor  Cornwallis 554 

as  to   battle  at    Hnlikirk    Hill 573 

as  to  battle  of  l:lutaw  Springs.  .  .    ?7is-8l 
Stedman,  ("apt.  of  Atlee's   regt.  a'  Long 

Island 2(1.' 

Stephen,  Adam,  Maj.  ( leid. 

Hrig.  (ieid.  guarding  the  Helauaie.    264 

promoted   Nlaj.  (lenl 2i)(i 

at  the  liattleof   lirandyu  ine,  dislin- 

gnishiil 3(19 

at  liatile  of  (iermanlown,  di.sgraced   377 
di-missed  the  American  service.  .  .  .    3(/> 
Stephens,    Kdward,  Drig.  lienl.  d.  1744, 

./.  

promoted  Maj.  Cenl 2o'i 

joins  Ciates  with   Ti;.  militia 515 

rallies  niditia  alter  battle  of  Camden   =  i  7 


btcpliens,   Edward,  surveys   the  V.id- 

kin 531 

escorts  prisoners  and  returns  to  duly   550 

brings  recruits  to  ( ireeiie Ss) 

at  battle  of  (juilfiud s57 

:*■.  at  bailie  of  liuilford 5(13 

Slims,  Maj.  (jenl.    (//.)  at  Cliadd's  Ford   3(m) 

at  the  battle  of  liramlywine 309 

at  ihe  battle  of  ( iermantou  n 3S5 

Sterling.   Col.   1 /)'/■.)  sii/:   .Maj.   tieid.    at 

i'ort    W'.isliington 251) 

in    New  jei-e\ 3114 

.■.•.  .11  b.mle  of  Springfield 4((i) 

Steuben,     fredk.     Win.     .\ugustu-,     de, 
liaron,  Maj.  ( ienl.,  /'.  173",  </.  171)4. 

arrives  at  X'alley   l'dig(,- 40J 

a|)poinle(l  Mai.  Cien.  without  di-scnl   403 

in  h.irmony  with  Washington 41 14 

at  b.i  lie  of  Nb  111  mouth 443 

lUi  duty  in  N'irgini.i 530 

is   threatened    liy  .\rnold- 54.S 

ac<|uiesces   in     l.a    fayetle's  assign- 

ineiit 5S6 

at  I'eteisburgli  .lud  llr.indon,  \'.i.  .  .    ^i)n 
is    dri\i.'n    Iroiii    I'oint    of    fork   liy 

Sinuoc 002 

effects  a   junelion    with    l.a  F.iyetle.    O03 

is    leniembered ()55 

Sleu.irt.  ('.ipt.   (/>'r.i   uses    sHaiagem    at 

1  bulging    koek so8 

Steuarl,      l.ieiit.    Col.,     succeeds      Lord 

Kawdon s77 

in  commaml   at  <  hangiburgh 577 

retire^  to  laiiau  >piings 5S2 

leports  his  nil  ivcments 533 

makesgallant  liglil  at  Lui.iw  Springs  5S2 
re|)orts  the  battle  of  I'ulaw  Springs  582 

retires  to  Monk '>  Coiner jsa 

Stewart,     Maj.     (/>''•.  1,     /■.     before     Lort 

(_'linton 359 

Stewart,    L.iisign,   {/I'r.),   I;,   at    battle    of 

Cuilfonl' 5(12 

Slewail,   Lieut.  Col.,  (Ciuard-i,  /-.  at   b.U- 

tle  of  Cuilfonl s02 

Stiles,  L/ra,  I'res.  I'.  1727,  ,/.    171)?,   \ale 

(  oll'.'ge,  the  friend  ol  (,ieene.  ...      80 
Stirling.  Willi.im  .\lexander,  (j-^irll,  Maj. 
(  icnl.,  i\  1720,  /•.  17-^3. 

Colonel  in    .New    Jersey 14S 

liiig.  Cenl.  at  bailie  of  Long  Lsland  205 

lighls  Cenl.  ( irant's  division 210 

lights  Lord  Cornwallis 210 

surrenders  to  Cenl,  1  le  1  lei-ler.  .  .  .    210 

is    exchanged 23 1 

re.iches  W  hile  I'laiiis 23S 

at  battle  of  'Irenton,  (see  map).  .  .  .    27S 

guards    the    llelaware 1(14 

at  battle   of  I'rincetoii 2f9 

promoted  .Maj.  Cenl ...    2\p 

in  command  at  Metuchin 300 

engages   L(H-d   Cornwallis 301 

at  battle  of  lirandywine 377 

eomiiiands  reserve  at  (ierniantown  .  .    3S7 
advises  attack   upon  New   N'ork  and 

I'hiladelphia 4"4 

eominands  left  winy  at  Monmouth .   438 

I'res.  court  martial  to  try  Lee 445 

crosses   to  Staten  Island    on    the  ice   485 


■>   ]':    ■'.' 


704 


CHRt)N()l,OGICAl,    AND    GKMCkAI.    I\|ir:\. 


Stock  Well,   I.icul.  goes  to  Albany  to  get 

aiil  lur  I'Dit  >tluiyk'r 324 

Stony  Point  alianilonccl  liy  .I//1.  (;arrison  46(.> 
oci;u|)ic(l    liy    ticncrals  L  Union    and 

X'aiiglian 466 

sloinu'd    l)y  (jcnl.  Wayne 472 

aliandoncil  by  .l/n.  troops 474 

abandoned  by  ( jenl.  Clinton 47(1 

Slonlntjton,  (  unn.  lanni'nailrd 14-j 

Stono  leiiy,  po^t  (/>'.}  attacked  wiilioiit 

MlCL'e's.-< 4(.5 

Storms  seallcr  llcel  of  Sir  IVlcr  I'aiker.  175 

jjart  Ilowo  and  Wasliinj^lon ;,n  ^ 

delay  Count    1  )'l!slaiiii;   tour  weeks.  447 

scalier  Admiral  liyrous   lli'ct 447 

hcalU-r  Heels  ot  liowo  and  l)'Eslaing  4^0 
drive  Admiral  ISynm  from  l)0^ton..  455 
disperse  (It'et  of  Coiml  1  )'l!slaing.  .  .  482 
dis|Hr>c  I  linion's  soullieni  expedi- 
tion    4.)'; 

ofl'  Newport  in  1777 531; 

scalier  Arnolil's  Xir^inia  expedition  548 

cut  off  tile  escape  ol  Cornwallis.  .  .  .  ()4() 

Strategy   defined 48 

deals  lirst  «illi  the  theatre  of  war.  .  4S 

of  the  war  of  1775 -Sj 651 

"         "       limited  by  bad  logistics  hi 

Strategic  front 54 

movements,  their  philosophy 50 

nioMMuenis  of  Wasliiiigloii,  17S1...  50 

skill  sluil  lip  Clinton  and  Cornwallis  631 

Sullivan  Island  occupied  by  (ienl.  Clinton  I  77 

lorl,  lakes  liie  name  of  Moullrie.  .  190 

Sullivan,  John,   Maj.    Genl.  6.  1740,  U. 

1795- 

Brig.  CienI 8i) 

succeeds  Thomas  in  Canada I5<) 

wriles  W'asliinglon  from  .Sorel 1(14 

sends  troop,  lo   Three  Rivers l6() 

under  r.ites  ihe  Krilisli  army 166 

reporls  battle  at    Three  Rivers 107 

abandons  Canada jh- 

retires  to  Crown  Toinl '  ■  ■  ■  1(0 

succeeds    Greene     (sick)    on    Long 

Island    203 

his  confidence  while  at  lirooklyn.  . .  204 

is  superseded  by  I'utnam .  .  204 

repi>rts  ballle  of  I.oiii;  I-land 205 

responsible  for  bad  reconnoissance.  .  205 

taken />';.f.  at    Long  Island 211 

bears  a  proposition  (loni  Genl.  Howe  223 

is  i\clian_i;ed 23 1 

leaihes    \\  liile  Mains,  X.  Y 23.S 

with   Lee  in   New  Jersey 25S 

succeeds  Lee  in  command  of  division  2(13 

commands  right   wing  al   Trenloii .  .  271 

is  reiiiiked   by  Wa^hiiiglon 2c)() 

letiies  before  (ienl.  Howe 2i).S 

joins  the  'iiain  . /w.  army 3()5 

attacks  jjosls  on  Slalen  Island 3O6 

make-'    liad    receirinois^ance    on    the 

Drandywine 3711 

finds  Genl.  Howe  in  his  rear 372 

discusses  his  reconnoissance 372 

his  slateiiient  U)  Congress  considered  374 
withholds    the    credibility    of    dis- 

paitlies 375 

his  division  in  disoid.er 376 


rACi 

Sullivan,  John,  did  not  bring  the  right 

w ing  into  action 37^) 

his  report  examined .377-8 

his     posiiion      misunderstood      by 

Sparks 378 

wriles  to  Hancock,  (see  letter) 379 

his  personal  bravery  uiniuestioned.  .   3S0 

at  battle  of  German lown 3,87 

shows  gallanlry  at  (iernianlown.  .  .  .   38*1 
urges  allaek  upon  I'hiladelphia.  .  .  .   3()(; 

lands  on    klunle  Isl.md 441^ 

coniniands  al  I'rovidence,  R.  L    ...  44(1 
his  relalioii^  lo  Count  H'Kstaing..  .   441^ 

his  po>iii,]n  bef  .re  Newport 451 

reporls  his  active  force 452 

seiid>  sli.up  protest  lo  D'Lstaing.  .  .  453 
issues,  and  nio(li(ies,  a  rash  order. . .   453 

reporls  his  retreat 455 

Coniniands  an  Indian  expedition.   475-(> 
re-igiis  and   enters  Congress 524 

Sumner,  Jelliro,  Urig.  Genl..joiii>  Greene  577 
al  the  ballle  o(  T'.utaw  Springs.      .  .   5^0 

Sumter,   Thomas,  i5rig.  Genl.,  /'.  1734,  J. 

org.ini/es  a  rille   regiineiit 180 

assails   Rocky  .Moiinl 507 

assails  1  Luigmg   Rock 507 

capture,  a  valiialile  train 51 1 

is  roiiled  by    Tarleton 512 

'c.  at  lllackslock's  I'lanlalion 522 

on  iluly  between  Canada  and  Ninety 

Six 561) 

occupies  Orangeburg 574 

Sunbury,  (ia.  captured    by  Sir  Aug.  I're- 

vost,  Maj,  Genl 464 

Surrender  of  lUirgoyne's  army 35 1 

(.  harleston 497 

\'oiklo«n O43 

New   York 65(1 

Swearigen,   t'apt.  (.•////.),  kdled  al  ballle 

of  Freeman's  T'arm 341 

.Siveel,  (hislorical   writer),  a-,  lo   troops  at 

lUinker    Hill icx> 

Symond--,    I'lioma,,  Capt.  (Royal    Navy), 

lead,  the  attack   at  Lorl   Sullivan   186 
signs  Articles  of  Capitulation,  York- 
town  641 

Symonds,  K'ol.)  Njw  Hamp-hirc  militia, 

at  ballle  of  liennington 332 


T. 

'T.ACTics,  Grand,  defined  and  illustrated  48 

'Tactics,  Minor,  deliiied 48 

Tail,  Captain,  (./«/.),  conspicuous  at  bat- 
tle of  Cowpens 540 

Talbot,  Lnsign,  /•.  al  ballle  of  Guilford.  5(13 

lames,  Cajit.,  i:  al  Savannah 482 

TarleUm,   llaneslre,  Lieut.  Col.  i>.   1754. 

'/.  IS3.-5. 
alt.uks   Sheldon's  horse    at    I'ouud 

Ridge 468 

his  views  of  a  southern  campaign. .  493 

loses  conlidence  in   rmalisl  militia.  508 

re|)orls  alt.ack  upon   liaiiging  Rock  5(x> 

has  Ironble  with   militia 510 

justly  criticises  Gales 510 


CHRONOLOGICAL  AND  GENERAL  INDEX. 


705 


It 

.  37'' 
377-8 

V 

'.  378 
379 
.  3S0 
.  3S7 
.   388 

•  3W 

•  44') 
44H 

■   447 

•  45" 

. .  452 

.  .  453 
..  453 
■  •  455 
475-<> 
•  •  524 
u;  577 
.  .  iio 
J. 

..  180 

.  .  5"7 

.  .  507 

.  .  511 

..  512 

,  .  522 


46S 
4')3 

510 

510 


PAGK 

Tarlelon,  Hani'stre,  reaches  Camden. .  .  511) 

captures  Siiiiilc-i'scomniaiul 512 

litiiouMtes    iMcckleiiljiiri;     an'l    Ro- 

liuii   Ccmntie-.,  N.  C ;ii) 

can  not  ini^t  nominal  royalists 511) 

reports  liatlle  of  Kiiij^'s  Mountain.  521 

re|)iiUe(l  at   lilackstcck's  Plantation  522 

sent  111  pursuit  ol   .Morgan 541 

crowils  Morijan  over  the  racolel...  541 

Slates  sireiiylh  of  his  force 54X 

report  of  liattle  of  l^owpens 544-5 

criticises  Cornwallis  for  the  disaster  545 

crosses  the  Calawb.i   551 

explains  tireene's  escape 553 

reports  skirmish  near  Guilford 550 

battle  of  (iuilford SS') 

-States  the  issiie  as  douUtftil 5')i) 

coni|ilimenis  the  Marylmd  troops..  5t)i 

compliments  W.ishinjjlon's  cavalry  .  561 

criticises  the  action 5')- 

70.  at  (iuilford 503 

opinion  of  I  lobkirk  Hill 573 

report  of  battle  of  Mutau-  ,Sprini;s  .  .  582 

mounts  his  rej^t.  on  bloodeil  horses.  589 

makes  a  raid  upon  Ciiarlottesville.  .  Oix) 

reports  lu^  lapid  march .  .  6oi 

com|.liments  I. a  Kayelte   603 

reports  skimiish  at  NViUianisbursj  .  .  604 

attempts  to   capture   .Muhlenbur^.  .  604 

ayaiii  comiiliiiients  I, a  Kayette  ....  (kxS 

criticism  of  b.itile  of  Jamestown  .  .  .  boS 

in  reserve,  at  Jamestown ()Oi) 

incursion  tliroui;li  liedford  County  .  6u) 

rep'irts  failure  of  expedition bio 

skiriniAhes  iie.ir  Willi. iiiisburi; (ill 

joins  Cornwallis  at  N'orktown 61 1 

reconnoitres      La      I'ayette's     posi- 
tion    bl2 

unjustly  questions  actions  of  Corn- 
wallis    613 

his  strictures  noticed 614 

a^ain  criticises  (.driiHallis  unjustly.  634 

reports  skirmish  with  French  lancers  b36 

gains  no  fame  as  a  scientilic  soldier.  b3b 

Tarrant's   f.irm,  scene  of  skirmish  with 

Tarlelon   551 

Taylor,   Zachary,    Maj.  tien.,  su/>.    I'res. 
U.  S,,  /'.  '17S4,  ,/.  1850. 

opens  war  with  Me.Kico 46 

Taylor,  M.ijor,  at  liutiiii^ton's    I'Ord  .  .  .  373 

'I'en  liroeck.  Col.,  joins  the  army  of  (jates  337 

ill  battle  of  lleiiiis  Heights 348 

I'ernay,  De,  t'lievalier,  convoys  Rocham- 

beau's  army  from  France 503 

dies  at  Newport,  Kliode  Island.  .  .  .  525 

is  succeeded  by  M.  Destouchcs, . . .  525 

Tetes-dc-1'oiit,  their  value 70 

Thayer,    Major  (.////.),  at   (juebec  with 

Arnold 137 

at  Fort  Mitilin 3()5 

Thomas,  John,  Maj,  Gen.,  appointed  by 

Massachusetts 10 

apiiointed     Lieut,    (ien.     of    .State 

forces 84 

appointed  t'ontineiUal   ISrig.  Gen..  89 

ordered  to  Can.ula 1 5O 

retrea'-.  from  Quebec 163 

died  of  small  po.x 1C4 

45 


PAGI 

homas,  Geor|»e  IL,  Maj.  Gen.,  U.  .S.  A., 

l>.  181b,  1/.  1870. 
is  represented  as  similar  to  Greene, 

in  type  ol  manhood 81 

homp-.on,  William,  IJiii;.  Gen.,  sent  to 

tJanada 157 

/<>is-.  at   riiree   Rivers i65 

hompsoii.  Col.  .South  t!arolina  Rangers   17^ 

on  Sullivan  Island 185 

at   lybee  Island 459 

liree  Rivers,  battle  at,  descril)ed 166 

iconderoL;a,  taken  by  Ktlian  .Mien.  ...    liq 

trophy  li.it  jireserved I  iq 

taken  by  Rurj^oyiie 31 3 

ighlmin,  Lient.  Col.,  Aide-de-camp   lo 
Commander-in-Chief,  .it   ilaiK.in 

lleii^hts 230 

at  the  battle  of  .Monmouth.  ......   440 

omci,  Robert,  .M.I),  (Historical  writer), 

a.,  to  .Arnold  at  Freeman's  Farm.    342 
oiiyiie,    Gov.    {/>'/:)   of  St.    .\ugustine. 

dispatches  inteicepted 178 

owers,  Robert,  sei/.es  private  arms  for 

(lublic  use 265 

reason,  delined  by  CoULjress  in  1776.  .  .  178 
relawiiey,  Lieut,  t-'ol,,  ~o.  at  Monmouth  444 
rentoii,  .New  Jersev,  battle  foujjiu,  Dec. 

26,   I77<>---' "■ 

surprise  jiroposed  by  Wa>liini;ton .  .  267 

slreiii;th  of  i;arrisoii 270 

general  plan  of  attack 271 

localities     described     .and      success 

reali/.ed 273 

prisoners  removed  to  Newtown.  .  .  .  275 

leoccupied  by  .Vinerican  army 277 

skirinish  with  Cornw.illis 2S6 

riplett,  Capt.,  conspicuous  at   battle  of 

Cow|)cns 5.^0 

rophies  ot  Bennington,  overestimated  .  332 

lojihies  of  Ticonderog.i,  inventory  pre- 
served   iig 

rumback's  regt.  (//.)  at  Fort  Clinton,  .  358 

runibull,  Jonaihan,  tlov.  Conn,  (states- 
man), /'.  1 710,  1/.  1785. 

supports  Washington 142 

sends  troops  to  New  Vork 156 

reports  his  visit  to  the  northern  army  l63 

writes  W''asliiiigton,  I77() 197 

inspired  many  key-notes  of  the  war.  253 

rumbull,    Jonathan,   Jr.,    Col.    (states- 
maul,  /'.  1 741),  li.  1804. 

ciniimissary  .it  Long  Island 216 

on  Washinglon's  stall" 526 

lyon.  Win.,  tiov.  of  New  York,  conters 

with  ( Ien,  ("linlon 14S 

colliers  with  (ien.  Howe 192 

invades  (.'oiinecticut 297 

skiimislies  at   L)anl)ury  and   Kidge- 

tield .  297 

in  expedition  against  Fori  Clinton.  358 

])ublislies  liritish  Conciliatory  IJills.  403 

invades  Connecticut  again 468 

lands  at  New  Haven 469 

4th  of  July  jjroclamation 469 

burns  Fairfield  .  , 470 

reports  a  raid  upon  Norwalk 470 

destroys  Green  Farms 471 

damages  inflicted  stated 47' 


•/0() 


CHRONOLOGiCAi,  y\Nt)  (;i:m.i<m,   imii:x. 


irW' 


P4}' 


i  j 


lAC.K 

'Iryoii,  Will,,  ill  cxpfdilitjii  lo  ('i)iiiiccli- 

iiit  I'.inii )().s 

Tryoii  roiiiiiy.  New  N'ork,  (lis:i(li(liil  .  .  ;iJ-' 
'riickcr,  Si'ij;iM!it,  it'pdrK  A  sruiii  III!  lln' 

lli:inil\  \(  iiit     ;',7'_' 

■|'llll>,    iK',     .\l.,',,llK    Willi     iMfllcIl    lln(.|,-, 

Inr  ilic  (  licsapcalu' ^~.\ 

riiinluill,  I.iciil.  (ill.  (A'/-.)  npils  Siiiiilcr 

(mill  I  l.iiij.;irii^  Rciik ^07 

ill  iniiiiiiiiihl  ,11  Cam  lie  II 5  II) 

'I'li^liiii,  (  III.,  ai  sl^lllm^ll  at  .Miniii^iiik.  .    .47,) 
'lutlli.-,  |i.M>|,|i  I'.,  K.v.  Dr.,  Tris.  Wali.ili 
College,  Indiana,  lii>liiriial  uiiln 
anil  aiitlioi  /'.  1  SiS. 
fuinisjus    (lata    as    lo     New    Irr^cy 

s.urilu-c> pfi 

lias    |iroviiiiisly    (ill  iiisliiil    nllU■^    in 

Irving'  aii'l  iiamioll   ;s7 

Twis-,,    l.irul.    (/>';■.)    lis  i.iiiMiilic'-,    .Mi^ar 

I..ial  Hill '.  .  .    301, 

Tyor's       aiilaliiiii  iniii)iiiil  liy  la    lay 

.;li' '  .    (1115 

'rylt-i.  liiliii,  siLjns  |>iiili  ^1  In   I  ll!  ,1.1111^    .\:_  \ 

V. 

UnKI'.ASoNAMI.K   ov    liiiiiiilialiii^   iiUiina- 

tum,li.iil  |K)liiy 4'j 

U|)liaiii,    l.iciil.    ('ill.,   suiuls    iL-fii^cfs   tu 

aid  Arnold (125 


V. 

Vai  I'NTINK's  Ull.I,  ncciipird  by  Wash- 
in  ^1  mi  '.'^d-d-Jii 

A'allr)'  loitjo  cxpciicnii's )iii 

nil  .iiiipiiu'iit  liy  liii^aili-i,  (^i.-i'   m.ip) 

\aii   (  iirtlanil,  Cnl.,   al    liallk'   nf   I'nr- 

nian'.s   l''aiiii y},lt 

Vaiiik,  Kii  haul,  (  111.  /(.    175'J. 

Malr^  AiiiDld's  iflatiiins  lo  halllf  of 
!■  nini.Lii's    I'.iiin 341' 

Vdrmiiii,   James   Milclull,    IJri^;,  (iiiil. /'. 

17.il),  "'■  I7«'>- 

|iiiiiiiiiif.|  llii^.  (icni 'Jii'i 

Willi  liiii;adr   at  i'fckskill 3(i'.' 

joins  \\  asliin^ton's  army 31^(1 

i.s  sent  to  WoiKilniiy  near  Red  jSaiik  39(1 

advises  an  attack  upon  Niw  \'ork.  .  4114 

al  the  liatlle  nf    Moiiiiinulh 43(1 

is  assigned  lo  I, a  [■'.lyelli-'s  division  44S 

in  tireeiie'^  orii;inal  iniiip.iny \.\^ 

enters  Conjjress (155 

Vattel,    I'nieriek,   (jiiiisi    and    uiiler),  /'. 
171.1,1/.  17^.7. 

clas^dies  uais,  as  lawful  or  iinlawful  2.) 

Vaut;han,  John,  Maj.  (iinl.,  al  \N  ilniiiij.; 

ton  w  iih  (  ornwallis 175 

aecoiiipanies  ( 'liiiton  to  (^'liaileston  .  171; 

reaches  New  \'ork ui;4 

on   New  N'oik  IsUiiid   Willi  Clinton  .  21;; 

1)11  riis  K  in};stoii 3(10 

at  the  e.iplure  of  I'oit  Clinton 3s'S 

eapuiies  .Stony  i'oint )(i() 

Vangliaii,     l.ieiit.    Col.   (Am.),  pi  is.    al 

Canideli 5  1  S 

Vaughan,  l.ieut,  (Br.),  k.  at  Moiiiiioulh.  444 


\'ei4;e!iiics,   Charl.-s   Oravier,   f'ouni    dc 
(/•^.  Miiiishy],  h.  I  717,  it.  17^7. 
eoiniiieiiN  on  li.illle  111   ( ierinanlown  410 
leg. Mil.-,   Ilie    .\nieiii.iii    (  oii};iess   .1.^ 

loo  e.\irliiii; 53'J 

(.Mlatanlee^  .1   l<  Mil  lioiii   l|i>!l,ilid    ...    (123 
\eiL;iie,  ill-    l.i     .M  ,    upnn    ihe    .niioii    of 

(  llll;;ll■>^ 4iii) 

\eipl,iiiik\    roinl,    .liMiiiloiiid     by     .Sir 

I  li'lll)  (    lillloll 47/' 

\  II  lory  01  dralh,  \\  .iduiigli.ir.^  eoimtef- 

sii;ii,   111  1.   -Jslli.   177(1 2(ji3 

\'ini  eiiiir  .,    !  Iiidi.iii.ij   i.ipliiud    by    Col. 

(  Ink )()l 

n-i.iki  11  by    (ioM.    I  l.iinilloii  ol   I 'e- 
llnll 4(1! 

IV    l.ikill    bv  Cnl     (I. Ilk      l()5 

\  iniiHiiil,    r..i|irii.     ,.iiU    1. 11     ihi-      (hesa- 

piike  u  nil    lump, 5S4 

in    ill. live    III    .lit, Ilk     ii|'nn    ledoiibt 

al   N  nikiiiu  n (>3S 

V'iii^iiii.i,  I  iilri  .    li|'n|i  wai ^(i 

I  illinuii  .1!  (Jiiebei 1  J  I 

liiiops  .11    llarlem    llii^hc 22<) 

sends  troops  tn  Indiana  and  Illinois  411(1 

iiiililia  at   bailie  of  (  amileii 5l(j 

ennlinenlaN  at  I'.iil.iw  Springs ^71) 

e\rils  her  poweis  to  the   illmo.-^l.  .  .  .  5ij^ 
\'iiiN,    .\n-.parh     iei;l.    dislin^uisheil     al 

Newport 454 


WAli.\sii    Ri\iu,   Indiana,  lonlrollid   by 

(  l.iike's  boal^ 4(,() 

W.^ll-^^nlll^s  brii'.ide  ill  Spenri'r'->   divis- 

inii -.'21 

Wa^LJoiier,    ('apl.    l./w.i,    --kuinuhe^    at 

Cliadd's    I'oril 3(^1^ 

\\  akletk     is    to    liniiish    l''.nj;l.iiiil    with 

troops 172 

Walker,  (apt.  [.Ini.)  .u  bailie  ol  Spriiii;- 

(iclil,N.  J :.  51,1 

Wallace,   Sir  James,    convoys   Clinlon's 

army  up  the  I liidMin 35S 

is  captured  near  Savannah 177 

Walton,    ( lenrge,    (  oloiiel,    (.tin.),    Willi 

rillemin  at    'I'ybee    l>hiiiil 4^'^ 

W.illei>.  a^  to  'rreiiloii i!bl 

W.ii.  as  .1  f.u:t,  not  lo  be  ii;iioieil,  but  ii'l;- 

iil.ited '.  .  l.S 

an  extreme   resort 2u 

liow   induced 24 

offensive  and  dclciisive,  only  types  of 

action 25 

chissiliiation  of,  siniplilied 25 

national,    ilhistraled 2() 

for  coniiuest,  wroii(.; 27 

of  interveiilioii,  eoii-,idered 27 

to  luiniiliale  Sl.iles,  unsound 42 

when  liglilliil 28 

j^enerally  lads  of  ils  puiposo 28 

civil,  delincd  ,ind  illusl rated 2(> 

livil,   iiisiiriei  lion  defined 3'>-I 

civil,  rebellion  delincd 3I-2 

ci\  il,  revnlution  deliiied 32-4 

I'lovidciice  in,  illusi.ratcd JS"  9 


(lIRONOI.OGirAL    AND 


4',{. 


.    35« 

■  177 
h 

\      IH 
'Jo 

■  '^i 

A 

■  25 

.       2S 

.       2() 

.       27 

.       27 

,.      42 

.  .       28 

,  .       26 

■  ■       21) 

.    30-1 

.    31-2 

.    32-4 

•   35-9 


War,  il.-i  fiinil.uiii-iil.il  co.'.liii'iiis  slalid.  .     40 

iK'J^ill-.      HI    llil-   1  '.  /v-l |(| 

its   piiiiL-cul lull   a  ]ii:ilti-r    ol    soiiiiil 
pdlii  y .\ti 

t.luMlrc  iif )(] 

Ward,  AiU-MM,,  M.ij.   (iciil.,  //.   1727,1/. 
iHiw). 

llU   .llllci'i'il.iil-, (^,84 

ii|)|)i)liiii-i|    M.i],  ( iiul 81) 

lllUMlMIll    111    llJi  |Mi,|||ull (|  1 

SlMul,  II'ImIdIi  Clllflll^    111    lluilkl'l     I  I  ill      Ml 

'■iiici  1  I'll  I'pii    Willi  I  hi'  .11  111  V r  5  5 

W.niii;i,  .St  ih,  ( 'ill.,  /'.   171.),,/.    17S5. 

a  viiliiiilcTi  at   I'.iiiikrr  II  III 1  H) 

jniii-,  I'llliaii  Alli-ii iji) 

c.ipliiris  ( ■|iiivii  I'liini ijii 

viiil-,  ( 'iiii'.Nk'M  lur  .1  iiiiiiiiii^iiiiii .  .  .    iji  1 

j■p^Il^  .Si  Imi)  |rr\  ( iiiniii  iii<l I  _M 

cliMlf.l   l.inil.  I'lil.    ii\i|-    ,\llrll 1J7 

ilclcaU  ( ii'iK'r.il  I  ai  li'luii 1  ji) 

i^  ilislilii;ili-,liril  .u    I  liilili.irillMii .  .  .  .     (I'l 
t;iilli-(:K  111,  riiiiiiii.uiil  al  .\Iaiu:licil(.-r   ;)  12 

lipillU  In    (  ii'lll.  Sl.uk i  i2 

0llirirlll.il    l!rlllllll'..;tii|l ijj 

al    ImIIIoiiI    I' lrriiian\  I'.i;  111 337 

Wariiii,  ju^i'lih,  I  )r,  li.i.ii.ir  .iiiil   |iliil,ii|. 
ihiu|ii^l|,  /'.  1711,  ./.  I77> 

M.i   ..  (  'mil.  S.ilciy    1, 

hi,  ii|iiiiiiiii  iif  llii'  «  ai 1) 

ills  iiitliinur  al   Hunker  1  till ,  .      i,i) 

siTvcd  Willi  I'rcc.iil iMi 

/.'.  al  Itiiiikri   llill in. 

Washiiii^tijii,   Willi, nil,  (j)l.,  /'.    1752,  ,/. 
I'sio. 

Capl.iiii  ,ii  li.iiilc  111'  TiriilDii 272 

caplitiL'-.  iwi)  ^;iiii,  .11  ■rrciiiiiii 272 

'0.  at  ballli;  uf   I'tciiIhii 27  ( 

skiriiiiiliLM  Willi    I'.irltiiiii [iiij 

is  -.iirpri-.L-'l  at  .\Ii)iik\  (  'niiin |<yi 

ilclniys  a  loyali.st  (kl.iLliiiinil    ....    541 

willi  (  licciic  nil  ihr  I  )ail 5=52 

al  llu;  li.Ullr  111  I  iuiUiinl =;:;7 

at  till-  liaMl,-,if  lliilikiik  Kill 572 

at  llu-  li.illlc  I  if  lOutaw  Spniii;-,  ....  ^-^l 
<«.  anil  lakni //v'.v.  .It  I'iiitaw  Spiiiu;-,  511 

Washini^'luii,    I).  C,   a-    an    nliirclivL'    in 

w.ir  of  iSdi    •; 53 

\V'ashiiiL;l(in,    (ii:iiil;i',    (  icii.,    .uif'.    I'rcs. 
twicr  /'.  I7J2,  ,/.  171,.), 

ailtL'cciU'iil^  III' hi,  r.ii  !•    iih' Si 

appiiinluil    .\iiicrir.ui     ( 'umnianilcr- 

iii-(  !|iicf aij 

assumes  I' iinin.uiil  .it  I  !anilii  iil^r.  .  .  i/j 
rcporls    e  a-,u,illic-,    at    Ihinkri'    11  ill 

lIllltL') Ill 

SUluls      Aniul'l       1)11       r\|K'i||l  inn       111 

<J:iiiail,i I  JI 

his  ihi.'iuy  ul'  invasion  of  (Jaiuula.  .  .  125 
anticipali^s  llic  aclimi  of  Gt-n.  (,'arlc- 

toii     127 

urges  .Monli^iinii-rv'-,  man.li  In  .Mmi- 

Ircal    ... '. 127 

urges  Scliuylii  in  lii,r  iml  .i  inniiiriil  127 

writes  tn  Schiiyli-i  ,u  lo  pnv\i|<-i.  ...  127 
writes  to  Scluiyler  a-.  In  .MIiiT,  r,ip- 

lurc 12s 

anticipates     C.ulclnn's      retreat      In 

(juel)ec 132 


W 


Gi;M;kAi,   i.M)i;\.  yoj 

I'Vl.K 

.!  .hiiigloii,    i;oiiipliuii!iils    Wnn.ler    on 

w. living    r.iiik 1^3 

ui;;e,  .Moiitjioniery  am!  .Si  Imvler  iml 
""  le.igli.     .       . ■ I  (J 

willilmlil-,    cniiiiiii, lions    Imm    gi.-ii- 

"•^'^ 139 

wiile.  In  .Seliu)  li'r  n(   lii,lii.il,      ...  1  ii) 

ili-,i  1  ilie-,  ihe  eoiiililinn  of  the  .iiiiiy.  I  )■/ 

reliiikes  gamlililig  .mil  iiii|i-i  rmie,.  I  \) 

.illemU  lo  the  ln^i>lies  nf  \\  .a 1  pi 

icliiiki-.  leliginii-i  Idgolry  in  soliliei  ,  I  11 

est, ilili,,liei  new  Work,  about  lio-,liiii  142 
writes  ( iov.   rriiinlmll    .i-,   to   priv.i- 

!•■'■' >1^ 

re^,liiie-,  pliiiiilri   l.ikeii  I iiHi/eii.    l|{ 

nHnmini'inl .  .1  n.ivy  in  lir  Imili  ....  1  )  ( 

eall,   I  niincil   nl    .New  Imi  d.iiiil  ;;iiv- 

eiimri 1  I  5 

siiliiiiii,     a    plan     for    all. 11  k     upon 

l''o,iiiii IK 

ernimnii-'e,  llir  u,i;  nl  pnwiler I  || 

keeps  up  luiliiaiy  ,liow  wiih  li;w  men  1  jn 

his  lile.i  ol  iiiilil.iiy  lilsciplilie 1)7 

ileiiniiiues  eowanl,  and  cird  pl.iviii;;  I  (7 
wriles   ( 'oiigri'ss    thai    he    i,    nul    nl 

l"'"'''-i 1(7 

w.inls      powil<T     or     lie.    In     allaek 

""^'"" I  17 

w  I  lie.  Ill  Joseph  Ke-ed  ol  hi,  plans.  1.(7 
pin|inses       lo      atlaek      l<oieliester 

llelglil,  .  ,  . Hi 

le.uii,  lh.it  ('linlnii  pi. 111  ,  .111  expedi- 

imn 1  )i 

sends  I  ,ee  lo  .N<:w  V'ork 1  (S 

I  I  nil  ises  I.i'e's  condiu  l.  .  ,  ,    i  |i^ 

decides  lo  allaek    KimIoii j  ::;ij 

aels  nl  111,  iiw  11  will  .11   I  111  si  I  111 1  s  I 

sui  (  csslul,  when    .leliiiL;   ol    his   own 

Will 1  s  I 

liiiiiili.uds  llii, loll  lor  three  iiighls.  .    151 

oeeiipie,   I  Inn  lii',ler  lleighls Is2 

enters  Mnslnii  w  itli  hi,  .iriiiy 153 

regards  .New  V'ork  as  llowe',  olijce 

live  .  .    I  s5 

le.ive,  a  gari  1,1111  III  lln.inii   i^h 

innves  his  aiiiiy  lo  .New  Vnrk 15') 

siiperiiilends  ni.iieh  ol  the  .inny  ...  is'i 
at  New  N'nik,  .\piil  In  jiily,  i77'i..  is'i 
sends  siipplie,  and  I  iiiii|i ,  lo  1  aii.id.i  157 
lehuke,    .  ildieis    lor    n.idiliiig    llieir 

own  wrong s 1^7 

puts  I'utn.iin   III   1  ninin.iiid   .it    .New 

York 15* 

inits  (iii'ene  in  I  niiini  iiid  al  I'lrnnklyii  15S 
writes   Seliuyler,    .May,    177(1,   .is   In 

luliire  pl.uis lyS 

expected  a  lilomly  siiininer I5.S 

wriles    to  ('uiigiess   liieln,iiig   letter 

ol  .Siillivai) 151J 

li.i,    interview    with    Howe's    Adjt. 

( leii    11^4 

deseiilies    In    Schuyler    the     peace 

coniinission li>4 

denonnees  gossip  mongers lij5 

sends  nioie  iionp,  lo  ( .'amliri  Ige.  .  .  lij5 
opposes    the    ev.ieu.ilinii    nl    Crnwn 

I'oiiit li/l 

writes  to  (inv.  ■rrumlnill,  .\ug.,  177O   |i)7 


■liim 


i:i. 


Mi 


708 


CHRONOLOGICAL    ANO    CKNEKAL    INDICX. 


\VashiMt;t(in,  places  Sullivan  at   Ilrook- 

lyii,   :-t,i-  virc'ciK',  mcU 203 

in^l^m■li()lls  t>>  I'utiiam 2<>.( 

rtliukc^  skulkers 204 

reports    lo    Coi)(;ress     the     Hritish 

iiiDVeinents 2iH 

crosses     to     liruuklyii    ;i(ter    b.illle 

begins 212 

his  lelenlicin  of  lirooklyn  is  dilili- 

erale .' 212    Id 

at  llroiiklyn  after  tlie  Katlle 21.} 

lii^   polity  is   to   postpone  ami  gain 

time 2ifi 

plans  retreat  fr.mi  Mrooklyn 21(1 

his  self  possession  iliirinij  retreat.  .  .  2lS 

recji|;aiii/e^  his  divisions 220 

(leiniuiices  rolihin^;  oreli.irds 220 

urjjes  a  regular  army  estalili-.limeiit.  221 

ailvi-.cs  three  daily  loll  ealN 221 

thinks  it  time  lo  punish  deserters  .  .  221 

affirms  a  deler,,ive  |ioliiy 222 

prepares  to  abandon  New  \"oik.  . ,  .  222 

writes  to  Coin;res^  as  to  New  N'ork .  222 

hi^  army  fad  in;;  away 2.'2 

calls  a  coniK  il  of  war 224 

lietjins  to  remove  publie  stores 224 

head'HiartiTs  changed    from   Robert 

Murray's  to  Ko^er  Morris" 22^ 

reports  a  iianie  on  New  N'oik  1-land  22'i 

hispersoiial  exposure,  to  stop  a  (laiiic  22<) 

rf|)orts  his  position  at  Harlem  ....  22(1 
reports     a     skirmish     at     Harlem 

HeiL;hts 22i) 

deride-  home-sickiie-.s 2il 

censures  confliets  in  aiilhoriiy 231 

•s  to  discipline  at  Harlem  Heii;hts.  231 
will    iii'-iiect    alarm    posts,  Oct.   II, 

'77f> 2.v1 

offers  a  reward  for  captured  lior-es.  23(1 
shows    the    weiknc'-s    of    Hessian 

cavalry 23C1 

his  liead(|iiarlers  at  Valentine'.s  Hill  23'i 
by  interior  line,  ^ain^  White  Plains  23(1 
calls  a  council  of  war  before  march- 
ing      2.17 

his  position  at  White  I'lains 238 

writes  (iov.  'I'rumbull  for  tlom'  ....   238 
retires  to  North.  Ca>tlc  Hcit;hls.  .  .     241 
advises  Congress  of  Howe's  move- 
ments     242 

states  to  Ciov.  Livingston  his  anxiety 

for  New  Jersey 243 

writes    to   (Ireeiie,  in    doubt    as    to 

I'ort  Wa^hin^to^ .  .    243 

gives  (iiveiie  direction^  as  to  Mount 

Wa-hiiigton 243 

his  elaborate  orders  in  logistics  to 

Lee 245 

instructions  to  Lee,  when  to  follow 

him   245 

ia  al)Out  to  enter  New  Jersey 245 

to  (iov.    Livitigston,  a>   to   uncfiual 

bounties      246 

to    >Llllin,   as    to    care    of    ])ublic 

property 246 

to  Knox,  that  Lee  will  follow  .....   246 
to  Commis-,ary  Cliecvers,  that   Lee 
will  follow 246 


Washington,  as  to  superfluous  liaggage.  .  246 

assign^  1  Ic.itli  to  the  1  lij^hl.iiid-.  .  .  .  247 

to  Congress,  as  to  l"'ort  Washington  247 

ariives  at  I'ort  I.ee 247 

reports  his  arrnal  at  l''oit  Lee i.\i) 

proposes  to  witlidr.iw  the  garrison  .  25(1 

reports  ea|ilure  lit  I'oit  lie 25 

reports  capture  of  fort  Washington  25^ 

letter  to  his  brollur 252 

his  views  considenil 253 

marches  from  I'ort  Lee  to  I'riiuelon  256 

secures  all  boats  on  the  Helaw.ire,  ,  257 
rcjiorls  his  march  through  New  Ji'r- 

MV   257 

is  at   Treiilon,  1  Ke.  3d,  1776 257 

iiii.ilile  to   liiid  I.ee 257 

orders     Schuyler     to     send     certain 

troops 257 

is  In  hind  the  1  'el.iware 257 

orders  I.ee  to  join  him. 250 

sends  re|nate(i  letters  to  l.ce  that  he 

needs  him 260 

miflly  iioliics  Lee's  lapture 2(13 

n.-ieives  enlarijed  aulhoniy 263 

writes  to  (iovr.   riuniiuill,  1  )ec.  14th, 

177b 2f)5 

writes    to    C'lenl.   dates,    |)ec.    14th, 

1:7b '(>S 

sends  Arnold  to  Khode  Island,  I>ec. 

17"'! 265 

writt  .  to  Heath,  Dec.  14th,  177b.  ,  .  265 
writes  (Congress  Hec.  2uih,  assuming 

ie--pon-iliilities     266 

orders  three    batlali'ins    of  arlillerv 

raised '.  266 

orders    the     Ticoiideroga    regis,     to 

.Morristown 266 

unfiilils  to    Reed    his   plan    against 

Trenton 267 

his  characteristic  reticence 268 

entitled  to  credit  for  attack  on  Tren- 
ton    268 

is  compelled  to  take  the  nlleiisive.  .  2(h) 
treatment  <if  jirisoners   settled  upon 

Dec.  177b 26() 

plan   of  attack  of   //.  jio.t    Hec.  2b, 

177b 271 

fights  the  battle  of  Trenlon 271-5 

substitutes  the  bayonet  for  powder.  272 

retires  lo  NewliuMi,  Dec.  27th,  177(1.  275 
writes  lo  .M.ixuell  ibat  he  will  ag.iin 

invade  New  Jersey 276 

writes  lo  Heath   to  drive  the   enemy  277 
his  interview  with  Maj.  Wilkinson, 

(Note) 277 

his  view  of  his  enlarged  powers.  .  .  .  283 
army  reinforced  by  Mercer  and  <'ad- 

wall.-ider 284 

again  at    Trenton,  Jan    ^st,  1777...  284 

fills  behind  the  .\s-anpiiik 285 

improves  his  opportunity 286 

intends  to  strike  liiiiiiswick 287 

employed  a  ruse   while  abandoning 

camp 287 

nolihe^  I'utnaui  of  his  plans 2S7 

takes  a  bold  ollensive 287 

his  personal  exposure  at  I'rinceton.  2.SS 

burns  bridge  and  moves  to  Tluckeniiii  2ijij 


ClIRONOI.OfilCAL  AND   GKNKRAI,   IN'DKX. 


709 


277 
2S3 

284 
284 
285 
286 
287 


WaRhinjjton,  needs  mounted  troniT;. . . .  290 
makfs  his  hi-ndquartcrs  at  Morris 

town 2<ji 

gives  inslriictiiins  lo  Heatli  and  I'ul- 

n.im 2')i 

his  report  after  I'riiKeldti 2(;i 

orders  triiii|)-  finiii  I'eek^kill 2(jl 

reiirove-.  IlcUh    for   coiidiicl    liefore 

Kort  Iiidependeiuc 2(j2 

issues  counter-proclamation  totlenl. 

Howe's 2<;2 

controls  fjriMter  part  of  Ni  w  Jersey.  29J 
instructs  Scliiiyler  to  use  New  I'^n^;- 

laiiil  troops 294 

sends  Knox  to  recruit  artillerymen.  2i(4 

repress(  s  ])hmd<  rinij  hy  nulitia.  .  .  .  2i)S 

]irotcsIs  a^;ainst  //.  nuirai;es 2c)5 

writes     Morns    liis     opiMioii    a>    to 

Howe's  plans 21)1; 

reliiikes  Sullivan 2()5 

makes    an    c-tiinate   <jI    the   liriiisli 

forces 2()7 

his    army    jjivcn    l)y   divi>ions    and 

lirit^adi-s    2()7 

writes  Schuyler   a^  to   ricnndero(;a.  2<j7 

his  new  theiiry  of  l!ii\w's  pl.ins,  .  .  .  21)7 

strcnLjthens  Middlcljii'nk 207 

remove-,  to  MiddlelirooU 298 

will  not  risk  his  army  to  save  I'hila- 

delphia   208 

orders  a  division  from  Pcekskill.  .  .  .  29S 

oriicrs  pursuit  of  Ilowe   3(X) 

marches  lu  ()ud)liletown y.x) 

foils  the  plans  i>f   I  [owe 301 

regains   M  iddk  l.rook 301 

learns  of  l!urL;oyne  .s  niovi  nients.  .  .  302 
issues     a     cdunler-proclamation    to 

iiurL,Myiu's 306 

writes   letter  lo  's   and   receive:; 

sli.irp  leply 310 

has  coiiliileiice  in  Schuyler 318 

writes  Si  liiiylerjoreshadowinjj;  Hen- 

nini^ldii 2i(j 

writes  Schuyler, foreshadowint;  ( )ris- 

kany 325 

writes  ScIuiyl.T  as  to   relief  of   h'ort 

Schuyler 325 

his  forecast  .is    to  Fort   Schiivlcr.  .  325 
is   ijjnored   by  Ciates    in  oftlcial   re- 

r""s 335 

sends  troops  to  Alliany 344 

sends  comniissicm  >,{  Maj.  tienl.  to 

Arnold,  vvith  comnieiils,  (Note)..  354 
understands    intercepted    letters  of 

Howe 362 

is   disconcerted    hy    Howe's    move- 
ments    365 

manlies  ihrmigh  I'I'iladelphia. .  .    .  365 

reaches  N\  ilmiii^;lon 365 

deceived  liy  had  reoniioissaiice.  .  .  .  370 

his  puiposo  to  cros-,  the  Hrandywine  371 
countermands    movement    over    the 

lirandywine 372 

mild  letter  to  .Sullivan    379 

sends     whole    ri(;ht    wing    to    meet 

Howe 376 

writes  to  Sullivan  as  to  his  conduct.  379 

moves  to  battle  with  the  reserve.  .  . .  380 


Washington, covers  the  retreat  at  Hrandy. 

wine 3S0 

relre.its   lo  Chester   and   reports    lo 

Congress 3S0 

marches  lo  I'hiladelphia   3S2 

halls  at  (iirnianiown  one  d.iy 382 

orders  I'utiKiin  to  send  him  troops.  382 
stieni^theiis   defenses    of   the    Hela- 

ware 38 2 

sends  sur;^eons  to  Howe 3S2 

crosses    at   Swede's    I'did,    inviting; 

battle 3S3 

recrosses   the  Schuylkdl  and  camps 

on   the    I'erkioniy 3SS 

moves  to  Vell<jw  .Springs  and  .Nor- 
wich     3S3 

a^.iin  orders  I'utnam  to  send  troops,  3H4 
applies  to  dates  for  Morj^an's  coip^.   384 

liii  powers  a^;ain  i'nhnijed 3S4 

inarches     lo   (iennanloun     bv   lour 

routes 387 

accompanies  Sullivan's  divisiiui ...  .  387 
his  pl.m  of  battle  of  ( ieiin.iiilovvii.  .  3,S7 
retires  in   f;ood  order  from  (iirmaii- 

town 390 

his  habian  policy  sneered  at 393 

coiiipliiiients     defenders      of     Fort 

.M  illliii 396 

sends  ('ol.    Haiiullon   to   (iates    for 

tioop'^  •••. 307 

his  re|iori  nf  skirmish  ,it  lid^e  Hill.    31J7 

c<implaiiis  of  .Mini in 398-9 

pleads  for  the  army 399 

at  \'alley  I'cn'jje 31)9 

sends  out  skirmishing^  p.irties 402 

aiitliori/eil  to  call  out  3,cm)0  iiiilili.i.    403 

awaits  action  of  linlisli  army 404 

is  visited  by  a  cominitte  of  ( 'on^jress  403 
celebrates    ihe    French    alliance    at 

N'alley  Forj^e 404 

his  conlidenee  in  I, a  h'ayettc 405 

observes   the   o]ieratioiis   at    I'.arien 

Hill 407 

notices  .Millhii's  arrival,  sliarply  .  .  .  408 
calls   a  council  of  war  a^:  to  future 

plans 408 

under-estimates  Hritisli  forces 408 

learns    of   pioposi'd    evacuation    of 

I'hiladelpliia 408 

receives  letters  from  Fee 410 

answers  Fee's  letter  shirply 411 

pursues  (.'liiiton  into  New  Jersey.  .  .  414 
intrusts    pursuit    of  Clinton    to    Fa 

Fayette 414 

his  arniv  near  Fni;lislitown 415 

under  obbj^alioiis  to  pur-.ue  Clinton  417 
his  instructions  at  .MoninoutI;  .  .  .  .422-4 
instructs  Fee  to  carry  out   Fa  Fay- 
ette's plan 424 

instructs  Fee  to  consult  oiti  .ers  and 

form  his  plan  of  battle   423 

restores  order  at  Monmouth 439-40 

his  altercation  »  ith  Fee 44'>-I 

profanity  at  AFmmouth,  not  in  the 

testimony 441 

maiehes  to  White  Plains 446 

makes    Newport    Ids    objjctive    of 

operations 448 


7IO 


CIIRONOLOOICAL   AND   (IIINI'.UAI,   INDKX. 


Wasliinniiiii,  assij^iis  Vaiiiitni  ^t\il  (  'iIomt 

lol.a  l''aviiti''s  (In  iiinii    |^^ 

t'.iicrS  Sullivan  In  tall  upon  militia  .(.p 
sciiils   (Inriu;   ami    I. a    I'ayciic   in 

Nl'Wpnll    )  (S 

Js  ailvi^ii!  of  l.unl    lli)\vi''s  cvinili 

tidii  tci  Nfwpini 4.|i) 

flflvisfs  rolriMi  t'lnm  .Ni\\|iiiit \n 

Jii)|(niiily    iicilhi'^    his    icoiiii|ialinii 

ol  Wliili'  l'laiii> )" 

rcniovi's    lua<l<|iiaiU'is    to    I'islikiil 

ami   l''rc(lc'iii  k-.liiir^ i;; 

distrlliiiirs     tliL'    army    fur    wijiUr 

<|iiaiiiT> 457 

rciiMivcs    lK'aili|ii,uli'is    111     Middlu- 

briMiU 45S 

lanu'iiis    tlic    cliMTM'    initii'sis    of 

si'i'linns 4(11 

draw-,  a  fi-aifiil  |)it.  c  of  llic  tinu's.4(il  -l' 
dcsLjilif    tlio  |iaramciiiiit  claims  of 

c'ontcrl,  dipi'iror  siqiprr |(i." 

proposes  to  piiuiili  Indian  di'pri'd.i- 

lions \ii  \ 

unaMe  to  ai<l  llio  Soulli 41  5 

rt'iiiovos      liead(|iiartiTS      to      Nru 

Windsor (d; 

orjjaiiizcs    an    atlaik    upon     Slony 

I'oint 172 

orders  N.  ('.  ,111(1   \',i.  troops  lo  ilic 

south   4^  I 

his  luaihpiartvMs  at  M()rri-.U)\vn  .  .  .  4.^1 
his    ri'(|nisili(iii    upon    New    Ktscv 

tilled ." ■    4SS 

criticises  thirteen  stale  ^oveiei^nties  4S() 
his  wrilteii  opinion  of  Sihuyler.  .  .  .  4()() 
explains  iniilinous  eonduet  of  Iroojis  41)1 
complains  of  iMiusii(e  In  I'rauce.  .  .  4')2 
doulils  a  p  issilile  (lel(  11^1'  (if  (  liarles- 

ton 4'H 

is  Jiosled  on  tile  Slioil    liilU 4(>i) 

isenijiarnissed  liy  ririli--li  movements  500 

apiieals  to  Stales  to  fill  CjUda 502 

makes     New     \'i.rk      (ilijettivc     of 

eampaiL;n 503 

in  consultation  with  kochamla"  s<i4 

takes  jiosilion  at  I'lakeness  ,  .  ) 

coiilides  lo   Schuyler  the   tr 

in  Vermont 524 

sends  three  ret^inieiils  '  .  .    524 

com|.ares     rolliiiL;    si  \>\g 

siKiw-lialls 524 

confers  witli  l\oelianil)e.iu  .  .    525 

writes   I  )r,    I'lanklin   the   condition 

of  affairs 525 

establishes  winter(piarters  for  17SU-1  527 
Ills  liead(|uarters  at  New  Windsor  .  527 
keeps  aloof  from  army  durint;  mutiny  538 
would    tonj;ratiilate    liieeiie     if    he 

cr;;Ii!  lulp  him 548 

writ  s  to  l.a  I'ayette 5S5 

ni'.eis  Kochamlieau  at  Newpi  it.  .  .  .    5S5 

sends  La  Kayette  ader  ArniMl 5S5 

does    nol    iudge    measures   liy   afler 

events 5S6 

gives    j;lo(iniy     ilistraci     of     pulilic 

atTaiis 5S7 

thinks  there  arc  too  many  chimney 
corner  patriots 587 


Washington,  urpes  Schuyler  to  lieconic 

.Secretary  ol  war 5.S8 

.ipproves      la      I'ayettc's     comlucl 

toward  Arnold 596 

coidiis  Willi  koi  h.imlie.ui  at  Wctli- 

eisheld 60J 

niodilK  s  Ills  plan  of  c.imp,iii.;n (114 

advises  I„\  layelle  ol  his  plan '114 

l.iki  s  the  oll(lisi\i- (il  7 

ai;ain  at  Welllel^^u■ld .   dlS 

h.is    a    tUd-lnld    plan   a);.iinst    New 

\oik (118 

at  \alenl ine's  II ill t)2o 

lecoiinoilres    .New    \'oik    Island    in 

fori  (• (>20 

rcciiMnnitres  New   jersey fi2o 

niniiilicil   liy  his  po^ilinn  before  the 

umld (i2l 

liu  lalsc  ami  his  real  plan 621 

summons  aid  as  against  New  N'oik.  '122 
with  Koihambe.iii  at  W  ist  Point  .  .  (j22 
enlel^  I'hilailelphia  with  his  army.  .  (>2] 
le..Mis  ol  ihe  aniv.il  of  1  >e  lirassc..    I>2.\ 

phKCe.ls  lo  Head  of  I''.|k (124 

visits  Haiti  UK  lie (130 

at  .MdUiit  \  eriion    ();Vi 

jiiius  I, a  I'ayette  at  Willianishurt;. .   fi.io 

i  isils  (  ount  De  tirasse (135 

his  plans  in  d.iiij^er '135 

p(  rsuades  I  )e  (irasso  lo  remain.  .  .  .  (135 
riporls  the  lirsl  p.irallel  opened.  .  .  .  631) 
pKiposes  condilions  lo  C'oriiwallis.  .  (141 
si^'iis  capiiulalion  of  V'orklown  ....   (.■41 

cont;ralulales  the  allies (144 

exeliaiiijes  courtesies  with  Detlrassc  645 
his  |i|ans  for  southern  operations  fail  (145 

his  criticisms  of  oflicials (152 

his  Control  of  interior  lines ()s4 

orders  a  cessation  of  hostilities  ....  (158 
comniit',     Ameiiia     to     ( iod      and 

posterity   658 

Watercomnuinii  atinii  with  Albany  cut  off  193 
Waterloo,  liallle  of.  inodilied  by  rain..  .  3<j 
Watson,    Col.    {/>/:)   divi  ried    from    his 

march  to  Caiiiilcii 561) 

joins  1  .Old  Raw  iloii 574 

Watson,  .\braliani,  Mas-,  (dm.  Safety.  .       9 
Wayne,  .Anthony,  .Maj.  (ien.,  />.  at  I'aoli, 
renn.,  1745,  </.  I  7()'i. 
sent  from  Hosloii  to  IS'ew  \'ork.  ...    157 

as  Colonel  in  Canada l(>() 

in  battle  at    Three  Rivers ibO 

t^.d.'aiit  111  battle  at  Three  Rivers  .  .    167 

]ir(inioted  lirij^.  ( len   2()0 

attacks  Hessian  rear  tjuard  in  iS'.J.  3(X) 
on  Court  ol  Ini|iiiry  as  to  Schuyler  .   312 

at  battle  of  lirandywine 3(17 

makes  viout  defense  at  C!hadd's  l''ord  jSo 
is  attacked  near  Paoli  (his  birthplace)  383 

at  battle  of  I  lerinantown 387 

coiviinaiid-.  left  centre 388 

is  tired  upon  by  Steven's  division  .  .   381J 

his  ciiiiduct  in  the  action 3()iJ 

opposes  W  ashinj^ton 3(j3 

advises  to  attack  I'hiladelphia 404 

joins  La  I'ayette  in  pursuit  of  Clinton   414 
lieard  Washington's  instructions  lo 
Lcc 423 


CllKO.\()i,(»(;ic.\i.   AMI    (,i;m;uai,    l\ni;\. 


1 1 


PAna 

liccoiiie 
S!i» 

tniuliict 

S<)f) 

a   Well, 

6<)j 

;;" 'pi4 

an (>I4 

<'I7 

.  MS 

ist    \r\s 

()I8 

()20 

land   ill 

f)30 

(i2u 

fore  the 

(.:.M 

. .  . (..M 

V  \  oik.  ()22 
'"lint  .  ,  622 
army.  .  (l2^ 
las.sc.  .   (>2.( 

''-M 

(130 

())() 

'l)iir{;. .  630 
''35 

Ms 

in (,15 

rii.  .  .  .    ()((, 

■allis.  .    ()}i 

11 (4 1 

'144 

(Iras.sf  645 

)ns  fail  645 

(iS2 

f'?l 

s (j^S 

and 

(15S 

ClUllIf  KjJ 

dii...  3() 
II    his 

5<'9 

574 

'ilv..  n 
ra.,li, 

i....  157 

166 

166 

Ts  .  .  167 
....  296 
S.  ] .  icjo 
y\ci- .  312 
....  3f,7 
■■'ord  3H1) 
lace)  383 
....  3«7 
....  3SS 
>ii  .  .  389 
.  .  . .   3()() 

398 

404 

titon  414 

s  to 

.  ...   423 


Wayne,  h'slitir-  on  irml  i,|  ( icii.  l.ce  .  ..\:,\  H 

m|;is   till;  ollciisivo  niovcinunt |_'.| 

ill  ihc  holli'^l   (iylil  ill    .Moiniioulli    .    \y, 
|)oslcd  iiiMi   I )iiMdc'il)L'r^  nioiml.iin.   4(17 

si  1)1  Ills  Ml  my  I'oiiit 173 

uii.ililc    1(1   Mippa'ss    niuliiiy    in    llic 

army 537 

joins  I. a  I'.iyi'Me  in  Vii(;iiii.i 003 

(  ons|ii(uoiis  ill  i)alllc  ol    l.inu'sldun 

l''oid , '. (loS 

sent  local  (ilT  niicii  ol  ( 'uriiualli^.   (ill 

joins  (irciiic  ill   ihc  soiilli O45 

is  rciiuinlxK'd ('?? 

Wolili,  Cnl.  (./w.i,  :il  iialtlc  ul   'I'linton  .;;.; 
WcbsUr,    i.iiiil.   Cdl.  (/Jr.    (liiaidsl,   ,il 

Stony  I'l'int 4ii() 

surpri-.is(  111.  Washington  al  Monk's 

l^iriii  1 ,i)fi 

at  llii   liaillc  o!  (  amdeil ',1(1 

|uiisiics   Morgan 5m 

at  liattlc  III  ( luilford    550 

,v.  nion.iily  .It  (iiiillord s''.i 

WeliNlcr,  D.viiirl,  (stiitc^in.iii  and  oi.iloil, 
/'■  17S2,  (/.  1852. 

in,  (i|iiiiioii  (d  .'^ihiiylcr , 311) 

Wccd.iii,  i'oi.  (./w.)  at  riarliiii  Iltit;IUs.    22._) 

IHciMinlfd  IJrig.  (icnl 2oO 

III   reserve  at  lir.imhAviiie .(''7-7" 

in  Viiijinia  in  17S1 5311 

.It  (iloneester. 030 

Welliii^toii  (Arlliiir  Welicdcv)  Diikc, 
siti.  I'ield  Mardi.il.  />'r.  Co.ii- 
inaiuler-in-chief /'.  17(11),,/.  i.Svi. 

invarialily  iiii|irovcd  siieics-, -!■ 

Wcinyss,  Maj.  (lenl.  (AV.),  I.iiled  a^'ain,! 

Slimier  at  I'i^li  I  lain  I'oicl vji 

Weniys,  ('apt.  (/>'''.),  willi  (Jiieen's  k.iiiL;- 

ers   at  Cli.idd's  l''oi'd 3(111 

Werner,  l.ieiit.  (//.),  iii.ide  pi, 111  of  lialtle 

of  I'rMiih  wine 370 

Wesley,  lohii,  (eminent  divine),  ^.  1 703 
'/.  I7i;i- 

as  10  I  lie  uar ^~~} 

Wesson^,  I 'oloiiel,   hi,  reL;iiiieiu    in    part 

al    {''oi  I  Seliiiyler 324 

al  I'leeman's  {''arm 331 

at  liallle  c.r  M.inmoiilh (3; 

West,   Col.    (.////,!,    al     Newport,     kinMle 

Island 451 

W'e^l   roini,  its  slrateL;ic  relations (0 

loililied   l>y     MeDeMiijall    ami     K  — 

eiusko 40', 

entrusted  to  Arnold 505 

enlnisled   loCnene ;o(i 

visited  liy  I\oeliaml)eau Ojj 

Weslliam,  destroyed  by  I'ol.  Isimeoe.  .  .  .    ;  |i| 

We^lover,  the  retreat  of  Simcoe    ooj 

Wet/ell's  Mills,  scene  of  a  skuiiiisli 555 

Welherslicld,   (Jonii.,   the   pl.iee   of   con- 
ference with  Kochamlieaii .  .  .  .    603-iS 
Wheatoii,  Henry,  (jurist),  6.  17^5,,/.  184S, 

makes  all  cili/eiis  helligercnts  in  war     25 
^Vhipplc,    Willi, im,     iirif,'.     C'lenl.,    i<>ins 

dales 337 

unites  in  ihe   j^roiesl   .ii;ainst    l)'l!s. 

laini; 45;, 

Wii,)ple,  Coiiiiiiodore,  (.hii.),  eoniniands 

lleet    al  <  harli'ston 495 


(•A'iK 

Whitcomlie,    .\s. I,  ('ill.,  his  leyt,  in   part 

at  Hunker   Hill km) 

Wliili'  I'l.iin^,  iMllle  loiiL;hi  al  Ch.ilteiliin 

lldl 241 

While,  M,ij,,(  /«/.),  lialtloofCimniaiilown  3S(j 
Wliiteslioriiii-h,    N.  \.    iie.ir  hattle-lield 

of  ( (riskaiiy 32  } 

Wiikain,  [deiil.  (.///;.),  k.  at  S.iv.i.ui.di .   4.'*2 
Wilkinson,  James,  .\l.ij.  (lenl.  /»,   1757,  </. 
I  s  2 1 . 

M.ij  ,  with  I.ec  .It  his  ciptiin 2^i\ 

a  vihinteer  at  'I'lentoii      2;|; 

ha-     interview     ullh      W.iNliin;.;lnn, 

(Nole) ."  .  .  .    277 

lii^  slaleiiii-iil  .  a>  lo  .\iiiold 3.(2 

like  a  liiiv  .idvriiiiM'er  with  (i.ile,,..    '^  ( 
a^  lo  .\riiold  .11  Iteinis  llei^jhls..    34,S  9 

pi.'inoied  liri|.;.  (ieni ...    31)-' 

Willelt,  Marimis,  Col../..  17.14, ,/.  182(1. 

oidcied    111   I'oil    Srhuvier Vi\ 

rca.'hcs  the  pn'-t .  .  .  .  ' y,-,^ 

iiK'kcs   a  s.diy 524 

ojierates  ai^ainvl  llie  (  )i:ondaj;:is.     .  .   .(03 
Willclt,  Capt.'(/y/-,  ),  ,11    fort   •rnniil.nll 

Conn (i2(i 

Williams,  J.ime.,  (  ol.  1   ;«/.).  /,■,  at  Rmn's 

Mountaii ^20 

Wdliains,  .Maj.  (/.'/•)  /■.  at   Hunker   Hill  .    1  in 
Willi.ini>,  Willi  on,  Ciini,    Siifel  v,  S.  C  ,  .    171) 
Willi, nil,,   (  nhn    II,,   M,i|.  Col.  \.;w.), /'. 
174S  (/.  17.14. 

at  fort  Wa^liiii!.;!.!!!   2)S 

•IK  al  I'ort  Wiisliim;loii 250 

Adj.    ( len.    of   (.en.  Ciiiles  at  t.'iiin- 

den 

al  battle  of  (!auiden 

makes  reporl  of  the  biiille     ,  . 

ilel.icheil  wilh  li.L;hl  1  r. .ops c^2 

at  Iiallle  of  (  hiilford 5^7 

,il  liallle  ol  llobkirk's  Hill 572 

.it  .-aeij.e  ill  .\u.i;u-t.i :;74 

at  biitlle  of  I'.iil.iw  Spiiie.'s 571) 

Willi, iins,    ii   siiiidl    post,  ilirciiteiied    li\' 

.Moil;  ni 5.(1 

Williiliiw.  .\liij.  (/.'.•■,  l'oot\  t;iken/.rM-.  al 

llemi';  I  (eights  . 547 

Willi, iin-on,     jiimes,    llrii;.    I  lei  .    (./«/.  I 

sriil  lo  ,\iiL;usla     464 

Williiimsoii's       riiiiilaliou,      sc  II.'       of 

skinni'-h :ii7 

Willis,  Capl.  (/!)■.]  -,i'.  ill   li.iiile  of  Mou- 

inoiilh \.\  I 

Willis,     Maj..    of    Conn.,    .it     liiillle     of 

Jamestown doS 

Wilmoiiskv,   Ciipi.   (//.)  l\   ,it    biUlle   of 

(iiiilliiiil |;(i  I 

Wini.slioioii^li,     Headipiar-,    of     ('oin- 

w.dlis 521 

Winli.ich's  net.  (//.)  heloiv  fort  .Mercer  3()| 

Winter  at  X'.illey  Kor^e, .///;.  army .p.| 

I'hiliidelphia,  yi'/'.  army 41.1 

.M..rrisU)wn,  .tin.  arm 4'-(i 

.New  \a\-k,  Ih:  army 4S.S 

Wise,  Maj.  i.l//i.)  ,..  al  Savannah (Ha 

Wolcott'.s  lirij;ade  joins  Cates 337 

Woodliridyi-,  Henj.  K.,  Col,,  his  regt.   in 

pan  at    Hunker  Hill lofj 

Woodhridije    N.  J.,  a  „ub-po-,t  in  1776.  .    a^a 


•  5 '4 

•  SI5 


hHi 


Ifi 


ri2 


CIlkoNOLOGICAL    AND    GENERAL    IM)i:X. 


ft'oodford,  William,  Urig.  Gen.,  promoted 

at  Valkty  l'\jr).;o  (^ce  Map)   

at  batllf  ot  Monmoulii 

reinforces  Charieston 

iVoodford,  l.ieiit.  Col. .detached  by  Gales 
Woodlnill,  Natlianiel,   I'wii,'.  (ieii.,  taken 

/;■/>.  Lout;  Island 

VViiolsey,  Theotlore  I)\vi;;lit,  Rev.  Dr., 
l')x.  I'res.  v'ale  College.  Linguist 
and  writer  upon  Inleriialioiuil 
law,  /'.  iSoi. 

defines  a  just  war 

his  encouragement  recognized 

Wooster,   Daniel,  Maj.  Gin.,  iJ,   1711,  ,/. 

1777. 

his  antecedent.s 

joins  Montgomery  at  St.  Joim's  . .  . 

.irrivos  at  Quebec 

his  patriotism  consjiicuous 

takes  a  subordinate  command 

i.-.  recalled  from  (  inada 

demand.s  surrender  of  Quebec 

before  Fort  Independence 

resigns  liis  commission 

is  nvutally  wounded 

Wright,    Royal    Gov.    N.    ('.,    calls    lor 

troops 

WykofT,  a  guide,  at  battle  of  Monmouth. 


296 

444 
495 
511 

211 


'-•4 


S4 

I2() 

133 
133 

159 
162 

2()2 
29(1 


178 

439 


Wyllis,  Col.  (Ww.)  at  Bedford  Pass,  L.  I.  205 
Wyngand,  Lieut.  (/Jr.)  w.  at  battle  of 

Guilf(M-d 503 

Wyoming  Mass.icre  (noticed) 459 

Wythe,  (jcorge,  \  a.,  supports  Col.  Clark 

at  the  west 461 

Y. 

V.\I,K    College    students,    under    Capt. 

James  llillliou>e,  at  New  Haven.  469 
\'oung's  House  captured,  with  garrison, 

'by// ■ 480 

N'"ike,    Lieut.    Col.    {Br.)    comniaiided 

brigade  at  battle  of  Jamestjwn.  .   60S 
N'        own,  surrendered  to  allied  arir.y.  .   641 

conditions  of  c.ijjilulation 641 

strength  of  garrison  surrendered.  . .   043 
^'ear.  Anno  Domini,  187(1,  July  4tli,  cele- 
brated by  all  civilized  nations.  . .  ,658 

z. 

Zones  of  operations,  defined 56 

during  the  war,  1775-178 1 56 

during  the  w.ir,  1861-1865 57 

their  mutual  dependence 57 


Nt)TL 


Ri  ii.iJjcK,  John,  was  noininatfid,  but  not  .oniirmed,  by  the  United  States  Senate, 
a    Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court, 


III  Miiiioriiii/i. 

Ciip:snf.v,   Ciiari.Ks   C.  (Br.1,    Roy.d    Lii^niieers,   deceased    after    the    Hiograpbical 
Table  went  to  press       His  repiU.itio"  desrrves  permanent  honor. 


rAot 

iss,  L.  I.  205 
attle  of 

5«-'.i 

459 

)1.  Clark 
461 


r    Capl. 

Havuii.  469 
;arrisuii, 

480 

iiianded 

blawn.  .  608 

anr.y.  .  641 

641 

Icrcd.  .  .  O43 
nil,  cele- 
tions.  . .  ,658 

56 

5'' 

57 

57 


talcs  Senate, 


BiograptiicaJ 


